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AGENT OF
SOCIAL
CHANGE**

Claude Heller, *Editor*

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The Military as an Agent of Social Change

Editor

Claude Heller

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Introductory Note

In organizing the XXX Congress of Human Sciences in Asia and North Africa, the planning committee approved the organization of a seminar entitled "The Army as an Agent of Social Change," which we were kindly asked to chair. The topic turned out to be a challenging one, because of its complexity and its importance for more than one region of the world. Moreover, it includes a variety of aspects which would be difficult to study and understand in an isolated fashion.

It could well be argued that the title chosen was not the most felicitous one, given that, in a good number of cases, the military has constituted an obstacle to social change. Nevertheless, we think that a concrete study of what consequences the actions of such an important actor in contemporary political life have had is an important task.

Military intervention has taken place in countries with different degrees of economic and political development, has adopted different forms, has been the expression of different ideological orientations, and has generated different consequences for the lives of nations. The main objective of the seminar was to further communication among specialists of different social origins, so as to exchange experiences and ideas on a topic of particular importance.

We have selected the most representative papers of the seminar: those referring to problems of a general nature related to the topic of militarism and those dealing with specific national cases.

First of all, Eugene Kim did an interesting review of different typologies which have been used to explain the role the military has assumed in contemporary life. His study is extremely useful since it lets one find a general framework for the different theoretical and interpretative reflections on the phenomena we are treating, so as to propose a model for civilian-military fusion which can be used as a starting point for all analyses.

Within the field of theory, but from a different methodological perspective, Óscar Cuéllar Saavedra presents a paper entitled "The Military and Class Struggle: About the Ideological Mechanisms of Corporativism," which leads us to take up the relationship between the behavior of the armed forces as an institution and political development in a differentiated society. For the author:

In a class society, the relationship between the dominating sectors and the dominated sectors is established as a permanent effort to guarantee the survival of the basic social order as well as to unveil the essence of the exploitation. When these two reach a certain level of efficacy and maturity, expressed in the accelerated democratization of the political system, it determines the disarticulation of the State's apparatuses as well as it, consequently, forms a threat to the preservation of the esprit de corps in the bosom of the military institutions.

The topic treated is well related to the behavior which the armed forces of several countries have shown when class struggle becomes more acute, "opening the door of irrationality which finally destroys democracy."

Students of militarism have placed great importance on military intervention in developing nations. However, it is important to remember that the latter do not form a homoge-

neous whole. The militarization of politics is nestled in an extremely complex process in which a large number of variables come together, such as the development of the armed forces as an institution, their social composition, the internal and external ideological influences which they assimilate, the social structure, the state of economic development, the ethnic and religious composition, the political framework, the international situation, etc. Therefore, the danger of generalizations and the need for specific examples through case studies.

To this effect, Asaf Hussain argues, in his study on Pakistan, that not all developing countries face the problems existing in plural societies. In the case of the country under study, the military was subordinated to civil authority until 1958, when it assumed a leading role. Nevertheless, the policies which it promoted from the government reactivated an ethnic nationalism which resulted in a civil war and which, even if it ended with the creation of Bangladesh, persists in other Pakistani provinces such as Baluchistan and Sind ever since 1971. Professor Faisal Al Samir, in turn, analyzes the army's role throughout Irak's process of political and social development from a historical perspective. He therefore considers the conditioning introduced by western colonialism as well as those which reflect social change and ideological influences operating in the bosom of the armed forces.

It is very clear that the political behavior of the military cannot be understood by abstracting the influence that different internal ideological and social forces exert nor the international conditioning factors which delimit the framework within which every "national process" evolves. Estrella Solidum systematizes the military responses to political events in several southeast Asian countries in her study. To wit, she considers five main periods: 1) the Japanese occupation (1941-1945); 2) the independence movements (1945-1948); 3) the intensification of communism and of other insurgent movements; 4) the consolidation of independence (1945-1970); and 5) the political instability of the seventies.

We ourselves treat the topic of military relations between the United States and Latin America, trying to take stock of the consequences that said relations have had for the region. Throughout the study, we attempt to set the generalizations and simplifications right, according to which the growing militarization of Latin American politics is almost solely due to military dependency on the United States. We do not pretend this to be an exhaustive study, nor the final word on the topic, but rather we try to raise an area of questions which will open up future directions for research. This introduces us to the analysis of two specific cases in the region.

Riordan Roett focuses on the analysis of one country, Brazil, perhaps the most controversial in Latin America, given its historical peculiarities, its dimensions and the role it plays in the southern horn. Roett analyzes the Brazilian process from 1964 to our days, defining its leaders as a civilian-military technocratic alliance which confronts problems not resolved by previous governments. The author raises the essential question: if said alliance did lead to an accelerated process of economic development through the use of the State's power, will that be sufficient to respond to present-day challenges? Roett, after analyzing the different sectors of the process, proves to be skeptical about a real social change. If there has been a change, it has taken place "in a selective, controlled, coldly pragmatic form at all levels of society."

Finally, Nelson Minello treats the no less significant case of political militarization in Uruguay. The author presents as his main hypothesis that in "the crisis produced by the breaking up of the domination model by polyclass alliances—which in Uruguay took the form of a contradictory alliance of interests of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, supported by the large middle class, it was the military that occupied the place which a bourgeois faction normally would have filled in a reaccommodation of the dominant society." Starting from the rupture of the model of class conciliation which was shaped

by the 1966 elections and the role played by the armed forces as direct allies of imperialism, an unconstitutional State was gradually established beginning with the 1973 institutional coup.

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The Military-Civil Fusion as a Stable Political Model for Third World Nations

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I. Introduction

The end of World War II saw the collapse of old colonial empires and many former colonies became newly independent states. The initial optimism for their nation-building and developmental efforts was, however, short-lived. Political instability and violence became endemic. Military coups d'état occurred frequently. Economies stagnated. Population increases went unchecked. Social change was taking place haphazardly only to compound the already existing woes. Echoing the state of affairs in these emergent and other third world nations, Samuel P. Huntington concluded in 1968: "There was a lack of civic morale and public spirit and of political institutions capable of giving meaning and direction to the public interest. Not political development but political decay dominated the scene."¹ According to him, there were, in 1958, thirty-four prolonged, irregular or guerrilla insurgencies, brief revolts, coups and uprisings and overt, militarily conventional wars. Since then, these insurgencies, revolts, coups, uprisings and

¹ Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (Yale University Press, 1968), p. 4.

wars have steadily increased and, in 1965, they numbered fifty-seven.² What was responsible for this trend?

In answer to the above question, there has been a perplexing number of theories, conceptual frameworks for analysis and typologies. Perhaps reflecting the formative stage of the science of political development and modernization and civil-military relations, no one explanation is without counterarguments. Each case that is explained seems to be different from the past instances and from the future happenings that need explanations. Lucian W. Pye in his *Aspects of Political Development*, for instance, identifies ten different emphases in various efforts to extrapolate the meanings and causal factors of political development out of divergent cases. Political development, then, may mean: (1) the political prerequisite of economic development; (2) the politics typical of industrial societies; (3) political modernization; (4) the operation of a nation-state; (5) administrative and legal development; (6) mass mobilization and participation; (7) the building of democracy; (8) stability and orderly change; (9) mobilization and power; and (10) one aspect of a multidimensional process of social change.³ Each of these meanings of political development is not, perhaps, self-explanatory, but we are not to dwell on the further explanations and arguments for or against each and all of them. Our point, regarding the confused state of the field, is clear. Dankwart A. Rustow, furthermore, even denies the term *political development*. To him, political modernization is a more appropriate concept and it means an increasing complexity of interdependent human relationships and an increasing role which the government plays in resolving differences among individuals and/or groups and promoting the welfare of the people.⁴ In one of his latest articles, "The Change to Change: Modernization,

² *Ibid.*

³ Lucian W. Pye, *Aspects of Political Development* (Little, Brown and Co., 1966), chap. 12, especially pp. 33-44.

⁴ Dankwart A. Rustow, *A World of Nations: Problems of Political Modernization* (The Brookings Institution, 1967), chap. 1 *passim*.

Development and Politics," Huntington even abandons the concepts of modernization and development and advances the concept of change. For him, the political system is an aggregate of various components and the study of politics should focus on their changes and relationships. Such components include: (1) culture — those values, attitudes, orientations, myths and beliefs relevant to politics and dominant in the society; (2) structure — those formal organizations through which the society makes authoritative decisions (i.e., political parties, legislatures, executives and bureaucracies); (3) groups — those formal and informal social and economic formations that participate in politics and make demands on the political structures; (4) leadership — those individuals in political institutions and groups who exercise more influence than others on the allocation of values; and (5) policies — those patterns of governmental activity which are consciously designed to affect the distribution of benefits and penalties with the society.⁵

The growing realism which we have noted above in the study of political development and modernization can also be detected in the study of civil-military relations in the third world nations. In his recent paper on "Military Institutions and Coercion in the Developing Nations," Morris Janowitz emphasizes the development of coercive institutions (i.e., paramilitary organizations) and regime stability in the third world nations.⁶ The focus of interest in the study of civil-military relations in the third world nations is not any longer exclusively on whether or not the indigenous military contributes to political development or modernization. Rather attention is increasingly shifted to the manner with which the military in the third world nations has been maintaining political stability. As stated by Janowitz:

⁵ Samuel P. Huntington, "The Change to Change: Modernization, Development and Politics," *Comparative Politics* 3,3 (April 1971): 283-322.

⁶ Morris Janowitz, "Military Institutions and Coercion in the Developing Nation," (A paper presented at the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, University of Chicago, April 24, 1976).

In the most succinct terms, the trend after the initial period of military intervention, has been one of increased stability of regimes or, perhaps more accurately, enhanced regime consolidation. There has been a process of "political learning," if you will. Roughly speaking, the period of intense instability centered on the years from 1945 to 1965, while, since 1965, the trend toward more "effective" regimes — that is, more enduring regimes — has become discernible. There is no need to exaggerate the extent of this development or to extrapolate it mechanically into the future. The present issue is to document and explain an increase in political stability which has frequently been accompanied by an element of domestic political moderation..., the thrust of my argument — my underlying hypothesis — moves in a very different direction, for it is concerned with the impact of the coercive institutions of these nation-states. Since 1965, one of the dramatic developments in these nations has been the rapid growth of the paramilitary forces that have, over the short run, increased the regimes' capacities to rule... the expansion of paramilitary forces during the decade 1965-75 has been greater than the expansion of personnel of the central national military establishment.⁷

The formula for political stability in the third world nations which Janowitz delineates is an authoritarian rule under the central military which controls the paramilitary institutions. What this author observes in the third world nations is, furthermore, a new leadership structure — military-civil fusion. The purpose of this paper is then to explain the military-civil fusion and to argue that such military-civil fusion may be a dominant, stable model of development for third world nations.

II. Studies of Civil-Military Relations

As a significant political actor, the indigenous military has used various means to intervene in the political process. Samuel E. Finer identifies four different means: (1) influence; (2) blackmail; (3) displacement of civilian government; and

⁷ *Ibid.*

(4) supplantation of civilian regime.⁸ What particular means will prevail depends, furthermore, on the level of political culture, and it is in the countries of low and minimum political culture where the military has assumed direct control over the affairs of state.⁹

Finer's work is one of the pioneering macro-theorizing efforts explaining the political intervention of the military in the third world nations.¹⁰ Claude E. Welch, Jr. and Arthur K. Smith identified twenty such propositions summarizing various studies.¹¹ They could be summarized in terms of the following three key sets of independent variables.¹² First is a set of variables related to the susceptibility of the political system to the forcible seizure of power. Included are variables which refer to the general pattern of legitimacy within the society which help define the appropriate means by which authority within the system may be transferred; Finer's concept of "level of political culture" within a society is of this general nature. Other studies have emphasized variables which refer to broad and fundamental transformations of the system producing instability and thereby placing a greater premium on the use of force in politics. Edwin Lieuwen notes that a change of this

⁸ Samuel E. Finer, *The Man On Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics* (Praeger, 1962), chap. 10.

⁹ *Ibid.*, chap. 7 *passim*.

¹⁰ Other general theoretical works include: Stanislaw Andreski, *Military Organization and Society* (University of California Press, 1954); John J. Johnson, ed., *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries* (Princeton University Press, 1962); Morris Janowitz, *The Military in the Political Development of New Nations* (University of Chicago Press, 1964); Edwin Lieuwen, *Generals vs. Presidents* (Praeger, 1964); William F. Gutteridge, *Military Institutions and Power in the New States* (Oxford University Press, 1962); Edward Feit, *The Armed Bureaucrats: Military-Administrative Regimes and Political Development* (Houghton Mifflin, 1973); Claude E. Welch, Jr. and Arthur K. Smith, *Military Role and Rule* (Duxbury Press, 1974); J. Stephen Hoadley, *The Military in the Politics of Southeast Asia* (Schenkman Publishing Co., 1975).

¹¹ Welch and Smith, *Military Role*, chap. 2 *passim*.

¹² This summary discussion of the variables is based on the author's earlier work with Professor John P. Lovell, "The Military and Political Change in Asia," *Pacific Affairs*, 1 and 2 (Spring and Summer 1967): 113-123. Also carried in Henry Bienen, ed., *The Military and Modernization* (Aldine-Atherton, 1971).

sort occurred in Latin America following the onset of world depression in 1930, leading directly to a pattern of military dominance in politics. Variables related to susceptibility of the system to forceable seizure of power may refer to specific phenomena more limited in scope or time, such as the emergence of an external threat to the system, or an event which discredits a civilian regime, or removes from the scene key elements of civilian control. For example, in South Korea the military coup of May 1961 followed the April 1960 student movement which toppled the First Republican regime of Syngman Rhee (1948-1960) and the ineffective Chang regime of the Second Republic (1960-1961). There had been a long series of negative evaluations of civilian politicians by the people. In Burma, a threat of civil war coupled with the chronic inefficiency of civilian governments seems to have been the key factor which prompted, in 1958 and also in 1962, the military to take over the government from U Nu, who was still a popular figure in Burmese politics at the time. In Indonesia, even though the exact circumstances which surrounded the coup and counter coup in September 1965 are still shrouded in mystery, it is clear that the army's assumption of power was in part designed to break the paralysis of the country under the flamboyant leadership of Sukarno. Under growing economic distress in the country and disenchantment with the central government in Java, Sukarno was no longer able to maintain the precarious balance between and among various power-seeking institutions, with the government, the army and the Communist party (PKI) being the dominant ones.

A second important set of variables is that relating to the capacity of the military to execute a coup d'état. In most of the states of Asia, the size alone of the military offers one crude index of the capacity of this group for political influence. Ironically, in some cases the eventual dominance of politics by the military was facilitated by decisions of civilian leadership to increase the size of the armed forces in order to cope with

real or imagined external threats or internal unrest. In both South Korea and South Viet Nam, for example, civilian policies to increase substantially the armed forces, implemented through the largesse of American aid, contributed directly to the emergence of the indigenous military as the dominant group in politics.

The reasons for the increasing dominance of the military in Asia are more complex than size alone. The development of military establishments with modern skills, equipment and weapons is also a characteristic of the transitional societies of Asia. Such skills, equipment and weapons — along with size — comprise what Robert Dahl terms "political resources." Coupled with other resources prevalent among the military establishments of contemporary Asia, such as relatively disciplined, cohesive organization, their political resources have given the military a capacity for forcible intervention in the politics of virtually every nation-state in Asia. Nevertheless, there is no direct link between the political behavior of the military and their political capability. In order to explain their political behavior, one must examine also their political attitudes and beliefs. Thus, a third set of variables identified in recent research relates to such attitudes and beliefs — the political perspectives of the military.

Salient among these perspectives are the images which militaries develop of their own appropriate role and status within the society, and their perceptions of civilian elites and of the political system as a whole. Under conditions where civilian political leadership is perceived by the military as corrupt, incompetent, or otherwise incapable of coping with the basic tasks of government, the motivation among the military for performing these tasks themselves directly increases. Evidence suggests that such perceptions were among those contributing to the decision of General Ne Win and his officers to seize power in Burma in 1958. Similarly, if civilian political leaders take action, or seem about to take action, detrimental to the personal or organizational interests of military

men, the motivation to intervene in politics to neutralize or ward off the threat to their interests is likely to develop. For example, in Indonesia, Sukarno's support for the Communist-supported plan of arming a militia force of peasants, who would serve as a counterforce to the regular army, seems to have contributed to the dissatisfaction which led to the September coup of 1965.

A general knowledge exists explaining the military coup d'état. What is uncertain, however, is the performance of the military once it assumes political sovereignty. Many questions have been raised in connection with this but with no conclusive answers. Once the military assumes power, for instance, how does it perform in its leadership capacity in solving the problems of development? Or to put it another way, as Claude E. Welch, Jr. pointed out, "Can a military-based government cope more successfully with the difficulties civilian regimes encountered? Are some of these problems susceptible to solution by means congenial to the governing military junta, in ways that escaped the preceding civilian regime?"¹³ Answers to these questions are still inconclusive and too often gaps in information have been filled by handy generalizations which have proven limited by temporal outlooks. Many more empirical cases are needed and in most of the available cases, the duration of military rule has been too short for a meaningful longitudinal study. Eric A. Nordlinger's study, which has cast doubts on the developmental role of military rulers in developing nations, is based on cross-national data for the period of 1957-62.¹⁴ A similar study over a longer period of time may have produced a different conclusion. Furthermore, there are different types of military regimes at different levels of development with varying goals and orientations. Indeed their performances need different judgmental criteria. To quote

¹³ Claude E. Welch, Jr., "The African Military and Political Development," in Bienen, *The Military and Modernization*, p. 213.

¹⁴ Eric A. Nordlinger, "Soldiers in Mufti: The Impact of Military Rule upon Economic and Social Change in the non-Western States," *American Political Science Review* 64, 4 (December 1970).

Huntington again, "As society changes, so does the role of the military. In the world of oligarchy, the soldier is a radical; in the middleclass world he is a participant and arbiter; as the mass society looms on the horizon he becomes the conservative guardian of the existing order."¹⁵ In their cross-national aggregate study of the political and economic performance of military and civilian regimes covering the period 1950-70, R. D. McKinlay and A. S. Cohan found that: (1) military regimes do not form a distinctive type of regime in regards to performance; (2) levels of diversity within military regimes are similar to those found within civilian regimes; and (3) the degree of similarity or dissimilarity between military and civilian regimes varies from variable to variable.¹⁶

III. Various Types of Military Regimes

McKinlay and Cohan define a military regime as "one in which the armed forces have made a coup, established a government in which the main executive post is held by a military person, and have stayed in power for at least the major part of one year."¹⁷ Or, according to Welch and Smith, there are five different types of military regimes: predatory, reformist, radical, guardian, and garrison-state types.¹⁸ Both of these classifications are, however, somewhat unrealistic. The classification by McKinlay and Cohan may serve the purpose of quantitative analysis, but it is unable to discriminate different types of military regimes particularly in terms of their leadership composition and political orientations. The classification by Welch and Smith shows different types of military regimes in terms of their achievements, but does not

¹⁵ Huntington, *Political Order*, p. 221.

¹⁶ R. D. McKinlay and A. S. Cohan, "A Comparative Analysis of the Political and Economic Performance of Military and Civilian Regimes," *Comparative Politics* 8, 1 (October 1975): 22-23.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ Welch and Smith, *Military Role*, chap. 3.

discriminate how military each regime is in its internal composition.

In his discussion on praetorianism, Huntington classifies military regimes on the basis of four options concerning the military retention or abdication of power and attitudes toward political participation. Once in power, the military can return and restrict, return and expand, retain and restrict, or retain and expand power and participation.¹⁹ With a similar emphasis, Amos Perlmutter distinguishes between arbitrator-type and ruler-type praetorian armies. Differences in these two types of armies are found in their tendencies toward intervention, maximization of military influence, professionalism and the ultimate length of military rule.²⁰

A. R. Luckham has devised a classification that uses three variables to create categories of regimes. Luckham's typology uses high and low levels of civil institutional power; high, medium and low levels of military strength; and integral, fragmented and permeated levels of integration of institutional boundaries. This classification results in a differentiation between military and revolutionary regimes, but is primarily designed for civil-military relations in general. However, under the type of regime labeled guardian state, Luckham distinguishes between direct rule, alternating rule, catalytic action or covert rule by the military.²¹ Welch and Smith expand Luckham's typology by adding popular political participation as another variable. This results in two types of politics, civic and praetorian, each having two types of control: objective civilian control with integral boundaries, subjective civilian control with fragmented boundaries, the military as an independent political actor, and the military as a coalition actor.²²

¹⁹ Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, pp. 233-237.

²⁰ Amos Perlmutter, "The Praetorian State and the Praetorian Army: Toward a Taxonomy of Civil-Military Relations in Developing Countries," *Comparative Politics* 1 (April 1969): 382-404.

²¹ A. R. Luckham, "A Comparative Typology of Civil-Military Relations," *Government and Opposition* 6 1 (Winter 1971): 5-35.

²² Welch and Smith, *Military Role*, pp. 34-52.

Finer suggests viewing military regimes in terms of sets of techniques employed by the military to further its policies. He distinguishes between indirect-limited, indirect-complete, dual, direct and direct-quasi-civilianized military rule. Finer's analysis is based on the power and influence wielded by the military in a given political culture through its control of policy decisions and the level of overt action that is used.²³ Finer offers another typology in the form of the constitutional role of the military. In this case, regimes are distinguished by the power intent of the military. One category consists of regimes intending on a long term period of rule, including those following a prearranged program, and those that have been created with no intention of returning to civilian control. A second category consists of temporary regimes also with two sub-types — the holding or caretaker regime and the transitional regime designed to lead to competitive politics.²⁴ This classification suffers from relying on the public statements of intentions and goals by the military regime.

One of the more prevalent lines of thought in the literature on types of military regimes is the concept of guardianship. The role of custodian or guardian prompts different reactions from different militaries with a range of possible reactions extending from direct to indirect rule, and may occur prior to or following a coup. Once a coup is an established fact, however, as succinctly stated by Charles Moskos, Jr. in his survey of civil-military relations, "in their search for support and political legitimacy military rulers must make some comparisons with preexisting and emergent civilian interest groups."²⁵ Moskos' observation continues:

The outcome is often a mixed or fused civil-military regime. Civil-military fusion can be regarded as a political system in which overt military rule has been transformed into a civil-mili-

²³ Finer, *Man on Horseback*, pp. 245-246 and 149-151.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 246-248.

²⁵ Charles C. Moskos, Jr., "The Military: A Review Article," *Annual Review of Sociology* 2(1976): 69.

tary relationship allowing for real, if fragmented, patterns of civilian political participation. In particular, the ruling officers must seek allies with the civilian bureaucracy (Feit, 1973). Civil-military fusion implies the institutionalization of a political order with more stability and system-transforming potential than can be accounted for by the praetorian perspective.²⁶

At the outset of a successful military coup, the political weaknesses of the military become all too obvious. The coup leaders suffer from their lack of legitimacy and their technical inability to govern a larger society. Thus, according to Edward Feit:

The first stage of military government is one in which army officers control the polity directly, holding all principal offices in that state themselves. This state cannot last, however, and is followed by a second phase, in which civilian cadres, mostly from the administrative arm, are drawn into the regime, which claims to be apolitical. At the same time, cohesion-without-consensus is built. This cohesion is an alliance of often mutually hostile social forces, which are balanced against each other by the military government as a means of maintaining power. To initiate the promised regeneration of society, on which the military claim to power is based, the regime shifts, in its third phase, from being apolitical to being political. The leaders seek a mass base as a means of legitimizing the regime and inducing progress.²⁷

IV. The Military-Civil Fusion

The cyclical pattern of development which Feit hypothesizes in the foregoing analysis, however, seems to have only limited applicability. What has emerged in the civil-military relations in the third world nations is rather a stable political

²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 69-70.

²⁷ Feit, *Armed Bureaucrats*, pp. 2-3. Feit further observed that: "The search for legitimacy, and interplay of previously balanced yet unstable forces, leads to the breakdown of the cohesion on which power is based. The breakdown of cohesion leads, in turn, to the downfall of the military regime and its replacement either by another military regime or by a civilian regime subject to the same conditions as that which was overthrown by the army earlier." *Ibid.*

model of military-civil fusion. Recently, the cases of South Korea and Indonesia illustrate this development.

A. South Korea

In South Korea, the military leaders, headed by General Park Chung Hee, that came into power through a coup in 1961, have overcome some major hurdles for their continuance in power and, for more than ten years, they have enjoyed an unprecedented control over the people and the society at large. They also succeeded in generating an unprecedented economic growth.

Throughout the 1960's what lurked behind these success stories of the Korean military regime was, first of all, the keen political acumen of the coup leaders.²⁸ They realized their own limitations and conscientiously tried to overcome them. The coup was waged by a small group of officers. In order to stay in power, they needed the backing of some 600,000 men in South Korea's armed forces, and for their support they co-opted many military non-coup leaders into their ranks. The Korean CIA and intelligence networks were quickly developed to counteract any activity subversive of their power. They were also keenly mindful of their non-civilian origins in the assumption of their power, and they willingly and consciously co-opted

²⁸ The military regime is defined here as the regime that is controlled either directly by the military following a coup or by initial coup leaders in a civilian government with strong military backing. This section is based on the author's earlier works on the South Korean military. For details, see in particular: C. I. Eugene Kim, "The Military in the Politics of South Korea: Creating Political Order," *On Military Intervention*, ed. Jacques Vandoom and Morris Janowitz (Rotterdam University Press, 1971), pp. 361-386; "Transition from Military Rule: The Case of South Korea," *Armed Forces and Society* 1,3(May 1975): 302-316, carried also in Henry Bienen and David Morell, eds., *Political Participation under Military Regimes* (Sage Publications, 1971); "The Government Elites of the Republic of Korea, 1948-72: A Quantitative Analysis of Their Socio-economic Background Data," *Report of the First Joint Conference of the Korean Political Science Association and the Association of Korean Political Scientists in North America* (June 9-12, 1975, Seoul, Korea), pp. 109-131.

intellectuals and other civilian leaders into their military and civilian complex.

The so-called "Brain-Trust" had become a trade-mark of the Park regime. Korean academicians and other professionals have been widely co-opted. The Park regime has had strong military support. Unlike the previous regimes of President Rhee and Premier Chang, we find a large number of retired military officers in influential government positions under President Park. As the following analysis will show, however, it is more than the military that has constituted the backbone of stability of the Park regime. Their political acumen and capability in Korea's praetorian setting have led the Korean military leaders in power to a politically-suave balancing of power in the government and the society.

The biographical data of the governmental elites of the Park regime, as compared with those of the previous regimes of President Rhee and Premier Chang, show the representation of a wider range of different socio-economic backgrounds of leading personnel in the high government service.²⁹

Of the three republics, the composition of cabinet ministers of the Third Republic of President Park, for instance, resembles that of the First Republic of President Rhee more than it does the Second Republic of Premier Chang. The cabinet ministers of the Third Republic, as compared to those of the First Republic are, however, wider in the distribution of their ages and more highly educated. They are also more rural in their places of birth, and they represent more provinces in the country. As for their prior occupations, both the First and the Third Republic are highly bureaucratic in comparison with the Second Republic. The bureaucratic origins of the Third Republic cabinet ministers as compared to the First Republic are, however, much more military. In other words, the Park regime of the Third Republic of Korea shows a highly co-optive tendency for the recruitment of its governmental leaders,

²⁹ More in detail, the following tables are indicative of the co-optation by the Park regime of various socio-economic groups:

TABLE 1
ROK CABINET MINISTERS:
PLACE OF BIRTH BY PROVINCE

<i>Province</i>	<i>Aug. '48- April '60</i>	<i>Sept. '60- May '61 (percent)</i>	<i>Dec. '63- Oct. '72</i>
Seoul	28.4	19.1	14.1
Kyonggi	9.2	4.8	9.4
Kangwon	8.3	4.8	2.4
Ch'ungch'ong, North	4.6	0.0	5.9
Ch'ungch'ong, South	9.2	4.8	7.1
Cholla, North	3.7	14.3	3.5
Cholla, South	3.7	14.3	7.1
Kyongsang, North	10.1	23.8	11.8
Kyongsang, South	11.9	9.5	17.7
Cheju	0.0	0.0	0.0
Hwanghae	1.0	0.0	5.9
Pyongan, South	3.7	0.0	2.4
Pyongan, North	5.5	4.8	8.2
Hamgyong, South	1.0	0.0	2.4
Hamgyong, North	0.0	0.0	2.4
Total (base)	100.0% (109)	100.0% (21)	100.0% (85)

Note: The cases of "no information" are not included in the computation.
Source: Kim and Lovell Data. Adopted from Chong-ik E. Kim, "The Governmental Elites of the Republic of Korea, 1948-72: A Quantitative Analysis of Their Socio-economic Background Data," *Report of the First Joint Conference of Korean Political Scientists in North America* (June 9-12, 1975, Seoul, Korea), pp. 109-131.

TABLE 2
PRIOR OCCUPATION

	<i>Aug. '48- April '60</i>	<i>Sept. '60- May '61 (percent)</i>	<i>Dec. '63- Oct. '72</i>
*Liberal profession and professional and technical	25.1	22.9	30.0
Political party and/or national assembly	31.8	36.6	31.1
Central bureaucracy	10.6	11.0	12.5
Local government service	16.7	13.4	9.2
Military	0.5	1.5	9.0
Business	10.6	10.1	10.5
Diplomatic post	0.1	0.2	1.3
Other	1.9	0.9	0.4
Total (base)	100.0% (1245)	100.0% (454)	100.0% (1180)

Note: The cases of "no information" are not included in the computation.
Source: Same as Table 1.

* Liberal profession and professional and technical include college and university professors, educators, lawyers, doctors, journalists, etc.

and it seems to be more mindful of the representation of various geographical areas and politically influential groups in the country.

As a military regime, the Park government shows a strong entrenchment of former military officers in its governing process. However, these military officers are not alone in the governmental leadership positions, since they are allied with intellectual and civilian bureaucratic elements in the country. The Park regime has, furthermore, been courting big business interests in the country for its export oriented, heavy industrial development. Excluded from the leadership positions of the Park regime are representations from the newly emergent working people and the traditionally underprivileged farming population. Instead, the Park regime's handling of these groups has been oppressive and, in the name of political stability and continued economic growth toward eventual unification of the country, it has opted for their political demobilization. The revised constitution of 1972, for instance, states:

Art. 29 (3)

The right to collective action may be either restricted or may not be recognized in accordance with the provisions of law for public officials and workers engaged in state, local autonomous governments, state-run enterprises, public utility businesses, and enterprises which have serious influence on the natural economy.

Art. 32 (2)

Laws which restrict liberties and rights of citizens shall be enacted only when necessary for the maintenance of national security, order and public welfare.

Characteristically, what has emerged out of the South Korean case is an adaptation of the Kemalist model in which Ataturk Kemal, after assuming power in 1919: (1) took the primary role in selecting a system of government for the country; (2) chose their allies from among civilian politicians and from the civil services; (3) became the source of revolutionary change, making an effort to transfer the state from praetorian

to non-praetorian rule; (4) formed their own "civilian" political party; and (5) institutionalized the Kemalist tradition that the army in the barracks must serve as the protector of civilian rule.³⁰

B. Indonesia

Since the coup in September, 1965, a stable model of military-civil fusion has also emerged in Indonesia. As a modern, organized force, the military in Indonesia grew as a powerful political actor under the late President Sukarno. Under Sukarno's "Guided Democracy" (1959-65), all political parties and partisan newspapers were either banned or their activities restricted, elections were suspended and all legislative and executive posts were made appointive. The Communist leaders continued to organize peasants and workers but they backed Sukarno. Only the military stayed aloof from Sukarno's monopoly of power and between Sukarno and General Nasution who was the minister of defense and the army chief of staff during the "Guided Democracy" period, "a sort of tug-of-war developed." In the aftermath of the September coup, however, Sukarno was gradually removed from power. The Communists were crushed. The Consultative Assembly, which Sukarno appointed earlier, voted in March, 1966 to withdraw his mandate of "president for life." Sukarno was removed from the office completely in 1967 and General Suharto was named acting President.³¹

As President, Suharto broadened his government to include a number of civilian ministers. The Musjumi religious party, which had been banned in 1960, was also given permission to reform and was again active as the Parmusi. In the 1971 elections, the first since 1955, and only the second since the country gained its independence, the *golkar* (*golongan karya*)

³⁰ Perlmutter, *Praetorian State*.

³¹ Hoadley, *Military in the Politics*, p. 103.

or "functional groups" were organized into the *Sekber Golkar* ("Central Joint Secretariat") and included in it were the organizations of youth, labor, peasants, army, women and intelligentsia. Suharto had in fact realized Sukarno's dream of having various functional groups united beyond him, but there was still an important difference. Sukarno wanted to keep the functional groups independent of the army; Suharto preferred the integration of the two bodies. To Suharto, the armed forces are to be both an instrument of the state and an active functional group, promoting political and economic stability and the welfare of the people. In the Golkar's seven-point working program, the theme of stability stands out as the most prominent.³²

In pursuance of the goal of stability for Indonesia, Suharto ordered an end to the confrontation with Malaysia and directed Indonesia to rejoin the United Nations, which Sukarno had quit earlier. Relations between Indonesia and the United States improved almost immediately also. Efforts have been launched to attract foreign capital to improve the country's unstable economy. Concessions have been given to foreign companies, and the mining of metals, the cutting of timber and especially petroleum industries have proceeded to grow at a rapid pace.

On the domestic front, the government moved against black marketeers and smugglers, pressed charges against tax evaders, sought to reduce corruption within the bureaucracy, and managed to bring the prices of basic commodities under strict control. Although agriculture continued to be a problem for the regime, Indonesia has begun to amass considerable wealth as a result of the exploitation of its oil reserves. In conjunction with the state-owned oil company known as Pertamina, foreign companies such as the Union Oil Company of California have made the petroleum industry a lucrative enter-

³² *Ibid.*

prise. And petrodollars have been readily converted into needed manufactured goods and foodstuffs.³³

C. *Thailand: The Failure to Achieve Military-Civil Fusion*

Thailand's model is that of an unsuccessful military-civil fusion. In 1932, a coup group of twenty-four civil servants and thirty-seven military officers imbued with western constitutionalism waged a successful coup against the traditional Thai royal absolutism. Since then, Thai politics has been, in a sense, the politics of coup d'état, oscillating between constitutionalism and the illegitimate assumption of power by various factions within the military. Despite several attempts made to establish a constitutional government, each time a new constitution was put into effect, it was soon discarded by another coup.³⁴

Following the 1932 coup, the civilian and military officials in the new government were never effectively fused and they constituted separate power groups, each containing several cliques. The decision to make a coup and subsequent state policies originate from within the private and official meetings of the top officials. Each clique is bound together by ties of kinship, friendship, school acquaintances, and senior-junior civil servant relationship and loyalties.

In 1933, a second coup was carried out by the military faction within the government. The older civil servants, led by Phraya Mano, were accused of leaning toward the royalists. The second coup government was then led first by General Phahon, who resigned in 1938, and he was succeeded by his deputy, General Phibun, who held the premiership until 1944, when his government was overthrown by a group of civilian

³³ See, for instance, Ruth Sheldon Knowles, *Indonesia Today* (Nash Publishing, 1973), *passim*.

³⁴ Fred W. Riggs, *Thailand: The Modernization of a Bureaucratic Polity* (East-West Center Press, 1966), especially chap. 8.

elites who were associated with the anti-Japanese resistance movement during World War II. In 1947, however, a group of thirty-six military officers supported by the displaced General Phibun overthrew the three-year old civilian government.³⁵

Since 1975, Thailand has experienced a total of eight coups and ten different constitutions. Whatever surface stability Thailand has manifested has been presumptive. Thai politics, as David Morell has also pointed out, is an example of politics dominated by competition between military and civilian leaders, each seeking personal and institutional access to principal authority. "In their attempts to cope with the transition challenge," Morell concluded, "Thai military leaders have never selected the Ataturk model of creating a mass party under their direct domination; instead, they have turned over power to (or acquiesced in the accrual of power by) fragmented political groups. The result continues to be a highly unstable political outcome."³⁶

V. Sources of Military-Civil Fusion

In South Korea and Indonesia, the successful military-civil fusion has resulted from several sources. The political acumen of coup leaders has contributed to it. In the third world nations, the civil-military boundaries are seldom integral; they are often either fragmented or permeated. The military, like other social forces and institutions, is highly politicized in the context of development. In the developing and transitional societies, therefore, "politics lacks autonomy, complexity, coherence and adaptability. All sorts of social forces and groups become directly engaged in general politics. Countries which have political armies also have political clergies, politi-

³⁵ Hoadley, *Military in the Politics*, chap. 2, especially 12ff.

³⁶ David Morell, "Alternatives to Military Rule in Thailand," in Bienen and Morell, *Political Participation*, p. 10.

cal universities, political bureaucracies, political labor unions and political corporations. Society as a whole is out-of-joint, not just the military."³⁷ Many military officers of new, developing nations, furthermore, typify the "adaptive" career pattern.³⁸ These officers are much more political in their career background and orientation than the "prescribed" type. They were recruited into the military during either the liberation war period or the days of rapid expansion of the military establishments following independence.

The political acumen of coup leaders, however, explains only part of the successful formation of military-civil fusion. According to Huntington, the military leaders who have been effective in political institution-building could be found in a society "where social forces are not fully articulated." "The tragedy of a country like Brazil in the 1960's," he maintained, "was that it was, in a sense, too developed to have either a Nasser or an Ataturk, its society too complex and varied to be susceptible to leadership by a military regime."³⁹ Indeed, in Thailand, in part because of its history of continued independent existence, civilian institutions are much more developed than in Korea and Indonesia, both of which had suffered colonial experiences. Ultimately, however, the answers for the successful military-civil fusion must be found in the weak military tradition in the country and the coup leaders' awareness of their own shortcomings to rule. In both Korea and Indonesia, military coup leaders have never been confident of their legitimacy as sovereign political actors.⁴⁰ They, therefore, conscientiously sought civilian help where feasible. Civilian leaders were also pliable and easily co-opted into the military regimes. The Park regime of South Korea has maintained a "brain trust" and civilian technocrats and adminis-

³⁷ Huntington, *Political Order*, p. 194.

³⁸ These concepts are borrowed from Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier* (Free Press, 1960).

³⁹ Huntington, *Political Order*, p. 261.

⁴⁰ Hoadley, *Military in the Politics*, especially 123; C. I. Eugene Kim, "The Military in the Politics of South Korea".

trators, businessmen, politicians and intellectuals have liberally been recruited in the governing structure. Suharto of Indonesia has also been maintaining a sort of kitchen cabinet of civilian and other advisors, and his Sekber Golkar, as explained earlier, was formed with the intent of fusing military and civil leaders.

VI. Conclusions

In South Korea and Indonesia, the coup leaders have shown concern for their lack of legitimacy to rule. The coup was an illegitimate assumption of power to begin with and the coup leaders have consciously sought to legitimate their rule. In South Korea, the military assumption of power was acquiesced at the outset as a corrective measure of political instability and socio-economic ills of the country and it was thought of only as a temporary measure. The so-called "military politics" in South Korea was regarded with disdain by the general populace still imbued with the deep Confucian tradition. In Indonesia, the military leaders had, for a long time refused to assume power, despite their intense political involvement under Sukarno, because of their lack of confidence concerning their legitimacy to govern in the eyes of the masses. They were also uncertain about their organizational unity, in view of persistent interbattalion and interdivision rivalry, and about their capability of creating a coherent ideology and program.

On the basis of the foregoing analyses, then, the following typology of military-civil relations could be devised. What we are interested in is the formation of successful military-civil fusion as a stable model for development in third world nations. We are also treating only the so-called praetorian politics, not the civic politics.⁴¹ By the praetorian polity, we mean: (1) civil power is "not so high;" (2) military power is either

⁴¹ Welch and Smith, *Military Role*, p. 43.

CIVIL-MILITARY BOUNDARIES

Fragmented Praetorian States

<i>Extent of Politization of the Mili</i>	<i>Political & Organizational Strench of the Mili</i>	<i>Civil Power</i>	<i>Successful Mili-Civil Fusion</i>
High	High	H M L	
	Medium	H M L	X
	Low	H M L	X
Medium	High	H M L	
	Medium	H M L	X
	Low	H M L	X
Low	High	H M L	
	Medium	H M L	
	Low	H M L	

"high" or "medium;" and (3) the civil-military boundaries are fragmented.⁴² Among the praetorian states, then, successful military-civil fusion is most likely among the states where: (1) the extent of politization of the military is either high or medium; (2) the political and organizational strength of the military is medium or low; and (3) civil power is medium.

A summary of the information derived from the above analyses is presented in the form of a chart on page 31.

What indeed emerges from the foregoing analysis is a balanced model of civil and military strength in the praetorian society for the formation of successful military-civil fusion. If the political and organizational strength of the military is too strong in comparison with the civil power, the military would remain monopolistic in its exercise of power. If, on the other hand, the civil power is too strong, it would constitute a separate power group against the military as in Thailand. If the civil power is too weak, it would not be able to supply the necessary personnel in the successful military-civil fusion. For the successful military-civil fusion, the civil power must show a medium level of development, not too strong to constitute a separate power group against the military, but not too weak for the military to ignore it entirely.

⁴² Luckham, *Comparative Typology*, p. 22.

The Military and Class Struggle: About the Ideological Mechanisms of Corporativism

Oscar Cuéllar Saavedra

I. Introduction

In a class society, the relation between the dominating sectors and the dominated sectors is established as a permanent effort to guarantee the survival of the basic social order as well as to unveil the essence of the exploitation. When these two reach a certain level of efficacy and maturity, expressed in the accelerated democratization of the political system, it determines the disarticulation of the State's apparatuses as well as it, consequently, forms a threat to the preservation of the *esprit de corps* in the bosom of the military institutions. It necessitates, as a consequence and at the same time, the reinforcement of the system's guaranteeing collective obedience, whose specific function, at the level of overall society, is entrusted to military institutions. The system's guaranteeing collective obedience assume a "functional" aspect, separate from everyday conflicts. But the sharpening of the class struggle leads to the unveiling of their specific functions and roles, opening the doors for the gallop toward irrationality, which ends up destroying democracy's very existence, based on an attempt to preserve military *esprit de corps* — which consti-

tutes its particular form of existence — as well as the fundamental on which it rests.

Ideological mechanisms, specifically those of a corporate type, play an important part, particularly when they intertwine with an organizational form which rests on total hierarchy and totalitarian authority, and which arrogates legitimacy as its own principle of existence. It rests, then, in the final analysis, on the unfolding of a corporative ideology of submissive integration to (legitimate) authority, which is *dictated*, and does not arise from the democratic acceptance of the fundamentals. Independently of the progressive or reactionary form that can be assumed by military intervention oriented to reestablish the social equilibrium disarticulated by accelerated democratization, what is essential, in the orientation that the military leadership imposes, is the fact that it always unfolds, in a highly professionalized and bureaucratized army which boasts an esprit de corps, in the form of a corporativist integration of the society under the State's care — identified, as the ultimate system guaranteeing collective obedience, with the armed forces. That, finally, makes evident the importance of the military's corporative ideology, which is channeled, as a permanent activity in the bosom of its own ranks, by the routes of the structure of total authority embodied in the military's specific, professional socialization. This does not suggest the impossibility of its "penetration" by revolutionary organizations, but rather the structural difficulty, derived from military socialization, of designing a demythologization strategy for the corporativist ideology of submissive integration. Corporativization processes, at the same time, constitute an essential aspect of military existence and a form of separation/unification of the armed forces, as an institution, with the social-economic order which they definitely assure. That leads to the generation of coherent mechanisms oriented toward preserving the esprit de corps, among which self-recruitment and estate differentiation stand out.

II. General Framework for the Analysis

A. *Rina Conti's Statement*

Rina Conti, 35, mother of two, was somewhat successful in Buenos Aires and Santiago in the first few years of the sixties. Striptease artist, played at the Maipo, Nacional, and was the "vedette" of the Bim-Bam-Bum. Invited to Europe at the height of her fame, she declined. Married a dental surgeon and abandoned the stage to devote herself to her home. Tall, young and attractive, raises her children, today grown up, and leads a peaceful life in a middle-class neighborhood of Santiago. An avid reader of women's magazines, she talks about many things, but only once did she let out the real her. It was a decisive, clarifying statement. A neighbor of mine, she used to invite my daughter to play at her house. One day I ran across her on the street and she revealed her worry to me about the girl's ideas. They had talked and discussed what was happening in Chile — it was the moment of the Unidad Popular. I asked her, naturally, about what they had discussed, and if she thought we could talk about these affairs ourselves, as the reasonable adults that we were. Her reply — Rina Conti's statement — was clear: "I'm not going to discuss it with you because you can convince me." It was May 1973. The coup was in September: she was dying of joy.

Rina Conti is only one of many cases, but she is a case which forms a typical answer in a situation of polarization in a class struggle. Her reply sums up and clearly expresses the functioning of general, ideological class-mechanisms, which permit the maintenance of a certain coherence at the level of the behavior of "middle-class" subjects (we use the expression provisionally) and, of course, of the bourgeois, in the objective situation which occurred during the revolutionary process of the Unidad Popular. It points out the irrational — or rather, the irrational/rational basis which underlies a coherence based on class interests. At the same time, at least theoretically, it refers to the question of *bourgeois* hegemony over other social sectors.

Let us explain, in advance, that here we see the start of a structure of ideological protection based on the control of information. It is in this sense, we believe, that one can attempt to probe into the structure of elusion, that is, the mechanisms which permit closing off the path of information in critical situations, as a condition for maintaining behavioral coherence, which rests on runaway irrationality. Behavior relies on the perception of general class interests, when the objective conditions set by the development of a revolutionary process, channeled by way of a legitimate democratic system, make the dominant class' position contradictory or unsure.

That also opens a window so as to partially illuminate the ideological mechanisms of corporativism. I will try to organize an initial sketch — therefore, of necessity, general and tentative — so as to later discuss some hypotheses related to the question of corporativism and the role of the armed forces in contexts of class struggle. But first, two observations: (1) we will proceed by successive steps, and we will not initially worry ourselves about defining many of the terms that we use, hoping that they will be clarified in the course of this exposé; (2) the argument unfolds as a descriptive statement of the *general* mechanisms of the ideology, but the point of departure assumes that they operate in the bosom of class relations. Therefore, one will speak of groups and classes in a relatively undifferentiated manner, with the understanding that the dynamics of groups are related to those of classes.

B. *Ideology and Class: A Note on the Structure of the Ideological Process*

The responses of a class in a situation of a sharpening of class struggle (and, in this case, also that of strata and groups which are relatively differentiable in society) are subject to a double determination: (1) to the degree of difficulty of the conflict which the class struggle presents; (2) to the specific

efficacy of the ideology organically channeled in the strategy of the groups in conflict (especially, but not exclusively, the parties). The sum of these, in the final analysis, refers to an accumulation of mediations which come together in the question of the *limits* imposed by the position that the classes occupy in the structure of production (and the role of the other sectors in the total structure of the division of social labor), to the consciousness which can be reached by the classes in the course of the conflicts (possible consciousness). That obliges one, from an analytic point of view, to make a clarification, at least a tentative one, of a double sequence: (a) to make the question of the way in which a class is conceived explicit — what forms it as such? (a problem of class consciousness in the "definition" of classes); and (b) to make the meaning of what is understood here by (ideological) *domination* ("hegemony") explicit.

Related to the question of the possible consciousness — and of the maximum consciousness possible (Goldman 1966) for specific groups in specific social relations, is the question of ideologies, the extent to which they are constituents of the coherent field which, in the end, "defines" the classes as a "collective will" (Gramsci 1974). In other words, it deals with the role of ideologies insofar as they: (a) operate as *elusions* (elusion structure) helping maintain the coherence of the information that a certain type of (possible, thinking of collectives) consciousness can accept without plotting against the group's identity; (b) act as "constituents" of a certain collective consciousness, and insofar as they define the field of identity.¹

¹ One eludes information which could place the integrity of the group as such in danger, be it by way of distortion — even aberrant: "I am not a Marxist because I am a living being and I believe in God" or by way of flat denial — "I'm not going to discuss it with you because you can convince me," etc. That is, what is generally known by the name of "selective perception" in psychology, and what Martín-Baró calls "selective disattention" (Martín-Baró 1976). One can also include the dissimulation-concealment (although dissimulation is, more properly, an overall resultant of the ideological function) of that which forms the objective base of the

In that sense, it is clear that a definite relation exists between the positive aspects (constituents) and the negative ones (eluent), in terms of an inclusion-exclusion process, which determines the type of consciousness possible (and, therefore, also the "maximum consciousness possible") in given social situations, which include class confrontation.

Therefore, the question of the role of ideologies is also related to the thematic notion of *hegemony* ("ideological domination"), conceived as the specific efficacy of the use of ideology — that is, of the mechanisms of reinforcement/constitution (positive) and those of elusion/concealment (negative), in relation to other collectives, in the form of a supra-ordinating connection of anticipated neutralization. That implies: (a) that the ideological function does not hover in the air; that it becomes possible in the relationships of the classes among themselves, and of classes and groups; (b) the ideological process and, therefore, ideological domination, presuppose and require the existence of a system of associations, a supporting structure, to be operative, all of which serves to constitute/reinforce and elude/conceal the bases of the material existence of classes in their relations with other collectives (classes, groups).

The central idea, then, in the *total* characterization of the role of ideologies, refers to the indication that they operate, establishing the *closure* of the passage of information which could affect group coherence, its identity as such (eventually, its disintegration, its lack of identity), based on the organization of a protective structure which shapes the categories for

group's existence. In the bourgeois' case, for example the organization of the relationships of production is based on exploitation — insofar as its unveiling can provoke a collapse at the level of the ethical-ideological relationships and, therefore, affect the coherence of the group, and then, the process of disintegration begins. And with respect to the "constituent" aspects, it is a question of the forms in which the perceptions of the group's active (or passive) identity is generated, shaping it as such and not only as a mere aggregate of individuals. That is, aspects that generate the "identification code" (language, styles of behavior, estate distance; but especially, the shape of the general categories of intellection, etc.), beginning with which the individuals feel a part of the group.

understanding what is real. Therefore, there is an "outward" function of the group, which can also penetrate other groups, as well as an "inward" one, as requisites for maintaining identity; that is, in the last analysis, the coherence of the group in action. At the same time, it can be pointed out that closure is determined by the relationship of some classes with the others, and with the "world" which class relationships produce and express (for example, the force of a republican-democratic system of widened participation). This means including the conflictive class relationships as they unfold, as well as *their product* (structures of "coexistence"). It is precisely starting from these complex relationships (conflict/coexistence) that the role of the ideologies, as mechanisms oriented dialectically toward maintaining the identity (opposition/attraction) during coexistence, becomes obvious. Thus, it can be stated that the role of intellectuals — understanding the term in an ample sense (organic intellectuals) (Gramsci 1947b) consists basically of *assuring closure*, by means of elusion, etc., as well as by means of "creation" (for example, organizations, etc.).

This complex function is, then, contradictory, or better yet, it is based on a contradictory structural situation (the antagonism of classes), and is formulated as a need — namely, the need, derived from the level of socialization, whose axes are the school and family, and whose cradle is the class structure derived from the relations of production to assure the coherence of the world which forms the collective "for itself" (insomuch, as a definite class, etc.). The "authenticity" of the group (class) is defined in a "Lockean" way as a process, and in the interplay between its relations and what is real, it can only be expressed insofar as it is capable of maintaining coherence in what is a task which stops, as well as passes on information, a task that characterizes the role of ideology in the "constitution" of the class as such. A class, and therefore a (specific) class consciousness, presupposes, ontologically at least an "identification code"

(an ideology and a protective structure which shape categories for understanding what is real and define the scope of their possible action). It is thus clear that the role of intellectuals (and more amply, of class organizations, in their different forms and expressions) consists of assuring closure, with which the "class" world" (its consciousness) is continually reinforced and formed, and information is avoided which can affect its coherence by placing it as evidence before its own contradiction, that is, its necessity.

In this sense, class consciousness, even though it can be initially understood as the result of an "imputation" (Lukács 1975), is not merely something constructed intellectually, nor a product of the researcher's need to organize a model which permits him to "comprehend" the social action according to its meaning (Weber 1969), but a *result*, understood as an "objective possibility" of the form of the class's existence, which is verified in accordance with the peculiarities of the development of the productive forces and the *forms* in which the latter unfold in the interplay of the specific contradictions which the relations of production assume in time and space.

Class consciousness appears then, as a result of the form of class existence, and the latter is defined first, at ground level, in a relational way. It is the contradiction inherent in its "objective" existence — particularly in the case of the bourgeois — which constitutes its possible world of movement, insofar as the essential characteristics of the organizational form of the relations of production define the limits of possible perception, beyond which it runs the risk of being converted into another thing. This is why the revolutionary task of the party assumes the character of a "cultural revolution," in which what is at stake is making the objective bases of class existence, that is, the nature of exploitation, evident. Precisely to the extent in which that places the capacity for *rational* (ethical-rational) perception of the subjects, an apparent mask of bourgeois existence, in contradiction

with the irrationality of the organization of the relations of production. In that sense, it is not a case, then, of the "construction" (of the character of an "ideal type"), but rather of a latent, constant tension, which is inherent to the bourgeois' existence as a part of an antagonistic class structure, which to be substituted as such, requires an unfolding of the protective structure which continuously avoids the possibility of a "raw" confrontation, if we may use the expression, with reality. This is the role of ideology in the formation of the "class world," that is, the (possible) class consciousness as such (the bourgeois).²

Groups — classes — are not alone in the world. The world is defined as oppositions, relations, articulations (the world, by definition, is a *social* world, that is, it implies some form of coexistence among groups and, therefore, the necessity of some function of closure). The need to assure coherence and, therefore, the necessity of a function of closure, only occur insofar as the world (society) is formed as opposition and connectiveness, as similarity and difference, and specifically, as class struggle. It is then, in the last analysis, the latter which defines the need for closure, and the opposition between antagonistic classes which requires a certain coherence, which should be maintained through the establishment and validity of a certain identity code — that is, an ideology (understood as a "block": organization/ideology).

The latter is not hovering in pure air, nor in the air of pure reasoning. On the contrary, the relationship rests, neces-

² The bourgeois for example, therefore, cannot even accept its ideology — to see itself as an exploiting class, and this is what defines the closure: its own possibility of coherence which, as an unavoidable requirement, occurs at the level of action (and of the perception of what is rational and irrational). In other words, it runs the risk of disintegrating ideologically to the extent in which it can recognize its condition, which is what defines it as such. Its "false" conscience (which is, according to Lukács, also and paradoxically, its "real" conscience). It is from this that the bourgeois necessarily forms itself as a class "in itself," that is, that generates and functions on the basis of an ideology and a defense structure which is defined in terms of the dialectic of what is "positive/negative," which we have alluded to so briefly.

sarily, on the fact that antagonism, class struggle, evolves from those differences which are the "in itself" of the group (the structure of the productive relationships based on exploitation). The function of assurance consists essentially of the intelligent defense of the end point, and the need to extend the limit — as a strategic maneuver (or tactic/strategy) which, in chess, is directed toward occupying the center and displacing the adversary, with the goal of assuring one's own future position. The "code" which, in its operation, determines the character of the "for itself" (in the sense that it protects it and, therefore, contributes to its continued existence and reproduction) is the result of the need to assure what is essential of the "in itself," insofar as the "for itself" is the consciousness of the "in itself" (the consciousness, in the bourgeois' case, necessarily deformed, of their relational existence), and therefore the consciousness (even though it may be "unconsciously," as Lukács would say) (Lukács 1975) of the danger which the existence of another opposing group, the proletariat, carries or can carry within for its existence. The "in-and-of-itself" and the "for itself" are reciprocal functions, if we may use the expression, and their result is the use of closure.

In situations of sharp class struggle, characterized by a popular mobilization, these decisions, presented here in a way which is, of necessity, synthetic, that is caricatured, are clearly made explicit. The popular mobilization, especially if it is directed by class parties and even more when it is expressed through legitimate channels of participation, wrenched away as successes of the popular struggle, carries the contradictions to the end point. When this happens, and the critical threshold is reached, class consciousness also reaches its end point, and the identification code is polarized, making its internally contradictory character clear, and consequently, permitting examples such as: "I'm not a Marxist because I'm a living creature and I believe in God," or even, "I'm not going to discuss it with you because you can convince me."

Class struggle, in its critical level, which is reached by a process of growing antagonism, sharpens the efficacy of ideologies and the protective structures, as well as makes their limits evident, causing the full unfolding of the irrationality of the dominant class and middle layers attracted by the functioning of the hegemony. That is to say, contradiction demands in certain situations the distortion of all information and the denial of dialogue. It demands the rupturing of reason; that is, it represents the necessity/demand of a maximum irrationality, precisely as an expression of the (maximum) "rationality" which the objective situation, that determines the character of the operations of the code (ideology), may reach. It is a case, therefore, of the "rationality" of an irrational behavior, measured, of course, in terms of a norm which is no good, in this case, for the preservation of the group as such. At the same time, it unfolds as a demand to close ranks, in a corporative way.³

All this means that the maximum danger for a group — concretely, the bourgeois — forms a critical point, from the point of view of its hegemony, and that it consists of the possibility that the closure will be broken. When the closure is broken, group coherence also breaks down and, therefore, places its own existence in danger. The identification code ideology, implies a tacit norm, like Ross's "ultimate constitutional norm" (Ross 1963) which defines irrational ("rational") behavior as necessary every time that group coherence is in danger if one stays in the realm of coexistence (more clearly expressed in maintaining a democratic system of widened participation — democratic rationality).

³ This is the irrationality of fascism, the form of irrationality which is possible for the bourgeois in the acute moment of class struggle. The moment demands passion, the radical mobilization of the bourgeois (cf. Mattelart 1974), which then becomes strictly irrational from the point of view of its interests and strictly irrational from the point of view of "normality" — and with this, also with respect to its apparent ideological predicaments (positive, in the sense of coexistence, which is naturally conflictive, but only up to a certain degree) which are expressed in democratic mechanisms of widened participation.

The danger that the identification code may not be so explicit, or its validity may be permeated by the rationality of (democratic) coexistence, in such a way that it permits the political development of the proletariat and the attraction, in turn, of middle strata which are ideologically subordinated to the bourgeois, is the biggest danger to the bourgeois' very existence. And it is its "possible" consciousness which best defines the ideological character of the bourgeois' intellectual thinking: the fact of always being used above the abyss, and therefore, necessarily by way of an ambivalent dialectic. This is because of the necessity to articulate two different codes: the code of (bourgeois) identification and the code of (democratic) coexistence. This makes it tend continuously towards forms of nonconflictive corporativist integration, but also, as is revealed in critical situations, takes it to an extreme point: it tends towards fascism, and in the limiting case, it becomes fascist.

To the extent in which (democratic) coexistence, and therefore the code of coexistence, understood in its concrete form — that is, as a democratic system — assumes and expresses a certain rationality in the collective behavior which eliminates political irresponsibility, and by the fact, on the other hand, that the identification code continuously (in "normal" situations) requires reference to it for its optimum ("soft") operation — that is, to "run the limit" toward the middle strata, oriented by the ("democratic") "order", a zone is really formed starting from which ideology's character and role is defined, which is expressed as a struggle for hegemony, understood as "direction". To the extent in which the coexistence code is, by its own nature, rational — that is, refers to the "general interest" the dialectic of the ideological operation oscillates between the rational and the irrational, between the interest in survival of the bourgeois as such, as opposed to other groups, and the interest in the conservation of the rationality which a democracy expresses, and which, in a certain sense and to a certain extent,

"soften" its possibility of attraction, that is, maintain the alternative of a coherence that does not need to fly off to the level of the irrational. But, at the same time, the development of democracy — a product of the dynamics of class relationships — opens the possibility of the political development of the proletariat and, with this, in the limiting case, also endangers bourgeois existence (Moreno Rivas 1975). Such is, then, the contradictory space in which hegemony is permanently played in a class society.

We have tried to lay down the theoretical-analytical foundations necessary to discuss the question of the relation between the "objective" existence (at the base) of the classes, (possible) consciousness and the mediative role of ideology, emphasizing the bourgeois' situation. Thus, we have a "block," mediated by ideology and the protective structures, which shape and channel tensions derived from the foundation — which defines the "objective" existence of the bourgeois vis-à-vis the proletariat — and the requirement of coherence, necessary for the efficacy of the action in the bosom of the class struggle. From this perspective:

1. (Possible) class consciousness is expressed, then, by the intermediation of ideology and protective structures, as a field with defined limits which only admits certain information, and not others (the dialectics of perception and selective inattention);
2. On the other hand, this same constriction, which is played in a *permanent* effort to attract other groups and classes, as well as a permanent reinforcement in the bosom of its own ranks — and which is carried out in the bosom of the antagonism toward the proletariat — leads to an immanently contradictory situation, derived from the need to maintain the alternative of attraction as a (functional) strategy of lower cost for maintaining the system in its entirety;

3. It, then, generates a latent tendency toward corporativism as well, as the seed of its own destruction, when it is expressed in the development of coexistence (democratization) in addition to identification;
4. Opening the way, in this manner, for the political development of the proletariat, in critical situations of a decisive class struggle, it unfolds in an irrational way revealing its internal contradiction: thus constituting fascism;⁴
5. This means, finally, that hegemony — understood as being the specific efficacy of the interplay of ideology in relation to other collectives — reveals its limits: it no longer takes its shape (is carried out) in the form of a supraordinating bond of anticipated (therefore, "legitimate") neutralization, but becomes purely irrational and unleashed violence;
6. In its development, it can even reach the point in which, instead of keeping the support of certain middle strata, it loses it, the latter depending, of course, also on the form in which the political action of the proletariat is reconstituted.

Seen from this point of view, hegemony, more than appearing as an attribute, appears as a process, and specifically, as a process which, from the bourgeois' point of view, unfolds with the goal of impeding the generalization of democratic rationality — that is, in the final analysis, the political organization of the proletariat as such. But this leads us to a second approach, in which we will attempt to show the link between domination (ideological, that is, hegemony) and its organizational forms. Or if you wish, a tentative analysis of hegemony understood as a "block" — organization/ideology.

⁴ The bourgeois orients itself toward suppressing the conflict, by excluding it or limiting it — by way of limited participation, restricting citizens' rights, etc., or by abolishing the forms of democratic participation. That is usually expressed in the creation of mechanisms of integration of a corporative type. In the limiting case, of course, the "exclusion" of the conflict is managed through the physical suppression of the enemy.

C. *Hegemony and Organization*

We have characterized the function of hegemony three ways so far: as (ideological) *domination*, as the "specific efficacy of the interplay of ideology," and as a *process* — that is, in its entirety as an expression of the struggle of classes to attract support and simultaneous reinforcement from its own ranks. It would be interesting to bring out two aspects of this general characterization: (a) the one referring to its character of "supraordinating bond of anticipated neutralization;" and (b) its need, therefore, to materialize as an organization.

Hegemony constitutes a process of struggle for *ideological control* — that is, for the effort of hiding and concealment — in class struggle and, in this sense, it emerges as domination. What is understood by domination? A first attempt at answering this question will lead us to emphasize the role of the organization in its characterization, and finally to propose the idea that domination can only be understood — that is, only takes on meaning when one understands it, as a system oriented towards guaranteeing obedience, or rather, coherence in collective action.

One has to realize that "domination" has a different meaning in liberal theory than it does in Marxist theory, a different meaning in the theory of elites than in liberal theory. From our point of view it is advisable: (a) to try to show the differences underlying these lines of thought; and (b) show how they are not necessarily exclusive, as an analysis of the unfolding of Marxist theory will allow one to see. We do not intend to state the problem here, but only point it out — insofar as it is necessary within the framework of our presentation.

Perhaps this treatment would be clearer if we only contrasted two of its overall meanings: domination/exploitation and domination/organization (note: we are using these names provisionally).

Within the liberal tradition — which in its reactionary form, ever since Constant, ends up as the classic theory of elites (Pareto, Mosca, Michels), there is a fundamental tendency which links the idea of power to the one of (legitimate) authority. Ever since Locke, who understood power as refering to the *right* (the individual's as well as the government's) [nowadays we would say the State's] to make decisions within their competence (and to which extent they constitute norms of authority, the organisms of decision also being, in this sense, ["legitimate"]) authorities, as opposed to those "authorities" and decisions that exceed the accepted [valid] field of competency) — up until Weber — who distinguishes between legitimate and nonlegitimate domination, based on, again, the existence of a minimally valid (accepted) order versus a mere nonauthorized determination (which is expressed in the forms of monopoly and, more amply, the constellation of interests), relationships of power (domination) have been seen basically in the field of overall societal *competencies* (accepted by individuals), or rather, politics.

It is no accident that the analysis of nonlegitimate forms of power (domination) have not been able to reach the same level of treatment as the legitimate forms, and that when one attempts to analyze them, they always appear in reference to their norm, that is, to legitimate power. Their unveiling, in capitalist societies, in which decisions are dictated as a consequence of the internal laws of capitalism, and not primarily as a result of some type of legitimacy derived from acceptance, might have also meant the unveiling of the economic structure of the class society, that is, the uncovering of exploitation. But this is not possible without entering directly into the enemy's — that is, the proletariat's — terrain. It is precisely Marxism which lays bare the fact that forms of domination and power, including the legitimate ones, derive from the economic structure of society, and that "legitimate" powers respond, in the last analysis, to its decisions. When this is treated by Marxists, at the same time that the proletariat's

political organization is developed, and thus, it constitutes a movement for democracy and socialism, it will *already* be expressed as class struggle, that is, as a struggle for the democratization of society and the political system, as a struggle to abolish the foundations of inequality, and therefore, of the domination which is erected on the foundation of exploitation.

The answer which we are interested in bringing out here, expressed in the theory of elites, will assume the utopianism and improbability of democracy and socialism, on the basis of an argument which would insist on the fact that relationships of domination constitute a fact about the very existence of the society, that is, wherever some type of complex organization is formed. Domination here, coincides with authority; that is, it is tied, in general, to the idea of organization, and in particular, to the idea of political organization. Fashioning itself in the form of, "domination/organization," which, in short, refers to the reactionary thesis according to which the dominant or dominated character of a class does or does not pass through the control of the command positions in the State, and not necessarily through the control of the means of production.

From our point of view, there is something true in this, that is, more precisely in the fact that every type of domination expresses itself in some form of organization, even though it is necessary to explain that its character — egalitarian or discriminatory — depends on the economic structure of society, and specifically, on the form in which basic societal relationships, relationships of production, are organized. From this point of view, the notion of domination unfolds in at least two levels, the first of which is precisely related to the *fundamental organizational forms of capitalist society*. A capitalist productive regime, because of its own assumptions, implies a certain way of organizing work relationships which is based on the appropriation of added values and which determines the subjects' conduct, in which case the work itself is converted

into merchandise. The subjects' "obedience" is thus obtained, as the "natural" result of the constituent characteristics of the capitalist productive regime, without some specific form, particularly destined to guarantee it, being necessary at this level. The subordination of work to capital occurs as a consequence of the laws of the functioning of the capitalist productive regime, and it is, in this sense, that the latter does not require "extra-economic coercion" ("domination/exploitation").

But this is only one step in the analytical process: the capitalist productive regime is internally contradictory, and therefore generates the objective possibility of organizing the exploited through its own dynamics. When the development of productive powers and the complexity which it assumes in the form of certain relationships of production make the proletariat's organization possible, the guarantee systems' need for the obedience of the proletariat — and, in general, of the different sectors and strata subject to capitalist exploitation — becomes obviously explicit, manifesting themselves in attempts of a corporativist character (which try to hide the antagonism of the constituent classes) as well as in forms of hegemony oriented toward "attraction," without excluding, of course, repression and coercion. Of course, a productive society based on exploitation also forms a system of domination, and it is expressed as the productive organization itself, subject to "market" laws. But the guarantee of obedience — its efficacy — is not (relatively) complete, given that capitalist exploitation carries within itself the very seed of its destruction, insofar as it generates continued tension toward the organizing of the proletariat. Thus, the State (eventually some organized group or, in any case, an organization or some organizing complex) constitutes the maximum guarantee of obedience and subordination, and that forms the "general" instance of domination ("domination/organization"), which the theory of elites presents as a universal constant.

The "realist" perspective (Burnham), in this way, frac-

tures what is real, segmenting it and separating the "domination/organization" form — considered at the level of political organization, that is of the State (Michels, Mosca, Pareto), or rather of the organization *in general* (Dahrendorf) — from the real bases which give it meaning and define its character (Vianello 1974), that is, from the forms of "domination/exploitation." One tries then, to present *one aspect* of what is real, of the concrete totality which society constitutes (and perhaps in its most visible and, in a certain sense, most outward expression), as if it were, without more ado, what was decisive and permanent in the former.

But it is an important aspect, and it is worth pointing out: even though it is presented as a pure form of domination (and, in this sense, I am hinting at something outward), it is also true that its content — the one which harbours and assures exploitation, because of its own nature, shaped by the existence of antagonistic classes — *requires* an "outward" unfolding. This means that it also expresses an instance of real determination: the "domination/organization" is the unfolding, within the society as a whole, of the fundamental structure of the latter, that is, of the organization of the work relationships based on exploitation.

Weber (Weber 1969) is the one who has presented the concept of domination, in its different aspects, in the most clear and systematic manner. It is a good idea, then, to briefly characterize his treatment, attempting to recover what there is of value. If the conceptualization of the "phenomena" of power, domination, etc., are commonly made and understood, under the simplifying assumption that those terms falsely represent bilateral, formal relationships between actors, the advantage of the Weberian notion lies in the fact that he conceives domination as a complex social relationship in which there is at least a director — and, eventually, an administrative cadre — oriented toward assuring compliance of the "order," which is understood to be legitimate, that is, accepted.

The typology of the (legitimate) domination then, is presented as a characterization of the general forms of relationship oriented toward guaranteeing obedience (Cuéllar 1971). Obedience is obtained in a regular way when: (a) there is a minimum level of acceptance of the order's validity (legitimacy); and (b) an administrative cadre, an organization, exists which is charged with carrying out the order. Evidently, this implies that a system of sanctions — as informal as these may be — exists which are in the charge of the administrative cadre and are applied when there is insubordination. But, on the other hand, it also implies that obedience is guaranteed, in the limiting situation, *when the administrative cadres accept the validity of the order*. They are the ones who, in the last analysis, have the guarantee mechanisms against even insubordination. Likewise, in it lies the real instance of determination which the exposition of the domination, understood as "domination/organization," is indirectly taken as the defining factor of the relationship.

On the contrary, the perspective which recognizes, in the state, a general system of guarantees *of the basic structure of society* — and does not merely see in it a permanent shaping of all forms of domination, independently of the base — also recognizes the fact that the obedience of subordinates (that is, definitively and seen in a way which is surely static, the *result* of the function of hegemony and of coercion) is based on the unfolding of the differentiated organizational forms which support the entire society. In this sense, "domination" goes together with "organization", only that the characterization is not used up in the segmentalized contemplation of its reality — joined ideologically, in the elitist (and also Weberian) perspective, to the State or to the organization in general. Thus, the opposition of "domination/exploitation" to "domination/organization" is diluted, no longer appearing as entities which are completely separable. Rather, it would seem that if domination is always expressed as an organization, it unfolds as much at the level of the productive or-

ganization itself (domination/exploitation) as at that of the general systems *guaranteeing obedience* of the exploited (domination/organization) where, without a doubt, it assumes relatively autonomous and specific forms, without exactly giving up being an unfolding of "reflection" forms (Lukács) of the domination which is identified with exploitation.

Seen from our perspective, this has a double meaning: (a) that domination can be understood as a reciprocal relationship of organization and a minimally legitimate (accepted) "normativity," as a "consensus" about a set of norms and values and as a supporting structure for its unfolding and completion which, in the last analysis, can even rest solely *on the organization of the consensus in the bosom of the administrative cadre* (Hume 1964), at the base as well as the superstructure level, being included in the forms which we have designated here, generically, as "domination/exploitation" and "domination/organization;" and (b) one of resulting ones, derived from the existence of a system or from a complex of systems whose purpose is to assure obedience, lies in the fact that it will be expressed as a continuous effort to *expand* acceptance of the "order" among the members of the relationship, in which case it can be seen, from our point of view as a process, and specifically as a dialectic of attraction (acceptance) and rejection, appearing as a complex in which what is "legitimate" and what is "illegitimate" are joined in what is real, that is, in the bosom of the organization which they form as well as with respect to the role which the latter fulfills in the field of class struggle.

As to the process of attraction and rejection, it also plays in the bosom of the contradictory tendencies which, from the bourgeois' point of view, make it oscillate between corporatism and democracy, between the need to attract, thus maintaining the possibility of bourgeois subsistence and runaway irrationality. This way of understanding domination presupposes, then, a redefinition of its biased meaning, in order to

conceive it as the form which class struggle acquires and assumes as a continuous process as well as a permanent effort (Miliband 1971) to attract and reject support from opposing sectors — or, for the case in hand, especially the intermediate ones — as well as that related to its own ranks. Understood as such, hegemony (ideological domination) shows itself to be a *structured* process, linked to the “validity of the order” (the identity code) and supported in the organization which constitutes it as a system guaranteeing the “obedience of subordinates,” that is, a system guaranteeing collective obedience which emerges as a “configuration of supra-ordinating linking of anticipated neutrality.” If the function of hegemony presupposes an essentially contradictory relationship, expressed in the antagonistic efforts of the unveiling-hiding of the basic social organization — that is, exploitation it can only materialize insofar as it unfolds, at the same time and as facets of the same movement, on the basis of a certain “normativity” — an identity code, in the aforementioned sense of defined limits, and on the basis of the organization which backs it, guaranteeing obedience, that is, the coherence of the group as such. And its play is in the space of coexistence — or rather, of the contradictory situation of conflict and coexistence always oscillating between tendencies toward corporativist forms permeated with (democratic) coexistence and forms of coherence achieved in the limiting case, when class struggle becomes more acute by runaway irrationality.⁵

⁵ The function of hegemony is expressed as much as a latent tension toward the corporativization of worker-employer relations, in its different shapes and possibilities (suppression of union organizations and its substitution by “representation” nominated from above, efforts at co-opting the leadership, etc.), as it is also, and simultaneously, expressed as an effort to attract the social-cultural, and especially the political level, in the struggle to maintain control of the State and to wall in, restrict or deviate the democratization of the political system. While its unfolding at the level of productive organization cannot be complete, because of the very character of capitalist development and the political organization of the proletariat, it needs, then, to take the form of attraction at the level of political society. However, here also, political struggle appears as class struggle, and the tendency toward corporati-

The ideological process is, then, a structured process and it takes the form of a "block" (ideology and organization). Hegemony, understood as the specific efficacy of putting the ideology into play — and therefore, as a process of class struggle in one of its dimensions, oriented towards attracting support and reinforcing its own ranks by exercising "closure," also forms a system capable of guaranteeing coherence. In this sense, a process of *ideological control* also figures within its own ranks as a form of "pure" domination which does not exclude but rather requires some form of coercion. But it is necessary to insist on its dynamic character. To think of it as a "type," or in other words as a "structure," could also lead one to consider it — and in a concrete way — as something static and in a certain sense "prepotent" (which proceeds in a sole direction and in an overwhelming way). It is not a question of a univocal and unidirectional relationship, but of a reciprocal relationship where the fundamental actors are the social classes, conceived of as "totalities" — that is, as much "in itself" as "for itself," as a unit of action, or at least of "aspirations of the collective will" — *in the class struggle*. Hegemony takes part, then, in the process of class struggle and as an aspect of class struggle.

vization and control is limited by legitimization (and, in this sense, relative autonomization) of the democratic system, which is thus presented as the determination of the class struggle at a middle level, as its objective product. If this is expressed as the expansion of the democratic characteristics of the political system, the doors are opened to the stampede of irrationality, and the bourgeois' alternatives are reduced, more and more, to a fascist type corporativization, that is, in the last analysis, to the unfolding of the class coherence in the form of "rational" irrationality, which we have alluded to before. The armed forces form themselves, in this way, the "last bastion" of the bourgeois, in virtue of its special corporative characteristics. Hegemony is supported and centered on the State structures which are functionally corporativist. The army's system of authority, in this sense, is like a privileged field in which class struggle is played as a process of ideological control inside the ranks themselves, as well as a form of domination which passes on to favor the coercion.

III. The Military, Corporativism and Class Struggle

A. *The Processes of Corporativism and the Function of Hegemony: The Armed Forces*

Systems guaranteeing obedience tend to assume corporative forms, that is, to eliminate insubordination and rejection, establishing the organization's character of group spirit (*esprit de corps*) *in the bosom of the function which is carried out*, passing up internal differentiations, which could be determining conflicting interests. Its characteristic feature consists of redefining the differences as correlative (but not conflictive) with respect to the overall function which the parts perform, which is presented, thus, as the overcoming of the contradictions in the synthesis of the organ which they form. Unions — corporativism's norm — glue even antagonistic interests clouding the real basis (that is, exploitation) of the functional organization, which is emphasized through the issuance of an "order" which is understood as legitimate in its very principle of existence and through the unfolding of an organizational structure which backs its being carried out. That leads to the privilege of centralized authority being in the cupola of the organization. Forms of corporative organization manifest themselves as a *latent and recurrent* tendency in the very bosom of the productive organization, as an attempt therefore to eliminate conflict at the base level.

Nevertheless, at this level, corporativism has its limits: development of productive forces tends to dissolve it, giving way to classist organizations (but the latter are also subject to the inertia of the organization's existence, including the classist organization par excellence — the party, which expresses the development of the proletariat's political consciousness (bureaucratization, the cupola's authority over the base, etc.)). But — more important than this, and on top of this — the

fact is that, in the dialectic of class struggle and conflict, the development of democratic forms — as its objective product — generates a field where, once again, the concrete totality which society constitutes is segmented as an unfolding of its productive structure, and therefore, as a straightening out and a (relative) “*reflectional*” autonomization (in the sense in which Lukács [1975], Kofler and eventually also Kosik [1967] use the expression) of the different levels of exploitation as domination and as a function of hegemony. That leads in relation to the real dynamics of class society, to the configuration of the “autonomous” organizational structures, separate from the relationship of exploitation, that is, to the possibility of a full unfolding of the systems of obedience as *functional systems*, closed to the outside and apparently, although from a certain point of view, in a real sense also, separate from the classes and class struggles.

They constitute, then, systems guaranteeing collective obedience, configurations of supraordinating linking of anticipated neutrality. And they do it assuming a *general form*, which is expressed in the organizational diagrams of centralized authority. Thus, although they can be presented as being immediately separate from fundamental economic relationships, in the last analysis they do not, for that reason, stop obeying a double determination: (a) on the one hand, the one that the entire society experiences insofar as it *unfolds from its basic economic structure* and from the form of the organization of the fundamental — that is, productive — social relationships, constituting the complex which guarantees the obedience as well as the coherence of the action (of the organization, and finally of the instances in which the bourgeois’ very existence is attained); (b) that derived from the very dynamics of the organization as such, as an articulated system of linked obediences, that is, capable of assuming a certain autonomy, a specific step insofar as its development — or if one wishes, its existence in time — succeeds in establishing

the routine of coherence founded on obedience, as a functional requisite of its own existence.⁶

Therefore, while the systems guaranteeing obedience are (apparently) not linked with exploitation, that is, they are not found in the very bosom of the productive organizations, the possibility of corporativization can be even greater, as a *normal* tendency and configuration of hierarchical relationships. It can assume even a base of state-functional (separation-linking) distancing of the equalized subjects through the performance of a function which, if it separates them, only does it so in virtue of *efficacy* (founded along lines of authority), but not in virtue of exploitation. This is especially clear in the professionalized armed forces which, today, constitute the fundamental pillar of the State, understood as a complex oriented toward guaranteeing the general "obedience" and coherence of "society," because in order to assure the fulfillment of essential social functions; a society, apart from coming together — as a result of the different and contradictory interests that constitute it — as "legitimacy," or democracy, it is also expressed as an exigency to maintain armed institutions which rest on structures and schemes capable of consolidating them in their own role: the supreme instance of unification, in the case of insubordination.⁷

⁶ Sociological ideology sees, here, the shape of closed, coherent systems, at most with a "systemic" ("input-output") or teleologic link with its "environment," falling again into the segmentalization of what is real in the organization, and separating it from that which gives it sustenance and defines its meaning (cf. Vianello 1974).

⁷ In capitalist society, which rests on a certain principle of "rational" and "entrepreneurial" organization oriented toward profits, the productive organization acquires a type of organization directed toward *maximum efficacy* based on the rational calculation of interests, a type which is generalized, constituting the very "prototype" of the organization, for any kind of activity, including, of course, military organizations, specifically the professionalized and bureaucratized ones. Except that the latter set themselves up as a system dedicated exclusively to guaranteeing the obedience of society as a whole, as an "ultima ratio." And to this end, they need to set themselves up as a system guaranteeing *the total obedience in its own ranks*. Only in this way can its role be fulfilled in a general way, in the service of the State's apparatuses as a whole and, therefore, also in the service of the economic and *social* system which it guarantees.

Armed institutions show a fundamental characteristic: their principle of articulation is not to be found in production, but in "pure" organization. The latter acquires the appearance of an organization with total authority and constitutes the very essence, the touchstone of institutional existence. He who attacks it (total authority), attacks the very principle of its existence, that is, its essence. In order to guarantee obedience, it has three conditions of privilege: (a) it does not rest directly on any form of exploitation of salaried labor, as an organizational system; (b) it boasts, by its own structure, of separation and distance from the State, with respect to society as a whole as well as within itself, assuring itself, to the utmost, of the full obedience of the troops ("classes"); (c) it has the "legitimate" monopoly of the control of violence, including itself as the ultimate instrument to guarantee its own coherence. It constitutes, then, a pure case of corporativization, capable of self-reproduction.⁸

This does not mean that there are not any problems: the fact that its development is done in a contradictory and unequal way is from the essence of what is real and, in this

⁸ From another perspective, which is elucidating in any case, Stinchcombe (1970) points out: "Thus we will expect institutions to replicate themselves to the degree that:

1. Powerful people secure successors of the same persuasion:
 - (a) by selection of their successors,
 - (b) by controlling socialization of their successors,
 - (c) by controlling the conditions of incumbency of their successors performing,
 - (d) by being heroes and ego-ideals to potential successors.
2. Powerful people influence popular belief:
 - (a) by controlling the content of resource-using media of socialization,
 - (b) by rationally devoting resources to long-run stability, because they defend the value full time,
 - (c) by shaping the conditions of socialization of the general population indirectly through the public's hopes for elite status and their hero worship.
3. Powerful people determine the structure of social activity:
 - (a) thereby serving other social functions besides the value in question,
 - (b) eliciting commitment to the activities, and hence to the values embodied in them."

case, from the function of hegemony; and the fact that it encounters resistance is from the essence of a system guaranteeing obedience. And this is why it exists in its specific form, and it is in order to crush it that its internal organization has been designed, in which professionalization fulfills a unique role. In the armed forces' case, its own structure presupposes this possibility, and moreover, anticipating it, it shapes itself. Here is the role of military ideology and its organizational support. The organizational structure of professional and bureaucratic military institutions is designed precisely to *suppress resistance* — including in a physical way — and this means a system of total hierarchy and totalitarian authority, which presupposes and requires a specific socialization *based on a corporative ideology of submissive integration* to "legitimate" authority (within the body, but eventually also with respect to civil authority, to the extent that the latter shows its efficacy, that is, its capacity to maintain subordination).

Such an ideology (conceived as a "block": ideology/organization), insofar as it embodies the very existence of the organization, as well as the possibility of its subsistence, defines the limiting thresholds of its action, that is, its field of coherence. The legitimacy of such an order does not presuppose *acceptance* by all the subordinates in its bosom, simply *obedience*. But in order to be really effective, it has to impress some sort of legitimacy — by consensus — on its members, and the more mechanical its result (obedience) is, the more the institutional existence is assured. In this particular sense, "legitimacy" should ideally be extended among officers and "classes," but, as a minimum, it is only necessary that it appears in the bosom of the officers. The army is not a democratic body: more precisely, it is the most antidemocratic organization that can exist. Submission/consensus is obtained by the integrating socialization of a corporativist character and by coercion, mediate or immediate. Legitimacy is *dictated*, it does not come from acceptance of the fundamentals. Hence the importance of total hierarchy and totalitarian authority.

In this sense, it constitutes a pure case of *domination*, which does not exclude the function of hegemony, which is all the more necessary insofar as: (a) its exigency is immediate efficacy and without distorting the order; and (b) its structuring, from a social point of view, supposes a differentiation between masses and officers which, conveniently, have different social origins in a professionalized army), and is united, in a corporative way, by established symbols of estate status; and (c) finally, as a body functionally separated from society and oriented by the principle of submission and the efficacy of the action, it is in objective opposition to the development of the democratization in society's bosom. And, precisely, the corporativizing exigency is reinforced in periods of crisis: except that there are no crises for corporative ideology, or if you wish, the possibility of crisis is its normalcy, which makes the unfolding of military ideology — understood as a "block": ideology/organization — particularly sensitive to "social conflict," class struggle, to the extent that it can undermine its own principle of subsistence, that is, the principle of total authority. We will repeat that once more: in the case of the professionalized and bureaucratized armed forces, the existence of an "order" and a totalitarian, antidemocratic hierarchy is a condition for the institution's existence, and this places it in objective contradiction, as a body, with the popular sectors and the proletariat, oriented toward democratic, egalitarian, "massive" forms of organization.

B. *Class Struggle, Democratization and Corporativization*

The continuous conflict between the tendency toward corporativization, in its multiple forms, and that of rupture/rejection (which may not assume a specific organic form) also affects the armed forces. Or more precisely, the situation of the class struggle is decisive for determining the form and level of the ideological struggle in the bosom of the armed

forces and the performance of the function of hegemony which its own organic structure channels.

In this sense, the accelerated democratization of political life, as a result of the proletariat's action, places the armed forces in a potentially conflicting situation, which can be seen, analytically, in two ways: (a) on the one hand, insofar as it alters its functional ties to the State's bosom, its ties to other State apparatuses and in this way, also to society; to the extent that the democratization reaches the State organs themselves, generating disorders in its functioning (executive-parliamentary conflicts, etc.); (b) at the same time, they affect it internally to the extent to which democratization constitutes a danger for its own existence, placing it in objective contradiction to itself, when threatening the very structure of totalitarian authority. The esprit de corps is threatened, particularly because democratization has influence on the subordinates — the "classes," and especially, the annual draft, as an unveiling function (a function, in this sense, of "hegemony") for the proletariat, insofar as the validity of an enlarged democratic system permits the free play of the latter's organization and political activity, at the same level of legitimacy which the State arrogates to itself.

The armed forces can appear, in a certain sense, as a neutral form, separated from the immediacy of the political struggle, when it is in a process of sharpening the class struggle, above all when the latter expresses itself by way of legitimate democratic mechanisms — thereby making room for a certain disarticulation of the State as well as for legitimacy in the bosom of the proletariat's activity, because of the very character of its organizational and ideological structure (which emphasizes professionalization, bureaucratization and functional corporativization) as well as because of the differentiated social composition of its cadres. But that really reflects the need, derived from its constitutive estimates, to reinforce its corporative characteristics. To that end, the degree of functional separation seems to increase with respect to the groups

in conflict and with respect to society as a whole. All of which, nevertheless, requires a particular tension and effort, all the more so because its social composition, from different class origins, in the daily nature of its private life and in the "normal" performance of its "public" roles which require it to fulfill other social functions "besides the value in question" (Stinchcombe 1970), is not ignorant of the class struggle (which, in its limiting case, transcends even the barriers of family, group, etc. solidarity).

Democratization does not occur as a pure result from the level of "coexistence". On the contrary, it is the product of class struggle, and moreover and at the same time, expresses the exacerbation of the class struggle. Its unfolding provides the bourgeois with the critical alternative in which its possibility of subsistence carries it like runaway irrationality. In this way, the continuity in the democratic character of the political system sees itself threatened by the form of existence of the bourgeois in the class society, which even requires the destruction of the system of coexistence for its preservation as such. The sharpening of the conflict therefore tends to carry the breaking up of the unit of the State and economic apparatus, particularly when democratization reaches not only the recognized instances of popular participation in the mechanisms which are directly political, but that it also affects the very axes of society, its very foundations, and it is expressed as a tendency toward the redefinition of the relationships of production (Moreno Rivas 1975).

When the class struggle reaches the critical point, the army's corporative characteristics are also subject to crushing tensions. This leads to the encouraging of tendencies toward intervention, all the more when proletariat and popular defense groups are organized. This constitutes the maximum threat for the military institutions *as a body*, that is, as systems of submissive obedience based on the principle of total authority. The corporative structure unfolds its specific function of hegemony to the limit, in its scheme to maintain the esprit

de corps. And the alternative of rupture thus makes the armed forces as a whole — but especially the officer ranks — confront the situation in which, objectively, the door is opened for runaway irrationality, which is expressed as the corporative rationality of the defense of its own existence.⁹

The danger of the shattering of the armed forces is, then, the touchstone, the critical point which corporative "consciousness" can reach — in this sense, as much a "reflection" as a form of defense of the structure of bourgeois society and its latent tendencies toward suppression of the conflict. Thus, corporative consciousness — which is, as such and in a moderate way, also a reflectional class consciousness — opens up to the perspective of a coup, that is, to the *predominance* of irrational (corporative, class) tendencies over the rational ones (democratic coexistence, oriented toward the true forms of equality).¹⁰

⁹ Nevertheless, one should not think that existing *real* alternatives assume, always and in every case, the form of irreconcilable duality. The very fact that the armed forces perform functions other than "the value in question" (Stinchcombe), that they serve, in a specific way, as a specialized organization, as well as the degree of legitimacy of the democratic system ("coexistence" system), which, in its unfolding, also legitimizes and permits the proletariat's action, can have important consequences with respect to the true course of the military action at the political level, depending, naturally, on the particular situations given in concrete cases. The possibility of success of a strategy of "institutional neutralization" by the military in a process of democratization (Moreno Rivas 1975) is not inconceivable. Neither is the fact that corporative action can assume a "progressive" character. To a great extent, the result and the orientation will depend — given a certain level of professional development and of sharpening of the class struggle — on a certain level of development of the productive forces and also of the strategies organically channeled by the groups in conflict, and in this case, especially the proletariat's (which in turn, will depend, to a great part, on its degree of political clarity the homogeneity of action, that is, of its collective rationality). From this point of view, what is trying to be pointed out here is that, even in the event of progressive orientations, what is relevant is to take note of the *corporative aspect* that defines the essence of the armed institution as an organization — and therefore, its own possibility of formal subsistence, and that leads to the point that solution tends to pass through the *preservation of the essential structure of the organization as such*. No one has yet seen, at least as far as we know, a case of a professional and bureaucratized army which dissolves itself of its own accord.

¹⁰ That, at the same time, constitutes a movement that is expressed and conceives itself as the "true" rationality, unfolding itself as the "normalization" of society by way of an activity that leads to the domination of the

The attraction which generates the proletariat's activity and rationality, even if it can acquire meaningful importance, is, then, hindered by the peculiar efficacy of the corporative structure mounted on the base of the "pure" organization, identified ideologically with the nation as a whole and, therefore, functionally linked to the class interests that the State protects, and in the last analysis *assures* at the point, by the corporativization of the armed forces. Military corporativism is constructed and defined to suppress resistance, including physically. The probability that progressive tendencies triumph in the bosom of the military organization is threatened by the former's very own structure. All this does not mean, as is obvious, the ultimate impossibility of all attempts at "penetration" and permeation, but rather, it makes evident the lack or difficulty of encountering ways of designing and channeling a strategy of demythologizing corporative consciousness in the bosom of the military institution.

At the beginning of this study, we pointed out that a class' — and for the case in point, functional groups' and levels' — responses in situations of class struggle are as subject to the decision, derived from the degree of sharpening that the former assumes, as to that of the specific efficacy or the ideology organically channeled into the strategies of the groups in conflict, although it is necessary to state precisely this all refers to the proletariat's political action. One would have to recognize a double movement with respect to the bourgeois: (a) on the one hand, what can be called in a certain sense,

State over society; or as an attempt at the (re)unification of society, in the form of a generalized corporativization of the latter, under the shelter and protection of military corporativism. Therefore, the tendencies, in South American military coups which were carried out by highly professionalized and bureaucratized armed forces, toward the "segmentary corporativization" of society and the relationship between the State and society (O'Donnell 1975) — in what would appear to be an attempt to organize society as a *reflection* of the military organization itself, with its particular connotations of hierarchy, total authority and the differentiated functional stratification of the (antagonistic) social groups in conflict.

the "automatism of *reflection*" of the productive structure, site of society's basic configuration, which *changes things*, without emphasizing, then, the "willful" and conscious aspect that a strategy expresses, in order to give way to the "objective" aspect of a "functional" determination of the very structure of the basic organization which society — and its unfolding: the State, shape; (b) on the other hand, the conscious, deliberate aspect of the bourgeois' strategies of attracting the armed forces.

We can, then, attempt a synthesis: when the critical point is reached in which the proletariat's political organization assumes control of the productive process (or, objectively, threatens to do it), carrying out even the control of the process of political-formal democratization, the bourgeois assumes in its responses a unilateral form of runaway irrationality, which expresses, with the maximum evidence possible, the operation of "closure," as a need to assure one's own coherence (irrational/rational form of the critical point). The army fulfills its role here. The latter is also determined by the level of conflict — in the complexity of its development — of the class struggle and, therefore, by the specific efficacy of the strategies of the opposing sectors, channeled in the organic ideologies (ideology/organization) in its overall configuration (with respect to the society as a whole, and specifically with respect to the middle strata, as well as to "body" which the armed institutions constitute).

It is not by chance, in short, that the critical point is brought into play with the armed forces as its axis: society's development (and therefore, the State's), as class struggle and in the class struggle, is transformed just as much as a "democracy" as a functional separation, isolation and corporativization of the armed institutions (apparently) outside the field of direct and visible ("everyday") confrontations. The armed forces are a part of the structure of the State and the political system, and their ultimate function is — at the same

time, the redundancy being valid, the *ultimate* guarantee of obedience, that is, of collective coherence. In a way similar to how the legitimization of a democratic system is able to generate a relative autonomy (independence) of the democratic forms which open the way for the political development of the proletariat, military *functionalism and functional specialization* also generate a "relative autonomy," a "reflection," of a corporativism whose essence coincides with its organizational forms of existence: they prove their *specific political role* as a structuring of the function of guaranteeing the subordinate's obedience (particularly, the working masses and the proletariat, and in an extreme case, society as a whole). The performance of this role leads it to take the shape of "pure" domination. Thus, if the opening of the democratic system, at the same time that it expresses the dimension of "coexistence" — insofar as it constitutes the latter's rational field, appearing as its *objective* product, also constitutes the condition for the development of the proletariat's political organization, the military bureaucratic *professionalization* — formed in the army's corporative structure, forms, at the same time, the most effective point of "closure" of the whole State structure, founded as it is on its overall totalitarian organization, which, while functionally separating itself from society at the same time and in one fell swoop unites it *mediately*, to the subsistence of the system of exploitation.

This does not mean, as was pointed out, that class struggle should disappear here, that it should not be expressed in the bosom of its own military ranks, but that the *form of existence* and of definition of its specific role: (a) makes, on the one hand, the unfolding of the function of hegemony (mediated by the specific articulations given in the State apparatus as a whole, with a particular role oriented toward a *general* guarantee of obedience) more effective in the sense of the bourgeois' interests. And on the other hand, that the performance of its own functions in society's bosom, to the extent

to which it defines forms of social relations with sectors of the bourgeois and the middle strata attracted by the function of hegemony, of an "everyday" character, at levels of relatively equal status, also facilitates channeling the bourgeois' conscious strategies toward the political-coup activation of the officer cadres; and (b) simultaneously, they make the proletariat's (particularly when set up as a revolutionary party) action more difficult, when it is affected by the sharpening of the conflict in the bosom of the army as a confrontation of the esprit de corps, the threat of which leads it, in an extreme case and *as a body*, to be the executor of runaway irrationality. This, at the same time that it means the destruction of the democratic system to the bourgeois' advantage, is the esprit de corps' reconstructed form, that is, the maintaining of military corporativism based on the affirmation of the structure of total authority.

C. *A Final Note. About Self-Recruitment*

In the preceding paragraphs, we have attempted to bring out one dimension of the analysis of military corporativism which seems to have been neglected in the empirical studies carried out in Latin America: that is, the weight of the specific professional socialization, channeled by the very organizational structure of the armed forces, in the form of a (corporative) ideology, and the weight of a continuous process of ideologization, both of which emphasize the need for submissive integration to authority as a *conditio sine qua non* of institutional existence. As a whole, it forms a type of mediation in the relations between State and society, in which the functional separation of the specialized bureaucratic organization acquires a particular meaning in handling the violence. We should point out here that one or the mechanisms, through which the performance of the function of the hegemony which we have been emphasizing is reinforced, appar-

ently passes through the peculiar point of the link between professionalization and what we have called "self-recruitment" in another place (Cuéllar 1971b).

It might seem, in fact, that as the functional separation of the armed institutes increases, in the form of a growing professionalization and bureaucratization, it keeps itself going in procedures of selection of members who favored the admission of subjects coming from military families. In Brazil (Stepan 1974) as well as in Chile (Moreno Rivas 1975), where professionalization has undergone strong development, the percentages of officers that are sons, nephews or sons-in-law of military men are frankly surprising. This raises a question of extraordinary complexity, especially if we think of military institutions on the whole, considering the social composition of not only the officers, but also the "classes."

On the one hand, and supposing that this process does not constitute an exception, one would think that they are operating, therefore, as a means to reproduce the status of certain, functional, middle strata, as well as a way of "social ascent" within the very bosom of the military ranks, that is, therefore, *fusing* the (ideological) determinants derived from the specific, professional (military) socialization with the ones coming from the (military) family socialization. Thus, a tendency toward the constitution of a coherent group, unified and "separated" (in a certain way) from the social classes, in a particular way: in the sense that they tend to be converted into specialized administrative cadres of domination, conceived here as the very form of the organization of the State and society. In other words, as the pure configuration of the *functional leadership of the general organization* founded on the estate differentiation which is reinforced creating its own ways of consolidation and social (estate) ascent. Or, as the theoreticians of elites would say, as the *political class* par excellence, at the service of a State which is "separated" from society and conceived as a general instance of overall coherence. The

capacity to direct and control the State gathers strength in this way, except that in the form of a corporative style which, if it is not necessarily detached from change and reform, is attained starting from — and on a foundation of preservation — the limits which define the corporativization processes, which are contrary to tendencies toward democratization (at least from a middle term perspective). On the other hand, the social composition of the armed forces also includes the "classes," and especially the annual draft, which, when playing as a "maneuverable mass" in the bosom of the military institution, would generate, in a helpful way, a foundation for reinforcing the ideology of State superiority.¹¹

With these developments, certainly preliminary ones, we believe we have at least set the boundaries for *one* field of discussion for the analysis of the forms of the military's political participation and, specifically, for the discussion of the shapes which the new (supposedly "permanent") varieties of its action take in the directing and control of the State and social life of the countries which have seen the emergence of the so-called "bureaucratic-authoritarian States" (O'Donnel 1975; Cardoso 1972). We have not touched whatsoever on the question which is clearly fundamental: the type of development in the foundation which has preceded and accompanied these forms of a "state of exception," which lie underneath as the final cause for its flourishing. This has been done initially by several analysts (Cardoso 1972; CEDAL 1974; O'Donnel 1975), who, likewise, have been concerned with trying to characterize the general forms which are presented

¹¹It is superfluous to point out the fact that, in the research which we have undertaken in Chile and El Salvador, an important part of the "classes", and particularly the annual draft is made up of "campesinos," the majority of which are illiterate, secularly subjected to forms of labor relations in which patriarchal "systems of obedience" are predominant. That makes us think that the significantly rural character of the great majority of Latin American countries cannot help but have an effect on the specific forms and the very content of military ideology. As far as we know, this has not been the object of analysts' attention.

in their special characteristics. Rather we wanted to point out the meaning of "intermediate factors" — mediations — since we do not believe that it is enough to purely indicate the structural causes in order to infer, from there, the super-structural results. In the analysis of the mediations lies one part of the explication, and at the same time, there is where research can acquire a certain efficacy which is not only "comprehensive" but even of service to the praxis.

Military and Ethnic Nationalism in Pakistan

Asaf Hussain

I. Introduction

Politically sovereign states have always maintained some form of a military organization to safeguard their territorial integrity. The political status and power vested in or generated by such an organization varies among the developing countries. In many such countries where it has either been politically active as "the power behind the throne" or has assumed political power itself, scholars have sought to search for the causes of military intervention. This paper will, therefore, focus on the political role of the military in the new state of Pakistan.

Data for this paper was collected in Pakistan during 1975. Permission to carry out the research was courteously given by General Tikka Khan and the Research and Development Department of the General Headquarters of the Pakistani military at Rawalpindi, who greatly facilitated my research

* The author wishes to thank Dr. Theodore P. Wright, Jr. of the State University of New York at Albany for his helpful comments on this paper. Responsibility for the contents, however, rests entirely with the author.

by arranging interviews, etc. General Tikka Khan's permission was absolutely essential for establishing credibility with the officer corps, as their attitude was "if it is alright with the chief, it is alright with me." In addition, the author's Punjabi background and his knowledge of the normative structure of the Pathan and Punjabi hospitality codes, assured his guest status. At times, this was distinctly advantageous in obtaining research information from the officers, as some questions could have been interpreted as being offensive or too sensitive, coming from another person. Apart from the information obtained through the cooperation of the military, the author also utilized other sources, such as interviews arranged through personal contacts, snowball sampling, and interviews through letters of introduction, so that the cross section of the military officer corps covered the rank of captain to general.¹ Some retired officers were also interviewed.

The literature available on the Pakistani military in books, journals and newspapers was also thoroughly researched. In order to safeguard the identity of my informants, few names will be mentioned. The term *military elites* has been used in this paper to refer to those officers who have held military and political positions (General Ayub and General Yahya Khan); the *officer corps* refers to the military officers included in the sample, and any generalizations drawn from their opinions have been extended by reference to the Pakistani military.

Many political scientists have put forward theories of military intervention which derive either from the nature of the military organization or the nature of the society. Those who subscribe to the former view state that the colonial heritage equips an army with professionalization, discipline, in-group solidarity and modernization.² As a group, the military

¹ A total of seventy officers were contacted. The interviews lasted from half an hour to three hours and there were repeated sessions with important officers. Questionnaires and tape recordings were not allowed.

² See M. Janowitz, *The Military in the Development of New Nations* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1971). Many essays in J. J.

considers itself apart from its traditional society.³ In such a situation, military intervention becomes inevitable if the politicians create chaos in the country. On the other hand, military intervention may take place due to the nature of the society.⁴ For example, if societal conditions are such that there is class dominance or elite groups who fight for political power without legitimation,⁵ the military may resort to intervention in the political arena.

Without underestimating the merits and demerits of these theories, the author found that none were adequately applicable to Pakistan. The approach taken by the author has therefore not been that of taking a theory and fitting the data into its framework. On the contrary, the data was allowed to develop its own theory. In other words, the perspectives gleaned from the in-depth interviews of the officer corps were found to be meaningful and sympathetic to certain theoretical perspectives in the literature, with certain modifications. Consequently, this not only limited the range of theories but also modified them to explain the social reality of the political culture of the Pakistan military.

The theoretical perspective which could be applied most

Johnson, ed., *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1972), follow the same line of thought.

³ E. B. Shils, "The Military in the Political Development of New States," in Johnson, *Role of the Military*, p. 31.

⁴ See S. E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback* (London: Pall Mall, 1962). Other works of interest are: E. W. Lefever, *Spear and Spectre* (Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution, 1970); and M. Price, "A Theoretical Approach to Military Rule in New States," *World Politics*, 23 (April 1971): 399-430.

⁵ Amos Perlmutter, "The Praetorian State and the Praetorian Army: Towards a Taxonomy of Civil-Military Relations in Developing Politics," in *Political Development and Social Change*, ed. J. L. Finkle and R. W. Fable (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1971), pp. 284-304. Other works referring to the same theme are: R. Emerson, *From Empire to Nation* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970); M. Halpern, "Middle Eastern Armies and the New Middle Class" in Johnson, *Role of the Military*, pp. 277-316; A. R. Zolberg, "Military Rule and Political Development in Tropical Africa: A Preliminary Report," in *Military Profession and Military Regimes*, ed. J. van Doorn (The Hague: Mouton, 1969), pp. 157-174; C. E. Welch, Jr., *Soldier and State in Africa* (Evanston: Northwest University Press, 1970); S. P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969).

meaningfully to Pakistan's situation was that of *praetorianism*. But praetorianism can have a variety of meanings, ranging from a military which plays the role of a "king maker," to one which intervenes to maximize its own power. The definition given by Amos Perlmutter characterizes praetorianism as the "institutionalization of the military to the point where it can become an autonomous group if it is not successfully subdued."⁶ Such a definition does not adequately suit the South Asian context as much as it does the Middle Eastern context where it has been applied. It therefore needs to be modified for the Pakistani situation because of the unique matrix of the state of Pakistan. The concept of praetorianism is redefined for the purpose of this paper as "the institutionalization of the military guardianship role of the ideology of an ideological state." Some theories, as was pointed out earlier, emphasized the military's emergence from the nature of its society. Here the nature of the state reflected the type of military it possessed.

The question then arises: what is an ideological state? An ideological state has been defined as one whose ideology originates in ideas rooted in a religion, mobilizes its own support basis, forges its own territorial boundaries and occupies a supranational position for the legitimization of the state. The more strongly the idea is rooted in the minds of its adherents, the more its chances of being crystallized into movements which subsequently lead to the political creation of geographical boundaries with or without struggle. There are very few examples of such states in the present century, for aside from Pakistan, the only other such state is Israel. The existence of the military in such states, apart from its function of external defense, forms the pillars of the foundation of the state itself. Its role has been very well expressed for the state of Israel, in which the Israeli military was found to be "the only thing that made the state a reality... the

⁶ A. Perlmutter, *Egypt: The Praetorian State* (New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1974), p. 53.

beginning and end of political existence." ⁷ This was true of Pakistan as well.

In ideological states such as Pakistan, where the military preceded the existence of the state (as part of the British Indian Army), it became the guardian of this Muslim ideology upon the creation of the state in 1947. As such, it was primarily the guardian of its ideology and consequently of the territorial boundary in which such an ideology pervaded. Thus, by becoming the defender of the faith (Islam) through its territorial boundaries (Pakistan), it assumed the guardianship of the latter.

Such an attitude, articulated in different ways by the officer corps, could be considered to be strongly prevalent in the Pakistan military. One Major General expressed it very cogently, stating that "Pakistan is the army, and, the army, Pakistan." ⁸ This attitude is similar to that of the German generals (Von Seeckt) who identified with the state rather than with the government in power.⁹ But the difference is that the Pakistani military ideology was based on Islam, which has always been the religion of the state.

This paper, therefore, attempts to present the political culture of the officers of the elite military institutions of the country, in so far as it is related to: (I) the military's link to the state of Pakistan; (II) its intervention in the political system; and (III) its involvement with ethnic nationalism.

II. The Military-State Relationship

It is assumed that all militaries are related to their respective states. The relationship of the military to the ideological state is relevant to this paper. The exact nature of the military's

⁷ Ayad Al Qazzaz, "Army and Society in Israel," *Pacific Sociological Review* 16, no. 2 (April 1973): 144.

⁸ Interview with a Major General in Rawalpindi, July 1975.

⁹ To General von Seeckt, "the role of the Reichswehr is to maintain the unity of the Reich and those who compromised this are its enemies from whatsoever side they came." See S. E. Finer, *Man on Horseback*, p. 26.

links to the state, should, it is hoped, throw light on the military's political role in the state. Three links therefore, seem to emerge from subjective evaluations by the officer corps and are supported by the literature on the subject. These are: (a) the colonial link; (b) the identity link; and (c) the structural link. Each of these will be discussed in greater detail.

A. The Colonial Link

The British Indian Empire (1857-1947) faced threats from two sources: an internal threat from its multiethnic population, and an external threat from neighboring countries along its northern borders. In an effort to consolidate their territorial acquisitions, they created two powerful organizations, popularly known as the "steel frame" (the Indian Civil Service) and the "sword arm" (the British Indian Army). The latter was used to protect the empire from external threats along its borders, and from internal uprisings and other massive war campaigns (World Wars I and II).

The colonial policy, based on the principle of "divide and rule," sought to establish differential relationships with various ethnic groups, in order to administer the empire and especially to counter internal insurgencies.¹⁰ Such a task did not present any special difficulties, for the various groups, which had been freed from Muslim domination, now sought to establish their relations with the colonial center. Thus, the administrative cadres attracted the Hindus (the baboo class), while more sensitive jobs required confidants like the Eurasians (Anglo-Indians). For the military, soldiers could be recruited from neighboring Nepal (Gurkhas) as well as from many other ethnic groups such as the Sikhs, Pathans and Rajputs in India. One such ethnic collaborator chosen by

¹⁰ See C. H. Enloe, "The Military Uses of Ethnicity," *Millennium* 4, no. 3 (Winter 1975-76): 220-234. This is an excellent analysis of how power shapes ethnicity.

the British were the Punjabi Muslims from the province of the Punjab with a Muslim majority — those areas of Punjab which now form part of Pakistan.

The British selection of such ethnic collaborators was influenced by the subjective theories of their officers, who classified ethnic groups as belonging to "martial races" or "soft cultures." Where an ethnic group was labeled as "martial," colonial military recruitment policies were then favorably inclined towards that group, and particularly in the case of Punjab, it brought Muslim Punjabis (and non-Muslim Sikhs) recruits. Their label emphasized their "difference from the rest of India" and set them "apart as friends and servants of the Raj."¹¹ Thus, Punjabi Muslims, Sikhs, Rajputs and Pathans belonging to the traditional feudalistic orders joined the British Indian Army in large numbers. The label "martial race" stimulated competition among the ethnic groups and the large numbers of recruits reinforced their self-images. Although the recruitment of Punjabi Muslims increased between 1892 and 1914, the First World War was their major test and the Punjabi Muslims gave the largest number of recruits as compared to other ethnic groups.¹²

The damage done by such ethnic recruitment policies in terms of inflating the self-images of various ethnic groups was a legacy of colonialism which was to affect the power relationships between inter-ethnic groups in both India and Pakistan. All the Punjabi officers interviewed for this study believed in their superior martial qualities and one Sepoy Khuda Dad Khan, who was the first recipient of a Victoria Cross from British India during World War I, was regarded as one example of Punjabi chivalry.

Furthermore, the British Indian Army, contrary to its popularized tradition of being "apolitical," was a highly polit-

¹¹ P. Mason, *A Matter of Honour* (London: Jonathan Cape Ltd., 1974), p. 388.

¹² S. P. Cohen, *The Indian Army* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 44-45.

The following table gives the corresponding figures:

ETHNIC GROUP RECRUITMENT IN THE BRITISH
EMPIRE DURING THE WAR OF 1914-1918

<i>Ethnic Group</i>	<i>Number of Men</i>
Punjabi Muslims	136,000
Sikhs	88,000
Rajputs	62,000
Gurkhas	55,000
Jats	54,000
Hindustani Muslims	36,000
Pathans	28,000

Source: S. P. Cohen, *The Indian Army* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), p. 69.

icized force. Apart from their external defensive functions, they were often used for the suppression of internal insurgencies. They not only prevented the British Empire from disintegrating, but restrained themselves as their politicized ethnic groups fought over the communal nature of Hindu-Muslim politics.¹³

The apolitical role of the British Indian army ascribed to the British military tradition had no basis in colonial India. The ethnic recruitment policy was enough, in itself, to politicize the military for the British by dividing it along communal and ethnic lines so as to ensure that a repetition of the 1857 mutiny would not reoccur. Although the British effectively kept the military out of the politics of nationalism, which was sweeping the masses along secular (Indian nationalism) and religious (Muslim nationalism) lines, it would be stretching the argument too far to say that the native military was indifferent to its political future. The native recruits were part of British India and not part of the colonial elite and, following the social consciousness of communalism of those times, a mutual animosity between Hindu and Muslim officers

¹³ S. P. Cohen, "Security Issues in South Asia," *Asian Survey* 15, no. 3 (March 1975): 69.

developed quickly. This was the result of their awareness of the fact that they would be confronting each other after the two new states were created.

Senior officers of the Pakistani military who had served with the British stated that their political consciousness about the future of their compatriots was of central concern to them. The ideas of "guardianship" among colonial military and civilian officers were also inculcated in the Muslim military officers. While the former held India "in trust for eventual return to the people of India," the latter developed a protective ethos and were aware that they would have to account for its existence with their lives.¹⁴

B. The Identity Link

While the colonial link reinforced the military's ethnic, political and professional self-images, their identification with Islam linked them with the pre-colonial Muslim state. This state began with the invasion of Sind by an Arab general (Mohammad bin Qassim) in the seventh century and reached its zenith during the Mughal rule. The main pillar of the Muslim state was the Muslim army ("mansabdars"). This was evident from the fact that if Mughal emperors, in spite of their political skills, were not good military commanders, the threat to their empire from the subjugated Hindu population and from colonial adventurers became serious. The Muslim empire came to a bitter end in 1857 when neither the weak king nor the mansabdars could contend with the superior military skills of the British army.

The religion-state and religion-military relationships were unique to Pakistan. Without Islam, Pakistan would not have come into existence; without Pakistan, the military would not be able to exist; and without the military, Islam and Pakistan would both be threatened. Thus, in perpetuating such a state,

¹⁴ Lt. Colonel J. C. M. Baynes, *The Soldier in Modern Society* (London: Eyre Methuen, 1972), p. 71.

the military was perpetuating Islam. Without this commitment, the state would not have been viable. The military's legitimization of the state was indeed "the only thing that made the state a reality."¹⁵ The political creation of Pakistan became a reality in 1947 and the threatening figure of the Muslim army contingents, which later became the Pakistani army, have acted ever since then as deterrents in getting such a partition annulled by the Indians. The latter found the division of "Mother India" repugnant for historical, political and religious reasons.

For the Muslim units of the British Indian army, the transference of loyalties from the colonial state to the state of Pakistan did not present a problem. Their political commitment was stronger than the colonial-created bureaucracy. They could relate their new role of protecting the Muslim state as an extension of the role of the pre-colonial armies: defenders of the faith. All that remained of the great Muslim empire in South Asia was the Muslim state of Pakistan.

No other religion has such a special relationship with the armies composed of its adherents as does Islam. This can be further generalized as being applicable to the other Muslim armies (Turkish and Arab), because Islam is considered to be "the most martial of major world religions."¹⁶ For the Arab military elite:

Islam's attitude towards political and military power is not one of negation, disassociation or suspicion, but of complete affirmation. A religious value is attached to power, success and victory as such. Islam endows the army with the prestige and authority of an institution meriting divine blessing and its heritage paves the way for military intervention which is to be regarded as most fitting and proper in the eyes of God and man.¹⁷

¹⁵ Ayad Al Qazzaz, *Army and Society*, p. 144.

¹⁶ R. E. Ward and D. Rustow, eds., *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), p. 352.

¹⁷ Eliezer Beer, *Army Officers in Arab Politics and Society* (New York: Frederick Praeger and Co., 1970), p. 281.

The role of the armed forces in the ideological state was one of defending Islam for a Muslim ruler who "turned" his back on the enemy and, except for tactical and strategic reasons, "did not remain a Muslim any longer."¹⁸ Religious attitudes were therefore found to be quite strong among the Pakistani military. The use of Islamic concepts like *jihad* ("holy war"), *ghazi* ("victorious warrior") and *shaheed* ("martyred warrior of Islam") evoked strong sentiments. The result was that the *izzat* ("honor") and *ghairat* ("self-respect") of the nation were the prime concern of the Pakistani military.¹⁹ Islam was therefore a significant "motivating force for soldiers during peace and war."²⁰ Another officer advised his officers to "seriously study Islam" and "display visible signs of religiousness in front of his men." He also wanted them to pray at least once a day in the unit's mosque, and on Fridays he would occasionally deliver the sermon to his men.²¹

Responses to questions indicated that the officer corps was religious and well versed in Islamic history and the Muslim history of India. Many of their idols were South Asian or Arab Muslim generals. Two religious trends were evident from my sample. First, the older the officer, the greater his religious convictions, and second, the greater an officer's war experience, the more religious he became. Those who had had narrow escapes during the 1971 Civil War discovered a source of great strength in religion.

C. *The Structural Link*

The social structure of Pakistan was composed of different groups. The Punjabi Muslims became the largest ethnic

¹⁸ Brigadier General Gulzar Ahmed, "Armed Forces of an Ideological State," *Pakistan Army Journal*, 11, no. 1 (June 1969): 31-32.

¹⁹ Fazal M. Khan, *The Story of the Pakistan Army* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 63.

²⁰ Lt. Colonel Aslam H. Qureshi, "Some Psychological Aspects of Motivation," *Pakistan Army Journal*, 15, no. 1 (June 1973): 26.

²¹ Major Sikander Shami, "Random Thoughts for an Officer and His Wife," *Infantry* (Quetta), 3, no. 1 (July 1974): 31.

group in Pakistan after 1971 and tended to dominate other ethnic groups like the Pathans, Baluchis, Sindhis and Muhajirs. The only common bond between all these groups, including the Bengalis before 1971, was Islam. It provided a strong base within which a political community could be created, for Islam had demonstrated its potential by the elite's mass mobilization to create Pakistan.

Other factors which differentiated ethnic groups were language, ethnic identities and social organization. Some groups possessed a tribal organization (Pathan and Baluchis), while peasant social organizations characterized most of the other ethnic groups (Punjabis and Sindhis). The only exception was the Muhajirs, who were settled mainly in urban areas. In the efforts made towards detribalization and modernization, it had proved difficult to transcend primordial ties. These were enshrined in the social organization and ethnic identities of these groups.²²

The structural link between the military and the ethnic groups was the predominance of the Punjabis in the military. This imbalance was the result of the colonial link. Although exact figures were not made available at the General Headquarters, the following table represents an average of the estimates given by the officers interviewed.

ETHNIC GROUP STRENGTH OF THE PAKISTANI MILITARY
OFFICER CORPS

<i>Ethnic Group</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
Punjabis	70
Pathans	15
Muhajirs	10
Baluchis and Sindhis	5
Total	100

²² See the case of Basque nationalism discussed by Milton M. da Silva, "Modernization and Ethnic Conflict," *Comparative Politics* 17, no. 2 (January 1975): 227-251.

Punjabi domination of the Pakistani political system has often led to the assumption that the military, which is predominantly Punjabi, must be its supporter. On the contrary, the military was constantly embarrassed by the dominant influence structure of the Punjabis.²³ The Punjabi Governor General, Ghulam Mohammad, who was a member of the "Punjabi bureaucratic elite," invited General Ayub Khan to take over political power in 1954.²⁴ The latter, however, declined. Other influentials spanned "long periods of time and have influenced decisions of several regimes."²⁵

Thus, many Punjabi bureaucratic, landowning and professional elites who wielded direct or indirect influence in the political arena assumed support of the military because of the interrelationships mentioned earlier. Thus, they were shocked when the military did intervene, when it initiated its policies of land reform and when it began its purge of bureaucratic elites. To the military, inculcated with nationalistic ethos, ethnicity was an anathema.

III. The Political System and Praetorianism

Pakistan's political system had many groups such as the bureaucratic, landowning, professional, industrial and religious elites who were directly or indirectly involved in the struggle

²³ The term "influence structure" is taken from Laporte's book and is defined as a combination of "a large measure of personal and family connection, demonstrated expertise and/or skill (usually administrative or manipulative) and political expertise and/or skill (the ability to manipulate crowds to represent one's position..." See R. Laporte, Jr., *Power and Privilege: Influence and Decision Making in Pakistan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), p. 7.

²⁴ Ziring mentions two powerful persons belonging to this elite group: Ghulam Mohammad, the governor-general who was responsible for the One Unit Plan, and Chaudhri Mohammad Ali, the Prime Minister of Pakistan who evolved the Constitution of 1956. See L. Ziring, "The Failure of Democracy in Pakistan: East Pakistan and the Central Government," (Ph. D. diss., Columbia University, 1962), pp. 116-118. Also see Ziring's excellent study: *The Ayub Khan Era* (Syracuse, N. Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1971).

²⁵ Laporte mentions such "influential" persons: M. M. Ahmad. See Laporte, *Power and Privilege*, p. 7.

for control of the political-power arena.²⁶ Since the system lacked political institutionalization, the elites tried to monopolize the political arena by using various strategies, including colonial policies (The Government of India Act 1935), mass mobilization of various segments, elite coalitional politics, etc. For them, the new state had become a means, rather than an end, for advancing their vested interests and personal ideologies. As such, they never made any concerted effort to resolve their differences and integrate the people of Pakistan. An analysis of the politics of praetorianism will be made by looking at the causes of military intervention and the military regimes' efforts at integration.

A. Ethnic Cleavages and Military Intervention

The military was the only elitist group which did not intervene in the political arena before 1958. One reason given for this by the officer corps was that the military did not lack political authority. It had no need to actively control the political system, as its needs were never opposed. The literature on the subject supports this assertion.²⁷ The military was the agency employing the largest manpower in the country. It enjoyed the highest prestige and had ample resources to train and educate its men.

More than fifty per cent of the country's budget was allocated to the army, and this was never questioned.²⁸ It needed no invitation to join in nation-building activities to help the civilian authorities, as its record in this field was already well documented. Its activities ranged from help dur-

²⁶ See Asaf Hussain, "Elites and Political Development in Pakistan," *The Developing Economies* (Japan), 14, no. 3 (September 1976).

²⁷ R. A. Moore, "Military Nation Building in Pakistan and India," *World Affairs* 132, no. 2 (December 1969): 219-234. Also see, R. A. Moore, "The Use of the Army in Nation Building: The Case of Pakistan," *Asian Survey* 9, no. 6 (June 1969): 447-556.

²⁸ G. Kennedy, *The Military in the Third World* (London: Gerald Duckworth and Co. Ltd., 1974), p. 160.

ing floods to smuggling control, from building dams, bridges and roads to pest control.²⁹ Powerful generals, like Ayub Khan, have been quoted to have said (at a staff meeting of 1,000 officers in Quetta) that, although he had been asked to take over political power, he did "not have the time and have more than enough on my plate."³⁰ They could have obtained control of the political arena any time after 1951.

The military's power can also be reviewed from another angle: its exemption from public prosecution for political offenses. Neither General Ayub nor General Yahya were prosecuted for political corruption, although various civilian political elitist groups exerted pressure on succeeding governments. Senior military commanders like General Niazi and Lt. General Rao Farman Ali were not put on trial for their military performance in Bangladesh. Even in the post-1971 periods, senior armed forces officers like General Gul Hassan and Air Marshall Rahim Khan, who were reported to have "thought loudly" regarding replacing Bhutto, were dismissed on the one hand and rewarded with ambassadorial appointments abroad on the other hand. Bhutto tried to absolve the military from its intervention by calling it an "oligarchy" which tried to "usurp Pakistan" and saying that the armed forces were "dragged" into politics and exploited.³¹ This makes it clear that the military exerts sufficient political influence in the country.

The military was also aware of the internal problems facing the country, the most important of which was the lack of a "solid and cohesive nationhood."³² The military helped the

²⁹ R. A. Moore, "The Army as a Vehicle for Social Change in Pakistan," *The Journal of Developing Areas* 2 (October 1967): 57-74. Also see D. W. Chang, "The Military and Nation Building in Korea, Burma and Pakistan," *Asian Survey* 9, no. 2 (November 1969): 818-830.

³⁰ Interview with Major General Rao Farman Ali, July 1975. General Ayub Khan has mentioned this in his book. See *Friends Not Masters* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 37-60.

³¹ F. Zaman and Aman, *Z. A. Bhutto: The Political Thinker* (Lahore: Peoples Publications, 1973), p. 35.

³² Memorandum of General Ayub Khan "A Short Appreciation of Present and Future Problems of Pakistan" (London, October 1954), in Colonel M.

political elites during their administrative breakdowns, and their reputation for political neutrality was established in the country. One informant noted that it had become the only "stabilizing force" in the country, to such an extent that political elites began to look up to it as a "savior" because they had "no axes to grind."³³

The military was aware of such responses from the public, but as long as the political system remained intact, it did not worry about changes of government or political struggles for power. By 1958, the political concern of the military had reached its limit for one important reason: the ethnicization of Pakistan's politics. The inter-elite conflict for power was transformed into an inter-ethnic conflict between two groups: the Punjabis and the Bengalis (of East Pakistan, now Bangladesh). Political elites from these ethnic groups mobilized their members to gain access to the political center. To the military, such ethnic cleavages and conflicts posed an internal threat of disintegration of the state and its ideology.³⁴ It was not prepared to preside over the political breakup of the state and, therefore, with the fullest conviction "that there was no alternative" besides military intervention, they entered the political arena to save the country from "disintegration and complete ruination."³⁵ Their mission was singular: to maintain the territorial integrity of the Muslim homeland.

B. *Class Exploitation and Elite Conflict*

When General Ayub Khan (1958-1969) established the first military regime, he was primarily concerned with one

Ahmed, *My Chief* (Lahore: Longman's Green and Co., 1960), p. 85. Also see, General Ayub Khan's broadcast to the nation, as its Chief Martial Law Administrator, on October 18, 1958.

³³ Interview with a brigadier general, August 1975.

³⁴ Ethnic nationalism was destructive even for the internal structure of the military as many Bengali officers deserted the armed forces during the Civil War in 1971 and made their way to Bangladesh via Kabul and India.

³⁵ General Ayub's broadcast to the nation on October 18, 1958.

objective: to liberate the political system from ethnic factionalism which was hindering the development of a national identity.³⁶ A "One Unit Plan," which bound the five ethnic groups (Punjabi, Baluchi, Sindhi, Pathan and Muhajir) into one unit, was implemented in 1954. Within this unit, the Punjabis, being in the majority in the largest province were the recipients of the largest economic benefits and at the same time, as a unit, they were able to defuse the Bengali attempts at power-sharing and access to the political arena, as well as deriving any benefits from economic development. This led to an increase in Bengali ethnic consciousness. Political relations between the ethnic groups created political distrust.³⁷ At this stage, no political leader could have failed to take the political and economic grievances of the Bengalis into consideration.

Ayub Khan's military regime defined their objective as follows: economic modernization for the resolution of ethnic cleavages. Many studies have revealed the modernizing role of the military.³⁸ It was therefore not surprising that the Pakistani military regime initiated a massive drive towards economic development rather than political development. They concentrated on the organization of business structures,³⁹ while making promises for the creation of an "adequate infrastructure" and an "adequate institutional framework" for encour-

³⁶ For the problem of the national identity of Pakistan, see Asaf Hussain, "Ethnicity, National Identity and Praetorianism: The Case of Pakistan," *Asian Survey* 16, no. 10 (October 1976): 918-930.

³⁷ See Raunaq Jahan, *Pakistan: Failure in National Integration* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), pp. 38-50. She postulates the development of the "vernacular elite" who had strengthened their position by 1954 after defeating "the national elite" in the elections. The Bengali struggle against the Punjabis began to crystallize into ethnic nationalism from this time on.

³⁸ Lucian W. Pye, "Armies in the Process of Modernization," in Johnson, *Role of the Military*, pp. 69-89.

³⁹ R. S. Wheeler, *The Politics of Pakistan* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971), p. 291. Also see A. L. Fritschler, "Business Participation in Administration," in *Administration Problems of Pakistan*, ed. C. S. Birkhead (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1966), pp. 63-68.

aging the development of the public and private sectors among the Bengalis.⁴⁰

Towards the end of Ayub's "decade of development" the following developments crystallized:

1. A new class of Punjabi and Muhajir industrialists emerged who were in control of enormous economic resources.⁴¹
2. Industrial development was located mainly among the Punjabi and Karachi.⁴²
3. Political elites became easily corruptible and the Pakistani society developed trends that were geared towards materialistic goods, thus weakening religious ties.
4. The trends in society were reflected by the military, and the professionalism of the officer corps was affected. They began to seek positions in government-sponsored or private corporations.⁴³ Members of Ayub's regime suddenly became rich and could even manipulate decision-making at a national level to suit their needs.⁴⁴
5. The military itself expanded into industrial ventures for the welfare of its servicemen. The Army Welfare Trust

⁴⁰ Pakistan Planning Commission, *Socio-Economic Objectives of the Fourth Five Year Plan: 1970-1975*, p. 12.

⁴¹ L. J. White, *Industrial Concentration and Economic Wealth in Pakistan* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1974), pp. 60-61 and 82-83.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 40. Also see A. Martin, "Location of Industries in West Pakistan," in *Pakistan in the Development Decade*, ed. A. M. Ghouse (Lahore: The Economic Development Seminar, 1968), pp. 149-159.

⁴³ Officers of the Pakistani armed forces occupied senior positions in the following corporations: The Pakistan Oil and Gas Corporation, Pakistan Press Trust, West Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation, West Pakistan Agricultural Corporation, Small Industries Corporation, Karachi Development Authority, Karachi Port Trust, National Shipping Corporation, Pakistan International Airlines, National Oil, Burmah Shell, Sui Northern Gas, and Batala Industries. See K. B. Sayeed, "The Role of Military in Pakistan," in J. van Doorn, *Armed Forces and Society* (The Hague: Mouton, 1968), p. 297.

⁴⁴ An account of how Gauhar Ayub wanted to use his father's position to fit tanks with diesel engines from a company which would give him a large commission was related personally to me. Such corruption is not uncommon in the higher bureaucratic circles and many persons from these circles have accounts in foreign banks, but relatively few incidences of such corruption can be traced to the army, although many officers have become corrupt when placed in civilian positions.

supplied the army's standing order and at the same time took on new business investments.⁴⁵ The Fauji Foundation depended on the management and business skills of its new military managers.⁴⁶ Retiring army officers could always get a job in the many business concerns owned by the military.

Ayub's formula for national integration was doomed to failure from the very beginning. By keeping the One Unit Plan and depending on the bureaucracy as well as the landed aristocracy, he facilitated, rather than checked, Punjabi domination.⁴⁷ It was not a question of whether Bengalis, Baluchis, Pathans or Sindhis could be made to participate, but whether the Punjabis could be prevented from monopolizing development schemes and policy-making.

Political scientists often make a clear empirical distinction between civilian and military authority structures. This

⁴⁵ The articles of the Association of the Army Welfare Trust listed plans to enter into the following industrial ventures: flour mills, oil milling, poultry farming, cold storage plants, packing of cattlefeed, cattle breeding farms, dairy farms, meat and fish business, textile machinery, tools, appliances and motors, cement, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, banking and insurance, cycle manufacturing, cinematographic films, hotel building, car industry, printing, confectionary, hides and leather, soap, mining, sugar manufacture, tea, coffee, waterproof materials, garments, shipping, etc. See the memorandum and articles of the Army Trust, Rawalpindi. Interview with the Director of the Army Welfare Trust, Major General Khadim Hussain Raja, in July 1975. He indicated that the army's concern for the welfare of its servicemen cannot be compared with any other program in the country.

⁴⁶ In the post-1971 period, its managing directors have been Major General (retired) Mumtaz Nawaz Malik, and in 1975, Major General Rao Farman Ali. Its major production items are sugar, cloth and yarn, and its total assets for the four years have been increasing. In 1971, they were 161 million rupees; in 1972, they were 337 million rupees; in 1973, they were 454.53 million rupees; and in 1974, they had increased to 578.87 million rupees. See K. Zuberi, "Fauji Foundation: A Profile in 1975," *Pakistan Economist*, 15, no. 8 (February 1975): 14-26.

⁴⁷ Ayub's most powerful advisors were the Punjabi bureaucrats Fida Hussain, Altaf Gohar, Manzoor Qadir (architect of the 1962 Constitution) and M. M. Ahmed (chief of the Planning Commission). Others were Muhajirs like Akhtar Hussain and G. Mueenuddin. Nawab Amir Mohammad Khan of Kalabagh was the governor of West Pakistan for six years and helped to consolidate Ayub's rule for that period. For further information on the latter and Altaf Gohar, see H. Feldman, *From Crisis to Crisis* (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), pp. 301-304 and 56-57.

may be a true analytical distinction in Western societies, but it is difficult to make this distinction in societies with strong ethnic, kinship, provincial and tribal interrelationships. In the case of Pakistan, the military's structural link to the Punjab provided the Punjabis with limited accessibility based on the above interrelationships. Such interrelationships penetrated the military's institutional boundaries, and the bureaucratic and landowning elites often attempted to exert pressure on the military. The normative code implied in such interrelationships made individuals have high expectations of their groups. In the political arena, these ranged from delivering collective benefits for the group in materialistic terms (economic development of one's region, town or village) to non-materialistic terms (power, prestige, position and factionalism).⁴⁸ Ayub's failure to check the diffusion of civilian-military relations reflected negatively on the military.

The downfall of Ayub's military regime can be seen from multi-focal dimensions such as inter-elite conflict, elite-mass gap and ethnic-elite polarization.

Ayub's policies alienated various political elitist groups. His religious policies mobilized fierce opposition from the religious elites (Maulana Maudoodi and the Jamait-e-Islami party), while his dislike of democratic politics, his banning of political parties, the manipulation of election results and the rigid control of provinces, the centralization of power, all resulted in infuriating the professional elites. The latter were mainly lawyers who had turned against Ayub's regime and were powerful in mobilizing anti-Ayub forces in Pakistan.⁴⁹

⁴⁸ Ayub's hometown in the Hazara District was modernized during his rule. Similarly, Larkhana, Bhutto's town in Sind, is now undergoing large scale modernization.

⁴⁹ Judges like M. R. Kayani were openly against the military regime. Bar associations became anti-Ayub and the Combined Opposition Party was organized with the help of eminent lawyers to defeat Ayub in the elections of 1965. See *Dawn* (Karachi), October 5, 1964 and October 8, 1964; R. Braibanti, *Research on the Bureaucracy of Pakistan* (Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1968), p. 28.

Their predominance in the Awami League and radicalization of party politics, so as to mobilize the Bengalis, were also significant.⁵⁰

Above all, Ayub had alienated the military. One general, who personally knew Ayub, said that his switch to political support (1965 elections), his personal failure of surrounding himself with "yes men" and the removal of military rivals created widespread discontent within the military.⁵¹

Ayub's collaboration with industrial, landowning and bureaucratic elites widened inequalities in income and alienated the masses toward the elites. The landowners and the industrialists became richer and the peasantry and the industrial laborers struggled for survival. Also, while industrialization had created economic opportunities and higher expectations, only the privileged groups with ethnic influence could take advantage of them. In the face of such discontent, a popular movement, like the Pakistan People's Party of Z. A. Bhutto, was easily mobilized against the military regime.

The greatest impact of Ayub's policies was on the elitist political system. His original objective of minimizing ethnic consciousness by creating economic affluence backfired and resulted in ethnic polarization. The effect of this was such, that it created conflicts within the elite systems such as the bureaucracy, where Bengali and Punjabi officers separated and had conflicts over policy issues. Some even collaborated with ethnic political elites, like Mujibur Rahman, and were tried in the famous Agarthala Conspiracy Case.⁵²

In the end, he turned to the army for support. When they

⁵⁰ M. Rashiduzzaman, "Leadership, Organization and Tactics of the Bangladesh Movement," *Asian Survey* 12, no. 3 (March 1972): 185-200.

⁵¹ Interview with a Major General, July 1975.

⁵² The Agarthala Conspiracy Case charged thirty-eight Bengalis of conspiring to incite ethnic nationalism and secede East Bengal from Pakistan in collusion with India in December 1967. There were politicians, senior civil servants, as well as military personnel involved along with Mujibur Rahman. For the testimony of Bengali civil servants, see *The Pakistan Observer* (Dacca), February 2-6, 1969.

did not respond, he tried "to play politics."⁵³ He ordered General Yahya Khan to impose martial law in February 1969. The latter issued a directive concerning it but, because of internal pressures from senior officers, had to withdraw it. Next, Ayub tried to create public disturbances in East Pakistan through Bengali collaborators so that the military could be induced into enacting martial law but this, too, failed.⁵⁴ On March 20, 1969, Generals Yahya Khan and Gul Hassan went to the president's house and informed Ayub's advisors that they would impose martial law if Ayub stepped down.⁵⁵ Ayub agreed, but asked Yahya to record his speech first and then he would follow suit. Yahya, however, received a warning against doing this from his advisors, since this would have left him vulnerable to a charge of treason. Therefore, Ayub's speech was recorded under the supervision of a general and was broadcast by another at the radio station.⁵⁶

The transfer of power from one military head to another was not a smooth one. This reinforces the fact mentioned earlier that military support of political leadership in Pakistan was necessary for sustaining or dismantling it.

IV. Ethnic Nationalism and Confrontation

General Yahya (1969-1971) took over the government of the country with a promise of "protecting the country from utter destruction."⁵⁷ His rule, like a military operation, was run more from general headquarters than from the presidential palace.⁵⁸ Political unrest had come to an end, but the

⁵³ Interview with a Brigadier General, July 1975.

⁵⁴ Interview with a colonel, August 1975.

⁵⁵ Prior to this interview, General Ayub had sent his advisors to the GHQ to request military support, but they were told by General Gul Hassan: "I have told Yahya to tell that old cock that this is a political matter and he had better sort it out himself." Interview with a Major General, July 1975.

⁵⁶ Interview with a lieutenant general, August 1975.

⁵⁷ General Yahya Khan's first broadcast to the nation, on March 26, 1969.

⁵⁸ See Fazal Mugeen Khan, *Pakistan's Crisis in Leadership* (Islamabad: National Book Foundation, 1973), pp. 28-31.

imposition of a second military regime had a different impact on different segments of the elite and of the masses. Drastic measures were needed for the integration of the ethnically-polarized political elites. For the exploited masses, it was hoped that new leadership would alleviate their poverty. The ethnically exploited (particularly the Bengalis) looked on it as a mere change from one military dictator to another. In general, the overall fear of the invincibility of the military regime was no longer there.⁵⁹

Yahya Khan used a political rather than an economic approach to diffuse the ethnic situation. His political formula included elections to decide the country's leadership. Accordingly, he dismantled the One Unit Plan and, in 1970, held the first fair elections in the country based on "one man, one vote." His Legal Framework Order of 1970 promised to give "maximum autonomy" to the provinces and ensured that:

- a) the people of all areas in Pakistan shall be enabled to participate fully in all forms of national activities; and (b) within a specified period, economic and all other disparities between the provinces and between different areas are removed by the adoption of statutory and other measures.⁶⁰

Any political leader whose leadership was dependent upon electoral votes in West Pakistan (now Pakistan) would have had to ally himself with the Punjabis. Leaders like Wali Khan of the National Awami Party could not become national leaders, as they only had the support of the Pathans and Baluchis. Bhutto, on the other hand, was a Sindhi landowner who had launched his Pakistani People's Party in Lahore and had influential Punjabi, Sindhi and Muhajir supporters. He therefore emerged as the popularly-elected leader in West Pakistan.

The Bengalis elected Mujibur Rahman as their leader, and under his charismatic influence at that point in time, they

⁵⁹ This impression is from the author's personal knowledge, since he was living in Pakistan during the military takeover in 1958 and 1969.

⁶⁰ Legal Framework Order in S. G. M. Badruddin, *Election Handbook 1970* (Karachi: Publishing and Marketing Associates, 1970), p. 128.

became fanatically committed to opposing Punjabi domination. The results of the elections thus turned into a contest of ethnic nationalism.

Mujib's Awami Party put forward a six-point plan which contained more than the Legal Framework Order of 1970.⁶¹ Mujib had to make a choice: either accept the prime minister-ship of Pakistan or become the founder of the new state of Bangladesh. In a situation fraught with complete ethnic distrust and political intrigues, no political arrangement emerged. For Mujib, the glory of being the founder of a new state was a more attractive proposition than being prime minister of Pakistan for a limited time. Taking into consideration the strength of ethnic nationalism of his people and the support of neighboring India, he declared himself in favor of a new state of Bangladesh. Yahya's weakness lay in the fact that, although he realized the strength of ethnic cleavage, he underestimated the power of ethnic nationalism.

In an effort to stop the disintegration of the state, the military elites ordered the military to "do their duty" to "ensure the integrity, solidarity and security of Pakistan."⁶² Even to the last day of the fall of Dacca, the military elites sought to "preserve and promote the ideology of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan."⁶³ To the Bengalis, however, the military was no longer politically neutral, but became the "sword arm" of the Punjabis. The outcome of the Civil War made the military realize (a consensus among the officer corps) that it was not the Indian forces but the forces of ethnic

⁶¹ According to the "six points," only defense and foreign affairs were to come under the control of the federal government. But foreign trade, taxation, three separate currencies and a separate provincial parliamentary force would be under provincial control.

⁶² General Yahya's broadcast to the nation on March 26, 1971. Quoted in M. Zafrullah Khan, *The Agony of Pakistan* (Oxford: Alden Press, 1973), p. 148.

⁶³ Yahya's last press information release, which stressed his point of granting "maximum provincial autonomy within the concept of one country." This was sent to the press on December 17, 1971, but was later withdrawn as he stepped down from power. It was published for the first time in 1974. See *Herald* 5, no. 3 (March 1974): 18-20.

nationalism that were their greatest foe. They surrendered to the less feared of the two: the Indian military.

V. Military Elites and Translegitimation

In ideological states, the relevance of legitimacy was not the same as in other states. In Chile, for example, changes in ideology lead to the replacement of political ideology and a transformation of the political system, when General Pinochet took over the country's government and dismantled the Marxist state. In Pakistan, however, since its ideology emanated from religion, any attempt to displace Islam and replace it with a secularized ideology would have radically altered the political system and endangered the very political creation of the state. Islam was, therefore, a constant. It was the religion of the people as well as the ideology of the state. Any other ideology would have to be accommodated within the framework of Islam, such as Bhutto's Islamic Socialism.

The military's political actions in Pakistan were and will always be translegitimated, in so far as they were related to the integration and existence of Pakistan. Its political concern (which crystallized through interviews with the officer corps) was embodied in the military ideology and the military roles, which will be explicated below.

A. *Military Ideology*

The military's identification with Islam and Pakistan was postulated earlier. A further addition to this can be seen in the oath which every member of the armed forces has to take. They solemnly swear that they believe in Allah, the prophet Mohammad, the Holy Quran, have faith in and allegiance to Islam and will strive to "preserve the Islamic ideology which is the basis of the creation of Pakistan."⁶⁴ Their militarization

⁶⁴ The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, April 12, 1973. See Article 244 and the Third Schedule, pp. 116 and 153.

of this ideology is manifested in their commitment to the state, rather than to the government in power.

The military's respect for the man-made constitution indicated its allegiance to the government in power. Whenever such allegiance was withdrawn, the constitution was abrogated, as in the case of Ayub (Constitution of 1956) and Yahya (Constitution of 1962). Their allegiance to Islam and Pakistan took precedence over that to the government in power. The guardianship of Islam translegitimated its political concern, which could never be illegitimated (lack of legitimacy) or delegitimated (disappearance of legitimacy) so long as it was concerned with religion and state. Every government in power had to take this into consideration.

Muslim ideology envisaged the "establishment of an Islamic and truly welfare state where exploitation ceases to exist and where all human affairs are conducted in accordance with the norms of justice and fraternal cooperation, the establishment of a truly democratic order assuming freedom and opportunities to all members of the society to conduct their affairs through consultation and mutual consent."⁶⁵ The failure to establish such a state is traced back to the lack of internalization of the Muslim ideology in the multi-ethnic state. After emphasizing Islam as the "basis for the creation of Pakistan," Naqvi continues:

the fact is that since Pakistan is a rich mosaic of ethnic groups, therefore the circumstances have gradually led to a stage where these groups have little sympathy for each other and less participation in common ideals. There has developed much suspicion and even hostility among these groups. Ethnic, caste, regional and kinship alignments are now predominant in our rural areas and also in our urban centers. The religious cleavages have also been inducted through the little educated Mullahs between various Muslim sects. Over and above the internal dividing forces work-

⁶⁵ Major Syed Shahid Abbas Naqvi, "Motivation of the Armed Forces towards our Ideology." This mimeographed paper was given to the author by the Research and Development Department in July 1975. See p. 2.

ing against our ideology, there is a wily enemy who has a well chalked out and a far-sighted plan to obliterate Islam and in turn the existence of Pakistan as a separate country...therefore any training or guidance towards our ideology, it is essential, first to define the Muslim ideology and then suggest ways and means of introducing it as part of the regular training of our armed forces.⁶⁶

This, he argued, would result in the "desired will to fight and defend this soil" for the "strength of the Pakistan Armed Forces mainly lies in quality and not in quantity."⁶⁷

Scholars debated the legitimacy of the military as long as it functioned according to the "legitimate goals" defined by the "political community."⁶⁸ In Pakistan this was embodied in the ideals and values of Islam. The conflict arose from a lack of consensus as to which elite group was the most competent to interpret and maintain them. Would it be the religious and landowning elites, with their traditionalization of Islam; the military or bureaucratic elites, with their modernization of Islam; or the professional and industrial elites, with their secularization of Islam? As these fragmented communities could not unite in order to decide the legitimate goals, the cancer of ethnic nationalism spread across the elite strata and became a threat to Muslim ideology as well as to the state of Pakistan.

The military ideology internalized by the Pakistani military placed the interests of the state above their own lives. The Civil War of 1971 left its mark on the military and, although members of the officer corps were in bitter conflict over the military strategies used by the generals, the esprit de corps remained and was reinforced by its ideology.

The military's right to intervene when the state was threat-

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

⁶⁸ J. van Doorn, *The Soldier and Social Change* (Berkeley, California: Sage Publications, 1975), p. 95. Also see Gwyn Harries—Jenkins et al., eds., *The Military and the Problem of Legitimacy*, Sage Studies in International Sociology (London: Sage Publications, 1976).

ened with disintegration was upheld by the Supreme Court of Pakistan, who called the exigencies of ethnic nationalism "the doctrine of necessity" and stated that "all the legislative and administrative measures taken by his regime cannot be upheld on the basis of his legitimacy, but such laws and measures which are protected by the Doctrine of Necessity [i.e., laws made for the welfare of the nation and the orderly administration of the country] shall and can be deemed to be valid."⁶⁹

B. Military Roles

Roles are expected behavior patterns for individuals occupying different positions in a political system. They may be shaped by such factors as environment, history, culture and leadership.⁷⁰ The occupants of such roles are expected to operate within set parameters, and when these are overstepped, then either the system must change to accommodate the occupants of such a role or the latter must be removed. Lissak's concept of "role expansion" explains the behavior patterns of the military as the "penetration by the officer corps, either collectively or as individuals, into various institutional fields, such as economic enterprises, education and training of civilian manpower, fulfilling civilian administrative functions and engaging in different forms of power politics."⁷¹

Such an expansion of roles had already taken place within the military-industrial and civilian complexes in Pakistan, and it was accepted because of the military's efficiency. What was relevant within the context of the ideological state was

⁶⁹ The Supreme Court of Pakistan judgement in the case of Asima Jilani v. the Government of Pakistan, announced on April 20, 1972. Quoted in Hassan A. Rizvi, *The Military and Politics in Pakistan* (Lahore: Progressive Publishers Ltd, 1974), p. 310.

⁷⁰ R. F. Hopkins, *Political Roles in a New State: Tanzania's First Decade* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), p. 42.

⁷¹ Moshe Lissak, *Military Roles in Modernization* (Berkeley: Sage Publications Ltd., 1976), p. 13.

their role monopolization. Such a role gave the military the right to define and determine its own goals for ensuring the integrated existence of the country. This right was not disputed. However, when the military deviated from its role, it conflicted with other political elites and was challenged by the ethnic ones. Conflicts with the political elites, particularly the religious ones, arose because of the different interpretations of Islam. In the case of the professional elites, it was due to the implementation of political strategies (like Ayub's "Basic Democracy") for ruling the country. The military intervened with its translegitimate sanction, but later discarded this role and tried to monopolize other roles (such as Ayub's ambitions to be president-for-life). Then, even the military refused to support its own men.

The military anticipated that whenever political expediency made demands on the political roles of its officers, they would need training in political skills. Such training was given in one of the most sophisticated institutions—the National Defense College. Here, selected officers from the rank of brigadier up received instructions on various aspects of national defense to "prepare them for the planning of national strategy and for assignment at the policy-making levels."⁷² Their training focused on the following factors:

- a) Study and analysis of Pakistan's national aims and their implementation, particularly in the military field;
- b) Study of the situation in areas which need to be controlled in order to achieve Pakistan's national aims;
- c) Study of elements which constitute national power and their relation to military power;
- d) Study of the comprehension, direction and control of national power, including military power, leading to the planning of national strategy.⁷³

⁷² Syllabus of the National Defense College.

⁷³ Syllabus of the National Defense College.

The officers of the Pakistani military were divided into two strategies: a political-military stratum and a military-professional stratum. Officers within these strata were not in any superordinate or subordinate position relative to each other. They could be of the same rank or not, the only difference being that one would be concerned with the political aspects of the military, while the other with the military aspects of the state. These roles were not mutually exclusive.

Officers belonging to the military-professional stratum were responsible for managerial responsibilities and the professionalizing of the inner skill-structures of the military, while those in the political-military stratum were responsible for the military's security role within the state. The civilian and military governments chose only officers with political skills to take on political responsibilities. These skills were judged by criteria such as rank, training, experience, personality and personal influence.

The failure of the political elites to resolve political disputes often forced the military to take over such problems. The "wisdom" of the Bhutto government is evident from its action banning all political parties (the National Awami Party in particular) and from the imprisonment of ethnic political-elites. By closing all the channels for establishing political dialogues, he is following the precedents set by past regimes, which had proven themselves disastrous for Pakistan. In response to a challenge from the Baluchi ethnic nationalists, the Bhutto government did not negotiate, but used a military solution. Since 1974 the military's new "development" role has been used:

- a) to assist the civilian administration in restoring law and order to affected areas;
- b) to apprehend hostile elements and recover unauthorized arms and instruments of warfare;
- c) to maintain the security of the lines of communication in

the affected areas and undertake whatever action was necessary against hostile elements;

- d) to assist the civil administration in various development and uplift projects in the Marri and Mengal areas of Baluchistan.⁷⁴

The officer corps was reluctant to be pushed into military action because of the incompetency of the political elites, and this matter had been of great concern to them. Even when they have not wanted to enter the political arena, their role of patrolling their own society has always existed. The military's dilemma in fighting ethnic nationalism was that it meant waging war on its own people. If it was victorious (Baluchistan, 1974), it was criticized for committing "genocide." If it lost (Bangladesh, 1971), it was considered an "occupation" army in a new country.

VI. Conclusions

The political leaders of Pakistan have always regarded the military with distrust and, as such, have devised various strategies to establish their equilibrium with it. Ghulam Mohammad made the military a direct offer of political power, and Ayub, the commander-in-chief, quickly sent the military back to the barracks, after taking over as President of Pakistan. Towards the end of his rule, his political actions resulted in alienating the military.

Bhutto, on the other hand, has continuously flirted with the military by trusting and distrusting them, by challenging and rewarding them. He first challenged the military through the People's Party of Pakistan,⁷ when he was sure that the military had fallen out with Ayub. After having served in Ayub's cabinet, his assessment of the relationship between the

⁷⁴ See Government of Pakistan, *White Paper on Baluchistan* (Islamabad: Printing Corporation of Pakistan, 1974), p. 25.

military and Ayub after 1965 proved fairly accurate. He could not do the same with Yahya, as the latter had a working relationship with the military. He therefore lobbied for support within military circles and this brought him to power in 1971.⁷⁵ He was able to exercise his power at a time when the military was recovering from its defeat at the hands of its worst foe: ethnic nationalism. During this period he was able to dismiss officers and reorganize the armed forces by appointing a newly designated chief of staff instead of a commander in chief, so that ultimate authority rested with the head of state alone. He also declared any action which attempted to abrogate the constitution through force or conspiracy as being "high treason."⁷⁶ In addition, he recognized the military's role as guardian and defined the military constitutionally as the Pakistani defenders against external aggression, and "subject to law, act in aid of civil power when called upon to do so."⁷⁷

Bhutto's policies have therefore sought a way to accommodate the military in the political arena by granting it a monopolization of its role. The military, as stated earlier, was the most powerful elite in the country, and, as such, was not interested in seeking power for power's sake, but rather for safeguarding the state from ethnic nationalism. When the military elites deviated from this role, they were challenged by the civilian political elites. The military has, therefore, taken steps to control those political aspirants who deviate from its own goals. For example, they dealt severely with the younger officers involved in the "military coup" which attempted to assassinate Bhutto and other generals in 1973.⁷⁸

⁷⁵ Bhutto's "active lobbying" was with several members of the Yahya military junta, such as Lt. General Gul Hassan, Major General Omer, etc. See G. W. Choudhury, *The Last Days of United Pakistan* (London: C. Hurst and Co., 1974), pp. 104, 146, and 192. Lt. General Hassan and the Air Marshall brought him the support of the armed forces.

⁷⁶ The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, Article 6, (1), (2) and (3).

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 117, Article 245.

⁷⁸ This plan was brought to light in March 1973. Twenty-one army officers

The military's monopolization of its role, therefore, gives it the freedom it requires to exercise its role in its own sphere of influence, alongside the political leaders of the country. The most popular general in the armed forces, General Tikka Khan, was elevated from his position as chief of staff and appointed as special assistant to Bhutto on matters pertaining to national security.⁷⁹ While the general's concern has been to combat the forces of ethnic nationalism, Bhutto's concern should be to consolidate the ethnic fabric of the country into a political community. If he fails in this task, due to a pre-occupation with the consolidation of his own political position, that of his party or his ethnic and other collaborating groups at the cost of the others, he may "drag" the military into the political arena once more, either to deliver him or to replace him. Bhutto's future political actions will therefore determine the military's monopolization of its role.

(including two Brigadiers) and fourteen air force officers were involved. They were *court-martialled* with varying degrees of imprisonment by the military. See *The Pakistan Times*, February 2, 1974 and March 3, 1974.

⁷⁹ In an interview with General Tikka Khan in August 1973 (when he was chief of army staff), the author was informed of his efforts to expand the recruitment base to persons from all ethnic groups. This concern emanated from the desire to make it representative and such a people's army could be an effective deterrent to ethnic nationalism.

The Role of the Army in the National, Social and Political Development of Iraq

Faisal Al Samir

In the recent history of Iraq, the army has persistently been a decisive force in almost all the great political and social developments. It may be said that, with the exception of the 1920 revolution, which was a purely popular and civil one waged mainly by peasants and led by the national bourgeoisie against the British occupation, the army has constantly been in the foreground in Iraq. Since the creation of the so-called "Independent Iraq" there have been several coups d'état and revolutions (in 1936 and 1958)—all executed by the armed forces. The recent history of Iraq, therefore, is completely connected with that of the army.

The phenomenon mentioned above can be easily explained by these facts: ever since the occupation of 1914-1917, Britain has intended to keep Iraq under its full control, serving as a strategic point as well as a source of wealth, since it is rich in oil. The 1920 revolution was the first lesson which led Britain to adopt a keen and intelligent policy conforming to the spirit of the times: since the Iraqis had such a bitter hatred of direct subjugation, why not create a state modeled on the West, with a formally-elected king, a constitution and a

parliament? As to British interests, they could be well guaranteed by a treaty drawn up by the British authorities and legalized by the Iraqi government.¹ To grant the new state all the forms and façades necessary for a modern state, the British mandatory authorities thought it more convenient to create an Iraqi army "to preserve law and order," and to be a label for independence.²

In order to understand how the Iraqi army—created by British authorities—changed to a revolutionary power, we have to deal with the main points of the socio-political history of Iraq in the last few decades.

Present-day Iraq cannot be studied apart from two main phenomena: the first is the growth of the army as a decisive power, and the second is the emergence of the "Iraqi intelligentsia." These two forces flourished in quite different ideological climates, on the one hand, and did not appear at the same time, on the other. The military emerged during the making of Independent Iraq in 1921, while the intelligentsia started to play its role in the early thirties.

We do not have the space nor the interest to deal with the "Ottoman Iraq" here, but we feel obliged to point out an important fact concerning our subject: until the end of the Ottoman era, an Iraqi intelligentsia as such did not exist—as opposed to the case of Egypt, Syria and Lebanon, which had been acquainted with Western liberal thought. The earliest group of intellectuals was formed in Iraq during the thirties, and was represented by a small number of newly-graduated young men from the higher schools of learning in Europe and

¹ During the mandate, three treaties were concluded between Britain and Iraq: 1922, 1926 and 1930. According to the latter, Iraq entered the League of Nations in 1932.

See A. Razzak al-Hasani, [History of the Iraqi cabinets], vol. 1 (Sidon, 1965), pp. 103-111; by the same author, [The Modern Political History of Iraq], vol. 3 (Sidon, 1957), pp. 13-21, 23-24, 33, 51; Ernest Main, *Iraq from Mandate to Independence* (London, 1935), p. 128.

² See J. G. Browne, *The Iraqi Levies* (London, 1932); H. A. Foster, *The Making of Modern Iraq* (London, 1935); Majid Khadduri, *Independent Iraq* (Oxford University Press, London, 1960), p. 76.

Lebanon and from the Iraqi Faculty of Law. Therefore, the new state created in 1921 had a very bad shortage of cadres and depended mainly on the army officers who had studied and served in Turkey, and then joined Sherif Hussein of Mecca and his sons during the First World War. Those officers became the "power-elite" of the Iraqi society from the very beginning, and the governments for several decades were formed mainly from them.³ Those classic army officers monopolized political and social life, with few exceptions, for about forty years.

During the twenties and early thirties, the ideologies of constitutionalism, liberalism and moderate nationalism were prevalent in Iraq because they were from the West and because they suited the upper classes, which dominated the parliament and political life in general. But since the mid-thirties, such ideologies as mentioned above, were not without competition and rivalry from the newer patterns of Western thought—socialism, marxism, nazism and fascism—inspired by the October Revolution on the one hand, and by the rise of Germany and Italy on the other. Such new ideas found fertile ground in the milieu of the intelligentsia as well as among the young army officers.⁴

Until around the mid-thirties, the Iraqi army was a rather conservative body styled on the British model controlled by the British authorities, and headed by classically-minded officers who were mainly from the upper classes and were schooled and trained in Istanbul. The emergence of the na-

³ Until 1958, the government in Iraq had been almost monopolized by people like Nuri al-Said, al-Madfa'i, al-Hashimi, al-Askari, al-Gailani, al-Suwaidi, etc. They were all descendants of upper-class families.

See al-Hasani, *Iraqi Cabinets*; Heyworth Dunne, *Parties politiques et gouvernement dans l'Iraq d'aujourd'hui*, *Orient*, no. 15.

⁴ King Ghazi (1933-1939) was himself an admirer of such patterns of ultranationalism. He opposed British influence and gained popularity among young officers and students.

Such ultranationalistic patterns were clearly reflected in the pamphlets issued by Sami Shawkat, the director general of education in that period. See Shawkats, [These Are Our Objectives] (Baghdad, 1939); and [The Art of Death] (Baghdad, 1939).

tional bourgeoisie as leaders of the Iraqi army took place when General Bakr Sidqi—of Kurdish origin—seized power in the military coup d'état in 1936. He was the first representative of the Iraqi national bourgeoisie in public affairs, and his coup could mark the awakening of this class. Beginning with this date the ruling upper class, which had been completely in the service of Britain, was compelled to share with the middle class the power it had so long monopolized. Such a start led, through bitter struggles, to the complete replacement of the upper class by the national bourgeoisie in the July Revolution of 1958.⁵

The Iraqi army was created from the small force which was trained between 1921 and 1926, and which gradually gained practical experience. From 1932 on, it was capable of maintaining order within the new state, after having put down several local uprisings.⁶

The feeling arose, after 1930, that the army had to be enlarged and its equipment improved in order for it to be more efficient in helping to establish a strong central government capable of securing peace and stability in the country. Such a feeling pushed the government to pass a bill for compulsory military service in 1931. This move was strongly rejected by Britain and the League of Nations, with the justification that a strong army might lead the central government to suppress the tribes which bitterly opposed the conscription. But later, in 1934, the bill was approved. One year earlier the Iraqi army, led by Bakr Sidqi, ruthlessly and effectively smashed the uprising of the Assyrians near Mosul—an operation which lifted the spirits of the "military" and gave them much prestige and popularity.⁷

⁵ Since July 1958, the traditional upper class families mentioned above have disappeared from the scene of public affairs.

⁶ S. H. Longrigg, *Iraq: 1900-1950* (Beirut, 1968), pp. 242-43. Morris James, *The Hashimite Kings* (London, 1959), pp. 148-9.

⁷ Concerning the Assyrians, see W. A. Wigram, *Our Smallest Ally* (London, 1920); by the same author, *The Assyrian Settlement* (London, 1922); Charles Luke Hary, *Mosul and its Minorities* (London, 1925); R. S. Stafford, *Tragedy of the Assyrians* (London, 1935), pp. 32-108.

Compulsory conscription led to essential quantitative and qualitative changes in the structure of the Iraqi army. Until 1934 the soldiers were mercenaries. But from then on, the army was composed of all young men aged nineteen, fit for service and not going to school. In other words, it became composed of mostly young soldiers. Discipline and strict training were introduced into the army by young, ambitious and conscientious officers graduated from the new military college established in Baghdad. One further development of 1936 could be taken into consideration, namely, the introduction of modern arms bought for the first time in the history of Iraq from Germany, Italy and Czechoslovakia. This step, taken by the government of the coup d'état, caused a great rage in Britain. In the same period a small Iraqi air force was created, which was quickly able to prove itself efficient and brave. New blood, new arms and new discipline naturally produced a "new army," admired by the people and completely different from the old one, which had been established just to maintain "internal law and order."

Socially speaking, the "new army" was not chosen from one class, but represented the complete model of Iraqi society and contained all its social classes and strata. In other words, it had been composed from all fit, young Iraqis who were not going to school. Those soldiers came from the peasantry, the working class and the lower bourgeoisie. The army's triumphs filled them with dignity and pride, and led them to believe that they were carrying out the sacred mission of achieving the full independence of their fatherland. We must not fail to point out here that even the wealthy classes could not avoid sending their sons that had failed to continue their schooling to compulsory service, by paying an exemption fee. Even by doing so in accordance with the Law of Conscription, those boys were obliged to join the military service for several months. The level of education and conscientiousness was raised very much in the soldiers' ranks due to the recruiting of students who failed to complete secondary school. This

contrasts with the situation before 1934, when soldiers were ignorant and completely illiterate, having been chosen from the most socially and economically backward strata of the society, mainly from the poor peasants.⁸

Although we have just stated that compulsory conscription meant that the army came to represent all social classes, we must nevertheless add that, because the upper classes could send their sons to study elsewhere, the majority of the soldiers came from the lower classes, mainly from the peasants and workers.

The establishment of the Military Training College in Baghdad in the late twenties can also be looked upon as a fundamental change in the structure of the Iraqi army. Young, ambitious and patriotic officers began to join the ranks of the army and gradually replaced the traditional, classically-minded officers. This meant that the military college supplied the army with new generations of young and conscientious officers, who had been brought up in a new society, amidst new ideologies of nationalism and patriotism, and in a society where foreign and colonialist influence was indirect and only behind the scenes. On the other hand the national bourgeoisie, both middle and lower strata, could send their boys to the military college thanks to the sweeping wave of nationalism in the mid-thirties. The Law for Reserve Officers was a further significant development in the history of the Iraqi army. All fit graduates from the upper-level schools were compelled to join the military service for several months. This meant that the army enjoyed the services of the intellectual elite—teachers, physicians, lawyers, engineers, etc., which played a significant role in introducing new ideas and concepts into the army.

The triumphs of the army over the Assyrians and also over the tribal and Kurdish uprisings (1935-1936) made of

⁸ In 1925, the army consisted of only 7,500 soldiers. After 1934 it consisted of six infantry battalions, three cavalry regiments and two mountain and one field battery.

it a "savior" in the eyes of the people. Pride and dignity, coupled with intuition, led to a feeling of superiority among the military.

At the same time we must take into account that the Iraqi system of government had failed to satisfy the army, and that the politicians had lost prestige with their intrigues and corruption, although they were to reap the fruits of the army's victories. Why should not the army itself, the army officers thought, put an end to such conditions and rule the country directly, in order to establish a good government as in the case of neighboring Turkey and Iran? They agreed that the army should rule the country to help create a stable and strong government which would be able to eliminate foreign influence, achieve social and economic reforms and participate in the Arab people's struggle for freedom and unity.

The speech delivered by General Sidqi in Mosul, after his victorious campaign against the Assyrian villagers, may throw light on the ambitions and intentions of the army officers at that time. "Thank you," he said, "Thanks which I offer as a pledge of what the army is almost to perform in the future, in accomplishment of the great duty which the army has felt and is still feeling that it must be prepared to perform. Therefore let us, with army and nation, await that day."⁹

The army officers, headed by General Sidqi, perceived that without collaborating with a popular civil movement possessing a reformist program which could guarantee the sympathy and support of the masses, their intended military coup would not meet with any real success. Although some objections arose in the milieu of the al-Ahali group (mainly out of fear of a military dictatorship) Hikmat Suleiman, a conservative reformist member of the group who had admired the authoritarian structure of Turkish politics (and prime minister of the coup government), was able to persuade the group to support the coup and participate in the revolutionary cabinet.¹⁰

⁹ Stafford, *The Tragedy of the Assyrians*, p. 204.

¹⁰ See *al-Bilad* (daily newspaper), 15, 16 January 1935, for Suleiman's

In October 1936, the military coup was spectacularly achieved without any significant opposition and a new reformist regime was established with the enthusiastic welcome of the masses. But only a few months later the ministers found no other solution but to resign, leaving the floor to a mere military dictatorship which only lasted about ten months, amidst many difficulties and much opposition led by the classic politicians. General Sidqi himself was assassinated on August 18, 1937, and the old regime came back into power by a counter-coup led by some right-wing military leaders.¹¹

This first military coup in Iraq was of great significance for the following reasons:

1. It resulted from new sources of political and social power, and produced almost a complete change in the system of government. It was able to restrict the monopoly of leadership and authority of the group of upper class politicians, and introduce the middle class representatives of the army to the foreground of public affairs. Although the coup had failed to produce a bona fide military rule, the army finally became a decisive force, henceforth determining the rise and fall of almost all the cabinets until 1941.¹²
2. The coup of 1936 offered the Iraqi Left their first big opportunity to put their reform program into practice. The failure of the experiment was due not to a lack of comprehension or sincerity, but to the reformists having misjudged the forces which had brought them to power and to the fact that they could not perceive the strength of the

ideas on reform; Abu al-Nasr and A. Fattah, *Iraq Between Two Coups d'état* (Beirut, 1938), p. 18.

On the Ahali group and their reform program, i. e. "populism" (al-Sha'biyah), see al-Chadarchi, [Memoirs] (Beirut, 1970); *al-Sh'abiyah* (in Arabic) (Baghdad, 1933).

¹¹ Khadduri, *Independent Iraq*, pp. 118-120, 121-24. For the assassination of General Sidqi, see Sarkis Sarani [The Secrets of Bakr Sidqi's Assassination] (Beirut, n. d.), pp. 4-36; see also Be'eri, G., *op. cit.*, pp. 19-20.

¹² al-Hassani, [Political history], pp. 148-202; Majid Khadduri, *The Army Officer, His Role in the Middle Eastern Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1955).

numerous enemies that democracy had at that time in Iraq. It must be taken into consideration that not only in Iraq and the Middle East, but also in many European countries, liberalism had lost ground in the face of anti-democratic and fascist ideas which were in their prime and were capturing the imagination of many people during that period.¹³

The failure of the coup of 1936 was, however, a great disappointment to the masses who had heartily welcomed the reform program. After the withdrawal of the reformists from the coup cabinet in June 1937, there were many demonstrations and also many strikes by the young working class, including the Iraqi Petroleum Company's workers, in support of the reformists and in protest of the Right's intrigues.¹⁴

Not only the intelligentsia, young army officers and workers supported and sympathized with the coup, but also the peasants who were in a state of complete poverty and misery.

Fascist patterns of nationalism found room in Iraq during the late thirties. Slogans of ultranationalism had spread widely among students and the young officers. The *futtwah* ("youth organization") was then formed by the Ministry of Education. Military training, way of life and dress were imposed in all secondary and higher schools in Iraq.

Nazi Germany had some political success when Fritz Grobba became the German minister in Baghdad. In one of his secret reports to his government, Grobba outlined his opinions and estimates about the national Pan-Arab movement, and by what means it could be backed by Germany. The document reveals the intimate contact between Grobba himself and some prominent national figures.

¹³ See the document "The German Ideas in Iraq, 1937-1938," *Middle East Journal* 12, no. 2 (1958); Hirszowicz Lukaz, *The Third Reich and the Arab East* (London, 1966); *al-Bilad*, May 28, 1936, p. 40.

¹⁴ Procès-verbal of the special session of the House of Commons, meeting no. 33, pp. 470-71. A. Jabbar Talib, [A Quarter-century of the History of Trade Unions in Iraq] (Baghdad, 1960).

The military coup d'état of May 1941 offers a brilliant example of the prevalent ideologies in Iraq at that time. As had been the case in 1936, the coup was able to secure the support of the people and even their admiration, being both a national and a patriotic movement achieved by the army and directed against foreign influence. The 1936 coup had leaned, as we have stated, toward the Iraqi moderate "Left," while that of 1941 reflected the prevailing ideologies of ultranationalism, i.e. it had been influenced, directly or indirectly, by the impact of nazism and fascism, especially when we take into consideration the popular hatred of Britain, the arch enemy of Hitler.

The 1941 coup proved that, in spite of the ideological gaps and differences among the Iraqi opposition groups, they could agree on the main objectives: the struggle against foreign influence and the achievement of independence. Such terms as "Left" and "Right" had lost their acuteness and distinctiveness during the Thirty Day War against the British occupation. They had, in fact, almost disappeared—a phenomenon which can be observed in all the revolutionary movements in Iraq.

The direct reason for the coup of 1941 can be found in the dispute among Iraqi politicians about how to interpret the Treaty of 1930. Nuri al-Said strongly adopted the policy of complete support for Britain in the war effort, not only by offering all the facilities it needed and breaking off diplomatic relations with Germany, but also by declaring war on the latter and even sending Iraqi troops to the front. Such policy met with strong and bitter opposition from many army officers, Pan-Arabs, ultranationalists of the Muthanna Club and politicians, led by Rashid Ali al-Gailani, who tended toward keeping Iraq away from such dangerous complications.

But the indirect reasons for the above-mentioned coup were deeply rooted in Iraqi society and had been accumulating since the failure of the Sidqi coup. The year 1938 witnessed mass arrests and trials of communists and democrats. Britain

restored its influence and the army was again compelled to import arms and ammunition from Britain only. Another law was issued according to which many army officers, politicians (including al-Gailani himself), intellectuals and prominent lawyers accused of being pro-Sidqi were exiled to remote places. In 1939 a state of emergency was declared and many patriots, civil and military, including Suleiman, the former prime minister of the 1936 coup, were tried by court martial. Some were sentenced to death and others to a long prison term.

At the end of 1940 the situation in Iraq was much worse. Britain seemed to have the intention of occupying the country for war purposes, which for the people meant not only political and military subjugation, but also hunger and toil so as to feed the British troops. At that time Iraq suffered an acute social and economic crisis because of the declining prices of agricultural crops during the depression and also because of the widespread unemployment among peasants, workers and intellectuals.

All these factors inspired a group of army officers to discuss and then plan a new military coup. The most prominent among them were the four ambitious young officers well known by the name of "The Golden Square".¹⁵ The ground was so well prepared for such a move, that it only needed a spark. This came soon after, when al-Gailani, who had formed the cabinet in 1940 under opposition pressure which led to the resignation of Nuri al-Said, rejected Britain's demand to send troops to Iraq in accordance with the 1930 treaty. Al-Gailani made this move in agreement with the influential Golden Square and other patriotic army officers, and was backed by the Pan-Arabs and was, at least, not opposed by the "Left."

¹⁵ This is one of the most interesting documents published by the Allies after the Second World War, dated December 8, 1937, concerning the future relations of the German government and the Nazi party with the political movement in the Arab world in general and Iraq in particular.

When the regent announced the dismissal of al-Gailani, the Golden Square declared a state of emergency and occupied Baghdad with its troops on April, 1, 1941. A National Defense Government was formed by a council headed by al-Gailani. The regent, who had fled to Jordan, was replaced by another, and al-Gailani was nominated as prime minister. The new regime was enthusiastically welcomed by the masses, and the Youth Organization members took their places as voluntary soldiers to defend the "Patriotic Regime" side by side with the army.

The British troops soon landed in Basrah, and a thirty-day war began on April 29, 1941. The war was clearly unfair due to the quantity and quality of arms. Iraq lost the war in spite of the bravery of the army and the people.

After the return of the old regime, cruel measures were taken against the patriotic army officers and politicians. The Iraqi army was then almost liquidated. A great number of officers were dismissed, and many military personnel and civilians who had participated in the coup were sentenced to death or imprisonment. The army itself was reduced from four to three divisions.

During the following years, the regime adopted a double-faced policy towards eliminating revolutionary tendencies within the military. On the one hand, they retreated to a careful choice of army leaders and to strict supervision and censorship, in an attempt to keep the army far from politics. On the other hand, they pampered the high-ranking officers and gave them abundant privileges. During the last decade prior to the July Revolution of 1958, the "Old Regime" had looked to the outsiders who were stable, strong and protected by a loyal and devoted army.

The developments which have taken place in Iraq since the end of the Second World War deserve much consideration. The society has been in a transitional stage: the beginning of industrialization and mechanized agriculture, the rapid growth

of a national bourgeoisie and intelligentsia, and the expansion of democratic and Marxist ideas.

On the other hand, the ruling upper class rapidly grew up into a secret police authority which encouraged corruption, bribery and treachery and restricted the wealth of the country to a very limited strata of the society.

Peasants, who formed about half of the population, lived under the worst conditions.¹⁶ The legal system under the British domination and domestic rule recognized the class-order and granted the tribal chiefs authority over the members of their tribe. In 1932, the Iraqi government issued a law to deal with the land problem which said that cultivated land had to be the private property of the chiefs. But in reality the tribal chiefs, who in the past only looked after the land and their people (the land being common property), henceforth became the sole owners of the cultivated land. In this way the state created real feudalism, which existed until the July Revolution of 1958.¹⁷

Under such bad conditions and suffering, the peasants found no solution but to desert their land and move to the big cities in the hope of making a better life. This was rarely possible, so that they found themselves almost limited to unemployment and poverty.

There was little change, however, in the Iraqi social strata, because of several factors tending to preserve the status quo. Prominent among these were the ruling class and the *shaykhs*, feudal tribal chiefs who dominated parliament and political life. The establishment of the Board of Development in 1950 did not result in any serious distribution of influence or wealth, because the profits from the oil revenues invested in building dams, irrigation projects and roads only went to

¹⁶ According to the statistics from 1958-59, there were three million people working in rural areas, i. e. 3/7 of the total population, while according to the census of 1947, it was more than half the population of Iraq: 1947: 4,816,185; 1957: 6,538,109; 1965: 8,261,527.

¹⁷ See Talaat Shaibani, [The reality about land property in Iraq] (Baghdad, 1958).

foreign companies, the upper class and to a limited number of local entrepreneurs, especially the real estate bourgeoisie. Just before 1950, it seemed that the balance of powers that the traditional government had tried to keep was effectively destroyed.

By devoting a large proportion of oil revenues to the Board of Development, the government was trying to avoid the impending explosion through slow reforms and the gradual creation of a middle class.¹⁸ But, on the other hand, the regime refused to allow the new emerging forces, especially the national bourgeoisie, to share the authority. The farther this process went, the more it became an isolation of the "old regime."

Immigration of the rural population provided the cities with large numbers of unskilled laborers who were subjected, as we have stated, to misery and despair on the one hand, and to the impact of new revolutionary political ideas, on the other. The regime could not provide solutions to such problems, because it thought that the dangers came only from the intelligentsia and the petite bourgeoisie, and that such dangers could be avoided by means of persecution, suppression, bribery and temptation. It believed that the army, strong and loyal, would at last provide a safe shelter. The regime wondered why peasants deserted their villages and betrayed their tribal traditions and the patriarchal authority of their shaykhs.

The Iraqi industrial bourgeoisie appeared too late because the capital needed for such enterprises was controlled by foreigners or by a few rich families. The emergence of the industrial bourgeoisie after the Second World War was due to the increased profits made by the industrial establishments and to the lack of consumer goods. Since the fifties Iraq, wit-

¹⁸ See "The Iraqi Development Board," *Southern Social Science Quarterly* 36 (1955); *The Economic Development of Iraq: Report by the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development* (Baltimore, 1952); S. J. Habermann, "The Iraq Development Board: Administration and Program," *Middle East Journal*, 9 (1955).

nessed a reasonable growth in its industry, mostly because of the petroleum revenues allotted to the development projects. But it is worth pointing out that the commercial, agricultural and real estate bourgeoisie had appeared much earlier, and they were more numerous than the industrial one, because the investment of their money in such enterprises was less risky and better guaranteed than in industry.¹⁹

Because of the above-mentioned facts, the working class was too weak and small in size.²⁰

The poor conditions which the majority of the people (peasants, workers, intelligentsia, and petite bourgeoisie) lived under, coupled with the political institutions, resulted in introducing the great masses into the battle against the "Old Regime" which was backed by the colonialists. This meant that new leaders from more humble origins came to the forefront, not to represent the ideologies of the upper classes, but rather the radical ones.

In the big cities, politics were based on quite new lines, concepts and ideas, which were introduced into the country with the impact of modern Western political thought. Not only did the parties, trade unions, press and intelligentsia discuss the economic, social and political problems from radical points of view, but such enthusiastic discussions and arguments were in fashion with nearly all the inhabitants of the big cities. They were discussed in homes and cafés, and even whispered in offices and public buses.

¹⁹ See *Report of the Industrial Census of Iraq 1954* (Baghdad, 1956); *Report on the Census of Services and Service Industries in Iraq for 1957*.

²⁰ According to the census of 1947, only 7% of the labor force was engaged in manufacturing. In 1954, the total number of workers and their families was estimated at half a million. The conditions of the Iraqi workers before 1958 were very bad. The minimum monthly wage paid to workers was 7.5 dinars, according to official legislation. But tens of thousands received much less than the minimum. Such an income could not meet the essential necessities of life.

See Hashim Jawad, *The Social Structure of Iraq* (Baghdad, 1945); Davis G. Adams, "Current Population Trends in Iraq," *Middle East Journal*, 10, no. 2 (1956); M. Hassan Salman, [The Economic Development in Iraq] (Beirut, 1965); *Report of the Industrial Census of Iraq 1954* (Baghdad, 1956).

As for the concept of progress, it had quite different meanings for the different sectors of Iraqi society. For the bourgeoisie it meant an opportunity for social mobility, economic success and a better life. For the peasant in a mud hut, amidst illiteracy, poverty and disease, it meant land reform, schooling and free medical care.

Radical movements were found, as a rule, in the big cities (Baghdad, Mosul, Basrah), while paternalism continued in the non-metropolitan, i.e. the rural regions. Such differences appeared shortly after the creation of the nation and grew during the decades of economic and cultural adjustment that followed. The cities, where the population density was greater and development was urban, had served as the centers of commerce, culture and industry for the whole country. Baghdad, as the capital, had long maintained its political and ideological leadership in the country. The rise of new elites in these cities, composed of educated professionals, permitted the establishment of new patterns of thought and communication, and the comprehension of new social and political ideas, some of which were quite alien.²¹

The regime, in order to avoid change through violence and revolution, tended to use bribery in addition to persecution and suppression, and to absorb opponents and people with ability from the intelligentsia into the regime, in an attempt to leave the masses unarmed, unorganized and without leadership. In 1957 many intellectuals, politicians and party members felt despair and withdrew from political work.²²

Revolution was in the air. It could be smelled by all those who hated the regime and it was surely coming soon. But, how and when? The decadence of the ruling upper class

²¹ See Malcolm N. Quint, "The Idea of Progress in an Iraqi Village," *Middle East Journal*, 12, no. 4 (1958); William Polk, *The Nature of Modernization in the Middle East* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1955); "The Power Struggle in Iraq," *Middle Eastern Affairs*, 11, no. 2.

²² Nearly all the legalized political parties were obliged to stop their open activities and restrict them to the secret work of the National Front, in co-ordination with secret parties.

meant it was no longer able and suited to keep power. In the meantime the emergence of people of superior quality in the lower strata of society who were capable of maintaining authority and willing to use force, was the social phenomenon which soon brought about the revolution.

Power was concentrated mainly in the hands of the upper class, which was almost unwilling to recognize the new social forces emerging from the middle and lower strata of society. Such classes grew in number and ambition due to the opportunities from education and industrialization.

The regime believed that the danger came only from the civilians, because the army was believed to be loyal and controlled completely by the high-ranking officers. They did not even suspect that a revolutionary movement existed and flourished among the "free officers." There were new elites in the making who came from the lower strata, represented radical ideologies and dreamed of rebuilding a "New Iraq." Those officers only reflected the general sentiments of the vast majority of the people and because they possessed the means for change, they were able to finally seize power and destroy the traditional system of rule on July 14, 1958.²³

The July revolution must be looked upon as one of the most important events in the recent history of Iraq. Not only did it influence the nature of the country's power elite by bringing the lower and middle strata of the national bourgeoisie (both military and civil) to power, but it also deeply influenced the structure of the society as a whole and even the structure of the army itself.

Before the revolution, the power elite was a static group, its leadership determined by birth and its outlook shaped into the traditional scholastic patterns of religious establishments or bureaucracy. In small cities, villages and among tribal groups, landowners remained at the top of the social and

²³ See: Caractacus, *Revolution in Iraq*, transl. into Arabic, Beirut, 1959.

influence ladders. The politics of such rural regions was one of custom, religion and ethnic differences.²⁴

The revolution caused a big shift in the nature of power, creating a new society by abolishing feudalism and achieving land reform, introducing industrialization and controlling national wealth and resources. Power began to grow outside the traditional establishments and the character of the new power elite was different from that of the recent past in several ways: in their social origin, in their adoption of new slogans and concepts such as the nation-state and Arab socialism and, above all, in their endeavor to attract the masses, the opposite of the old power elite which had never bothered about the middle and lower classes.

The army officers who had achieved the revolution were searching to establish a new society ruled by a new power elite—a society fully independent and sovereign, neutral, industrialized, with agrarian reform and social justice. But the new leaders had obscure, vague and sometimes contradictory ideologies. From the beginning they vacillated between leftist and rightist political attitudes, especially in their outlook toward "reform." They possessed, indeed, the goodwill, bravery, enthusiasm and above all, the self-denial to achieve the demanded reforms. But they lacked an integrated program of strategy and even of revolutionary theory.

It is quite clear now that the free officers had not agreed on a detailed and comprehensive program. They were merely non-party patriots who sympathized with the aims of the national movement and perceived that without the army's interference in politics, no other power would be able to carry out just such aims. The free officers were a secret, loose circle, bitterly touched by the loss of Palestine because of imperialistic intrigues and treacherous governments, conscious of the poor conditions the Iraqi people were in, and deeply influenced by the Egyptian Revolution of 1952, especially after the Suez

²⁴ See: Quint, *Op. Cit.*; Polk, *Op. Cit.*

War of 1956. They also admired and sympathized with the military coups achieved by the Iraqi army in 1936 and 1941. Being sure of the absolute support of the masses, they planned to overthrow the "royal regime" and fulfill the political and social ideals of Iraq.²⁵

The free officers were men who had passed their youth. Many of them were married, had children and lived a normal life, enjoying the limited pleasures and luxuries guaranteed by their considerable salaries. They had no personal complaints indeed. But they felt, as their fellow citizens did, the miserable conditions which their country was in and because they possessed the means for change, they did not hesitate to take advantage of the opportunity. The free officers, of course, were not isolated from the life outside the barracks. They read papers, books and underground pamphlets, listened to radio broadcasts and discussed national and international politics with their civilian friends and acquaintances.

Personal ambitions cannot be ignored as a significant motive which pushed the military toward the risky path of revolution. The free officers were deeply inspired by the example of other military officers who came from humble origins and who could, by their bravery and zeal, rise to the top of authority. They came mostly from the lower stratum of the middle class, and the power elite in Iraq was mainly from the upper classes. They were also conscious that the door of authority would remain closed in their face, as in the case of their civil companions. Such facts can even explain why many military men vacillated between different issues and ideologies.

Due to the lack of a revolutionary theory and a comprehensive program to deal with all the political, social, and economic issues which emerged from the process of the revolution, acute disputes soon arose among the military leaders. They were in complete agreement about overthrowing the old regime, achieving full independence, carrying out social reforms,

²⁵ Caractacus, *Op. Cit.*

Arab solidarity, etc. However, they later discovered that they had not agreed on many issues: to what limits and extremes should social reform go; where would public freedoms be checked; what sort of cooperation was there to be between Iraq and other Arab States; and many others.²⁶

²⁶ Caractacus, *Op. Cit.*

Francois de S. Marie, *Iraq Rouge*, Paris, 1960.

Rassi, Pierre, *l'Iraq des revoltes*, Paris, 1961.

Military Responses to Political Events in Southeast Asia

Estrella D. Solidum

I. Introduction

The phenomenon of military intervention in the politics of developing countries continues to be a subject of interest to scholars and politicians alike. Although it occurs in many countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America, it has not been taken for granted but rather analyzed for its political implications. This is because the military which engages in political activities has always invoked "reason of state." This is to say that when a state which has just acquired sovereign status is confronted by problems that often nearly threaten its very existence, the military has intervened in politics in order to save the country or put it back on its chosen path to development. If development is to be understood in terms of directional change, in some cases the military has wanted to influence the choice of direction; in other cases, merely return the events to the original direction, and in still other cases, create the changes towards the selected goals. Thus, the military, in responding to political events, has participated in political and social change, in positive or negative ways.

Many propositions have been offered regarding the military's position in political and social change. One group states that the military should be kept apart from political life. On the other hand, neo-realists say that because of the military's characteristics, such as its efficient organization and high degree of training and discipline, it is able to participate in political activities. We contend that these two views overestimate the military's institutional aspects and minimize the effects of political pressures on it.

This paper attempts to compare the responses of the military to political events in Indonesia, Burma, Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. It is our position that the military's responses to political events in the Southeast Asian states are largely a function of the events.

The political events treated in this paper include: (1) the Japanese occupation period from 1941-1945, (2) the independence movement, 1945-1948, (3) the intensification of communist and other insurgencies, 1948-1957, (4) the consolidation of independence, 1945-1970, and (5) the political instability of the 1970's. Although these events are in chronological order starting with 1941, some of them may trace their beginnings to earlier years and some of the events are seen to overlap one another.

We must first try to look at the characteristics of the military in the various states under study.

The military officers in Burma, Thailand and Indonesia share many characteristics with politicians. They have similar social and educational backgrounds due to their close associations through family or political experiences. In Thailand, the early military organization which dates back to the Sukho thai period, included every man who could be mobilized in time of war to fight the enemy. Even in the reign of King Paramatriloknatha of Ayutheya (1448-1488), who separated civil affairs from military affairs, the separation was not clearly delineated. It was only in the time of King Chulalongkorn,

in 1892, that the organization of the military was greatly improved when it became a distinctly formal and functional group. But its hierarchical structure was always harmonious with Thai attitudes. In modern Thailand, military officers have historical origins similar to those of civil officials in the bureaucracy. In fact, all political leaders are soldiers, in a sense. Furthermore, the military's dominance in politics since 1932 is partly an outgrowth of the relationship among the sections of the government before 1932.¹ The Thai military has no ideological orientation.

The military in Burma also has a large amount of political experience. Many senior officers in the present government belonged to the young nationalist elite of 1948. In the Burma Independence Army, the officers took on more political than military roles, such as membership in the Thankin Party as administrators for the country. Generals Ne Win and Aung San also held political roles after independence.²

Another source of political experience was the pressure exerted on them by the chief of political factions who tried to win the military's sympathy during times of severe political crises. But declining to be identified with any political factions, the military established a rural movement called the National Solidarity Association (NSA) to inculcate values of law and order, and encourage independent candidates to run for parliament and generate popular support for the military. Earlier, around 1958, the military conducted special schools in public administration for civil service personnel. In the period during and after the caretaker government of 1958 and 1962, seventy-four officers were either shifted to civilian posts, requested to stay, or they themselves resigned from the military. The military had experience in large-scale business operations because it created the Defense Service Institute (DSI) which

¹ David A. Wilson, "The Military in Thai Politics," in *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries*, ed. John B. Johnson (Rand Corporation, 1962), p. 255.

² Moshe Lissak, "The Military in Burma," *Asian and African Studies* (Jerusalem), vol. 5 (1969), pp. 144-145.

became the largest and most powerful business organization in Burma. When U Nu created the Burmese Economic Development Corporation, which took over the DSI enterprises in 1961, he used military men to run it. Therefore, the military's overall influence in economic policies increased.³

Indonesia's military became an important political factor in the country in 1958. But it already had political experience long before that. The background of its officers and men has given it a propensity to engage in politics. It was originally a volunteer group of students, social workers, professionals and others which formed the *Peta*, which later became the core of the Indonesian army. Many of the military officers of later years had been associates of political officials in the earlier fight for independence.⁴

In addition to its heterogeneous background, Indonesia's military had no professionalism nor military traditions and discipline to go by. They had a fighting spirit which enabled them to clash with politicians over strategies to be used in consolidating the country's independence. But because the military was composed of highly autonomous and virtually independent constituent units having a territorial basis and never being completely under political or governmental control, these factions were used by politicians to their own political advantage. The military also shared experiences with the politicians in their fight against the Japanese, in the consolidation of the unitary Republic of Indonesia, especially up until 1950, in the amnesty of the rebel military in 1961, and in other cases. In summary, the military developed the belief that they were "shareholders" in the corporate body, the Republic of Indonesia.⁵

The military of the Philippines, Singapore and Malaysia

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Roeslan Abdulgani, *Nationalism, Revolution and Guided Democracy* (Center of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University), 1973.

⁵ Guy Pauker, "The Role of the Military in Indonesia" in *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries*, ed. John B. Johnson (Rand Corporation, 1962), p. 198.

have remained professionalized and have recognized the principles of civilian supremacy and military restraint.

In Cambodia and Laos, the military did not enjoy the same importance as in Thailand. They originated as units of the French Union Army. In Cambodia, all military personnel were prevented by law from participation in politics. The government tried to keep most of the commanders away from the capital by rotating their tours of duty throughout the country.⁶ The military in Cambodia was aided by the police force which received para-military training. Similarly, the Royal Laotian army was under royal government control. But in 1959, the Royal Laotian army blossomed into a political force as the United States encouraged it to take over control of the government under the direction of Gen. Phoumi Nosavan. This was when the U. S. failed to influence the Royal Laotian government to abandon its neutralist position.

When Ngo Dinh Diem took over in the Republic of Vietnam, he took the military and the police firmly in his hands and subjected them to close civilian control.⁷ The military belonged to the upper class, possessing wealth, "family" and education, but it lost its professional character as Diem increased his personal control over it. In the latter years of Diem's rule, the military became divided into young and old groups—North and South Vietnam—originating groups with personal loyalties or with the ability to advance.

With this information on the characteristics of the military of the various countries, we may now turn to a discussion of how the military responded to political events in each country.

⁶ George McKahin, *Governments and Politics of Southeast Asia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1964), pp. 604-610.

⁷ Roy Jumper and Marjorie Weiner Normand, "Vietnam" in G. McKahin, *ibid.*, pp. 400-411.

II. Responses to Political Events

A. The Japanese Occupation Period

All the southeastern countries under consideration, except Thailand, experienced Japanese occupation after the colonial governments were initially defeated by the Japanese forces. Thailand did not have an anti-Japanese movement, so there was no occasion for the military to act. In the rest of the Southeast Asian states, the native military units were part of the colonial military set-up which fought the Japanese forces. Except for the Philippines, which had native armed forces that were professionally organized in 1935, the rest of the countries saw the birth of their military during the resistance movement against the Japanese.

B. The Independence Movements

Except for Thailand and the Philippines, the countries under study had to work for their independence after 1945. Indonesia, Vietnam and Laos fought protracted wars. Their militaries were formally created in this period and engaged the colonial forces until sovereignty was established. Burma, Malaya and Kampuchea negotiated for their independence and did not have to fight for it. But in the negotiations, many senior Burmese military officers were active in political roles as well. On the other hand the Indonesian military, while fighting for independence against the Dutch, also participated in the political aspects of the independence movement. Meanwhile, in Thailand the military was discredited when the Japanese with which they had aligned themselves during the war were defeated, and the civilians assumed political control for two years, the longest period since the 1932 coup. But the military spread information about the unpreparedness of

the civilians to rule, and in 1947 the military seized power once again and ruled until 1973, as they had from 1933 to 1944. It may be recalled that the coup of 1932 was an alliance of civil servants and officers.

C. Communist and Other Insurgencies

After independence, all the countries of Southeast Asia were confronted with the problem of communist and ethnic insurgencies. The Communist Parties' armed struggle was in line with party directives from the USSR. All the countries used their military to fight the insurgents. As before, the countries with a professional military continued to be directed by civilian rulers. In the Philippines, Malaya and Vietnam, the civilian governments directed military operations, while in Laos and Kampuchea, the royal governments did the same. At this time, Thailand's government was already in the hands of the military, which was supported by the bureaucracy. The Thai military mounted operations against the insurgents in the provinces. In Indonesia, the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) was operating legally by this time and shared political power with the other parties in the parliamentary government. Hence, no organized military campaign was directed against it. But there were some clashes between the communist irregulars and the military. Communist leaders Muso and Amir set up a Communist rebel government in 1948, but this was soon ended by Sukarno's appeal and Madiun's capture by the military. There were other rebellions in Indonesia by Moslem groups and local military commanders, which created a general state of insecurity, political instability and economic decline which the civilian officials could not prevent. The military developed a great distrust of the "scheming politicians." Even as the military faced the Dutch, Darul Islam and Partai Komunis Indonesian forces, certain elements of the military, particularly General Nasution, became active in politics and tried to influ-

ence President Sukarno to dissolve parliament and rule with the military. Sukarno resisted the military's attempts to dictate to him and asserted great authority during this chaotic revolutionary situation. He was able to avoid becoming a captive of the military by rejecting its demands and by setting up a "Guided Democracy," with himself as the authoritarian leader. Nonetheless, Sukarno always included the military in the high echelons of his government and asked for their participation in economic and political activities, together with other parties and groups. This went on until the Gestapu affair of 1965, when the military moved to secure the country in the face of danger from a communist coup. At this point, the military of Indonesia, tutored in nationalism, became a populist and political-minded element in society.⁸

Burma faced many insurgencies both from the Red Flag and White Flag Communists and from the secessionist states. The military, under the direction of the U Nu government, mounted operations against the insurgents and aided by the police, tried to maintain peace and order. Meanwhile, the civilian political leaders failed to produce the social and political institutions with which to meet the legitimate demands of the various groups satisfactorily. The Burmese government became a shaky coalition based on personal loyalties and thereby failed to combine modernization with traditional institutions, which resulted in failures, especially in economic areas. The government's policies alienated the intelligentsia and the military. The latter, at this point, underwent a period of ideological gestation from 1948-1955 and adopted a pragmatic attitude based on its "Ideology on the Defense Services." On the other hand, civilian officials and leaders went in a different direction to achieve the socialism they began to sloganize. The military refused to be identified with any political faction and instead encouraged and supported independent candidates for parliament. By 1958, U Nu handed

⁸ Abdulgani, *Nationalism*, p. 62.

over power to General Ne Win. In 1960, after two years, the military returned to the barracks badly fragmented and disappointed. But by 1962 there was a rapid succession of crises. The military, which did not consider itself a separate class, but "born of the people and looking after the country's unity," decided to assume the responsibilities of the state to rescue this Union.⁹ It cleaned up the public administration, improved the economic sector and suppressed the insurrection with its "Hercules Operations."

D. The Consolidation of Independence

Even as the insurgencies were going on, the countries of Southeast Asia were engaged in consolidating their sovereignty. Malaya and the Philippines proceeded along the lines that had been agreed upon earlier. Although there was a report of the military's plans to capture power during the height of the corruption in one administration of the Philippines, nothing came of it. In Indonesia, President Sukarno proclaimed a "Guided Democracy" under his leadership, and set up institutions that allowed representation from every sector including the military. Thus, it became only one of the groups that Sukarno used to govern.

In 1963, the influence of the army was reduced when General Nasution was excluded from the circle of political power. The influence of the PKI and Murba increased with the inclusion of Subandrio and Chairul Saleh in the cabinet.

In 1964 and 1965, the Army, together with the smaller parties, pressed President Sukarno to dissolve all parties and form a one-party system. Sukarno tried to maintain a balance through the unity of opposing forces. The PKI hastily tried to form the Nasakom cabinet, with a dominant position for the PKI, by causing a "short circuit" within army ranks. At

⁹ Brig. Gen. Thaung Dan, Vice Chief of Staff, AIR, 1962, see Lissak, "Military."

this time it was rumored that Sukarno was ailing and no longer as able as in his younger years. The October 1965 coup broke the balance, and the military under General Suharto took over.

In Burma, as was said earlier, the military took over and created the Revolutionary Council government (RC) which, it claimed, was done to implement the principles of the 1948 Constitution. Later, the army ideologists defined the normative principles so Burma could achieve progress. In 1964, the Revolutionary Council promulgated the National Solidarity Protection Law which dissolved all political organizations and gave the leading role to the Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP). The military officers in the Revolutionary Council also established the Security and Administrative Committees (SAC), the Worker's Unity in Rangoon, and the Central School for Political Science to train party cadres. The RC also tightened its control over the Sangha, urging the religious to purify their faith and be less dependent on the government.

In Thailand, the government was rather stable with its strong bureaucracy and the military rulers in command. The military was popular because it had traditionally protected the country's honor and was the symbol of national independence. Its rule just fitted into the social values of hierarchy and national glory. At the same time, the people had no traditional attachment to civilian rule and their democratic experiment in 1932 failed after a short time. Even in the 1950's and 1960's, party politicians had proven to be irresponsible. Also, there had never been any charismatic leadership in Thailand. Besides, what really mattered was not how the government came to power but whether it could govern, according to the High Court in its ruling on the issue of legitimacy of the military government in 1947. Thus, the military leaders in power remained unchallenged. They set up a parliament and allowed political parties (in reality, cliques) as they wished. The military ordered sweeping arrests of communists and sympathizers. In complete control, the military's self-confi-

dence was bolstered by the obedience of subordinates, by the autonomy of the Ministry of Defense, the judicial independence of the military and its big budget.

Vietnam's President Ngo Dinh Diem was in full command of the army during the years he was engaged in strengthening the institutions of South Vietnam. Every troop movement was cleared directly from his palace. As the political and military situations deteriorated, Diem had to tighten his control over every office. He bypassed formal military structures and cemented personal contacts. This led to widespread dissatisfaction within officers' ranks which culminated in the 1963 coup and finally in his assassination. The coup brought the military into political dominance for the first time since independence. Diem lost power because the top military officers abandoned him. Diem feared military involvement in politics, yet he made officers think in political terms by making uncritical loyalty to him the basis for advancement. Diem and Ngo Dinh Nhu kept the officers divided and prevented them from establishing roots in the provinces. Diem's and Nhu's policies antagonized the military, always putting its honor and prestige at stake. Then the ablest generals, who were moved to Saigon, eventually turned against them. The military in Vietnam was practical-minded and had no social theories about change. It did not set up a military dictatorship, but instead a civilian government, and if it had an ideology, it was of a negative type— anti-communism. With this, and with technical competence and self-sacrifice, the military selected civilian leaders. But by the time of the coup in 1963, the military's will to fight the communists who were also Vietnamese was gone and discipline was very low. Problems of planning and execution existed at all levels of the military. Consequently, the military changed the government a few times until finally they controlled only Saigon.

The Geneva Agreements of 1954 provided among other things that the Royal Laotian Army would reintegrate the Pathet Lao units in Laos. Premier Phoui Sananikone placed

them under strict control, which led to the dissatisfaction of the Pathet Lao. The government also agreed to the participation of the Pathet Lao through its political party, the Neo Lao Hak Xat. This event caused the American-created Committee for the Defense of National Interest (CDIN) to fear a drift toward a greater accommodation with the Pathet Lao. In December 1958, the army, headed by General Phoumi Nosavan and with the CDIN as its spokesman, announced that it was taking over the government to assure peace and security.¹⁰ In 1960, a united front of the CDIN and the Rassemblement du Peuple Lao (RPL) agreed to allow NLHX participation in the spring elections but would take measures to eliminate the chances of a NLHX victory. The royal army regrouped the balloting places and controlled all traffic to the polls to prevent Pathet Lao influence on voters. The result was a complete victory for CDIN-RPL and nothing for NLHX.

After the victory, Captain Kong Le and his royal army paratroop battallions took over the government in Vientiane by coup, charging American domination and calling for a truly neutral government under Souvanna Phouma. The latter realized that he could no longer count on the full support of the Royal Laotian Army and that the U. S. was actively working to undermine his authority. The U. S., for its part, believed that neutrality would put Laos on the path to communist domination. As a result, the loyalty of the army was badly splintered between Souvanna Phouma and the generals, who had been won over by American money.¹¹ Finally the U. S., unable to influence the neutralists, resorted to military means, supporting General Nosavan, who continued to wield political influence. But in a final bid for the premiership, his coup failed and he fled to Bangkok. Laos returned to the neutralist rule of Souvanna Phouma, which lasted until 1975 when the Pathet Lao took over Vientiane and caused the king and the non-Pathet Lao officials to retire.

¹⁰ "Laos," in G. McKahin, *Op. Cit.*, p. 550.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 554.

The military in the Philippines, Malaysia and Singapore remained under civilian control and became engaged in civil projects such as construction of physical infrastructures, opening up new lands, emergency activities and the like.

E. Political Instability in the 1970's

Another type of political instability was experienced by the Southeast Asian countries in the 1970's. It may be said that the 1960's saw different kinds of political institutions established in most countries. Burma had the Revolutionary Council in 1962. President Suharto took over the government of Indonesia after the coup and suppressed the Communists; Thailand still had Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachorn's government; the Philippines continued with the Marcos regime; Malaysia had a stable parliamentary system; and Singapore had also had a stable, independent government since 1965. Kampuchea's Lon Nol regime was trying to compete with the lingering popularity of Prince Sihanouk, who headed an exile government in Peking; Vietnam elected President Nguyen Van Thieu to run government affairs; and neutral Laos continued to be under Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma's stewardship ever since 1963.

But it seemed that these were not the types of government that the people wanted to institutionalize after all. In the Philippines, many groups besieged the government for reforms. The people's demands could not be met satisfactorily because of their conflicting nature and the misused capabilities of the government. In a master move, President Marcos put the state under martial law in 1972 and established himself as the supreme head. As civilian president, he emphasized his leadership over the military, which in turn declared its loyalty to him. Thus, in the Philippines, the military itself has not had the chance to intervene in politics.

During 1971, several important political events occurred

in Indonesia. For the first time in sixteen years, parliamentary elections were held and the results reflected the fundamental changes since 1965. The PKI and Sukarno and the Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI) were removed from the picture and only the military remained to emerge as the undisputed political force.¹² Since then, it has become the center of a new governing coalition, with experts and bureaucrats on both sides. The role of the military in the new parliament is readily seen to be dominant because of its influence in the Golkar (Organization of Functional Groups), now the Government Party, and because it has seventy-five of the one hundred appointed members to the Parliament. Altogether, the military has more than a two-thirds majority control of the Indonesian parliament. But during the reorganization of the Golkar, many civilians were appointed to key leadership posts. The army has been reorganized with a focus on the centralization of command. The Command for the Restoration of Security and Order (KOPKAMTIB) also underwent a change, combining the leadership of the Armed Forces, State Intelligence, and Ministry of Defense and Security—all military generals. It has been active in domestic problems. The military is also involved in making and implementing the nation's foreign policy. The military continues its partnership with the civilians in Indonesian politics, even though the country has returned to civil and constitutional authority.¹³ The military is President Suharto's power base. Even in the face of mounting criticism from the student and youth groups, which have continually acted as fiscalizers of the excesses of the government officials, Suharto cannot crack down on the erring military officers since he would lose their support. But he also realizes the popularity of student and youth movements and the need to include all the other groups in the representative assembly in order to get them to cooperate with him. So far,

¹² Lim So Jean, Patrick Low and Young Mun Cheong, "Indonesia: Developments since the National Elections," *ISFAS* (Singapore, 1972), pp. 3-4.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 11-13.

Indonesia has not had true military rule. However, the military is continually being trained for civilian jobs, and therefore it is likely to continue participating in political matters.

Burma's situation is one of civilianizing a military government. From the resulting feedback the Revolutionary Council knew that it was not getting the people involved in Burma's road to socialism. Economic and political growth were set back, insurgencies continued, and the Chinese press attacked the Burmese government for the murder of communist leader Thakin Than Tun. Burmese troops clashed with Chinese troops. Students continued their demonstrations. On November 29, 1968, General Ne Win, chairman of the RC, consulted with thirty-three former party leaders who were officially appointed to the Internal Unity Advisory Board. On June 1, 1969, the board proposed the formation of a national government to include officers, civilian politicians, and representatives of the racial minorities; the formation of a National United Front; the release of all political prisoners; and the denationalization of some sectors of the economy. General Ne Win rejected these, but he announced that the RC would not retain power indefinitely. U Nu then formed a movement for the reestablishment of parliamentary democracy in Indonesia. Meanwhile, the only civilian member of the cabinet resigned his posts as Minister for Foreign Affairs and Planning. General Ne Win went ahead with civilianizing the government by the Constitution on January 4, 1974, with an elected, single-chambered, People's National Congress, a Council of Ministers, a Council of People's Judges and a single political party. All the military titles of officers holding civilian offices were discarded in favor of the title "Mister."

Thailand has now had a civilian government for the last two and a half years. The protests about the Thanom government culminated in a week of student demonstrations against the military government's delay in promulgating a permanent constitution and resulted in the resignation of the military rulers. Even the two interim civilian administrations of Dr.

Sanya Dhammasakti continued to receive pressures from student, farmer and labor groups, the National Legislative Assembly and others, who demanded: open channels of communication; increased wages; increased rice supply; a continued ban on trade with China; better working conditions for private school teachers; guarantees of land reform and trade union; a lesser role for the military in relation to civil disturbances; the popular election of the Senate; guarantees against foreign economic control; and guaranteed employment. During one emergency, the government dealt with student leaders so as to ensure that they did not get involved in the problem. The civilian government emerged in a much stronger position.

Thus, in Thailand, the military took a back seat in government because of the demands of legitimate social groups.

The Indochina war ended with the Agreements of Paris in January 1975. Since then, Communist parties have taken over the governments of Vietnam, Kampuchea and Laos, in successive moves. The new political systems are based on the collective leadership of the communist groups, with the military, called the People's Army, composed of military and politicized paramilitary units serving as the arm of the collective leadership. The latter is the policymaking body and all others are executors of policies. This system is very different from the pre-communist governments, where the decision-making points were diversely located, depending on the strength of a particular office at the moment.

III. Conclusions

Thus far, we have presented the characteristics of the in eight Southeast Asian countries.

From this discussion, we can make several generalizations:

1. When the military is a professional group, adhering to the principle of civilian supremacy, it does not show any ten-

dency to participate in politics or policymaking. This is the case in the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore and in the royal governments of Laos and Kampuchea.

2. When the military is politicized by its participation in early independence movements, in subsequent activities to suppress politico-military insurgencies, in politics, either as "shareholders" or "guardians of the nation's honor", or as the tools of political leaders, then the military develops a predisposition to intervene in politics. This was the case in Indonesia, Burma, Thailand and Vietnam.

3. Although the tendency to intervene in politics is strong, if the political structures are stronger, the military exercises restraint in its political ambitions. This is borne out by the situation in Thailand, under an absolute monarchy, in Indonesia, under President Sukarno, and in Vietnam, during President Diem's earlier years of rule. This is also the case in the communist regimes of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea.

4. When the political structures weaken in countries with a politicized military, the latter tends to take over the government for reasons that vary according to the military's self-image. The cases of Burma under Prime Minister U Nu, Thailand since 1932, and Vietnam during the later years of President Diem, show this.

5. The military in power will realize that it cannot hold out long exercising a monopolistic use of power and will agree to civilianize the government, when there are strong pressures upon it from social groups with clearly legitimate demands and which enjoy popular support in the country. This is presented by the experiences in Indonesia under President Suharto, Burma under General Ne Win, and Thailand under Marshal Thanom.

Thus, we can conclude from these generalizations that military responses to political events are a function of the latter. In spite of similarities in origins and characteristics, the military produced different responses to different political

events. The explanations offered above for military intervention in politics represent a variation of those made in the past.

In general, the military in Southeast Asia, either as rulers or as subordinates to civilian leaders, acted the way it did, under different circumstances, with the firm belief that it was doing its duty to the nation. This duty, as it was perceived by the military, consisted of: consolidating independence; improving the country's security by suppressing movements that tended to disturb the conditions which were necessary for the development of the country; setting up civilian institutions which could run the government efficiently and with honor; sharing in policy-making; providing ideologies that inculcated duty and honor to the country; and actually running the government itself. In so doing, the military, no doubt, produced political and social changes which greatly affected the course of events.

This study, based on Southeast Asian experiences, has hopefully shed new light on the role of the military in developing countries.

Military Relations between the United States and Latin America: an Attempt at Evaluation

Claude Heller

I. Introduction

Throughout the decade of the sixties and the beginning of the seventies, the main characteristic of Latin America as a whole has been the growing militarization of political life, expressed by a long succession of coups d'état. The victory of the Cuban revolution constitutes the starting point of a new phase in the history of the continent, since it not only produced a revision of American foreign policy toward the region, but also influenced the internal life of more than one Latin American country. During the period considered, different revolutionary and reformist attempts failed in the face of a third, authoritarian tendency, expressed in the violent irruption of the military on the political scene. Even if the twenty-one coups d'état, occurring from 1962 to 1976, have different origins and social meanings, and even if the intervention of the military developed in the most diverse ways, the dominant fact is that intervention has not been limited, in the case of the most important countries, to resolving a con-

juncture crisis. Rather, military intervention has been transformed into a direct participation in and an assumption of the leadership of the state's apparatus. The military controls power without returning it to the civilians, at least in the short run, and the desire to keep it does not follow the ambitions of a group of officers. This refers to "institutional" coups and not to "palace revolutions," which imply the intervention of the military as an organized body, and not to a fraction of individuals that take the society's general crisis as the only alternative to be resolved.

On the other hand, it is evident that Latin American political life has been conditioned by the hegemonic influence of the United States, reflected by mechanisms of dependence whose manifestations and degree vary for each country of the region. The role that the United States plays in Latin America demonstrates the difficulty of precisely delimiting the dividing line between what is a "national process" and what are the conditioning factors external to it. Within this context, the objective of the present study is to analyze a central aspect of the relations between the United States and Latin America, the one relative to military relations. The problem of these relations should be contemplated from the perspective of a process of denationalization operating in the political, economic, social, cultural and technological orders. Even if militarization of Latin American political life is the most evident fact, it is not a question, however, of finding a "guilty supernational party" for militarism. We believe that one frequently falls into mechanical analyses which concentrate their attention on Latin American dependence with respect to the United States as a fundamental and explicative determinant of the political process of the countries of the region. That has frequently led to the formulation of dangerous simplifications and generalizations which hardly help appreciate the problem of militarism in all its dimensions.

Taking all this into consideration, what interests us, basically, is to evaluate the impact that the American military aid

policy, as an instrument of foreign policy, has had on the political attitudes of the Latin American military.

II. The American Peace

Military relations between the United States and Latin America have always been connected to the notion of hemispheric or intercontinental security. American military aid was begun in the period prior to the First World War, and more than thirty missions were sent to the region between 1920 and 1940. It was during the Second World War that the United States practically monopolized military aid, since the European nations had to concentrate their efforts on the conflict. In 1942, the Inter-American Office of Defense was founded, whose objective it was to examine hemispheric affairs. Within this context, Congress approved an aid program of more than 400 million dollars in military equipment and materials, in the form of bilateral agreements made with eighteen countries, with the goal of forming a system of regional defense against any extracontinental aggression and assuring the military cooperation of the countries of Latin America.

Since 1945, the notion of hemispheric security was oriented toward an eventual Soviet aggression in the region. It was with that perspective that the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance was signed in 1947, according to which an aggression against a member state would be considered an aggression against all the other signatory states, which would imply a collective response. Nevertheless, the end of the war led to a temporary reduction of the military aid concentrated in areas more important to the interests of American foreign policy. It was not until the Korean War that the United States required greater cooperation from Latin America in the fight against international communism. In 1951, Congress approved a total of \$38,150,000 in military aid to Latin America, which

was granted through bilateral agreements of reciprocal assistance signed with thirteen countries.¹

According to these agreements, the American government supplied military equipment and materials in exchange for the active collaboration in hemispheric defense on the part of the beneficiary nations. Since 1952, military aid has risen considerably, in close relationship with internal political events, in particular the Cuban revolution, as can be seen by the following:

MILITARY AID TO LATIN AMERICA: 1952-1965 ²
(Millions of dollars)

<i>Fiscal year</i>	<i>Amount</i>	<i>Fiscal year</i>	<i>Amount</i>
1952	.2	1959	31.5
1953	11.2	1960	32.3
1954	34.5	1961	45.0
1955	31.8	1962	54.3
1956	23.5	1963	51.8
1957	27.1	1964	62.9
1958	45.6	1965	51.3

Washington's doctrine of hemispheric security was accompanied, from a political point of view, by a favorable attitude toward the military regimes in Latin America. It was in this manner that, after the Second World War, the Truman and Eisenhower administrations manifested themselves as adherents of a policy of stability in the continent in which coups d'état and personalistic dictatorships became the rule and not the exception. Both American administrations recognized and gave support to de facto governments, without any type of moral or juridical considerations. The only conditions exacted,

¹ John Baines, "US Military Assistance to Latin America," *Journal of Latin American Studies and World Affairs* 14, 4 (November 1974):477.

² Harold Hovey, *United States Military Assistance: A Study of Policies and Practices* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1965), p. 51.

and imposed by the cold war, were a militant anticommunism and opposition to any transformation of the status quo of an internal type.

The victory of the Cuban revolution and its evolution toward socialism posed a new problem for inter-American relations. The ideological presence of the Soviet Union, which penetrated an area of influence traditionally reserved for the United States, and the revolutionary enthusiasm that seemed to spread to several countries of the continent represented a threat to American public and private interests. It is within this context that the United States policy toward Latin America since the sixties should be analyzed. "Cubanization" had to be avoided and it was in various areas that the Kennedy administration began a counterrevolutionary offensive.

Such strategy included, first of all, the thwarted, indirect intervention in the Bay of Pigs in 1961, with the object of toppling Fidel Castro's regime. Second, it studied the creation of the Alliance for Progress and economic operations destined to reduce, within a period of ten years, the principal social tensions engendered by the nature of Latin American economic development, but whose real object was to avoid revolutionary explosions similar to the Cuban one. Third, it tried to use the inter-american system to isolate Cuba from the rest of the continent, which was transiently accomplished with the ousting of Cuba from the OAS in 1962 and the breaking-off of diplomatic relations with Havana by those countries who still maintained them. Fourth, it propitiated an intensification of military relations with Latin America and a revision of the policy which should be followed toward regimes produced from a coup d'état, as well as the nature of the military aid programs and the very concept of security on the continent.

There are many specialists on Washington's Latin American policy who maintain that President Kennedy tried to "promote democracy" in the region, throughout his brief government term, by following a new policy toward anticonstitutionalist regimes. Kennedy's main idea was that military dictatorships,

characterized by conservative economic and social policies, did not constitute a guarantee against communist expansion and action. On the contrary, they only favored a climate propitious to communist penetration, and proof of that were the events which had developed in Cuba.

President Kennedy's administration decided to utilize the policy of government recognition as a means of pressure, that is, the breaking-off of diplomatic relations and suspension of economic and military aid to governments that got power by the use of force against democratically elected governments. The new policy was to be introduced in the context of the creation of the Alliance for Progress, which was to be a "peaceful and positive revolution" to transform the economic and social structures of Latin America, a transformation that would only be viable under favorable political conditions, that is, the democratization of political life.

However, an examination of American policy shows that, in reality, it was very different from this idealistic image of Kennedy. In fact, if we consider the different coups d'état that occurred in a row, one can see that American policy was not always the same, and that it was characterized by an apparent incoherence and lack of continuity, insofar as it was formulated on the basis of a causal analysis. Thus, the non-recognition of governments and the suspension of economic and military aid were applied in four cases: Peru, in 1962; Guatemala, Honduras and the Dominican Republic, in 1963.

In June 1962, a coup d'état brought down the government of Manuel Prado in order to prevent Haya de la Torre, the Aprist candidate who had won in the elections, from taking power. The American government decided to break off diplomatic relations as well as cutoff all economic and military aid. It should be taken into consideration that the Aprist party had abandoned its old, anti-American position and its revolutionary verbalism, integrating itself into the political-oligarchical game. Likewise, the intervention of the military represents an important antecedent in the orientation of the

coup d'état of 1968. Nevertheless, diplomatic relations were resumed two months later, with the Department of State justifying its attitude because of the provisional government's promise to hold new elections in 1963.

The same policy was followed for the new governments that had come to power by the use of force and which were the following: Ydigoras Fuentes in Guatemala on March 31, 1963, a few months before elections were held in which Juan Arevalo, a well-known opposition politician, was considered to be the probable winner against Ydigoras Fuentes himself; Juan Bosch in the Dominican Republic, in September 1963; and Villeda Morales in Honduras, in the month of October.

Nevertheless, the policy of non-recognition of governments arising from coups d'état was not followed in two cases: those of Argentina in 1962 and Ecuador in 1963. In March 1962, a coup d'état toppled the government of President Frondizi. Kennedy's administration believed the military's action did not signify an interruption of the constitutional process, since the president of the Senate, José María Guido, the legal successor of the president-elect, had immediately occupied the presidency of the Republic. Perhaps the real reason is found elsewhere: in the chancellor's meeting on the Cuban problem, Argentina did not support the American position, and the military's anticommunism was added for reasons of internal politics, as was the case of the evident force of Peronism.

In the case of Ecuador, in July 1963 the government of President Arosemena, who had abstained from voting against ousting Cuba from the OAS, was toppled in turn. Washington decided to recognize the military junta as the provisional government until conditions permitted holding elections. The policy of isolating the Cuban Revolution was favored by the events described.

The Department of State only pointed out, on the occasion of Arosemena's fall, that the American government repeated its firm conviction, shared in the hemisphere, that the military

takeover of power should not be a substitute for constitutional processes.³

At the end of the Kennedy administration it seemed that the president had decided to follow a more coherent policy, especially after the regime of Juan Bosch in the Dominican Republic, which the United States would have liked to turn into a "model of democracy," was toppled by a military junta. In its own way, the Department of State had shown itself to be very skeptical regarding the president's ideas, since democracy "could not come from the outside." At any rate, it is clear that the United States reevaluated the role of the military in Latin America. Edwin Martin, Undersecretary for Latin American Affairs, pointed out that the armed forces could not be reduced to impotence in the political life of Latin America and that they ought to participate in making certain decisions.⁴ For Martin, the military did not always support those who opposed social changes, such as was conceived in the Alliance for Progress, since "this year, military governments have supervised the election, in Peru and Argentina, of two of the most progressive regimes that these countries have known. This year, the military regimes of Ecuador and Guatemala have announced reforms of great importance." From this it can be deduced that Washington's role ought to consist of "taking advantage of our influence so that these regimes be liberal and so that they consider the well-being of the population as far as possible."

The apparent incoherence in Kennedy's policy did not contradict American interests but, on the contrary, it was the expression of them. Washington did not base its policy on the foundation of a great principle of "regional democratization," which could have been supported by pressures more effective than those utilized, but rather, followed a "case by case" policy as a function of its bilateral interests and necessities. Nevertheless, the fundamental importance of Kennedy's

³ *The Department of State Bulletin* 49, 1260 (August 1963):282.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 49, 1271 (November 4, 1963):199.

policy was in the new orientation that it gave to military relations and that would be followed by his successors Johnson, Nixon and Ford. A new orientation which, on the other hand, was in open contradiction with the policy of the promotion of democracy. The practice of recognizing governments so as to check coups in Latin America, was abandoned for good in 1963, and said abandonment is explained as a function of American interests in the region. In fact, the principal characteristic of American foreign policy has been the open support given to military regimes as a safety barrier for public and private interests. From 1963 to 1967, Latin American political life was defined by American tenacity, as was demonstrated in Panama in 1964 and the Dominican Republic in 1965, the role of the Special Forces in the repression of the Guevara guerrillas in Bolivia, as well as the military's rise to power in Brazil, the fall of Goulart being received enthusiastically by Washington.

If the counterrevolution triumphed in Latin America in the decade of the seventies, the fact should not go unnoticed that toward the end of the decade and the beginning of the following, the American hegemonic position was questioned in relative terms by internal events in the region in the period 1968-1973. The United States' difficulty in resolving the armed conflict in the Asian Southeast coincided with important changes of government in Latin America, which seemed to question Washington's interests in the region.

In this respect, one should briefly mention the coups d'état in Peru and Panama, in October 1968, the coup d'état of Torres in Bolivia, in 1970, the electoral victory of the Unidad Popular in Chile, as well as the start of a new government in Mexico, resolved to assume a more aggressive and independent foreign policy. In the same way, the formation of the Frente Amplio de Izquierda in Uruguay for the 1971 general elections, the fall of Velasco Ibarra in Ecuador in 1972, the election of Carlos Andrés Pérez in Venezuela and the resur-

gence of Peronism, seemed to complicate Latin American political chess.

Nevertheless, nationalist and reformist experiments were quickly frustrated, especially the fall of Torres' regime in Bolivia in 1971, the progressive militarism in Uruguay which peaked in 1973, the coup d'état in Chile in 1973, and the deterioration of the Peronist process, which led to the formation of a new military regime. The case of Chile made the American policy in the region clear, when Washington was attributed with the ability to "destabilize" the political life of a Latin American country, even though the population might have demonstrated its disposition toward a change of societies by means of the electoral process. As can be seen further on, the military's growing role is, to a good extent, related to the nature of American military aid.

III. Military Aid to Latin America

Latin American military aid is justified by the fact that United States security is interdependent with the security and well-being of the rest of the world. Without military aid programs, the American armed forces would be obliged to assume wider responsibilities and there would be little guarantee for American interests. Economic and military aid, as well as the so-called "emergency funds," are granted to friendly countries of the free world so as to reinforce their defenses against external aggression and their internal security, maintain economic stability in crisis situations, and help establish a basis for economic and social progress.

American military aid is divided into three fundamental parts: (1) the supply and donation of military materials; (2) the possibility of selling American armaments at reduced prices; (3) the preparation and training of Latin American officers in the United States and abroad.

The Cuban revolution led to the revision of the very nature

of the military aid programs. In fact, the traditional notion of hemispheric security was substituted by one of intercontinental security, which meant that the threat of aggression could come from within a Latin American country and not necessarily from without. The proliferation of guerrilla movements with the support of Cuba was the origin of the new concept, since the fight against subversion and communism acquired a new dimension. The emphasis of military aid ought to be placed on the internal security of every country and all governments ought to be trained to guarantee their own security, adapting their military potential to the ways of "internal war." The United States adopted a military policy of supporting actions of *counterinsurgency* and *civic action*, whose object was to provide a margin of internal security for the efficient application of the programs of the Alliance for Progress.

It is evident that the counterinsurgency programs constituted the very basis of the policy of "internal security" on the continent. Thus, for example, when discussing the program of military aid for Latin America for the fiscal year 1965 in Congress, Secretary of State Robert McNamara revealed that 52% was destined for maintaining internal security and 15% for civic action. The term "internal security," in this context, means the training and military materials provided by the United States so that the armed forces of the recipient countries can confront internal subversion.

The counterinsurgency programs began functioning in 1962 and consisted of teaching Latin American officers the most sophisticated methods of anti-guerrilla warfare, and psychological warfare and propaganda. These programs were given on American bases on territory of the American Union, such as the Panama Canal zone. To this aspect of counterinsurgency one should add the creation of the Inter-American Police Academy, financed by the federal government, as well as the Agency for International Development, whose formal objectives were "the preparation of the police force, in the modern, democratic state, for public functions." In fact, its real objective

consisted of preparing police officials for fighting urban, subversive actions. In the period 1962-1963 alone, more than 600 officers from fifteen countries studied tactics for controlling street demonstrations and methods of espionage and counter-espionage in detail.

The second aspect, as we have pointed out, consisted of elaborating civic action programs in close collaboration with Latin American military personnel. Those programs had the objective of modifying the poor popular image of the military in the bosom of Latin American society. From the American point of view, the military not only constituted a force that guaranteed the maintenance of order in the face of subversion, but also could be stimulated to participate in the economic and social transformations, participating in activities such as the construction of highways, schools and housing, as well as in medical assistance in badly communicated and abandoned rural areas. Through civic action programs, the United States intended the Latin American military to support economic and social reforms and not oppose them with a systematic political veto. In this way, the armed forces would play a fundamental part in the "modernization process," made easy by its access to information about all the internal problems, as well as by close contact with civilian society.

In Table 1, one can see the evolution of American military assistance to Latin America under the different programs.

Ever since the Second World War, the United States has monopolized the sale of arms to Latin America, substituting the principal European countries which had had a great influence on the armies of some of the countries of the region from the beginning of the nineteenth century, as much in their training as in providing arms. At the beginning, the largest part of the equipment and military materials were granted for free under the auspices of the Military Assistance Program. That equipment was accompanied, subsequently, by sales financed through credits under the Foreign Military Sales Program which, like the Military Assistance Program, was designed to

Table 1

SALE OF ARMS AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE: 1950-1974
(Millions of Dollars)

	1950-1968	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1950-1974
Authorized military sales **	332.0	28.2	20.0	25.3	55.4	110.3	112.8	191.1	875.1
Credits for authorized military sales ***	193.9	35.1	22.4	—	50.8	61.8	59.1	118.1	541.2
Value of equipment exempted under authorized military sales	260.4	47.3	31.4	35.2	25.6	44.3	54.6	N. D.*	N. D.
Value of military equipment provided by private companies ****	N. D.	12.9	20.2	29.8	40.1	21.8	19.7	N. D.	N. D.
Total military equipment provided	N. D.	60.1	51.6	65.6	65.6	66.1	73.4	N. D.	N. D.
Donations under the military assistance program	950.8	41.1	22.4	23.1	23.8	28.8	22.8	21.6	1,134.4

Source: "The Politics of US Arms Sales to Latin America," *NACLA* 9, 2 (March 1975).

* N. D. = No Data.

** Agreements from government to government for the sale of American military materials.

*** Credits provided or guaranteed by the Department of Defense for the sale of American military materials.

**** Under license from the Office of Arms Control.

build up "the defense of the free world in the face of the threat of communist aggression."

In the decade of the seventies, with the triumph of the Cuban revolution, American policy was based on the belief that, in a period of revolutionary effervescence, Latin America's priority was to promote economic development and that, within this context, the acquisition of modern arms became secondary. The principal role of the armed forces should consist exclusively of guaranteeing internal security and of developing civic action programs. To this end, the excessive purchase of traditional arms for external defense (tanks, heavy artillery, supersonic aircraft and warships) was considered unnecessary from a military point of view, as well as economically expensive because it would drain resources to be used for encouraging the process of economic development. It was expected, then, that Latin American countries would slow down their arms purchases not related to counterinsurgency operations.

Nevertheless, this evaluation of the role that Latin American armed forces ought to have played, according to the Americans, was not shared by some governments of the region. In the last years of the decade of the sixties, the American Congress adopted various measures tending to restrict the sale of sophisticated arms to countries in the process of developing. The consequence of this American policy was that the principal countries of South America diversified their source of military supplies, Europe being the principal beneficiary. An example of the consequences of the American reticence to sell sophisticated and costly arms, judged useless for a country that was not undergoing (at least in 1965) an external threat, was Peru. The government of that country tried to break the American monopoly by buying Mirage airplanes from France, once the American government had refused to sell it combat aircraft of recent production. As can be seen in Table 2, countries such as Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru have diversified their military dependence.

TABLE 2
THE SALE OF ARMAMENT TO LATIN AMERICA, 1964-1973
(Countries receiving and countries supplying, millions of dollars)

	Total	USA	USSR	France	Great Britain	Czechoslovakia	Canada	West Germany	Others
Latin America	2,323	983	309	364	186	2	166	84	229
Argentina	312	169	—	73	17	—	4	19	30
Bolivia	31	27	—	—	—	—	—	—	4
Brazil	448	232	—	75	39	—	49	9	44
Chile	157	89	—	9	21	—	1	1	36
Colombia	173	85	—	54	7	—	—	6	21
Costa Rica	2	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Cuba	311	—	309	—	—	2	—	—	—
Dominican Republic	24	24	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Ecuador	71	32	—	12	15	—	—	5	7
El Salvador	15	9	—	—	—	—	—	2	4
Guatemala	30	29	—	—	—	—	—	—	1
Haiti	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Honduras	14	8	—	—	—	—	—	—	6
Jamaica	2	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
México	30	21	—	—	—	—	—	1	7
Nicaragua	15	14	—	—	—	—	—	—	1
Panamá	13	8	—	—	3	—	—	—	2
Paraguay	16	15	—	—	—	—	—	—	1
Peru	360	83	—	55	59	—	78	37	48
Trinidad Tobago	2	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—
Uruguay	37	27	—	—	—	—	—	—	10
Venezuela	257	107	—	83	23	—	34	4	6

Source: US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Trade: 1963-1973* (Washington, D. C.), p. 70.

The diversification of the arms markets by Latin America provoked a bitter debate between the executive branch and Congress. The former contended that limitation of arms sales to Latin America implied the loss of an important export market in a moment in which the American balance of payments was having difficulties and even a possible loss of influence in Latin America to the advantage of other European countries and even the Soviet Union. European competition, in a market traditionally reserved for the United States, led the government in Washington to review the policy it followed and President Nixon's administration to adopt a more flexible attitude, which reached its high point in June 1973, when the restriction on the exportation of arms of a highly technological content to developing countries was repealed.

The increase in the sale of arms to Latin America in the last few years is well-known, since if the yearly average for American exports was 30 million dollars in the period 1966-1970, they amounted to 113 million in 1973 and 191 in 1974, that is, from 1972 to 1974 they totaled 414 million dollars.⁵

If the development of Latin American political life throughout the sixties and the beginning of the seventies is examined in its totality, one can conclude that the balance was widely favorable to American interests. The underlying objectives of the military aid programs, an essential instrument of Washington's foreign policy, were reached inasmuch as not only did a general revolutionary outbreak not occur, but also counterrevolution prevailed in the face of the existing revolutionary threats. The doctrine of internal security, adopted by the armed forces in countries where social crisis made the existing order questionable, showed itself to be effective. After Kennedy's administration, the administrations of Johnson, Nixon and Ford openly supported the military regimes of the region, not only recognizing them, but also favoring a political orientation in accordance with American interests.

⁵ Michael Klare, "The Political Economy of US Weapons Sales to Latin America," in *North American Congress of Latin America* 9, 2(March 1975):3.

In particular, one should point out the importance of the coups d'état in Brazil in 1964, Argentina in 1966, and Chile in 1973, which modified the geopolitical balance in South America in their respective moments. If the first years of the decade of the sixties were characterized by an effervescence of Latin American politics as a consequence of the impact of the events in Cuba on the continent, the militarization of politics would become the most significant event for the second half of that period. The defeat of various guerrilla movements by the armed forces, which were transformed into authentic national powers which were very effective in their repressive tasks, as well as crushing the revolutionary potential in the Dominican Republic in 1965, by the American intervention legitimized by the OAS, led to the (transitory) reduction of military aid to Latin America toward the end of the seventies.

Charles Meyer, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, pointed out, in 1969, the sensible reduction of guerrilla activities, such as subversion, in the region. American military personnel in Latin America was supposed to be reduced from 800 people in 1967 to 505 in 1970, and military aid would be reduced to seventy-five per cent of what it had been during the fiscal year 1966, when it had reached 80.7 million dollars.

Meyer realized that the orientation of the military aid programs throughout the sixties had been concentrated toward reinforcing the capacity of Latin American armies to confront subversive movements supported by communism. Nevertheless, the defeat of the guerrilla forces of Che Guevara in 1967 by the Bolivian army which was "amply equipped and trained in counterinsurgency actions by the United States, seemed to lead Cuba to follow a more cautious policy insofar as the creation of new points of insurrection in the hemisphere was concerned." ⁶

The balance, apparently positive for American interests,

⁶ *The Department of State Bulletin* 61, 1571 (August 4, 1969):100.

should be analyzed more thoroughly. As has been pointed out, the preparation and training of Latin American military personnel by American missions or in schools located in foreign countries, constitutes a central aspect of military aid. It is also, without a doubt, the most complex aspect, since contact between American and Latin American military personnel provokes reactions which are more unexpected than would be imagined.

Formally, officer training by American military missions or in foreign countries pursues two main objectives: (1) to provide them with technical training and motivate their interest in democratic principles and in social and economic progress; (2) to train them in actions relative to internal security and civic action. From 1950 to 1975, 71,651 Latin American officers, coming mainly from countries where the political situation was explosive, were trained.

What are the ideological consequences of that contact? To what extent is there a relation between military aid programs and the political intervention of the military? As Luigi Einaudi has pointed out, the secrecy that surrounds and protects the American military aid policy makes it impossible to establish a precise balance in regard to its specific contents as well as in its results: "to maintain that an officer has participated in a coup d'état as a consequence of his training by the United States is as arbitrary as defending the idea that said training has turned him more democratic."⁷ Nevertheless, we can suggest some general ideas if we compare American expectations toward Latin America and the consequences of the very nature of military aid. The objectives of American policy, implied in its programs of military aid, can be synthesized in the following manner: since the Cuban revolution, the United States has sought to reinforce Latin American military apparatuses, adapting them for the fight against "internal subversion," on the one hand, and the formation of

⁷ Luigi Einaudi, *Peruvian Military Relations with the United States* (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, June 1970):40.

a military elite capable of assuming the political leadership in countries where social crises threatened to lead to revolutionary situations. The types of military aid programs are not indifferent to the politicization of the armed forces, expressed in the increased degree of political intervention. In fact, the training of Latin American officers is not limited to the transmission of the methods of "technical" employment of the new arms granted or sold by the United States, but tends to place this learning, in particular, within the context of fighting against an "internal adversary," so as to maintain national security.

Who is this "internal adversary" who threatens the security of the nation? International communism, a very ample concept which is not limited to guerrilla activity or to another type of revolutionary violence, but which is, moreover, the origin of all social crisis or agitation, be they workers' strikes, peasant takeovers and invasions, or student movements. The counter-insurgency programs define a specific enemy: a communism which should be combated relentlessly.

Anticommunism constitutes, therefore, an essential element in the ideological preparation of Latin American officers. Nevertheless, that is not always translated into unconditional support of American policy in Latin America. Anticommunism does not exclude, as is shown for example in the case of Peru since 1968, the existence of a well-developed, nationalistic feeling that gives rise to conflicts with the United States. Luigi Einaudi, who interviewed Peruvian officers about the topic in question, writes: "If some generalizations can be inferred on the basis of individual conversations, one would have to say that besides the knowledge received, officers develop positive and negative judgements, which are more realistic about the United States than if they had never been exposed to it; although training frequently produces admiration for many things from America, it can produce a spirit

more critical than favorable to the concrete policies of the United States in Latin America.”⁸

The rejection of communism does not contradict a nationalistic attitude that includes anti-imperialistic feelings. At least this was what Peruvian military officers expressed violently, with concrete policies on an internal as well as on an external level, after the coup d'état of 1968. In the case of Peru, this nationalism should not be confused with a “primary” nationalism exalting the nation and its values. On the contrary, Peruvian “anti-imperialism” is probably the conclusion of the analysis that the military made of the nation’s underdevelopment, since one of the main threats to national defense, such as they defined it, was precisely Peru’s external dependence with respect to the United States.

This brief analysis leads us to ask if, in reality, the consequences of the militarization of Latin American politics have been relatively contrary to the expectations of Washington’s policy. The case of Peru, like that of other countries where the military took over—Bolivia, during the Torres regime (October 1970-August 1971), and Panama under Torrijos’ government (October 1968—present)—seem to demonstrate the risks of a policy that has supported the increasing role of the armed forces in civilian life, questioning American public and private interests. Nevertheless, the risk of a militarism which is nationalistic and different from the past has been accepted by Washington, particularly since the publication of the Rockefeller Report in 1969, as a lesser evil in the face of the possibility of a radicalization of politics and the formation of new leftist regimes in Latin America.

Starting from the modification of the social composition of the armed forces, Rockefeller pointed out the appearance of a new type of militarism which was not moving toward social change without some consequences. For this social change, “motivated by growing impatience in the face of corruption,

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 38.

inefficiency and a stagnated political order, the new military is prepared to adapt its authoritarian tradition to the objectives of social and economic progress.”⁹ The existence of authoritarian regimes is not without its dangers, according to Rockefeller, since extreme nationalism could lead them in “any doctrinary direction, as for example Marxism which, because of its thesis, justifies the taking of power by a vanguard elite and the government’s management in the hands of a reduced group or a single institution like the army.” But an important influence which can counterarrest this simplistic vision of Marxism “is the knowledge of the fundamental achievements of the way of life in the United States which many military men from other countries of Latin America have been able to obtain through the training programs that the United States heads in Panama and the United States.”

Finally, it should be clear that even if it is true that the American military aid policy has concentrated on the internal security of the beneficiary countries, reinforcing anticommunism and opposing all revolutionary ruptures, and even if it is also true that the United States’ policy has contributed to the armed forces’ political intervention, one should avoid simplistic generalizations which see Washington’s *diktat* in every coup d’état. The existence of ideological relations between the United States and Latin American military “establishments” is irrefutable: the monopoly of military aid and arms sales held by the United States up until the last few years has facilitated relations of friendship and political alliances that occasionally backfire against the governments of the continent. Nevertheless, the militarization of politics occurs only when the concrete conditions of a society permit it. And, in the final analysis, it is in the society in question where one should look for the structural causes that lead to the political intervention of the armed forces.

At present, the sale of American arms to Latin America

⁹ “Informe Rockefeller,” *Foro Internacional* 10 (January-March 1970):3.

has an important political aspect insofar as it facilitates access to foreign military leaders who, in the great majority of receiving countries, play an important role in the internal political life. Contact is made initially in the purchase-sale negotiations and is maintained by the training programs for the equipment acquired, the servicing, maintenance and technical assistance. One example of the former is the case of General César Ruiz Danayau, commander in chief of the Chilean air force, and one of the principal protagonists in the first attempted coup d'état against Salvador Allende in June 1973, who got together frequently with American officers in 1972-1973, during the negotiations for the purchase of combat aircraft.¹⁰

These relations have grown in importance since the reduction of the Military Assistance Program, which has oscillated between twenty-three and twenty-eight million dollars since 1971, as can be seen in Table 1.

If, in the sixties, the United States accentuated the importance of internal security, given the political conditions of the continent, in the last few years, with the importance of guerrilla fighting diminishing, it has concentrated its policy on promoting sufficiency in countries considered key ones in the Third World, and more specifically in Latin America, and which are called, according to American strategy, to play a primordial role as regional powers. The distribution of military sales evidently reflects American interests in the region. In this sense, it is no accident that, for 1976, Brazil is the principal beneficiary of American arms exports, which had a value of sixty million dollars, if we take into account the role Washington assigned the Brazilian regime: the president at that time, Nixon, interviewed by Garrastazu Medici in 1972, said, "wherever Brazil leans, the rest of Latin America will lean." This idea was confirmed by Kissinger in his Latin American tour of February 1976, pointing out that Brazil was destined to become a world power within a short time. Pinochet's

¹⁰ Klare, "Political Economy."

military junta, in turn, received American war materials valued at fifteen million dollars in 1974 and sixty-nine million in 1975, according to the declarations of Democratic Congressman Michael Harrington,¹¹ while economic aid to Chile under Salvador Allende was characterized by its restricted nature.

What we can call a "decentralization of regional responsibilities" seems to constitute the present orientation of American foreign policy. At a time when inter-american mechanisms, which were manipulated by Washington throughout the decade of the sixties, have entered into a profound crisis that makes it impossible to have recourse to them again, the delegation of authority in "allied" countries in the Southern Cone, as a protective shield in the face of possible revolutionary attempts, constitutes an alternative for American foreign policy. Such decentralization requires the strengthening of the armies of those Latin American countries considered key ones, not only in their internal repressive tasks, but also in their function as a regional, external defense. Washington's arms sale policy has been oriented in that direction, and one would have to add the development of the domestic military industry in countries like Brazil. The deterioration of Argentine political life, which culminated in a coup d'état at the beginning of 1976, as well as the rise of the Right in almost all Latin American countries, has led to speculation about the makeup of a South American military system. In this respect, the *Jornal do Brazil*, considered the spokesman of Brazilian diplomacy, pointed out in the month of May, that "the only defense system with a possibility of success is one which is established on a continental level," taking into account that at no other time in history have circumstances been more propitious for the creation of an organization for the defense of South America.¹²

The formation of an anticommunist axis is visualized as a dike holding back the "Africanization" of Latin America,

¹¹ *El Día* (Mexico), January 25, 1976.

¹² *Ibid.*, April 19, 1976.

that is, the successful expansion of the revolutionary movement, as has been the case in several African countries. The possibility of a new hardening of Cuban policy, which could reflect the promotion and support of revolutionary movements on the continent, has been a source of worry for Washington. The participation of Cuban troops in the revolutionary process of Angola led the chief spokesman of the Ford administration to declare that no new action of the Castro regime beyond its borders will be tolerated.

IV. Conclusions

As a general conclusion, it seems important to us to point out the fact that military relations between the United States and Latin America are of a specific nature. Military dependence is not a phenomenon exclusive to Latin America, and it is not hard for us to locate on an updated political map the socialist, capitalist and non-aligned countries which have forms of military dependence which are much more definite and submissive than in the Latin American case. Nevertheless, military dependence does not, in every case, imply automatic political dependence. Such, for example, is the case of France, the third largest supplier of armaments in the world, which does not generate a military-political dependence as marked as in the case of the United States or even the Soviet Union. American military aid, under its different programs, has constituted an essential instrument in consolidating Washington's interests in Latin America, from the moment that the military was recognized as a main actor in the political plot.

Since the end of the Second World War, American policy has required continental military integration in "the defense against communism" by means of bilateral pacts and the inter-american system. Anticommunism has been the factor binding Latin American armies to the American army and, in this sense, the military aid policy adapted itself to the changing

circumstances of Latin America, especially since the Cuban revolution, as well as to the different ways of expressing revolutionary and even reformist movements.

We want to leave two questions clear, which, in our judgment, are fundamental. In the first place, Washington's policy toward the region does not constitute the sole factor explaining the militarization of political life and the ideologically conservative orientation of the same. The United States has taken advantage of a situation of political and social crisis to continue counting on a loyal and subordinate ally in its area of most direct influence. Second, if military dependence has fostered anticommunism in the Latin American military, that does not imply the unconditional acceptance of Washington's decisions with respect to the region. We previously mentioned the problems related to the arms race started by some countries, independent of the opposition of the American government. In our times, Brazil, in nuclear materials, is a good example of the former. But, more important, perhaps, is the fact that the military's nationalism, as well as the concept of "national security," both necessarily opposed to internationalistic ideologies, have led, in certain cases, to an analysis which sees a threat to national sovereignty and to the viability of an independent development in any dependence with reference to the outside.

Finally, we cannot but mention the possible importance that the coming of the new Democratic administration of the United States could have for Latin America. To the internal institutional crisis, a product of the "Watergate" affair, one should add a questioning of the real effectiveness of the American foreign policy as implemented by ex-Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Kennedy's "moralistic" concerns, at the beginning of the decade of the sixties, seem to be shared by President Carter, at a time when the dignity of man is non-existent in countries whose authoritarian and dictatorial political regimes received support decided upon by Washington. The second Linowitz Report, as well as recent statements

by high-ranking officials of the Department of State, would seem to announce an open policy toward Latin America. Proof of this is the initiation of new negotiations with Panama relative to the problem of the canal, and a political willingness to examine the relations with Cuba, which have been repeatedly announced. Likewise, Carter's administration has established a "harder" policy toward governments that systematically violate human rights.

Cyrus Vance, Kissinger's successor, pointed out, when presenting the budget proposal for foreign assistance before the Congress, that said program would be connected "with a growing attention for the observance of human rights...in each specific case we will have to measure our political concerns for human rights in the light of our economic and military objectives."¹³ In the case of Latin America, that implies a sensible reduction in military aid to Uruguay and Argentina.¹⁴

We might think, then, that the American foreign policy toward Latin America seeks to differentiate itself from the attitudes and practices that have characterized it since Lyndon Johnson's administration. It is, nevertheless, too early to evaluate the outline of an American opening-up of policy, which will be conditioned from two perspectives. In the first place, by the fact that the Soviet Union, France and even Israel are modifying Latin America's armaments market, threatening a market which has traditionally been American ever since the Second World War.

Second, and perhaps the most important condition, it is the internal situation of Latin America which will, in the end, determine the conciliation or contradiction between a "political concern for human rights" and the national interests of the superpower in the region.

¹³ *Ibid.*, February 25, 1977.

¹⁴ In the latter's case, the reduction would be from thirty-two million dollars in 1976 to fifteen million in 1977.

The Brazilian Military and the Expansion of State Power: Implications

Riordan Roett

I. Introduction

The question of social change in Brazil—that is, a significant alteration of social structures, the expansion of individual opportunity and the integration into a nation of marginal sectors—is inevitably part of the expansion of State power, under military aegis, since 1964. Social change, when understood as occupational and class mobility, role transformation, differentiation, etc., has taken place since 1964, contrary to the position of some observers of Brazilian development. But what is unique about that process of change is the degree to which it has been State controlled and State dominated. Rather than proceeding autonomously, social change has become one aspect of the expansion of State power. Social change, its control, direction and manipulation, has become one of various strategies by which a patrimonial order is maintained in contemporary Brazil.

Prior to the "Revolution" of March 31, 1964, it was feasible to consider radical alternatives to the prevailing social structure of Brazilian society. Incipient social protest move-

ments appeared to be possible and regime policy, where it existed, served to support, at least rhetorically, the goals of societal transformation and the restructuring of a basically conservative social system, a neoclassical, liberal economic order, and a paternalistic political regime. Autonomous leadership challenged prevailing modes of political control, ranging from the reformist emphases of Celso Furtado, Miguel Arraes and Dom Helder Câmara to the more extreme alternatives posed by Leonel Brizola and Francisco Julião.

If the pre-1964 attempts to restructure Brazilian society were unsuccessful, as they ultimately were, they represented the first twentieth century effort to introduce change into one of the most traditional, agrarian societies in the hemisphere. The civilian-military technocratic alliance that came to power in 1964 eliminated that nascent challenge to the existing order. Almost simultaneously, that alliance turned to rapid economic growth and limited distribution to satisfy selected class and social groups favored by the alliance because of the central role they played in legitimizing the regime.

The essential question to be raised in this paper is whether or not the solution employed after 1964—the employment of state power to define and direct social change—is sufficient in the second decade of the “Revolution” or whether new pressures, related to, but more intense than, those that surfaced prior to 1964, will pose a real threat to the patrimonial order.

II. Social Change before 1964

Data for 1960 confirm the rural/agrarian status of Brazil at that society entered its most turbulent years of pre-Revolutionary agitation. Of a population total of seventy million, 31% were urban, 69% rural. Only 60.5% of the population fifteen years and older was literate. The lowest 50% of the population received only 17.7% of the gross national income.

Other socio-economic indicators confirm and accent these trends.

With the creation of the 1946 Republic, after the overthrow of Getulio Vargas' "Estado Nôvo" in 1945, a period of multiparty politics emerged for the first time in Brazilian history. A significant shift of the population from rural to urban areas began. Industrialization increased, particularly after 1955. Labor unions, long dormant and totally tied to the central government, reached for autonomy. Student groups, at all levels of education, became increasingly radical and the Roman Catholic church discovered a social mission.¹

The rural areas of the country represented the most stagnant segment of society. As one commentator remarks:

...73 percent of all farms in 1950 employed human labor exclusively. They used hoes, bush knives, and axes as their only equipment. At that time only 27 percent of all farms used draft animals, and 82 percent of these farms were located in the southern part of the country, a fact which emphasizes the extent to which pre-technology characterizes the greater part of Brazilian peasant agriculture.²

Data published by the Brazilian Institute of Agrarian Reform (IBRA) indicates the severe imbalance in the land tenure system and land patterns in Brazil. 76% of the properties registered are minifundia. These 2.5 million uneconomic units occupy a total land area of forty million hectares, less than 14% of the total land area registered as private property. Thirty-two million hectares are held as private property by 150 landowners, each of whom owns more than 100,000 hectares, mostly unexploited. In 1950, 62% of the agricultural work force were landless agricultural workers. If those whose land was classified as not viable economically

¹ For an overview of this period, see Thomas E. Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967).

² Shepard Forman, *The Brazilian Peasantry* (New York & London: Columbia University Press, 1975), pp. 43-46.

are included, the number of de facto landless agricultural laborers is 81%.³

Against this background of profound backwardness, the incipient national-populist political coalition active in the urban areas was accompanied by rural political mobilization. The peasant leagues of Julião were soon accompanied and rivaled by the efforts of the Church, the State and the Communist party to organize the peasantry. Paulo Freire carried his liberating educational system into the interior of the Northeast. The Church organized a series of radio schools that broadcasted throughout the northeast region. A massive United States foreign aid program, allegedly in support of social change, functioned in Recife. And Celso Furtado and a cadre of social reformers and economic planners, employed SUDENE, the Superintendency for the Development of the Northeast, to build a political coalition for prudent, progressive change.⁴

It is important to note that the impression or allusion of change did not represent a substantive, actual redistribution within or a reorganization of the socio-economic or political systems. The time frame within which the national-populist coalition acted was of short duration. Leadership was fragmented and often contradictory. There did not exist a single, coherent program of reform. Many would argue that the lower classes remained instruments of elite competition, both between the traditional rural and bourgeois groups as well as the self-styled, middle and upper class reformers and revolutionaries. As Carlos Estevam Martins noted:

...the successive attempts to restore political equilibrium by increasing the participation of the lower classes were to reach their limit with the Goulart government's efforts to open up the system, efforts that far exceeded not just the populist plans of Vargas or Janio Quadros, but the original intentions of the

³ Instituto Brasileiro de Reforma Agraria (IBRA), *A Estrutura Agraria Brasileira* (Rio de Janeiro: 1967).

⁴ See Riordan Roett, *The Politics of Foreign Aid in the Brazilian Northeast* (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1972).

Goulart government itself. These efforts included the mobilization of the rural masses and of the lower echelons of the Armed Forces, and they unleashed a series of consequences fatal for the alliance's survival: the alienation of rural property owners and of the constitutionalist military; a horizontal split in the party system; a stalemate between executive and legislature; and, finally, the rejection of the regime by the very forces that owed it, if not their life, then at least the political importance they had come to enjoy.⁵

III. Brazil after 1964

The political elites in Brazil reacted quickly in early 1964 when it appeared that their prerogatives were about to be challenged by the social and political mobilization. Supportive of the anti-communist objectives of the armed forces, the class elites saw their salvation in the freezing of the system as it had been before 1964. Class polarization had resulted from the rapid and imbalanced growth sequence of the late 1950's and early 1960's. The economic crisis which no government after 1960 appeared able to control, threatened when combined with class tension, to totally polarize the society. It was clear to both Left and Right that ordinary political measures were insufficient: only a radical solution would resolve the deadlock.⁶ The Right moved first, allegedly in response to provocation from the Left, in March 1964 and the authoritarian system that has ruled Brazil since the overthrow of Goulart took power.

Whereas Goulart had presided over a weak State in terms of coercive powers and economic and administrative resources, the civilian-military technocratic alliance that assumed power

⁵ Carlos Esteve Martins, "Brazil and the United States from the 1960's to the 1970's," in *Latin America and the United States: The Changing Political Realities*, ed. Julio Cotler and Richard R. Fagen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1974), p. 272.

⁶ Thomas E. Skidmore, "Politics and Economic Policy-Making in Authoritarian Brazil, 1937-71," in *Authoritarian Brazil*, ed. Alfred Stepan (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1973), pp. 4-5.

in 1964, moved quickly and emphatically to strengthen and eventually create a model of State power never before encountered in Brazil, specifically, and in few countries in Latin America. The principal mechanism through which the State assumed extraordinary power over all aspects of society was the economic stabilization program of 1964-1967 and the ensuing economic "miracle."⁷ The Brazilian State, for the first time, possessed the economic foundation on which to build a strong, centralized authoritative political order and to implement social policies consonant with civilian-military technocratic goals.

It is important to clarify the nature of the technocratic alliance that came to power in 1964. With only a few exceptions, the alliance did not represent the traditional political party leadership. While the conservative, co-optable party leaders were given a dependent role in the new State-oriented system, they were given no power. The "social elite," defined as the great families of either São Paulo or Recife, for example, lost power in real terms. In exchange, they would receive social and economic guarantees from the new regime that easily substituted for the political power they once derived from their economic wealth and social influence. As Guillermo O'Donnell has stated:

operating in a different social context, technocratic role-incumbents in situations of high modernization are likely to act in contrast to their usually politically liberal role models, and to constitute the core of the coalition that will attempt the establishment of an authoritarian, 'excluding' political system.⁸

The Superior War College (ESG) throughout the 1950's and 1960's provided a convenient and important forum for

⁷ See Werner Baer and Isaac Kerstenetzky, "The Economy of Brazil," in *Brazil in the Sixties*, ed. Riordan Roett (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1972).

⁸ Guillermo O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California, Institute of International Studies, 1973), p. 86.

civilian technocratic and military officers to exchange ideas and examine alternative development models. Frequent employment of retired military officers in state enterprises and in multinational and national industrial and commercial firms offered other opportunities for collaboration. Foreign education and training of both civilians and military provided opportunities to learn new roles and develop new expectations of state performance. By 1964, a core of civilians and military officers were prepared to destroy the 1946 Republic and its middle class, populist politics and move towards a profoundly more dramatic alternative.

As Werner Baer has pointed out, the growth of State power has not been a "carefully conceived scheme."⁹ It has been a reaction to assorted international economic crises, a desire to control foreign investment, and the objective of rapid industrialization. An important component of State growth has been military participation and initiative, going back as far as the 1930's and the incipient steel project at Volta Redonda. Given previous familiarity with government enterprises, the support of a disenchanted technocracy, the leadership of individuals such as Roberto Campos and Octavio Bulhões in the new government, the decision to strengthen the State's role in the economy, and, simultaneously, to employ that economic power for social and political purposes, was a more coherent emphasis rather than a new direction in policy.

As Baer further comments:

the 'state' includes a variety of public authorities at the federal, state, and local levels, enterprises and banks controlled by one of these levels of government, and various types of controls by both control and institutions concerned with monetary and fiscal policies.¹⁰

⁹ Werner Baer et al., "The Changing Role of the State in the Brazilian Economy," *World Development*, 1, 11(1973), p. 23.

¹⁰ Werner Baer et al., "State Capitalism and Economic Development: The Case of Brazil" (paper prepared for the conference on "Implementation in Latin America's Public Sector," University of Texas at Austin, April, 1976), pp. 4-5.

The State serves as regulator through its controls over the fiscal system and its impact on the distribution of income and resource allocation. Through direct regulation of prices, production, foreign trade and wages the State reaches into all societal activities. As the country's principal banker and financier, the State mobilizes private and public savings for State investment purposes. Its loan policies control access to working capital for both agriculture and industry.

The Brazilian State is a major producer as well. Of the 5,113 largest incorporated firms in 1974, over 39% of their net assets belong to state enterprises, 18% to multinational firms, and 43% to private Brazilian firms. The State is dominant in mining, steel, chemicals, petroleum, public utilities and other key areas. Control over domestic savings and their distribution gives the State enormous social and economic influence. It is the most powerful financial intermediary for long-term financing. The continual expansion of State control over the economy has been accompanied by a natural increase in overall policy formulation in all sectors of the economy.

The Brazilian State, controlled by a technocratic alliance of civilians and military after 1964, expanded its role in society for various reasons. As already mentioned, the civilian and military elite had determined, by 1964, that they had to win the zero-sum game that had polarized the nation. Moreover, they determined that economic growth was the surest road to regime stability, political legitimacy, international prestige and a modicum of internal social peace. The regime was willing to employ various techniques to either neutralize, co-opt and/or eliminate subordinate actors or potential challengers to its policy of State expansion.

The electoral and political party systems were dismantled. The 1946 Constitution was scuttled. The representational function of the congress was destroyed. Labor unions were intervened and ruthlessly subjected to State power. The incipient rural unionization efforts in the Northeast and elsewhere disappeared overnight. Radical, reformist and populist poli-

ticians lost their political rights, were exiled, or imprisoned. Recalcitrant noncommissioned military officers and enlisted men were disciplined. Student activism was met with severity. The Roman Catholic Church, confronting a unified political elite, quietly retreated from its previous position of enlightened leadership; those of its leadership who were unwilling to accept Church policy, such as Dom Helder Camara in Recife, became non-people. Traditional social linkages and ties, such as the patron-client relationships that characterized the rural areas, were allowed, and encouraged, to reassert themselves. The hierarchical structure of Brazilian society reappeared forcefully.¹¹

Abortive efforts by pre-1964 politicians (such as Carlos Lacerda) to organize a united civilian front against the authoritarian regime failed quickly. The outbreak of a wave of urban terrorism, led by Carlos Lamarca and Carlos Marighela, met with immediate, draconian measures from the security and police authorities. Nuisance protests by opposition party members in the congress led to the closing of that legislative body. There were few other efforts to protest the severe discipline imposed by the regime.

If one policy followed by the technocratic elite was political reorganization and repression, another was *watchful and continuous social control*. The natural allies of the new regime, potentially, were those who had stood to lose the most if the pre-1964 stand-off had been won by the Left: the middle and upper classes, urban and rural. The rural groups, in a long period of relative decline and marginalization, especially in the Northeast, were easily won over with an implicit pledge that agrarian reform efforts would cease; that renegade priests, reformers, and administrators would be silenced, that their traditional control over the agricultural population would be restored, and that nothing would be done by the regime to overtly challenge their alleged social

¹¹ See Riordan Roett, *Brazil: Politics in a Patrimonial Society* (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, Inc., 1973), esp. chapter 6.

and economic hegemony. That group was the most dependent, and therefore the least important, in the bargaining process.

More important, clearly, were the industrial and commercial bourgeoisie and entrepreneurs of the urban centers. It was here that State involvement in the economy would reap immediate and continuing benefits. In exchange for economic encouragement and social peace, i.e., passive labor unions, favorable fiscal policies, incentives, pragmatic monetary management, wage policies that were always behind the rate of inflation, etc., the economic bourgeoisie and the multinational corporations provided significant support for the regime and its policies of State expansion.

An ironic aspect of that relationship between the private sector and the State was that the greater the increase in State power, a relative decrease occurred in the influence and breadth of investment of the Brazilian private sector. Through the encouragement of foreign investment, important segments of the national economy were excluded from Brazilian control. Through the expansion of joint ventures, between the State and multinational corporations, other areas have been excluded from private domestic capital investment. While the private sector needed State support, the State clearly indicated that its investment priorities would not first serve the private investor and entrepreneur. Given the rapid growth and high rates of return that characterized the economy between 1968 and 1974, the Brazilian entrepreneurs might not like State policy but they still benefitted from it. And, pragmatically, the industrial and commercial bourgeoisie had no other options politically and were in agreement on the social policies followed by the State.

By 1974, state firms represented 16% of total sales, multinationals 28%, and private firms 56%. While private firms have larger sales and net assets than either multinationals or state enterprises, the combined figures for the latter two, in comparison with private firms, indicates that they control 57% of total assets and 44% of sales. Moreover, State

companies are dominant in key sectors, are among the largest and most dynamic, have more favorable access to government fiscal and monetary resources, and manifest greater levels of efficiency and profits.¹²

The key social group in the political and social balance was the urban middle class. The strongest and most vocal opponent of the pre-1964 national-populist alliance, its representatives had taken to the streets in protest over food prices, the growing communist menace, and the hyperinflation which threatened to destroy their economic base and erode incipient social status.

In large part, the economic program of the post-1964 regime was directed at winning and maintaining the allegiance of the middle sectors of Brazilian society at all costs. The momentary appeal of the national-populist alliance for the middle groups was remembered by the technocratic coalition that came to power in 1964 and it was not to be repeated. Wage and price policies, employment opportunities, industrial production choices, etc. were geared to satisfy middle-class demands and expectations and simultaneously to enhance the power of the State and its capacities to define and direct societal development.

The middle class in Brazil had never been large nor powerful. It served as the perfect and logical counterpart to the civilian and military technocrats, who came from the middle class themselves but held values and goals autonomous from their class origins, in rebuilding Brazil and projecting the *grandeza* ("greatness") of Brazil. In fostering the expansion and growth of the urban middle class, the State gained an ideologically compatible ally. In legitimizing the 1964 technocratic alliance, controlled elections were employed as an indication of the functionality of the constitutional system; media and press coverage of regime activities tended to avoid, even with censorship, the most damaging aspects of regime perfor-

¹² Werner Baer et al., "State Capitalism," p. 8.

mance; and middle-class support was firmly behind discipline—discipline in the educational sector, against the terrorists and in the labor unions.

Wage policies were a key mechanism for economic redistribution to the middle sectors. As Albert Fishlow observes:

between 1960 and 1968 wages are essentially constant. A potentially more accurate picture, because the data are more homogeneous, is possible by restricting comparisons to the industrial states of Guanabara, Rio de Janeiro, and São Paulo. Here we find equally dramatic evidence of redistribution between the two urban classes. In the case of the former states, nonagricultural employees exhibit modest growth while there is an evident gain for employers and self-employed.¹³

Fishlow continues that there is no evidence:

of any sustained effect upon the fortunes of agricultural laborers except in São Paulo, and these at a rate inferior to the gain of nonagricultural employees.

...neither rural workers nor any but the largest proprietors apparently realized significant improvement in their incomes over the decade.¹⁴

In global terms, the real income of the lowest 50% of the population barely rose after 1964 while their proportional share of the gross national income fell very sharply. The more skilled of the manual working class, approximately the next 30% of the total economically active population, barely held their own in terms of gross national income. The upper 5% of wage earners gained most; their real income rose 72% and their share of the GNP advanced from 27% to 36%. Brazil's index of income inequality, as underestimated by the Gini coefficient, rose from a modest .488 in 1960 (relatively low by Latin American standards) to .574 in 1970, the highest

¹³ Albert Fishlow, "Some Reflections on Post-1964 Brazilian Economic Policy," in *Authoritarian Brazil*, ed. Stepan, p. 92.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

ever recorded at the national level in any country in Latin America.¹⁵

IV. The Northeast and Social Change

The direction of State policy in the social and economic areas is perhaps clearest in the Brazilian Northeast. In 1970, that region accounted for 30.3% of the population, but accounted for only 12.2% of the national income and only 5.6% of the national industrial production. By contrast, the Southeast, with 42.7% of the population, accounted for 64.5% of the national income and 80.6% of the industrial output.

The 1972 sample survey of PNAD revealed dramatic regional differences in social well-being. In São Paulo, for instance, 85% of the households had electricity, while in the Northeast only 25% had access to electric power; 73% of the São Paulo households were linked to a sewage system or had septic tanks, but only 15% of Northeastern households had this service.¹⁶ Other data are comparable in establishing the enormous disparity between regions.

Income data reflects this inequality. A 1970 report by the Bank of the Northeast said that the percentage of total income going to the lowest 40% of the population of the city of Recife, the "capital" of the region, declined from 16.5% in 1960 to 11.5% in 1967. In Maceio, one of the smallest state capitals, 15.4% of income went to the lowest 40% of the population in 1964; in 1968, only 11.2%. In only one of the eight capitals did real monthly per capita income rise for the lowest 40% of the population. In Recife, the highest one-fifth of income earners increased their share from 47.1%

¹⁵ Philippe C. Schmitter, "The 'Portugalization' of Brazil?," in *Authoritarian Brazil*, ed. Stepan, p. 201.

¹⁶ Werner Baer, "The Brazilian Growth and Development Experience," in *Brazil in the Seventies*, ed. Riordan Roett (Washington: The American Enterprise Institute, forthcoming), p. 19.

in 1960 to 56.4% in 1967, confirming the care with which the middle class has been treated since 1964.¹⁷

The Northeast has been an underdeveloped region for centuries. Innumerable efforts have been undertaken by various regimes to ameliorate socio-economic conditions in the area. A recent analysis of employment, earning and income distribution in the urban sector of the Northeast since 1960, as a reflection of federal government regional policy, dramatically supports the argument that State power has favored the middle and upper-income groups. Social change among the poorest sector of society has been deliberately not supported by the post-1964 regime. Government policies have been directed at the urban areas, to the detriment of the rural poor as well as the urban slum dwellers, in support of economic activities that correspond to national development priorities. Equity and distribution issues have played little, if any, role in the formation of State expansion.

David Goodman's findings are that:

...deliberate industrialization and related policies have aggravated the dualism of the Northeastern economy, intensifying socio-economic stratification. Urban-rural income differentials have widened and the inequality of the regional income distribution increased sharply over the past decade.¹⁸

Explicit criteria of efficiency versus equity in designing government programs is clear. Capital intensive investment is encouraged in an area plagued by unemployment. These policy options are reinforced by additional government sectoral investment criteria which discriminate heavily in favor of projects producing intermediate and capital goods:

¹⁷ Banco do Nordeste do Brasil, "Distribuição e níveis da renda familiar no Nordeste urbano," as reported in "A Economia brasileira e suas perspectivas," APEC, 9(July, 1970).

¹⁸ D. E. Goodman, "The Brazilian Economic 'Miracle' and Regional Policy: Some Evidence from the Urban Northeast," *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 8, 1(May, 1976), p. 3.

efficiency criteria also are evident in the design of public expenditure policies and the heavy concentration of investment resources in transportation, power, communications and secondary activities. Capital formation to expand such social services as public health, sanitation, education and housing, which have a more direct impact on the poorer, less privileged groups of the community, has been seriously neglected...the absorption in transportation projects of 89% of *total* capital expenditure in Ceara and 72% in Pernambuco in 1969 represents a most distorted view of social needs and priorities.¹⁹

The seemingly dramatic attention given the Northeast in the Medici government, after the catastrophic drought in 1970, reinforces the efficiency, non-equity thrust of State policy. The rash of new programs, PIN (National Integration), PROTERRA (Land Redistribution), and PROVALE (development of the São Francisco River Valley) emphasized infra-structure projects and credit support for agro-industry. As Goodman comments, "the equity-related and re-distributive components of these new schemes have atrophied or been abandoned entirely."²⁰

In addition to income levels and questions of distribution, available data indicates that the nutritional situation in the Northeast, already critical in the 1960's by United Nations standards, has deteriorated in the last decade. Food consumption, particularly of proteins, declined. Very high rates of infant mortality continue in the region. Nutritional deficiencies cause mental and physical impairment in tens of thousands of Northeastern children annually. Substandard housing and primitive sanitary conditions are pervasive. Widespread incidence of debilitating diseases and parasitosis has been confirmed among the poor.²¹ Life expectancy at birth, in the Northeast's central region, with 54% of the region's population, was 44 years in the decade of the 1960's, below the national average of 56 years.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ Inter-American Development Bank, *Northeast Brazil: Food Production and Nutrition Project*, mimeographed report (Washington, D. C., 1974).

While the available data clearly confirms the decline in the quality of life and the standard of living of the Northeastern urban poor, by extrapolation, the existing conditions in the rural zones can be imagined as far worse. The efforts to draw excess population out of the Northeast region into the Amazon Valley, the Transamazon Highway and settlement program, have been downgraded by the incumbent government of General Geisel. Such colonization programs, which have been tried on other occasions by the government, met with almost immediate failure due to a lack of planning, poor soil and a failure by the government to provide the other services required for the creation of communities of farmers in the valley.

The Northeast is the most dramatic example of Brazilian State policies that ignore social change and issues of equity and redistribution. The plight of the urban and rural poor throughout the country is comparable, if relatively better than the Northeastern poor because of generally higher standards of living in the South. A decision was made in 1964 by the civilian-military technocratic elite to establish criteria of efficiency in all economic development policies. The social and human consequences have been disastrous for the poorest 40% of the Brazilian people.

V. Social Change and the Future of Brazil

If the record to date in Brazil is one of military agreement to civilian elite policies of non-equitable and non-redistributive development, what does the future hold? Can the present policy of deliberately passing the cost of rapid economic growth to the poor continue? Does the demand for social change progress inexorably in all societies, or is it possible for State power to postpone indefinitely those measures that will better the plight of the poor absolutely, but

at the cost of a relative reduction in the purchasing power, income and symbols of status of the privileged minority?

There are few signs at the present that the regime is willing to respond to obvious claims by the poor for policies that support social change. The State centered economy, it is predicted, will recover from the current malaise caused in great part by international oil prices and balance of payments difficulties.²² The possibility of an internal market, sufficient to keep domestic demand high and maintain current industrial production patterns, is possible.²³ The opposition party, the MDB, is moving towards a position of numerical equality at the polls with ARENA, the government party. But few believe that the military will allow the MDB to become a real majority in congress. Social protest movements and guerrilla activities have been eliminated through repression and show little sign of reappearing in the immediate future. It would seem, therefore, that the regime, for the moment, is in command and will be able to deal with the institutional and group diversity that characterizes today's Brazil.

One must look at other trends to infer the possibility of pressure building sufficiently to require State response to obvious social needs. One such trend is that of urban growth. Brazil is characterized, as is all of Latin America, by two strong demographic trends which are "the continuing rapid rate of population growth and the great exodus from rural areas to the cities. These forces are reshaping the economic and social fabric of each society..."²⁴ The urban expansion, so obvious in Brazil, emerged in the 1950's and has grown stronger due to two mutually reinforcing factors: a sharp decline in mortality rates and consistently high birth rates and the steady movement to the cities of rural residents.

²² William R. Cline, "Brazil's Emerging International Economic Role," in *Brazil in the Seventies*, ed. Riordan Roett (Washington: The American Enterprise Institute, forthcoming).

²³ Baer, "Brazilian Growth," p. 13.

²⁴ *Economic and Social Progress in Latin America*, Inter-American Development Bank, Annual Report (1974), p. 147. Other data in this section about urban growth and population are taken from the 1974 report, section V.

With a 1960 population of seventy million, the projection for 1980 is 121 million and 202 million people in the year 2000. The average annual rate of growth of the population from 1960 to 1970 was 2.8%. It will drop one-tenth of one percent every ten years, reaching a level of 2.5% in 2000. Urban growth trends are more startling. Using cities of 20,000 inhabitants or more as the base, the 1960 population was 31% urban; 40% in 1970; and estimated to be 47% in 1980. By 1980, Brazil will have nine cities with a population of more than one million inhabitants.

To reduce the growing pressure on urban areas—which is greater in other countries in Latin America—a significant drop in the rate of birth is required. To achieve that in Brazil would necessitate a drastic change, over a short period of time in attitudes, values and patterns of behavior. The incumbent regime has given little serious consideration to nationwide birth control policies. The lack of concern for nutritional and sanitary standards in the rural areas, where a majority of the population still live, indicates continuing illness and malnutrition among the burgeoning population born in the rural zones. Extension services into the countryside have not accompanied regional development programs—the emphasis on infrastructural investments in the Northeast, for example, has left little funding for social and human services.

The sheer size of the major cities in the years ahead raises the question of general urban services such as housing, local transportation, educational facilities, health clinics, etc.—none of which have been a subject of serious concern on the part of the federal government. If the exodus from the countryside continues, and all trends indicate it will, the dual problem will become aggravated: impossible conditions of life in the rural areas and an increasingly frustrated existence in largely unmanageable cities. While there is no causal link between levels of discomfort and neglect in either rural or urban settings, the combination of high population growth rates, changing age cohorts, inadequate social services, deliberately control-

ed wage policies, growing polarization in income, and few societal investments that benefit the majority, some factor of potential destabilizing violence must be considered.

There are those who argue that the upswing in the international economy will benefit Brazil sufficiently to allow the State to continue its policies of selective trickle-down and increased services at a level that will preclude outrage and rebellion. The linkages of Brazil to the international economy are complex and require separate analysis. Suffice it to say that a renewal of growth and a satisfactory solution of current monetary and balance of payments difficulties will allow the regime to renew its current policies of gratifying middle and upper-class desires and ambitions, but will do little to induce greater concern for the majority of the population in the lower sectors of society.

The traditional weakness of class loyalty in Brazil, and the longstanding network of familial and patron-client, hierarchical relationships that characterize Brazil, will work to mitigate anomic violence. Social control mechanisms, flexible and time-honored, will provide a means for channeling the feelings of a majority of the population. The threat of State coercion will act as a deterrent as well. The policy of allowing limited social and geographical mobility for the most capable and ambitious of the lower class is an effective escape valve. The emergence of an "elite" among the semi-skilled and skilled working class in the major urban industrial cities of the South may herald another, effective way of maintaining stability in the dependent labor movement.

There is not a strong tradition of public violence and protest in Brazilian political history. Regime changes have come about, generally, not as a result of popular revolutionary agitation but of elite maneuvering, generally with purposeful military participation. There is little to indicate that the military plan to withdraw from their central role in State decision-making or that the civilian elites are sufficiently dissatisfied that they will seek dissident military allies to con-

struct a coalition capable of successfully confronting those who now hold power. The continued rise in popularity, if not power, of the opposition MDB may require stringent action on the part of the regime. If that action is judged insufficient by the most conservative, nationalist elements of the 1964 alliance, it is possible to imagine a "coup within the coup," which would have even less concern for issues of equity and redistribution.

Is it possible to look to external pressure to induce a greater concern for social change among Brazilian State decision-makers? The United States is the only actor capable of fulfilling that role; recent trends indicate that the United States exercises far less influence in Brazil than it did even five years ago. The foreign aid and military assistance ties between the two countries are minimal. Increasing concern in the United States Congress about continued violation of human rights in Brazil has exacerbated the relationship. The opposition of the Ford administration to the nuclear agreement with West Germany has caused widespread resentment in both military and civilian elite circles. A series of economic and trade issues separate the two countries. Brazil's increasingly prominent role as a moderate influence in the Third World has given it new bargaining power internationally. All these factors would indicate little real possibility of a change in Brazilian policy in response to United States pressure.

There is no reason to believe that multilateral lending institutions will be able to persuade the regime to adopt different policies, although international lending criteria are now somewhat more responsive to equity issues. Multinational corporations operating in Brazil have little interest, other than a cosmetic one, in pressuring the regime for greater flexibility in distribution and equity policies. The very factors that draw the multinational corporation to Brazil are those that require amelioration.

The Brazilian State today holds sufficient power to resist external pressure to move towards policies that support social

change. The internal structure of Brazilian society, socially and politically, particularly when seen in a historical context, offers the regime the reassurance that traditional modes of deflecting social unrest will continue to work in its favor, save in the most drastic circumstances. There is little substance to the argument that anomic violence or planned popular protest movements, mass based or urban guerrilla focused, will undermine the regime.

The most likely scenarios that favor a sudden shift in policy focus on the growth pattern of the economy. If the middle and upper classes believe that the economic leveling-off or downturn they are now experiencing is not of short duration, they might turn to another segment of the 1964 alliance in search of new economic policies. Those policies, more nationalist in content, would not necessarily favor redistribution and probably would oppose it. However, it may be necessary in fact to initiate controlled policies of redistribution if there are fears that the internal market is weak and will not support a revival of previous growth records, or that the need for skilled and semi-skilled workers permits the expansion of the lower middle-class income group.

It is difficult to imagine the middle and upper-class civilian groups deliberately selecting policies of equity that will undermine their own position. Moreover, the deep commitment to national greatness and international prominence provides a continuing, future-oriented justification for all elite groups, military and civilian, to rationalize their non-support for redistribution as in the nation's real, long-term interests.

The prospects for social change under military tutelage in Brazil are minimal. It is unwise to make categorical statements that change will never come; it takes place even today, in a selective, controlled, coldly pragmatic form at all levels of society. What has not emerged since 1964 is a concern among those who direct the State for mass equity and integration into national society. Only a cataclysmic series of events will precipitate voluntary policy changes that favor the poor.

Political, short-term concerns by a segment of the 1964 alliance may support humanitarian, paternalistic aid programs for the most disadvantaged, but such policies will be understood and employed as palliatives.

The tragic irony of the 1964 Revolution is that the tremendous energy, that has gone into creating a powerful State apparatus and that has produced one of the most impressive economic growth models in the world, has totally failed to generate a different path of development for the people, the nation.

Militarism in Uruguay as a Response to the Hegemonic Crisis

Nelson Minello

I. Introduction

In this study we will attempt to analyze the presence of the military in the Uruguayan government. Our general hypothesis is that following the hegemonic crisis produced by the breaking up of the domination model by the polyclass alliances—which in Uruguay took the form of a contradictory alliance of interests of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, supported by the large middle class—it was the military that occupied the place which a bourgeois faction normally would have filled in a reaccomodation of the dominant class.

The military has now taken power, not under the inspiration of a charismatic chief or leader, but as an institution, as the armed forces. We are no longer witnessing the classic Latin American "military coup," with the strongest officer or non-coms leading the military assault. Now we find that a man is respected for his rank within the hierarchical structure and, because of that, it is the respective authorities, the commanders in chief, who make the decisions.

The presence of a civilian—first, Bordaberry, and now

Aparicio Méndez—at the head of the Uruguayan government would signal a certain contradiction in our hypothesis, since we would not be able to classify Uruguay as a classic case of military regime. As we pointed out in another study, one might imagine a situation of Bonaparte-like characteristics.¹ But reality was simpler: for a long time, the armed forces did not need to substitute Bordaberry, since the latter, in the final analysis, gave in to military decisions. When Bordaberry—who we said was useful and not very troublesome—decided to seduce the military with a Bonaparte-like plan in which he remained at the head of the executive branch and the armed forces retired to the background, the latter answered by removing him and implanting a system of government by institutional acts through which—besides proscribing politicians and parties, and other repressive measures—the president would now be elected by a council made up of the twenty-one generals of the armed forces and twenty-five unrelated civilians.² Power remained in the hands of the armed forces.

The crisis of worldwide capitalism—which has had to retreat from many areas in defeat, on the one hand—and the special situation of dependency in which Latin America finds itself—where the political-military interests of the empire tended toward the easy goal of a repressive scheme and a crystallization of social relationships—together with the capitalist need to impose and maintain new norms of exploitation (polarized accumulation) lead imperialism to prefer the armed forces as the surest and most valid spokesman at the present time. This does not mean that we postulate a direct and mechanical connection between imperialism and the armed forces, but we do maintain that the latter seem to increasingly take on the form of an occupying force closely linked to imperial interests (even if they may have cooperative projects of a certain autonomy).

¹ "La militarización del Estado en América Latina: Un análisis de Uruguay," *Cuadernos del CES* (México) 17 (1976).

² See his memorandum to the Council of Generals (Junta de Oficiales Generales) dated December 9, 1975; *Excelsior* (Mexico), April 11-14, 1976.

Finally, we maintain that the Uruguayan army has intervened in the political scene every time it was necessary for the dominant groups. Johnson's statement: "In Uruguay... the armed forces have stayed in the background for the major part of this century, and militarism, as an art, has declined considerably..." is correct if we consider that the apparent inactivity of the Uruguayan army is fundamentally due to the fact that the depth of the political crisis only managed to really affect the system in very few cases.³ In order to study the military's political participation, one has to first outline the system of class alliances of the society in question. That will permit us to show its apparent apolitical nature and its no less apparently surprising irruption on the political scene more clearly.

In a very schematic way, we can show that the system of class alliances and interrelationships in Uruguay presents us with a landowning bourgeoisie, in rural society, that takes advantage of the mobilization and efforts of the small and medium-sized producers and the numerically scarce groups of peasants and rural, salaried workers.⁴ The phenomenon of interrelationships of factions and classes makes achieving an alliance unnecessary. In the urban sector, instead, the panorama is more complex. On the one hand, there is the industrial bourgeoisie which maintains an alliance-interrelationship (if one can imagine this combination, by which we mean that the industrial bourgeoisie is not as clearly dominant as the rural faction, but neither does it have to work out, *strictu sensu*, an alliance) with the commercial and financial factions.⁵

³ John J. Johnson, *Militares y sociedad en América Latina* (Buenos Aires: Solar-Hachette, 1966), p. 22.

⁴ At least until the fifties. At that time, the Federal League of Rural Action (Liga Federal de Acción Ruralista) came into existence, headed by a radical commentator, Benito Nardone, who was able to group small rural producers together. The latter, informed of the international prices of the export goods, achieved a greater degree of liberty. The corporativist view did not manage, after all, to break the domination of the landowning bourgeoisie, who, with some concessions, managed to maintain their domination.

⁵ The industrial bourgeoisie did not always occupy this position. At the beginning of their independent life, the commercial bourgeoisie was the most

On the other hand, there is the proletariat and the large middle class. The industrial bourgeoisie works out—principally via State legislation—an alliance (which we have already called one of contradictory interests) with the proletariat and, through it, joins together with the middle sectors. On a societal level, hegemony, apparently in the hands of the industrial bourgeoisie, always remains in the hands of the landowning faction.

II. The State in Uruguay

Although independent since 1825, the formation of a modern Uruguay, participating in the international division of labor, can be found in 1870. In this decade, and under an authoritarian government model, the big cattlemen, concentrated in the Rural Association (*Asociación Rural*), imposed their own plan. This can be synthesized as follows:

Respect the family which is yours; the home, which is your home; property, that is, property which is the foundation of the whole structure. Follow the politics you wish, but be content with the usufruct of work and save the capital which is the seed of tomorrow's harvest.⁶

The plan implemented a government that would protect its efforts to produce and export cattle products, maintain an absolute respect for private property, provide means of technological progress such as fencing fields, crossbreeding and refining creole cattle with imported specimens, and maintaining an efficient police force in the fields which would protect their property.

important one. Beginning with the economic crisis and especially since the end of the sixties, the financial bourgeoisie displaced both factions. They were, in all the cases pointed out, different moments in the international division of labor imposed by imperialism.

⁶ *Revista de la Asociación Rural del Uruguay* (1937) cited by Carlos Bañales, "Función política de las fuerzas armadas uruguayas," mimeographed (ILARI, 1971), p. 9.

The task of liquidating a pre-capitalist economy showed the landholding bourgeoisie to be very flexible. It was permeable to a rapid, rising vertical mobility, sensitive to the requirements of capitalist centers (because of the type of meat or wool exploited, which coincides with the needs of a technology in whose creation it did not participate), and showed a clear policy of economic rationality, maximizing its profits under conditions of calculated and acceptable risk.

The landholding bourgeoisie—also clearly tied to the financial and commercial factions—skillfully took advantage of the authoritarian governments and then favored a return to a liberal State. In the first years of this century, José Battle y Ordóñez—a politician who would profoundly mark the country's political life—unified the whole country under a single center of power and initiated his plan, known from then on as the "Battlist model."

The latter imposed a benefactor and paternalistic state, which redistributed national income produced by exporting meat and wool, and favored the middle class (with the extension of government employment), working factions (by maintaining their sources of work) and, basically, the industrial bourgeoisie (which it helped with state subsidies to maintain light industries of durable consumer goods). Apparently, the project was contrary to that of the landholding groups. Nevertheless, it was admitted by the latter, as long as it kept the ownership of the means of production in the hands of the agrarian bourgeoisie.

The characteristics of the economic structure of the country (80% of its exports consisted of wool, meat and hides obtained through extensive exploitation using a small labor force), plus an early urban concentration of European migrant artisans, together with the policy of redistribution already mentioned, determined, on the one hand, the almost nonexistence of a peasant class (and the minimal importance of the rural wage earners as a class faction) and, on the other, the formation of a large sector of employees (the majority, government)

and workers. The figures from the 1963 census show 16.6% of the population working in agriculture.

The labor movement—with a long tradition, since the first union was founded by 1875, and the first confederation of workers appeared, under anarchist influence, in the first decade of the twentieth century—had profound experiences in class struggle, culminating in the middle of the sixties with the constitution of the National Workers' Convention (Convencción Nacional de Trabajadores: CNT), the sole confederation of unions which joined together workers and employees from private industry and from the autonomous state industrial entities, primary and secondary teachers, private and government administrative employees, private and official bankers, health personnel, etc.

On the political level, two large polyclass parties (the Nacional or Blanco, and the Colorado) predominate, with a range of positions going from extreme left to center (left) in internal structure. Both parties show certain autonomous traits which permit the participation of the nondominant social classes in the system.⁷ Although both govern together, it should be pointed out that the Colorado party has held the executive uninterruptedly from 1865 to 1958, and from 1966 to 1973. The Nacional party, on the other hand, only held top government positions in this century between 1958 and 1966. The absolute predominance of the Colorado party is important, among other things, in order to understand the role of the army, which was formed and professionalized under Colorado administrations.

The political action of these polyclass parties and the populist role of the Battlist State made the creation of an alternative and opposing ideological project enormously difficult. The unification of the progressive and popular forces was first achieved in 1971, with the creation of the Frente

⁷ Alberto Couriel, "Uruguay: Las causas económicas de sus transformaciones políticas e ideológicas," in *América Latina: Economía y política*, ed. James Petras (Buenos Aires: Editorial Periferia, 1972), p. 404.

Amplio. In this case, even if certain electoralist interests predominated and, from a class point of view, strongly influenced the small intellectual bourgeoisie, a very important experience in political class struggle was gained. The subsequent behavior of the dominant groups and the armed forces is proof of that.

In 1930, the end of outward growth, practically all the branches of the so-called traditional industry were established and a process of establishing new branches—alcohol, milling, cement, chemicals and others—was carried out, which was accelerated starting 1946. This process was halted in 1955. Nevertheless, the peculiar characteristics of Uruguay—its political situation, the interests of the capitalist as well as the workers' groups, the fact that the ownership of the means of production were in the hands of Uruguayan capitalists—permitted a process by which the crisis began slowly and burst thirteen years later.

The 1966 election confirmed the rupture of the "Battlist model" of government. The Gestido-Pacheco Areco presidential ticket, which assumed power in March 1967, held, in its bosom, the representatives of the Battlist liberal, populist traditions as well as the bourgeois which possessed the mechanisms of economic leadership. Thus, the names of bankers, lawyers for foreign companies and cattlemen were substituted in these areas for those coming from the non-bourgeois "political personnel."

The class conciliation model suffered, from the beginning of the fifties, from the erosions made by the demands of the landowning faction, through a regressive policy of redistribution which was more favorable to its interests; of the industrial faction, that called for greater protectionist measures; and of workers and middle class that tried, unsuccessfully in the majority of cases, to maintain a life-style which was increasingly attacked by inflation.

Substantial modifications, especially beginning in 1968, occurred in the political-judicial superstructure in particular.

From a model of consensus and dialogue, one goes rapidly to violence as a system. And in this process of bourgeois reaccommodation the armed forces take on an increasingly decisive role.

III. Political Activities of the Armed Forces

A. Militarism

During the first fifty years of independence, Uruguay did not have a professional army. A leader of that armed group said:

I deplore as much as anyone the terrible need for corporal punishment which our military laws prescribe. But take a look at the personnel of our front-line corps: they are made up of a large quantity of American slaves, indolent and accustomed to severity, that only with that does one get them to smarten up and observe the duties of a soldier and, on the other hand, even worse, recruited in the prison yard.⁸

And even the efforts of the central government—an 1852 decree that organized the front-line army and a law from the year 1858 that provides for the creation of a National Guard, on a conscription basis—were of more use to the regional leaders than to the central authority.

Regarding this, a communiqué sent to the President of the Republic in 1866 by a provincial governor is worth remembering. The reason for the communiqué was the chief of the executive's having ordered the removal of the aforementioned governor, who said:

The due respect which I owe to the authority of Your Excellency has had to remain paralyzed at this moment... and in this

⁸ León Palleja in Eduardo Acevedo, *Manual de historia uruguaya* (Montevideo, 1936)—cited by Bañales, "Función política," p. 4.

case I repeat to Your Excellency that he should behave himself, since, otherwise, I have decided to overthrow you myself with arms.⁹

At the end of the 1860's the last remaining soldiers returned to Montevideo, who, together with the Argentine and Brazilian armies, had participated in the aggression against and destruction of Paraguay. In this war of the Triple Alliance, Uruguayan soldiers and officers, accustomed to the skirmishes of civil uprisings, had to face operations of a greater magnitude, which gave the joint military a certain maturity and even obliged the creation of a rudimentary general staff.

It is in that era that the army was supplied with modern artillery and automatic weapons, and at the same time could count on a railroad and telegraph network in the country which permitted the State's troops more fluid communications and mobility.

In August 1855, the Military Academy or College was founded, destined to prepare future officers, at the same time that the number of men under arms was increasing. The formation of the modern army coincides with the beginning of the landholding bourgeoisie's plan which we already mentioned. A good part of that formation was done under authoritarian governments, with men belonging to the Colorado party.

The last years of the nineteenth century and especially the first years of the twentieth found foreign military missions arriving in Uruguay: German and French. The former, specializing in artillery, practically disappeared following the First World War. French influence, on the other hand, was such and lasted so long that one distinguished Uruguayan officer was able to say that the army was Gallicized:

There were French missions here and officers of ours studied in Saint-Cyr. Tactical regulations of the era were translated literally and therefore were plagued with Gallicisms.¹⁰

⁹ Cited by Bañales, "Función política," p. 7.

¹⁰ Juan José López Silveira, "Una coyuntura vital," *Marcha* (Montevideo), September 24, 1965.

B. Battlist Presence

At the beginning of the century, the Uruguayan army was not yet a national corps. In spite of its relatively small size, the country had two governments: the legal one, established in Montevideo, with the executive, legislative and judicial powers, a civil bureaucracy and an army; and the one established in Cerro Largo, a province of the northwest of the republic, where a leader who dominated several expanses of land resided. Civil servants were named by the central government after consultation with the aforementioned leader.

Battle y Ordóñez, upon reaching the presidency in 1903, "armed himself, reorganized the army, acquired copious war materials, fortified the defensive power of the State..."¹¹ And he went after the parallel government, utilizing armaments as well as the railroad and telegraph, defeating it with a technology which the gaucho cavalry, with its lancer charges, could not accede (although defeat was also due to the dispersion caused by their leader's death). The Peace of Aceguá, which ended the internal military conflict, established a respect for legal authority, the surrender of all arms and ammunition to the government detachments and, finally, the incorporation of the rebel chiefs and officers, who were granted amnesty, into the army.

Once the country was unified, the Battlist model under fay the industrial bourgeoisie established in key administration posts, counting on the middle class to furnish its political class, and having the acquiescence of the landowning bourgeoisie whom the country's unification permitted the peaceful exploitation it had sought since 1870, the army seemed to abandon the political scene. The observations most frequently made refer to this as the "apoliticization" of the Uruguayan armed forces.

¹¹ Alberto Zum Felde, *Proceso histórico del Uruguay* (Montevideo: Arca, 1967).

Battle used the army to implement his plan which, fundamentally, benefited the bloc in power. At the same time, he was distrustful of the army as a support group. He made reforms in the structure of the armed institution, with an increase in the military regions and a rotation of commands. Through this, he sought to decrease the importance of each of the officers, who now had fewer men and territory under their control, while he tried to impede the rebirth of a "feudal" power, a product of the military chief's contact with the very same milieu.

On the other hand, the philosophical foundation of the Battlist team, and of Battle himself, harbored an embryonic antimilitarism. And the law of compulsory military service which began to be discussed during Battle's second presidential term (1911-1915) was not approved until the Second World War, and in such a way that it only constituted a bureaucratic formality.

This view regarding the armed forces is not without its contradictions. In 1915, that is, at the time the rejected law of compulsory military service began to be discussed, the creation of primary and secondary school battallions was proposed. This measure was taken up again, in a certain way, by General Gestido in 1962 when he proposed the creation of military schools in each of the capitals of the interior of the country. Moreover, all citizens were required to enroll—without which it would be impossible to hold a public office, a very important thing in a country which has such an enormous part of its active population working in government jobs—but real military instruction was not sought. Also, they created the Reserve Officers' Training Center (Centro General de Instrucción de Oficiales de Reserva: CGIOR) in the forties, where military instruction was provided after working hours and a fighting spirit was instilled, and also the Civilian Marksmanship Polygon (Polígono de Tiro Ciudadano), where the army provided arms and marksmanship instruction, charg-

ing only for the ammunition used, and at ridiculously low prices.

Socially speaking, the Uruguayan army constituted a channel for upward social mobility and absorbed, and it still does, the unemployed. The former occurred since many of the sons of the urban (especially the provincial) *petit bourgeoisie* decided upon a position in the military school (or the naval or air force schools, when they were created). Here they had food, clothing and even pocket money provided by the State. Later, as officers, they could get a post in Montevideo, where the barracks met their food and housing needs and, in many cases, begin a professional career (which would otherwise have been difficult for their parents to pay for, even though, as it were, instruction was free). The absorption of members of the *petit bourgeoisie* and the middle class (frequently from very humble groups) into the officer corps shows one of the characteristics of the Uruguayan army. The garrisons in the country's interior absorb at least part of the unemployed and unskilled agricultural masses into its ranks. This has been doubly important since the end of the sixties, when the unemployed masses' alternatives became either to become a soldier or a policeman.

C. The Police Coup d'État

The Uruguayan army did not seem to intervene in the coups d'état from 1933 to 1942 either—the only ones occurring in the country until February 9, 1973.

The 1933 coup is an expression of the *bourgeoisie's* readjustment to the new conditions created following the 1929 crisis. The latter, as in the rest of Latin America, gravely affected the agro-exporting economy, since its export balances decreased appreciably and the volume as well as the price became only a third or a half of that reached in 1929, for wool and meat respectively.

The bourgeoisie froze salaries, fought about unemployment and discouraged consumption, in order to maintain a surplus adequate to their interests. These mechanisms, nevertheless, showed discontinuity with Battle's populist model, while they sacrificed the interests of the industrialist faction—which, in the short run, advocated an increase in consumption and in the numerical volume of the proletariat—for the benefit of the class as a whole.

In order to achieve his ends, Dr. Terra—at the time president of the republic—became a dictator with the aid of the police and the militarized fire department. The most widespread version showed that "the army remained passive, in their barracks, leaving the President, in function of the dictatorship, to solve the situation with only the help of the police force."¹²

There is part truth in the statement. The army as such did not join in the coup, and even an opposition politician and protagonist pointed out:

Terra still did not have everyone on the army's side with him. That was shown conclusively later on when, with the pretext that it was old and useless, almost all ammunition was withdrawn from the army...and, on the other hand, the militarized police, which was the instrument employed to topple the institution, was subsequently given ammunition and supplies. Only the Blandengues regiment (the executive branch's guard) from the army was really employed this way, and its troops were increased until they were doubled on the eve of the coup.¹³

That did not mean, of course, that the army was apolitical:

It is clear that the military was not overlooked in planning and carrying out the coup. Many of them took part in police ranks, as for example Colonel Baldomir, the capital city's chief of police, and Colonel Urrutia, chief of police from Cerro Largo. Top military officials—especially the chiefs of the general staff—

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 251.

¹³ Emilio Frugoni, *La revolución del machete* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Claridad, n.d.), p. 115.

in daily contact with the president, and whose support they needed to be very sure of, were not, of course, unaware of what was being plotted, and relied, precisely, on the protection of the bayonets.¹⁴

On the other hand, the coup was carried out by a fraction of the Colorado party (allied with another of the Nacional or Blanco party). The army was "colorado" and surely used that loyalty as the political emblem which so characterized Uruguay. It was not a "*catastrophic equilibrium*" situation, but only an internal reaccommodation of bourgeois interests.

The dictator-president was a man linked to the interests of American imperialism, and the objective of his coup was to situate Uruguay in the new international division of labor which emerged after the crisis of 1929.

Succeeding Dr. Terra in the executive branch—after an election in which a good part of the electorate abstained from participation—was General Alfredo Baldomir. Once the economic mechanisms were readapted in accordance with the interests of the bourgeois class and of imperialism, he, in turn, carried out a coup d'état (called the "gentle" coup) which again allowed the interplay of the parties and of bourgeois democracy, and a return to the Battlist model.

D. From Border Defense to Internal Struggle

While the country went through an accelerated industrialization process, by substituting imports, in which the industrial bourgeoisie led the most dynamic pole of the economy, the armed forces continued in their classic mission of defending national sovereignty against an external attack.¹⁵ This was the Uruguayan army's "orthodox" stage. This stage began to change from 1939-40 on, when French influence gave way

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

¹⁵ Carlos Real de Azúa, "La clase dirigente," *Nuestra Tierra* (Montevideo) 34 (1969).

to that of the United States. Superimposed on the mission of defending against a foreign enemy was the task of protecting "western and democratic" values against an enemy described as more camouflaged: first, the Nazi "fifth column" and then the so-called communist menace.

In 1943-44 already, the United States Lend-Lease Act provided the Uruguayan army with modern and armored means of transportation, antiaircraft and motorized field guns, some of which are still in service.

The new modernization brought with it dependency in the field of equipment and maintenance. Army officers graduated from the Chemistry and Engineering Faculty of the university had formed the Technical Armament and Explosives Corps ever since 1939, with which they not only tried to provide maintenance for existing equipment, but also utilized national industries (or, rather, ones set up in the country) to develop (partial) supply programs for the armed forces. This attempt, as was another to set up a munitions factory—which was already in the country—was discouraged by the high command. The factory was sold and the Technical Corps broken up to such a degree that many of its members went on to private activities.¹⁶

American influence became hegemonic, as in the other countries of the region, upon signing the Military Assistance Pact with the United States in 1953. From this point on, Bañales points out, the custom was established of not assigning budgetary entries for the supply of materials to the three services, the search for internal supply sources was discouraged (as was looking for other external ones that were not American), and one was at the mercy of the United States interests insofar as instruction, equipment and even the use of said arms and equipment were concerned. One example of this dependency was the air force.

Up until 1955, it was regarded as one of the most modern

¹⁶ Bañales, "Función política," p. 25.

of th region: it had a group of B-25 bombers, carefully maintained by the machinery of the Military Assistance Pact, and a squadron of F-80 jet fighter-bombers. Beginning in 1955, the maintenance of the B-25's was eliminated, and every Uruguayan requirement to modernize its aircraft went grossly unheeded. The reason becomes clear if we remember that imperialism had to have an air force which was nearby and docile, and at the same time sufficiently powerful to balance the Argentinians, since it looked unfavorably on the presence of Juan Domingo Perón (who was toppled by a military coup that very same year) in the presidency of the neighboring country.

American influence was not limited to armaments: officers, NCO's and enlisted men were trained in and by the United States. Between 1950 and 1968, 1,414 Uruguayan military personnel attended foreign training camps.¹⁷

In internal affairs, without being detrimental to the disputes about which group was to designate regional officers or general inspectors, political activity seemed secondary. Nevertheless, the armed forces acted when the system needed it. An officer who used the pseudonym "Belisario" wrote that beginning in 1958 there was "a marked and frequent intervention of the permanent armed forces in labor and social conflicts, that is, in its real role as the second link of the 'antisubversive' forces."¹⁸ In fact, this role was being played by the armed forces even earlier. It is sufficient to remember their decisive intervention in the 1951-52 security measures, when the industrial bourgeoisie in the government decided to liquidate a focal point of worker-union resistance which did not participate in the bourgeois-middle class-proletarian pact; or even the innumerable times that the army set the Montevideo port into operation; or when the navy threatened to take over the Montevideo power plant in the face of a workers' strike.

¹⁷ Dieter Senghaas, *Armamento y militarismo* (México: Siglo XXI, 1974), p. 108.

¹⁸ *Marcha*, May 1964.

The Cuban revolution, in which a guerrilla force of a few hundred men—supported by an entire movement in the cities—defeated an army trained and equipped by the United States, led the navy to emphasize antiguerrilla warfare and civic action, without totally abandoning its function of coastal and antisubmarine defense. Uruguay was no exception. The corps of engineers, favored the most by the new treatment, pointed out:

Every month, the corps of engineers receives, from the United States of America, the materials needed to provide it with heavy organic equipment.

The moment has come to exchange routine instruction for training oriented toward fertile applications which capitalize on effort, through urgent tasks of enormous social transcendence. The moment has come to intensify the army's collaboration in highway, bridge, airport, dam and forestry projects, etc.

No more army, caretaker of parks and barracks, unproductively waiting for internal disturbances or for the even more distant possibility of an armed struggle; but each day it is more necessary for the armed forces to again cross the country's fields as the advance party in the eradication of misery, illiteracy, insalubrity, the need for food...¹⁹

As one can see, a resounding praise of the army's transformation from an instrument of coercion to another of work. But the mechanism of civic action was not used very much in Uruguay. Its objectives were to improve the army's image and facilitate wiping out the guerrillas and, in accordance with recommendation XLVII of the Inter-American Defense Board (Junta Interamericana de Defensa) in December 1960, to contribute to the formation of reserves of skilled laborers.²⁰ Uruguay had not witnessed any violence from the peasants

¹⁹ *Boletín del Arma de Ingenieros* (June 1964)—cited by Bañales, "Función política."

²⁰ Coronel Raúl Martínez Espinoza, "Planeamiento de la acción cívica militar," *Revista del Ejército* (Colombia) 10, no. 39 (1970):193.

for many years and the army had no need to change its image. On the other hand, the country's economic situation did not call for the creation of an army reserve made up of skilled laborers.

Meanwhile, the police became the beneficiary of American aid. It was able to improve its so-called intelligence services, supply itself with an efficient radio communications system, and improve instructional materials. It not only obtained equipment as aid, but also received professors such as Dan Mitrione and regularly sent students to courses at the International Police Academy, with its headquarters in Washington.

Uruguay benefitted from the recommendations made by Nelson Rockefeller after his trip through several Latin American countries. The benefits were such that, according to declarations of the Under-Secretary for Latin American Affairs in 1970, the Uruguayan police was in second place (after Brazil) and, in 1971, would be in first place in the allocation of advisory funds.²¹

E. The Impact of the Crisis

We already pointed out that the 1966 elections confirmed the breakdown of the class conciliation model. The Uruguayan political panorama is undergoing more and more profound modifications: the two traditional parties undergo constant shifts within or without their slogans; political-administrative corruption reaches very high levels (skillfully disclosed by the "armed propaganda" operations of the guerrilla groups); the ideological radicalization of large sectors of the middle class (unions formed by government, bank and school employees, as well as students—especially those in secondary school) leads the government to a repression which is some-

²¹ Carlos Real de Azúa, "Política, poder y partido en el Uruguay de hoy," in *Uruguay hoy*, ed. Luis Benvenuto et al. (Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI Argentina, 1971), p. 282, n° 16.

times massive, sometimes focused, but always increasingly intense; the appearance of guerrilla groups—such as the MLN Tupamaros who, although in many aspects, following the direction taken by other Latin American movements, have a distinctive characteristic, especially the tendency to promote or get involved in broader movements, or the OPR, with all its armed support of social and workers' conflicts—modifies, all the more, the liberal, albeit idyllic, plan for Uruguayan struggle which has existed until now. On the political scene, the breakdown of the bipartite system by a movement acting as a nucleus for leftist parties, the progressive Christian democrats, groups split off from traditional parties—the Blanco as well as the Colorado parties, and they are basically the factions with the deepest popular roots within those parties—and a great conglomerate of partyless people, with “anti-oligarchical and anti-imperialist” tendencies, show another crucial characteristic of the moment.

The armed forces have not yet intervened directly in the repression. In 1967, according to Wood, there were 17,000 men under arms. In 1972, according to information from the national budget, its ranks reached 27,614 men.²² In 1968, the national budget devoted 24.36% to education and 26.2% to repression. In 1976, at least 49% of the budget is destined for repression. Military salaries showed a marked increase: in the year cited, 1968, a primary teacher earned 18,350 Uruguayan pesos, an army sergeant 13,040 and a police sergeant 13,000. In 1973, primary teachers received a 237% increase, army sergeants 696%, and police sergeants 744%.²³

The breakdown of the class conciliation model, as was already pointed out, brought with it an ever increasingly active participation of the armed forces. First, there was the task of policing, the specific repression of certain unions; then, carrying out large “combing operations,” which meant, by their volume, the forthright presence of the army before the

²² *Marcha*, December 22, 1972.

²³ *Ibid.*, September 22, 1973.

average citizen, who saw his house leveled and was threatened by military submachine guns.

After April 14—when an MLN Tupamaro operation provided the pretext necessary to declare a “state of internal war” and place all repressive forces under military command—the army intervened actively in the political struggle. Meetings at the Military Center and Naval Club, which have officers on active duty present, analyzed and judged the situation at that very moment. At some garrisons, an operation against fraud was carried out; at others, sentences from the military courts were not made known; in others, prominent government politicians were finally jailed, etc. The myth of an obedient and non-deliberating army was torn to shreds.

This stage of the political-military crisis was resolved toward the end of October 1972 in a meeting of top leaders with the president. The former put forth eight points which, together, implied military autonomy from civilian authority in the continuation of their commands (no top officer could be relieved of his command or transferred without the officer corps’ previous consent) and military intervention in public administration and in the investigation of fraud.

IV. The Militarization of the State

On February 8, 1973, the leaders of the air force and the army decided not to recognize the authority of the minister of national defense, General Francese, and “suggested” the advisablility of relieving him, since keeping said minister on in his post “would take the air force back to the times, already long past, when it was the armed wing of the behind-the-scenes political and economic interests, turning its back on its mission of national security and on the nation’s interests.”

President Bordaberry made different attempts, all futile, to hold on to power, and ended up by going to Air Base No. 2 in person, where he signed the so-called Boiso Lanza Accord

(named after the base). In communiqué no. 13 the armed forces stated that:

This process has culminated in an accord based on that which was expressed in communiqués 4 and 7/73 from the Joint Military Command, which predicts that the mission of providing security for national development within the framework of the republican democratic system can be carried out successfully.

We should analyze, therefore, communiqués no. 9, issued on February 9, 1973, and no. 7, given on the following day.

There were two main objectives: reestablish internal order and provide security for national development. Both were adopted to "achieve the general welfare within the democratic republican system in accordance with the present philosophy of the armed forces."

Then there was an extensive enumeration of sectoral objectives, among which we could point out: 1) anti-Marxism, together with a recuperation of national values—the former is "incompatible with our traditional lifestyle" and the latter are from "those that forged our nationality and whose basic facets are patriotism, austerity, unselfishness, generosity, honesty, abnegation and firmness of character"; 2) a moralizing campaign, destined to combat corruption in public administration; 3) a series of socio-economic reforms: the "redistribution of land... through fiscal measures," a policy of credits favorable to small and middle-sized landowners and to co-operatives, the elimination of foreign debt, the elimination of superfluous expenses, and combating monopolies (but does not explain how), etc.; 4) the establishment of military tutelage.

This underlies all military propositions: begin by defining national security as "the state according to which the patrimony, in all its forms, and the process of development toward national objectives are protected from interference or aggressions," which, as one can see, is immensely broad. The National Security Council (Consejo de Seguridad Nacional)

was created, in which four members are military officers (the chiefs from each of the branches and from the Joint General Staff) and two (the ministers of defense and of the interior) hold their posts with the military's approval. The paragraph of communiqué no. 4 continued: "Assure the intervention or the representation of the armed forces in all organizations or activities related to national security." Given the broadness of the definition, the military wants to intervene in every aspect of the country's economic and social life.

Methodically and one by one, the military took over unveiling—and unveiling themselves—the problems which the February coup had brought up. At this time, the objectives of the main union, the National Confederation of Workers (Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores: CNT), were declared to be incompatible with the military's objectives, and it was later banned. It called for the immunity of one and then of two parliamentarians of the Frente Amplio to be taken away. Sometime later six generals, three brigadier generals from the air force, and an army major read a communiqué in which they strongly attacked the legislative branch on a national radio and television network, and finally dissolved it on June 27, 1973.

The problem of political prisoners got worse with the imprisonment and torture of union leaders and hundreds of workers. At the end of October of that year, they intervened in the Universidad de la República, detained the rector, its deans and several employees. Then, political parties were declared in recess and those making up the Frente Amplio were banned.

In subsequent years, the military's presence became more and more important. The names of officers of the armed forces appear as the heads of the states and provinces, in the top management of autonomous or semi-autonomous organizations, in the banking system, in the schools, etc. In accordance with its primitive project, it also wanted to dominate the country's economic-financial system. But the alliance of im-

perialist—armed forces—transnational bourgeois interests made them leave that apparatus in civilian hands, as is also visible in other Latin American military regimes.

In Uruguay's case, the military had proposed an interventionist economic policy—and even presented a plan indicative of that tendency—but abandoned the scene, accepting Vegh Villega's presence in the Ministry of the Treasury and, with him, the clear policy of a liberal nation which favored private initiative in the economy. In other areas—cultural, political and ideological—the military has maintained its presence and has increased the militarization of the country.

President Bordaberry's removal marks a new stage in the process of militarization of the State. In fact, the future "president" will be "elected" by a council composed of twenty-five civilians and twenty-one generals—in which military cohesion will prevail over the opinions of civilians with very different social integration and class interests—which will continue in this capacity for five years. During this period, government will be by the so-called "institutional acts." At the end of the period, the two traditional parties will be able to return to the political arena—presumably purged by the institutional acts, as in Brazil—and elections will be permitted among the candidates admitted.

V. Conclusions

The main object of this paper is to point out how the army has taken the place of bourgeois factions in solving the crisis of domination by means of alliances. We also wanted to show how the apolitical nature of the Uruguayan armed forces is basically a product of the dominant ideology.

Created under Colorado governments, the army was made into a real, armed wing of a system of domination and, in the hands of the party in power, was converted into an instrument which the latter used to solve disputes with its adversaries.

It has intervened in the formation of modern Uruguay (1870), in the unification of the country under a single power (1904), or when needed for the dominating groups' objectives (1951-52). Due to the special characteristics of the Uruguayan political system, interventions have had special characteristics, far removed from the traditional military conduct in Latin America.

Its apparent inactivity should be attributed to the close ties between the army and the Colorado party, and to its function as a path for upward social mobility. Both characteristics meant that the armed forces' conscience and views were to be those of the party in power, permeated as they were by Battlist ideology, and impregnated with political liberalism and mesocratism. This mesocratism, on the other hand, was reinforced because of the overwhelming presence, in the military ranks, of officers from the very humble middle class.

That explains its non-intervention in the 1933 and 1942 coups (which were, in reality, interventions by omission). The changes the system needed could be made without its help.

Starting with the outbreak of the crisis in Uruguay—that is, in the middle of the fifties—the secondary and non-antagonistic contradictions between the Colorado party and the Nacional party (partially resolved because an officer belonging to the Nacional party was designated Inspector General of the Army) gave way to contradictions more closely related to the defense of class interests, which could be reduced, in the military sphere, to the contradiction between those supporting legality and those supporting the coup. The armed forces again, as in the past, played a more notable role in the repression (combing operations, the militarization of civilians, etc.).

Following 1968, when the economic crisis also established itself in the political arena, the new definition of the country permeated, unavoidably, military officers and commands. Letters of retirement, movements supporting young officers and a certain uneasiness within the fighting corps established a

pattern for this crisis within the armed forces. Special and solid military socialization, however, made corps spirit and solidarity prevail.

When the crisis entered a stage of catastrophic equilibrium—there was no new bourgeois model to substitute for the shattered Battlist model (except for pure and simple violence). and progressive and leftist groups were united in a coalition which was born of the electorate, but which could convert itself into a dangerous embryo of counter-ideology, while the unions maintained their pressure on the system—the military saw the bourgeoisie powerless to solve the country's problems of political guidance (and it proved that they were only used for dirty work). The military then decided to personally take over defending and guiding the country's politics. They think that they have an ideology, a plan, and an order to defend (from leftist insurrection as well as from the corruption of the traditional politicians). The aspirations of the petits bourgeoisie made them unaware of an irreversible structural situation: in the long run, their policies would only be able to benefit the interests of the imperialist, transnational groups and, only incidentally, the dominant bourgeoisie. So as to set their project in motion—with imperialism's acquiescence—they installed an unconstitutional State in Uruguay, with a military government.

