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MEXICO: (S/ANE) LOS ZETAS USING KAIBILES TO TRAIN NEW MEMBERS (C). THE MEXICAN PARAMILITARY GROUP LOS ZETAS'S DECISION TO HIRE FORMER GUATEMALAN SPECIAL FORCES (KNOWN AS KAIBILES) AS TRAINING CADRE SUGGESTS THE ZETA LEADERSHIP NO LONGER HAS THE INTERNAL CAPABILITY TO TRAIN ITS NEW RECRUITS OR IS TRYING TO EXPAND ITS OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY.	NOT RESPONSIVE	
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	STS THE ZETA LEADERSHIP NO LONGER HAS THE INTERNAL	
CAPABILITY TO	O TRAIN ITS NEW RECRUITS OR IS TRYING TO EXPAND ITS	
	CAPABILITY. MEXICAN MILITARY AND LAW ENFORCEMENT	
	VE CAPTURED OR KILLED SEVERAL LOS ZETAS MEMBERS DURING	
THE PAST FEW	` <del></del>	
	AS FORMED IN 2001 WHEN MEMBERS OF A GROUP OF	
	ECIAL FORCES PERSONNEL DESERTED THE ARMY TO SERVE AS	
	AND ENFORCERS FOR GULF DRUG TRAFFICKING CARTEL CHIEF OSIEL	
	JILLEN <mark>. SOME 20 OF THE ORIGINAL ZETAS REMAIN ACTI</mark> VE OLICE ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS AGAINST THEIR ORGANIZATION:	
(c) FACH CONTROL	SECURITY FORCE DEPENDING ON THE SIZE OF	
THEIR ASSIGNE	ED AREA OF OPERATIONS.	
	JUNE 2005, THE ZETAS WERE CONTINUING EFFORTS TO	
	MEMBERS WITH MILITARY OR LAW ENFORCEMENT EXPERIENCE AND	
	OUGHT TO ATTRACT FORMER OR CURRENT MEXICAN SPECIAL FORCES	
	MEXICAN MILITARY'S ANTICORRUPTION EFFORTS APPARENTLY HAVE	
STYMIED THES	SE EFFORTS. HOWEVER, GUATEMALAN MILITARY DOWNSIZING FROM	
	I 2004 CREATED A POOL OF SPECIAL FORCES-TRAINED CANDIDATES	
FOR THE ZETAS	S TO DRAW ON TO TRAIN NEW ZET <mark>A ME</mark> MBERS OR OFFSET	
PERSONNEL SH		
(U) ACCORDI	NG TO MEXICAN DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL SANTIAGO,	(b)(1),1.4 (c)
	ILES ARE PROVIDING TRAINING TO ZETA RECRUITS BECAUSE OF A	
DECLINE IN FO	RCE STRENGTH OF THE ORIGINAL ZETAS. THE GUATEMALAN	
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MINISTRY OF DEFENSE IDENTIFIED FOUR KAIBILES AMONG A GROUP OF GUATEMALANS DETAINED BY MEXICAN AUTHORITIES FOR ILLEGAL WEAPONS POSSESSION IN SEPTEMBER.

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PROVINCIAL SECURITY OFFICIAL SAYED AGHA TO COMMAND THE FORCE. AMONG OTHER SECURITY POSTS, AGHA PREVIOUSLY SERVED AS SECURITY COMMANDER IN KANDAHAR WHILE SHIRZAI WAS GOVERNOR OF THAT PROVINCE.

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