

# MAESTRÍA EN ECONOMÍA

Trabajo de investigación para obtener el grado de Maestro en Economía

### Precautionary savings in Mexico

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To Leonardo, Emilia, Matías and Lara.

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## Summary

The interest in trying to understand what factors produce a high level of savings among individuals and nations has been systematically present in the development of economic thought since the classical economists. J. Maynard Keynes established a simple and direct relationship between consumption (and therefore saving) and disposable income: people increase their consumption proportionally to the increase in their (disposable) income as a "fundamental psychological law". Around 1946, Kuzntes found evidence against the prediction of the Keynesian model. This led to the emergence of life cycle and permanent income theories that, from a perspective of individual decision-making, have until now formed the basis on which to try to answer these puzzles.

Leland (1968) was the first to speak of "the precautionary demand for savings" and points out that, under the assumptions of non-satiety, risk aversion and convex marginal utility, saving increases with income uncertainty. Hall (1978) presents the rational expectation hypothesis problem that confirms Leland's hypothesis that without the proposed assumptions, the uncertainty about income, consumption (and therefore saving) does not change, making it a random walk.

There is a large number of investigations that try to demonstrate the existence of precautionary savings. These studies differ in (1) the dependent variable; (2) the measure of uncertainty and the type of data (panel or cross section) and (3) in the control variables included in the regression and, therefore, there is a great variety of results, both for and against , on the existence of precautionary savings.

Until now there was only three empirical studies for Mexico, mainly focused on the macroeconomic perspective trying to explain the relation between private savings and the uncertainty caused by inflation. The results are contradictory because there are evidence supporting the existence of precautionary savings in Mexico but, at the same time, there is also evidence of a negative correlation between financial savings and inflation, which means that precaution is not a motive to saving.

The objective of this research work is to test the hypothesis of precautionary savings using the MxFLS. To achieve this, the theory of permanent income is used to build an econometric model where it is first decomposed into its permanent and transitory parts. Subsequently, under the assumption that the average transitory income is equal to zero, the volatility of this income is estimated to incorporate it into an estimate of consumption. To prove the existence of precautionary savings in Mexico, the income volatility coefficient must be negative and significant.

The results of the econometric exercises strongly suggest the existence of precautionary reasons for saving. This is the first work in which these results are found for the case of Mexico. In addition, it is possible to point out that this precautionary reason is greater for households whose head is male and, finally, a clear relationship was found between the magnitude of the precautionary saving and the size of the town where the households reside, in particular, the saving precautionary is greater in larger cities.

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## Introduction

Friedman (1957) developed the Permanent Income Hypothesis (PIH) to describe the implications of agents' intertemporal consumption keeping in mind that people prefer to smooth their consumption throughout their lives. For this, it proposes to decompose current income into two parts: (1) permanent income (expected future income) and (2) transitory income (or unexpected). This decomposition has important implications for the intertemporal consumption decision taken by the agents and consequently with the savings pattern since, by definition, saving is the amount of income that remains after consumption and is a way to transfer present income to consume in the future. In particular, if agents observe an increase in their transitory income, the agents do not modify their current consumption decision, which implies that this additional income is completely saved, which ultimately generates an increase in wealth and, therefore, an increase in future consumption.

Because in this model agents make their consumption decisions considering their future income (which by definition is uncertain in nature), it is important to establish how agents act in the face of a change in their perception of the uncertainty about their future income. Leland (1968) coined the term precautionary savings to describe the situation in which agents decide to sacrifice a part of their current consumption (extra savings) in response to greater uncertainty about their future income. When agents anticipate the realization of a bad state of nature in which they will obtain lower incomes, they save a reserve as a precautionary measure in order to smooth their consumption, this is called precautionary savings.

The objective of the present work is to empirically demonstrate the existence of precautionary savings in Mexico using the permanent income hypothesis as a basis, exploiting for the first time for these purposes the Mexican Family Life Survey.

It is important to note that to date only three studies (Villagomez, 1998; Fuentes & Villagomez, 2001; Velandia Naranjo & van Gameren, 2016) on precautionary savings have been carried out in Mexico. The findings of these studies point to the absence of a precautionary reason in the savings of Mexican families. However, it is also important to point out some aspects that can influence the results. Firstly, two of them were carried out

from a macroeconomic perspective, so there is the possibility that the heterogeneity of Mexican families could cancel the result. Second, the theoretical context suggests the use of panel-type data, however, only one of these studies used data of this type, although with the limitation that it only follows a population of 50 years and over. In this sense, the present work contributes to test the theory from a microeconomic perspective using a panel that allows tracking all kinds of families over a period of 10 years.

The results of the econometric exercises strongly suggest the existence of precautionary reasons for saving. This is the first work in which these results are found for the case of Mexico. In addition, it is possible to point out that this precautionary reason is greater for households whose head is male; a clear relationship was found between the magnitude of the precautionary saving and the size of the town where the households reside, in particular, the saving precautionary is greater in larger cities, contrary to what was found by Villagomez (1998) and Fuentes and Villagomez (2001), and finally, the magnitude of the precautionary motive is greater for households in which the head of the family is younger than 50 years than for those where it is greater which may explain the partial evidence found by Velandia Naranjo and van Gameren (2016).

The work is organized as follows. In chapter one, a review of the literature is made, beginning by describing the process as the theoretical framework developed historically, how the interest in precautionary savings arises compared to other reasons for saving, and how this theory suggests the use of some variables for the empirical test. This same chapter also reviews the empirical results at the international level and in the case of Mexico. In chapter two, the choice of the uncertainty variable on future income is justified and the construction of the econometric model is detailed. Chapter three details aspects of the survey, on the construction of the indexes of well-being and health, as well as the summary statistics of the panel. In chapter four, the results of the different exercises carried out are presented, and finally, in chapter five, it is concluded.

## Chapter 1

### Literature review

The objective of this chapter is briefly sketch the historical development of precautionary savings theory and the way in which it was empirically tested in order to identify the relevant aspects behind the precautionary motive to save<sup>1</sup>. There are theoretical models (two and multiple periods) that predicts an increase of savings when future income are subject to uncertainty. However, the empirical evidence about the magnitude of the precautionary savings is very wide.

### 1.1 Theoretical models

#### 1.1.1 Savings in the Macroeconomic literature

The interest to try to understand which factors yield to a high level of savings among individuals and as well as nations has been present systematically in the development of the economic thinking since classics economists: Adam Smith believed in two fundamental laws of economic behaviour, one of them was the accumulation law in which savings play a central role in the capital creation; Malthus thought that savings in excess could reduce the demand generating a negative shock to the economy; Hobson considered that the unequal wealth distribution push the richer to save more just because they could not spend all their money. However, these classical authors focused on the macroeconomic perspective in their works, the role that they assigned to the individual in their arguments is virtually none (cf. Villagomez, 1998).

J. Maynard Keynes was the first trying to answer the fundamental question *Why do people save?* He proposed eight answers to the question —(among which the precautionary

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>For a comprehensive review of the theoretical literature see Baiardi *et al.* (2019)

reason stands out as the first answer— (Browning & Lusardi, 1996) and established a simple and direct relationship between consumption (and therefore savings) and disposable income: individuals increase their consumption proportionally to the increase in their (disposable) income as a 'fundamental psychological law'. Although Keynes' theory dealt with the determination of aggregate demand and national income, became the dominant paradigm during 40's and 50's of last century.

However, around the end of World War II, Simon Kuznets published their estimations of aggregate consumption<sup>2</sup> and income since 1869 putting on the table three main findings against the prediction of the Keynesian model: (i) the average propensity to consume remain constant over the span of his data while at the same time average income grew tremendously; (ii) The average propensity to consume rises during recessions and declines during expansions; (iii) Individuals' average propensity to consume declines strikingly as one moves up the income ladder (Lundberg, 1971).

The empirical findings in the work of Kuznets motivated the emerge of new theories of consumption among them the Life Cycle Hypothesis developed by Modigliani and Brumberg. These authors focused on the process of wealth accumulation and decumulation over the adult stage of the life cycle. At any given age, both income and wealth will determine the levels of consumption and savings. Thus, during the early years of adulthood, the individuals borrows in order to acquire assets. As income increases and current needs tend to stabilize, these debts are liquidated and wealth is accumulated. During retirement, the individual use the accumulated wealth in order to maintain his consumption level (Kouri, 1986).

A little bit later, Milton Friedman (1957) published a theory which offers an alternative explanation of the behavioural explained by the life cycle theory. The main point of Friedman's criticism of this theory is that the horizon for consumption decisions planning may be longer than periodicity of income receipt, that is annual income is not the best predictor of annual consumption; a better explanation of current consumption may be permanent income. These theories constitute a paradigm shift: from then until now, theoretical and empirical developments consider consumption and saving as an intertemporal individual decision.

### 1.1.2 Precautionary motive (vs other motives) in the Microeconomic literature

Keynes' other seven answers list other reasons why people save. Among the relevants from the point of view that they have been taken up for their microeconomic study are: (1) the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Discussed in more detail in the empirical section

motive of the life cycle that establishes that individuals save by anticipating a decrease in their income and an increase in their needs as they age; (2) the reason for intertemporal substitution establishes that individuals save to enjoy an appreciation of their resources and (3) the reason for precaution mentioned above in order to build a reserve against unforeseen contingencies.

Leland (1968) was the first to model "the precautionary demand for savings". In his seminal article, he model intertemporal consumption under risk and uncertainty in a two period model:

Maximize 
$$E[U(C_1, C_2)]$$
  
subject to :  
 $C_1 = (1 - k)I_1$   
 $C_2 = I_2 + (1 + r)kI_1$   
 $E(I_2) = I_2^*$   
 $E(I_2 - I_2^*)^2 = \sigma^2$   
(1.1)

where  $U(C_1, C_2)$  is a utility function to consume in periods 1 and 2.  $I_1$  is the fixed income in period 1, and  $I_2$  is the random income in period 2. The last two restrictions describe the moments of the distribution of  $I_2$  (i.e. the mean and variance of future income), and k is the control variable, which measure the savings rate. In this framework, Leland points out that, under the assumptions of non-satiation, risk aversion and convex marginal utility, savings  $(kI_1)$  increase with income uncertainty  $(\sigma^2)$ .

Hall (1978) introduce to the problem the rational expectation hypothesis, assuming a quadratic utility function, which confirm Leland statement that under this type of utility function "optimal saving would not be affected by the degree of uncertainty" (Leland, 1968, p. 467). However, his research put on the table the fact that the Permanent Income Hypothesis does not exactly capture consumption behavior.

Kimball (1990) think in this phenomena as the consumer's propensity to prepare to future uncertainty and develop a prudence theory analogue to the risk aversion theory by Pratt. When utility is additive separable the absolute prudence coefficient measure the strength of the precautionary savings:  $\varphi = -\frac{u'''(\cdot)}{u''(\cdot)}$ . Researches using this measure and the relative prudence coefficient are able to find evidence of precautionary savings. Kimball also define the Equivalent Precautionary Premium (EPP) as a proxy of the effect of uncertainty on consumption and savings –researches using EPP as the uncertainty measure also find evidence of precautionary savings (Carroll, 1994; Carroll & Samwick, 1998).

Carroll (1997) argues that savings are better described as buffer-stock if consumers with significant income uncertainty are impatient. When the consumer also face liquidity

constraints (binding or with positive probability to be binding in the future) these constitute by itself a motive for precautionary savings (Carroll & Kimball, 2001). However, risk have no added precautionary savings effect for those who initially face liquidity constraints. Carroll and Kimball (2001, 2016) shows the complex relationship between precautionary savings and uncertainty, risk aversion, liquidity constraints, time preferences, permanent income, initial level of wealth among other factors.

Another branch of the precautionary savings theory begun with the seminal works of Sandmo (1970) and Rothchild & Stiglitz (1971) where the main source of uncertainty is considered to come from the interest rate. In this literature, precautionary savings depend on the magnitude of the relative prudence index (which is nothing more than the aforementioned absolute prudence index adjusted for wealth) (Li, 2012; Liu & Menegatti, 2017). Baiardi (2014) consider labour and interest rate risks –the recent literature considering the presence of multiple risks (contemporaneous and background) is growing– in this framework precautionary savings not only depends on prudence,but on cross-prudence and on the size and the sign of the correlation between them.

The most usual theoretical model to estimate the existence and magnitude of precautionary savings is a problem of intertemporal maximization where the individual (household) has to decide how much of his income he spends to consume today and how much he saves to be able to consume in the future (A. Deaton, 1991; Lusardi, 1993):

$$\begin{aligned}
& \underset{C_{t+j}}{\text{Max}} \quad E_t \left[ \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} (1+\delta)^{-j} U(C_{t+j}) \right] \\
& \text{S.t.} \quad \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \frac{1}{(1+r)^j} E_t(C_{t+j}) = A_t + \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \frac{1}{(1+r)^j} E_t(Y_{t+j}) \end{aligned} \tag{1.2}$$

where  $E_t$  is the expectation conditional on the available information at time t,  $U(\cdot)$  is the instantaneous utility function,  $C_t$  denotes consumption in period t,  $A_0$  is the initial wealth,  $Y_t$  is the monetary income at time t and for simplicity I assume that the subjective discount factor is equal to the non-stochastic interest rate r.

In general two forms of the utility function are used: constant relative risk aversion  $(CRRA) - U(C) = (1 - \gamma)^{-1}C^{1-\gamma}$  — and the constant absolute risk aversion  $(CARA) - U(C) = -\theta^{-1}e^{-\theta C}$ . Depending on the shape of the utility function, savings does not depend on the uncertainty or savings depend on uncertainty but not on the wealth levels or savings depend on both uncertainty and on the wealth levels (i.e. the precautionary motive is different for poor and rich).

As it was said before, life-cycle or permanent income models fail to explain the "consumption puzzles" but the precautionary savings theory can explain the excess of

smoothness of consumption, the excess of sensitivity (Zeldes, 1989) and the persistent growth of consumption (A. Deaton, 1987). In addition, Weil (1993) state out that consumers prudence is reinforced by larger income risk, stronger risk aversion, weaker distaste for intertemporal substitution (i.e. weaker desire for consumption smoothing), higher interest rates and the persistence of income shocks (it also increase precautionary savings). In order to address the consumption puzzles, habit formation (actual consumption depends on past consumption) is included in models of precautionary savings but the evidence in this modified models is not conclusive.

#### 1.1.3 Relevant dependent variables

The researches trying to demonstrate the existence of precautionary savings differ each other on three main aspects: (i) dependent variable; (ii) uncertainty measure; and (iii) the controls<sup>3</sup>.

The most common dependent variables used are: consumption (level and/or growth) – expected negative relation–, savings (level and/or growth on savings rate) and wealth (which is by definition the accumulation of savings or possessions over time), but other authors also has been used wealth-to-income ratio –expected positive relation. This variety in the use of dependent variables reflects the different edges from which the problem of intertemporal maximization can be addressed.

Regarding uncertainty measures, it is important to note that, contrary to the dependent variables, there is no consensus on which to use or how to approximate it. Theoretically, the relation is between the expected future consumption growth and the conditional variance of the consumption growth rate but the latter is endogenous so its approximated with other variables trying to capture uncertainty on future income growth. Usually the choice of the uncertainty variable mostly depends on the type of data<sup>4</sup>.

A wide variety of uncertainty measures –objective or subjective, for example: estimated income variability, variability of consumption/expenditure, belief of being unemployed and unemployment rate to mention some– not based on theory are widely used in empirical exercises to prove the existence and magnitude of precautionary savings. Several authors consider that a good measure of the uncertainty of labor income may be income volatility or

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>Another important recent branch of this literature is concern in finding an estimate of the coefficient of relative risk aversion

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>The advantages of macroeconomic data are (i) availability, (ii) time dimension (iii) it's possible compare countries, regions, or areas. However, the aggregate measures of uncertainty may not be a good indicator of the uncertainty faced by individuals. Micro data are very heterogeneous because it comes from surveys generally not designed to address this specific issue

the standard deviation of the percentage change in the value of wealth (Zeldes, 1989; Carroll, Hall, & Zeldes, 1992a; Lusardi, 1993). In both cases there is strong evidence supporting the existence of precautionary savings in the UK (Guariglia & Rossi, 2002) and the US (Kazarosian, 1997; Carroll & Samwick, 1998).

Precautionary savings also depend on both individual characteristics. For example, age, sex, education (may be negatively correlated with the intertemporal substitution preferences), income (decomposed into permanent and transitory components), past consumption (to capture habit formation), family size (composition), existence/number of children, dependent children (adulthood), number of income recipients (precautionary savings may depend on the family structure), race, marital status, health (unhealthy people may save more than healthy ones, taking into account the public health system), occupation (self-employed its expected to save mare because their income is more variable, also could be selection-bias), financial literacy, etc.

#### **1.2** Empirical findings

#### **1.2.1** International evidence

Precautionary savings theory has been tested at both micro and macro level with no conclusive results. Moreover, among those studies finding evidence of the existence of precautionary savings, there's no consensus about the magnitude of the precautionary motive for savings nor how to measure uncertainty. As noted in the previous section When the marginal utility is increasing and convex, uncertainty affects consumption decisions generating precautionary savings. With this in mind, below is a brief review of the most relevant empirical works to show the reader the variety of approaches that have been used to test this theory<sup>5</sup>.

Among the studies that have found evidence in favor of precautionary savings are those carried out by Hall and Mishkin (1982), Campbell (1987), Zeldes (1989), Caballero (1990), Deaton (1991), Carroll (1994), among others. In general, papers that directly test the effect of future income uncertainty on consumption or savings rates using microdata tend to provide robust results about the existence of precautionary savings. Caballero (1990) and Weil (1993) show that the magnitude of precautionary savings increases as the variance of the income generating process increases and its persistence increases.

Bande and Rivero (2013) use the Great Recession to test whether there is evidence of precautionary savings in Spain. The recession was followed by an increase in the private

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>For a detailed revision see Lugilde et. al. (2019)

savings rate in Europe, especially in Spain. This increase in the savings rate in Spain coincides with an unprecedented increase in the unemployment rate. The authors note that this relationship is seen more clearly for Spain than in the rest of Europe, which suggests a positive relationship between the unemployment rate and the private savings rate.

The authors use regional data from 17 regions of Spain for the period 1980 - 2007. The analysis is of a macroeconomic nature. The authors approximate the uncertainty measure by taking the square of the transitory income, so they first fit an ARMA model to the GDP to decompose the income into its permanent and transitory components.

In a static version of the model, the authors found significant evidence at 10% of the existence of precautionary savings, however, when changing the measure of uncertainty for the unemployment rate, the evidence became stronger and when they combined the measures of uncertainty, only significant the unemployment rate. Therefore, evidence in favor of precautionary savings in Spain.

Carrol (1994) uses data from the United States to test, on the one hand, if the theoretical predictions of the PIH model are verified and, secondly, the precautionary saving hypothesis. For the first exercise Carroll finds that current consumption is strongly related to predictable changes in current income but is not related to predictable changes in lifetime income.

When it comes to precautionary savings, Carroll finds that the degree of uncertainty in future income induces agents to consume less (i.e. evidence of precautionary savings) using standard deviation and variance of income and the equivalent precautionary premium as uncertainty measures. The author uses two data sources for his analysis the Consumers Expenditure Survey (CEX) and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) using the econometric technique called Two Sample Two-Stages Least Squares (TS2SLS), which allows estimation of the first stage of a 2SLS in one sample and estimation of the second stage on a different sample.

Their results show that by taking any of the 3 uncertainty measures, the coefficient is negative, although it is only significant for the EPP. suggesting that an increase in one standard deviation in uncertainty reduces consumption by 3 to 5 percent.

Benito (2006) tests the hypothesis of precautionary savings for British households using the risk of losing their job as a measure of uncertainty. It is important to note that the consumption measure that it uses is consumption in food. Although to broaden the scope, the proposal to postpone the purchase of durable goods as a function of the loss of employment is also studied.

The paper uses two approaches to consider the role of job insecurity. In the first, a question from the survey about the belief of becoming unemployed for the next 12 months is exploited, while in the second, an estimate is made of the probability of moving to

unemployment (in the same period of time).

The paper uses the British Households Panel Survey (BHPS) for the years between 1992 and 1998. The author finds that the insecurity effect of keeping employment has significant and negative effects on current consumption: an increase of one percentage point in the probability of losing a job translates in a reduction of household consumption of 0.7%. Furthermore, they find that the effect is greater for young households based on observable characteristics such as education level, union membership, age, health, sex, size of workplace among others.

An important exercise in the empirical literature is to estimate the coefficient of relative risk aversion (Deidda, 2013; Blundell, Etheridge, & Stoker, 2014; Baiardi, Manera, & Menegatti, 2013; Dynan, 1993) under the assumption of CRRA utility functions, applying the second-order Taylor approximation of the Euler equation:

$$E_t\left(\frac{C_{t+1}-C_t}{C_t}\right) = EIS\left(\frac{r-\delta}{1+r}\right) + \frac{\rho}{2}E_t\left[\left(\frac{C_{t+1}-C_t}{C_t}\right)^2\right]$$
(1.3)

where  $EIS \equiv -U'/(U''C_t)$  is the inverse of the coefficient of relative risk aversion,  $\rho = -(U'''/U'')C_t$  i the coefficient of relative prudence, and the second moment of the expected consumption growth its a measure of the expected consumption risk. The size of  $\rho$  determines the strength of precautionary savings.

#### 1.2.2 Evidence from Mexico

Until now there are only three empirical studies for Mexico, two of them focused on the macroeconomic perspective trying to explain the relation between private savings and the uncertainty caused by inflation. The results are contradictory because there are evidence supporting the existence of precautionary savings in Mexico but, at the same time, there is also evidence of a negative correlation between financial savings and inflation, which means that precaution is not a motive to saving.

Villagomez (1998) try to explain the fall in the private savings rate in Mexico (macroeconomic approach) at the beginning of the 90's due to a reduction of the liquidity constraints in a Life-Cycle framework. An important assumption of these models is that individuals can borrow or lend any amount at a fixed interest rate as long as they end with no debts or wealth, i.e. perfect capital mobility. If the capital market experience credit quantitative rationing due to asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders or differential interest rates there are liquidity constraints that deviate individuals consumption from their optimal path.

Villagomez consider two types of representative consumers, a fraction  $\lambda$  facing liquidity constraints and the others acting according to the Permanent Income Hypothesis under rational expectations. To estimate the impact of the financial liberalization during the late 80's the author include in the model an interaction term between a dummy variable (zero before the liberalization) and  $\lambda$ . The regression was estimated using instrumental variables and the results confirms the relevance of the liquidity constraints (around 50 % of the total population), it also shows there are a positive and significant correlation between the reduction in the liquidity constraints and the fall in the private savings rate. These conclusions are opposed in relation to the existence of precautionary savings in Mexico.

Fuentes and Villagomez (2001) using a Mexican households synthetic panel –constructed from the National Survey of Households Income and Expenditure (ENIGH)– from 1984 to 1996 in a standard version of Modigliani's model. The authors point out that with this kind of surveys, it's difficult observe consumption (i.e. expenditure is different than consumption) so they defined consumption in two ways. Expenditure in: (1) non-durable goods, education, health, imputed rent and transfers; (2) including durable goods, capital and house. They took income as the monetary income plus non-monetary income. They consider population between 15 and 65 years old. Due to the dataset construction their estimations carry on a linear combination of three simultaneous effects (concerning with: (i) the economy cycle; (ii) generation differences; and (iii) life-cycle). To analysed them separately they uses a decomposition technique proposed by Deaton (1991). To identify the lower income population they used four approaches: (i) split the sample into urban and rural areas; (ii) accordingly to the ownership of financial assets; (iii) by income percentiles; and (iv) accordingly to their education level (because it is well known that this variable is a good approximation to the permanent income).

Their data show an increasing saving rate belong the period until 1996 when the financial crises affect the household savings negatively. They also show that aggregate savings rate reach the minimum between 30 to 50 years (i.e. approximate at the middle of the labor life – contrary to the theoretic prediction–). When they used the areas approach to identify low income population they find larger cohort effects and an increasing saving rate along the life-cycle to those living in rural areas. When they used the financial assets ownership approach they find exactly the opposite (this estimation is not robust because the small number of observations and due to the endogeinity between the financial assets ownership and the savings rate). When they used income percentile, the cohort effect suggest that those below the 20th percentile save more near the end of their labour life, also the generational effects are opposite than expected: older cohorts save more than younger cohorts (may be due to a selection bias). For the exercise using schooling level, the cohort effect is not monotone

decreasing and the age effect show that for those with low scholar level the savings rate reach the minimum at 35 years old and then is increasing until 60 years while for the most educated people the savings rate are always increasing. These results are opposite than those predicted by the life-cycle model (U-shape vs inverted U-shape). The authors consider this is because the possible existence of both liquidity constraints and precautionary savings.

Finally, Velandia Naranjo and van Gameren (2016) is the only empirical study made form the microeconomic perspective. They consider that lower rates of (1) insurance coverage and (2) entitlement to a retirement pension may result in a greater uncertainty about the future (relative to other countries with better social protection systems), situation that may cause the emergence of precautory motive to save. They estimate a relation between accumulated wealth (financial and total net wealth) and uncertainty to see if there's precautionary wealth (accumulation of precautionary savings) component.

If there's a positive relation between risk and accumulated wealth, uncovered population must have greater accumulated wealth than those covered. They used the Mexican Health and Aging Study 2003 (MHAS) that allows them to include different liquidity assets in the measures of wealth. They also control for others potential motives to wealth accumulation. To account for the fact that risk may affect individuals differently according with their wealth level the authors run a quantile instrumental variable regressions. However, they don't find a robust negative relationship between wealth and uncertainty. They find higher positive savings among those with insurance in the median and the upper quartile and no effect in the two firts quartiles.

## Chapter 2

## **Econometric Framework**

The objective of this section is to establish a theoretical framework for the econometric analysis, thus I will explain how I expect uncertainty affect consumption and therefore saving decisions and also I will explain the way in which I incorporate uncertainty into the analysis.

#### 2.1 A measure of uncertainty

As it was said before, Leland (1968) and Modigliani (2019) shown that under some properties of the utility function, an increase in the uncertainty in future income translates in a reduction of current consumption, i.e. into a precautionary savings. To test empirically this hypothesis the first issue to address is to determine the measure of uncertainty.

In both of the theoretical models, the path of consumption is described by an Euler equation relating the expected future consumption growth with their variance. Carroll (1992b) state that this cant be estimated because the variance of the consumption growth may be determined simultaneously with the accumulation of wealth. Other researchers have proposed to use the unemployment rate as a proxy of the uncertainty of the future income (Deaton, 2011).

Since the vast majority of consumers get their income from labor, the risk of future unemployment could be a good measure of uncertainty, however, the the characteristics of the Mexican labor market, especially the high degree of informal labor, suggest a high degree of substitution between the formal and informal markets, that is, a person who loses a formal job can join the informal market almost immediately, reducing the fall in their income, which implies that unemployment (aside from being a more appropriate measure for a macroeconomic approach to the problem) is not a good measure in the case of Mexico, a better measure would be the informality rate as Velandia Naranjo and van Gameren (2016) somehow tried to control. However, because in this work the analysis will be carried out at the household level, informality is also not a good measure to measure income uncertainty, therefore, in this work I will use the income volatility technique mentioned above that although it is a measure that is not theory based, it allows avoid the endogeneity indicated above, since this occurs in the volatility of the variance of consumption. Specifically, I will consider the standard Permanent Income Hypothesis to test the existence and the magnitude of the precautionary savings motive from the variability of the transitory component of monetary income.

### 2.2 Estimation Strategy

Given the above, in this work a two-stage strategy will be used. In the first stage, the income will be decomposed into its permanent and transitory parts, for which the following regression will be estimated:

$$Y_{i,t} = \mathbf{X}'_{i,t}\beta + \varepsilon_{i,t} \tag{2.1}$$

where  $Y_{i,t}$  denotes the logarithm of the monetary income for household *i* at round *t*,  $\mathbf{X}'_{i,t}$  it is a set of control variables at the household level (size of the locality of residence, index of well-being, the household head's sex, age, education, health index, condition of insurance, condition of occupation) and a term for each household (which has to be determined with statistical tests if it should be fixed or random) and  $\varepsilon_t$  is the error term. In this context, the transitory income is equal to the estimated errors, so under the assumptions of the classical regression model, its first two central moments (see equation 1.1) are  $E(\varepsilon_{i,t}) = 0$  and  $E(\varepsilon_{i,t}^2) = \hat{\sigma}_{i,t}^2$ , the latter being the one used as the measure of uncertainty and it is assumed to be variant over time and between households.

As it was said before, a sufficient condition in order to have precautionary savings is the convexity of the marginal utility so I will assume that the utility function takes the form of a Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA). So under these assumptions (and taking the second order Taylor approximation to linearize) the regression that will be estimated in the second stage of the econometric strategy is:

$$C_{i,t} = \mathbf{X}'_{i,\mathbf{t}}\gamma + \mathbf{Y}_{i,\mathbf{t}}\alpha_1 + \varepsilon_{i,\mathbf{t}}^2\alpha_2 + \eta_{i,t}$$
(2.2)

where  $C_{i,t}$  stands for the logarithm of consumption of household *i* at round *t*,  $\mathbf{X}'_{i,t}$  it is the same set of control variables used in the first stage,  $\mathbf{Y}_{i,t}$  is the logarithm of monetary income as mentioned above,  $\varepsilon_{i,t}^2$  is the volatility of the transitory monetary income estimated in the first stage and  $\eta_{i,t}$  is the error term.

## Chapter 3

### Data

The theoretical literature suggest the use of panel data, however, until relatively recently Mexico did not have an adequate panel to test the precautionary saving hypothesis. In this research, the 3 rounds of the Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS) will be exploited for the first time for these purposes.

#### 3.1 The Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS)

The MxFLS is the result of a joint collaboration between the best academic institutions in Mexico and whose main objective is to have a multi-thematic and longitudinal database. So far, 3 monitoring rounds have been carried out, including the baseline survey each of them with information at the individual, household and community levels. During the first survey carried out in 2002, interviews were conducted with 8,400 households throughout the country. The subsequent rounds were carried out during 2005-2006 and 2009-2012, respectively.

All longitudinal-section survey faces attrition problems derived from (1) the lack of answers and / or (2) the sociodemographic changes in the original sample. To solve these problems, the MxFLS does a natural refreshment of the sample, incorporating individuals who are added to the original households, however, I consider only interviewed households in the three rounds (7,332) which constitutes nearly the 87 % of the original sample.

The survey allows inferences to be made about the Mexican population at the national, urban-rural and regional levels. For these purposes, each book of the survey has crosssectional and longitudinal expansion factors (except for the basal round), however, the survey documentation does not indicate how to mix these weights when using data from different books. There is the possibility of adjusting the existing factors based on the response rate, however, it is an exercise that goes beyond the scope of this work, so it is important to note that the expansion factors were omitted in all the estimates made under the consideration that there is a large enough sample.

Because the survey contains information at the individual and household level on the same aspects, significant inconsistencies result. To solve this problem, the decision was made to carry out the analysis at the household level, but where possible, individual information (only family members was considered) was used to construct the variables at the desired level, however, it is worth noting that this procedure did not always result in better quality information, so in these cases the aggregate information was taken. At the end of this exercise, a database with 80 constructed variables was obtained.

#### **3.2** Wealth and health indexes construction

Because in the database there are multiple variables (self-reported and observed by the interviewer) related to the characteristics of the home (number of rooms, material of floors, walls and ceilings, etc.) and also on the state of health of the individuals, it was decided to group these variables into indexes by means of multiple correspondence analysis, in order to reduce the number of controls.

The construction of the household well-being index was carried out for each of the rounds of the interview and a set of 15 variables including telephone tenure, type of property of the house, if the house has a kitchen, number of rooms to sleep, source of the drinking water, possession of a toilet, type of house, if the house has electricity, floor material, wall and roof, among others (see Table A1 for a summary statistics of these variables) was used for this, resulting in a total of 31 dimensions. The analysis was carried out using principal normalization and only the first dimension was taken. For the first round, this first dimension explains around 69.38 % of the inertia, for the second round 72.11 % and for the third round only 41.31 % (see Table A2 for details).

For the construction of the health index, only 4 self-reported variables are used: how is their health, if they stopped their activities due to illness, how was their health a year ago and how do they think their health is compared to that of other people of the same age and sex (see Table A4 for a summary statistics of these variables) in order to maximize the number of observations on which the analysis is performed. In addition, this index is calculated for each of the household members for whom there is information but the value of the household was imputed to whole household. Out of a total of 5 dimensions, only the first one is considered. The inertia explained by this dimension for the first round is 71.13 %, for the second 41.9 % and for the third 64.28 % (see Table A5 for details).

Since the analysis can be understood as a generalization of the principal component

analysis (where dichotomous and categorical variables are analyzed instead of continuous), the construction of both indexes was performed normalizing by the main component and the weights (see Tables A3 and A6 for details) were rescaled so that these were contained in the interval [0, 1].

#### 3.3 Income and Consumption construction

Because the consumption and income variables are fundamental for this research, some lines will be used to explain how they were constructed from questions from the MxFLS.

Following Villagomez's (1998) considerations to infer consumption from spending data, the consumption variable in this work includes household spending on: food (inside and outside the home), transportation, tobacco and alcoholic beverages, articles personal, household cleaning supplies and entertainment.

With respect to income, only the monetary income of the main activity was considered, which in most cases was wages and salaries, in some other cases, this monetary income corresponds to the profits of non-agricultural businesses and finally, for the The rest of the cases this income corresponds to the earnings of agricultural and rural businesses.

Table 3.1 shows the summary statistics of the variables already mentioned as well as other explanatory variables. As it can be seen 80 % of the households are headed by men, the average age of the heads of the household is almost 51 years. It is also important to note that despite the fact that on average 1.5 household members work only 40 % of households are insured, this may have an impact on precautionary savings decisions. Finally, it is also important to note that the volatility of income is much greater than that of consumption, which possibly indicates, first, that households smooth their consumption and, second, it is possible for households to act rationally in the face of the volatility of their income.

Variable		Mean	Std. Dev.	Observations
Wealth	overall	0.2046655	0.1933933	N = 21996
index	between		0.1357755	n = 7332
	within		0.1377231	T = 3
Male	overall	0.8008729	0.3993529	N = 21996
Household	between		0.3993711	n = 7332
Head	within		0	T = 3
Age of	overall	50.83252	15.1315	N = 20456
Household	between		15.16999	n = 7332
Head	within		3.188616	T = 2.78996
Health	overall	0.9174636	0.0603941	N = 21614
index	between		0.0266683	n = 7332
	within		0.0542563	T = 2.9479
With insurance	overall	0.4000185	0.4899131	N = 21614
condition	between		0.4020395	n = 7332
	within		0.280691	T = 2.9479
Working household	overall	1.532109	1.143059	N = 21614
members	between		0.9123988	n = 7332
	within		0.6898676	T = 2.9479
Log of	overall	7.401173	1.97893	N = 21996
consumption	between		1.284347	n = 7332
	within		1.505579	T = 3
Log of	overall	5.800247	3.809416	N = 21996
Income	between		2.695806	n = 7332
	within		2.691642	T = 3
	Observations	Round 1	Round 2	Round 3
Locality	1 (> 100, 000)	2,697	2,774	2,648
size	2(15,000-99,000)	679	737	743
	3(2,500-15,000)	800	899	718
	$4 \ (< 2, 500)$	3,156	2,922	3,210

Table 3.1. Summary statistics of relevant variables

## Chapter 4

### Results

This chapter presents the way in which it was determined if the model to be estimated should contain fixed, random or none effects. Later, the results of the regressions for the complete sample and for different sub-samples are presented: by sex, size of locality and age groups. The results obtained in the different econometric exercises suggest the existence of precautionary savings in Mexico.

#### 4.1 Random *v.s.* Fixed effects

Because the data is panel-type, the first issue to be resolved is determining whether the aforementioned model should be estimated by fixed effects or random effects, for which reason the Sargan-Hansen and Breush-Pagan lagrange multiplier tests were performed in order to determine what is the best specification.

A test of fixed vs. random effects can also be seen as a test of overidentifying restrictions. The fixed effects estimator uses the orthogonality conditions that the regressors are uncorrelated with the idiosyncratic error  $\varepsilon_{it}$ . The random effects estimator uses the additional orthogonality conditions that the regressors are uncorrelated with the group-specific error  $u_i$  (the "random effect"). These additional orthogonality conditions are overidentifying restrictions.

The Sargan-Hansen test is implemented using the artificial regression approach described by Arellano (1993) and Wooldridge (2010), in which a random effects equation is reestimated augmented with additional variables consisting of the original regressors transformed into deviations-from-mean form. Under conditional homoskedasticity, this test statistic is asymptotically equivalent to the usual Hausman fixed-vs-random effects test; with a balanced panel, the artificial regression and Hausman test statistics are numerically equal. These tests were carried out for both stages of the econometric strategy with the full sample, obtaining the following results for the first stage both Sargan-Hansen  $(\chi^2(7) = 126.47)$  and the Breusch-Pagan  $(\chi^2(1) = 198.09)$  indicate that the best specification of the model is with random effects. These result are verified in the second stage (Sargan-Hansen  $(\chi^2(9) = 111.65)$  and the Breusch-Pagan  $(\chi^2(1) = 92.15))$ ). For the rest of the econometric exercises, it was only possible to estimate the Breusch-Pagan test due to the limited observations, the statistical values are presented at the end of each of the results tables.

From the foregoing, it can be concluded with considerable certainty that the best model is the random effects, however, the results of the regressions will be presented under the three models (random effects, fixed and pooled effects) to verify the sensitivity of the results.

#### 4.2 First stage: Income uncertainty measure

Tables A7 to A15 shows the results of the first stage under the 3 specifications (random effects, fixed effects and OLS) for different samples (complete, by sex of the head of the household, by size of locality and by age of the head of the household). As can be seen, in most econometric exercises the coefficients reflect the expected sign and are significant.

Considering the complete sample (Table A7), the regression coefficients are quite similar between the random and grouped effects specifications, while for the model considering fixed effects, the coefficients even have the opposite sign. It is worth noting that the variables that are consistently significant are the sex of the head of the household (indicating that the income is higher if the head is male), age of the head of the household (noting that as age increases, a lower income), educational level of the head of the household (the higher the educational level, the higher the income), health (better self-perceived health, higher income) and occupation status (higher income for the employed), which is logical.

For the sub-samples by sex of household head (Tables A8 and A9) the first difference that stands out is that for households headed by a man the size of the locality where they reside is important to explain their level of income, while for households headed by women no, however, it can also be seen that one more year of schooling translates into higher income for female households than for male households.

Tables A10 - A13 show the results for sub-samples by size of locality. As can be seen, the health index is an important variable in determining household income only in large cities. On the contrary, the sex of the head of the household is important in all locality sizes except in large cities, which is logical considering that in these policies to reduce discrimination have been successfully implemented.

Finally, Tables A14 and A15 show the results for the sub-samples by age group. As can be seen, the size of the locality is not a relevant variable to explain the household income of any of the age groups. In both age groups, income has a positive correlation both with sex and with the education of the head of the household, although the correlation between income and sex is greater if the head of the household is younger than 50 years, while the correlation between the income and education is higher for households whose head is over 50 years.

#### 4.3 Econometric models

Table 4.1 shows the results of the second stage regression for the full sample in which the existence and magnitude of the precautionary saving can be inferred. As mentioned above, precautionary savings are nothing more than extraordinary savings (that is, a decrease in consumption) made by households in the face of an increase in uncertainty, therefore, it can be affirmed that an increase of one standard deviation in the volatility of monetary income reduces current household consumption by 5.78 % in Mexico there is precautionary saving. It is not noting that in all three specifications the coefficients are highly significant and, in addition, quite close in terms of their magnitude, which in no other empirical work for Mexico had been found.

#### 4.3.1 Female *v.s.* Male Households

In this context it is important to find out if the behavior of the households is different depending on the sex of the head of the household. Tables 4.2 and 4.3 show the results of this exercise that had not been carried out in the previous literature for the case of Mexico.

The first thing that is important to note is that in both cases, there is strong evidence to affirm that, regardless of the sex of the head of the family, Mexican households make precautionary savings (despite the fact that households with a female head of household represent only 20 % of the sample). The second relevant fact is that male-headed households have higher precautionary savings (an increase of one standard deviation in income volatility represents a decrease in current consumption of 7.06 %) than female-headed households (the reduction in consumption is 2.92%), fact that it may be little intuitive but it can be explained by the fact that culturally in Mexico men are in charge of bringing income to the home, even when there is no longer a relationship between parents.

#### 4.3.2 Urban v.s. Rural areas

The results are presented in Tables 4.4-4.7 separating the sample for the different sizes of the locality where the households reside. Villagomez (1998) carried out a similar exercise dividing the sample into rural and urban areas in order to differentiate the impact of precautionary savings between rich households (living in urban areas) and poor households (living in rural areas).

As can be seen, there is robust evidence to point out that, regardless of the size of the locality of residence, Mexican households save precautionarily. Furthermore, the magnitudes of the coefficients allow establishing a direct relationship between the level of precautionary savings and the size of the locality, that is, the greater the size of the locality where the household resides, the greater the level of precautionary savings they make.

This result seems to contradict the theoretical predictions if one thinks that the households that reside in smaller localities tend to dedicate themselves to agricultural activities that present greater volatility in their income, however, it is reasonable to suppose, first, that a greater competition for jobs work can increase income volatility in urban areas and, secondly, for these households it is more difficult to re-channel their income to meet their needs and fulfill their obligations, unlike households that reside in rural areas, which is why it is reasonable to suppose that they have to foresee more.

#### 4.3.3 Age groups

Finally, Tables 4.8 and 4.9 present the results of the exercise considering two age groups of the heads of the household in order to be able to compare with the results obtained by Velandia Naranjo and Van Gameren(2016).

For this exercise, the sample was divided into two groups according to the age of the head of the family. In the first group, households whose head of household is under 50 years of age were considered, and in the second group, those households whose head was over 50 years.

In this exercise, robust evidence in favor of the existence of precautionary savings in Mexico can be seen again, so it is possible to affirm that, regardless of the age of the head of the household, Mexican households make precautionary savings, a result that agrees with the partial evidence on the existence of precautionary savings in Mexico found by Velandia Naranjo and Van Gameren(2016).

Additionally, it can be seen that the level of these savings is almost double for young households (an increase of one standard deviation in the uncertainty about future income translates into a reduction of almost 9.28 % in current consumption) than for older

households (precautionary savings of 4.82% compared to a similar increase) which implies that younger households are better prepared (better understand the consequences) to face difficult situations.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	
	Random Effects	Fixed Effects	OLS	
ARIABLES Log Consumption				
Income volatility	-0.0289***	-0.0225***	-0.0284***	
	(0.00212)	(0.00324)	(0.00234)	
Locality between 15 and 100 thousand	$0.107^{***}$	0.153	0.103***	
	(0.0384)	(0.0975)	(0.0336)	
Locality between 2.5 and 15 thousand	0.197***	0.0960	0.187***	
	(0.0354)	(0.123)	(0.0304)	
Locality less than 2.5 thousand	0.299***	-0.0257	0.298***	
	(0.0262)	(0.104)	(0.0313)	
Wealth	-1.005***	-0.984***	-1.028***	
	(0.0677)	(0.0743)	(0.0535)	
Sex of Household Head	$0.141^{***}$		0.140***	
	(0.0277)		(0.0259)	
Age of Household Head	-0.0203***	-0.0185***	-0.0202***	
	(0.00108)	(0.00330)	(0.00112)	
Education of Household Head	$0.141^{***}$	$0.215^{***}$	0.132***	
	(0.00595)	(0.0134)	(0.00598)	
Health	$1.450^{***}$	$1.606^{***}$	$1.346^{***}$	
	(0.179)	(0.189)	(0.152)	
Insurance	$0.707^{***}$	$0.519^{***}$	$0.718^{***}$	
	(0.0414)	(0.0511)	(0.0493)	
Working household members	$0.705^{***}$	$0.528^{***}$	$0.695^{***}$	
	(0.0441)	(0.0618)	(0.0479)	
Log Income	0.0289***	$0.0258^{***}$	$0.0300^{***}$	
	(0.00367)	(0.00469)	(0.00371)	
Constant	5.830***	$5.663^{***}$	5.954***	
	(0.188)	(0.185)	(0.151)	
Observations	$21,\!504$	21,504	21,504	
R-squared		0.118	0.169	
Number of Households	7,332	7,332		
Robust standard errors in parentheses	*** p<0	0.01, ** p<0.05,	* p<0.1	
Sargan-Hansen statistic	103.38	$\chi^2(11)$	P-value = 0.000	
Breusch-Pagan LM	88.04	$\chi^2(1)$	P-value = 0.000	

### Table 4.1. Log Consumption

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Random Effects	Fixed Effects	OLS
VARIABLES	L	og Consumptio	on
Income volatility	-0.0146***	-0.00472	-0.0152***
	(0.00376)	(0.00501)	(0.00281)
Locality between 15 and 100 thousand	0.222***	0.0417	$0.218^{***}$
	(0.0774)	(0.198)	(0.0676)
Locality between 2.5 and 15 thousand	0.102	-0.345	$0.106^{*}$
	(0.0904)	(0.276)	(0.0624)
Locality less than 2.5 thousand	$0.371^{***}$	0.184	$0.365^{***}$
	(0.0620)	(0.210)	(0.0503)
Wealth	-1.214***	-1.036***	-1.256***
	(0.140)	(0.189)	(0.0891)
Age of Household Head	-0.0168***	-0.00933*	-0.0168***
	(0.00157)	(0.00566)	(0.00217)
Education of Household Head	$0.114^{***}$	$0.157^{***}$	$0.109^{***}$
	(0.0120)	(0.0233)	(0.00828)
Health	$1.474^{***}$	$1.768^{***}$	1.337***
	(0.519)	(0.461)	(0.440)
Insurance	0.447***	0.420***	$0.448^{***}$
	(0.0627)	(0.100)	(0.0556)
Working household members	0.473***	0.194*	0.487***
	(0.105)	(0.114)	(0.0747)
Log Income	0.0363***	0.0263***	0.0385***
	(0.00802)	(0.00880)	(0.00857)
Constant	5.746***	5.215***	5.902***
	(0.496)	(0.532)	(0.390)
Observations	4,259	4,259	4,259
R-squared		0.107	0.184
Number of Households	1,460	$1,\!460$	
Robust Standard errors in parentheses	*** p<0	.01, ** p<0.05,	* p<0.1
Breusch-Pagan LM	7.98	$\chi^{2}(1)$	P-value = 0.002

Table 4.2.	Log Consumption	(Female Household Head)
<b>I</b> UDIC 1.2.	Log Combumption	(I cillate Household Head)

0	•		/
	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Random Effects	Fixed Effects	OLS
VARIABLES	L	og Consumptio	n
Income volatility	-0.0353***	-0.0283***	-0.0344***
	(0.00306)	(0.00382)	(0.00286)
Locality between 15 and 100 thousand	0.0908**	0.213	0.0868**
	(0.0399)	(0.134)	(0.0373)
Locality between 2.5 and 15 thousand	0.239***	0.202	$0.225^{***}$
Locally sourced 2.0 and 10 choadand	(0.0498)	(0.133)	(0.0402)
Locality less than 2.5 thousand	$0.294^{***}$	-0.0952	0.295***
	(0.0317)	(0.154)	(0.0294)
Wealth	-0.928***	-0.953***	-0.949***
Wearth	(0.0648)	(0.0859)	(0.0674)
Age of Household Head	-0.0226***	-0.0228***	-0.0224***
	(0.00127)	(0.00405)	(0.00143)
Education of Household Head	0.150***	0.233***	$0.141^{***}$
Education of nousciloid field	(0.00653)	(0.0139)	(0.00586)
Health	$1.476^{***}$	(0.0105) $1.589^{***}$	$1.376^{***}$
iioainii	(0.172)	(0.198)	(0.212)
Insurance	0.851***	0.578***	0.866***
Instrance	(0.0537)	(0.0672)	(0.0616)
Working household members	(0.0357) $0.791^{***}$	(0.0072) $0.611^{***}$	(0.0010) $0.775^{***}$
working household members	(0.0559)	(0.0688)	(0.0569)
Log Income	0.0279***	0.0265***	0.0287***
	(0.00327)	(0.00620)	(0.00428)
Constant	6.026***	(0.00020) $5.849^{***}$	$6.140^{***}$
Constant	(0.173)	(0.227)	(0.183)
	(0.113)	(0.221)	(0.105)
Observations	17,245	17,245	17,245
R-squared		0.123	0.162
Number of Households	5,872	5,872	
Robust Standard errors in parentheses		0.01, ** p<0.05,	* p<0.1
Breusch-Pagan LM	82.57	$\frac{\chi^{2}(1)}{\chi^{2}(1)}$	P-value = 0.000
$\sim$			

Table 4.3.	Log Consumption	n (Male Household Head)
<b>T</b> UDIC 1.0.	Log Combumptio	i (male nousenoid nead)

(Greater than 1		abitants)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Random Effects	Fixed Effects	OLS
VARIABLES	L	log Consumptio	n
Income volatility	-0.0518***	-0.0547***	-0.0509***
	(0.00384)	(0.00574)	(0.00386)
Wealth	-0.869***	-1.426***	-0.824***
	(0.251)	(0.266)	(0.194)
Sex of Household Head	$0.121^{**}$		$0.126^{***}$
	(0.0561)		(0.0460)
Age of Household Head	-0.0336***	-0.0411***	-0.0332***
	(0.00242)	(0.00704)	(0.00256)
Education of Household Head	0.183***	$0.321^{***}$	$0.171^{***}$
	(0.00860)	(0.0196)	(0.00957)
Health	1.438***	1.451***	1.409***
	(0.265)	(0.329)	(0.282)
Insurance	1.343***	$1.028^{***}$	1.359***
	(0.0862)	(0.109)	(0.0974)
Working household members	1.337***	1.300***	1.317***
	(0.0836)	(0.125)	(0.0880)
Log Income	0.0184**	0.00781	0.0201***
-	(0.00795)	(0.00770)	(0.00618)
Constant	5.811***	5.878***	5.858***
	(0.272)	(0.391)	(0.309)
Observations	7,852	7,852	7,852
R-squared		0.184	0.192
Number of Households	2,934	2,934	
Robust Standard errors in parentheses	*** p<0	0.01, ** p<0.05,	* p<0.1
Breusch-Pagan LM	24.93	$\chi^2(1)$	P-value = 0.000
-			

### Table 4.4. Log Consumption (Greater than 100 thousand inhabitants)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Random Effects	Fixed Effects	OLS
VARIABLES	]	Log Consumptio	on
	-0.0296***	-0.0330**	-0.0289***
Income volatility			
Wealth	(0.00806) -1.447***	(0.0138) -1.398***	(0.00724) -1.400***
weard	(0.249)	(0.381)	
Sex of Household Head	(0.249) 0.144	(0.361)	(0.252) 0.144
Sex of household head			
	(0.0990) - $0.0208^{***}$	0.0100	(0.0911)
Age of Household Head		-0.0100	-0.0206***
	(0.00314)	(0.0111)	(0.00388)
Education of Household Head	$0.134^{***}$	$0.161^{***}$	$0.132^{***}$
T 1.1	(0.0173)	(0.0287)	(0.0157)
Health	1.710***	1.686***	1.703***
	(0.535)	(0.633)	(0.535)
nsurance	0.612***	0.249*	0.648***
	(0.142)	(0.145)	(0.133)
Working household members	$0.649^{***}$	0.683**	$0.642^{***}$
	(0.160)	(0.294)	(0.145)
Log Income	$0.0183^{*}$	$0.0204^{**}$	$0.0185^{**}$
	(0.0105)	(0.00990)	(0.00835)
Constant	6.032***	5.874***	6.008***
	(0.539)	(0.674)	(0.551)
Observations	2,101	2,101	2,101
R-squared		0.085	0.168
Number of Households	905	905	
Robust Standard errors in parentheses	*** p<0	0.01, ** p<0.05,	* p<0.1
Breusch-Pagan LM	4.87	$\chi^2(1)$	P-value = 0.013

### Table 4.5. Log Consumption (Between 15 and 100 thousand inhabitants)
(Detween 2.5 and		,	
	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Random Effects		OLS
VARIABLES	I	og Consumptio	n
Income volatility	-0.0246***	-0.0321***	-0.0222***
U U	(0.00849)	(0.0109)	(0.00679)
Wealth	-1.540***	-1.833***	-1.535***
	(0.248)	(0.353)	(0.185)
Sex of Household Head	0.248**		0.242***
	(0.106)		(0.0849)
Age of Household Head	-0.0201***	-0.0213*	-0.0197***
	(0.00367)	(0.0117)	(0.00300)
Education of Household Head	$0.116^{***}$	$0.159^{***}$	0.109***
	(0.0235)	(0.0459)	(0.0164)
Health	1.041	1.429**	0.824
	(0.677)	(0.577)	(0.538)
Insurance	$0.646^{***}$	0.703***	0.607***
	(0.131)	(0.188)	(0.109)
Working household members	0.637***	$0.847^{***}$	0.575***
	(0.168)	(0.235)	(0.138)
Log Income	$0.0282^{***}$	0.0129	$0.0316^{***}$
	(0.00953)	(0.0154)	(0.00992)
Constant	6.466***	$6.284^{***}$	6.689***
	(0.711)	(0.827)	(0.523)
Observations	2,381	2,381	2,381
R-squared		0.113	0.186
Number of Households	1,016	1,016	
Robust Standard errors in parentheses	*** p<0	0.01, ** p<0.05,	* p<0.1
Breusch-Pagan LM	2.58	$\chi^2(1)$	P-value = 0.054

#### Table 4.6. Log Consumption (Between 2.5 and 15 thousand inhabitants)

(Less than 2.5	thousand milar	mantsj	
	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Random Effects	Fixed Effects	OLS
VARIABLES	Ι	log Consumptio	n
Income volatility	-0.0122***	-0.0120**	-0.0127***
	(0.00282)	(0.00545)	(0.00251)
Wealth	-0.960***	-0.826***	-1.058***
	(0.0493)	(0.0836)	(0.0611)
Sex of Household Head	$0.104^{***}$		0.112***
	(0.0353)		(0.0411)
Age of Household Head	-0.0148***	-0.0149***	-0.0147***
	(0.00129)	(0.00489)	(0.00121)
Education of Household Head	$0.0896^{***}$	$0.105^{***}$	0.0822***
	(0.00847)	(0.0183)	(0.00749)
Health	1.271***	1.503***	$1.065^{***}$
	(0.255)	(0.262)	(0.271)
Insurance	0.336***	$0.186^{***}$	0.359***
	(0.0370)	(0.0576)	(0.0470)
Working household members	0.289***	$0.250^{***}$	0.304***
	(0.0528)	(0.0956)	(0.0479)
Log Income	0.0303***	0.0253***	0.0330***
	(0.00508)	(0.00643)	(0.00542)
Constant	6.413***	6.316***	6.625***
	(0.245)	(0.220)	(0.257)
Observations	9,170	9,170	9,170
R-squared		0.067	0.156
Number of Households	3,453	$3,\!453$	
Robust Standard errors in parentheses	*** p<0	0.01, ** p<0.05,	* p<0.1
Breusch-Pagan LM	64.66	$\chi^2(1)$	P-value = 0.000

#### Table 4.7. Log Consumption (Less than 2.5 thousand inhabitants)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Random Effects	Fixed Effects	OLS
VARIABLES	Ι	Log Consumptio	'n
Income volatility	-0.0464***	-0.0336***	-0.0463***
	(0.00629)	(0.00506)	(0.00632)
Locality between 15 and 100 thousand	0.0261	0.174	-0.000300
	(0.0554)	(0.154)	(0.0442)
Locality between 2.5 and 15 thousand	0.218***	0.0544	0.209***
	(0.0413)	(0.196)	(0.0452)
Locality less than 2.5 thousand	0.209***	-0.198	0.198***
	(0.0407)	(0.176)	(0.0368)
Wealth	-0.971***	-1.265***	-0.966***
	(0.0957)	(0.121)	(0.0894)
Sex of Household Head	0.165***		0.161***
	(0.0486)		(0.0509)
Age of Household Head	-0.0385***	-0.0378***	-0.0383***
	(0.00306)	(0.00731)	(0.00337)
Education of Household Head	0.174***	0.229***	0.165***
	(0.0114)	(0.0200)	(0.0103)
Health	2.830***	2.406***	2.736***
	(0.290)	(0.310)	(0.325)
Insurance	1.237***	0.796***	1.249***
	(0.143)	(0.0951)	(0.146)
Working household members	1.045***	0.718***	1.052***
	(0.116)	(0.0911)	(0.118)
Log Income	0.0258***	0.0236***	0.0272***
	(0.00519)	(0.00512)	(0.00365)
Constant	4.933***	5.549***	5.047***
	(0.254)	(0.294)	(0.300)
Observations	10,902	10,902	10,902
R-squared		0.127	0.157
Number of Households	4,413	4,413	
Robust Standard errors in parentheses	*** p<0	0.01, ** p<0.05,	* p<0.1
Breusch-Pagan LM	52.19	$\chi^{2}(1)$	P-value = 0.000
~			

Table 4.8. Log	Consumption	(Household H	Iead Age u	nder 50 vears)
		(		

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Random Effects	Fixed Effects	OLS
VARIABLES	L	og Consumptio	n
Income volatility	-0.0241***	-0.0132***	-0.0241***
	(0.00274)	(0.00436)	(0.00254)
Locality between 15 and 100 thousand	0.164**	0.166	$0.169^{***}$
	(0.0673)	(0.190)	(0.0536)
Locality between 2.5 and 15 thousand	0.196***	0.0564	0.186***
Locally between 2.5 and 15 thousand	(0.0647)	(0.246)	(0.0660)
Locality less than 2.5 thousand	(0.0041) $0.391^{***}$	(0.240) 0.197	0.395***
Locarry ress than 2.9 thousand	(0.0479)	(0.197)	(0.0416)
Wealth	-1.076***	-0.986***	(0.0410) $-1.136^{***}$
weaton	(0.0880)	(0.116)	(0.0813)
Sex of Household Head	0.136***	(0.110)	0.138***
Sex of Household Head	(0.0435)		(0.0414)
Age of Household Head	-0.0150***	-0.0135***	-0.0148***
Age of Household Head	(0.00131)	(0.00133) $(0.00449)$	(0.00143)
Education of Household Head	$0.137^{***}$	(0.00449) $0.212^{***}$	(0.00113) $0.128^{***}$
Education of Household Head	(0.137) (0.00983)	(0.0212)	(0.00675)
Health	(0.00983) $0.991^{***}$	(0.0221) $1.446^{***}$	(0.00075) $0.846^{***}$
nearth			
T	(0.240)	(0.279)	(0.184)
Insurance	$0.538^{***}$	$0.405^{***}$	$0.548^{***}$
<b>TT</b> 7 1 · 1 · 1 · 1	(0.0431)	(0.0661)	(0.0479)
Working household members	0.626***	$0.356^{***}$	0.626***
т т	(0.0583)	(0.0854)	(0.0581)
Log Income	0.0287***	0.0264***	0.0299***
	(0.00509)	(0.00684)	(0.00479)
Constant	5.999***	5.492***	6.161***
	(0.244)	(0.335)	(0.177)
Observations	10,602	10,602	10,602
R-squared		0.113	0.176
Number of Households	4,426	4,426	
Robust Standard errors in parentheses		.01, ** p<0.05,	_
Breusch-Pagan LM	27.95	$\chi^2(1)$	P-value = 0.000

Table 4.9. Log Consumption (Household Head Age over 50 years)

## Chapter 5

### Conclusions

Until now the empirical studies for Mexico focused on the macroeconomic perspective trying to explain the relation between private savings and the uncertainty caused by inflation. The results are contradictory because there are evidence supporting the existence of precautionary savings in Mexico but, at the same time, there is also evidence of a negative correlation between financial savings and inflation, which means that precaution is not a motive to saving.

The objective of this research is to contribute to this literature by performing an analysis of precautionary savings at individual households following them over a longer period of time. The MxFLS, a panel survey with three observation points between 2002 and 2010 permits such an analysis. To achieve this, the theory of permanent income is used to build an econometric model where it is first decomposed into its permanent and transitory parts. Subsequently, under the assumption that the average transitory income is equal to zero, the volatility of this income is estimated to incorporate it into an estimate of consumption. To prove the existence of precautionary savings in Mexico, the income volatility coefficient must be negative and significant.

The results of the econometric exercises strongly suggest the existence of precautionary reasons for saving. For the first time for Mexico there are results on the existence and magnitude of precautionary savings according to the sex of the head of the household, in particular, in both cases the existence of precautionary savings is confirmed and its magnitude is greater in households whose head is male (fact that can be explained by cultural issues).

For the first time, there are also results for four categories of locality size and it was possible to clearly identify a direct relationship between the level of precautionary savings and the locality size. These results contrast with those obtained by Villagomez (1998), firstly because of the number of categories considered, and secondly, it is possible that the households that live in the cities face more complex situations that lead them to be more cautious.

Finally, it is also the first time that results are available for young and old homes. This exercise is consistent with the results obtained in the rest of the estimates and allows us to conclude that young households save twice as precautionaryly as old households. This result complements the partial evidence obtained by Veladia Naranjo and van Gameren (2016).

Despite this, there are considerations that could not be incorporated into the analysis. First, as mentioned above, the survey had a variety of expansion factors, however, it was not possible to include them in this work because the documentation of the survey does not indicate how to do it and, the construction of unified factors is beyond the scope of this study, however, it undoubtedly constitutes an opportunity to expand this research in the future.

Secondly, future research it would be important to verify the soundness of the results in at least three aspects: (1) to reinforce the estimates with a single-stage technique where the dependent variable may be consumption, saving and / or wealth; (2) Control for income heteroskedasticity, possibly performing a percentile regression; (3) Improve the construction of the relevant variables to incorporate their dynamics and (4) try to construct an informality measure or access to low-quality, low-cost health services to see if these are relevant variables in the determination of precautionary savings in Mexico.

# Appendix

		Roi	und 1	Roi	und 2	Rou	nd 3
Variable	Category	Freq.	Percent	Freq.	Percent	Freq.	Percent
	0 (Has)	5,285	62.61	4,596	54.47	6,068	59.93
Telephone	1 (Do not	$3,\!156$	37.39	3,841	45.53	$4,\!057$	40.07
	have)						
	Total	$8,\!441$	100	$8,\!437$	100	$10,\!125$	100
	0 (Has)	747	8.85	611	7.38	845	9.14
Kitchen	1 (Do not	$7,\!693$	91.15	$7,\!668$	92.62	8,403	90.86
	have)						
	Total	8,440	100	$8,\!279$	100	$9,\!248$	100
	0 (Has)	148	1.75	131	1.59	313	3.39
Electricity	1 (Do not	$8,\!287$	98.25	8,130	98.41	8,907	96.61
	have)						
	Total	$8,\!435$	100	8,261	100	9,220	100
	1 (Paying it)	492	5.83	444	5.36	1	508
	2 (Own and	$5,\!397$	63.95	5,772	69.7	6,207	67.11
	fully paid)						
House	3 (Own on	764	9.05	516	6.23	525	5.68
ownership	communal						
	land)						
	4 (Borrowed	955	11.32	939	11.34	$1,\!306$	14.12
	or assigned						
	without						
	payment)						

#### Table A1. Summary statistics (variables used for the wealth index)

Round 1 Round 2 Round 3							
Variable	Category	Freq.	Percent	Freq.	Percent	Freq.	Percent
	5 (Rented)	767	9.09	558	6.74	599	6.48
	6 (Other)	65	0.77	52	0.63	104	1.12
	Total	8,440	100	8,281	100	9,249	100
	1 (Water	4,283	50.75	4,965	59.96	6,009	64.98
	jugs)	,		,		,	
	2 (Tap water	3,218	38.13	2,429	29.33	2,121	22.93
	inside the			·		·	
	house)						
Source of	3 (Tap water	395	4.68	470	5.68	654	7.07
drinking	outside the						
water	house)						
	4 (Pipe	60	0.71	37	0.45	51	0.55
	water)						
	5 (Haulage)	444	5.26	373	4.5	384	4.15
	6 (Other)	40	0.47	7	0.08	29	0.31
	Total	8,440	100	$8,\!281$	100	$9,\!248$	100
	1 (Toilet)	$6,\!127$	72.61	$6,\!428$	77.64	7,317	79.11
	2 (Latrine)	$1,\!497$	17.74	1,214	14.66	$1,\!195$	12.92
Type of	3 (Black	288	3.41	326	3.94	443	4.79
toilet	hole or pit)						
	4 (No	526	6.23	311	3.76	294	3.18
	service)						
	Total	8,438	100	$8,\!279$	100	9,249	100
	1 (Tubed	4,864	57.64	$5,\!086$	61.48	$5,\!944$	64.4
	public						
	drain)						
	2 (Septic	1,064	12.61	$1,\!272$	15.38	1,092	11.83
	tank)						
Drainage	3 (Open	330	3.91	280	3.38	468	5.07
	drain to the						
	$\operatorname{street})$						

Table A1 – Continued from previous page

			und 1	-	und 2	Roi	Round 3	
Variable	Category	Freq.	Percent	Freq.	Percent	Freq.	Percent	
	4 (Drain to the	1,901	22.53	1,441	17.42	1,496	16.21	
	property) 5 (Drain to river or	190	2.25	165	1.99	172	1.86	
	canal) 6 (Other)	89	1.05	29	0.35	58	0.63	
	Total	8,438	100	8,273	100	9,230	100	
	1 (Public collection service)	5,911	70.06	6,500	78.54	7,346	79.52	
	2 (Throw it in the public garbage can)	274	3.25	252	3.04	417	4.51	
	3 (Throw it into the river or vacant lot)	255	3.02	115	1.39	118	1.28	
Garbage	4 (Burning inside the home)	1,058	12.54	783	9.46	472	5.11	
	5 (Burning outside the home)	862	10.22	582	7.03	822	8.9	
	6 (Buries it within the land of the	51	0.6	28	0.34	20	0.22	
	house) 7 (Buries it out of the home ground)	12	0.14	9	0.11	12	0.13	

Table A1 – Continued from previous page

		Ro	und 1	Ro	und 2	Round 3	
Variable	Category	Freq.	Percent	Freq.	Percent	Freq.	Percent
	8 (Other)	14	0.17	7	0.08	31	0.34
	Total	$8,\!437$	100	$8,\!276$	100	9,238	100
	1	972	11.55	955	11.54	1,137	12.32
	(Firewood)						
	2 (Coal)	37	0.44	44	0.53	48	0.52
	3	39	0.46	38	0.46	113	1.22
	(Petroleum)						
Cooking fuel	4 (Gas)	$7,\!259$	86.27	6,925	83.7	7,726	83.7
	5 (Does not	66	0.78	92	1.11	80	0.87
	use fuel)						
	6 (Other)	41	0.49	220	2.66	127	1.37
	Total	8,414	100	8,274	100	9,231	100
	1 (Movil	3	0.04	74	0.9	42	0.46
	House)						
	2 (premises	8	0.09	28	0.34	56	0.61
	used as a						
	house)						
	3 (Roof	12	0.14	52	0.63	85	0.92
	room)						
House type	4 (Room	177	2.1	220	2.66	144	1.56
	or house in						
	neighborhood	)					
	5	173	2.05	157	1.9	160	1.74
	(Apartment						
	in building)						
	6 (House	1,966	23.33	$2,\!438$	29.53	$3,\!358$	36.42
	alone that						
	shares walls)						
	7 (House	6,037	71.65	$5,\!236$	63.42	$5,\!285$	57.31
	alone that						
	does not						
	share walls)						

Table A1 – Continued from previous page

Round 1 Round			und 2	Rou	Round 3	
Category	Freq.	Percent	Freq.	Percent	Freq.	Percent
8 (Other)	50	0.6	51	0.62	91	0.99
Total	$8,\!426$	100	8,256	100	$9,\!221$	100
1  (Wood,	3,272	38.8	3,011	36.45	3,748	40.65
mosaic, tile,						
carpet)						
2 (Firm	4,123	48.89	$4,\!270$	51.69	4,684	50.8
cement)						
3 (ground	1,014	12.02	967	11.71	746	8.09
floor)						
4 (Other)	25	0.3	12	0.15	42	0.46
Total	$8,\!434$	100	8,260	100	$9,\!220$	100
1 (Concrete,	6,741	79.93	6,789	82.19	7,868	85.34
brick,						
tabicon,						
block)						
2 (Adobe)	935	11.09	767	9.29	553	6
$3 \pmod{1}$	410	4.86	371	4.49	420	4.56
4 (Asbestos	104	1.23	144	1.74	187	2.03
sheet,						
metal sheet,						
fiberglass,						
plastic,						
mica)						
5 (Embarro	66	0.78	67	0.81	50	0.54
or						
Bajareque)						
6 (Carrizo,	50	0.59	37	0.45	40	0.43
bambu,						
palma,						
tejamanil)						
	8 (Other) <b>Total</b> 1 (Wood,         mosaic, tile,         carpet)         2 (Firm         cement)         3 (ground         floor)         4 (Other)         Total         1 (Concrete,         brick,         tabicon,         block)         2 (Adobe)         3 (Wood)         4 (Asbestos         sheet,         metal sheet,         fiberglass,         plastic,         mica)         5 (Embarro         or         Bajareque)         6 (Carrizo,         bambu,         palma,	Category       Freq.         8 (Other)       50 <b>Total 8,426 Total</b> 3,272         mosaic, tile,	Category       Freq.       Percent         8 (Other)       50       0.6         Total       8,426       100         Total       3,272       38.8         mosaic, tile,       .       .         carpet)       .       .         2 (Firm       4,123       48.89         cement)       .       .         3 (ground       1,014       12.02         floor)       .       .         4 (Other)       25       0.3         floor       .       .         1 (Concrete,       6,741       79.93         brick,       .       .         1 (Concrete,       6,741       100         3 (Wood)       410       4.86         4 (Asbestos       104       1.23         sheet,       .       .         1 (Asbestos       104       1.23         sheet,       .       .       .         plastic,       .       .       .         nica)       .       .       .         5 (Embaro       6       0.78         6 (Carrizo,       50       0.59 <tr protect.combaro<="" td="" thttps:="">       .&lt;</tr>	Category         Freq.         Percent         Freq.           8 (Other)         50         0.6         51 <b>Total 8,426 100 8,256 Total</b> 3,272         38.8         3,011           mosaic, tile,         -         -         -           carpet)         -         -         -           2         (Firm         4,123         48.89         4,270           cement)         11.014         12.02         967           floor)         -         -         -           4 (Other)         25         0.3         12           floor)         -         -         -         -           1 (Concrete         6,741         79.93         6,789           brick,         -         -         -         -           1 (Concrete,         935         11.09         767           3 (Wood)         410         4.86         371           4 (Asbestos         104         1.23         144           sheet,         -         -         -           plastic,         -         -         -           5 (Embaro	Category       Freq.       Percent       Freq.       Percent         8 ( $\bigcirc$ ther)       50       0.6       51       0.62 <b>Total 8,426 100 8,256 100</b> 1 (Wood, 3,272       38.8       3,011       36.45         mosaic, tile,          36.45         carpet)         8.889       3,011       36.45         carpet)         4.889       4,270       51.69         cement)        4.889       4,270       51.69         cement)        12.02       967       11.71         floor)        12.02       917       0.15         floor)         920       0.15         floor)        0.3       12       0.15         floor)         935       100       8,260       100         flock)         9.35       11.09       767       9.29         d (Asbestos       104       1.23       144       1.74         sheet,         1.449       1.74         glast	Category         Freq.         Percent         Freq.         Percent         Freq.           8 (Other)         50         0.6         51         0.62         91           Total         8,426         100         8,256         100         9,221           I (Wood,         3,272         38.8         3,011         36.45         3,748           mosaic, tile,         -         -         -         -         -           carpet)         -         -         -         -         -           2         (Firm         4,123         48.89         4,270         51.69         4,684           cement)         -         -         -         -         -         -           3         (ground         1,014         12.02         967         11.71         746           floor)         -         -         -         -         -         -         -           4 (Other)         25         0.3         12         0.15         42           floor         -         -         -         -         -         -         -         -         -         -         -         -         -         -

Table A1 – Continued from previous page

		Ro	und 1	Ro	und 2	Round 3	
Variable	Category	Freq.	Percent	Freq.	Percent	Freq.	Percent
	7	46	0.55	35	0.42	24	0.26
	(Cardboard						
	wall)						
	8 (Waste	17	0.2	14	0.17	13	0.14
	material)						
	9 (Stone)	38	0.45	29	0.35	19	0.21
	10 (Other)	27	0.32	7	0.08	46	0.5
	Total	8,434	100	8,260	100	9,220	100
	1 (Joist and	915	10.85	907	10.98	1,013	10.99
	polyurethane,						
	joist and						
	vault)	1 065	57 60	5 100	69.01	F 000	64.07
	2 (Concrete,	4,805	57.68	5,122	62.01	5,990	64.97
	partition, partition,						
	·						
	block or concrete						
	slab)						
	3 (Roof tile)	371	4.4	301	3.64	344	3.73
Roof	4 (Asbestos	695	8.24	750	9.08	669	7.26
material	sheet)	000	0.21	100	0.00	000	1.20
	5 (Reed,	245	2.9	111	1.34	94	1.02
	bamboo or						
	roof)						
	6 (Sheet	742	8.8	622	7.53	732	7.94
	metal,						
	fiberglass,						
	plastic or						
	mica)						
	7 (Palm,	159	1.89	150	1.82	140	1.52
	shingle or						
	wood)						

Table A1 – Continued from previous page

 $Continued \ on \ next \ page$ 

		Roi	und 1	Round 2		Round 3	
Variable	Category	Freq.	Percent	Freq.	Percent	Freq.	Percent
	8	407	4.83	275	3.33	169	1.83
	(Cardboard						
	sheet)						
	9 (Waste	12	0.14	8	0.1	17	0.18
	material)						
	10 (Other)	24	0.28	14	0.17	52	0.56
	Total	$8,\!435$	100	$^{8,260}$	100	$9,\!220$	100
Rooms for sle	eep	9 4 4 0	2.04*	9975	2.17*	0997	2.13*
		8,440	(1.00)	8275	(1.44)	9227	(1.27)
* Mean. Standard errors in parenthesis.							

Table A1 – Continued from previous page

	Round 1		Round 2		Round 3	
Dimension	Inertia	Percent	Inertia	Percent	Inertia	Percent
dim 1	0.0786485	69.38	0.0663606	72.11	0.0613215	41.31
dim $2$	0.0070854	6.25	0.004503	4.89	0.0528021	35.57
dim $3$	0.0038588	3.4	0.0022212	2.41	0.0096651	6.51
dim $4$	0.0018428	1.63	0.0019585	2.13	0.0016369	1.1
dim $5$	0.0013802	1.22	0.0010592	1.15	0.00098	0.66
$\dim 6$	0.0011364	1	0.0007131	0.77	0.0008204	0.55
$\dim7$	0.0006233	0.55	0.0006654	0.72	0.0006872	0.46
dim $8$	0.0004711	0.42	0.0004908	0.53	0.000478	0.32
$\dim9$	0.0003794	0.33	0.0003746	0.41	0.0003466	0.23
$\dim10$	0.0003151	0.28	0.0002745	0.3	0.0002971	0.2
dim $11$	0.000283	0.25	0.0002584	0.28	0.0001979	0.13
dim $12$	0.0002091	0.18	0.0002299	0.25	0.0001619	0.11
$\dim13$	0.0001509	0.13	0.000152	0.17	0.0001161	0.08
$\dim14$	0.0001274	0.11	0.0001391	0.15	0.0001084	0.07
dim $15$	0.0000983	0.09	0.0001026	0.11	0.000089	0.06
$\dim16$	0.0000838	0.07	0.0000938	0.1	0.0000603	0.04
$\dim17$	0.0000648	0.06	0.0000609	0.07	0.0000579	0.04
$\dim18$	0.0000459	0.04	0.0000476	0.05	0.0000516	0.03
$\dim19$	0.000032	0.03	0.0000419	0.05	0.0000403	0.03
$\dim20$	0.0000276	0.02	0.0000331	0.04	0.0000305	0.02
Total	0.1133512	100	0.0920237	100	0.1484356	100

Table A2. Multiple Correspondence Analisys (Wealth index)

First 20 dimensions displayed. Total correspond to all dimensions

Variable	Categories	Round 1	Round 2	Round 3		
Talanhana	0 (Has)	0.205	0.211	0.134		
Telephone	1  (Do  not)	-0.343	-0.244	-0.171		
	have)					
Kitchen	0 (Has)	0.403	0.471	0.43		
KIICHEII	1  (Do  not)	-0.039	-0.037	-0.042		
	have)					
Flootnicity	0 (Has)	0.936	0.821	0.901		
Electricity	1  (Do  not	-0.017	-0.013	-0.03		
	have)					
	1 (Paying it)	-0.384	-0.329	-0.243		
	2 (Own and	-0.023	-0.016	-0.03		
II	fully paid)					
House ownership	3 (Own on	0.474	0.495	0.314		
	communal					
	land)					
	4 (Borrowed	0.131	0.103	0.102		
	or assigned					
	without					
	payment)					
	5 (Rented)	-0.27	-0.215	-0.142		
	6 (Other)	0.477	-0.091	1.613		
	1 (Water jugs)	-0.229	-0.185	-0.126		
	2 (Tap water	0.113	0.125	0.056		
Source of drinking water	inside the					
Source of drinking water	house)					
	3 (Tap water	0.622	0.664	0.59		
	outside the					
	house)					
	4 (Pipe water)	0.363	0.301	0.425		
	5 (Haulage)	0.739	0.773	0.494		
	6 (Other)	0.735	0.813	2.783		

 Table A3. Weights of the Wealth index variables

Variable	Categories	Round 1	Round 2	Round 3
	1 (Toilet)	-0.224	-0.178	-0.122
True of toilet	2 (Latrine)	0.544	0.586	0.38
Type of toilet	3 (Black hole	0.565	0.593	0.675
	or pit)			
	4 (No service)	0.761	0.758	0.499
	1 (Tubed	-0.285	-0.24	-0.149
	public drain)			
Drainage	2 (Septic tank)	0.085	0.128	0.066
Dramage	3 (Open drain	0.442	0.511	0.236
	to the street)			
	4 (Drain to the	0.535	0.559	0.349
	property)			
	5 (Drain to	0.541	0.578	0.411
	river or canal)			
	6 (Other)	0.412	0.345	2.349
	1 (Public	-0.211	-0.153	-0.095
	collection			
	service)			
Garbage	2 (Throw it	0.1	0.055	0.033
Clarbage	in the public			
	garbage can)			
	3 (Throw it	0.476	0.637	0.354
	into the river			
	or vacant lot)			
	4 (Burning	0.562	0.655	0.355
	inside the			
	home)			
	5 (Burning	0.543	0.646	0.455
	outside the			
	home)			

Table A3 – Continued from previous page

Variable	Categories	-	Round 2	Round 3
	6 (Buries it	0.594	0.468	0.343
	within the			
	land of the			
	house)			
	7 (Buries it	0.38	0.516	0.433
	out of the			
	home ground)			
	8 (Other)	0.629	0.016	4.491
	1 (Firewood)	0.833	0.78	0.546
	2 (Coal)	0.493	0.516	0.614
	3 (Petroleum)	-0.09	0.103	-0.035
Cooking fuel	4 (Gas)	-0.113	-0.106	-0.094
	5 (Does not	0.14	0.147	0.153
	use fuel)			
	6 (Other)	-0.322	0.336	4.866
	1 (Movil	-0.069	-0.136	0.281
	House)			
	2 (premises	-0.318	-0.051	0.751
Uougo tumo	used as a			
House type	house)			
	$3 \pmod{\text{room}}$	0.103	-0.091	0.677
	4 (Room	-0.187	-0.043	0.264
	or house in			
	neighborhood)			
	5 (Apartment	-0.512	-0.41	-0.251
	in building)			
	6 (House alone	-0.119	-0.11	-0.08
	that shares			
	walls)			
	7 (House alone	0.054	0.064	-0.002
	that does not			
	share walls)			
	8 (Other)	0.285	0.443	2.061

Table A3 – Continued from previous page

Variable	Categories	Round 1	Round 2	Round 3		
	1 (Wood,	-0.331	-0.304	-0.218		
Floor material	mosaic, tile,					
FIOOI IIIateriai	carpet)					
	2 (Firm	0.059	0.031	0.03		
	cement)					
	3 (ground	0.814	0.803	0.732		
	floor)					
	4 (Other)	0.874	0.421	3.808		
	1 (Concrete,	-0.162	-0.133	-0.106		
	brick, tabicon,					
	block)					
	2 (Adobe)	0.502	0.409	0.295		
	$3 \pmod{4}$	0.849	0.896	0.882		
Walls material	4 (Asbestos	0.626	0.483	0.316		
	sheet, metal					
	sheet,					
	fiberglass,					
	plastic, mica)					
	5 (Embarro or	1.098	1.13	0.786		
	Bajareque)					
	6 (Carrizo,	1.015	1.23	0.709		
	bambu,					
	palma,					
	tejamanil)					
	7 (Cardboard	0.781	0.803	0.637		
	wall)					
	8 (Waste	0.899	0.793	0.785		
	material)					
	9 (Stone)	0.534	0.604	0.6		
	10 (Other)	0.81	0.757	3.732		

Table A3 – Continued from previous page

Variable	Categories	Round 1	Round 2	Round 3
	1 (Joist and	-0.242	-0.195	-0.116
	polyurethane,			
	joist and			
	vault)			
Roof material	2 (Concrete,	-0.226	-0.184	-0.15
Roof material	partition,			
	partition,			
	block or			
	$concrete \ slab)$			
	$3 \pmod{\text{tile}}$	0.529	0.543	0.707
	4 (Asbestos	0.284	0.285	0.2
	sheet)			
	5 (Reed,	0.503	0.53	0.412
	bamboo or			
	$\operatorname{roof})$			
	6 (Sheet	0.513	0.558	0.392
	metal,			
	fiberglass,			
	plastic or			
	mica)			
	7 (Palm,	0.621	0.516	0.305
	shingle or			
	wood)			
	8 (Cardboard	0.762	0.865	0.677
	sheet)			
	9 (Waste	0.911	0.965	0.681
	material)			
	10 (Other)	0.483	0.835	3.362
	1	0.263	0.259	0.176
	2	-0.067	-0.045	-0.083
	3	-0.2	-0.181	-0.065
	4	-0.251	-0.209	-0.096
Rooms for sleep	5	-0.269	-0.289	-0.114
rooms tor steep		Co	ntinued on	next page

Table A3 – Continued from previous page

	10,510,110	eonunaea jio	ne precedue	$P^{\alpha}g^{\phi}$	
Variable		Categories	Round 1	Round 2	Round 3
		6	-0.367	-0.236	-0.07
		7	-0.273	-0.26	-0.106
		8	0.161	-0.112	0.171
		9	-0.482	0.47	-0.243
		10	-0.099	0.314	0.285

Table A3 – Continued from previous page

Table A4. Summary statistics (variables used for the health index)

		Roi	und 1	Roi	und 2	Roi	und 3
Variable	Category	Freq.	Percent	Freq.	Percent	Freq.	Percen
	1 (Very good)	936	4.73	1,580	7.67	$1,\!995$	8.5
	$2 \pmod{4}$	$9,\!199$	46	$10,\!180$	49.44	$10,\!597$	45.15
Health	3 (Regular)	$8,\!592$	43.39	$7,\!984$	38.78	9,798	41.75
status	4 (Bad)	$1,\!002$	5.06	798	3.88	988	4.21
	5 (Very bad)	73	0.37	47	0.23	91	0.39
	Total	$19,\!802$	100	$20,\!589$	100	$23,\!469$	100
Stopped	1 (Yes)	1,768	8.93	1,517	7.37	2,201	9.38
Stopped	3 (No)	18,036	91.07	$19,\!078$	92.63	$21,\!268$	90.62
activities	Total	$19,\!804$	100	$20,\!595$	100	$23,\!469$	100
	1 (Much better)	531	2.68	798	3.88	737	3.14
Health	2 (Better)	4,361	22.02	4,429	21.55	4,965	21.16
	3 (Equal)	$12,\!653$	63.89	$13,\!301$	64.73	$15,\!084$	64.27
status a	4 (Worst)	$2,\!201$	11.11	$1,\!978$	9.63	2,598	11.07
year ago	5 (Much worst)	57	0.29	43	0.21	85	0.36
	Total	19,803	100	$20,\!549$	100	$23,\!469$	100
Health	1 (Much better than others)	836	4.22	952	4.63	1,190	5.07
status	2 (Better than others)	$5,\!938$	29.98	5,525	26.84	6,902	29.41
compared	3 (Equal than others)	11,680	58.98	12,702	61.71	13,750	58.59
to other	4 (Worst than others)	$1,\!308$	6.6	$1,\!361$	6.61	1,567	6.68
people of	5 (Much worst than others)	42	0.21	42	0.2	59	0.25
the same	Total	19,804	100	$20,\!582$	100	$23,\!468$	100

sex and

age

	Round 1		Round 2		Round 3	
Dimension	Inertia	Percent	Inertia	Percent	Inertia	Percent
dim 1	0.170164	71.13	0.13048	41.9	0.204805	64.28
dim $2$	0.026637	11.14	0.12629	40.55	0.044642	14.01
dim $3$	0.013486	5.64	0.015989	5.13	0.030309	9.51
$\dim 4$	0.010751	4.49	0.005945	1.91	0.013397	4.2
dim $5$	0.001075	0.45	0.001872	0.6	0.004399	1.38
Total	0.239218	100	0.311414	100	0.318596	100

Table A5. Multiple Correspondence Analisys (Wealth index)

Variable	Category	Round 1	Round 2	Round 3
	1 (Very good)	0.258	0.007	0.276
Health	$2 \pmod{2}$	0.199	0	0.183
	3 (Regular)	-0.087	0.018	-0.115
status	4 (Bad)	-1.068	0.087	-1.115
	5 (Very bad)	-1.883	0.104	-2.608
Stopped	1 (Yes)	-0.742	0.07	-0.767
activities	3 (No)	0.075	0.011	0.079
	1 (Much better)	0.239	0.008	0.261
Health	2 (Better)	0.109	0.005	0.122
status a	3 (Equal)	0.098	0.009	0.096
year ago	4 (Worst)	-0.775	0.067	-0.766
	5 (Much worst)	-1.923	-0.021	-2.633
Compared	1 (Much better than others)	0.151	-0.024	0.233
to other	2 (Better than others)	0.115	-0.048	0.113
people of	3 (Equal than others)	0.042	0.025	0.057
the same	4 (Worst than others)	-1.077	0.089	-0.877
sex and age	5 (Much worst than others)	-2.012	0.096	-2.434

Table A6. Weights of the health index variables

VARIABLES         Locality between 15 and 100 thousand         Locality between 2.5 and 15 thousand         Locality less 2.5 thousand         Wealth         Sex of Household Head         Age of Household Head         Education of Household Head	Random Effects -0.191** (0.0875)	Fixed Effects Log Income -0.889***	OLS
Locality between 15 and 100 thousand Locality between 2.5 and 15 thousand Locality less 2.5 thousand Wealth Sex of Household Head Age of Household Head			
Locality between 2.5 and 15 thousand Locality less 2.5 thousand Wealth Sex of Household Head Age of Household Head		-0 880***	
Locality less 2.5 thousand Wealth Sex of Household Head Age of Household Head	(0.0875)	0.000	-0.169**
Locality less 2.5 thousand Wealth Sex of Household Head Age of Household Head		(0.196)	(0.0852)
Wealth Sex of Household Head Age of Household Head	$0.155^{**}$	-0.494**	$0.158^{**}$
Wealth Sex of Household Head Age of Household Head	(0.0766)	(0.238)	(0.0681)
Sex of Household Head Age of Household Head	$0.0867^{*}$	-1.090***	$0.114^{**}$
Sex of Household Head Age of Household Head	(0.0448)	(0.189)	(0.0509)
Age of Household Head	0.0527	-0.181	0.0788
Age of Household Head	(0.106)	(0.193)	(0.112)
	$0.344^{***}$		$0.342^{***}$
	(0.0551)		(0.0558)
Education of Household Head	-0.0401***	-0.0420***	-0.0402***
Education of Household Head	(0.00150)	(0.00539)	(0.00135)
	$0.138^{***}$	0.190***	$0.134^{***}$
	(0.00712)	(0.0159)	(0.00873)
Health	1.439***	1.329***	1.418***
	(0.304)	(0.438)	(0.323)
Insurance	$1.217^{***}$	$0.771^{***}$	$1.278^{***}$
	(0.0555)	(0.0853)	(0.0396)
Working household members	1.334***	1.280***	1.337***
	(0.0194)	(0.0331)	(0.0207)
Constant	2.481***	3.638***	$2.478^{***}$
	(0.284)	(0.478)	(0.316)
Observations	21,504	21,504	21,504
R-squared		0.188	0.325
Number of Households	7,332	7,332	
Robust Standard errors in parentheses	*** p<0	.01, ** p<0.05,	* p<0.1
Sargan-Hansen statistic			-
Breusch-Pagan LM	138.99	$\chi^2(9)$	P-value = 0.000

#### Table A7. Income Decomposition

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Random Effects	Fixed Effects	OLS
VARIABLES		Log Income	
Locality between 15 and 100 thousand	-0.410**	-1.553***	-0.370***
	(0.178)	(0.402)	(0.143)
Locality between 2.5 and 15 thousand	0.0125	-0.768	0.0192
	(0.156)	(0.498)	(0.207)
Locality less 2.5 thousand	-0.0584	-1.092**	-0.0428
	(0.117)	(0.462)	(0.121)
Wealth	-0.257	-0.656*	-0.209
	(0.270)	(0.372)	(0.253)
Age of Household Head	-0.0337***	-0.0328***	-0.0338***
	(0.00246)	(0.0107)	(0.00217)
Education of Household Head	$0.164^{***}$	$0.211^{***}$	$0.161^{***}$
	(0.0174)	(0.0290)	(0.0159)
Health	$1.605^{**}$	1.434	$1.603^{*}$
	(0.769)	(0.894)	(0.942)
Insurance	$0.784^{***}$	$0.560^{***}$	0.815***
	(0.125)	(0.168)	(0.104)
Working household members	1.767***	$1.661^{***}$	$1.773^{***}$
	(0.0649)	(0.0808)	(0.0495)
Constant	1.772**	$2.614^{***}$	$1.751^{*}$
	(0.692)	(0.927)	(0.903)
Observations	4,259	4,259	4,259
R-squared		0.256	0.409
Number of Households	1,460	$1,\!460$	
Robust Standard errors in parentheses	*** p<0	0.01, ** p<0.05,	* p<0.1
Breusch-Pagan LM	37.46	$\chi^2(1)$	P-value = 0.00

Table A8. Income Decomposition (Female Household Head)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Random Effects	Fixed Effects	OLS
VARIABLES		Log Income	
Locality between 15 and 100 thousand	-0.116	-0.718***	-0.0991
Socarry between 15 and 100 thousand	(0.100)	(0.270)	(0.0775)
Locality between 2.5 and 15 thousand	0.206**	-0.415	0.209***
socarry setween 2.5 and 10 thousand	(0.0911)	(0.254)	(0.0802)
Locality less 2.5 thousand	0.129*	-1.077***	$0.159^{***}$
	(0.0697)	(0.178)	(0.0568)
Wealth	0.138	-0.0570	0.155
	(0.150)	(0.153)	(0.142)
Age of Household Head	-0.0406***	-0.0451***	-0.0407***
	(0.00174)	(0.00420)	(0.00132)
Education of Household Head	0.129***	0.182***	0.125***
	(0.0110)	(0.0208)	(0.0103)
Health	1.365***	1.279***	1.340***
	(0.405)	(0.402)	(0.416)
Insurance	1.314***	0.820***	1.380***
	(0.0466)	(0.0847)	(0.0559)
Working household members	1.245***	$1.195^{***}$	$1.247^{***}$
	(0.0255)	(0.0420)	(0.0231)
Constant	$3.006^{***}$	$3.955^{***}$	3.003***
	(0.378)	(0.422)	(0.393)
Observations	17,245	17,245	17,245
R-squared	-	0.174	0.296
Number of Households	5,872	5,872	
Robust Standard errors in parentheses	*** p<0	0.01, ** p<0.05,	* p<0.1
	147.1	$\chi^{2}(1)$	P-value = 0.000

Table A9. Income Decomposition (Male Household Head)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Random Effects	Fixed Effects	OLS
VARIABLES		Log Income	
Wealth	0.818***	0.694	0.836**
Wealth	(0.316)	(0.471)	
Sex of Household Head	(0.310) 0.130	(0.471)	$(0.332) \\ 0.135$
Sex of Household Head			
	(0.0887)		(0.105)
Age of Household Head	-0.0460***	-0.0538***	-0.0459***
	(0.00293)	(0.00958)	(0.00212)
Education of Household Head	$0.131^{***}$	$0.200^{***}$	$0.125^{***}$
	(0.0125)	(0.0228)	(0.00979)
Health	0.789	0.541	0.845
	(0.590)	(0.582)	(0.595)
Insurance	1.559***	1.023***	$1.617^{***}$
	(0.0844)	(0.0986)	(0.0627)
Working household members	1.424***	1.382***	1.426***
	(0.0323)	(0.0604)	(0.0276)
Constant	3.053***	3.631***	2.993***
	(0.551)	(0.599)	(0.569)
Observations	7,852	7,852	7,852
R-squared		0.239	0.354
Number of Households	2,934	2,934	
Robust Standard errors in parentheses	*** p<0	0.01, ** p<0.05,	* p<0.1
Breusch-Pagan LM	55.44	$\chi^2(1)$	P-value = 0.000

#### Table A10. Income Decomposition (Greater than 100 thousand inhabitants)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Random Effects	Fixed Effects	OLS
VARIABLES		Log Income	
Wealth	-0.186	-0.728	-0.0361
	(0.474)	(0.701)	(0.574)
Sex of Household Head	$0.485^{**}$		$0.494^{***}$
	(0.219)		(0.174)
Age of Household Head	-0.0410***	-0.0257	-0.0412***
	(0.00582)	(0.0197)	(0.00457)
Education of Household Head	0.138***	$0.0860^{*}$	0.137***
	(0.0290)	(0.0449)	(0.0216)
Health	1.262	0.537	1.310
	(1.258)	(1.210)	(1.210)
Insurance	$1.161^{***}$	0.377	$1.278^{***}$
	(0.160)	(0.287)	(0.146)
Working household members	$1.307^{***}$	1.382***	1.317***
	(0.0702)	(0.115)	(0.0657)
Constant	$2.475^{**}$	$3.655^{***}$	2.348**
	(1.171)	(1.351)	(1.182)
Observations	2,101	2,101	2,101
R-squared		0.148	0.295
Number of Households	905	905	
Robust Standard errors in parentheses	*** p<0	0.01, ** p<0.05,	* p<0.1
Breusch-Pagan LM	30.84	$\chi^2(1)$	P-value = 0.000

#### Table A11. Income Decomposition (Between 15 and 100 thousand inhabitants)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Random Effects	Fixed Effects	OLS
VARIABLES		Log Income	
Wealth	-0.264	-0.595	-0.230
	(0.393)	(0.400)	(0.365)
Sex of Household Head	0.439**		$0.445^{***}$
	(0.194)		(0.166)
Age of Household Head	-0.0404***	-0.0140	-0.0417***
	(0.00331)	(0.0145)	(0.00507)
Education of Household Head	$0.148^{***}$	$0.178^{***}$	$0.142^{***}$
	(0.0283)	(0.0499)	(0.0295)
Health	$1.777^{*}$	1.120	1.858
	(1.015)	(1.140)	(1.215)
Insurance	$1.077^{***}$	0.911***	$1.090^{***}$
	(0.170)	(0.259)	(0.129)
Working household members	$1.281^{***}$	$1.405^{***}$	$1.270^{***}$
	(0.0673)	(0.0998)	(0.0646)
Constant	2.402**	2.296**	2.398**
	(0.957)	(1.134)	(1.155)
Observations	2,381	2,381	2,381
R-squared		0.216	0.332
Number of Households	1,016	1,016	
Robust Standard errors in parentheses	*** p<0	0.01, ** p<0.05,	* p<0.1
Breusch-Pagan LM	35.79	$\chi^2(1)$	P-value = 0.000

#### Table A12. Income Decomposition (Between 2.5 and 15 thousand inhabitants)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Random Effects	Fixed Effects	OLS
VARIABLES		Log Income	
Wealth	-0.101	-0.354**	-0.0598
	(0.146)	(0.179)	(0.136)
Sex of Household Head	$0.495^{***}$		$0.494^{***}$
	(0.0944)		(0.0936)
Age of Household Head	-0.0364***	-0.0418***	-0.0360***
	(0.00213)	(0.00767)	(0.00182)
Education of Household Head	$0.144^{***}$	$0.170^{***}$	$0.145^{***}$
	(0.0168)	(0.0325)	(0.0165)
Health	1.850***	$1.995^{***}$	$1.758^{***}$
	(0.530)	(0.502)	(0.517)
Insurance	0.869***	$0.412^{***}$	$0.953^{***}$
	(0.0765)	(0.134)	(0.0710)
Working household members	$1.258^{***}$	$1.174^{***}$	$1.270^{***}$
	(0.0303)	(0.0538)	(0.0322)
Constant	2.174***	$2.876^{***}$	2.203***
	(0.521)	(0.564)	(0.475)
Observations	9,170	9,170	9,170
R-squared		0.142	0.299
Number of Households	$3,\!453$	3,453	
Robust Standard errors in parentheses	*** p<0	0.01, ** p<0.05,	* p<0.1
Breusch-Pagan LM	61.74	$\chi^2(1)$	P-value = 0.000

#### Table A13. Income Decomposition (Less than 2.5 thousand inhabitants)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Random Effects	Fixed Effects	OLS
VARIABLES		Log Income	
Locality between 15 and 100 thousand	-0.203*	-0.797***	-0.198*
	(0.118)	(0.304)	(0.117)
Locality between 2.5 and 15 thousand	0.130	-0.460	0.135
	(0.0989)	(0.381)	(0.0982)
Locality less 2.5 thousand	0.0130	-1.061***	0.0206
	(0.0790)	(0.312)	(0.0668)
Wealth	0.00487	-0.728***	0.0588
	(0.164)	(0.218)	(0.154)
Sex of Household Head	0.384***		0.379***
	(0.0896)		(0.0844)
Education of Household Head	0.110***	$0.173^{***}$	$0.107^{***}$
	(0.0131)	(0.0242)	(0.0129)
Health	2.334***	$1.914^{***}$	$2.349^{***}$
	(0.586)	(0.697)	(0.459)
Insurance	1.673***	1.188***	$1.713^{***}$
	(0.0636)	(0.115)	(0.0689)
Working household members	1.321***	$1.255^{***}$	$1.324^{***}$
	(0.0314)	(0.0586)	(0.0307)
Constant	1.344**	2.956***	1.313***
	(0.532)	(0.637)	(0.419)
Observations	10,902	10,902	10,902
R-squared		0.170	0.253
Number of Households	4,413	4,413	
Robust Standard errors in parentheses	*** p<0	0.01, ** p<0.05,	* p<0.1
Breusch-Pagan LM	52.46	$\chi^2(1)$	P-value = 0.00

Table A14. Income Decomposition (Household Head Age under 50 years)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	
	Random Effects	Fixed Effects	OLS	
VARIABLES	Log Income			
Locality between 15 and 100 thousand	-0.164	-1.297***	-0.129	
	(0.122)	(0.339)	(0.120)	
Locality between 2.5 and 15 thousand	0.154	-1.125***	0.151	
	(0.126)	(0.390)	(0.102)	
Locality less 2.5 thousand	$0.164^{*}$	-1.308***	0.206***	
	(0.0912)	(0.286)	(0.0698)	
Wealth	0.233	0.369	0.166	
	(0.180)	(0.243)	(0.176)	
Sex of Household Head	$0.259^{***}$		$0.266^{***}$	
	(0.0693)		(0.0777)	
Education of Household Head	$0.151^{***}$	$0.190^{***}$	$0.148^{***}$	
	(0.0163)	(0.0221)	(0.00990)	
Health	0.822*	$0.978^{*}$	0.740	
	(0.486)	(0.512)	(0.481)	
Insurance	0.801***	$0.461^{***}$	0.848***	
	(0.0749)	(0.115)	(0.0722)	
Working household members	1.335***	$1.308^{***}$	$1.340^{***}$	
	(0.0281)	(0.0423)	(0.0301)	
Constant	3.110***	$4.255^{***}$	3.145***	
	(0.432)	(0.653)	(0.499)	
Observations	10,602	10,602	10,602	
R-squared		0.203	0.369	
Number of Households	4,426	4,426		
Robust Standard errors in parentheses	*** p<0	0.01, ** p<0.05,	* p<0.1	
Breusch-Pagan LM	113.53	$\chi^2(1)$	P-value = 0.0	

Table A15. Income Decomposition (Household Head Age over 50 years)

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