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THE CIVILIZATIONAL PROJECT. THE VISIONS OF THE ORIENT

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The Civilizational Project: the Visions of the Orient

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Foreword

On the occasion of the XXX International Congress of Human Sciences in Asia and North Africa, held in Mexico (3-8 August, 1976) one symposium was devoted to the theme "The Civilizational Project: The Visions of the Orient."

Up until then, international conferences of so-called "Orientalists" used to dwell in the murky waters of marginalization (of the Orient) and reductionism (to the Western context and models). During the epochal years of 1949-1973 — from the victory of socialism in China to the liberation of Vietnam and the October War in the Middle East — it became apparent for all to see that it was no longer feasible to study social, economic, cultural, political and intellectual processes at work in Asia and Africa, with a distant, segregationist and reductionist approach, as had been the case during the previous decades, when Orientalists and Orientalism — now in vital crisis and accelerated decay — doggedly refused to recognize that the tide was turning.

It was therefore an inportant decision of the Organizing Comittee of the Mexico Congress — following the lead given to the participants during the inaugural meeting by President Luis Echeverria — to anchor contributions and discussions firmly in the new world order, slowly but inexorably emerging for all to see on the five continents of our one world.

The theme of our symposium came to be chosen, therefore, within this framework, as a focal point of the new perspectives of the sciences of man and society in the world, it being understood that there can be no such "sciences", in the strict sense of the word, that would apply to more than one continent or region. Nevertheless, it seemed to us valid to point out that the massive transformation of the Orient in our times is providing the sciences of man and society with a crucial laboratory, where dialectical processes are more visible, explicit, contradictory, and revealing, than in other more tranquil areas of

the world, owing to the historical legacy concentrated in the West since the sixteenth century.

The papers in this volume give but a pale image of the intensity, scope and breadth of the discussion during our sessions. A very wide audience accepted the challenge of novel perspectives and converted the presentation of papers into a much wider and animated theoretical workshop, thanks particularly to the active presence and participation of our colleagues from Latin America and Mexico.

Professor Sencer Deviçioglu, from Istanbul University, provided a major parallel paper on economic theory, while Professor Najm Eddine Bammate, from Unesco, contributed his vision of the interplay of cultures and civilizations with regard to our theme.

We would like to thank our hosts in Mexico, in particular Professor Graciela de la Lama, for having created an amicable and efficient environment in the capital city of Mexico, in August 1976, which helped us all to present this modest contribution to the restructuring of the intellectual visions of our times, in the rash hope that perhaps it will be of some benefit to the international community at large.

Anouar Abdel-Malek

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The East Wind
The Historical Position of the Civilizational Project

Anouar Abdel-Malek

I have known some who have been educated rationally, as it is called. They were marked by a microscopic acuteness, but when they looked at great things, all became a blank and they saw nothing – and denied (very illogically) that anything could be seen, and uniformly mistook the negation of power for the possession of power — and called the lack of Judgment, and the never-being-mover to rapture, Philosophy!

(S.T. Coleridge, letter to T. Poole, October, 1797).

The East Wind prevails over the West Wind.

(Mao Tse-Tung)

The Tides of History

That a congress concerned with the study of the Orient, or with the future of the Orient, should be held in one of the key capitals of the western hemisphere, in Mexico City, which has its own preoccupations, and that this congress should be concerned with the human sciences in Asia and North Africa, is indicative of the transformation of our world, which was the theme underlying the whole of the XXX Congress.

1.1 Transformation — In what sense? Geared to the achievement of what goals? What is it that is being transformed? Are we talking of specific societies, nations, and societal groups? Or are we referring to different aspects of social processes, institutions, sectors and levels? Do we specifically mean the Orient? Or does this transformation also relate to the Occident? The fact that this congress — concerned centrally with the transformation of the Orient in a changing world, at this turning point in the history of civilization — was held in Mexico, clearly indicates that public opinion in the major centers of the Orient, Asia and North Africa, as well as sub-Saharan Africa, truly believe that the solidarity between the three continents, which evolved during their protracted struggle for national liberation, socio-economic revolution and national-cultural identity and/or renaissance, can now develop into a more subtle cross-cultural, cross-civilizational set of approaches to the future of mankind.

It seems to us that this major theme of this world congress gives a key to the scientific content of our joint endeavor. In other words: studies related to the human and social sciences in the contemporary Orient — here tentatively defined to include Asia and North Africa, but not the whole African continent, with some definite offshoots in the central and southeastern parts of the western hemisphere — ought to concern themselves primarily with precisely this transformation of the Orient in a changing world. And this in its turn, raises the problem of the different approaches to the study of the Orient.

1.2 We shall not repeat our central critical analysis of "Orientalism in Crisis" (1962). Since then, a whole generation of such essays has come forth, showing forcefully that in these times colonial Western-centered reductionism is "unacceptable." At least in the academic scientific sphere, something had to be done to recognize non-Western societies. This could be achieved, and has been achieved, in the following ways:

a) By recognizing the variety of non-Western societies, albeit in an essentialist, segregationist manner, as exemplified by the growing recognition of Max Weber's ideal type approach throughout the whole range of the social sciences in recent years. Segregationism and exoticism increased the marginalization of non-Western societies, comforted with the thought that they were "different" and assured of the fact that few links, if any, remained with the

mainstream socio-cultural power centers. Exceptionalism was preferred to specificity: *l'exceptionnalisme de la dérision,* indeed...

b) From Yalta onwards, a more technical approach prevailed. The so-called "Third World" was made up of different societies, but the difference was to be found at an economic level, itself assessed via quantitative means and tools (GNP, industrialization, rites of modernization, consumerism, etc.).
This "developmentalist" approach was, in fact, a concerted attempt to maintain good old reductionism. But it consisted of, and still consists of, an *aggiornamento* of reductionism on the one hand, and a paraphernalia of glittering tools, erudite international experts and aid for development, etc., on the other hand. The functionalist-structuralist school in the human and social sciences were busily evolving their "neo-Marxist" theories of "center" and "periphery," the "center" being, essentially, the West, and the "periphery" being perforce the nations of the three continents, but primarily the Orient.

c) The crisis in developmentalism — of which more later — is now opening up hitherto uncharted paths of thought and action. The major scientific-political categories — North and South, developed and developing, welfare and hunger, etc., now have to be modified to take into account vital socio-economic problems of the real world: food and hunger, energy, the ecological balance, the hidden resources in the oceans and beyond the terrestrial atmosphere, disease and physical survival, war and peace, coexistence and détente.

1.3 It is precisely here that the problem of the study of Oriental societies is taking shape as a study in the "human sciences" — and not just the "social sciences," which would have been the choice of developmentalists. Here, we can see at work the combined traditions and influences of the humanistic approach of classical Orientalism on the one hand, and economic-technological developmentalism on the other.

Could it be that this combination of humanistic reductionism and socio-economic reductionism will produce a deeper understanding of the processes at work in the Orient? Or will it be necessary to proceed still further, beyond the neo-positivism of sophisticated phenomenologies, beyond the smokescreen of political ideologies? And, if so, how?

And in what direction should we proceed? These are some of the questions that we hope to answer here.

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At the heart of the matter lies the organic interrelation between *power reds culture*. The techniques of developmentalism and its experts are tormenting theoreticians and practitioners alike in the Orient with the mirages of "lagging behind," "bridging the gap," and, hopefully, "overtaking." In short, the creative minds of the Orient are forced into a dichotomous approach to the hegemonic Western world.

2.1 They are, first and foremost, invited to identify this historically based hegemony with a type of technology and economic production as if it were simply a question of infrastructure. Steel production, for example, is translated into a need to increase the number and capacity of the polytechnics and centers of applied technology; the sophistication and dominance of the mass-media are imitated with a quantitative barrage by the national media; the prime importance of scientific research itself is reduced to the level of a runner in a protracted hurdle-race, trying to reach the millenium, that timeless, spaceless state where boundless resources will lead to limitless enjoyment, through ever-expanding productivity and ever-increasing consumerism.

2.2 Yet, on the other hand, and sometimes in a parallel fashion, they are encouraged to believe that such links as are perceived between the infrastructure and superstructure, that is, between modern technology and the industrial mode of production in both capitalist and socialist societies, and the cultural-scientific dimension in the sphere of the superstructure, do have some kind of relationship, though of a dual type. Intellectuals from the Orient are vigorously encouraged to be knowledgeable about Western culture, to recognize its eminence and unique quality, to comprehend the formative influence of the socio-cultural pattern upon the transformation of science and technology. And they are also simultaneously requested to abhor the very mention, let alone the theory, of any linkage between culture and material power, as if the two were part of two self-encompassed monads. Above all, they are required to dismiss "bureaucratic," "repressive," or "archaic" understanding of the historic role of the state, as the central organ of societal maintenance, of culture, of national-culture, as the strongest linking factor within each

nation or national-cultural regional grouping. Thus they become immune to the understanding of the vital role of the civilizational project throughout the history of mankind. Should we choose to limit our reflections to the modern world — to the rise of the West to its hegemonic position, from the fifteenth century to Yalta — we would, even so, see clearly and powerfully at work the role of national culture and the civilizational project in the rise of the West. The Renaissance, understood as an elaboration of Greek and Arab logic and metaphysics, the combination of Christian ethical philosphy with the Greco-Roman tradition, the importance of natural philosophy and the scientific method, the political philosophy of the nation-state; such were the ingredients of the formation of the universalistic and humanistic conception of the great European period between the seventeenth and the nineteenth centuries, in an age of revolutions which was also the age of Bacon, Galileo, Luther, the Encyclopaedists, Leibnitz, Kant, Hegel, Marx, and Wagner. There seems no need to dwell at length on this dimension of the problem. Yet it was felt that it should be stated clearly at this point, so that the problem of the "civilizational project" would not appear as one more form of the exceptionalism meant to appease the irritated minds of Orientals.

What has been said of the rise of Europe to hegemony can and ought to be said of all the great periods of world history: Pharaonic Egypt, Persia, the China of Confucius and Sun Tzu, South India and the Mogul empire, the great empires of Central and South Africa, the ancient civilizations of Central and South America, Japan, from Nara to Meiji, and the formation of the Islamic empire. In short, never in history have we witnessed power without culture, or continuity and influence outside a cultural-civilizational context, or a central role in regional or world affairs without a civilizational project.

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How then, should we read the theses and challenges mentioned, say, in the first of a major series of speeches made to commemorate the Bicentennial of U.S. Independence, by the U.S. President? After stating that "the American adventure is driven forward by challenge, competition and creativity," that this "country must never cease to be a place where men and women try the untried, test the impossible and take uncertain paths into the unknown," the speaker stresses the

theme of the "American adventure," to "keep reching into the unknown," that the best of the American adventures lie ahead. He then outlines a program for the next hundred years of exploration and discovery:

— To "find out even more about the forces of nature, how to harness them and preserve them."
— To "explore the great riches of the oceans, still an uncharted frontier."
— To "turn space itself into a partner for controlling pollution and for instant communication to every corner of the world."
To "learn how to make our energy resources renewable and draw new energy from sun and earth."
To "develop new agricultural technologies so that all of the deserts of the earth can bloom."
To "conquer many more of humanity's deadly enemies such as cancer and heart disease."

At the same time and in a much lower key perforce, a French essayist, Huges de Varine, in his recent book, *La Culture des Autres,* chooses to explicitly say that the salvation of Western culture will depend on (the assimilation, imitation, control of?, etc.) the "other cultures."

The thrust in the U.S. President's Bicentennial speech clearly indicates the broad range of goals in the field of production and the improvement of human life. At no point do we find, however, an invitation to explore the wider framework of this grand design: the civilizational project of the West. For this project retains its infrastructural ("power") dimensions, and it is assumed that the philosophy of the project itself remains basically unchanged, in spite of the transformation of our world.

On the other hand, the populist grass-roots point of view wishes to support a humbler stand, starting from the premise that the West has lost its heart, as it were, through crises, wars, etc.; but this humble approach only leads to a renewed plea for reductionism. If the other partner, i.e., the Orient, has somehow succeeded in maintaining its culture and its civilizational pattern, it then becomes the duty of the West to appropriate this spiritual-cultural resource for itself, in the hope of gaining some historical respite for the benefit, of

course, of mankind. What is good for the "center" cannot possibly fail to benefit the "periphery."

Great voices have been raised to signal the crisis of Western civilization and the rise of the Orient, notably in the towering works of Arnold Toynbee and Joseph Needham. And it is striking to see that no attempt has yet been made to promote a civilizational and cultural revival of the West.

Could it be that the problem is not perceived? Or that the urgency of the crisis and the challenge is uncomprehended? Could it be, perhaps, that the formative material of the civilizational project has been consumed to the point that there is now a dearth of such resources and incentives, so that the one remaining solution would be to turn to the culture of non-Western societies and peoples?

Such, to be sure, is the basic position of the *negative mind,* busily at work now throughout the West, with the goal of dismantling the major institutions and processes of societal maintenance of those nation-states which made the greatness of the West and, evenn more, of corroding the will to create and innovate, of discouraging uncharted paths of thought and action towards a cultural revolution as the only means to overcome the crisis of Western civilization in our times, as manifested mainly in post-colonial Europe.

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On the other side of the river, the upsurge of the Orient — from the creation by Mohammed-Ali in Egypt of the first national state in the modern history of the Orient, to 1973, the year of the turning point, marked by the victory of Vietnam and the October War - has led to an inversion in the global process of *historical initiative,* to the point where it can now be posited that the Orient has seized the historical initiative of our times.

4.1 What exactly do we mean by this concept, introduced in 1970-1972, and reaffirmed now?

4.1(1) The rise of the Orient from centuries of decadence and marginalization, broadly speaking from the age of maritime discoveries till the early 1970's, has taken the shape of an explicitly civilizational process. This is exemplified in the very definition by the Arabs of the revival as a renaissance, "Nahdah," not as "autonomy," "independence," "modernization" or "development." Such was the

motto of Tahtâwî and 'abd el-Krim, of the military around Ibrâhîm and the cultural revivalists in the Near East, of political Islam with Afghani and Islamic fundamentalism with Abdoh, of the whole political class from Mohammed-Alî to Gamâl Abdel-Nâçer. We can trace exactly the same process in Japan, after commodore Perry's irruption, at the time of the Meiji. Such also was the case of the Indian national movement, from the days of the mutiny until Gandhi and Nehru. It is striking to see exactly the same process at work in the major centers of Asia. For China's "Long March," from the Opium Wars to the thoughts of Mao Tse-Tung, has been dominated and inspired by a persistent decision to maintain Chinese national specificity — whence the very fact that the most massive revolution in the history of mankind chose to label itself the "Cultural Revolution" — and we know how vital this dimension is to Vietnam, Korea and sub-Saharan Africa. It is interesting to note that this has been the exact course of the rise of the West to its position of historic eminence, as repeatedly indicated above. Yet it is important to note that the prevalence of the civilization orientation of the rise of the Orient in our times comes to coincide, in a protracted manner, with the crisis of Western civilization, but not of Western power. Such is the main lesson of this cursory analysis of the exogenous circle of social dialectics of the modern Orient.

4.1(2) The endogenous circle of social dialectics of the modern Orient reveals a persistent, yet often flawed, trend towards social cohesiveness and national-cultural unity. The major nations of the Orient, which have to bear, naturally, the brunt of the thrust forward, could only act in an efficient manner by giving priority to the centripetal trend in their economic, socio-political and cultural development. And the starting point itself, — i.e., the fact that the units of this advance forward were, perforce, nations, and not political parties, social classes, or intellectual fronts, per se — was considerably reinforced by the very logic of national action to resist foreign domination which has recourse, more and more frequently, to wars (Algeria, Vietnam, Indonesia, the Congo, the Zionist State, etc.). The position of the renaissance process started by the nations of the Orient themselves thus led, gradually, to the creation of national liberation fronts, of united national fronts, indicating that the predominant characteristic of socio-political movements in the contemporary Orient is a movement towards the broadest possible formulations, capable of strengthening, deepening and maintaining

the united will and action of a wide majority of the population, its component units and representative institutions.

National unity, instead of civil war; the will, and often the capacity, to treat internal contradictions in a non-antagonistic manner, instead of Manicheism; and frontism, instead of fratricidal internal struggles, appear to be the major characteristics of the endogenous develoment of the social dialectics of the modern Orient.

4.2 The combination of these two sets of characteristics were to prove formidable indeed, when coupled with the growing crisis of the Western hegemony.

4.2(1) The first wave of national liberation struggles, throughout the nineteenth century, culminated in the 1914-18 intra-European war and the economic crisis of 1929-32. It weakened the front of world capitalism, and increased its division, thus directly leading to the 1917 social revolution in Russia and, later, to the rise of fascist systems in Europe. For a time, it was possible to consider that the working class movement in the industrial countries, and more so in Europe, was gaining a growing share of the political initiative in the West. Yet the major political phenomenon of recent Western history, the 1939-45 war, clearly showed that main role was being played, and is still being played, by the state and the armed forces (including the socialist state).

From 1945 onwards, we have been witnesses to the inversion of the political process:

a) The major Western colonial powers have been compelled to withdraw from Asia and Africa, a process climaxed by the end of Vietnam;
b) At the same time, the regrouping of the immense resources of the West, around its hegemonic center, the United States of America led to a more subtle dialectic. On the one hand, the tempo of the rise of the Orient was far more sustained and powerful than of imperialism and Western hegemony; on the other hand, imperialism and Western hegemony were definitely not in decay — as a Manicheist-mechanistic interpretation of dialectics would put it — but the situation is that the tempo of growth of its power is now declining, though it continues to grow;
c) The stage is thus set for more protracted, more serious confrontations, as exemplified in the October War and its immense impact on world affairs.

4.2(2) The second wave of national liberation movements started

with the crisis of the 1930's, the rupture of Western hegemony after the 1945 war, and the massive transformation of the world scene.

a) The major parts of the Orient centered round China — Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos — succeeded in giving their national liberation movements a socialist character. In scarcely one generation, the united national front, directed against Western hegemony and imperialism, succeeded in putting more than one-third of mankind on the path of socialism, after national liberation and independence, whereas the working class movement in the industrial societies of the West is still cornered, for the most part, in the deadlock of the "popular front" approach, with the vital exception of the "historical compromise" in post-Gramscian Italy and its influence, notable in Spain.

b) Another major proportion of the national movements of the Orient, in areas directly menaced by the military power of the West, took the path of national liberation and independence, coupled with various degrees of social revolution, thus demonstrating the importance of geopolitics. Such was essentially the case of Nasserism, which includes, to a certain extent, the national revolutions in Egypt and Algeria, and the Arab national movement.

From 1952-56 to 1970-73 — from Nasserism, the FLN and Suez to Vietnam and the October War, via the Long Revolution — it became clear for all to see that the driving forces of the political transformation of our world were definitely located in the Orient, around its two major civilizational centers: China, at the center of the Asian circle, and Egypt and the Arab world, at the center of the Afro-Islamic circle.

4.3 Then, all ot a sudden, a whole range of vital problems emerged into view. It is significant that the so-called "energy crisis," as well as the food problem, erupted after the October 1973 war, while ecological and environmental preoccupations were rising to new heights. Above all, détente and the normalization of Europe at Helsinki, tried to cover up the demonic surge in strategic and tactical atomic weaponry and non-conventional means of warfare, while wars were raging at the very heart of the Arab Near East, and also in Central and Southern Africa.

The general atmosphere of these chain reactions can be summed up thus: to recognize first "the limits of growth," and, simultaneously, to maintain the basic prevailing social philosophy of the West, of productivism and consumerism, via hegemony. Thus, the

recognition of the exhaustible nature of oil reserves is not leading to a reversal of the human and social pattern in the Western industrial societies — the renunciation of motor-cars, transformation of the whole situation of public transport, etc., as in China — but to a search for other sources of energy, a very valid and useful quest indeed, yet to be treated in the same ruthless manner as the oil and coal reserves in modern times. More grabbing and avidity, instead of restraint and redefinition of objectives.

4.4 The role of the Orient in seizing the historical initiative does apper to be moving towards a new statement of the problem of human civilization, its goals, meaning, methods and instruments.

The trend here is unmistakable: from economism from economic reductionism to the recognition of the national position of the problem of social dialectics, around the key concept of national-cultural formations. The whole process is geared towards the statement of the problem in terms of civilization, by asserting the primacy of politics, as the key link in that process.

To summarize: from economism to the civilization quest, this is the locus and significance of the civilizational project.

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u) "Harb Oktober Wa'l-Wihdah al-'Arabiyyah" (October and Unity) *Al-Ma'rifah* (Damas) Feb. 1975, no. 156, pp. 66-84.

v) "L'Iniziativa stroica dall-'Occidente all-'Oriente", translated by Anna Haussmann, *Politica Internazionale,* August-October 1975, pp. 8-10.

w) *L'Armée dans la Nation,* collective work, A. Abdel-Malek (Ed.) SNED, Alger, 1975, 440 pp.

x) "Le Projet de Civilisation — Positions," Paper presented to the Symposium organized by the "Institut Charles DeGaulle" on "Les Conditions de l'Indépendace nationale dan le monde moderne" (Paris, Nov. 21-23, 1975), Roneo, 7 pp.

y) "Creativités nationales-culturelles ou 'Transfert' des Connaissances-Positions," Paper presented at the Meeting of Experts for the Establishment of a Program of Concerted Research on the Conditions pertaining to the Transfer of Knowledge, UNESCO, Paris, Dec. pp. 10-19, 1975 Roneo 31 pp.

z) "Le Concept de Spécificité," *Cultures,* vol. III no. 4, 1976.

a') *Evolution of the National Movement in Egypt, Dizionario Critico di Storia Contemporaneo,* La Nuova Italia Firenze, 1976, in press.

Intellectual Captivity and Developing Societies

Syed Hussein Alatas

It was approximately twenty years ago that I became interested in the problems of intellectual dependence and imitation thinking in developing societies, while a postgraduate student in sociology at the University of Amsterdam. Almost at the same time Myrdal was delivering his Cairo lectures (October 1955) which appeared in book form in 1956. The revised version was published in 1957.[1] He warned of the danger of the uncritical transplantation of social science knowledge and methodology to the developing societies, which should not accept economic theory uncritically, but should remold it to suit their problems and interests, carrying out research at all levels, including fundamental research. It is not a task for the dilettante and ignorant.[2]

Without being aware of Myrdal's Cairo lectures, I came to similar conclusions during the course of 1955 in a manuscript I prepared on colonialism, a small portion of which was published in London in 1956. Here I noted that Western colonialism in the developing societies had created a class of imitative intellectuals. "Western economic systems, methods of government, law, ideas of democracy, procedure of election, conception of welfare, and a host of many others, have been uncritically adopted and advocated by a section of the eastern elites without first checking their feasibility and validity in their own societies."[3]

Since the 1950's there has been an increasing reminder of this

[1]Gunnar Myrdal, *Economic Theory and Under-developed Regions*. Harper and Row, New York, 1957.

[2]*Ibid.*, pp. 100-106. "No critic has ever been effective without knowing thoroughly what he was criticizing. The steeply climbing path I am sketching out for the young social scientists in the underdeveloped countries demands, in fact, the most intense efforts to attain to true learning and the fullest mastery of the entire theoretical heritage." p. 106.

[3]Syed Hussein Alatas, "Some Fundamental Problems of Colonialism," *Eastern World*, November 1956, London.

problem by a very small group of scholars and experts from both developed and developing countries who, though they do not refer to imitation thinking as such, are to some extent discussing the outcome of the imitative outlook. The following observation is relevant: "Problems most relevant to the needs of developing countries are given too little attention by scientific researchers. One cannot look to the advanced countries for substantial and gratuitous leadership in this regard. The plain fact is that the problems of poor countries no longer have a high priority in the wealthier countries. At the same time, leadership is not forthcoming from the developing countries, and there is a lack of scientifically trained leaders to take the initiative for research into these problems and for constructing an integrated system of organizations and institutions to support research activities."[4]

The author cited the instance of protein deficiency in developing countries with its most harmful effects. "Chidanibara Subramaniam, India's former Food Minister, has expressed his concern about 'protein starvation' in India. He pointed out that according to estimates based on studies in the state of Madras, protein deficiency had caused permanent brain damage in 35 to 40 percent of Indian children by the time they have reached school age. These children, of whom there are 35 million annually, cannot absorb and retain knowledge, and thus to this extent, Subramaniam concludes, expensive new school facilities are wasted."[5]

Despite the gravity of the problem, the initiative to obtain fish protein concentrate was not taken by scientists in the developing countries, and although the work done in the West was praiseworthy, it was not sufficient and it did not have a high priority by any measure in the scale of funding. The tendency to imitate is not confined to what is being done but also to what is not being done. In the matrix of historical causation, the uncritical and imitative outlook is a relatively independent phenomenon which is not eliminated by structural and situational explanations.

To present the problem in maximum clarity, let us recapitulate what has been suggested. Several factors have been invoked to explain the lack of intellectual and scientific creativity in developing countries, namely (1) the lack of a scientific tradition, (2) the negative

[4]Claire Nader, 'Technical Experts in Developing Countries,' in Claire Nader, A.B. Zahlan, *Science and Technology in Developing Countries,* pp. 447-448. Cambridge University Press, London, 1969.

[5]*Ibid.*, p. 448.

attitude of the ruling power in promoting intellectual and scientific creativity, (3) the absence of a functional and effective community of thinkers and men of science (social and natural), and (4) the absence of adequate facilities and incentives for creative scientific effort.

These are some of the main causes, and each of them is responsible for a chain of events successively invading the affairs of the developing societies. The most crucial is, of course, the ruling power, for they wield the greatest influence for good for bad in the affairs of developing societies. It was estimated in 1962 that the Philippines, India and Pakistan each spent 0.1 per cent of its GNP on research and development, while the United States spent 2.8 per cent of its GNP on similar objetives.[6] The allocation of funds for research is mainly decided by the ruling power, which also establishes the investment priorities in different areas of research. An example which reflects the position of research in developing societies is the priority given to nuclear research. A Pakistani economist notes the following: "To draw another illustration from Pakistan (I am choosing all my examples from Pakistan because I think it is safer to offend my own countrymen!), in the last five years about ten times as much money has gone into nuclear research as into other important fields, such as the development of an appropiate technology for the production and manufacture of jute or the exploitation of the large resources of Pakistan's fisheries. Yet these two natural resources earn upward of $300 million of foreign exchange for Pakistan. When we discussed this question of research priority in the Planning Commission, those in charge argued vehemently that nuclear research was the wave of the future, that we could develop many peaceful uses for nuclear energy, and that we would be left behind in the race of modern science and technology unless nuclear research were given adequate funds. Unfortunately, the proponents of nuclear or other types of advanced and fashionable research are far more vocal and better trained than are the proponents of research into such earthy subjects as suitable varieties of crops, fishery resources, or other fields that have a direct bearing on the growth prospects of the country."[7]

[6]Stevan Dedijer, 'Underdeveloped Science in Underdeveloped Countries,' *Minerva*, II, no. 1, p. 62, 1963.

[7]Mahbub ul Haq, 'Wasted Investment in Scientific Research,' in Ward Moorehouse (Ed.) *Science and the Human Condition in India and Pakistan*, p. 120. Rockefeller University Press, New York, 1968.

Negative, corrupt and inefficient ruling elites cannot create favorable conditions for the development of science and technology or eliminate the existing obstacles. Considering all the obstructive conditions to the growth and development of an indigenous scientific and intellectual tradition, their influence, however, is not absolute. There is still the possibility of an intellectual revolt by the intelligentsia of the developing societies, but if this revolt is not forthcoming, the cause must lie deeper than the exiting external constraints imposed by the social system and its ruling elites. This cause is the intellectual captivity of the intelligentsia in the developing societies.

In two earlier papers I have discussed certain aspects of this problem, centering around the theme of the captive mind,[8] which is the product of higher institutions of learning, either at home or abroad, whose way of thinking is dominated by Western thought in an imitative and uncritical manner. It is uncreative and incapable of raising original problems, and it is incapable of devising an analytical method independent of current stereotypes, of separating the particular from the universal in science and thereby properly adapting the universally valid corpus of scientific knowledge to the particular local situations. It is fragmented in outlook, is alienated from the major issues of society, from its own national tradition, if it exists, in the field of its intellectual pursuit. It is unconscious of its own captivity and the conditioning factors of its formation. It is not amenable to an adequate quantitative analysis, but it can be studied through empirical observation. It is a result of the Western dominance over the rest of the world.[9]

The contemporary captive mind is not merely an uncritical and imitative type which exists in all societies. It is found above all in developing societies and the domination comes from a civilization external to its own, namely, Western civilization. The captive mind is governed by negative rather than constructive imitation. Constructive imitation is described in the following passage: "The assimilation through imitation of technology and scientific procedures and knowledge valid for the development of Asian society can be

[8]See Syed Hussein Alatas. 'The Captive Mind in Development Studies.' *ISSJ*. XXIV. no. 1. 1972: Syed Hussein Alatas. 'The Captive Mind and Creative development.' *ISSJ*. no. 4. 1974.

[9]Syed Hussein Alatas. 'The Captive Mind and Creative Development.' p. 691. *Ibid.*

highly constructive. Imitation saves time and energy. No society can develop by inventing everything on its own. When something is found effective and useful, it is desirable that it should be adopted and assimilated, whether it be an artifact or an attitude of mind. Constructive imitation is a feacture of social life. It is characterized by the following: (a) it supports existing and sound values; (b) it is based on a conscious and rational choice; (c) it considers the problems, if any, surrounding the adoption of the innovation; (d) its non-adoption would be inhibiting to society; (e) it increases the understanding of phenomena surrounding the innovation; (f) it does not disrupt other aspects of social life considered more valuable;(g) it does not create strains detrimental to the purpose of the undertaking; (h) it enters the collective value system in the sense that it is recognized as valuable by external groups of people; and (i) it is not the effect of manipulation by external groups motivated by their own interests to the detriment of the adopter."[10]

Negative imitation exhibits the opposite characteristics. The captive mind is a phenomenon relatively independent of ideology and the social system. "The concept of the captive mind as one dominated by negative imitation, that is, imitation which exhibits the opposite characteristics, is neither political nor ideological but phenomenological. An Asian may adopt communism, but as a communist he can be a captive mind or an independent mind. If he is independent he will adapt communist philosophy to the Asian setting, extricating what is culturally Western from the general philosophical components of communism. The same may be said of those who uphold the liberal-capitalist philosophy. Similarly, an Asian who is vehemently opposed to colonialism may yet be a captive mind. What defines the captive mind is the state of intellectual bondage and dependence on an external group through the operation of media such as books, institutions, the radio, the press, television, conferences and meetings."[11]

A captive mind is not altogether uncritical; it is critical at definite levels where it was taught to be critical. "Let us assume that an Asian student studies the method and organization of taxation in the West. When he returns, he discovers that the situations differ. He realizes that it is very difficult to collect taxes from far-flung villages with

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 692.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 692.

inadequate administrative facilities. Thus he becomes critical of the method of tax collection he was taught. But his critical awareness does not extend to the fundamentals of taxation. He does not ask whether tax deductions should be allowed only for the wife and children. Should it not be allowed also for parents if they are supported by the taxpayer? The Asian system of values enjoins maintaining your parents. Asia has no social security system that enables parents who are no longer working to obtain financial support. If our Asian student, returning from abroad, sets about to devise a taxation system in harmony with his own cultural tradition and the dictates of the local situation, involving a reappraisal of the current taxation system in its fundamentals, then we shall consider him an independent, not a captive mind."[12]

The phenomenon of the captive mind is so pervasive that it is difficult to bring about a general and open recognition of the problem. I am not aware of a single conference devoted to the subject. On the contrary, explanations are often offered to explain why scholars and scientists in the developing societies on the whole, have not been original and creative of new inventions and ideas. There is a dominance of the uncreative and uninventive type in the developing societies, while the creative and inventive type does not assume a position of leadership, as compared to the situation in developed societies.

The explanations given are valid to a great extent, but they ignore the contribution of intellectual captivity to the state of affairs. Here is an instance: "In most underdeveloped countries, the few institutions of higher learning which exist are staffed with a large proportion of the very few local scientists or engineers who are available. Many of the more senior of these received their training in the thirties or forties at some foreign university, perhaps did some routine piece of work for a thesis, and then returned to the homeland to be appointed to a post at a university or college. With no research being pursued there, with no competition from colleagues, and in the general atmosphere in which time and change were of no great concern, they settled down to teaching the science of 1938 throughout the 1940's and 1950's and now the 1960's. The concentration on the teaching of undergraduates accentuates this tendency to persist in the scientific ways of their own student days. By now, they have a vested interest in

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 692.

opposing any change in the curriculum, in the teaching methods or even in the administrative practices of the university, and since they are in senior positions, they act as a very strong barrier indeed to any modernization of the institutions of higher learning. It is a very vivid example of what might be called scientific "featherbedding," and it is strongly self-perpetuating inasmuch as the science students of today, who thus learn at best the sciences of yesterday, will get little of the excitement of being in the forefront of the sciences, will be badly prepared for a productive scientific career and hence will be mostly concerned with trying to secure for themselves the few comfortable old-fashioned academic positions which become available at the universities as the older generations disappear. To obtain these positions, they do not have to show great brilliance or present lists of research publications, but instead must exhibit a willingness not to rock the boat and to fit in with the old-fashioned ways which these intitutions have followed for the past decades. Almost all the universities on the Indian subcontinent suffer from this malady. The situation is somewhat different in the newer universities of Africa and South-East Asia, but for closely related reasons, very similar conditions exist. With active research being pursued at these institutions, such a process of intellectual calcification could not possibly have come about, and where it has not yet occurred it can still be avoided. If active and fundamental research is not carried out in these universities, this calcification will become or remain as firm as it already is in th older universities of the 'Third World.' "[13]

The above is a fairly accurate portrayal of the state of affairs in most developing societies; but intellectual calcification is also conditioned by mental captivity. Featherbedding and the retention of positions can go hand-in-hand with a creative outlook. Only when the creative interest is missing will calcification take place, and it occurs because the earlier generation of scholars was already captive in outlook. This captivity was not imposed by the external social system but emerged internally from the group of scholars. No matter how unfavorable a social system is, it cannot completely suppress creative interest provided it exists with sufficient vigor, although superficially it may appear that the problem of lack of originality is due primarily to the social system.

[13]Michael J. Moravcsik, 'Technical Assistance and Fundamental Research in Underdeveloped Countries,' *Minerva*, pp. 199-200, vol. II, no. 2, 1964.

The emphasis on the system and external conditions perpetuating the negative imitative outlook is in itself the outcome of imitative thinking. Ever since the 18th century, in Europe, there has been a growing emphasis on the conditioning influence of factors outside the individuals, and this is correct and necesary at a time when such factors are ignored. But the application of this principle should not be taken to result in the complete elimination of conditioning factors emanating from the individuals. For the history of man and society there are two concepts of causation, both equally valid; the problem is to decide how to combine both and to demarcate where one begins and the other ends.

It is my thesis here that structural and institutional explanations concerning the lack of originality and inventiveness amongst men of science and learning in the developing societies are only partially valid. A more fundamental cause is intellectual captivity. It has been suggested that the political order is sometimes inhospitable to the free expression of thought; as far as the developing societies are concerned, this is especially true if issues of unquestionable importance to the regime are involved. However, there is a wide array of issues to which the regime may be neutral or even favorable, although even in these areas there is a lack of creativity.

I have visited several developing countries in the last thirty years, and in many of them the conditions for original research are not entirely unfavorable. Several years ago I was asked to read a manuscript by an author in Sumatra, who was governor of a province and had legal training. His manuscript was one of the best political analyses of Sukarno's regime ever attempted, yet he was no less engaged in other affairs than the academics in Jakarta who complained that they had no time for research since they had to do other things to make ends meet, owing to the insufficiency of their salary. In a country like Malaysia, where such arguments do not apply, there is the same paucity of original and creative research. The salaries, the libraries, and the teaching load are all favorable for creative and original research.

Not all research requires huge amounts of money and long-standing institutional infrastructures. Thus, research on develoment directed at providing fresh and creative contributions to the problem is possible in Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines. I am not suggesting that all kinds of research can be accomplished in the developing societies, but I am suggesting that, in areas where research can be

accomplished, this is not sufficiently done, owing to the lack of perception and interest of the main body of scholars in creative and original undertaking. This lack of motivation stems from the capitivity of the mind.

This captivity is characterized by the absence of protest against fashionable current thinking in the West, the failure to raise relevant and original problems, the failure to increase the stock of concepts, the failure to create a relevant standard of excellence, and the unwillingness to generate an indigenous peer group. I am aware that there has been a tremendous increase in the application of the sciences in developing societies in the decades following the Second World War, but this is merely application by imitation, which has not conferred scientific power on the developing societies. There has not even been any attempt made to assess their own scientific power. The entire United Nations set-up and all its affiliates has not paid serious attention to this problem, except by way of exhortation and proclamation of laudable aims.

In 1963, the United Nations organized the "Conference on the Application of Science and Technology for the Benefit of the Less Developed Areas," in Geneva.[14] The twenty volumes of reports published by the United Nations and the United States Government, eight and twelve respectively, deal mainly with an account of scientific accomplishment and what the developing societies can do to introduce science and technology, as well as what the developed societies can do to assist them. Occasionally, passing remarks are made on the influence of the ruling elites and the deterioration of the sciences. Many of the problems facing the developing countries have been recognized, and good advice has also been given.

Consider, for example, the subject of soil science. An American contributor described the tremendous progress achieved by soil science in the West. As regards the developing countries, he suggested the opposite. "The status of soil science in the less developed countries is, in many cases, lamentable. They have few, if any, trained soil scientists and few laboratories, which are often poorly equipped. Their libraries are small, the books and journals often

[14]For more information, see the report of the conference, *Science and Technology for Development*. 8 vols., United Nations. New York. 1963. See also the published collection of United States papers to this conference, *Science, Technology, and Development*, 12 vols., U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., undated.

unwisely selected and out-of-date, and therefore, often of little use. Many institutions in which agricultural workers are being trained suffer from the same deficiencies. In many of the former colonial countries, the situation has deteriorated since independence. Most of the better trained scientists were expatriates, and many have departed without leaving qualified replacements. Most of the great tropical research centers have been closed down, and in many cases it will be years before they can resume a research program comparable in scope and quality with that under way a decade ago."[15]

However, despite the awareness of numerous problems facing the developing societies, a number of major problems have escaped the attention of the experts and scholars. By 'attention' I do not mean a mere assertion. By 'attention' I mean sustained and planned surveying, research and discussion of a problem. The following is an instance of a statement of awareness of a problem — the ruling elites of Latin America: "The objective of the ruling classes is not to create Research and Development systems which will make the countries scientifically autonomous. This, apart from being unnecessary to the social organization they wish to maintain, could actually endanger the national projects which they seek to prolong. Their objectives are mainly to create a scientific and technological system which will help to solve minor problems without putting the system itself in question. It has become apparent, however, that it is extremely difficult to circumscribe scientific activity in this very rigid manner. The more or less autonomous scientific centers, particularly in universities, tend to become discussion centers where the fundamental values of prevailing order are questioned. The political leadership does not realize that this critical or 'subversive' attitude — to use the stereotyped official terminology — has its origins in free discussion of ideas in an atmosphere of scientific objectivity. They become alarmed because they cannot tolerate serious analysis of the system. Consequently they try to neutralize criticism by repressing free expression, by ideological persecution, by selecting scholars for their ideology rather than for their intellectual ability, and so on. The result is that the scientific structure, submitted to a regime which is incompatible whit genuine intellectual creation, is degraded, until it becomes incapable of

[15] Richard Bradfield, 'The Evolution of Soil Science and its Application to Human Progress., *Science, Technology, and Development*, p. 122, vol. 3, U.S. Government Printing Office, *op. cit.*

satisfying even the limited demand of an essentially static system which only aspires to maintain itself."[16]

The above description applies to many ruling elites in many countries of Asia and Africa. We have not come across a thorough-going study of the role of ruling elites in promoting or obstructing the development of science in the form of a country case-study or in general for developing societies. No United Nations organization is likely to adopt it as an official program of research, but the role of the ruling elites in the develoment of science is a major problem, which current research into development has glossed over. At most some remarks are made about the necessity of positive leadership. The state of intellectual captivity has perpetuated the non-raising of the problem as a topic for sustained research. Hence one of the most vital causes of development is left unexplored. It may be argued that the scholar does not have the freedom to do the research or have access to the data. This may be true of existing regimes but is not so concerning a fallen regime.

There are numerous vital problems which are ignored simply because of the dominance of the captive outlook; for example, the problem of the generation of the scientific spirit. It has been generally recognized that development also implies the emergence and development of an indigenous scientific tradition. Yet, as Dedijer observed, there is still a dearth of systematic knowledge on some of its major aspects.[17] Rene Maheu, the former Director-General of UNESCO, was hinting at this problem when he said: "Science is not a body of formulae and recipes that in themselves — that is, without the intervention of the mind — can confer on man power over beings. This is the magical conception of knowledge. But science is the opposite of magic. Scientific knowledge is nothing but the crystallization of a certain activity of the mind. It is scientific spirit, without which knowledge cannot bear fruit, that we must first implant and develop at all levels of thought and action."[18] The distinction between the

[16] Amílcar Herrera, 'Social Determinants of Science Policy in Latin America', p. 33, in C. Cooper, (Ed.), *Science, Technology and Development*, Frank Cass, London, 1973. The author is a Research Fellow at the Fundación Bariloche, Buenos Aires.

[17] Steven Dedijer, 'Underdeveloped Science in Underdeveloped Countries,' *op. cit.*, p. 63.

[18] Rene Maheu in *Science and Technology for Development*, vol. VIII, p. 35, *op. cit.* This is his address at the opening of the plenary session, United Nations Conference on

scientific product and the scientific spirit, or between the institutional product and the institutional spirit, was recognized long ago.

The well-known Muslim reformer and agitator for science, Syed Jamaludding Afghani (1838-1870), in a lecture at Calcutta in 1882 devoted a great deal of time to the problem of the scientific spirit. He had perceived the problem very accurately, and maintained that science cannot be introduced piecemeal, but that it is part and parcel of a wider philosophical outlook. "The Ottoman Government, and the Khedivate of Egypt," he warned, "have been opening schools for the teaching of the new sciences for a period of sixty years, and until now they have not received any benefit from those sciences. The reason is that teaching the philosophical sciences was impossible in those schools, and because of the nonexistence of philosophy, no fruit was obtained from those sciences that are like limbs. Undoubtedly, if the spirit of philosophy had been in those schools, during this period of sixty years they themselves, independent of the European countries, would have striven to reform their kingdoms in accord with science. Also, they would not send their sons each year to European countries for education, and they would not invite teachers from there to their schools. I may say that if the spirit of philosophy were found in a community, even if that community did not have a particular science, undoubtedly their philosophic spirit would call for the acquisition of it and all the sciences."[19]

Here Afghani clearly differentiated between the learning of some sciences and the introduction of the overall general scientific spirit. The two do not necessarily accompany each other, and when the scientific spirit is missing the sciences cannot develop. This is what is now happening in the developing societies, the introduction of some sciences without the spirit. Elsewhere I have described this thinking and philosophical spirit, which constitutes the scientific spirit, as (a) the desire to know the network of causes of something, (b) respect for scientific methods, (c) the use of intelligence as widely as possible, (d) the cognizance of interdependence between the events, efforts and problems of the community or the universe, (e) the possession of

the Application of Science and Technology for the Benefit of the Less Developed Areas, Geneva, 4 Feb. 1963.

[19] Nikki R. Keddie, *An Islamic Response to Imperialism*, pp. 104-105. University of California Press, Berkeley/Los Angeles, 1968. This book contains the translation of Afghani's works.

confidence, clarity and progressiveness, (f) the abilitty to think on both a short-term and a long-term basis, (g) the capacity to view a question in perspective and (h) the ability to persist when facing any problem.[20] The need to introduce the scientific spirit along with the sciences has been recognized throughout the century. Suffice it to cite another instance, this time from Indonesia. In 1937 the Indonesian Muslim leader and reformer who subsequently became Prime Minister of Indonesia, Mohammad Natsir, urged Muslim youth to acquire the critical scientific spirit, discussing the contribution of Islam to science and learning. It was the disapperance of this spirit which led to the decline of the Muslim world.[21]

The Filipino reformer and martyr, Jose Rizal (1861-1896) spent his life preaching and agitating for the freedom and progress of his people, for their rational enlightenment, for the development of a rational spirit and the elimination of superstitions. Rizal treated, in a scientific manner, the subject of the indolence of the Filipinos and this work probably became the first sociological analysis of a problem in Southeast Asia.[22] In India, Tagore critically discussed the impact of Western education. In his essay 'An Eastern University' published in 1922, Tagore suggested the foundation on which the interaction with the West should be built. He said: "But before Asia is in a position to co-operate with the culture of Europe, she must base her own structure on a synthesis of all the different cultures which she has. When, firmly resting on such a culture, she turns toward the West, she will take, with a confident sense of mental freedom, her own view of truth, from her own vantage-point, and open a new vista of thought to the world. Otherwise, she will allow her priceless inheritance to crumble into dust, and, trying to replace it clumsily with feeble imitations of the West, make herself superfluous, cheap and ludicrous."[23]

The problems of negative imitation and intellectual captivity were

[20] Syed Hussein Alatas, 'Backwardness and the Will to Think,' in Syed Hussein Alatas, *Modernization and Social Change*, pp. 166-167, Anjus and Robertson, Sydney, 1972.

[21] M. Natsir, 'Djedjak Islam dalam Kebudayaan,' in his *Capita Selecta*, pp. 26-28. W. van Hoeve, Bandun-the Hague, 1954.

[22] See E. Alzona, *Selected Essays and Letters of Jose Rizal*. Rangel and Sons. Manila, 1964. On Rizal see also Syed Husseing Alatas, *The Myth of the Lazy Native*. Frank Cass, London, 1976.

[23] Rabindranath Tagore, *Creative Unity*, pp. 174-175. Macmillan, London 1922.

further expressed as follows: "In India, also, a vague feeling of discontent has given rise to numerous attempts at establishing national schools and colleges. But, unfortunately, our very education has been successful in depriving us of our real initiative and our courage of thought. The training we get in our schools has the constant implication in it that it is not for us to produce but to borrow. And we are casting about to borrow our educational plans from European institutions. The trampled plants of Indian corn are dreaming of recouping their harvest from the neighboring wheat fields. To change the metaphor, we forget that, for proficiency in walking, it is better to train the muscles of our own legs than to strut upon wooden ones of foreign make, although they clatter and cause more surprise at our skill in using them than if they were living and real."[24]

Tagore, like Afghani four decades earlier, sensed the distinction between the external manifestation of knowledge through its institutional outlets, and the spirit behind it. The captive outlook is prone to gloss over the significance of the moving spirit behind the growth of knowledge. Tagore's description deserves to be cited. He said: "But when we go to borrow help from a foreign neighborhood we are apt to overlook the real source of help behind all that is external and apparent. Had the deep-water fishes happened to produce a scientist who chose the jumping of a monkey for his research work, I am sure he would give most of the credit to the branches of the trees and very little to the monkey itself. In a foreign University we see the branching wildernesses of its buildings, furniture, regulations, and syllabus but the monkey, which is a difficult creature to catch and more difficult to manufacture, we are likely to treat as a mere accident of minor importance. It is convenient for us to overlook the fact that among the Europeans the living spirit of the University is widely spread in their society, their parliament, their literature, and the numerous activities of their community life. In all these functions they are in perpetual touch with the great personality of the land which is creative and heroic in its constant acts of self-expression and self-sacrifice. They have their thoughts published in their books as well as through the medium of living men who think those thoughts, and who criticize, compare and disseminate them. Some, at least, of the drawbacks of their academic education are redeemed by the

[24]*Ibid.*, pp. 184-185.

living energy of the intellectual personality pervading their social organism. It is like the stagnant reservoir of water which finds its purification in the showers of rain to which it keeps itself open. But, to our misfortune, we have in India all the furniture of the European University except the human teacher. We have, instead, mere purveyors of book-lore in whom the paper god of the bookshop has been made vocal."[25]

Around 1914, the well-known Indian Muslim nationalist and reformer Maulana Mohammed Ali (died 1931) discussed at length the comings of society, inhibitive of creative response. "The boy, during his ten years of education at public school, learns little that is useful. He has some strange facts and ideas stuffed into his memory and acquires some mechanical skill in the manipulation of figures. But he gets little intellectual training and discipline and, in spite of the moral textbook, his moral perceptions are usually dim."[26]

Around 1914, another well-known Indian leader and reformer, Subjas Chandra Bose (1897-1945), urged the youth of India to avoid the uncritical transplantation of entire ideas or institutions. He was concerned with reviving the spirit of initiative which could be generate by the inspiration of high ideals. He deplored the quality of the educated middle-class, who played a significant role in the various social and political movements but were often poor in ideas. For this Bose blamed the university professors. He said: "Who could ever deny the profound lack of love and loyalty regarding great ideals, among our educated fold? But, what is the reason for this mental poverty? It is because our teachers and professors never sow the seeds of idealism in our hearts while they instruct us. My charges are primarily against the University authorities and the so-called educators. I would ask them, do they allow the breeze of freedom to play freely within the courtyards of our Universities? Do they have any aspiration for independence, those who tread these precincts in quest of knowledge? Yet, all of you must be knowing that in France of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the movement that brought about a flood of awakening from one end of the country to another was directed by her University professors. Cast a glance at our own

[25]*Ibid.*, pp. 185-186.

[26]Afzal Iqbal, *Select Writings and Speeches of Maulana Mohammed Ali*, vol. 1, p. 164. Ashraf, Lahore, 1963.

Universities and you will instantly realize the very depth of our destitution."[27]

The concern for science and modern learning was widespread amongst reformers and political leaders throughout Asia during the 19th century and after. A revealing instance is Raja Rammohun Roy (1783-1874), the well known Indian reformer, who opposed the establishment of a Sanskrit college in Calcutta by the British. In this letter to the Governor-General in 1823, Rammohun Roy expressed his disappointment at the Government's attempt to establish the Sanskrit college. This was not what he understood as useful education for the Indians. He said: "When this Seminary of learning was proposed, we understood that the Government of England had ordered a considerable sum of money to be devoted annually to the instruction of its Indian Subjects. We were filled with sanguine hopes that this sum would be laid out in employing European Gentlemen of talents and education to instruct the natives of India in Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, Chemistry, Anatomy, and other useful Sciences, which the nations of Europe have carried to a degree of perfection that has raised them above the inhabitants of other parts of world."[28]

This college, according to Rammohun Roy, would only load the minds of youth with grammatical niceties and metaphysical distinctions of little or no practical use to society or to those who acquired them. In Europe, the medieval system of the Schoolmen was replaced by Baconian philosophy which emphasized science. The same should happen in India; the medieval Hindu philosophy should be replaced by a modern philosophical and scientific outlook. He summarized it as follows: "If it had been intended to keep the British nation in ignorance of real knowledge, the Baconian philosophy would not have been allowed to displace the system of the Schoolmen, which was calculated to perpetuate ignorance. In the same manner, the Sanskrit system of education would be calculated to keep this country in darkness, if such had been the policy of the British Legislature. But as the improvement of the native population is the object of the government, it will consequently promote a more liberal and enlightened system of instruction, embracing Mathematics, Natural Philo-

[27]Subhas Chandra Bose, *The Mission of Life*, p. 221. Thacker and Spink, Calcutta, 1949.

[28]J.K. Majumdar, (Ed.), *Raja Rammogun Roy and Progressive Movements in India*, pp. 250, 251. Art Press, Calcutta, 1941.

sophy, Chemistry, and Anatomy, with other useful sciences which may be accomplished with the sum proposed by employing a few gentlemen of talent and learning educated in Europe, and providing a college furnished with the necessary books, instruments and other apparatus."[29]

From the 18th century onwards there has been no lack of insistence by reformers in India, China, the Near and Middle East and South-east Asia on the acquisition of modern scientific knowledge. The problem was keenly felt. However, the reformers were obstructed by the attitude of the indigenous ruling classes. They had ceased supporting the cause of science and learning.[30] The responsability of the rulers to promote science and learning has been recognized throughout Asian history. Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406), the well-known Muslim historian and sociologist who is regarded as the founder of sociology and historiography, and one who had devoted perhaps the greatest attention to the sociology of science before the modern era, had clearly spelled out the responsibility of rulers for the development of science.[31]

Similarly, in the Calcutta lecture of 1882, Afghani stressed the responsibility of the rulers. The most obvious power in the world, according to Afghani, is science. "Since it is thus, science makes one man have the strength of ten, one hundred, one thousand, and then ten thousand persons. The acquisitions of men for themselves and their governments are proportional to their science. Thus, every government, for its own benefit, must strive to lay the foundation of the sciences and to disseminate knowledge. Just as an individual who has an orchard must, for his own profit, work to level the ground and improve its trees and plants according to the laws of agronomy, just so rulers, for their own benefit, must strive for the dissemination of the sciences. Just as, if the owner of an orchard neglects to tend it according to the laws of agronomy, the loss will revert to him, so, if a ruler neglects the dissemination of the sciences among his subjects, the harm will revert to that government."[32]

[29]*Ibid.*, p. 252.

[30]This was also suggested by Lord Minto in his 'Minute on Native Education,' March 6, 1811. *Ibid.*, p. 223.

[31]See Ibn Khaldun, *The Mugaddimah*, vol. 2, pp. 352, 356, 384, 385, 391. Tr. F. Rosenthal. Routledge and Kegal Paul, London, 1958.

[32]Afghani in Nikki R. Keddie, *op. cit.*, p. 103.

We have seen that the desire to promote science and the scientific spirit has been present in many developing societies from the 18th century onwards. In Turkey it was expressed during the 18th century. Following the Second World War, the vast area of the Third World colonized by the Western nations obtained its independence. Most of them have been independent for the last twenty or thirty years. Has their situation developed for the better? By better is meant improvement in food, housing, health, income, education, employment, social justice and individual security. For the overwhelming majority of the population in the developing societies there has not been a marked improvement. Cities have developed, schools and clinics have increased, certain classes have become wealthier, more roads have been built, more factories have been started. There is no doubt that these things have happened, but in terms of their meaningful context, they have not adequately met the needs of society. Economists and other students of development are now speaking of a widening gap between the developed industrial societies and the developing societies.

There are many reasons for this gap, such as the increasing economic and political domination by the developed societies, the corruption of the ruling elites of the developing societies, the relatively backward social and economic structure inherited from colonial times, the primary productive orientation of the economy, and all the other features of backwardness. However, the most vital factor is the lack of scientific power, a concept which should be introduced into development studies. As I shall show, this concept has never been used in the study of developing societies. I am not referring to statements on science and technology, or the exhortation that developing societies need science and technology. Scientific power, as an operational research and methodological concept, has yet to be introduced.

By scientific power is meant the capacity of a country to provide its own science and technology for the purpose of production, including services, from its own indigenous resources, although no country can hope to have a hundred per cent scientific power over everything it produces, since in some sectors of production there is always a certain amount of dependence on foreign knowledge. For instance, the Dutch have almost a hundred percent knowledge of how to build a boat, but not how to build a space craft. Taken item per item, we can safely conclude that for the enormous quantity and variety of

goods produced in Holland which the Dutch need, more than 70% of the scientific and technological knowledge put into the production of goods in Holland is derived from their own people. A reliable estimate is not available, but we can safely assume, simply from observation, that the bulk of knowledge required for producing goods in Holland is derived from the Dutch. This is not to be confused with raw materials, which is something else.

The concept of scientific power is essentially a qualitative concept. If percentage figures are assigned to it, this is not a numercial measurement, but simply an indication of degree of capacity. To clarify the concept and to unravel the problem of conceptualization, let us imagine a survey of scientific power say, in Malaysia. We draw up a list of all known goods used in Malaysia, and then we select those vital to the people or widely used among them in the various fields such as food, health, transportation, housing, communication, recreation, agriculture, etc. For each item we enquire how much of the science and technology required for its production is derived from Malaysians. If it is a brick, probably almost a hundred per cent. If it is fertilizer, probably much less, and if it is a television tube, absolutely nothing. To avoid the problem of measurement, we first take goods that can be produced almost a hundred percent by indigenous knowledge. We may start with this broad classification first and assign a scale to it, such as 0, 0.5, and 1.

If we take one hundred items and assign each a value on the scale, we may then have an idea of the scientific power, of the country and a similar estimate can be made every ten years. Though the value is not strictly speaking a measurement, it is at least an indicator, such as per capita output. The values in the scale 0, 0.5, 1 can be further increased and the criteria of evaluation can be further refined, and once this is done, the concept of scientific power can be used for analysis. For instance, we can say India has increased its scientific power by such and such an amount in such and such years.

There must, of course, be a consensus on the goods selected for appraisal throughout the developing societies. I admit there is still a great deal of thinking to be done on the concept of scientific power, but the purpose here is to indicate a line of thought. The lack of development of scientific power constitutes the most vital problem in the widening of the gap between the countries and the captive mentality has contributed a great deal to the poor development of scientific power. However, in some cases an enterprising foreign

group can generate scientific power in a developing society; one instance will probably be sufficient.

In the 1940's an American Professor of Chemistry discovered that certain Mexican plants contained a substantial amount of a substance called diosgenin. This substance could be transformed chemically into the female sex hormone progesterone, which at that time was difficult to manufacture. The discovery led to the setting up of a small Mexican company, Syntex, largely through the efforts of a young European organic chemist. Some of the key steroid hormones using diosgenin as raw material were manufactured in Mexico with the assistance of Mexican technicians, and the result, according to Carl Djerassi, who was personally involved, was as follows: "The methods used for the manufacture of these hormones were based, more or less, on published procedures and to that extent did not involve fundamental new research, but rather the adaptation of existing technology to local circumstances. In 1949 the therapeutic effects of cortisone were discovered in the U.S. and received worldwide publicity. As a result, academic as well as industrial research teams in Europe and the U.S. started to work feverishly on developing new synthetic methods for this important hormone. In the same year, the hormone sales of the small Mexican company Syntex had risen sufficiently that it could afford a research department of its own, and it was for this reason that I joined the company as Associate Director of Chemical Research. Since steroid chemistry per ser was not taught in Mexican universities, most of the Mexican technicians were trained on the premises and a number of fellowships were established, whereby Mexican university graduates could do their research in steroid chemistry in the Syntex Research Laboratories. As a matter of enlightened self-interest, the company subsidized the operation of the Institute of Chemistry of the National University so that in the early 1950's, the major portion of the operating budget of that institute was based on annual donations from Syntex. As much of the advanced research had to be performed by PhD-level chemists, who essentially did not exist in Mexico, most of the research chemists were brought from abroad and by 1959, PhD chemists from over a dozen different countries were working at Syntex. Scientific publication of research results in recognized international journals of the U.S. and Europe was encouraged - in fact, so much so that by 1959, more scientific publications in steroid chemistry had emanated from Syntex in Mexico than from any other academic or

industrial organization in the world. Some of the research results - for example, the first synthesis of cortisone from raw plant materials or the development of oral contraceptives - also gained general publicity, but the important fact to consider in the context of my particular thesis is that in a matter of ten years, Mexico - a country in which no basic chemical research had been performed previously - had become one of the world centers in one specialized branch of chemistry."[33]

Djerassi raised the question of why this happened in Mexico and not elsewhere. "It was a matter of proper timing, the existence of a domestic raw material and some entrepreneurship. However, the plant material is also abundant in Central and South America, in South Africa, in India, and in China, and if the proper incentive and entrepreneurs had existed at that time in those countries, the same development could have occurred there instead."[34] This is a good illustration of the potential of developing societies in advancing research, discovering new substances and enhancing scientific power. There are numerous untapped possibilities, but to tap them, a creative and non-captive outlook is required.

In the rare instances when scientists in the developing countries hit upon an important discovery, there is seldom any response from government and the private sector. An example is the case of insecticides in Pakistan. Studies that extended over eight years had discovered a series of chlorinated insecticides based on indigenously available hydrocarbons, possessing the same amount of pesticidal activity as Toxaphane with the further advantage of low mammalian toxicity. "The importance of this development to the agricultural productivity of the country may be gauged by the fact that Pakistan has been importing about $10 million worth of pesticides yearly; these can take care of barely 10 per cent of its plant protection requirements. Nonetheless, development of our own pesticides has been delayed over the years because of vested interests, who import them and lack faith in indigenous research effort. The struggle is on, however, and one can only hope that, through the sheer pressure of the economic situation, these products will ultimately be taken over for large-scale production."[35]

[33]Garl Djerassi. "A High Priority?...", *BAS* pp. 24-25, Jan. 1968.

[34]*Ibid.*, p. 25.

[35]Salimussaman Siddiqui, 'Problems Relating to the Utilization of Research Results,' in Ward Moorhouse. (Ed.). *op. cit.*, p. 116.

One of the most serious problems facing those scientists in the developing societies who are creative and constructive is the weakness of the peer group. The overwhelming majority are captive in outlook and exert no influence on government. Thus, they strengthen the already negative outlook of industry and government leaders towards research and development. Not only do the captive minds not create, but they also assist in the neglect of creative results. They do not perform the role which they could have performed as scientists and thinkers in the developing societies. I may be accused here of assigning too great a causal function to the captive minds as an impediment to progress, and told that one should accept the currently popular explanation of social and institutional structures: But this explanation leads to a dead end. If it is true, then there is no foreseeable hope for change, for the same social and institutional structures will persist for a long time. Furthermore, the history of scientific development does not bear it out.

One of the most penetrating and encouraging views on the development of science in developing societies was put forward by Carl P. Haskins, an American historian of science. He said: "But vital as relevant technologies are for the new nations, in the end they will not be enough. The new nations will need an indigenous, living science of their own, however limited in volume or in scope."[36] Haskings argued against the idea that scientific development is caused by industrial development. The Scientific Revolution, in the beginning, was quite independent of the Industrial Revolution. "Nowhere is this independence of the Scientific from the Industrial Revolution better demonstrated than in the panorama of those same pioneering scientific societies of Europe, and especially of Great Britain. If, for instance, the dates of founding of a representative sample of the early scientific societies of Europe be tabulated, beginning with the Italian Accademia dei Lincei in 1609 and ending with the Manchester Philosophical Society in England in the 1780's, a curious pattern emerges. The first five of these societies, ending with the British Royal Society and the French Academy of Sciences, both formally established in 1662, were founded within an interval of about half a century. The second group, somewhat different in character, shows a similarly compact distribution in its founding dates.

[36]Caryl P. Haskins, *The Scientific Revolution and World Politics*, p. 29. Harper and Row, New York, 1964.

The British Royal Society of Arts and Manufactures was constituted in 1754. The Lunar Society of Birmingham, picturesquely named for its club rule of calling meeting on nights when the moon was full so that its members might find their several ways homeward over the atrocious roads, was established some time before 1770. The societies in this group arose within a span of about thirty years. Yet a century elapsed between the dates of founding of the first group and the second. The Industrial Revolution was roughly coeval with the second group of founding dates. All of the earlier societies, therefore, appeared before it, and the initial stages of scientific development which they fostered went forward in its absence. It is of special interest in considering the circumstances and needs of the new nations in the field of science that the Newtonian revolution took place in a largely pre-industrial society."[37]

There was a general change of outlook proceeding with such vigor that in less than a generation the vision of a whole people was intellectually transformed. "Of such stuff was the Scientific Revolution made in its original setting. That setting, of course, may never be repeated today. It may be that a revolution of such intensity and scope can never sweep over a new society again. One must never forget the long centuries of special experience that underlay that historic and heady time. And yet many of its parameters are clearly relevant to the circumstances of more than one new nation in the world today. Familiar as all of them are with long and universally established technologies, some of the new countries have until recently been little more affected by the currents of contemporary world science than the European nations had been at the time of the original Scientific Revolution, and the intellectual and spiritual impact of the scientific could quite conceivably have an equally fresh, stirring, and compelling quality for them today. The gaps of understanding that may exist between the arenas of science and technology in many new nations, and the further gaps between an infant science and a virtually nonexistent industrial structure, are matched by the similar discrepancies that faced the early European men of science. It is by no means impossible to imagine that in another guise a scientific revolution could be repeated in much of its earlier intensity and dynamism in some national and social setting which today are, in certain ways, comparable to that of Western

[37] *Ibid.*, p. 31.

Europe in the middle of the seventeenth century."[38]

The sciences in Europe started outside the universities, which became firmly established only in the 19th century. The sciences gained entry into the universities as a result of the labor of intellectual politicians and philosophers. The situation in the 17th century was certainly more serious than that now prevailing in the developing societies. "The scientific community had no institutional mechanisms for regeneration. It neither taught nor trained people for research. It was dependent for its continued existence on the operation of the very same universities which its members despised and on the accidents by which original minds picked up their education independently of existing schools. Even though many universities alienated their abler students and caused them to rebel against the scholastic tradition, this was not an adequate basis for the emergence of a continuous line of scientists carrying on an elaborate tradition of research."[39]

It is to this period of European history that we should look for guidance. One important element is missing in the Third World, that is, a group of thinkers vigorously agitating for a change of outlook, an intellecutual revolution, comparable to what took place in Europe following the period of the Enlightenment.[40] The lesson to be learned is that inhospitable social and institutional structures could not prevent the emergence of the scientific spirit. The same had taken place in Japan, in Russia and in China, and there is no reason why it could not have taken place elsewhere. However, the vanguards of this revolution cannot be captive minds.

If we go back to the reformers in Asia during the 18th and 19th century, the reasons why they failed to generate an intellectual revolution were many. First, they need much more time to multiply their kind and to prepare an intellectual movement, the cumulative force of which can succeed in transforming society in a single generation. Their attention was also taken up by reacting to imperialism. They operated outside the establishment, resembling the European intellectuals during the 17th and 18th century who had to operate outside the establishment.

[38]*Ibid.*, p. 34.

[39]Joseph Ben-David. 'Scientific Growth...", *Minerva*, vol. 2. no. 4. p. 465. 1964. no. 4, p. 465, 1964.

[40]On this problem, see Syed Hussein Alatas, *Intellectuals in Developing Societies.*

Then there was the colonial power that succeeded in convincing indigenous peoples that the sciences could only be acquired through their mediation. Then came independence following the Second World War. Independence had not restricted but extended the influence of the West, though no longer in the form of direct political control. The demonstration effect of Western science and technology, of Western thinking, on development is one the major causes of intellectual captivity.[41] I have explained elsewhere that developing societies should assimilate as much as necessary of Western science and technology and other positive elements of the Western civilization. But this has to be based on proper criteria of selection and the end result should not be the loss of creativity and originality.

The developing societies have been continuously bombarded with ideas, advice, criticism, and sympathy, from the West with an intensity and velocity which leaves very little opportunity for a reflective reaction. Many of these are sound and present no difficulty for acceptance. Some of them, however, are dangerous. One of these is the suggestion that developing societies should give priority to adaptation of science and technology and leave original fundamental research to the developed societies.[42] The problem is posed in the wrong manner. Borrowing and adaptation are the abiding features of social life; the developed societies continuously borrow and adapt each other's ideas. But they do not neglect fundamental research. In the case of developing societies they, too, should do both, for if they do not do both they will continuously be dependent on the West for scientific power.

At the moment, even the adaptation of significant aspects of science and technology is done by the developed societies for the developing ones. The attitude of the industries in the United States is representative of the general outlook among the developed societies. An American report of the Board of Science and Technology for International Development has this to say: "Performing research, development, and engineering on site in the less developed countries ranks low among the priorities of U.S. drug companies. The U.S.

[41]On this see Syed Hussein Alatas, 'The Captive Mind in Development Studies,' *ISSJ*. vol. XXIV. no. 1. 1972.

[42]On this see Syed Hussein Alatas. *Erring Modernization: The Dilemma of Developing Societies*. U.N. Asian Institute for Economic Development and Planning. Bangkok, 1975.

companies feel strongly that to be productive, their research efforts should not be scattered over too many research and developed facilities. Most companies have small research units in development countries, principally in Europe; few, if any, have units doing advanced scientific work in less developed countries. Research in less developed counties may require financial commitments over a longer pre-payoff period than in developed countries. Modern drug research calls for an array of highly integrated and sophisticated operations. To produce fruitful results, most drug companies feel it necessary to have a "critical mass" in their research groups. Some firms indicate that at least 200 employees per research unit are required for this critical mass-a total far beyond what production volumes in most less developed counties would justify."[43]

This is not only the case in the pharmaceutical industry but also in other industries. Concerning electronics and electrical equipment, the report said: "Most companies design their products for worldwide application and make little effort to adapt individual items to local markets, particularly if the makets are small. When such adaptation is done, it is almost always carried out in the United States. The current trend "functional integration" in solid-state electronics reinforces this tendency towards centralized design of products and processes."[44] Hence the adaptation in the science and technology of manufacturing is controlled by the developed societies. It is logical that the source responsible for generating the product should also control the adaptation of that product to particular countries. Without the scientific power to produce a car there will also be no power to adapt it. The suggestion that developing societies should only be concerned at this moment with the application of scientific knowledge developed abroad, together with the necessary adaptation, may be read as an attempt to keep them in a state of continuous dependence on the West. As long as they do not develop scientific power, they will not be able to utilize their raw materials. They will have to sell them to the developed countries, and the terms of trade will be at the discretion of the buyer.

A rather interesting instance of adaptation was furnished by the well-known Muslim reformer in 19th century India, Syed Ahmad

[43]*U.S. International Firms and Research, Development and Engineering in Developing Countries*, p. 33. National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C., 1973.

[44]*Ibid.*, p. 37.

Khan (1817-1898). He initiated an association called the 'Scientific Society' which held its first meeting in January of 1864 with the object of introducing modern science and technology to India. One of the first things it did was to commission a British engineer to compile a book on agricultural machinery and instruments adapted to the Indian situation. Syed Ahmad suggested fifteen guidelines of adaptation which were sound and practical.[45] This became the pattern of subsequent events in developing societies. The adaptation is done abroad. If both original research and adaptation are done abroad, what is there left for the scientists, technologists, and intellectuals in developing societies to do? At the moment the general trend is towards passive acceptance of science and knowledge developed by Western civilization. A critical and creative assessment is not a usual feature.

In the historical and social sciences, there are some interesting instances of dissent. Karl Marx's theory of the Asiatic mode of production has rarely been challenged by Asian social scientists.[46] Before we go further, let us define the constructive attitude to take concerning knowledge from the West. There are, broadly speaking, four categories of knowledge found in the West. They are (1) general scientific knowledge which is universally valid, (2) knowledge about Western societies which is of little or no interest to the developing societies, (3) knowledge about the past and present of the West which is of comparative value to developing societies, and (4) knowledge concerning developing societies generated in the West.

Regarding all the four categories, there is a problem of selection as far as the developing societies are concerned. It is of no use to the developing societies, for instance, to acquire at this moment knowledge on cloning, on the use of drugs to induce what is believed to be mystical experience, and a host of other irrelevant knowledge.[47]

[45]Yusuf Husain. (Ed.). *Selected Documents from the Aligarth Archives*. pp. 37-41. Asia Publishing House, London, 1967.

[46]A study has been made to see how far it can be applied to particular countries. A Burmese study has found that it is applicable to Burma. See U. Khin Muang Kyi and Daw Tin Tin. *Administrative Patterns in Historical Burma*. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1973.

[47]We have not referred to the ethical foundation of knowledge yet. The danger of greater accumulation of potentially dangerous scientific knowledge has been pointed out. See Vladimir V. Mshvenieradze, 'Epistemological Aspects of the Social and Biological Sciences.' *ISSJ*, vol. XXVI, no. 1, 1974.

Each branch of knowledge contains a portion irrelevant to the developing societies, though it may not be so to the Western world. The second category is clear and simple. And account of navigation in the canals of Holland can hardly be of interest to the developing societies, whereas an account of the growth of Rotterdam as a harbour might be.

The third category, though of no immediate relevance, can nevertheless be necessary and important. This is knowledge concerning the West which can provide a lot of insights into the nature of certain phenomena and events. Though it may not deal with developing societies at all, it is of crucial significance. For some time I have been interested in the sociology of corruption.[48] I have learned a great deal on corruption in developing societies through my study of corruption in the Roman empire, the United States and Tzarist Russia. I have learned the essential conditions lacking in the developing societies for a successful fight against corruption through my study of corruption in the United States, and I have learned about the possible future development of corruption through my study of corruption in the Roman Empire. There is a vast amount of extremely useful comparative knowledge to be derived from the West. Accounts of Western societies, such as Daniel Bell's writings on the post-industrial society, though not directly relevant neverthless do given an idea of possible future development.[49]

The fourth category, that is, Western knowledge on the developing societies, is the one where the greatest of caution is necessary. I am not referring here to the kind of knowledge derived from the reports of experts on certain problems. I am concerned here with Western observations on the history, culture, religion, values, social systems, attitudes and the rest of such subjects pertaining to the developing societies, which the captive minds in the developing societies accept, or at least they offer no rebuttal. Once again, I am not referring to judgements or facts such as that India is overpopulated, or that the developing societies have unfavorable terms of trade, or many such assertions one usually comes across in books on economic development.

[48]See Syed Hussein Alatas, *The Sociology of Corruption*, Delta Orient, Singapore, 1975. First published in 1968.

[49]See Daniel Bell, *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society*. Heinemann, London, 1974.

I shall use here as an illustration Marx's theory of the Asiatic mode of production. Broadly speaking, the theory suggests that in Asia there was no private property in land before the coming of colonialism. The reason was the climate, which made artificial irrigation necessary, and since this could only be done by the central authority, power over land fell into its hands.[50] There are other parts of the theory which will be omitted here. The main point is the suggestion that there was an absence of private property in land. Despite this glaring error, the theory was not challenged by Asian Marxists. It was among Soviet scholars that a controversy developed over this problem in 1930-31, leading to a criticism of the theory and a reversal of the conclusion, but it was not until 1972 an Indian scholar successfully and conclusively proved the glaring error of Marx and Engels.[51]

Similary, there has been very little independent and critical reaction from Asian social scientists or historians towards Wittfogel's theory of Oriental despotism. A successful criticism has been put forward by an Indian historian, one of the very rare instances.[52] Lack of interest also prevails in the field of conceptualization. Concepts from abroad are accepted without criticism; however, a critical evaluation and modification of concepts immediately exposes misleading analyses.[53] Coming back to the theme of the infinite variety of pronouncements made on Asia and the developing societies and the necessity for the indigenous scholars to react to them, it should be pointed out that it is impossible to deal with all of them. Owing to the preponderance of the captive minds, the bulk of the pronouncements remain unchallenged.

Critical and independent scholars are faced with the problem of having to economize time and energy, and as a result they have to be extremely selective in devoting time and energy in reacting to pro-

[50]See the letters of Marx to Engels, June 2, 1853, and Engels to Marx, June 6, 1853, in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *On Colonialism*, pp. 313-317. Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1968.

[51]S. Naqvi, 'Marx on pre-British Indian Society and Economy,' *Indian Economic and Social History Review*, vol. IX, no. 4, 1972.

[52]Irfan Habib, "An Examination of Wittfogel's Theory of 'Oriental Despotism,'" in K.S. Lal, (Ed.), *Studies in Asian History*. Asia Publishing House, London, 1969.

[53]Mukherjee had critically analyzed the fallacies and errors arising from the use of some social science concepts. See Ramkrishna Mukherjee, *Development of Sociology in 'Developing Societies,'* Indian Statistical Institute, Calcutta, 1970.

nouncements on their society and people. Hence a standard of selection is required, which should be based on the following: (a) whether the pronouncement reaches a wide audience in the developing societies, (b) whether it is obstructive to development and modernization of the developing societies, (c) whether it is insulting by implication or otherwise, (d) whether it is delivered by an authoritative person, (e) whether it is a reflection of government policy or attitudes of groups whose actions influence the developing societies, (f) whether it is a mere exhortation or a presentation of a solution to a genuine problem, and (g) whether it is relevant and non-trivial.

Any pronouncement made on the developing societies which fulfills any of the above conditions deserves a response. Marx's theory of the Asiatic mode of production and Wittfogel's theory of Oriental despotism and its hydraulic society fulfill the requirement. However, there are numerous judgements on the developing societies which deserve to be ignored to economize on time and scare resources. Once again let me reiterate here that I am not referring to the pronouncements made arising from surveys or analyses of widely known data on development and investigations made by the particular sciences, many of which are useful for developing societies.

Perhaps it would be best to give some illustrations of the kind of pronouncement which is best ignored. A Swedish economist suggested that the rise of Western capitalism and industrialism was primarily a consequence social change unique to the West. Western imperialism was merely incidental to the whole process. He said: "This is not to exonerate the rapacity of colonialism, but merely to say that its contributions to Western economic growth seem secondary rather than primary. Similarly, although the West was responsible for violent disruption of social and political structures elsewhere, there is little to suggest that this interrupted a process of economic development which would have resulted in something similar to Western growth. It might even be argued that in many cases colonial rule, by removing ancient institutions, laid the groundwork for more rapid social and political modernization. At the end of colonial rule, few have wished to return to a *status quo ante*."[54] These pronounce-

[54]Goran Ohlin, 'The Contemporary Consequences of the Gap,' in Gustav Ranis, (Ed.), *The Gap Between Rich and Poor Nations*, p. 61. Macmillan, London, 1972. Proceedings of a Conference of the International Economic Association at Bled, Yugoslavia, August 27-September 2, 1970.

ments are impressive for the amount of ignorance displayed in them.

Ignorance is reflected in the suggestion that Western imperialism did not obstruct a process of economic development and modernization which could have developed if the area had not fallen into the hands of Western imperialist power. This might have been the case with some remotely located small, tribal and primitive societies. But it is certainly not the case with the vast area of Asia and Africa which succumbed to Western imperial domination. The above author is ignorant of basic historical facts. In Southeast Asia, for instance, we have sufficient data to show that Western colonial power blocked the process of greater and more meaningful acculturation with the modern West by the following actions: (a) destruction of an independent leading native trading class, (b) destruction of flourishing native trading ports, (c) destruction of native craftsmanship, (d) the control of education by allowing only that which was necessary for minor colonial administration, (e) economic exploitation that restricted the spread of the multiplier effect, and (f) the encouragement of opium smoking.[55] There are many other negative effects. The tendency among a sizeable section of Western scholars is to play down the obstrutive role of Western imperialism towards modernization and development, even though they recognize the economic injustice imposed upon the colonies.

Another instance of a pronouncement which is best ignored is the suggestion that Western imperialism 'created a cultural trauma which made it hard for non-European populations to absorb the new knowledge into their own cultural development.' Then its authors continue: "a further factor in the situation is that science-based technology originated primarily as a Temperate Zone subculture and was often ill-adapted to tropical conditions. Consequently, even well-meaning attempts to expand Western technology into the tropics have often created ecologial disasters, simply because Western-trained scientists and engineers have tried to apply methods which are suitable to Temperate Zone ecosystems to tropical ecosystems

[55] For further documentation on this and a lengthy treatment of the adverse effect of Western rule in Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines, see Syed Hussein Alatas, *The Myth of the Lazy Native*. Frank Cass, London, 1976. (In print). See also Jose Rizal. 'The Indolence of the Filipinos.' in E. Alzona. (Ed.). *Selected Essays and Letters of Jose Rizal*. Rangel and Sons, Manila, 1964. Also useful is Cesar A. Mahul, 'Social Background of Revolution,' *Asian Studies*, IX, no. 1, 1971.

where they are not suitable at all."[56] The idea of the trauma is purely a figment of the imagination. At most, it is applicable to the emergence of the cargo-cults in New Guinea. Where is the empirical and historical manifestation of the trauma? The failure of colonialism to introduce science and technology was presented as an innocent mistake while, in reality, it was a deliberate policy not to develop the sciences, technology and industries in the colonies.

Brushing such pronouncements aside is dictated by necessity. Our time and energy may better be spent on those works of Western scholars which can be helpful to us. Some of these works raise really significant problems concerning the developing societies. An instance at hand is Leopold Kohr's book discussing the danger of aid for development. The shared experience of hardship is the surest way to attain progress. "Indeed, it would be difficult to find a single precedent in history of a nascent nation ever stooping to ask for help during the pain-filled process of becoming itself. What created the Greek, Roman, German, French, Spanish, Icelandic, American, Swedish, Russian, Japanese, and the Chinese national communities was, invariably, the internally shared experience of hardship, through suffering ruggedly, determinedly, and uncomplainingly, the face of every individual began in due course to reflect the lines of the common struggle, the imprint by which each recognized in the other membership in the same collective being. There was no need for strengthening the rising group consciousness through the xenophobic vilification of outsiders. Shared hardship had made it strong enough. And not only this. It was the hardship, deprivation and sacrifice of the period of their ascent which made it possible for the now developed nations to accumulate those much-maligned riches which enable them today to extend the doubtful blessing of their help to the still-underdeveloped countries. But there is, of course, no reason why the latter should not be able to accumulate the same riches under their own steam. All they need to do is to duplicate what made their helpers so prosperous: forego the pleasures of alimony income and, instead, raise themselves by their bootstraps, however tough this may appear."[57]

[56]Kenneth E. Boulding and Martin Pfaff, 'The Grants Economy and the Development Gap,' in Gustav Ranis, (Ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 159.

[57]Leopold Kohr, *Development Without Aid,* pp. 11-12. Christopher Davies, London, 1973.

The suggestions for planning contained in the book are equally stimulating. Similarly, Andreski's treatment of parasitism of the ruling class in certain developing societies, its corruption and inefficiency, is extremely helpful to a deeper understanding of the problem.[58] The same may be said of Shils' study of the Indian intellectuals.[59] Works of this nature should also have been written by scholars from the developing societies; it is due to intellectual captivity that a great many scholars are not able to select original themes and approaches outside the beaten path. Many leading scholars in the developing societies have contributed to a 'mind drain,' a phenomenon distinct from the brain drain. A mind drain undermines the vigor of intellectual life more than a brain drain.

What is a mind drain? A mind drain is the migration of the mind to the Western world though the body may be in Asia, Africa or Latin America. Taking our example from Asia, the drained mind is the scholar who operates as though he is from the West. He is the *comprador* of knowledge, the fellow traveller. The problems with which he engages himself are those of the Western scholars, which are of little or no relevance to his country. He enters into a discussion in professional journals with Western scholars on problems raised by them, not by him. He becomes a fellow traveller. He believes he has entered the noble precincts of universal science. He indulges in abstract, non-contextual discourse, and his reference group is the Western scholars. They are the community with which he identifies himself, and he measures his degree of attainment by their response. He does not function as a scholar expressing the unique problems and aspirations of development studies from the perspectives of the developing societies. This mind drain is also a result of intellectual captivity, but while our captive mind is at least dealing with developing societies, the drained mind at times abandons it altogether. Sometimes both attributes are found in the same person.

A work which can be considered as the product of a drained mind is a book by the Indian economist Amartya Sen, who was concerned with measuring inequality at the abstract level involving the use of

[58]See S. Andreski, *Parasitism and Subversion*, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 1966.

[59]See Edward Shils, *The Intellectual Between Tradition and Modernity: The Indian Situation*. Mouton, the Hague, 1961.

formulas. His work does not help to solve the urgent economic problems of India and other developing countries; it is a participation in an abstract discussion of interest to Western scholars, and is alienated from real empirical problems. I am not suggesting that it is useless to engage in a theoretical formulation of the concept of equality and inequality, but if one is interested in it, one should relate one's thinking to the region. Keynes' study of saving was based on the Western capitalist background, but Sen's study of inequality was not based on India or other developing societies. I am not pronouncing judgement on the merit of his work, nor am I suggesting that his freedom to choose problems be curtailed. All I am doing is simply to classify his work as the product of a mind drain.[60]

If he had engaged his attention on how to overcome the cruel and vicious inequality prevailing in India and other developing societies, by discussing concrete empirical problems, he would then have functioned as an agent of development. By discussing Pareto, Marx, Bergson, Samuelson, Arrow, Bentham, and other Western economists in the abstract, Sen does not function as an economist of development for his country and region, no matter how great the merit of the discussion for the members of the society.

Another instance of a mind drain, but this time dealing with development, is the Burmese economist H. Myint.[61] His work presents the widely available knowledge on development from Western sources. Three extremely crucial factors in development were not treated by H. Myint, namely, the nature of the ruling elites, the problem of entrepreneurship, and the problem of corruption. Apparently he fails to deal with the three problems so strongly connected with development, while Myrdal, three years earlier, devoted timely attention to corruption and considered it one of the forces that help to preserve a soft state, that is, a state with a low degree of social discipline.[62]

Again, I am not referring to the merit of Myint's scholarship from the perspective of Western studies on development. All I wish to say in that Myint has not functioned as an effective scholarly exponent of development from the point of view of the developing world. Again,

[60] See Amartya Sen, *On Economic Inequality*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1973.

[61] See H. Myint, *Economic Theory and the Underdeveloped Countries*, Oxford University Press, London, 1971.

[62] Gunnar Myrdal, *Asian Drama*, vol. 2, p. 952. Penguin Books, Middlesex, 1968.

he treads the beaten path of Western scholarship without adding anything substantial to what is generally known in the field of development studies. In an earlier publication Myint devoted a chapter to the concept of critical minimun effort,[63] but the treatment of the concept follows the already familiar path; he has not related it to the developing world in a novel and revolutionary manner, nor has he raised hitherto submerged problems in the effort to provide an historical embodiment to the concept.

For instance, has India or China entered or passed the stage of critical minimum effort? What are the indications? How far are the indications comparable to those of the Western world? When did Japan pass that stage? What are the conditions for this effort peculiar to the developing countries? What are the social groups most vital for this effort in the context of the developing region? What are the obstructive factors? If Myint had extended the use of the concept to cover the above themes, then we could say he had developed it in the interest of development. What he has done is merely to help export the concept as the final product of the Western development thought factory without manufacturing an indigenous version incorporating the basic general framework.

To prevent any misunderstanding of my position in this paper, a number of issues have to be clarified. I believe in the objetive nature of science, in the existence of universally valid concepts and methodologies, and in scientific reasoning and attitudes which transcend the constraints of particular cultures. I believe no one should be opposed to knowledge, from whatever source, where I have used the term "Western scholarship" and differentiated it from Asian scholarship or other scholarship found in the developing world, what I am referring to is not the entire corpus of Western scholarship, but only that found in the developing countries. It is not the sciences which the Western scholars apply that are questioned, but the trend in the selection of problems, the explanations, interpretation, and areas of discourse which governed their scholarship.

I am treating this scholarship as an historical and sociological phenomenon of the present century, connecting it with the problem of intellectual captivity in the developing countries, and my position

[63]H. Myint, *The Economics of the Developing Countries,* Hutchinson, London, 1967.

should not be taken as anti-Western civilization. I have also recognized the value of some Western scholarship. What I am concerned with is the dominant trend in Western scholarship which is highly inadequate for arriving at a deep understanding of the problems of development in the developing world. Though this is not the theme of this paper, the implication is there that Western scholarship in the developing world is seriously inadequate, and that this state of affairs constitutes a serious problem for the developing world in the sense that the captive minds have assimilated and disseminated this seriously inadequate scholarship.

In the history of knowledge, there is always a time-lag between the emergence of an idea and the collective response to it; for instance, the idea of the widening gap. Collective and research interest in the gap is fairly recent phenomenon, although the gap was noticed decades ago.[64] As was the case with imitation thinking and the idea of assimilating science and technology from the West, reformers and leaders of political movements had perceived the problem before international organizations and experts entered the scene. Thus the Amir Shakib Arsalan, the Syrian Muslim leader and reformer, between the First and Second World Wars, mentioned in a publication the increasing gap between the Muslim world and the West.[65]

At this juncture in history, the problem of intellectual captivity has only reached the state of proclamation, and it will take time before serious research is devoted to it. As I have shown, the phenomenon itself had been perceived decades ago. The scientific study of the problem has not yet been organized, although there is an increasing awareness of it. Thus Akiwowo mentioned that African social scientists will continue for a decade or more to think and write as if they

[64]Myrdal discussed this in 1955. See his *Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Regions*, pp. 4-6, *op. cit.* For recent treatment, see Angelos Angelopoulus, *The Third World and the Rich Countries*. Praeger. New York. 1974; and Zygmunt Gostkowski. 'The Evolution of Developmental Gaps between Rich and Poor Countries, 1955-1965: A Methodological Pilot Study.' *ISSJ*. XXVII. no. 1. 1975.

[65]Amir Shakib Arsalan, *Our Decline and Its Causes*, p. 86. Tr. M.A. Shakoor. Ashraf, Lahore, 1944. He was attacking the conservatives who discouraged the acquisition of modern science. While the West ascends the height of worldly power and wealth, the Muslim world falls ignominously down and down into the abyss of poverty, owing to the influence of the anti-science conservatives.

were foreign social scientists who happened to be Africans.[66] The same problem exists in Latin America,[67] where the lack of an intellectual and scientific outlook has also been felt. The education experience throughout the Third World has not resulted in the development of a creative and intellectual outlook,[68] a problem that was recently recognized in Singapore, and which emerged despite the fact that Singapore is one of the best organized and developed states in the Third World.[69]

There are several aspects of the problem which have not been treated here, owing to the fact that they each require a special study. Some of the major aspects are the following: (a) ideological conditioning, done consciously or otherwise, that gives rise to and perpetuates intellectual captivity, (b) the influence of the academic imperialism of the Western world,[70] (c) the crushing impact of the surrounding environment of the developing society itself against creative research and intellectual pursuit,[71] (d) the influence of

[66]Akinsola Akiwowo, 'The Role of Social Scientists in Africa,' *ISSJ*. p. 199, vol. XXVIII, no. 1, 1976.

[67]Oscar Varsavsky, 'Scientific Colonialism in the Hard Sciences,' *American Behavioral Scientist*, vol. 10, no. 10, June, 1967. "Nationally oriented research aims to solve technical problems of specific interest to the country concerned, and in so doing develops in a functional way, the theoretical instruments that are most needed. Such research does not exist at present, except as applied science; there is not much of it, and what there is, is not good enough. Colonialist research is motivated by what the most advanced research centers of the world deem to be important, regardless of whether the country will benefit from it within the next century, or whether science will benefit, given the habitat. This is the current state of affairs." p. 22.

[68]See K. Previtt, 'Makerere: Intelligence versus Intellectuals,' Transition, vol. 6, no. 27, 1966.

[69]The Secretary of the Singapore Association for the Advancement of Science, Dr. R.S. Bhathal, a physicist, explained the problem in a talk to the Malayan Nature Society and the Association, June 7, 1976: "It has been observed at several interviews and discussions with science graduates who are the products of our scientific and engineering system that they have not acquired a facility to express the basic concepts of science or to explain some of the industrial processes (e.g., the processes that take place in a blueprint machine in terms of fundamental principles)."

[70]This is a topic that should be looked into. Academic imperialism exists, though it does not represent the entire expression of Western scholarship towards the developing societies. An imperialistic psychology and attempts at domination can be present in the absence of actual political domination.

[71]This has been extensively discussed in Syed Hussein Alatas, *Intellectuals in Developing Societies*, Frank Cass, London, 1976.

Western scholarship, some of which is unintentional, on the intellectual world of the developing societies, (e) historical causes bringing about the lack of intellectual and scientific interest in developing societies, and (f) the influence of the contemporary cultural background which does not elicit pressure for intellectual and scientific creativity.

As stated earlier, the aim of this paper is to awaken greater consciousness of the phenomenon in the hope that it becomes a generally established theme of attention among scholars. There are many obvious aspects of the theme which can be studied immediately such as: (a) the influence of the captive mind on government planning,[72] (b) the nature of the educational system as the result of and as a further breeding ground for the captive mind, (c) the growth and nature of library development and collections, and (d) other relevant aspects such as the kind of alienated intellectual ideas that float around in the developing world.

The phenomena of the captive mind and the intellectual captivity it involves are not easily quantifiable. They are those crucial phenomena whose effects on society are obvious, but which, owing to their complex nature, are difficult to catch in the net of surveys, graphs and statistics. Such is the case with nationalism as a trend, while we can have a quantified survey of an export trend. However, certain flexible correlations can be established. For instance, in the last three decades in a particular country several thousand university graduates have been generated together with several hundred experts. During this period what is their contribution to the creation and spread of knowledge in their respective fields about their own country? Such questions can be raised and attempts can be made to introduce meaningful themes of analysis and meaningful criteria of data selection. But the problem has first to be recognized: that there does exist such a problem as intellectual captivity in the developing world. The emancipation of the mind should be the major struggle now, since it greatly conditions the struggle for other emancipations.

[72] I have made an attempt in the case of Malaysia. See Syed Hussein Alatas, *The Second Malaysia Plan 1971-1975: A Critique*. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Occasional Paper no. 15, Singapore, 1972.

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Abbreviations

BAS: Bulletin on the Atomic Sciences.

ISSJ: International Social Science Journal.

Civilization and Liberation

Pablo González Casanova

Anouar Abdel-Malek, in his essay, invites us to consider a proyect for civilization. He starts by questioning two forms of European thought prevalent in non-Western societies: the essentialist, or typological, and the structural-funcionalist, or developmentalist. One reveals the exoticness of the spirit, the other, the backwardness of the economy. They are two good ways of not looking for a concrete determination of what Asia, Africa and Latin America represent. They are also ways of making the starting point, the West, an untouchable, unquestionable paradigm. Malek's reasoning ends here: the developmental model has undergone a crisis. Nowadays it tends to be substituted by new lines of thought and action, several of which he mentions, although strangely enough, he forgets the one his paper is directed against, although it can be inferred from occasional references. This is the plan for barbarism, with two categories: resistance and terror, which arises after the crisis in developmentalism. It is not the only plan, and, undoubtedly, other categories such as North, South, welfare, hunger, coexistence, détente, pollution, purification, oil, gas and nuclear energy are also present. But this plan for barbarism appears with the development crisis in South Vietnam or in Latin America, as well as other plans, those of socialism and liberation. In contrast to the policy of "razing to the ground," with which imperialism attacked the Vietnamese people, and of "internal war" and "general terror," with which it is punishing the Chilean people, is the construction of a new, socialist Vietnam, and the plan for the liberation, democratization and revolution of the Chilean and Latin American peoples.

In place of the plan for barbarism, Malek proposes a plan for civilization. On a theoretical level, he reveals an impulse to convert the "social sciences" into "human sciences." He thinks these insufficient, unless they openly treat civilization. He also proposes this goal for the political plan of liberation and revolution: the civili-

zational project. He thus proposes that a civilizational ideology should replace political ideology, in the sense of it being a study of man which is not limited to political values, but which includes cultural ones in their widest sense. Ideology, as a science linked to values or goals, appears in a context of political and civilizational values. And here, Malek questions two preconceptions: 1) that Western civilization be the goal and 2) that the problem of man can be reduced to a problem of infrastructure. With the first proconception, a false dichotomy is maintained, according to which Western civilization is better than Oriental civilization. With the second, another false dichotomy is maintained: that a (capitalist or socialist) industrial society is better than a non-industrial one.

In the first case, neither Western civilization itself, nor Oriental civilization, is questioned. The solution lies, nonetheless, in questioning both and not in being shackled to them, by stating, for example, that Oriental civilization is better than Western civilization. In the second case, the plan is limited to technological development, greater productivity, and consumption or "consumerism." Bourgeois and Occidental (or Oriental) thinking does not see the need for a qualitative change in superstructure, culture and civilization, nor in other infrastructural aspects which Malek does not refer to here, such as production relations. But even for Marxist thinkers and ideologists, although Malek does not directly say so here, the problem and plan are generally limited to proposing a change in infrastructure, from capitalist production relations, to socialist relations. And that problem and that plan are insufficient. As a human plan, they have to work on the strategy of the "new man," of which Che Guevara spoke. They have to work on the plan for democratic socialism, of which all of the left in Europe and the socialist countries speak. In short, they should study the plan for civilization more profoundly.

Liberation and revolution do not only suppose a goal of independence, democracy and socialism, but also one of a new man and a new civilization. This plan was born as the result of a long history of struggle for a certain type (or several types) of civilization, carried on by one actor (nation, people, class) or by several. No plan for civilization is born in an historical vacuum, nor can it ignore experience in the struggle for civilization.

Malek observes that, in the West's ascent, both the national culture of the Western countries and their plan for civilization were

important at the same time. And nevertheless, when speaking of the West and Western civilization, at least two important facts are hidden: 1) the relationship between material power and culture, and 2) the relationship among the state, bureaucracy, national culture, the plan for civilization and hegemony. When establishing their own plan, the forces of liberation should make these relationships explicit. Every great empire has had a plan for civilization. Liberation should have its own plan for civilization and make it explicit, discovering and working out goals without mystifying the means, without hiding them behind the pretext that they want nothing to do with cultural nationalism or the bureaucracy of the State. If "there is no evidence in history of power without culture," if no country or class has played an important role in regional or world affairs without a plan for civilization, then the struggle for culture and power, for class, and for national and international representation not only implies that power must use culture, but that liberating forces should place primordial interest in a plan for civilization.

It is "Western civilization" that has been taken as a constant. Even in studies about the "Western crisis" and "Western values," the latter have not been "variables." They should definitely be so. And if the West's solution is not to imitate the present-day Orient, but to carry out its own cultural revolution, its new civilizational project, then the Orient's solution is, at the same time, a civilizational project ("rebirth"), a liberation front and national unity. Here Malek makes a more direct proposal for civilization as a struggle. If Western civilization is in crisis, Western power is not. The liberation of the Orient cannot establish its objectives by imitating those of the West, in terms of "rebirth", it must also think in terms of power: national front, liberation front, and national will power. Malek points out the need for national power in the face of imperialism, or for a liberation front and unity, or for a state and a liberation bureaucracy, as necessary forms of carrying out a civilizational project, from Russia, through the remaining colonial and neocolonial countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, to Vietnam. Here, however, the reader is aware of the need to further distinguish three categories which are significant in a concrete analysis of liberation: culture, power and class.

For Malek, the problem is not solely one of Asian-centralism versus Euro-centralism, nor one of the liberation of the (colonial and semi-colonial) countries of the Third World, nor one of development, nor

one of culture or civilization, nor one of socialism versus capitalism. It is a problem of civilization as a non-imperialist plan for the peoples of the world, in a socialist framework, with nations liberated in large regions, in the future both near and distant, in a millennium of man which begins now, in every country. In order to analyze that multiple and varied problem, one has to attach importance to culture, power and class, in both brief and prolonged periods, in internal and international conflict.

The fact that a single analysis will not suffice is proven by China, which has a socialist regime with a type of socialism distinct from that of the USSR, insofar as the sources of power and culture as both a nation-state and as a civilization are concerned. It is an example, and a very important example. A concrete analysis demands consideration of the different "types of production" and, within each type itself, of the different "social formations" with their classes, cultures and power. It is here where one can place more emphasis on the factor or structure of interest. Malek places it on two: civilization and power. With them he resumes an Oriental air, similar to that of Mao or Nasser, and, in a certain way, expresses the dangers of each. Mao, or the modern Chinese, think too much in terms of the Orient, China, and dwell on terms of "power politics," geopolitics and the correlation of forces, forgetting about class struggle, about the conflict between socialism and capitalism, and about outright imperialism as the main enemy, to the point of inventing social imperialism and becoming confused. Malek thus distinguishes between two different types of imperialism: individual imperialism and social imperialism. This leaves one with only Chinese and Hubbsian thought, which ends the main struggle between capitalism and socialism, and leads to aberrations such as seeing China support Pinochet and South Africa, against the peoples of Chile, South Africa, Angola and Cuba. This terrible forgetfulness occurred in post-Nasser Egypt, and was a triumph for a class of merchants, concessionaires, native and transnational managers. Their government was easy prey for Mr. Carter, after having been, under the first Nasser, the leader of the Arab countries newly liberated in the post-war era and an ally of all anti-imperialist and socialist countries.

Class alone does not explain the problem. Power and culture are necessary. Moreover, class (i.e., the proletariat) does not explain the process of liberation as entirely completed nor as complete every-

where, nor does it always appear as the principal actor. Twenty* years ago in Cuba, two years ago in Angola and this year in Ethiopia, a history of liberation developed against a local and international proletarian background in which the industrial proletariat did not appear in the foreground. A revolutionary movement made up of militant activists and supported by a combatant people moves towards an anticapitalist political and social philosophy, which leads the country towards socialism internally and externally. The July 26 militants, those of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, or the revolutionary Ethiopian officers, rely on a combatant people and receive support from socialism and from socialist countries as a remote and non-rhetorical echo of proletarian internationalism.

And even though class (the working class) does not appear in the foreground, it sends its support from afar to the people who show a will to fight, who seek power and liberation, people with a desire to know and dominate the techniques and art of the modern warfare of an industrial society, made to subjugate and exploit it. Such people learn to use its instruments and those of the socialist industrial society that comes to its aid, once the struggle is begun. The reality of class, of class struggle, of the struggle between capitalism and socialism, cannot be eradicated. The active class of socialism reappears in the strange form of Caribbean or Angolan guerrillas and peasants, or in the newer class of revolutionary soldiers in Ethiopia, supported at present by their peoples and workers and, sooner or later, by socialist countries. All of them have a plan for power, and a plan for civilization.

Other thinkers, such as Marcuse, have spoken to us about the Europeans and the Americans. Malek tells us about the Africans, Latin Americans and Asians. And they converge.

* This paper was written in 1976 (Editor).

Proposal for a Radical Reinterpretation of the Asiatic Versus the European Social Formation

Asaf Savas Akat

> Dans les commencements du monde, il n'y avait pas de routes sur terre; a mesure que les hommes ont marché, les uns derrière les autres, les routes se sont tracées...
>
> *Lu Xun*

1. Capitalism dominates the world, yet it is heavily concentrated in one corner of the world, Europe and its offspring. All social sciences are founded there and mostly developed there. As a result, the whole of non-European history is understood through concepts which have been produced within European social practice: the history and social formation of a specific region volatilized into the concepts of history and social formation in general. This has prevented the correct appreciation (very necessary to revolutionary practice) of the dissimilarities between Europe and non-European countries.

In this short paper I shall try simply to develop some of the basic concepts through which we can start to reevaluate the specificity of Asiatic social formation.

2.1 My analysis will be based on the concept of 'mode of production', borrowed from the history of Europe (including the Mediterranean region). World history between primitive communism and capitalism has been characterized by three modes of production: ancient, slave and feudal. Outside this trinity, a loosely (if not badly) defined concept of the Asiatic mode of production is perfunctorily mentioned. I shall not attribute this Eurocentric bias to any subjective conditions (chauveinism, regionalism, or even racism); I do not think Marx or Engels were guilty of any of these. Rather, it was a set of objective conditions , by which, because of the relative poverty of data

on regions outside Europe, the importance of Europe in social (and political) practice through the ages was over-emphasized.

2.2 The study of modes of production should begin with the concept of the forces of production. This concept refers to man's relationship with the objective world around him, to his mode of appropriation of nature. I want to underline the qualitative aspect of the concept (relations between man and nature) and oppose it to the generally overestimated quantitative aspect (productivity). A materialist approach asserts that the objective relation that exists between man and nature is the basic determinant of society (and history).

First, let us try to establish the level of the forces of production specific to the trinity mentioned above. It does not require much knowledge of history: all three modes of production correspond to a technology involving a passive relation with nature. Almost all production is obtained by the application of labor-power on nature, without many complicated tools: agriculture. It is interesting to note that techniques which increase the productivity of land do not change these technical relations; only those technological changes which shift production from land to man-made (reproducible) means fo production could be considered as corresponding to a higher level of the forces of production (again the importance of the qualitative over the quantitative).

1. Agriculture makes it possible for the society to produce more than what is needed for the (biological) reproduction of its members. The existence of a surplus implies that this technology will correspond to a class society: Primitive communism is destroyed.

2. Agricultural technology is not complicated enough to permit large (economic) divisions of labor. This, in turn, means that commodity production can never be dominant; trade will always remain external to the system and will be mostly regional (international), representing different geographical monopolies.

And one corollary: the produced (reducible) means of production (which characterizes the capitalist mode of production) are not important in the social process of reproduction; the important means of production are not reproducible (land). (There are, however, two exceptions: the second, domesticated animals — cattle, camels, sheep, etc. — both reproducible and mobile. The effects of these two categories will be analyzed below.

The predominance of land as the ultimate means of production will also explain the relative importance (and efficiency) of warrior

(military) classes in all pre-capitalist societies: as land is not reproducible, the only way for any class to increase its surplus is by territorial expansion, therefore, by war.

2.3 The next question should be: what relations of reproduction are compatible with this level of the forces of production? The criterion I shall use for compatibility (or, correspondence and non-correspondence as Bettlehaim likes to call it) is reproduction: only those relations of production which permit the reproduction of the society, both short — and long — term, as well as internal and external, given the level of the productive forces, will be considered as compatible with those forces of production.

a) The ancient mode of production is the first stage in the transition from tribal (primitive) to class (agricultural) society. It is characterized by individual producers who also collectively assume the role of warrior, above an enslaved native population. Internally, it will have a tendency towards the formation of large-scale slave and land ownership, destroying the equality of citizens and giving birth to violent class struggles (among citizens). An interesting example of political and property relations which prevents this development by blocking internal dynamics is the case of Sparta. However, sooner or later, one of the cities starts conquering the others and its landowning classes become dominant. This transforms the ancient mode of production.

b) The slave mode of production is a large state, based on slave labor and the larger-scale private ownership of land. Its dynamics are determined by the availability of slaves outside the system: the society does not reproduce its labor force domestically, but is dependent on an external supply. However, its own expansion limits this supply by absorbing it. If slaves are reproduced internally, their cost is higher and their efficiency is lower than semi — or fully — dependent peasants, bringing us to another mode of production.

c) The key to understanding the modes of production corresponding to agriculture can therefore be found in the following two points. First, the existence of a surplus leads inevitably to a class society, making the ancient mode of production with class relations between citizens and slaves, yet non-class relations among citizens (tribal equality or democracy), a transitory stage, lacking the long-term external mechanisms for reproduction. Second, the necessity of domestically reproducing the actual producers at minimum cost forces specific forms of organization and land tenure on the society. The

slave mode of production, though a class society, fails here: the cheapest way to sustain a producer with family and children is to allocate him a piece of land, of which the produce belongs wholly or in part to him. It is the specific technical characteristics of agricultural production which dictate this. (It is worth noting that this dictum is valid even today, and in fully capitalist industrialized countries, where no big firm attains the efficiency of the individual farmer in most agricultural products, though not in all.)

The above arguments lead us to a definition of the relations of production corresponding to agriculture: a class of producers who reproduce themselves on lands whose surplus maintains a class of warrior-adminstrators. The non-dominance of commodity production implies that the surplus cannot be extracted by economic mechanisms (the market), leaving us with extra-economic coercion for the extraction of the surplus. However, this definition does not tell us which specific extra-economic mechanisms will be used for the extraction of the surplus from the producers. These, in turn, can only be understood by analyzing the relations of property compatible with these relationships of production. There, we can see at least two distinctly different types of (social and political) organization for surplus extraction: one centralized, the other decentralized.

I will now try to give a brief account of the two (pure) modes of production which are not transitory but fully correspond to the specific level of the forces of production: unless there is a radical change in technology, these modes of production can reproduce themselves eternally.

2.4 The feudal mode of production is well-known in all its characteristics. It involves judical serfdom and military protection of the peasantry by a (social) class of warrior-administrators, who enjoy hereditary private property. Their exercise of an exclusive monopoly of law and private rights of justice prevents the formation of a bureaucracy, leading to a political framework of fragmented sovereignty and subordinate fiscality. The lack of a strong central state coupled with the individual warrior-administrator residing in his lands and personally ruling over his subjects increases the probability of the surplus being extracted from the producers (serfs) in the form of surplus-labor, as this allows differentiation between the lord's own plot and those of his subjects (the peasants). Obviously, a whole structure of ideological, cultural, political, etc. apparatus compatible with these property relations develops.

Looking at its internal dynamics, we see that the feudal mode of production exhibits a tendency towards the formation of a centralized state, due to competition among feudals for a stronger position. A situation similar to that of the ancient mode of production could develop: while exploiting the producers, the nobles could try to set up, among themselves, political institutions to prevent the formation of a central state and to guard their privileges (parliaments). The military efficiency of the feudal mode is determined by the lack of the central state with its large armies: disadvantageous for conquests outside the system, but very efficient against invading armies.

2.5 The Asiatic mode of production is a second form of organization for surplus-extraction through a central state. In this mode of production, all land legally belongs to the state (or, more likely, to the empero who represents it), the warrior-administrator class expropriating the surplus as officers of the state. However, this type of organization may lead to a separation of the administrators who register and administer land and people (civilian bureaucracy) from the warriors. As the officers of the state have no claim to land, but only to its surplus, we can expect the surplus to be collected in the form of surplus-product: tax/rent and tribute. Obviously, a superstructure compatible with these relations of property would develop.

Looking at its internal dynamics, we can see that the Asiatic mode of production exhibits a tendency towards the parceling of power, as strong hereditary families of bureaucrats or warlords develop. Therefore, the central state would be inclined to take measures against all types of hereditary accumulation, thereby increasing social mobility in the society while suppressing all alternative centers of power. Its military efficiency can be opposed to that of the feudal mode of production: the central state permitting large armies with great potential for conquest, yet fragile against invasion as the collapse of the central army leaves the whole country open for occupation.

2.6 Obviously, the two modes of production analyzed above are pure types: they represent a structural level of abstraction. In history, societies in concrete time and space are found to contain the elements from one dominating. I would again like to emphasize that up until now I have given only the structure of the two modes of production, not their genesis. The latter, though very important, is outside the scope of this study. However, I will now try to give two potential causes for the genesis of the Asiatic mode of production, in the hope of clarifying some of the confusion which surrounds this concept.

3. *Two Roads to Asiatic Genesis*

It is my contention that we can find at least two structural reasons, both well ensconced in the material environment in which human society lives, that facilitate the development of an Asiatic mode of production. Both are closely linked to geography, showing the importance of environment and strengthening our belief in historical materialism.

3.1 *Hydraulic Society*

In defining the forces of production proper to agriculture, I pointed to one case where produced means of production could be important: irrigation. In those areas where irrigations is possible and permits large increases in productivity, the undertaking of these large-scale projects leads to the development of a strong state above tribal institutions. It is not surprising that virtually all the early civilizations (including Mesopotamia and especially Egypt) grew up around rivers with heavy irrigation and a strong central state. However, what gives these civilizations their long-term stability is not the public works nature of the state but the compatibility of the relations of production established with agricultural technology. Irrigation explains their appearance (genesis), but not their reproduction (structure).

3.2 *Nomadic Pastoralism*

The existence of societies dominated by the Asiatic mode of production but without any irrigation works is widely known as 'nomadic pastorialism'. This forces us to admit a non-hydraulic genesis for the Asiatic mode of production. My second proposal involves the existence of geographical regions, where, within the known agricultural technology, pastoralism is more productive than agriculture. These material conditions imply that for those societies living in such an environment, the ownership of land is irrelevant (therefore communal), but private ownership of domesticated animals exists. Whenever these tribes extend their territory towards lands where agriculture is possible, (which they often do, due to the mobile character of their means of production), an interesting fusion takes place. The invading tribe is interested neither in agriculture nor in private ownership of land. The tribute paid by natives to the head of

the tribe is the forerunner of the Asiatic tax/rent. However, a classless society is impossible with agriculture, which permits the formation of a strong military state. Again, the fusion of nomadic pastoralism with agriculture only permits the appearance of the central state. Its reproduction is not dependent on the existence of nomads; on the contrary as soon as it consolidates itself, it can cut its roots from the nomads (might even force them to settle for agriculture) and develop in a similar way to the hydraulic state.

3.3 These two roads to the Asiatic mode of production are by no means exhaustive. They represent potential objective preconditions for a centralized state and a lack of private property in land. However, the basic structure mentioned above remains valid: as some societies evolve towards feudalism in different ways, the same is also true of those evolving towards an Asiatic social formation. It is important that we should not confuse the genesis of a social formation (which is historical) with the potential causes of a genesis (which is structural).

4. *Marxism and the Asiatic Mode of Production*

Marx's conception of the 'Asiatic mode of production,' and that of the tradition influenced by it, had several shortcomings and errors. I shall try now to elaborate on these.

4.1 *Ordering of the Modes of Production*

Marx considered the Asiatic mode of production to be intermediate between primitive communism and ancient society. This is completely erroneous. Behind it we find the unfounded belief that different levels of the productive forces correspond to Asiatic, ancient, slave and feudal modes of production. I have already shown this to be false. What then, would be the criteria through which we can order these modes of production? I believe I have already answered that question implicitly: given the level of technology, only those modes of production which can reproduce themselves in the long run are modes of production proper to that technology; all the others represent transitory modes of production. This implies that the ancient and slave modes of production (along with others like Germanic, Slavic, etc.) constituted by relations of production which are not compatible with the forces of production on which they are based and are therefore transitory. Only the feudal and Asiatic modes of produc-

tion are fully mature agriculture modes of production, and there is always the possibility of one being transformed into the other: they are collocated.

It is worth criticizing another implicit ordering criterion, according to which, modes of production should be classified by the speed with which they develop forces of production. Feudalism is then accorded a higher rank among the pre-capitalist modes of production because it gave birth to capitalism. This approach is both empiricist and teleological. Let us follow its logic: capitalism is superior to all the pre-capitalist modes of production; feudalism gave birth to capitalism; feudalism is therefore superior to the other precapitalist modes of production. Actually, this corresponds to another myth, very dear to bourgeois ideologies, that private property is the cause of all the achievements of human society (see Weber, for example). What is being confused are private property of land and private property of produced means of production. Capitalism comes into existence with a radical change in technology, shifting the center of production from land to tools (equipment). There is no reason why state ownership of land should either exclude private ownership of the produced means of production (capital) or be inimical to the development of technology, and there is indeed no reason why private ownership of land should be conducive to this technological shift. As a matter of fact, history gives us examples: Sung China (10th-12th centuries) was far ahead of feudal Europe in industrial technology, despite state ownership of land, with a stagnating and backward technology. We must liberate historical materialism from this narrow determinism and try to establish the long-term determinants of the accumulation of knowledge which leads to radical changes in technology.

4.2 *Oriental Despotism*

A better example of the complete misunderstanding shown by European thinkers (including Marx and Engels) of Asiatic society is the concept of 'Oriental despotism'. A common theme for most European thinkers involved with the East ever since the 17th century (though it could even go back to Aristotle), it stresses the lack of private property on land as the cause of tyrannical and arbitrary power enjoyed by the head of state, and either implicitly or explicitly, opposes this to the political (and other hereditary) guarantees of

the European property-owning classes. I will try to show that this reflects a class position, namely that of the ruling classes, and that a different class position may have radically different consequences.

The key to understanding the specific class struggles (and alliances of the two modes of production lies in the centrifugal forces inherent in each, as analyzed above. In the feudal mode of production, the tendency towards the centralization of power would lead the nobles to establish hereditary rights to the land and political institutions to check the growth of the central authority. Therefore, we have political equality within the exploiting class along with castelike social immobility between the exploiting and the exploited classes. In the case of the Asiatic mode of production, the existence of a tendency towards decentralization forces the ruler to suppress all alternative centers of power, which implies keeping the right to land to himself and depending on a non-hereditary apparatus for the administration of his state. This, in turn, means great political inequality within the exploiting class (the sovereign having absolute powers), while social mobility exists between the exploiting and the exploited classes.

To search for 'despotism' in the two modes of production, I will now take a class position: that of the peasants. If we look at the question from their point of view, there is hardly any doubt as to which is more despotic: political equality among the ruling class is perfectly irrelevant for the masses, who do not have the right to participate in politics either way; yet, inter-class mobility could have some (even if only very restricted) meaning.

This leads me to review two fundamental and closely linked concepts, one found in the European, the other in Asian thought. The existence of a very active political life monopolized by the exploiting classes coupled with caste-like inter-class social immobility which characterizes European social formations, is the ultimate determinant of a concept of class (and 'class dictatorship') based on relations of property. On the other hand, the suppression of all political activity within the exploiting class coupled with inter-class social mobility, as encountered in Asian social formations, often led Asian political thought to a mystic conception of a classless society. The above analysis shows both these conceptions to be drastically wrong. Unless we learn to distinguish between relations of production, establishing the relations between the exploited the exploiters at a given level of technology, from the relations of pro-

perty, which, besides expressing the inter-class (sociopolitical) relations (of distribution and dominance), a great deal of confusion is bound to reign in understanding society. This is why human history is neither the history of technology (relations of production) nor that of the class struggles (relations of property), but a fusion of the two.

In conclusion, industrial technology, with its possibilities for transport and telecommunications, makes capitalism the first world-system, unifying remote corners of our globe, overcoming deserts, oceans and mountains, making geography seem superfluous. But this is a new phenomenon. Pre-capitalist history is characterized by the existence of several world-systems, each developing fairly autonomously, separated from one another by natural barriers. China, India and Mediterranean-Europe are the three major systems. We cannot expect their histories to be uniform (and linear). However, if the materialist paradigm is correct, then there should be strong converging tendencies at the level of the relations of production, with infinite differences as one moves up into the superstructure.

The purpose of this paper has been to show that such a structural convergence indeed exists. If so, the specificity of the history of one region can only be understood via that of the others: European history can only be written when we rewrite Asiatic history. To the multitude of world-systems there must correspond a unitary theoretical approach.

5.- *Bibliographical Note*

The 'Asitic mode of production' was christened by Marx. The concept of the Asiatic mode of production developed in this paper is different from Marx's, but not so much as to require a change of name. An excellent bibliography is given by A.M. Bailey and J.R. Llobera: "The Asiatic Mode of Production: An Annotated Bibliography," in *Critique of Anthropology*, no. 2 (Autumn 1974) and no. 4-5 (Autumn 1975). The elaboration and application of the concept can be found in *Sur le "Mode de Production Asiatique,"* (CERM, Editions Sociales, Paris 1974). E. Mandel's *The Formation of the Economic Thought of Karl Marx* (New Left Books, London 1971) has an excellent chapter devoted to the Asiatic mode of production which surveys the literature. I would agree with most of his criticism of the 'orthodox' school (like the CERM). Though he

hints at the collocation of Asiatic and feudal modes of production, he is prevented from grasping all the consequences of this, because of the predominance he attributes to exchange (trade) in the development of capitalism, failing to realize that this exchange can only be the result of a shift in technology, not its cause. I have greatly benefited from the monumental work of Perry Anderson, *From Antiquity to Feudalism* and *The Lineages of the Absolutist State* (both New Left Books, London 1975). *The Lineages...* is probably the most enlightening book on this subject, especially the conclusion and the two lengthy notes. An approach to historical materialism diametrically opposed to mine (and to that of P. Anderson) can be found in B. Hindress and P. Hirst, *Precapitalist Modes of Production* (Routledge, Kegan and Paul, London 1975), concluding that "no concept of an Asiatic mode of production can exist." Their logic, which tries to deduce a determinate set of social forces from the relations of production via the mode of appropiation of surplus-labor (p. 12) is actually circular: as can be seen from their discussion of the Asiatic mode of production, they end up by deducing the relations of property from the relations of property. Max Weber's *The Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilizations* (New Left Books, London 1975) is a good example of the Eurocentric bourgeois approach, which tries to equate private property with progress everywhere and always. Nevertheless, his discussions of Egypt and Mesopotamia are revealing. Another recent (and very important) book, I. Wallerstein's *The Modern World-System,* (Academic Press, New York 1974) exhibits a similar shortcoming: the author attributes an internal dynamic to the feudal mode of production itself (not to the European social formation) which leads to capitalism. Finally, I should express my gratitude to Jean Chesneaux's *Du passé faisons table rase?* (Maspêro, Paris 1976) for teaching me that society (and history) can only be understood if we agree to look at it with the eyes of the actual producers.

Westernizing Factors in the Philippines

Renato Constantino

A number of developing countries are confronted with great difficulties in trying to arrive at an indigenous view of the world and of themselves because of the deep-seated influence of Western culture. The consciousness of their people has been shaped by colonial traditions and today is further eroded by the economic ascendancy of Western global corporations and other institutions, especially the media.

While the participation of such Asian countries in an East-West dialogue may be marginal compared to that of nations who are the inheritors of the great Asian civilizations or who may have preserved to a greater extent their native culture despite colonial incursions, accounts of the difficulties of these less fortunate countries would be relevant to present discussions for the insights they could provide into the pervasiveness of Western influence and its possible deleterious effects even on countries with established cultures. For it must be recognized that even some Asian civilizations are now threatened by distorting influences as a result of the prevalence of active Western global corporations and institutions in their midst.

In the case of the Philippines, we must admit that the value of its contribution to a congress of this type is diminished by its own lack of knowledge of itself, because its own culture, its economic and political life and the consciousness of its people have been shaped by rigid control on the part of the Spaniards and by subtle but by no means less noticeable American influence. Although this paper confines itself to a study of the Philippines, it may still have relevance to the discussions of the congress because the Philippine experience could be partially parallel to that of other countries with similar histories, and because its present difficulties may provide lessons for those less afflicted with the penetration of Western popular culture.

To present the problem in a nutshell, we may say that Western-

ization has been so pervasive that by and large the Filipinos are unaware of their own lack of a national consciousness. Moreover, many of those who today seek to resolve this crisis are not likely to do it in the most meaningful way until they recognize the central role that colonialism has played in the development of this identity crisis.

Before highlighting the contemporary factors that have impeded the attainment of a Filipino national consiousness and the development of a distinctly national culture, it is worthwhile to trace the roots of present-day consciousness.

First of all, it must be pointed out that while other colonized countries in Asia had developed or had been exposed to the great Asian civilizations, the Philippines did not enjoy sufficiently developed pre-colonial civilization.[1] Therefore it did not have the cultural defenses that other colonized peoples had. The Spanish colonizers encountered scattered and fragmented communities based more or less on subsistence agriculture. There was no nation to speak of. These scattered groups were easily conquered and their low level of cultural achievement was easily eroded by the superior culture of a civilizing Church backed by the force of arms of a militant expansionist mercantilist state. There were of course certain exceptions, notably some Muslim groups in the South who a few decades earlier were already under the influence of Islam. But on the whole, the scattered tribes were easy prey to the invading Spaniards.[2]

Recent anthropological studies of certain Philippine ethnic minorities have given us additional insights into the general patterns of economic life and social organization of these people on whose cultural patterns those who are engaged in establishing a Filipino identity are currently focusing their attention.[3] Many cultural

[1] A description of precolonial societies in the Philippines may be found in Miguel Lopez de Legazpi, "Relation of the Voyage to the Philippine Islands, 1565," in *The Philippine Islands 1493-1803*, edited and annotated by Emma Blair and James Robertson, Vol. II, p. 203, *et seq.*; Miguel de Loarca, "Relation of the Philippine Islands," in *Ibid.* Vol. V. p. 39. *et seq.*; Robert Fox, "Prehistoric Foundations in Filipino Culture," in *Readings in Philippine Culture and Social Life*, edited by Amparo Lardizabal and Felicitas Leopardo, Quezon City, 1970, pp. 35-36; see also George H. Weightman, "The Philippine Intellectual Elite in the Post-Independence Period," *Solidarity* (January, 1970), p. 25.

[2] Renato Constantino, *Identity and Consciousness: The Philippine Experience*, Malaya Books, Quezon City, 1974, pp. 3-4.

[3] See for example, Edward R. Dozier, *Mountain Arbiters*, The University of Arizona Press, Tucson, Arizona, 1966.

presentations highlight the songs and dances of these tribes as representative of our rediscovered civilization. While this renewed Interest may be regarded as a worthwhile development — for these ethnic groups are certainly part of our cultural heritage — it must also be recognized that they are survivals of a primitive stage and therefore do not reflect a national culture. Moreover, this effort appears to be based on a static view of culture. It assumes that national culture merely awaits rediscovery and that the principal source of the people's pride in themselves must be sought in the achievements of their pre-colonial ancestors.

Over-emphasis of this aspect of our cultural heritage may not only result in an exaggeration of its accomplishments but worse, could actually be considered a regressive move, as it deflects our efforts away from studying the struggles of the people against oppression and colonialism, struggles which should be the basic source of a developing cultural identity because they represent the birth pangs of a nation — a nation that set its being against that of the colonial power. National culture should be seen as emanating from a people in action, in unending struggle for freedom and progress. Thus the real base of Filipino culture must be sought in the continued struggle of the people against colonial oppression and the pervasiveness of poverty.[4]

A second point that must be borne in mind is the difference between the indirect rule practised by the colonizers of other Asian countries and the direct rule of the Spaniards. This difference resulted in the preservation of their cultures while the natives of the Philippines became a *tabula rasa* in the hands of the Spanish friars and colonial administrators. The other colonizers largely confined themselves to trade; they did not have the same missionary zeal as the Spaniards who tried to conquer not only lands but also minds. Christianity in Indo-China, Indonesia and other countries was confined to coastal ports, while the inculcation of religion, which became both an objective and a colonial tool in every administration, greatly shaped the early course of Philippine economic and cultural development.

Spanish colonialism in the Philippines was effectively in the hands of the Church. Although there were frequent conflicts between the

[4] Renato Constantino, "Culture and National Identity, in *Dissent and Counter-Consciousness*, Malaya Books, Quezon City, 1970, pp. 41-47.

colonial bureaucracy and the Church, the former had to defer time and again to the wishes of the latter. The pacification of the country had been due in large measure to acceptance of the new religion by the native population. Moreover, "in more than half of the villages in the country there was no other Spaniard, and therefore no other colonial authority, but the priest," a situation which prevailed almost to the end of Spanish rule.[5]

In effect, it was the priests who really administered the colony. The long list of civil duties that the colonial administration entrusted to them clearly establishes the extent of religious influence in community life.

> He was inspector of primary schools, and of taxation, president of the board of health, of charities, of urban taxation, of statistics, of prisons; formerly president, but lately honorary president of the board of public works. He was a member of the provincial board and the board for partitioning crown lands. He was censor of the municipal budget, of plays, comedies, and dramas in the native language given at the *fiestas*. He had duties as certifier, supervisor, examiner, or counselor of matters in regard to the correctness of *cedulas*, municipal elections, prison food, auditing of accounts, the municipal council, the police force, the schools, and the drawing of lots for army service.[6]

Given the union of Church and State at the time and the accepted importance of religion as a weapon of pacification, it is not surprising that the religious orders used their tremendous influence on the population to shape not only good Catholics but good colonials as well. Furthermore, we must not forget that the religious orders owned vast areas of land and also profitably participated in both the galleon trade and internal trade. Their economic stake made them an integral part of the apparatus of colonial exploitation. Thus, the priests did much more than proselytize.

They demanded strict religious conformity and proscribed many aspects of native culture as paganistic and contrary to Christian tenets, but beyond this, they used their political and economic power in the community and their psychological and spiritual control over the minds of the people to develop colonials who were both servile and ignorant. From the pulpit and in the catechism schools that were for centuries virtually the only education allowed the natives, the

[5] Renato Constantino, *A Past Revisited*, Tala Publishing Services, Quezon City, 1975, p. 73.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 74.

virtues of resignation and obedience were stressed. Thinking was discouraged save that which contributed to the stability of the colony.

Literature was practically confined to religious or escapist subjects: the life of Christ, the lives of saints or ballads.[7] The paramount importance given to the afterlife and to the safeguarding of one's soul seriously circumscribed dissenting thought and action. Instead of developing their initiative to improve their condition, the people were taught to regard suffering as a sing of God's love and to rely on heavenly intercession rather than on their own efforts. The people lived in fear of excommunication and it was not unusual for mothers to counsel their sons to leave the thinking to the priests lest they be branded as subversives and worse, lose their souls via excommunication.

Because of the rigid censorship, the Filipinos were hardly introduced to the world of ideas at all. Until the educational reforms of 1863, the educational system was confined to the three R's and the catechism, and only children of Spaniards were allowed a higher education. Those who were able to read had access only to religious or escapist literature intended to provide moral lessons. There was no chance given to the development of an indigenous literature based on the people's experiences. No newspapers were allowed save those which were read by the Spaniards and even these had to undergo screening by the censors.

Thinking independently was considered subversive. It was not until the eighteenth century that because of the liberal trend in Spain and the new economic demands, the country was opened to commerce and therefore to new ideas.[8] In 1863, the educational reforms opened schools to natives and allowed the teaching of Spanish. The universities and colleges were no longer confined to children of Spaniards. Native students were allowed to enroll. A crop of educated native youth who came to be referred to as the *ilustrados* were able to go to university and then to Spain. From their ranks

[7]Constantino, *Identity...*, pp. 4-10; see also Bienvenido Lumbera, "Florante and Laura and the Formalization of Tradition in Tagalog Poetry." *Philippine Studies* (October, 1967); "Tagalog Poetry During the Seventeenth Century." *Ibid.* (January, 1968); "Assimilation and Synthesis: Tagalog Poetry in the Eighteenth Century." *Ibid.* (October, 1968); "Consolidation of Tradition in Nineteenth Century Poetry." *Ibid.* (July, 1969); T. H. Pardo de Tavera. *The Heritage of Ignorance. Thinking for Ourselves*, edited by Vicente Hilario and Eliseo Quirino. Manila, 1928. pp. 1-17.

[8]Constantino, *A Past Revisited, op. cit.*, Chapters 8 and 9.

came the writers of the Propaganda Movement, the purveyors of the ideas of the enlightenment.[9]

But even these *ilustrados* were for assimilation by Spain and regarded their own hispanization as evidence that the Filipino deserved to be the equal of the Spaniard. They were revolutionary in the sense that they espoused a new identity, but they were merely reformist in the sense that they wanted the Philippines to be a province of Spain. One may say, therfore, that the propangists of nationality were themselves purveyors of a foreign culture.

Although the masses had been trained in a hierarchical society to follow "their betters," their experience in struggle gained through innumerable uprisings gave them a definitely separatist rather than assimilationist viewpoint. For while the priests were shaping their minds, the people were also receiving contrary, influences from their own reactions to oppression which erupted from time to time in violent struggle. From these struggles the people gradually began acquiring their own concepts of an alternative order.[10]

Since the Church was such an important and visible part of colonial administration, and since the priests frequently invoked the awesome powers of their God in order to cow the natives into submission, many early impulses of protest set the powers of the people's old gods against those of the Spanish Deity.[11] Thus the material causes of such revolts — tribute exation, forced labor, etc. — were shrouded in the mystical garb of religious nativism and anti-Church violence. But they are for the perceptive to see in the claims that some native god or other had promised to give them food and clothing in abundance, as well as relief from tributes and church dues. It is interesting to note that while such nativism continued to surface through the years in people's movements, the inroads that Catholicism had made in the native consciousness became more and more evident in the assimilation of Catholic beliefs and rites by rebelling groups.

The natural direction of such a development was the demand by the Filipinos for equal rights within the Church.[12] At this point, the religious demands for equality which culminated in the struggle for secularization of the parishes (against the regular orders) and later

[9] *Ibid.*
[10] *Ibid.* Chapter 10.
[11] *Ibid.* Chapter 7.
[12] *Ibid.* p. 141.

for the Filipinization of the clergy, became an important current within the rising stream of protest for political and economic rights. These were articulated by young *ilustrados*, the majority of whom were sons of a growing local elite which had benefited from the economic development produced by the end of Philippine isolation from world trade and now had economic interests to protect and advance. While the *ilustrados* expressed essentially the demands of their class (whether or not they were aware that this was so) they couched these in universal terms, as demands of the entire nation. Though the Filipino masses would eventually go farther than the *ilustrados*, for that historical moment, the latter performed the patriotic task of synthesizing national feeling. This service (aided by the colonial trait of following one's betters) allowed the *ilustrados* to join the revolution of the awakened masses, eventually take over its leadership and compromise it again and again.

The anti-clerical thrust of the Revolution did not erode the Hispanic and Catholic culture of the elite. In fact, at a time when the Filipino people were most vitally declaring their separate national identity and could therefore have most creatively developed their own culture, the *ilustrado* leaders were showing themselves to be bound to Western culture in their ideas of government, in their own cultural preferences and in their lifestyle.

The Christianized Filipino was the product of a Western church. His religion and the culture that went with it was Western. Christianity was an alien, Western ideology through which the indigenous experiences were modified. The values that emerged in Philippine society were Christian values. The missionary Church became a power base of the ruling order. As an institution, it has continued to be a pillar of subsequent colonizing groups because of its own considerable economic stake in the stability of society.

Spanish colonialism Westernized the Filipino principally through religion. American colonialism superimposed its own brand of Westernization initially through the imposition of English and American school system which opened the way for other Westerizing agencies.

The result was the utilization of education as a weapon of pacification and for the transmission of colonial ideals that transformed the people into naively willing victims of American control. The use of English as a medium of instruction has been the principal cause of backwardness among the products of the system. Far from being a

medium of communication and instruction, for the overwhelming majority it constitutes a barrier to all but rote learning. In the early grades, too much precious time used to be wasted learning the rudiments of a language completely alien to the native tongue — time which could have been used to communicate facts and ideas.[13] This situation had now been remedied in part by the use of the vernacular in the primary schools. The problem in high school and college is compounded as students struggle to comprehend more complex material and express themselves in a language which despite years of study they can barely use.

Moreover, the neglected native languages have suffered from underdevelopment, and this in turn has retarded the intellectual life of the people. But of course, this situation has not prevented Americanization; rather, it has made the Filipino mind most receptive to the more banal aspects of American culture as transmitted through films, TV and popular reading matter. Such "cultural" fare in turn transmits those consumer tastes and attitudes that U.S. corporations find it most profitable to implant.

One particular example of manipulation of consciousness that should be mentioned is the distortion of the history of the early period of American occupation. Accounts of the years of fierce resistance, by the people, and accounts of the atrocities perpetrated by the Americans in quelling this resistance, were suppressed. Instead, the leaders of this resistance were branded as bandits while the early collaborators were presented to the people as leaders and heroes. Of course, the Americans were portrayed in the schools and in the media as altruistic benefactors who had been welcomed with open arms by the people. Thus, succeeding generations forgot their people record of resistance, their history of struggle. They did not make any great effort to retain and develop their fledgeling identity and to evolve their own culture based on their struggles and their real aspirations. After all, young people could not be expected to miss what they did not know they had even had.[14]

The momentary victory of the people over Spanish colonialism epitomized the beginning of a new culture — a culture of liberation.

[13] Constantino, "The Miseducation of the Filipino," in *The Filipinos in the Philippines*, Malaya Books, Quezon City, 1966, pp. 39-65.

[14] *Ibid*, see also Constantino, "Origin of a Myth," in *Dissent and Counter Consciousness*, Malaya Books, Quezon City, 1970, pp. 62-91.

Unfortunately, this was a short-lived gain, for before the new nation could really develop its own culture, it became the victim of another colonialism. A new massive dose of Westernization was applied. There was a regression to the old colonial state of mind as the nationalist cultural impulses were first repressed and then redirected by the Americans.

The success of Americanization gave the Filipinos a greater feeling of superiority over their Asian neighbors. As Christians they had tended to look down upon the religions of other Asian peoples and to regard their customs and culture as inferior. The victims of racism, the Filipinos became racists insofar as fellow Orientals were concerned.

Colonialism preserved the backward agricultural economy. Instead of producing a class of proletarians, an active sector that could carry out the more advanced struggle for independence and against economic exploitation, colonialism produced a big sector of petits bourgeois. Shopkeepers, salesmen, professionals, government employees, etc., formed the mass product of colonial relations and education. This sector became the most avid consumers of American goods; they were the most Westernized in orientation. Instead of being the exponents of an indigenous civilization, they became the transmission belts of an alien culture. Under such condition, it is not surprising that thought was minimal. The dangers of foreign control were not detected because of colonial conditioning.

Today, if a foreigner were to evaluate the cultural state of the Philippines he would probably be impressed by the achievements of Filipino artists, noting how they have kept abreast with cultural trends abroad. Unfortunately, too many of these achievements belong to a coterie that looks up to foreign models. As a matter of fact, the audience at cultural presentations is often dominated by the cosmopolitan set which patronizes and graces these events and whose approval is prized as a sign of success.

Of late, there have been any number of probably well-intentioned attempts by cultural leaders to remedy what they deplore as the cultural poverty of the masses by making available to them through provincial tours and lower prices the cultural fare that the middle and upper classes enjoy. Though it is not my intention to suggest that the people do not need exposure to the real cultural achievements of Western peoples and all peoples in fact, too often the result of these efforts merely results in further indiscriminate Westernization. A

more meaningful cultural development is one that seeks its roots in the people's history and the people's lives. Fortunately, this development is now being pushed by a few cultural workers and artists who see the emptiness of aping foreign models, but the Westernizing current is still dominate.

Filipino films are possibly the single most potent factor in the dissemination of Filipinism. But while they perform a sevice in this respect, Filipino films on the whole are reflective of a Westernized society because their themes are too often copied from foreign successes and because scrptwriters and directors view Philippine life through the lenses of their Western upbringing. Thus their greater popularity at the present time is not a complete gain, for they are still agencies for Westernization.

Because of the long monopoly of American films, the principal Western influence is American. Philippine movies therefore ape American movies in the preoccupation with escapism, sex and violence. Escapism, sex and violence are fed to the American audience because these are commercially profitable. And they are commercially profitable because the majority of the audience are no longer in quest of answers to social problems. They live for the moment; they have resigned their obligations as social beings... Their main preoccupation is material consumaption... The values they have embraced are intrinsically alien to human existence, for the material goods that obsess them have dehumanized their lives. While their government dominates nations and peoples, the American people have become enslaved by things, by the material goods they produce. The loss of a sense of social purpose has consigned great masses of the American population to an alienated existence.[15]

American movies mirror the weaknesses of American society. That society is the end product of historical and economic forces that are different from ours, or at any rate are not yet fully operative in our society, so that masses of our population have no other recourse but to immerse themselves in escapist entertainment. Our movies can still become a real Filipino institution. Stories based on local reality can enrich the lives of the people. We do not nedd to project foreign situations that have no relevance in our country. Our history and the lives of our people are rich in legitimate subjects for motion picture art. Socially conscious writers know how to exploit truly Filipino

[15] Constantino, "Scenario for Survival." *Graphic*, September 17, 1969, pp. 14-18.

subjects. Movies can then become an important agency for the re-orientation of our people, an educational agency that will help to evolve new values for the nation.[16]

No discussion of the present cultural state of the Philippines can afford to ignore the presence of certain institutions and relations that are central to our economic life. All over the world, especially in the Third World, global corporations have invaded the economies of developing nations. While the deleterious economic implications of these activities belong to another field of inquiry, the effects on culture are well worth mentioning.

The global corporations are economic bodies, but their operations have a direct effect on the culture of the developing countries. In the case of the Philippines, they reinforce the existing hiatus in cultural development. Through their advertising campaigns the multinationals induce a mood of consumerism and a self-indulgent attitude toward life. Through their sponsorship of TV and radio programs to advertise their products, they are able to influence the type of entertainment fare that millions view or hear. Since their objetive is profit, they are more likely to favor the lowest common denominator in cultural level in order to reach larger audiences. Thus they spur the dissemination of pop culture that diverts the attention of the people from serious political and cultural pursuits. At the same time, the programs that they sponsor subtly reinforce their advertising campaigns in cultivating a lifestyle inappropriate for the people of a developing nation. The drive of such global giants is to create new needs, to redirect attitudes, to change values so that consumption patters are evolved which will increace their sales. Needless to say, these influences are more likely to be inimical to the basic national welfare than otherwise. The experts that they send over speak a language of their own which is comprehensible only to the elite and the technocratic elements of society. They therefore reinforce the alienation of the elite from the people at the same time that they induce a Western lifestyle in segments of the population who are most prone to absorbing consumer values.

Note must be taken of the tourism program of the country to evaluate its own influence in the Westernization of the people. While basically the program is intended to raise necessary foreign exchange, there bas been too much emphasis on attracting the foreign tourist.

[16] *Ibid.*

Granted that tourism is a valid channel for cultural interchange and even that tourist dollars are badly needed for an ailing economy, still certain aspects of the tourist trade need to be watched carefully so that they may not have a deleterious influence on the cultural development of the people. At the present time, attention appears to be concentrated on projects intended to attract foreign tourists with little thought being given to the long range effects of the over-all program. Economic activities supportive of the tourist trade are given priorit over other projects that may have a more direct beneficial effect on the Filipinos themselves. There is currently a building boom for the housing, dining and entertainment of foreign tourists, but a scarcity of financing for low-cost living units. The former are definitely too expensive for the Filipinos themselves (with the exception of the very rich) and therefore a predictable consequence will be the creation of foreign enclaves, the luxury of which can only arouse envy and anger.

The desire to entice the foreign tourist has already subtly changed the orientation of stores and entertainment places. Folk customs and dances are revised ('jazzed-up' might be a more accurate term) to whet tourist interest, and folk festivals are even invented tourist come-ons. These developments might be regarded by the less perceptive as signs of a healthy cultural revival because so many communities seem to be bent on resurrecting their own indigenous versions of the mardi-gras. But in the frenzied competition for instant tourist meccas, the nation may well be losing rather than reacquiring its soul. And of course, these tourist activities, though they may be promoted in the name of culture, are at best only a very minor aspect of what real cultural development should be. Only when the tourism program is primarily based on the needs of domestic tourists can the attendant cultural activities become meaningful cultural developments. The immediate and very visible effect of our tourism orientation is to emphasize and deepen the Filipino colonial mentality, the hospitality that borders on servility, and the further Westernization of tastes as even the primitive cultures of our ethnic minorities are used to chase after the almighty dollar.

It is only lately that the Filipinos have from objective necessity started to identify with the Third World. Before this, we had very little sympathy with liberation movements. This is due to the fact that our exposure to world events emanated from Western media

reports which interpret international developments in the light of American economic and strategic interest. Victims of cultural Westernization, we suffered a crisis of identity as well. The resolution of this crisis can be achieved only with a progressively stronger identification with the Third World from which we can learn valuable lessons in developing a culture of our own as we build an economy which we ourselves control. For by now it is clear that the developing countries will have to unite in order to prevent the further inroads of Western economic and cultural control. A culture based on our needs will only envolve after we liberate our own economy. But liberation of that economy will also be hastened by the development, if only in its initial stages, of a culture that is based on our needs and goals.

What then, is the concept of a national culture? It is not the glory of the past, where there was little or none. It is not only folklore; it is not only a revival of tradition. Above all, it is the summation of the needs of the people, the description of their past and present condition, an expression of their values, thoughts and emotions, the depiction of their historic struggles to liberate themselves. True national culture is inextricably linked to the people's needs, ideas, emotions and practices. National literature, art, music and all other forms of culture must therefore find their source and inspiration in the people's activities and dedicate their achievements to the people.

It is true that the poverty of the masses is a major cause of their poverty of culture. But this poverty itself breeds its own dynamics as it transforms the feeling of deprivation into a desire to negate the condition itself. This process in turn develops its own forms of expression and action which if crystallized and systematized become the matrix of a people's culture. A real people's culture will constitute the negation of a culture that is merely an appendage of, or an emanation from a foreign culture which has obliterated our own because it is the expression of our own obliteration as a nation.

Precapitalist Modes of Production Compared with Capitalism and Socialism

Sencer Divitçioglu

1.1 In this paper, we will discuss theory only: the theory of modes of production (precapitalist modes of production, PCMP; the capitalist mode of production, CMP; and the socialist mode of production, SMP) and the logic of going from PCMP to CMP or SMP.

We will proceed at a level of theoretical abstraction and not at one of concrete analysis, as is stated in the preface to the *Critique*.[1] Marxist theory of modes of production used certain abstract concepts, the product of the mental processes of economic insight, such as: labor force, labor relations, real appropriations, the labor (or production) process, the process of extracting surplus labor, and the implementation of these categories — whether in the form of the redistribution of products or in the form of the distribution of wealth — and, finally, the class struggle resulting from it. Therefore, the modes of production have to be conceived and constructed, first of all, as a combination of abstract concepts which together form an articulated whole.

1.2 Now, avoiding the impasse of structuralism, how does one give a general analysis of a mode of production in strictly economic terms?[2]

To this end, we will dissect the concept of mode of production as such into its parts (hereafter called elements), which are dependent on and correspond to each other, and which together form an articulated whole.

[1] K. Marx, *Critique de l'économie politique*, in Oeuvres I, edited by M. Rubel (Paris: Pleiade, 1965).

[2] The idea that the construction of a general theory of mode of production would have to be a variant of structuralism and therefore ideological, has nothing to do with our analysis. For defenders of this thesis, see B. Hindess and P. Hirst, *Precapitalist Modes of Production* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975).

We now present a diagram for all modes of production, broken down into economic elements.



It is important to note that this diagram is to be understood as a logical succession of elements in different phases, at the level of a process of material reproduction, as well as at the level of the reproduction of social relations, thus forming successive levels with the goal of providing a complete explanation of a mode of production in the process of social reproduction. In fact, every mode of production must accomplish this double goal: on the one hand, the reproduction of material products and, on the other, the reproduction of social relations. This double function is systematized in the diagram: in the upper line are the forces of production (labor, land, means of production). Given the technical division of labor, they are combined to produce the work process. It is this combination (the work process) which forms society's material strength for the real appropriation of nature and not the forces of production taken individually, as Marx has already suggested:

> Whatever the social form of production, laborers and means of production always remain factors of it...For production to go on at all, they must unite. The specific manner in which this union in accomplished distinguishes the different economic epochs of the structures of society from one another.[3]

[3] K. Marx, *Capital*, II (Moscow: Foreign Publishing House), p. 34.

If one reads further in the above diagram, one reaches the product distribution stage (consumer goods and production goods), the predictable result of every material reproduction. Relations of production are placed on the lower line, clearly distinguished from legal forms of property, which belong to the superstructure of the social formation, and which rests on the real appropriation of the economy (of nature) by the organization of the labor process (production at the level of the social division of labor) and which, finally, is achieved by the extraction of surplus labor in the distribution of wealth phase.[4]

To complete the diagram, another new element has to be introduced: the process of realization by which the transition from the stage of the work process/surplus labor to the stage of redistribution/distribution would be assured.

Let us suppose that, in certain modes of production, the extraction of surplus labor is closely tied to the work process (see production) and it is this process itself which effectively creates the economic conditions for the operation of the extraction of surplus labor. However, in other modes of production, it could be that the extraction of surplus labor might not be operable at the level of the production process, but is accomplished by certain non-economic interventions, external to the labor process. Thus the transition from work process/surplus labor to the stage of redistribution/distribution is first achieved by economic demands, for the former, and by non-economic demands, for the latter. It is here that the element of the process of realization intervenes by means of the economic or non-economic demands through which the present redistribution of products as well as its equivalent, the distribution of wealth among antagonistic classes, are determined.

Let us delve into Balibar more deeply.[5] In certain modes of production, the stage of work process/surplus labor is equivalent in time and space, while in others, it is not equivalent. It follows that in the former case, in the framework of all modes of production, economic demands are dominant, while in the latter case, economic demands are displaced by the existence of non-economic demands, namely ideological (customs, religion) or political (legal, state), whose origins should be sought in the framework of social formation, and

[4] P. Ph. Rey, *Les alliances de classes* (Paris: Máspero, 1976), chap. 3.

[5] E. Balibar, "Sur les concept Fondamentaux du materialisme historique," in *Lire le Capital* II, by L, Althusser (Paris: Máspero, 1965).

not in the framework of mode of production.

1.3 The Marxist concept of mode of production is thus connected to a second concept of social formation, a concept which expresses the complex structure of societal unity where diverse aspects, economic, ideological and political, form an integrated whole once again. This Marxist concept is, itself, abstract, and sets the understanding of the specificity of one mode of production as its goal, through the combination of elements which have been influenced by certain non-economic elements, borrowed from the social formation. It is extremely important to know where the intervention of non-economic demands affects the mode of production and in what way this intervention could have modified the combination of existing elements.

In the diagram, all elements show divisions into successive stages, thereby constituting the mode of production, which results in class struggle between antagonistic classes (in certain modes of production, this element could be null).

After the preceding analysis, we can state that the most specific characteristic of class struggle — (in certain modes of production where economic demands dominate, in contrast to other modes of production where economic demands are displaced by ideological-political demands) — is that it may develop along purely economic lines, and not become an ideological-political struggle, whereas in other modes of production, ideological-political demands play a determining role.

1.5 After having presented our view on the general theory of modes of production, let us now treat it in mathematical terms.

In the case of all modes of production in which labor/surplus labor processes resemble each other, the latter's elements do not constitute a contractile set. That is, its elements are not susceptible to contraction and, consequently, are not reducible to one single type of element. On the other hand, in other modes of production where these two processes do not resemble each other, their elements constitute a contractile set. That is, these elements are susceptible to contraction and therefore are reducible to a single element, an element borrowed from the social formation in the form of ideological/political demands.

2.1 Before going into the details of this argument, let us introduce the conceptual definitions of the CMP, SMP and PCMP at this point in our analysis.

2.1.1 The CMP: besides exhibiting a high level of development of the forces of production, the CMP is defined as the production of merchandise-products and merchandise-labor force (products of exchange value), produced by constant and variable capital and realized in the process of circulation (exchange-market) with the goal of extracting the surplus value created by free laborers for the owners of capital. Class struggle between two antagonistic classes arises from this situation.

2.1.2 The SMP: besides specifying a high level of forces of production, the SMP is defined as the production of goods, made by means of production and by laborers, and fulfilled in the process of planning with the goal of achieving an optimum use value, given the surplus labor (investments) created by laborers established in social classes.[6]

2.1.3 The PCMP: besides exhibiting a low level of development of productive forces, the PCMPs are defined as the production of goods and merchandise, by very limited means (principally, land) and realized, on the one hand, according to customs and legislation and, on the other, according to the process of circulation (the circulation or merchandise does not necessarily imply that the labor force also becomes merchandise), with the goal, first of all, of satisfying the needs of the immediate producers and, secondly, of extracting surplus labor (rent in kind, real estate, and taxes) for the benefit of the property owners, merchants-businessmen and the representatives of the State (government, bureaucracy, technocracy, army and clergy). There is therefore a situation of diversity within the exploiting class.

2.2 Let us return to our previous proposition. We have seen that in the CMP and SMP the stage of labor/surplus labor processes is coupled with economic demands, although realization and form differ. The CMP operates on the basis of circulation to extract surplus value. The SMP operates on the basis of planning, so as to obtain the optimal use value.

Now, in both these cases, we have a set of purely economic elements, and it is for this reason that no element is susceptible to contraction.[7]

[6] For the time being, the problem of the form of Marxism under the contraints in the SMP is of no concern to us.

[7] The argument that planning can only be a political aspect of the SMP led to the

In fact, they form a non-contractible set. If, for example, one reduces all the elements of the set to forces of production, one comes to the absurd conclusion that the formation of the forces of production is unaffected by relations of production, circulation, planning, or the stage of redistribution/distribution.

Contrary to the case considered above, the elements of the PCMPs form a contractible set. All other elements are reducible to the forces of production: their development requires that the relations of production, and therefore the actual distribution of revenue, be completely modified. But this action, in turn, depends on the form of class struggle, which is itself predetermined by ideological/political trends.

2.3 As we have already emphasized, the difference between the two systems lies essentially in the fact that in the PCMPs (that is, non-CMP and non-SMP), the surplus labor extracted by the dominating classes generally takes the form of rent/taxes, and this extraction is not the result of a process of economic valuation, but is governed by the ideological/political demands originating in the social formation.

Meanwhile, in the CMP and the SMP, the valuation implies a purely economic process which, at the same time, generates the bases of a class (or non-class) theory and consequently, the theory of class struggle.

In the case of the CMP, the social reproduction process takes place completely within the economy. Here, ideological/political demands are present, but as reflections of the economy on the superstructure of the social formation. It follows that in the CMP, class struggle can only occur on the economic level, while in a PCMP, the lack of a general theory of economic valuation requires a *deus ex machina* from outside the field of economics, an ideological/political element to determine the formation and specificity of the antagonistic classes and, therefore, of the form of class struggle.

3.1 We can now treat the last question of our paper, that of examining the PCMP's transition process in contrast to that of the CMP or the SMP.

The first conclusion that one can draw from our analysis it that all the PCMP's characteristics have a common consequence: first of all,

negation of the survival of *economics* in the SMP. We are not in a position to discuss this subject.

the susceptibility of the disjunction of the system under the impact of the CMP or the SMP and, then, the impossibility of pursuing class struggle at the economic level.

3.2 The first consequence is deduced from the very nature of the PCMP's contractile whole. Since the pair ideology/politics is a reducible element of the whole, with the modification of this element in custom or form, under the influence of the CMP or the SMP, the PMCPs accede to the transition process. But, herein lies a theoretical difficulty. In order to complete the PMCP's split from their old elements, ideological/political demands should be replaced by circulation/planning (economic) demands.

It is clear, therefore, that if, in the case of transition to a CMP, the traditional commodities markets products and commodities and forces of production (circulation process), which existed before the CMP, really constitute an obstacle, the old relations of production or their economic expression as rent/taxes could bring the dominant social relations to a halt, although the forces of production might develop. But the process of transition toward a CMP can only be accomplished in connection with the old elements of the PCMPs, a connection which assures the disjunction of the old system, as Marx stated in a now-famous passage:

> No matter whether commodities are the output of production based on slavery of peasants... of communes...of state enterprises... or of half-savage hunting tribes, etc. As commodities and money they come face to face with the money and commodities in which the industrial capital presents itself and enters as such into its circuit as into that of the surplus-value born in the commodity capital, provided the surplus-value is spent as revenue, hence they enter into both branches of circulation of commodity capital.[8]

Contrary to the case of the CMPs, in the process of transition to a SMP the establishn ent of planning is a relevatively easy thing to achieve in comparison with establishing capitalist markets. Therefore, old relations of production could be an important hindrance to linking the SMPs with the CMPs, even if new legislation abolishes private land property. A logical consequence of this fact is that the SMP may suffer losses in the agricultural sector.

3.3 The Second consequence is also deduced from the nature of the formation and the specificity of classes, and from the class

[8]K. Marx, *Capital* p. 110 (emphasis mine).

struggle between the alliances of exploiting classes and the exploited class, i.e., peasants in the PCMPs (less important than some industrial sectors that employ laborers). If these classes and their struggles were the result of a formation of ideological/political elements, it is clear that these elements had already experienced ideological influence from the CMPs and the SMPs, by their contact (direct or indrect) with these modes of production. These influences can be in the form of a newly transplanted ideology or of a pacific or even repressive tax policy imposed on behalf of the CMP or the SMP. Once these ideological/political items are implanted and adopted, the ideological/political struggle between the two antagonistic classes is set in motion. One can say that a PCMP has to undergo the political/ideological influence of the CMP and the SMP, when due to their confrontation, the process and form of their present class struggle show a perpetual or sporadic concordance with the political/ideological demands of the social formation.

The outcome of these struggles is, of course, a function of the process, as well as of the form, of class struggle. It is because of this fact that the process of transition from the PCMPs to the CMP or the SMP should be seen as conjectural, and it is for this reason that the analysis abstracted from the transition process is not capable of forseeing the consequences of the development of class struggle in the PCMPs in a concrete manner. But, let us state with Chesneaux that "the principal function (of Marxist theory) is not and has never been to present a general, mechanical and definitive explanation of historical development and human societies in their concrete chronology."[9]

3.4 Our final conclusion in a non-teleological sense will appear, to the eyes of a careful observer, a little naive and unfounded, but we are not responsible for the shortcomings of Marxist theory of PCMPs, of a theory of class struggle on a political/ideological level, whereas, in the case of the CMP, the theory of economic class struggle has been confirmed on several ocassions.

It is true that the theory of class struggle in the PCMP's cadre only passed temporarily from economics to ideology/politics, and current Marxist analyses on the change from one to the other seem, recently, to have had a tendency to learn some lessons from the teachings furnished by class struggles in the non-Occidental world.

[9]J. Chesnaux, *Du passé faisons table-rase?* (Paris: Máspero, 1976) p. 43.