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Kingship in Asia and Early America

Editor

A. L. Basham

El Colegio de México

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Preface

This volume has emerged from a seminar on the ideologies of traditional Asian and pre-Columbian American kingship held in August 1976 at the 30th International Congress of the Human Sciences in Asia and North Africa, in Mexico. With the exception of the paper contributed by Dr. Santucci (which was read at another session of the Congress), and my own brief notes on the ideologies of kingship in pre-Muslim India, all the papers are substantially as presented at the Congress, but they have been revised where necessary by their respective authors, in the light of the often vigorous discussions which took place at the seminar.

It will be noted that in most cases the authors of each paper are members of the cultures concerned. I must admit that considerations of nationalism played a big part in the decision to invite such scholars, for, though we were dealing not with contemporary ideas, but with ancient and traditional ones, the theme has some bearing on contemporary politics. Hence I feared that remarks made by foreign scholars in their papers might in some cases be taken as disparaging or politically loaded by others indigenous to the civilizations being discussed. There was probably no need to take this precaution, but as a result we have a series of papers most of which are the work of specialists who have been born and bred in the cultures concerned, and this, I think, has given several of them an inward character, which otherwise they might have lacked. The only exceptions to the rule are the papers of Drs. van Seters and Santucci, both of which deal with kingship in long vanished civilizations, which by no stretch of the imagination can have any significant direct influence on contemporary affairs; and my own. The latter must be looked on as an addendum to that of Professor Sharma, who somewhat misinterpreted his briefing, and presented a paper dealing rather with the structure of ancient Indian government than with its ideologies. This was understandable in view of the great pressure on his time, for he combines the headship of a large university department with a very responsible administrative

post as Chairman of the Indian Historical Research Grants Committee. It is with his permission that I have added a few pages on Ancient Indian ideas of kingship.

In editing these papers I have not been able to obtain complete uniformity in matters of bibliography and footnoting. This could have been done, but, in view of the geographical distribution of the authors of the papers, and of the pressure on their time and my own, to insist on uniformity might have resulted in great delay in the appearance of this volume. I have only attempted to achieve uniformity in respect of typographical convention and spelling. The O.E.D. has been chosen as the norm rather than Webster, simply because most of the contributors employed the British system in the first place.

It remains for me to thank Professor de la Lama and the organizers of the 30th International Congress for making the symposium possible; those who contributed papers, and took part in the discussion; and three members of the supporting staff of my department at the Australian National University, (in alphabetical order) Miss Mary Hutchinson, Mrs. Portia McCusker, and Mrs. Pat Zeller, without whose help I could neither have organized the symposium nor have edited the papers.

A. L. Basham

Canberra, 1977

Introduction

To introduce this series of papers is, in one sense, easy: they are all very valuable for the information they contain, and the reader who carefully works through them all will have acquired most valuable background knowledge of theories of government of the major civilizations of early Asia and America. To say this, however, is not enough. It was part of the purpose of the seminar to try to discover common ground between the ideas of one culture and those of another, and to find, if possible, some ideas held in common by all of them, including the cultures of the Aztecs and the Incas. At the seminar, however, the discussions tended to emphasize in particular the ideology then being considered rather than to compare two or more cultures, and the final meeting, when the theme was considered as a whole, did not result in any definite conclusions. This is partly the fault of the chairman, myself, who perhaps did not exert sufficient authority over the course of the discussion; but it was also a measure of the intrinsic interest taken in the individual papers, each of which stands in its own right as an authoritative survey of its subject.

The earliest ideas of kingship discussed in the seminar were those of the Ancient Middle East, succinctly outlined by Dr. van Seters. In Egypt the king was divine with a clear and explicit divinity, though he was simultaneously human, while in Mesopotamia his divinity was even more qualified. Exceptional among the peoples of the region were the Hebrews, who seem at first to have managed without kingship at all, and later to have adopted that institution with much misgiving. This, at least, is the impression given by the Old Testament texts on the subject, which have come down to us after much later editing. Yet they did not exclude certain passages in the Psalms and elsewhere which show that, if the king was not divine, at least he was endowed with a divine charisma, obtained at his consecration, and that Yahweh, the only valid god, was believed to bestow magical powers upon the Messiah, "the Lord's Anointed"; it must be realized that every properly ordained Hebrew king was in this sense a Messiah.

Some of the ancient Hebrew ideas were inherited by the Arabs, and indeed in a sense the early Muslims repeated on a larger and more durable scale the experiences of the Hebrews nearly two millennia earlier, after their conquest of Palestine. Nomads and semi-nomads, they gained control of lands and peoples much more developed than they were, and, for all their efforts at maintaining the purity of their original faith, they could not fail to absorb some of the ideas of their new subjects, who were much more sophisticated than themselves. Just as a series of prophets inveighed against the kings of Israel for compromising with the gentiles in both thought and practice, and recalled the freer days of the desert, so a series of Muslim divines attempted to bring back the faithful to the ways of the Four Righteous Caliphs. They were not, on the whole, successful, for, though Islam could not permit a fully developed doctrine of royal divinity, the Iranian concept for *farr*, the divine radiance bestowed upon the righteous and legitimate ruler, gave the caliph, the *padshah* and the *sultan* an almost superhuman status, despite the occasional protests of the strictly orthodox and of a few rationalists such as the great Ibn Khaldun.

In India the Perso-Islamic doctrines of kingship were reinforced by indigenous ideas. The ideology of the protohistoric civilization of the Indus is unknown to us, but, as Dr. Santucci shows, the Aryan invaders of the second millennium B.C. seem to have been governed mainly by tribal chiefs who had already a certain divinity about them. Steadily they became more and more exalted until by the beginning of our era they were claiming to be gods on earth. Nevertheless there were strong ideological checks on the misuse of their power. In classical India government was not looked on as an end in itself, but as an unfortunate necessity in a steadily degenerating world. The High God had appointed the first king to preserve society, to protect the righteous against the evil and the weak against the strong. Moreover, the king's theoretical responsibilities included "pleasing the people". Thus the divine king had very important duties as well as rights, and there are traces of a doctrine comparable to the "Mandate of Heaven" theory of China.

The Indian doctrine of divine kingship, it should be noted, was not without its critics. Neither of the two heterodox sects, Buddhism and Jainism, assented to it, and the former evolved, in the form of a myth or legend, what was probably the first doctrine of social contract in the

thought of the world. In India there was no single and uniform teaching on social and political questions at any time.

Indian ideas, both Hindu and Buddhist, made their impact on Southeast Asia, but it seems that the kingdoms of that area, emerging into civilization, had a heritage of political ideas already, which centred on the association of a divine king with a mountain or hill. Thus the Hindu doctrine of royal divinity, qualified as it was, took on new forms in Southeast Asia. Probably nowhere in India did the king figure as such a thoroughgoing divinity as in early Cambodia, and India can show no monument to a god-king as impressive as the famous remains of Angkor. Yet the doctrine of royal divinity, in its most extreme Southeast Asian form, was to some extent modified by the realities of the objective situation, and by long-standing custom; and the arrival of Theravada Buddhism on the mainland, and of Islam in peninsular Southeast Asia and the islands, modified the doctrine still further. Nevertheless ideas of royal divinity were far from dead when the countries of the region were first opened to contact with the Western world, and their vestiges are still in evidence in Thailand, the last surviving kingdom of the region.

The Chinese evolved the basic features of their civilization with little direct external influence, and when the first important cultural impact from outside was felt their political ideologies were already fully developed. They had evolved an imperial system unique in the world's history for its stability and, in general, its success in providing security for the subject. The ideology of government had already been provided by a number of sages, whose names are too familiar to need repetition. The doctrine of the Mandate of Heaven, as formulated finally by Mencius, meant that the Son of Heaven was a divinity, but only by virtue of his Mandate. While the emperor held the Mandate he was entitled to extreme respect and implicit obedience, but the Mandate was bestowed at the pleasure of Heaven. If he were the Son of Heaven, his rights as such were dependent on Heaven's pleasure, and he could be, so to speak, disinherited or disowned if he did not carry out the will of Heaven conscientiously. Thus, though the history of China provides many instances of tyrannical emperors, it also provides numerous examples of revolts, successful and otherwise, of a more or less popular kind. The saying of Mencius, to the effect that an unrighteous Son of Heaven was a contradiction in terms, and thus revolt against oppression was morally justified, militated against the extremes of imperial injustice, as also did the belief that the with-

drawal of Heaven's Mandate was signalled by such natural calamities as flood, famine, pestilence and earthquake. The passive obedience of the subjects, and the loyalty of the unique civil service of Imperial China, were conditional upon the righteousness of the Son of Heaven. Nevertheless the subject in China had been disciplined over many generations to serve the state, and he seems often to have submitted without complaint to a degree of regimentation uncommon in other parts of Asia. It seems that Buddhism had little permanent effect on China's basic political ideologies. The Buddhist legend of the first king appointed by a social contract was never quite forgotten, but its influence grew weaker with time and distance, and Buddhists in China generally came to terms with the prevailing political theories.

Japan and Korea came strongly under Chinese influence, both Confucian and Buddhist. The latter kingdom became a smaller imitation of China, but, in the case of the former, there was a previous tradition of some kind of royal divinity, based largely on descent from a divine ancestor and the possession of sacred objects believed to be of divine origin. The unification of Japan under the rulers of Yamato brought with it a flood of Chinese influence, but in politics this was considerably modified. The divinity of the Japanese *tenno* was not that of the Chinese Son of Heaven. Increasingly as time progressed the divine emperor became a *deus otiosus*, the real power being exercised by members of an aristocratic clan. The process of excluding the emperor from the affairs of state culminated in the Tokugawa shogunate, when the emperor had a negligible effect on politics, but was looked on as so sacred that he was rarely if ever seen except by his immediate entourage. He was in fact looked on as the very incarnation of Heaven, with a divinity more complete than in any of the other kingdoms considered, except perhaps ancient Egypt. His one political function was to bestow legitimacy upon the *shogun*, who himself generally made no claim to divine status. Confucius had, so to speak, become a naturalized Japanese, and his precepts encouraging loyalty both to the emperor and the temporal rulers were made good use of by the rulers of Tokugawa Japan.

The Meiji "Restoration" brought about a strangely anomalous situation in which a monarch, denial of whose divinity was treason, became the constitutional head of a state successfully striving to modernize itself. The Emperor of Japan, who publicly abjured his divinity after the Second World War, was the last of the divine kings, the gods on earth whose pedigree can be traced back to Ancient

Egypt. Whatever the fate of the world, it seems very unlikely that the race of divine kings will ever be revived.

The theme of royal divinity recurs on the other side of the Pacific in pre-Columbian Mexico and Peru. Our knowledge of the ideologies of these highly developed civilizations is very deficient, since we have no reliable indigenous texts to use as sources, but must depend on the reports of the conquistadors, the clergy who followed them, and the indigenous converts of the latter. Much knowledge about the ancient rulers of America is irretrievably lost, and the ideological aspect has perhaps suffered worst of all.

On comparing what can be gathered of the ideas of the Aztecs with those of the Incas, both similarities and differences are clear. The comparison is probably rather like that made by Professor van Seters between Mesopotamian kingship and that of ancient Egypt. The Aztecs, like the Babylonians and Assyrians, recognized a qualified divinity in their kings, who ritually represented the gods on earth, and acted as intermediaries and high priests of the nation. For the Incas, like the ancient Egyptians, the king was the incarnation of the Sun-god and his divinity was more strongly stressed. The *Inka*, moreover, differed from the Aztec ruler in his more rigid control of the economic life of his nation, and his greater responsibility for the social security and economic welfare of his subjects.

None of the evidence presented by our two Latin-American scholars contains any real suggestion of trans-Pacific contacts in historical times. Resemblances between kingship in Asia and early America certainly exist, but they are such as one would expect to have evolved independently, and no conclusion can be drawn from them except that similar human circumstances tend to produce similar results. In early societies, such as those of protohistoric Egypt, India, China, and Peru, the problem arose of uniting tribes into kingdoms. The doctrine of royal divinity was a useful aid to achieving this end, and, since it fulfilled the needs of the situation, it had great survival value and in some cultures it became an implicitly believed dogma.

We do not suggest any conscious machinations of early rulers, or of their courtiers or priests, in the development of this doctrine, and those who do so lack insight into the mental processes of ancient or primitive peoples. For such peoples, that which exerts power above the ordinary is *ipso facto* divine. A man who exerts such power must either be descended from a god or be a god himself; and if he is descended from a god he has seeds of divinity in his own person. Those brought

up in a background of Judaeo-Christian or Islamic monotheism, even when well educated, often find it difficult to project themselves into polytheistic systems, such as those of Hindu India or Shinto Japan. Here divinity is almost commonplace, and can even inhere in inanimate objects. Hence it is not surprising that the powerful and influential should be looked on as gods.

The doctrine of royal divinity was so useful in the establishment and maintenance of power that it even affected those monotheist cultures whose ideologies were not at first sight favourable to it. The most rigid of monotheisms, those of the Jews and Muslims, were by no means impervious to its influence, as the papers of Drs. van Seters and Rizvi clearly demonstrate, though in these cases it was a divine charisma, rather than actual divinity, which was believed to descend upon the ruler. The same doctrine of the divine charisma of royalty was far from unknown in the Christian world, from Tsarist Russia in the East to Stuart England in the West and Ethiopia in the South. In the English Civil War, "the divine right of kings" became one of the main planks of the royalist party. Indeed the scope of the symposium might well have been profitably enlarged to include papers dealing with the Roman and Byzantine Empires, with medieval and early renaissance Europe and with tribal Africa, where similar phenomena have been attested; but such a course would have made the seminar too cumbersome, and would have been outside the purview of the Congress at which it was held.

The doctrine of royal divinity, which maintained and gave stability to so many Empires in ancient and medieval Asia and America, is now virtually dead, but it perhaps survives in a strange and attenuated form in the political mysticism of theories deriving from Hegel, where the divine king is replaced by the divine state, the divine nation, the divine race, or even the divine class. In such ideologies, terms such as "divine", "holy" etc. are not nowadays widely used, but a doctrine of divinity (in the polytheist sense of the term) is implicit in any theory that the state or the nation transcends in some way the totality of the individuals who compose it. The old doctrine of royal divinity may have been a means of bolstering up effete regimes, but at least it had the positive advantage of giving a sense of permanence and security. Moreover the divine king had certain moral obligations towards his subjects. As a god, he was expected to behave in a godlike manner. The divine state, having no personality except perhaps in the minds of its inventors, has no moral obligations and no conscience.

But this is, perhaps, a digression. It should not be the purpose of the editor of a volume such as this to expatiate on questions of political morality.

If the highest common factor in Asian kingship was the attribution, as far as the local theology permitted, of divinity to the king, this does not imply any sameness in the many Asian political systems. Within any one system there was a wide range of opinion. In India, the region of Asia best known to me, the doctrine of royal divinity was variously interpreted, and by some it was rejected outright; differences of opinion on such questions as the moral right of the subject to withhold taxes or even to revolt are quite evident. The same is true of the world of Islam, and even in China, where the political system approached most closely to totalitarianism, there was a considerable variety of views, at least in earlier times.

One further point emerges from these papers. The concept of "oriental despotism" goes back to ancient times, for its germs can be found among the classical Greeks, and even perhaps in the Old Testament. It has been used by Europeans for many centuries, bolstered by religious ideas, in defence of their lands and faiths against attacks from Asia, and in more recent times, with the turning of the tables, it has been part of the ideology of Western imperialism in Asia. The concept of oriental despotism, originally not very coherent, was, I believe, first given philosophical backing by Montesquieu and was taken up by several nineteenth century political thinkers, including Karl Marx. Since the Second World War it has been given a new lease of life by the sinologist Professor Karl Wittfogel, in a very able and controversial book, which perhaps aroused more irritation than its author expected or than the work merited, especially on the part of critics who felt (wrongly, we believe) that it was politically prejudiced, and who themselves may have been politically prejudiced in the opposite sense. The papers in this volume may throw some light on the problem of whether the kingdoms of early and medieval Asia were in fact as despotic as Wittfogel suggests. In the polytheist systems of Asia, if God, in the sense of the High God, the father God from whom all the lesser divinities had emanated, could do no wrong, this was not the case with the innumerable minor gods of the pantheon, the divine or semi-divine king among them, who were fallible and capable of sin and error. The king's divinity was dependent on his maintaining the divine norms, and in so far as he oppressed his subjects he endangered his own divinity and his security on the

throne. The theme of "oriental despotism" is specially emphasized in Dr. Sharma's paper, and he has shown that kingship in India did not normally fit the Wittfogel criteria.

We cannot finally judge the accuracy of Wittfogel's interpretation of Asian history from the contributions to this symposium, for the purpose of the latter was to consider theory and ideology rather than practice, but we may conclude that, whatever the factual situation, the ideologies of early and medieval Asia gave no support to arbitrary despotism, any more than they did to democracy. If there was arbitrary despotism in Asia, it was in spite of, rather than because of, the theoretical bases upon which her ancient empires were built.

Sacral and not-so-Sacral Kingship in the Ancient Near East

John van Seters

Introduction

In this paper I have tried to deal with the great diversity in the royal ideologies of the ancient Near East, not only between various regions but within a particular region or nation itself. To deal with the whole history of the Near East from its beginnings ca. 3000 B.C. to ca. 500 B.C. in any comprehensive fashion is impossible in this short space, so I have presented below general treatments of the best known periods for Egypt, Mesopotamia and Israel, and in each case I have given attention where possible to the theoretical questions raised by the convener of the seminar. Kingship in ancient Israel and Judah has received the most extensive attention in the literature and it does so here because it is my own special field of study. Furthermore, the textual evidence for it, the Bible, is the most familiar but not always the best understood and, in spite of the much shorter history of the monarchy in Israel and Judah, its ideology of kingship had the greatest impact upon later ages.

Egypt

In Egypt the king is called a god and his kingship is regarded as the continuation of that divine rule which was first established by the gods through continuous unbroken succession.¹ The king of Egypt, according to this mythological pattern, is the incarnation of the god Horus who was the legitimate successor of his father, the dead king-god Osiris, and every succession and coronation is the re-enactment of this paradigmatic event. Thus the king is the son of God, living and ruling

¹ On the ideology of kingship in Egypt see particularly H. Frankfort, *Kingship and the Gods*, Chicago, 1948. See also H. W. Fairman, "The Kingship Rituals of Egypt" in *Myth, Ritual and Kingship* ed. S.H. Hooke, Oxford, 1958, pp. 74-104.

on earth in the place of the gods and is associated in his various royal activities with the whole pantheon of deities. Throughout the history of the Egyptian monarchy this association is reflected in the titulary which he acquires. Thus by the Fifth Dynasty he becomes the son of Ra the sun god of Heliopolis, and later the son of Amon, the principal god of Thebes and the empire. In other periods, and in fixed ways and patterns, the king is related to many other gods and goddesses.

This gives to the office of kingship in Egypt a profoundly sacral character, more so than anywhere else in the ancient Near East. It is constantly iterated in the ceremonies and rituals performed by the king, particularly those which have to do with the succession. But this side of Egyptian kingship has been overstressed by many scholars.² It must also be pointed out that the king himself is human and must behave towards the gods in a manner befitting his humanity. He must maintain the cult places as an obedient son, and in strict reward for fulfilling such duties he receives divine benefits for himself and his subjects. He acts as the medium of divine order, blessings, and prosperity, but he is not the creative agent in bringing these about. Only the gods are directly responsible for the natural order of life such as the regular inundation of the Nile which sustains the whole of the Egyptian agricultural economy, and only the gods are capable as well of miraculous intervention in the affairs of men. The state of the land's prosperity and well-being, however, is regarded as a direct reflection of the king's piety. While the king is spoken of as omniscient when it comes to his authority to administer law and government, he can also be ignorant of particular matters on which he needs to consult with officials or read books.

This ambivalence in the divinity and humanity of kingship in Egypt has been very well summed up by G. Posener in the following statement:

Si, au lieu d'envisager l'acte, on considère la personne du roi, elle apparaît comme dédoublée. D'une part, on voit un être qui incarne un pouvoir sacré, qui personnifie une institution d'origine divine et qui participe du divin.. D'autre part, on trouve un chef d'état qui exerce une fonction terrestre et qui relève de l'humain. L'un naît et vit parmi les dieux, ses "pères", et l'autre n'en a qu'une connaissance livres-

² G. Posener, *De la divinité du Pharaon*, Paris, 1960. This work contains a good review of previous discussions of the subject and a necessary corrective to works such as Frankfort.

que et n'entretient avec le ciel que des contacts intermittents. Il l'approche rarement et le fait par des voies indirectes qui diffèrent peu de celles qui s'offrent au commun des mortels.³

This two-fold character of the Egyptian monarchy naturally raises the question of its origin. The early dynasties of Egyptian rule seem to represent the period of the most absolute power and prestige of the Pharaoh up to the Fourth Dynasty.⁴ This exalted attitude towards the king is in evidence from the First Dynasty onwards and it is entirely likely that similar forms of kingship already existed in the various separate nomes (districts) of Egypt prior to the unification of the land.⁵ The increasing recognition of the humanity of the king may have been due to the modification of the king's authority as a result of particular historical circumstances such as the First Intermediate Period, in which the nation experienced the disintegration of centralized authority. At the same time the divinity of the king continued to be maintained in the courtly and ritualistic traditions of the succession and the symbols of office.

There is no question, at any rate, that the divinity of kingship was the basis for political authority throughout the land. The king was the state. He was the only corporate and effective means of uniting the two parts of the land, Upper Egypt (the Nile valley) and Lower Egypt (the delta region) and all his titulature was made to emphasize this unity. In fact for the Egyptians history begins when the first king Menes united the two regions, and each subsequent king symbolically re-enacts this unity when he becomes king. In times when such a unity breaks down the Egyptians regard themselves as threatened by chaos and always hold in special regard those kings who subsequently restore the unity of the land. The king was the law, the mediator of right order, so that there was no appeal to a higher authority against him. This did not prevent dynastic change, and even assassination on rare occasions, but the justification for a new line of kings was a revelation of the true Horus who again established the divine order in the land.⁶

³ *Ibid.*, p. 88.

⁴ R. Anthes, "Mythology in Ancient Egypt", in *Mythologies of the Ancient World* ed. S. N. Kramer, Garden City, N. Y., 1961, pp. 33 ff.

⁵ A. H. Gardiner, *Egypt of the Pharaohs*, Oxford, 1961, pp. 400 ff.

⁶ See the "prophecy of Neferti" in J. B. Pritchard, ed. *Ancient Near Eastern Texts Relating to the Old Testament*, 2nd ed., Princeton, 1954, pp. 444-46.

Theoretically the king had complete control over all aspects of Egyptian life. Thus the king was responsible for the protection of his people, and on the monuments he is often represented as single-handedly smiting the enemy. In practice it meant leading the army, often in person. The king also maintained the law within the land and was the ultimate court of appeal, although this function was delegated to royal officials. The king was responsible in very practical ways for the prosperity of the state because Egypt depends so entirely upon state control of irrigation and other agricultural operations for its life and this can only be done by highly centralized authority. Other aspects of the economy such as foreign trade expeditions and mining in the Sinai and Nubia were also state monopolies. This royal control of the whole state economy was a very strong tradition in Egypt and this tradition was not destroyed by periods of disunity precisely because such periods of local autonomy were often characterized by economic hardship. Unity and prosperity went together.

It would appear that as far as the day-to-day affairs of state were concerned the ideology of kingship was quite effective for most periods of Egyptian history, especially as the unity of the land in one head-of-state was maintained. The one area where there was some tension between theory and practice was in the transition from one dynasty to another and in the legitimization of a particular reign or royal house. The problem of establishing the claim of only one royal family was particularly acute during the so-called intermediate periods which could last for several centuries. But the issue could arise at other times as well. Amenemhet I, the founder of the Twelfth Dynasty, was formerly a vizier not of royal blood, who rose to power from his strong position from within the administration. In theory the new Horus need not be the actual son of the previous ruler, although there was certainly a propensity towards dynastic succession. But Amenemhet felt compelled to justify his rise to power by the fiction of a prophecy made many years previously, predicting his rise to power to put an end to troubled times. In fact, the Twelfth Dynasty in general was characterized by propagandist literature which urged loyalty to these kings.⁷ For a large part of this dynasty the Pharaohs reigned by the will and consent of the aristocratic families of the nomes in spite of royal dogma, and centralization of power was only fully achieved after more

⁷ G. Posener, *Littérature et politique dans l'Égypte de la XII dynastie*, Paris, 1956.

than a century, and perhaps not without a struggle.⁸ The succession was also regarded as so insecure that a coregency was established by Amenemhet I in which his son shared the throne. This created the anomaly of two living Horuses on the throne -both legitimate rulers.⁹ Yet this situation did not decrease in the least the carrying out of the traditional rites of divine kingship.¹⁰ This practice of coregency continued throughout this dynasty and reappeared at later times in Egyptian history as well.

If space permitted, one could multiply examples in which the problem of legitimizing a particular ruler or dynasty arose. At times it was dealt with by an extension of the ideology of divine kingship in a new way; at other times it was frankly set aside by use of military might or administrative power. It was never regarded with such single-minded veneration that it could not be manipulated by the powerful and the ambitious. The dogma of kingship in Egypt has been presented as a monolithic structure which dominated the Egyptian view of life for thousands of years, but the other side of the coin is the reality of the dynamic development and change of the institution through the centuries of Egyptian history.

Mesopotamia

The ideology of kingship in Mesopotamia is much more complex than that of Egypt, reflecting no doubt the greater diversity of cultural groups which settled and influenced the river valley civilizations of ancient Iraq.¹¹ The earliest articulation of and ideology of kingship, in the Sumerian King List, comes close to a thousand years after the beginning of historical texts which make reference to kings and city-states in the early third millennium B.C. In the King List and related documents kingship, i.e., the insignia of kingship, descended from heaven for the purpose of shepherding mankind. So the institution of kingship was of divine origin. The person of the king is spoken of as

⁸ Gardiner, *op. cit.*, p. 140.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 129 f.

¹⁰ Frankfort, *op. cit.*, pp. 101 ff.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 277-333. See also S.N. Kramer, *The Sumerians*, Chicago, 1963, pp. 33-72; L. Oppenheim, *Ancient Mesopotamia*, Chicago, 1964, pp. 95 ff. For a recent summary with bibliography see H. W. F. Saggs, *The Greatness that was Babylon*, London, 1962, pp. 359-389, 523 f.

chosen by the gods for his task, but the manner of this election, whether by sacred lot or otherwise, is not stated. The theme of divine election primarily expresses the affection of the gods, while the ruler actually becomes king by virtue of dynastic succession. While the Sumerian King List emphasizes the continuity of kingship from the time of the heroes onward and justifies the right to its possession by the political domination of one city-state over the whole region of Sumer and Akkad, the national states of Assyria and Babylonia in the subsequent period emphasize genealogical connections with the tribal founders of the state in the distant past.¹² The dynastic principle was firmly established as an important component throughout Mesopotamian history and king lists became an important feature of the official scribal tradition.

In contrast to these ideological understandings of kingship are the attempts at seeing the historical rise of the royal office from quite different social and institutional bases. The two terms for ruler, *lugal* and *ensi*, are regarded as giving a clue to these. It is thought that *lugal*, "great man", was originally one chosen by a primitive democratic assembly of elders to deal with a political or military emergency. His extraordinary powers were for a limited period of time. Inevitably, however, such limited measures gave way to autocratic rule by the strong man. The *ensi*, on the other hand, seems to have evolved out of the office of administrator of the city temple which was the dominant economic and religious institution of the early Sumerian cities. From such a base of power he became the ruler of the whole. Yet the word *ensi* was always limited in its reference to one city-state, whereas *lugal* was more appropriate to one who had control over more than one city.

The problem with the theory that kingship arose out of primitive democracy is that it rests upon indirect evidence from texts of a much later period and it does not account for the religious nature of kingship contained in all the early texts.¹³ Furthermore it would appear to be seriously contradicted by the evidence of the so-called royal graves of Ur, which come from the Early Dynastic Period. These have suggested to many the burials of kings who were regarded as divine and who at their death were buried with many courtiers who committed suicide

¹² J. J. Finkelstein, "The Genealogy of the *Hammurapi Dynasty", *JCS* 20 (1966), 95-118.

¹³ T. Jacobsen, "Primitive Democracy in Ancient Mesopotamia", *JNES* 2 (1943), 159-72

for the purpose of serving the divine king in the afterlife.¹⁴ The latter part of the third millennium and the early second millennium B.C. also give evidence that the king was regarded as divine. This divinity may be limited to certain religious and ritualistic functions in which the king plays the part of the god in annual fertility rites.¹⁵ But this divinity does not provide the same broad ideological base in Mesopotamia as it does in Egypt and is not important for consideration here.

It is really the theme of the divine election of the king which is the most significant ideological principle by which the actions of the king are justified. This election is first and foremost for the service of the gods, the building and maintenance of the shrines and the cult. A serious neglect in this regard could jeopardize one's right to rule. Divine election is also given as the basis for the establishment of law and order in the land, as set forth in the prologues to the ancient Mesopotamian law codes.¹⁶ This was more than maintaining the traditional laws and courts. It also included enacting new measures for the protection of the weak. Besides this, in the early second millennium the Old Babylonian kings directly intervened in the economy, laying down general guidelines for trade and commerce, establishing fair wages and prices, and directly administering for the welfare of the state in such matters as dike control, etc. However, this kind of intervention and state regulation was much more necessary in Babylonia than it was in Assyria where farming was dependent upon the rain and not on the maintenance of dikes and irrigation canals. Another area where divine election expressed itself was that of military activity. In Assyria of the first millennium in particular, the state was a great war machine and the king was supremely the commander of the army. Since the gods were seen as taking an active part in the battles, the temples of the gods, particularly Asshur, benefited greatly from the booty and the tribute.

The identity of the state in Mesopotamia was primarily seen in the rule of the gods over their land and their cities. In the city-states of ancient Sumer this meant that the primary city temple provided the focus for the state and the *ensi* was ruler by virtue of being the chief

¹⁴ Saggs, *op. cit.*, pp. 372-81.

¹⁵ Frankfort, *op. cit.*, pp. 295 ff.

¹⁶ Pritchard, *ANET*, pp. 159, 164-5, 177-80.

“servant” of the god. With the rise of the national state of Sumer the chief god of the pantheon, Enlil, with his temple at Nippur, symbolized the focus of identity for the whole kingdom even though the political capital was always elsewhere. In the so-called Old Babylonian period the various kingdoms which had their centres in the major cities gave prestige to the god of that city. As Babylon grew to be the dominant city of the south, Marduk, the city god, replaced Enlil as the major deity of the region and the one primarily responsible for bestowing kingship over Babylonia. In the north, Asshur was identified as the Enlil of Assyria and the king was his high-priest and servant. As high-priest the king could exercise some control over the cult. In the south the king had no priestly functions and the priesthood of Marduk was more powerful and could come into open hostility with the monarch.

In the day-to-day matters of state the citizens accepted their obligation to obey the king. In the matter of succession, however, there could be some difficulty. The notion of divine choice did not clearly allow for the principle of succession and in Assyria the king had to give some recognition to the leading aristocratic families as part of the base of his authority. So the Assyrian kings established coregencies, ascertaining the choice of the gods among the royal sons before the death of the king, and then having all the officers, princes and vassals of the realms take a solemn oath of fealty to the designated successor. This did not always preclude a revolt or unrest at the ruler's death. Nevertheless the monarchy remained the only form of political rule through twenty-five hundred years of Mesopotamian history.

Israel

Kingship in ancient Israel is perhaps the most difficult of all to deal with. The nature of the source material in the Bible lends itself to such a variety of critical evaluation and interpretation that there is now a great divergence of opinion on all aspects of the subject. Space does not allow a review of those issues here but only a brief outline of a new approach to the subject.¹⁷

¹⁷ For recent treatments with bibliography see: R. de Vaux, *Ancient Israel, its Life and Institutions*, London, 1961, pp. 91-114, 525-527; K. H. Bernhardt, *Das Problem der altorientalischen Königsideologie im Alten Testament*, Leiden, 1961; J. Albert Soggin, *Das Königtum in Israel*, Berlin, 1967.

There can be little doubt that the Old Testament does not give us a unified ideology of kingship. At some points the king is acclaimed in lofty terms, at others the whole institution as well as numerous individual kings are strongly condemned. At some points the king is spoken of in language which is close to the veneration of a divine being; at others he is regarded as a mere mortal no different from his fellows. It is customary to ascribe these varying attitudes to different regions, groups and periods. But such solutions to the diversity are still a matter of considerable debate.

The liturgical tradition of the Psalter contains a number of royal psalms, some of which clearly reflect the king's coronation and therefore his rights and duties.¹⁸ The king is regarded as the "son of God" by adoption at his accession.¹⁹ This theme of divine sonship may have come from Egypt, but if so it has been modified to make the king less than divine and to suggest at most a place of special privilege and divine protection. The king is also spoken of as chosen by the deity, and this is signified by the act of anointing by prophet or priest. As the "anointed one" - Messiah - his person has a specially sacred character.²⁰ This concept of royal election is especially Mesopotamian, as we have seen, so that Israel may be viewed as the recipient of influences from both directions - Egypt and Mesopotamia.

But this theme of election takes on a special form in Israel in the so called Davidic covenant.²¹ In this divine commitment, God chooses the dynastic line of David in perpetuity, giving an ideological sanction to the dynastic principle which was not present in the other nations. It is a remarkable fact that only one dynasty occupied the throne of Judah from David to the end of the monarchy. This did not prevent assassination of the king, but in spite of this a Davidite was always placed on the throne. This is in contrast of the north where there were several dynasties over a much shorter period, the changes always coming as the result of a violent overthrow of the reigning monarch.

The anointing is associated with the gifts of the divine spirit by which the king receives powers both for military success and to rule the

¹⁸ See Ps. 2; 45; 72; 89; 110.

¹⁹ Ps. 2:7; 89; 28 (ET 27); cf. 2 Sam. 7:14.

²⁰ 1 Sam. 24:7, 11 (ET 6, 10); 26:9; 2 Sam. 1: 14f.

²¹ 2 Sam. 7; 23: 1-7; Ps. 132.

land with justice and wisdom.²² It is perhaps this aspect of ritual and ideology which gives to the monarchy the aura of divinity. This endowment was not easily separated from the person of the king himself. Similarly the paraphernalia of kingship, the throne, the crown, and the sceptre were also spoken of in lofty terms.²³

The kingship of the earthly ruler is directly related to the kingship of Yahweh, the God of Israel. The king in Jerusalem is the vice-regent of the deity and both are enthroned side by side in the capital. But this means that the king as vice-regent of the universal ruler has the right to rule over the nations and keep them in subjection.²⁴ Here the ideology in no way corresponds to the political reality. It would appear that some of this ideology is borrowed from the greater imperial powers of the day. But it seems to go beyond the political control even of these states. It is important to see that these qualities of kingship are spoken of in terms of hope and promise which were not realized in the actual experience of the present occupant of the throne.²⁵

In portraying the rise of the monarchy, the biblical tradition tells us that preceding the time of the kings there were temporary non-dynastic rulers who came to the fore by divine impulse or the appeal of tribal leaders and who led the people in battle in deliverance from their enemies. Subsequent to their victories they also "judged" Israel for the rest of their lives while the land remained at peace. The tradition presents a succession of such judges from the time of Joshua to the rise of Saul, at which time the monarchy began.

The need to deal critically with this tradition has long been recognized, and how to reconstruct the pre-monarchic society out of it is a matter of some debate. A widely held notion is to see, as a background to this period, a sacred tribal league similar to the Greek and Italic amphictyonies with a representative primitive democracy based on strong religious sanctions and association with a central cult-place.²⁶ The two functions of temporary military leader and of

²² 1 Sam. 10; 6-7; 16: 1-13; cf. Isa. 11: 1-5, 61: 1.

²³ Ps. 45: 7(6).

²⁴ Ps. 2; 72: 8-11.

²⁵ See also Isa. 9: 5-6 (ET 6-7); 11: 1 ff.

²⁶ M. Noth, *Das System der zwölf Stämme Israels*, Stuttgart, 1930; *idem*, *History of Israel*, 2nd ed., New York, 1958, pp. 85-109.

"judge" would have been quite distinct from one another and the real power would have been in the assembly of the tribal representatives.

Such a scheme has come in for considerable criticism of late, both of the way in which the historical analogies have been used and the very slim basis for the theory in the extant tradition itself.²⁷ Apart from a collection of hero stories which may have originated in the pre-monarchy period but which only received their final form late in the monarchy or exilic period, there is little useful data on early institutional forms. This makes the discussion about Saul's monarchy as the transition from one period to another equally difficult to control. It seems plausible to interpret Saul's rise as that of a strong man whose temporary leadership in a military adventure was made more permanent because of the seriousness of the Philistine threat to Israelite sovereignty. But the association of Samuel with Saul (and David) as the means by which the transition was made from judges to kings is a late secondary development of the tradition and therefore little can be said about the ideological basis of Saul's monarchy. It would appear that his court was rather simple and rustic in nature, although there is no need to doubt that his monarchy was at least potentially dynastic in character. Consequently there is no adequate basis for constructing out of Saul's monarchy a "charismatic" or "conditional" non-dynastic ideology, as some have done, and seeing in this the type of kingship in the northern kingdom of Israel.²⁸ The nature of the northern monarchy remains mostly unknown.

On the other hand, the book of Deuteronomy might suggest a modification of this statement. This work is regarded by many as based upon strong northern traditions and institutions, even though it was composed in its present form in the south. Yet Deuteronomy certainly did not represent the view of the court itself but a protest against what was regarded as foreign elements in it. The ideology of

²⁷ See most recently, R. de Vaux, *Histoire ancienne d'Israel 2 La période des Juges*, Paris, 1973, pp. 19-36.

²⁸ Cf. A. Alt, *Die Staatenbildung der Israeliten in Palästina*, 1930, translated as "The Formation of the Israelite State in Palestine", *Essays on Old Testament History and Religion*, Oxford, 1966, pp. 173-237. See also F. M. Cross, "The Ideologies of Kingship in the Era of the Empire: Conditional Covenant and eternal Decree", in *Canaanite Myth and the Hebrew Epic*, Cambridge, Mass., 1973, pp. 219 ff. For a criticism of Alt see G. Buccellati, *Cities and Nations of Ancient Syria*, Rome, 1967, pp. 146 ff.

kingship in Deut. 17:14-20 contrasts to a marked degree with the form of Jerusalemite kingship as outlined earlier. While the principle of divine election is affirmed, the active choice of the people is taken quite seriously. The king is spoken of as "one from among your brothers" and he may only have a very modest court and no great military or political pretensions. His knowledge of the divine will is not a special endowment but comes from the written law which he is to consult so that he will not view himself above his fellows. If he is obedient to this standard then he and his sons will have the right to continue on the throne of Israel in dynastic succession.

This view certainly influenced the ideology of kingship as presented in the historical books of Samuel and Kings. The criticism of absolute monarchy comes out in the negative statements about kingship "like the nations" in the account of the rise of the monarchy although without rejecting the monarchy altogether.²⁹ The conditional character of the monarchy becomes interpreted in various ways. The spirit which comes with anointing could be withdrawn, as in Saul's case, and with it the ability to rule properly and the right to pass on the rule, if the king was disobedient to the divine law. In the case of the Davidic covenant this right to rule could not be revoked entirely, but the king could suffer humiliation. It is possible that some could see in Deuteronomy a higher law of God and therefore on that basis remove the king from office. The revolt of Jehu, instigated by a prophet, is certainly interpreted in the history as a religious revolution against pagan worship as introduced by the court.

The author of Samuel-Kings certainly believed in a higher law by which the actions of the kings of Israel and Judah were to be judged. The prophets also provide a critique of the monarchy, but this is often made against the standard of the ideal king. The present king is condemned for the lack of justice or adequate concern for the poor and the weak throughout the land. Lavish courts built at the expense of the poor are also condemned. But what direct effect the king had on the economy, apart from the levying of taxes for the court's expenses, cannot be known.

The concept of the state, like that of kingship, also appears to be somewhat diverse in the biblical traditions. On the one hand the

²⁹ See R.E. Clements, "The Deuteronomistic Interpretation of the Founding of the Monarchy in 1 Sam. VIII, VT 24 (1874), pp. 398-410.

Judaean royal ideology makes the king quite central to the corporate identity of the nation.³⁰ But there is another form of the state, probably north-Israelite, which is primarily tribal whose basic identity is expressed in terms of traditions about eponymous forefathers and their exodus from Egypt, their sojourn in the wilderness when they received their "constitution", and their forced entry into the land. In this view the king is a late secondary development. It is really the people who are chosen and sovereign, even the "son" of God.³¹ It is possible to see these two models of the state, the one in which the king is primary and the one in which the people are primary, as belonging to Judah and Israel respectively, and to suggest that in the work of the historian of Samuel-Kings there is an attempt to combine the two patterns.

When the state of Judah came to an end in the destruction of Jerusalem by the Babylonians the monarchy also ended, but not the royal ideology. For many of those who harboured hopes of a restoration, such a renewed state was unthinkable without a king, the son of David, the Messiah. These fond hopes, building on the idealized models of the old ideology of kingship, came to expect a more than human figure who would usher in a great new age of the Kingdom of God. This was the rise of Messianism whose ultimate outcome was the rise of Christianity.³²

But it would be misleading to think that this was the only response to the end of the monarchy. For some, like Second Isaiah the prophet of the exile, the Davidic covenant was democratized so that now all God's people were to function at the vice-regents of God among the nations.³³ In a similar fashion the traditions about Abraham were interpreted in such a way that the royal rights and duties were extended through the covenant with Abraham to all his offspring and the people had their primary identity in him.³⁴ There were also those who separated the temple from the monarchy, since it had become a

³⁰ Against the notion that this ideology should be associated with Jerusalem only, see Buccellati, *op. cit.*, pp. 160 ff.

³¹ On the application of this term to Israel see Hosea 11: 1, Exod. 4: 22-23.

³² Of the many works on the subject see particularly S. Mowinckel; *He That Cometh*, New York, 1954.

³³ Isa. 55: 3-5.

³⁴ On this subject see J. Van Seters, *Abraham in History and Tradition*, New Haven, 1975, pp. 263 ff.

focal institution of its own in the time of the restoration, and traced its origins to the wilderness period, at the same time providing the model for a non-monarchic theocratic state.³⁵

Having sketched in outline the royal ideologies of Egypt, Mesopotamia and Israel and the problems and dangers of trying to reconstruct one orthodoxy for each of these regions, I want to consider one further, most remarkable, source on kingship which will illustrate vividly this lack of conformity to the "accepted" view of the monarchy in ancient Israel. I refer to the so-called Court History of David.³⁶

The usual interpretation of this document is to date it to the early days of Solomon and to regard it as written by a member of the court for the purpose of legitimizing Solomon's right to rule. But neither the early date nor this interpretation of its purpose can be maintained. On purely literary grounds it can be shown that the work was added to the completed history of Samuel-Kings some time in the Deuteronomic, exilic or post-exilic period. Its real purpose is that of a political satire on the ideology of kingship in the Deuteronomic history and on the Davidic covenant in particular.³⁷

In the books of Samuel the Deuteronomist shows how God designated David as the future leader (*nagid*) and shepherd of his people to replace Saul as a more deserving ruler who would fight the wars of the Lord and give the people of Israel peace and prosperity.³⁸ David is then promised through Nathan the prophet (2 Sam. 7) that he will have a perpetual dynasty (a "sure house"), and all of this David accepts with the greatest humility. The Court History, however, takes up this theme of the Davidic covenant in a most satirical fashion. In the story of the palace intrigue of 1 Kings 1, Solomon's right to rule is based, not on divine promise, but upon a promise the king is said to have made to Bathsheba, Solomon's mother, but which was

³⁵ This is the perspective of the so-called Priestly Code in Exodus to Numbers.

³⁶ This is usually identified as consisting of 2 Sam. 9-20, 1 Kings 1-2. L. Rost in his study, *Die Überlieferung von der Thronnachfolge Davids*, BWANT 111/6, 1926, also includes 2 Sam. 6:16, 20-23, and an earlier version of 2 Sam 7. Another recent treatment is R.N. Whybray, *The Succession Narrative*, London, 1968.

³⁷ This presentation of the Court History is based upon my forthcoming study to appear in *Histories and Historians of the Ancient Near East*, ed. J. W. Wevers, I have also included in the Court History 2 Sam. 2: 8-4, 12.

³⁸ 1 Sam. 13: 13-14; 16; 25: 28-31; 2 Sam. 5:2.

actually invented by Nathan, the Prophet. Then, without further divine revelation, Zadok the priest and Nathan, as conspirators, anoint Solomon and have him sit on the royal throne to be king in his father's place while David is still alive, to insure his right to rule. David himself agrees to this arrangement and states: "I have designated him leader (*nagid*) over Israel and Judah (v. 35)", a statement which in Deuteronomic terms only God can make. In the Court History the military commander confirms the action with his "Amen". This is a mockery of the theme of divine election.

The Davidic covenant is also placed in the mouth of Solomon (1 Kings 2:24) in the context of an oath that his elder brother should be put to death on mere suspicion of his intentions. When Joab and Shimei have also been murdered and Abiathar expelled, the Court History concludes: "So the kingdom was established in the hand of Solomon (2:24)", an ironic fulfilment of the divine promise. David also uses the fact of his being chosen by Yahweh as *nagid* in place of Saul as a taunt to Michal the daughter of Saul and excuses his rather dubious behaviour on the basis of it. (2 Sam 6:20-23). In similar fashion Abner uses the promise to David in a dispute with Ishbosheth, the son of Saul, and by it justifies his switch of loyalties and political manoeuvring with the elders of Israel (2 Sam. 3:9, 17-18), trying to get them to make a covenant with David through him. When Abner deals directly with David, however, he promises to deliver to David the northern tribes, which he describes as "all his (David's) ambitious craving". What the Court History is suggesting is that the Davidic covenant has been used as a guise and justification for quite dishonourable political action.

If the Deuteronomist's history of David is the legitimization of the royal house of David in place of Saul, then the Court History has been added to it as an anti-legitimation story. This negative perspective is also brought out in the description of the inauguration of David's rule and of the various revolts through which he maintained his power. David gained control over his kingdom by direct military action, by political scheming and by assassinations. David's household was full of turmoil and intrigue, infidelity and murder, hate and suspicion. This is a bitter attack upon the royal ideology of a "sure house" for David. David himself is a moral and spiritual weakling who does not fight the battles of the Lord but takes the wife of his bravest warrior. One can scarcely conceive of a more striking contrast to the view of the

Deuteronomistic historian that David is the ideal monarch against whom all the actions of the later kings are judged.

If this view is correct, then the Court History represents an anti-messianic sentiment in certain Jewish circles in Jerusalem in the post-exilic period. While one may admire the artistry and realistic portrayal of this oriental monarchy, as effective satire it failed, for messianism continued on, as we have said, into the rise of Christianity.

Abbreviations

ANET	Ed. J. B. Pritchard, <i>Ancient Near Eastern Texts Relating to the New Testament</i> . 2nd ed., Princeton, 1954.
BWANT	<i>Beiträge zur Wissenschaft von Alten und Neuen Testament</i> . Leipzig.
JCS	<i>Journal of Cuneiform Studies</i> . New Haven.
JNES	<i>Journal of Near Eastern Studies</i> , Chicago.
VT	<i>Vetus Testamentum</i> . Leiden.

Kingship in Islam: a Historical Analysis

S.A.A. Rizvi

In Islam God the Most High, Unique and One in Himself, enjoys unlimited sovereignty (*rubūbyya*) over His creations. Neither prophets nor "kings of kings" can claim partnership in His divinity. Two prophet-kings, Dāwūd (David) and his successor, Sulaymān (Solomon), although mighty and powerful, are described in the Qur'an as "excellent slaves of Allah".¹ In the Qur'ān also David is specifically addressed as *Khalīfat fi al-Ard* (Viceroy on Earth).² The people of Noah³ who rejected the truth and tried to destroy their prophet, perished, and the same was the lot of the disobedient members of the tribe of 'Ād who followed after Noah, and those of another tribe, known as the Thumūd,⁴ who flourished about two hundred years after 'Ād.

Of limitless divine favours the Qur'ān reminds the Israelites:

And (remember) when Moses said unto his people:
"O my people! Remember Allāh's favour unto you, how He placed among you Prophets, and He made you kings, and gave you that (which) He gave not to any (other) of (His) creatures".⁶

A leading example of such favour is the story of Fir'aawn (Pharaoh), the inveterate enemy of Moses who was drowned while the Israelites were saved.⁷

Such mighty kings as David and Solomon, as well as petty monarchs like those of the pre-Moses Israelites, feature in the Qur'ān as objects of divine indulgence to mankind. Nations and kings who

¹ Qur'ān; XXXVIII, 31; English translation by M.M. Pickthall, *The Meaning of the Glorious Koran*, Mentor Books, New York, 14th printing, n.d.

² Qur'ān, XXXVIII, 27.

³ Qur'ān, XI, 36-49.

⁴ Qur'ān, VII, 65-72; XI 50-60; XIV, 9; etc.

⁵ Qur'ān VII, 73-79; XI, 61-68; XIV, 9; XV, 80-84, etc.

⁶ Qur'ān, V, 20.

⁷ Qur'ān, X, 83-92.

disobey the divine message are unequivocally condemned. Allāh's undisputed sovereign power "to give kingdoms" and "to take away kingdoms"⁸ according to His will presupposes the existence of a state whose citizens, the *Ummat al-Islām* (Muslim community) are bound by the Sharī'a (divinely revealed law) or in which there dominates (in the words of a modern author) "Allāh's sovereign law revealed through His messenger".⁹ Before Muhammad died on 12 Rabi' I 11/8 June 632, a Qur'ānic verse affirmed:

This day have I perfected your religion for you and completed My favour unto you, and have chosen for you as religion AL-ISLĀM...¹⁰

The caliphate and kingship

The divine command contained in this verse marked the end of the legislative function which the Prophet Muhammad had performed in his capacity as the messenger of God; his successors, known as *khalīfas* (caliphs), inherited only his executive and judicial functions. Abū Bakr (11/632-13/634), the first successor to the Prophet, who was elected by mutual consultation (*shūrā*), chose to call himself *Khalīfat Rasūl Allāh*. This literally means "he who follows Allāh's messenger", the successor to the messenger of God. Through the use of this term Abū Bakr was strongly rejecting the title, "Caliph of God". 'Umar (13/634-23/644), the second Caliph, introduced the alternative title, *Amīr al-Mu'minīn* (Commander of the Faithful), in order to remind the *umma* (community) of the Qur'ānic injunction, "Obey, Allāh, and obey the messenger and those of you who are in authority".¹¹ The Sunnī jurists preferred to use the title Imām for the *Khalīfa* but Shī'is invariably used Imām for their religio-political leaders.

The prophecy of Muḥammad, as noted by Ibn Khaldūn (732/1332-808/1406), so remarkably consolidated the group feelings (*aṣabiyya*)¹² of the Arabs that they advanced against the Persians and

⁸ *Qur'ān*, III, 25.

⁹ E.I.J. Rosenthal, *Political Thought in Medieval Islam*, (Cambridge, 1962, reprint), p.8; "Some Aspects of Islamic Political Thought", *Islamic Culture*, Vol. XXII (1948), p.1.

¹⁰ *Qur'ān*, V, 3.

¹¹ *Qur'ān*, IV, 59.

¹² Ibn Khaldūn, *The Muqaddimah*, translated by Franz Rosenthal, (New York, 1958), Vol. I. pp.419-21.

Byzantines, depriving them of their royal authority. At the same time they amassed enormous fortunes to the extent that one horseman, for his share in a single raid, received about 30,000 gold pieces. This expansion of the Arabs was followed by the loss of their nomadic character and their acceptance of royal authority which, Ibn Khaldūn believed, was a necessary consequence of their new identity as a religious community. He underlined the fact that Muhammad had censured royal authority only if this form of superiority was achieved by reprehensible methods and if it were used to indulge in selfish purposes and desires; conversely he approved of royal authority which was based on rank gained through truth, and which served the purpose of inviting the great mass of people to accept the Muslim faith.

'Umar associated the royal reception given to him by his Syrian governor, Mu'āwiya, with "royal Persian manners".¹³ Mu'āwiya replied:

Oh commander of the Faithful, I am in a border region facing the enemy. It is necessary for us to vie with (the enemy) in military equipment.¹⁴

The need to introduce an efficient central administration had also prompted 'Umar to make serious departures from the traditional tribal organization of the Arabs and to assimilate such Iranian and Byzantine administrative practices into the Islamic framework as were compatible with the *Sunna* or the record of the Prophet's life in thought and action. At the end of the reign of the third Caliph, 'Uthmān (23/644-35/656), the Arab administrative machinery in Egypt and Iraq broke down and in June 656 he was assassinated. The era of the fourth Caliph, 'Ali (35/656-40/661), was torn by civil war and it was Mu'āwiya (41/661-60/680) whose diplomatic skill restored peace to these conquered regions. His accession to power marked the end of the reigns of the first four successors of Muhammad, collectively known as "the Rightly Guided Caliphs" (*al-Rāshidūn*). Their world-view of leadership synthesized the Arab tribal customs with those of the Meccan trading oligarchy, rejecting Iranian monarchical traditions. In subsequent centuries the image of their administrative system was to take on a utopian quality. Before his death Mu'āwiya succeeded in

¹³ *Kisrawiya*, from Kisra, the title of the kings of Iran.

¹⁴ *The Muqaddimah*, Vol. I, pp.416-17.

having his son, Yazīd (60/680-64/683), recognized as his heir, and this laid the foundations for the Umayyad dynasty.

By now Muslims throughout the Islamic world were divided into three religio-political groups. The followers of the Umayyads, claiming adherence to the true theory and practice of Muḥammad and of the first four caliphs, came to be known as *ahl al Sunna* or Sunnīs. Those supporters of 'Alī who remained steadfastly loyal to him and to his descendants, considering them the rightful successors of Muḥammad, called themselves Shi'īs. Another party of 'Alī's supporters, who finally deserted him and waged war against him, was known as the Khawārij. As we shall see, each party developed its own political doctrines, but the most remarkable feature of all three sects was the superimposition of Persian monarchical actions on the tribal and mercantile traditions of the Arabs. The Umayyad caliphs (41/661-132/750) and the 'Abbāsids (132/749-656/1258) continued to claim to be the successors of Muḥammad and used the ceremony of *bay'a* (pledge of allegiance) to give the caliphate the façade of contractual agreement, thus enforcing assent to the hereditary appointment of their successors.

The authoritative control of the Umayyads and the transfer of their seat of government to Damascus shocked both the Arabs and the overwhelming majority of the large population of freed slaves who had been Islamicized and were required to become clients (*mawālī*) of their masters' families. They came to believe that Allah's assurance, contained in the following Qur'ānic verse, had been violated:

Allāh hath promised such of you as believe and do good works that He will surely make them to succeed (the present rulers) in the earth, even as He caused those who were before them to succeed (others); and that He will surely establish for them their religion which He hath approved for them, and will give them in exchange safety after their fear. They serve Me. They ascribe no things as partner unto Me. Those who disbelieve henceforth, they are the miscreants.¹⁵

The massacre of Husayn bin 'Alī, the grandson of the Prophet Muḥammad, and a handful of his followers, on 10 Muḥarram 61/10 October 680 by the forces of the Caliph at Karbala, horrified Alī's followers, who, as a result of this action, became obsessed with a desire for revenge. Various adventurers began to disseminate Messianic ideas,

¹⁵ Qur'ān, XXIV, 55.

and promised the advent of a saviour from the family of the Prophet, the Mahdī.¹⁶

It was believed that the Mahdī would fill the world with justice and would rule in accordance with the puritanic ideals of Islam. He would remove all obstacles which prevented the glorification of Muslims as the "best community that hath been raised for the benefit of mankind",¹⁷ and restore the universal Islamic empire from one end of the earth to the other.

Many efforts to overthrow the Umayyads failed. This was finally achieved by the 'Abbasids, whose caliphs ruled the Muslim world with great skill and foresight between 132/749 and 247/861, although the dynasty lasted until 656/1258. The revolt brought about by the 'Abbāsids was not predominantly a Khurāsānī affair, although Khurāsānian leadership played a significant role in it, as did prominent figures from the mixed Arab, Aramaean and Persian population of southern Iraq, and the *mawālīs*, or non-Arab converts to Islam. Arousing anti-Umayyad sentiments among discontented elements, the leaders of the revolt took care not to disclose the name of the caliph they wished to install, promising only that he would be someone from Muhammad's family who would be "agreed upon" (*al-rida min al-Muhammad*).¹⁸

Al-Mansūr (136/754-158/775), the second 'Abbasid Caliph, in a testament to his son and successor, al-Mahdī (158/775-169/785), informed him that he was bequeathing to him the key to a chamber containing books which covered the collective wisdom of his forefathers.¹⁹ The claim to possess such mysterious knowledge was a weapon which the 'Abbasids used to refute the claims of the Shī'ī

¹⁶ *Mahdī* literally means "the guided one" and *Mahdīs* did claim to be divinely guided. According to a tradition the first four caliphs were also known as divinely guided ones (*khulafā' al-rāshidīn al-mahdiyyīn*). Early in 66/685-86, Mukhtār bin Abī 'Ubaid made Muhammad bin al-Hanafiya (a son of 'Alī, not by Fātima) a leader of the 'Alids to avenge Husain's assassination, giving him the title, *Mahdī*, son of al-Wasī (the legatee), one of 'Alī's titles. From that time until the present day political turmoil and religious gloom have led many adventurers to claim to be the *Mahdī*. *The Muqaddimah*, Vol. II, pp.156-214; S.A.A. Rizvi, *Muslim Revivalist Movements in Northern India in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries* (Agra, 1965), pp.68-134.

¹⁷ *Qur'ān*, III, 110.

¹⁸ Tabarī, *Tārīkh al-rusul w'al mulūk* (Leiden, 1964), Tertia Series I, pp.29-33.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, Vol X, p.443.

imāms, who were generally believed to have inherited through 'Ali the Prophet Muḥammad's esoteric wisdom and therefore were exclusively entitled to the succession. A more detailed testament from al-Mansūr reminded his son of this Qur'ānic saying:

The only reward of those who make war upon Allāh and His messenger and strive after corruption in the land will be that they will be killed or crucified, or have their hands and feet on alternate sides cut off, or will be expelled from the land. Such will be their degradation in the world, and in the hereafter theirs will be an awful doom.²⁰

This testament also asserted that authority (*al-sultān*)²¹ was God's strong rope (*ḥabl Allāh al-matīn*), His firm handle (*wa'urwat al-wuthqa*) and His straight religion (*wa dīnuh al-qayyām*) and that it was incumbent upon al-Mahdī to annihilate God's enemies, and to force men to obey the commands contained in His Book.²²

On his deathbed, al-Ma'mūn (198/813-218/833), exhorting his brother and successor al-Mu'tasim (218/833-227/842) to promote the welfare of the common Muslims, identified the caliphate with *mulk* (*kingdom*),²³ which in the Abbāsīd political vocabulary was a derogatory term reserved for the irreligious kingship of the Umayyads.

Realizing the significance of support for their cause from ordinary Muslims, the 'Abbāsīds removed the disabilities under which the *mawālīs* laboured; they also reaffirmed the importance of the *Shari'a* in their administrative system. Some Sunnī rulers began to believe that their role as leaders of the *firqa nājiyya* (the sect bringing salvation) was charismatic and sovereign. The compilation of works on *Ḥadīth* (the traditions of Muhammad's saying and deeds), on *Fiqh* which regulated religious rituals (*'ibādat*) and on laws relating to inheritance, property, contracts, obligations and other social affairs (*mu 'āmalāt*), increased the interest of the community in the golden era of Muhammad and his Rightly Guided Caliphs.

²⁰ *Qur'ān*, V:33.

²¹ "The Arabic word *sultān* is an abstract noun meaning authority or rule, and was used from early times to denote the government. In a society where state and ruler are more or less synonymous terms, it came to be applied to the holder, as well as to the function, of political authority, and was used informally of ministers, governors, and other rulers - even, on occasion, of the Caliphs themselves, Fāṭimid as well as 'Abbāsīd'. Bernard Lewis, "Politics and War", in *The Legacy of Islam* (Oxford, 1974), p.169.

²² *Tārīkh al-rusul w'al mulūk*, Vol. X, p.448.

²³ *Ibid.*, Vol. XI, p.1138.

The 'Abbasid caliphs attempted to calitalize on their descent from al-'Abbās bin 'Abd al-Muttalib (d. 32/653), an uncle of the Prophet. On ceremonial occasions such as the day they received bay'a, they religiously wore the sacred mantle of the Prophet, and offered distinguished positions to scholars trained to interpret the *Shari'a* and favourably disposed to the Caliphate. Nevertheless a growing discontent among the 'Alids and challenges to their authority from rival religious leaders forced the 'Abbāsids to constantly seek a more solid doctrinal basis for their power. In their predicament both the caliphs and their jurists began to claim that the 'Abbāsīd dynasty received its authority from a divine mandate; indeed Abū Yūsuf (113/731-182/798), the famous disciple of Abū Hanīfa (80/699-150/767), in his address to the Caliph Harūn al-Rashīd (170/786-193/809), said:

....Yea, God in His grace and mercy has appointed the rulers to be His vicegerents on earth and has granted them the light of wisdom to illuminate the eyes of their subjects as to their confused affairs and to make clear to them the rights about which they are doubtful. The light of the rulers shines in fixing punishments and in restoring rights to the owners thereof - after they have been proved, and by clear orders. However, the revival of the study of precedents and traditions laid down by devout people is extremely important, for the revival of the study of law is one of the good deeds which endure and do not perish. The iniquity of the shepherd spells ruin for his flock, and his reliance other than on faithful and good persons spells disaster for the community. Complete the good which God has granted you, O Commander of the Faithful, by redressing wrongs, and endeavour to increase it by giving thanks. For thus said God, blessed and exalted be He, in His precious book: "Assuredly if ye are thankful, I shall increase you, but if ye disbelieve, My punishment is severe" ²⁴

Some twenty-one books bearing the title, *Kitāb al-kharāj* or *Risāla fī al-kharāj*, of which only three can still be traced, ²⁵ were intended not merely to revive the principles of taxation used by the first four caliphs but also to sanctify the personality of the caliph, both as God's vicegerent on earth and as successor to Muhammad and the first four caliphs. The authors of these works were prominent jurists, and the image of the ruler they presented aroused great enthusiasm among the orthodox.

²⁴ Abū Yūsuf, *Kitāb al-Kharāj*, excerpt from A. Ben Shemesh, *Taxation in Islam* (Leiden, 1965), Vol. I, p. 73.

²⁵ A. Ben Shemesh, *Taxation in Islam*, Vol. II (Leiden 1958), pp. 3-6.

They also put forward the view that "the original rights of ownership in land are God's and His Prophet's and then yours *the umma's* afterwards. He who revives dead land has the best claim to it".²⁶ They also defined the caliph's share in *ghanima* (booty),²⁷ *jizya* (a poll tax on all adult males of the ahl al-dhimma who were able to fight) and *kharāj* (tax on landed property as distinct from poll tax).²⁸

What impressed the multi-racial society of the 'Abbāsids and left an indelible mark on posterity, however, were the Arabic translations, of the Pahlawī "Mirrors for Princes", and their Islamicized versions. This literary genre unequivocally asserted that rulers were divinely appointed and were accountable only to God. The jurists also maintained that God had made the caliphs trustees of their people and that the happiest "shepherd" before God on Judgment Day was he whose flock had been content during his reign. Nevertheless the Muslim religious élite (*ahl al-ra'y*) while enforcing what was right and forbidding, what was evil (*amr bi al-ma'ruf w-al-nahy 'an al-munkar*), could accuse a caliph of open violation of the Sharī'a, and even have him forcibly removed. This was legitimized by a saying of the Prophet:

²⁶ *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p.65

²⁷ *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p.43

²⁸ *Ibid.*, Vol. II, pp.28-44. Though it (*kharāj*) is sometimes used to designate tax on landed property, as distinct from poll-tax levied on the heads of persons (*jizya*), all Muslim authors use it also in its original meaning as a general name for taxes. Yahya, who uses it mostly in the meaning of land-tax, uses it also as general tax. Abu Yūsuf, Abu 'Ubayd, Qudama, Khaṭīb and Yahya also use *tasq*, *'usbr*, *jizya* and *kharāj* as synonyms, (*Taxation in Islam*, Vol. I, p. 6). Ibn Batta, a tenth century jurist, says, "The Prophet, may God bless and save him, said to Abū Dharr, 'Be patient, even if he be an Ethiopian slave'. All the '*ulema*', whether jurists, scholars, devotees, pietists, or ascetics, from the beginnings of this community until our time, have agreed unanimously that the Friday prayers, the two festivals, the ceremonies of Mina and of 'Arafāt, warfare against the infidels, the pilgrimage, and the sacrifices are incumbent under every *amīr*, whether he be upright or an evildoer; that it is lawful to pay them the land tax, the legal alms, and the tithe (*'usbr*); to pray in the cathedral mosques which they build and to walk on the bridges which they construct. Similarly, buying and selling and other kinds of trade, agriculture, and all crafts, in every period and under no matter what *amīr*, are lawful in conformity with the Book and the *Sunna*. The oppression of the oppressor and the tyranny of the tyrant do not harm a man who preserves his religion and adheres to the *Sunna* of his Prophet provided that he himself acts in conformity with the Book and the *Sunna*, in the same way that if a man, under a just *imām*, makes a sale contrary to the Book and the *Sunna*, the justice of his *imām* will be of no avail to him". *Kitāb al-Sharh wa'l-Ibāna 'alā usul al-Sunna wa'l-diyāna*, pp.66-68, in Bernard Lewis, *Islam*, Vol. I. (New York, 1974), p.171.

"Do not obey a creature against the Creator".²⁹ But according to the authors of the "Mirrors" there was no circumstance legitimizing disobedience to a ruler.

The earliest source for the "Mirror" writers were *Khudāy-nāma* and *Āyīn-nama*, translated into Arabic by Ibn al-Muqaffa³⁰ (102/720-139/757) and *Abad al-saghīr*³¹ and *Abad al-kabīr*, also by the same author. A lawbook³² known as *Karnamaka-i Artakhshtar-i Pāpakān* ("The Covenant of Ardashir" the Great", a Sāsānian monarch) is also said to have been translated by Ibn al-Muqaffa. The *Adab al-saghīr* and the *Adab al-kabīr* highlight Ardashīr's famous maxim that religion and kingship are twin brothers, religion being the basis of kingship and kingship the protector of religion.³³ To Ibn al-Muqaffa the role of the Sāsānian kings and the 'Abbāsīd caliphs encompassed both temporal and religious lordships. The only authority superior to that of a ruler was religion, and an ideal

²⁹ Abū'l 'Alā', Maudūdī, Abū Hanīfah and Abū Yūsuf, in *A History of Muslim Philosophy*, edited by M. M. Sharif, (Pakistan Philosophical Congress, 1963), Vol. I, pp.687-88.

³⁰ Besides other works, this Arabic author of Persian origin is well known for his translation of *Kaṭīla wa Dimna*, the collection of Indian fables from the *Pancatantra* and the *Tantrākhyāyikā*, which he translated into Arabic from the Pahlavī. Although accused of heresy by the orthodox he was executed at the order of the 'Abbāsīd Caliph Mansūr (136/754-158/775) because he had drafted a political document which offended the Caliph.

³¹ The *Adab* literature in the 'Abbāsīd period was a special genre, designed to teach the urbanity and elegant manners indispensable for refined living in towns. It drew heavily on Pahlavī, Sanskrit and Hellenistic literature. The ethical and didactic teachings of Ibn al-Muqaffa formed a handbook of social and political ethics for the Muslim élite.

³² The "Covenant of Ardashir" in Ibn Miskawayh's *Tajārib al-Umam* (pp.99-127), the facsimile of a Constantinople manuscript printed for the trustees of the E.J.W. Gibb Memorial Series, London, 1909. See also the *Zafar-nāma*, the alleged Persian version of Buzurgmihr's Pahlavī *andarz*, in *Chrestomathie Persane*, I, ed. Ch. Schefer (Paris, 1883).

³³ Abu Muḥammad 'Abd 'Allāh bin Muslim al-Dīnawarī, known as Ibn Qutayba, was a scion of an Arabized Iranian family of Khurāsān. He was born in Kūfa and lived in Baghdād, where he was a famous teacher. Besides *Adab* literature, he also compiled anthologies of Arabic poetry, a philological commentary on the *Qur'ān*, and a very important work on the interpretation of *Ḥadīth* entitled the *Kitāb Ta'wīl mukhtalif al-ḥadīth*. The last named work and the *Kitāb 'Uyūn al-akhbār* contain Ibn Qutayba's political ideas.

³⁴ *Tajārib al-Umam*, Vol. I, p.102.

government was based on the latter, while the worst was founded on the pursuit of transient pleasure. A government based on naked power would be racked with conflict and rebellion.³⁵ According to Ibn al-Muqaffa' the ideal ruler was an absolute monarch, sagacious, resourceful, strong, God-fearing, and eternally vigilant over his subjects. His servants should be loyal and dedicated, continually marvelling at his virtues in order that they become more firmly planted; in no circumstances should they disobey or rebel. In short, Ibn al-Muqaffa' declared that kings had been chosen by God and, receiving their authority directly from Him,³⁶ replaced Him on earth as His agents for the execution of His justice.

Besides the many "Mirrors for Princes", translation of Greek works, particularly by Ḥunayn bin Ishaq al-'Ibadi (192/808-260/873) and his predecessors, also made an impact on the political ideology of the 'Abbasids. Basing his ideas on these translations, al-Kindi (800-66) wrote a number of treatises on aspects of government and politics.

Under Platonic inspiration, Abū Nasr al-Fārābī (258/870-339/940) wrote several political treatises; the most important were *Kitāb Tahsīl al-Sa'ada*, *Kitāb al-Siyāsāt al-Madaniyya*, *Madīna Fādila* and *Fusūl al-Madani*. Al-Fārābī defined politics as "the royal political art",³⁷ designed to make men happy. He identified Greek city states with "nations" and underlined the fact that "excellent (ideal) authority" promoted true happiness and "ignorant authority" resulted in only a superficial contentment. To him authority was represented by the "royal office and dignity".³⁸

Neither the strong central administration of the 'Abbāsids nor the theories legitimizing their power were unanimously accepted by all the empires they had seized from the Umayyad caliphate. After their accession to power, while they were engaged in hounding the Umayyad scions, 'Abd al-Rahmān, (b. 113/731), the son of Mu'āwiya b. Hishām, secretly slipped into Palestine, where he rallied a number of Umayyad supporters. Thence they went to Egypt, Tunisia and the

³⁵ Al-Muqaffa, *Al-Adab al-saghīr wa'l-adab al-kabīr*, (Beirut, 1961), pp. 63-64.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 71-72.

³⁷ E.I.J. Rosenthal, *Political Thought in Medieval Islam*, (Cambridge, reprint, 1962), p. 119.

³⁸ D.M. Dunlop, *Fusūl al-Madani*, English translation of Arabic text (Cambridge, 1960), p. 18.

Moroccan shore of the Mediterranean seeking assistance from Islamized tribes and exploiting existing tribal rivalries. Finally, in 138/736, they succeeded in founding an Umayyad emirate at Cordova, in inaccessible Spain. Before his death in 172/788 'Abd al-Rahmān, known as al-Dākhil (the Immigrant), had firmly established a new Ummayyad dynasty,³⁹ although tribal revolts in Spain never waned. 'Abd al-Rahmān III (300/912-350/961) was the greatest of the Hispano-Umayyad rulers and the first Umayyad caliph of al-Andalus. After consolidating his kingdom he measured swords with both Christian Spain and the Fātimids of North Africa. 'Abd al-Rahmān III assumed the title of Commander of the Faithful, and the surname, *al-Nāṣir li-dīn-Allāh* (Defender of the Faith of Allah).⁴⁰ The Umayyad emirate was transformed into the Umayyad caliphate and the imperial traditions of Constantine the Great were Islamized. Jurists yielded to the fait accompli and the simultaneous existence of more than one caliphate came to be recognized as valid.⁴¹

The Spanish Umayyad caliphate was short-lived, and from the eleventh century onwards some twenty-three dynasties ruled independently in Spain, all claiming supernatural qualities for their kings. The period of these fragmented powers was known as the *mulūk al-tawā'* or "the reign of the party kings". One by one they fell into Christian hands; only the Naṣrids or Banū al-Aḥmar held out in Granada between 627/1230 and 897/1492.

A Khārījī dynasty ruled in western Algeria from 160/777 to 296/909. Their main support came from the newly Islamized Berber tribes who believed that their Arab masters had not adequately rewarded them for their services to Islam. Gradually the majority of these tribes renounced the Sunnī faith of the 'Abbāsīd caliphs in favour of the religio-political sect of the Khawārij. These were supporters of 'Alī b. Abī Ṭālib, who had become alienated from 'Alī the fourth caliph. In 37/657, in his war against Mu'āwiya, 'Alī had yielded to his enemies' pressure to appoint an arbitrator in order to avoid bloodshed. The Khawārij, crying "No decision save God's", had seceded from 'Alī and organized an independent sect. The Khārījī belief that the community itself was charismatic and divinely-

³⁹ *Muqaddimah*, Vol. II, p.115.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p.468.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p.393.

founded appealed to the sentiments of some Berber tribes. According to the Khārijites, only Abū Bakr and 'Umar were Rightly Guided Caliphs; they believed that towards the end of his reign, 'Uthmān had deviated from the path of justice, meriting either deposition or death. 'Alī and his supporters who agreed to arbitration were, according to them, sinners and therefore infidels. The Khārijites elected their Imām from among the outstanding members of their community and, like the Umayyads and 'Abbāsids, did not insist that only Qurayshites were eligible for the imāmate. The pledge of any two just Kharijīs made the contract with an imām legally sound, but should the community find a better candidate the reigning imām was bound to surrender his post. In the event of a caliph deviating from the path of truth and justice the community was authorized to depose or execute him.

The founder of Khārijite rule in western Algeria was 'Abd al-Rahmān b. Rustam (160/777-168/784), a member of the 'Ibādiyya branch of the Khārijites.

...The 'Ibādiyya, while agreeing with the general Khāridjī doctrine, recognized different types of *imāms* corresponding to the four states or "ways" (*masālik*) in which the community of true believers could face its enemies: the state of manifestation (*ẓuhūr*); when the community was strong enough to overcome the enemy: the state of defence (*ḍifa'*) when it could merely resist a powerful enemy: the state of self-sacrifice (*shira'*), when a small group of believers chose to rise against the enemy seeking martyrdom; and the state of concealment (*kīmān*), when the believers were forced to live under the rule of the enemy and to practise dissimulation. Only the *imām* of the state of manifestation can exercise all the functions of the imāmate, such as the execution of legal punishments, the collection of the tithe and the *ḍjizya* of the non-Muslims, and the distribution of booty.⁴²

Both the Khārijites and several semi-independent dynasties who owed allegiance to the 'Abbāsids were defeated by the Shī'īs, who ruled North Africa and Egypt until the middle of the twelfth century. The first 'Alid dynasty began in Morocco. Its founder was Idrīs I (al-Akbar) who had been born in Mecca, but, in order to escape 'Abbāsid vengeance against the 'Alid rebels, had migrated to North Africa. With the help of other 'Alid leaders and some Berber chiefs he founded the Idrīsīd dynasty of Morocco in 172/788. Although Idrīs died in 175/791 and the dynasty ruled until 314/926, in 297/910 a more prominent

⁴² *Encyclopaedia of Islam*², Vol. III, p. 1168.

brancha of Shī'īs, the Fāṭimids, seized North Africa, and only in outlying parts of Morocco did the Idrīsids survive a few more years.

The Fāṭimids were descended from Ḥusayn, the son of 'Alī by his wife Fāṭima. They traced their origin from Ismā'īl, the eldest son of the sixth Shī'ī Imām, Ja'far al-Ṣādiq, who died before his father's death in 148/765. According to a section of the Ismā'īlīs, Ismā'īl had never experienced an earthly death, and was to reappear as the Qā'im or the Mahdī, while for some time others recognized Ismā'īl's son, Muḥammad, as Imām. The movement was secretly propagated through dā'īs (missionaries). One of their most prominent leaders, Ḥamdān Qarmat, lived in Kūfa and propagated among the Bedouins the Messianic doctrine of the reappearance of Mahdī bin Ismā'īl, the seventh Imām, who was to restore justice and proclaim the hidden truth of Islam. About 286/899 Ḥamdān mysteriously disappeared, but his followers ruled eastern and central Arabia until 366/997 with their centre at Bahrayn. The Ismā'īlī leader, Abū 'Abd Allāh al-Shī'ī, was another spiritual head who in 289/893 established himself in western Algeria with the support of the Kutama Berber tribe. They acknowledged Muḥammad b. Ismā'īl as their Imām. In 297/909 Ubayd Allāh al-Mahdī, an enterprising Ismā'īlī leader, profiting from the spadework done by 'Abd Allāh, founded the Ismā'īlī Fāṭimid dynasty in North Africa. Five years later Ubayd Allāh seized Alexandria. In 308/920 he founded on the Tunisian coast his capital, al-Mahdiyya, and then attempted the capture of Egypt. Although he died in 322/934 his sons and successors, following his expansionist policy, seized Egypt in 358/969. The Fāṭimids founded al-Qāhira, the modern Cairo, where they built the great mosque, al-Azhar, and the famous al-Azhar academy. In the reign of the Caliph al-'Azīz (365/975-386/996), the Fāṭimids reached the pinnacle of their glory and Shī'ī *khutba* was recited from the Atlantic to the Red Sea, as well as in al-Yaman, Mecca and Damascus. However most of their subjects remained Sunnīs, though countless Ismā'īlī dā'īs, trained at al-Azhar, unceasingly pursued their proselytizing mission.⁴³

In accordance with their belief that the imāmate was a pillar of the Muslim faith, the Shī'ī propagandists also argued that the choice for the office should not be left to the discretion of the *umma*, since the

⁴³ B. Lewis, 'Egypt and Syria', in the *Cambridge History of Islam*, (Cambridge, 1970), Vol. I, p. 186.

Prophet himself had appointed 'Alī, his cousin and son-in law, as his successor. They maintained that the Imām was incapable of sin, either minor or grievous. All Shī'ī sects believed that the Imām's office was the exclusive right of the descendants of 'Alī and not of the Qurayshites. The Fātimid traced their line of descent from Muḥammad the son of Ismā'īl. Before their accession to power the Ismā'īlīs promised their adherents a share in the secrets of the universe and the mystical cosmos which they had discovered through the interpretation of the inner and esoteric meaning (*bāṭin*) of the Qur'ān and they practised *taqiyya* (pious dissimulation) of their faith. They obeyed contemporary laws while awaiting the true Imām who was to restore piety and righteousness to the world.

For over two hundred years the Fātimids ruled Egypt and Syria, but in 567/1171 their power was extinguished by the Turkicised Kurds known as the Ayyūbids (564/1169-650/1252). While the Fātimid Ismā'īlīs declined in Egypt, a different Ismā'īlī branch called the Nizārī established a formidable power in the heart of the Alburz mountain known as Alamūt. Commanding the shortest route between Qazvīn and the Caspian coast, the territories of the Nizārī were unevenly scattered from Syria to eastern Iran; they ruled these areas from 483/1090 to 654/1256. The first dā'ī (missionary) of the Nizārī Ismā'īlīs and the founder of their rule in Alamūt was Hasan-i Sabbāh. In 487/1094 he broke away from the Fātimid Egyptian Imām, al-Musta'ālī (487/1094-485/1101), accepting the latter's brother, Nizār, whom the Fātimids had rejected. Hasan's followers considered their leader to be a reformer and the *buḥja*, or living proof of the vanished Imam after Nizār's death. Hasan organized a corps of assassins called *fidā'īs*, desperate volunteers who dedicated themselves to the annihilation of Sunnī power through a systematic programme of assassinations of the Sunnī ruling élite, preferring to secretly execute their leaders rather than slaughter ordinary soldiers on the battlefield.

The Nizārī Ismā'īlīs came to be known as *Bāṭiniyyas* (propagators of the *bāṭin* or the allegorical and esoteric interpretation of the sacred texts), *Malāḥida* (heretics) and *Ḥashīshīyya* (eaters of hashish). The Crusaders called them "Assassins", and the essentially legendary stories surrounding the "Order of Assassins" and the "Old Man of the Mountain" (that is, Hasan) added both a chilling and a romantic touch to the image of the Nizārī kingdom. The political theories of the Nizārīs, however, were not essentially in contrast to the Ismā'īlī con-

cepts of kingship, although undoubtedly their method of achieving power was unprecedented.

Another Shī'īl sect, the Zaydīyya, were followers of the Husaynid, Zayd, a great grandson of 'Alī, who in 122/740 fell fighting the Umayyad governor of Iraq. They refuted the concept of a hereditary line of imāms, but believed that any member of the house of 'Alī, descended from his wife Fāṭima, could rise against a contemporary ruler and install a Zaydī imām in his place. They considered the imāmates of Abū Bakr, 'Umar and the first half of 'Uthmān's reign as valid, but they repudiated all enemies of 'Alī. Only a small section of the Zaydīyya rejected the rule of the first three caliphs. According to the majority, any descendant of 'Alī's sons Hasan and Husayn, was qualified to hold the office of Imām, but the imāms, they asserted, were not appointed by *ikhtiyār* (election) or *'adq* (contract). Only successful Zaydī rebels against prevailing authority were entitled to the office of imām.

One Zaydī Imāmate flourished in the Yemen from around 246/860 to as late as 1382/1962. Tabaristān, in the Sāsānian province along the southern shore of the Caspian Sea, the mountain region of Daylam, at the south-western corner of the Caspian sea, and northern Iran, were breeding grounds for anti-'Abbāsīd movements. The most prominent among these were the Zaydī Ziyārīds, who ruled Tabaristān and Gurgān between 315/926 and 483/1090.

The establishment of the Buwayhids or Būyid rule in central and southern Iran, under the nominal suzerainty of the 'Abbāsīd caliphate, was essentially a Zaydīyya achievement, and formed an important landmark in the evolution of the Perso-Islamic concept of kingship. The Būyids were Zaydī Daylamites, but the three brothers who carved out an empire in 322/934 were gifted statesmen and generals rather than petty-minded, sectarian zealots. In 334/945 a Būyid called Aḥmad seized Baghdād and was granted the title *Amīr al-Umarā'* (Supreme Commander) by the Caliph al-Mustakfī (333/944-334/946), in return for ensuring the overlordship and dignity of the caliphate. 'Abbāsīd suzerainty paid high dividends to the Būyids, and for more than a hundred years they ruled independently the 'Abbāsīd Sunnī province of Iran and Iraq. The most outstanding of them was 'Adud al-Dawla Fanā-Khusraw (338/949-372/983). So powerful was 'Adud al-Dawla that he forced Caliph al-Tābi' (363/974-381/991) to grant him several outstanding titles and privileges. In public, however, 'Adud al-

Dawla strictly observed the prescribed ceremonies and etiquette of the 'Abbāsids. In 977 he received the title *Amīr al-Umarā'* with due humility; when he was kneeling before the Caliph one of his followers, somewhat scandalized at such a servile act, asked if he were facing God. The quick-witted Amīr replied, 'Not God, but God's shadow on earth'. To this the Caliph added the following words:

It has pleased me to transfer to you the affairs and government of the subjects both in the East and in the West of the earth, excepting my own private possessions, my wealth and my palace. Rule them, begging God to grant you success.⁴⁴

At his investiture and during later receptions, the *Amīr al-Umarā'* requested the Caliph to perform several ceremonies which, though meaningless to the Caliph himself, had a great impact on 'Adud al-Dawla's Iranian supporters, as they were reminiscent of those of the Sāsānid dynasty.

In 980 'Adud al-Dawla issued coins⁴⁵ bearing the title *Shāhanshāh* (King of Kings); thus in the Iranian provinces of the Caliphate the Sāsānian monarchy was to all intents and purposes restored. 'Adud al-Dawla's support for the doctrines of the Imāmiyya Shī'īs was also of considerable political significance. The latter believed that Imām Ja'far al-Sādiq had been succeeded by his son, Mūsa al-Kāzim (d. 183/799-800). The Shī'ī doctrine that the twelfth and last Imām, Muḥammad al-Mahdī, had entered "major occultation" in 329/940, was most expediently exploited by 'Adud al-Dawla, as no *Ithnā 'Asharī* Imām remained to challenge his self-assumed supremacy.

The foundations of Būyid power, however, were based on the hegemony of military leaders, whose incessant scramble for lucrative *iqṭā's* (administrative assignments of fiscal units) ultimately weakened the central authority. In 420/1029 the famous Maḥmūd of Ghazna (388/998-421/1031) seized from the Būyids the rich Ray provinces, and in 447/1055 the Saljūqs finally shattered their power. Earlier in 389/999, in recognition of the overlordship of the 'Abbāsīd Caliph al-Qādir (381/991-422/1031), Maḥmūd of Ghazna, after having obtained such titles as *Wālī Amīr al-Mu'minīn* (Protégé of the Commander of the Faithful) and *Yamīn al-Dawla wa Amīn al-Milla* (Right

⁴⁴ H. Busse, "Iran under the Buyids", *The Cambridge History of Iran* (Cambridge, 1975), Vol. IV, p. 276.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 275.

Hand of the Kingdom and Trustee of the Nation), issued coins bearing the Caliph's name and offered him lucrative gifts from his Indian spoils. Maḥmūd's brilliant success in India and the annihilation of the Qaramatīs and Ismā'īlīs within his territories greatly enhanced his prestige among the Sunnīs. After his conquests Maḥmūd claimed:

God has swept away from this region the hand of the oppressors and has cleansed it of the activity of the infidel Bāṭiniyya and the evil-doing innovators.⁴⁶

A panegyrist of the Ghaznavids thus invited Sultan Maḥmūd's subjects:

Know that the Lord Most High has given one power to the prophets and another power to kings; and He has made it incumbent upon the people of the earth that they should submit themselves to the two powers and should acknowledge the true way laid down by God.⁴⁷

The revival by the short-lived Ghaznavid kingdom of the glory of the 'Abbāsid caliphs prompted many jurists to compile treatises presenting the orthodox Sunnī view of the caliphate. The most prominent were Abū al-Ḥasan al-Māwardī (364/974-450/1058) and his contemporary, Abū Ya'la ibn al-Farra (380/990-458/1066). Both wrote works entitled *al-Aḥkām al-Sultāniyya* (The Ordinances of Government), al-Māwardī from the Ḥanafī and Abu Ya'la from the Hanbalī points of view. The two authors showed an awareness of historical realities in their outlines of the duties and functions of the imām in relation to past tensions and conflicts, and they detailed the circumstances under which an imām could be deposed. Both works recommended that should any officer usurp the power of the Caliphate, the usurper could morally claim that power so long as he did not violate the Sunnī *Shari'a*.⁴⁸

The Perso-Islamic basis of kingship

The completion of the *Shāhnāma* by Firdawsī (329-30/940-41-411/1020) in 400/1010 gave a new impetus to both rulers and polit-

⁴⁶ C. E. Bosworth, *The Ghaznavids* (Edinburgh, 1963), p. 53.

⁴⁷ Abū al-Faḍl Baihaqī, *Āthār al-wuzarā'*, quoted in *The Ghaznavids*, p. 63.

⁴⁸ Māwardī, *Aḥkām al-Sultāniyya*, (Cairo, 1881), pp. 32-38.

ical theorists and was to become the most significant watershed in the history of Islamic political thought. As well as recounting the epic glory of the ancient Iranian kings, the *Shāhnāma* eloquently reminded kings and nobles that monarchs were instruments of God's will and that their commands were therefore inviolate. The God of the *Shāhnāma* was Omnipotent and Omniscient, the Creator of Zoroastrians, Jews, Christians and Muslims, who endowed Kayumārth (the founder of the ceremonial of throne and crown) with *farr* (effulgence) suggesting the mystique of true kingship.⁴⁹ *Farr* symbolised divine favour, which kings possessed as long as God did not deprive them of it. Thus Jamshīd, one of the greatest legendary kings of ancient Iran, is said to have asserted that he himself was endowed with this divine *farr* (*farr-i īzādī*). He believed that he was simultaneously both king and priest (*mūbad*), and would divert potential evil-doers from the wrong path and guide their souls towards the light. Jamshīd also invented weapons for his followers, and by virtue of his kingly *farr* he forged iron into helmets, chain-mail, missile-proof vests, swords and horse-armour, all products of his inspired intellect.⁵⁰

*Farr*⁵¹ or *farrah* is the *khvarenah* of the *Avesta*, a concept which held a special significance for the people of Iran. The *khvarenah* was a mystical kingly glory or majesty, and the *Shāhanshāh* was not merely an emperor but also the custodian of this supernatural glory and charisma.

The importance of *farr* in relation to kingship was so significant that even the orthodox Abū Hamid Muhammad al-Ghazālī (450/

⁴⁹ *Chū āmad bi burj-i hamal āfrāb jahān gasht bā farr u āyīn u āb*. Muhammad Dabūr Sayāqī (ed). *Shāherāma-i Hakīm Abu'l Qāsim Firdawsī*, Tehran, 1344/Z 1965, p. 4

⁵⁰ *manam guft bā farra-ye īzādī
hamam shahryārī u ham mūbadī
badan ra zi bad dast kūtah kunam
rawān ra sūy-i rawshanī rah kunam
nukhust ālat-i jang rā dast burd
dar-i nām-justan bi gurdān sipurd
bi farr-i kay'ī narm kard āhanā
chū khūd u zirb kard u chūn jūshanā*. Ed. Sayāqī. *Shāhnāma*, loc. cit.

⁵¹ R. N. Frye, *The Heritage of Persia*, 2nd edition, (London, 1965), pp.42, 263; *The Golden Age of Persia* (London, 1975), p.8; H.W. Bailey, *Zoroastrian Problems in Ninth-Century Books* (Oxford, 1943), p.2, and corrections by J. Duchesne Guillemin, "Le Xvarenah", *Annali del Istituto Orientale di Napoli*, Vol. V (1963), pp.19-31.

1058-505/1111) could not ignore it. In his *Nasīhat al-Mulūk*, on two separate occasions he drew attention to *farr*. In the beginning of his chapter entitled "Qualities required for Kings" Ghazālī says:

To guide His slaves to Him, He sent prophets; and to preserve them from one another, He sent kings, to whom He bound the welfare of men's lives in His wisdom and on whom He conferred high rank. As you will hear in the Traditions (*Akbbār*), "The Sultan is God's shadow on earth", which means that he is high-ranking and the Lord's delegate over His creatures. It must therefore be recognized that this kingship and the divine effulgence (*Farr-i 'Izādī*) have been granted to him by God, and that he must accordingly be obeyed, loved and followed. To dispute with kings is improper and to hate them is wrong, for God on High has commanded.⁵² "Obey God and obey the Prophet and those among you who hold authority", which means (Persian) "Obey God and the prophets and your princes (*amīrān*)". Everybody to whom God has given religion must therefore love and obey kings and recognize that their kingship is granted by God, and given by Him to whom He wills. God Almighty stated this, in the verse (Q.iii, 25): "Say, O God, owner of the sovereignty! You give the sovereignty to whom You will, and You take it away from whom You will. You strengthen whom You will, and You humble whom You will. In Your hand is the choice of what is best. Verily You are powerful over everything". This means (in Persian) that God on High, who is the King of Kings, (*Pādshāh-i Pādshāhān*), gives the kingship to whom He wills, and that he strengthens one man through His favour and humbles another through His justice.⁵³

In an anecdote given in the same chapter Ghazālī quotes a dialogue ascribed to Aristotle and continues:

Great men owe their greatness to the divine effulgence (*farr-i 'Izādī*) and to their radiance of soul, pureness of body, and breadth of intellect and knowledge, as well as to the dominion which had long been in their family. (It is because of these things that) they are and have been kings.⁵⁴

Ghazālī then adds that divine effulgence is expressed in the following characteristics:

Intelligence, knowledge, sharpness of mind, ability to perceive things, perfect physique, literary taste, horsemanship, application to work, and courage; together with boldness, deliberation, good temper, impartiality towards the weak and the strong, friendliness, magnanimity, maintaining tolerance and moderation, judgement and foresight in business, frequent reading of the

⁵² *Qur'ān* IV, 59.

⁵³ F.R.C. Bagley; *Ghazālī's Book of Counsel for Kings (Nasīhat al-mulūk)* (London, 1964), pp. 45-46.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 73-74.

reports of the early Muslims (*salaf*), and constant attention to biographies of kings (*Siyar al-muluk*)⁵⁵ and inquiry concerning the activities of the kings of old: because the present world is the continuation of the empire of the forerunners, who reigned and departed, each leaving a memory to his name and (acquiring) treasure in this life and the next.⁵⁶

The qualities listed by Ghazālī resemble those mentioned by Fārābī in his *Ārāʾ Ahl al-Madīnat al-Fāḍila*.⁵⁷ Although Ghazālī took great pains to demonstrate the incompatibility of the Neoplatonism of Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā with orthodox Sunnism,⁵⁸ his political works show a strange wedlock between the ideas contained in the "Mirrors for Princes" and those in the works of Muslim philosophers. What is indeed remarkable is that Ghazālī also recommended the need to draw on the glorious past of Iran described in such works as the *Siyar al-mulūk* or the Arabic translation of the Khudāynāma.

Ghazālī also stated as universal truths a number of traditions (*ḥadīth*) of doubtful authenticity such as:

One day of just rule by an equitable Sulṭān is more meritorious than sixty years of continual worship... By God in the hand of Whose power lies Muḥammad's soul, all actions of the just Sulṭān affecting his subjects are carried to heaven every day: and each prayer of his is worth seventy thousand prayers.⁵⁹

Ghazālī endorsed Ardashīr's proposition that monarchy and religion are like twin brothers,⁶⁰ and underlined the time-honoured saying of past sages (whom he failed to acknowledge by name): "The character of subjects springs from the character of kings".⁶¹ He disputed the current belief among Muslims that they received the amīrs they deserved and affirmed that "good men are good through the instrumentality of kings" and the "conduct of mankind varies with their (the kings') conduct". Ghazālī concluded:

⁵⁵ Bagley suggests that perhaps the reference here is to the *Khudāynāma*, which was known in Arabic as *Siyar al-mulūk*.
Ibid., p. 74, note 7.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 74.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 74, note 2.

⁵⁸ *Tabāʾiʿat al-falāsifa* (*The Inconsistency of the Philosophers*), completed in 488/1095.

⁵⁹ *Counsel for Kings* (*Naṣīḥat al-mulūk*), p. 14.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. LXIV, 59.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 60.

You should know that there is a saying of the Sages that "the people of an epoch resemble their kings more than they resemble their epoch", and that there is a saying in the Traditions that "the people follow the religion of their kings".⁶²

Considering the ancient Iranian kings to be paragons of virtue, Ghazālī extolled Anūshīrwān,⁶³ (531-579) for his justice. Only 'Umar and the Umayyad 'Umar bin 'Abd al-'Azīz (99/717-101/720) could be compared with Anūshīrwān. Ghazālī frankly admitted that "Kingship remains with the unbeliever but not with injustice", and cautioned rulers that "desertion and ruin of a territory result from two things: royal weakness and royal tyranny, each of which causes hardship among *dihqāns*".⁶⁴

Ghazālī lived in Tūs during the reign of the Great Saljūqs. Tughril (429/1038-455/1063), the founder of this dynasty, gained control of Baghdād in 447/1055; later he obtained from the caliph confirmation of the title of sultān, assumed by him at Nishāpūr in 429/1038. His successors, Alp Arslan (455/1063-465/1072) and Malik Shāh I (465/1072-485/1092), were awesome rulers. Their vast empire extended from Khwarāzm and modern Afghānistān to the greater part of Iran and Syria. A branch of the Saljūqs ruled Anatolia from 470/1077 to 707/1307. Although orthodox Sunnīs, their ambition to achieve independent rule prompted realists like Ghazālī to admit that

Muslims did not elevate the Hashimites and Umayyads in order to bow down to them and worship them, but, having appointed them to be the rulers, the Muslims obeyed and followed them, because obedience (to the ruler) is (a form of) worship of God.⁶⁵

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 62.

⁶³ In his reign the mystique of the title "King of kings" was reinforced by the "Mirrors for Princes" and other writings. Burzuyī the physician of Khushrāw, visited India and brought back the game of chess, plus many books, such as the fables of Bīdpāy, which were then translated into Pahlavi. Khushrāw sought religious support for the social stratification of Iranian society into four classes and remitted the head tax (an earlier form of *jizya*) on Jews if they were converted to Zoroastrianism. He was also responsible for the massacre of the Mazdakites, Zoroastrian heretics who were fighting for a type of communist revolution.

⁶⁴ *Counsel for Kings*, p. 62. In the Sāsānian period *dihqāns* were village heads and derived their power from hereditary titles on the local level. Under the Arabs they embraced Islam and were the principal intermediaries between the village revenue-paying classes and their Arab masters.

⁶⁵ I. Goldziher, *Streitschrift des Gazali gegen die Batinijja-Sekte* (Leiden, 1916), p. 81, quoted in *Counsels for Kings*, p. LIII.

Ghazālī discussed the caliphate in a number of works, consistently demonstrating that the *Shari'a* made the appointment of an imām obligatory. To him the institution symbolized the collective unity and historical continuity of the Muslim community, and he argued that the current situation made a change in the prescribed conditions for the election of a caliph permissible.⁶⁶ He affirmed that the validity of sultans depended on their oaths of allegiance to the caliphs, as adhered to by the Saljūqs. But Ghazālī also understood that necessity made lawful what was in fact prohibited. As noted by H.A.R. Gibb, "Ghazālī with his usual frankness and robust common sense, breaks through the sham and defines the position as facts had made it". Gibb quotes Ghazālī:

An evil-doing and barbarous sultān, so long as he is supported by military force, so that he can only with difficulty be deposed and that the attempt to depose him would cause unendurable civil strife, must of necessity be left in possession and obedience must be rendered to him, exactly as obedience must be rendered to emīrs... We consider that the Caliphate is contractually assumed by that person of the 'Abbāsīd house who is charged with it, and that the function of government in the various lands is carried out by means of Sultāns, who owe allegiance to the Caliph... Government in these days is a consequence solely of military power, and whosoever he may be to whom the holder of military power gives his allegiance, that person is the Caliph. And whosoever exercises independent authority, so long as he shows allegiance to the Caliph in the matter of his prerogatives of the *Khuṭba* and the *Sikka*, the same is a sultān, whose commands and judgements are valid in the several parts of the earth.⁶⁷

Nizām al-Mulk Tūsī (408/1018-485/1092), who for the last thirty years of his life was the prime minister of the Saljūq sultāns, forcefully argued in his *Siyāsāt-nāma* the absolute right of sultāns to rule. Generally he avoided using the word amīr or sultān for the Saljūq rulers and preferred the Persian term *pādshāh*. For him the office of king was both hereditary and of divine origin. He argued:

In every age and time God (be he exalted) chooses one member of the human race and, having adorned and endowed him with kingly virtues, entrusts him with the interests of the world and the well-being of His servants; He charges that person to close the doors of corruption, confusion and discord, and He imparts to him such dignity and majesty in the eyes and hearts of men, that

⁶⁶ Leonard Binder, "Al-Ghazālī", in a *History of Muslim Philosophy*, Vol. I, pp. 781-82.

⁶⁷ Ghazālī, *Ihyā' 'ulūm al-dīn*, in H.A.R. Gibb, *Islamic Society and the West* (London, reprint 1960), p. 31.

under his just rule they may live their lives in constant security and ever wish for his reign to continue.⁶⁸

Documents issued in the reign of the Saljūqs also used the terms *jahāndār* (monarch) and *jahāndārī* (monarchy) and stressed the fact that the principal duty of kings was to restore prosperity in a kingdom by dispensing justice and equity. They also underlined the interdependence of kingship and religion and emphasized the point that subjects were entrusted to a sultān's care by God and that it was his duty to ensure their protection.⁶⁹ As the Saljūq sultāns strove for the annihilation of the Ismā'īlīs and other non-Sunnī sects, justice, impartiality, the protection of subjects and obedience to the laws of the *Shari'a* applied to Sunnīs alone.

An interesting "Mirror for Princes" was written by a vassal of the Saljūqs. This was the *Qābūs-nāma* by 'Unsur al-Ma'ālī Kay-kā'ūs (441/1049-483/1090), the Ziyārid prince of the Caspian coastlands of Gurgān and Tabaristān. It was intended as a guide to the author's son and successor and was based on his own experience. He advised his heir to impose strict authority over his realm. He should not become intoxicated with the wine of kingship and should spare no pains in developing the qualities of "awesomeness" justice, generosity, respect for the law, gravity and truthfulness".⁷⁰

A very comprehensive Arabic "Mirror for Princes" called the *Sirāj al-mulūk* was compiled in 516/1122 by Abū Bakr Muhammad bin al-Walīd al-Turtūshī (d. 520/1126-27). The author was born in Spain in 451/1059-60 and, leaving his homeland in 476/1083-84, he visited Iran and Iraq. During his sojourn he met Nizam al-Mulk Tūsī whose scholarship and political acumen greatly impressed him. Although the earlier "Mirrors for Princes" drew upon the stories of Kalīla wa Dimma, translated from the Pahlavī by Ibn al-Muqaffa', they also contained Iranian anecdotes, some based on Indian sources. Turtūshī's work shows a more definite debt to the Kalīla wa Dimna. He also refers to a text called *Muntakhab al-jawāhir* (Selected Gems) composed by Shānaq for the use of Indian kings. The *Kitāb Shānaq fi al-tadbīr*,

⁶⁸ H. Darke, *The Book of Government, The Siyāsat-nāma* (London, 1960), p. 9.

⁶⁹ Muntajab al-Dīn Badī' Atabeg, Juwainī, *Atabat al-kutaba*, edited by 'Abbās Iqbāl (Tehran 1329/1950), pp. 9, 30, 33, 74.

⁷⁰ Ghulām Husain Yūsufī (ed.), *Qābūs-nāma* (Tehran, 1967), pp. 227-39.

mentioned by Ibn al-Nadīm,⁷¹ was in fact the celebrated *Cāṇakya-Nīti*, a collection of Sanskrit aphorisms on politics. Another work by Cāṇakya, on poison, was translated into Pahlavī by an Indian named Manka, and later Abī Hātim Balkhī rendered it into Arabic for Hārūn al-Rashīd's Barmakid wazīr, Yaḥyā bin Khālīd (170/786-187/803).⁷² Although Zachariae has shown that the maxims attributed to Cāṇakya in the *Sirāj al-mulūk* cannot be found in any Indian texts associated with his name,⁷³ and that the political theories attributed to him were familiar in most parts of the Islamic world.

Drawing on the vast material available in translation, Turtushī referred to kings by such titles as *mulūk*, *umarā*, *salātīn* and *wulāt*. He endorsed the view that a sultān's right to rule was of divine origin and that he was God's shadow on earth,⁷⁵ second only in rank to prophets and angels.⁷⁶ But a ruler was also a shepherd, and in Ṭurtūshī's world-view as the vicegerent of Maḥammad his duty was to promote the interests of his subjects. An eternal covenant between God and kings enforced the latter's duty to rule with impartiality and justice.⁷⁷ Borrowing from the Arabic translation of *Khudāy-nāma*, Ṭurtūshī compared the benefits accruing from sultans to such natural phenomena as rain, wind, the seasons, day and night, and described tyrants as worse than ravaging lions. But he preferred even the latter to anarchy, maintaining that good emerged even from a kingship bowed down with evil. In a maxim attributed to Cāṇakya, Ṭurtūshī encouraged rulers to act like the sun, moon, earth, rain, wind, fire, water and death.⁷⁸ From some Hindū source, probably the Śānti Parvan of the *Mahābhārata*, he presented the analogy of the big fish eating the small ones and asserted that this unhappy situation was

⁷¹ Ibn al-Nadīm Muḥammad b. Ishāq, *Kitāb al-irbrist* (Leipzig, 1878), pp. 305, 315-16.

⁷² Ibn Abi Usaybi'a, *'Uyūn al-Anba' fi Ṭabaqāt al-Aṭibba* (Cairo, 1882), Vol. II, pp. 32-33.

⁷³ Footnote from Ludwik Sternbach, *Chāṇakya-Nīti* (Hoshiarpur, 1970), pp. 37, no. 40.

⁷⁴ Al-Ṭurtūshī, Muḥammad bin al-Walīd, *Sirāj al-mulūk* (Alexandria 1289/1872-74), p. 76.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 75.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 67.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 88, 92.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 332. The maxim in fact occurs in the lawbook of Manu (vii, 4-7).

averted only by monarchy.⁷⁹ Ṭurṭūshī asserted that the relations of a monarch with his people were identical with those of the body with the soul; if the king were virtuous his people would prosper, but if he were not, evil would prevail in his territory.

Ibn Khaldūn fails to do full justice to Ṭurṭūshī when he says:

Al-Ṭurṭūshī thought that the military (strength) of a dynasty as such is identical with (the size of its) army that receives a fixed pay every month. He mentioned this in his *Sirāj al-mulūk*. His statement does not take into consideration the (conditions obtaining at the) original foundation of large dynasties... He did not realize how a dynasty originally comes to power, nor that only those who share in a group feeling are able to accomplish (the formation of a dynasty). But this should be realized. It should be understood how God intended these things to be. "God gives His kingdom (royal authority) to whomever He wants to give it".⁸⁰

In fact Ṭurṭūshī had personal knowledge of all aspects of kingship, from the Spanish kingdom with its servile incumbent and the tottering caliphate of Baghdād, to the considerably stronger Fāṭimid caliphs and the mighty Saljūq empire. Writing from Egypt he considered it advisable to ignore the Fāṭimid caliphs and concentrate on the sultāns, by then the real custodians of power.

An interesting "Mirror for Princes" was compiled by Muḥammad bin 'Alī al-Zahīrī, al-Kātib al-Samarqandī, in his Persian work, the *Aghrād al-Siyāsāt fi l'rād al-Riyāsāt*. It was written after the death of Sultān Mu'izz al-Dīn Sanjar, who died in 552/1157. By the time Sanjar ascended the throne in 511/1118 the great Saljūq power was only a shadow of the glory it had once been. Sultān Sanjar ruled against heavy odds. The Ghuzz Turks from Central Asia were then the dominant power. They defeated him twice in 1153 and finally took him captive. Three years later he escaped, but died soon afterwards. Sanjar's desperate efforts to save Khurāsān from the onslaught of Turkic tribes were remembered in historical tales and his son, who did not enjoy power, was also the centre of the false hopes of a number of scholars, some of whom like Samarqandī wrote solely for financial gain.

'Awfī's *Jawāmi' al-Ḥikāyāt wa Lawāmi' al-Riwāyāt*, as a work of instruction for rulers, using historical and literary anecdotes, was unsurpassed. Of over 2,000 of these stories relating to Iranian and

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p.12.

⁸⁰ *Muqaddimah*, Vol. I, pp.316-17.

Muslim ruling dynasties, most were intended to strengthen belief in the divine right of kings. The book, completed in 625/1228, was dedicated to Nizām al-Mulk Muḥammad ibn Abī Sa'd al-Junaydī, the wazīr of Sultān Shams al-Dīn Iltutmish (607/1210-633/1235), the real founder of the Delhi Sultanate of northern India. By 625/1228 the Sultān had vanquished all his enemies and in 626/1229, emissaries of the 'Abbāsīd Caliph, al-Mustansīr (623/1226-640/1242), invested him with the title of Sultān. What the Sultān had earned by his merit and military strength was legitimized by the caliphate, thus enhancing the recipient's religious prestige. 'Awfī, who had completed his work earlier, rightly believed Iltutmish to be the greatest ruler of the Islamic east.

With the extinction of the 'Abbāsīd caliphate in 656/1258 jurists were prompted to legitimize even Mongol powers. Thus Radī al-Dīn 'Alī bin Ṭawūs, the leading jurist of Baghdād, went to the extent of signing a *fatwā* (decree) that a just infidel emperor was preferable to a believing, unjust one.⁸¹ Ibn al-Tiqṭaqa, who was born shortly after the conquest of Baghdād and wrote *al-Fakhri* in 701/1302 for Fakhr al-Dīn 'Isā bin Ibrāhīm of Mosul, asserted that his book was not concerned with "the origin of power, its essential nature and its division into religious and temporal leadership (as seen in) the caliphate, the sultānate, the amirate, the governorate and the like — whether sanctioned by the divine law or not", but laboured to advise rulers that "the realm was guarded by the sword and administered with the pen".⁸²

A unique synthesis of the political works of Muslim philosophers and the "Mirrors for Princes" was produced by Naṣīr al-Dīn Tūsī (597/1201-672/1274). Until 645/1247 he served under the Ismā'īlī governor of Qūhistān at Alamūt and then entered the service of the Il-Khānīd Mongol, Hūlāgū (654/1256-663/1265), who later destroyed both the Ismā'īlīs of Alamūt and the Baghdād caliphate. Before relinquishing his post under the Ismā'īlīs, he completed a work entitled the *Akhlāq-i Nāsiṛī* drawing on the works of such philosophers as Fārābī, Miskawayh (c.320/932-421/1030), and Ibn Sīnā (370/980-428/1037), as well as the "Mirrors for Princes". Naṣīr al-Dīn Tūsī observed:

⁸¹ C.E.J. Whitting (tr.), *Al Fakhri* (London, 1947), p.14.

⁸² *Ibid.*, p.47.

...the government of some depends on enactments, as with contracts and transactions; while that of others depends on intellectual judgments, as in the case of the management of a kingdom or the administration of a city. But no one would be able to undertake either of these two categories without a preponderance of discrimination and a superiority in knowledge, for such a man's precedence over others without the occasion of some particularity would call for strife and altercation. Thus, in determining the enactments there is a need for a person distinguished from others by divine inspiration, in order that they should follow him.⁸³

He then added:

Now, in determining judgments, there is need (also) for a person who is distinguished from others by divine support, so that he may be able to accomplish their perfection. Such a person, in the terminology of the Ancients, was called an Absolute King, and his judgments the Craft of Kingship. The Moderns refer to him as the *Imām*, and to his function as the *Imāmate*. Plato calls him Regulator of the World, while Aristotle uses the term Civic Man, i.e. that man, and his like, by whose existence the ordering of civilized life is effected.⁸⁴

To Naṣīr al-Dīn Tūsī the kingly *farr* was the source of a ruler's benevolence and justice. In Naṣīrian ethics the latter meant the proper adjustment of the interests of the four different social classes known to the Iranians from ancient times.⁸⁵

According to Naṣīr al-Dīn Tūsī, mutual co-operation guaranteed a true state and its preservation depended upon the "close accord of friends" and "dissension among enemies".⁸⁶

The predominance of secular elements in Naṣīr al-Dīn's theories of kingship was remarkably improved on by Ibn Khaldūn (732/1332-808/1406), who drew his ideas from a sociological analysis of the significant events in the history of the Islamic world. His analysis of the complexities of *al-'umrān al-basharī* (human civilization) prompted him to inextricably link kingship with 'asabiyya (the spirit of kinship or a group feeling). 'Asabiyya stood for the solidarity inherent in groups of men which prompted them to found empires and dynasties. Ibn Khaldūn observed:

Royal authority is an institution that is natural to mankind. We have explained

⁸³ G. M. Wickens (tr.), *The Naṣīrian Ethics* (London, 1964), p. 191.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 192.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 233, 235.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 229.

before that human beings cannot live and exist except through social organization and cooperation for the purpose of obtaining their food and (other) necessities of life. When they have organized, necessity requires that they deal with each other and (thus) satisfy (their) needs. Each one will stretch out his hand for whatever he needs and (try simply to) take it, since injustice and aggressiveness are in the animal nature. The others, in turn, will try to prevent him from taking it, motivated by wrathfulness and spite and the strong human reaction when (one's own property is menaced). This causes dissension. (Dissension) leads to hostilities, and hostilities lead to trouble and bloodshed and loss of life, which (in turn) lead to the destruction of the (human) species. Now, (the human species) is one of the things the Creator has especially (told us) to preserve.⁸⁷

Continuing to underline the importance of '*asabiyya*' he remarked:

Not every group feeling has royal authority. Royal authority, in reality, belongs only to those who dominate subjects, collect taxes, send out (military) expeditions, protect the frontier regions, and have no one over them who is stronger than they. This is generally accepted as the real meaning of royal authority.⁸⁸

Ibn Khaldūn observed that all ancient kings framed laws which concentrated mainly on the worldly interests of their subjects, but that the quest of human beings for the path of God drove them to follow divine laws, in the case of Islam, the *Shari'a*. Thus the caliphate of Muhammad's first four successors enabled Muslims to act according to religious insight and was to all intents and purposes the substitute for government by the Lawgiver (Muhammad).⁸⁹ Although Sunni authorities offered innumerable religious explanations for the emergence of *mulk*⁹⁰ (kingship) after the end of the Rightly Guided Caliphs, Ibn Khaldūn unequivocally asserted that the Umayyad struggle for power and the introduction of hereditary succession were prompted mainly by the necessity to safeguard the unity of the Umayyad '*asabiyya*', which was unwilling to accept any other solution.⁹¹

The functions of *mulk*, as a secular institution, in Ibn Khaldūn's

⁸⁷ *Muqaddimah*, Vol. I, pp. 380-81.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 381.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, Vol. I, pp. 387-88.

⁹⁰ Al-Balādhurī and al-Ṭabarī consider that the Khawārij threat was mainly responsible for the secular and hereditary character of the Caliphate; Ibn Qutayba al-Dīnawarī also endorses the same view in *Al-Imāma wa'l Siyāsa* (Cairo, 1937), pp. 113-115. Al-Dīnawarī condemns the change as illegal. E.L. Petersen, '*Ali and Mu'awiya in Early Arabic Traditions* (Copenhagen, 1964), pp. 145, 146, 157, 167, 173.

⁹¹ *Muqaddimah*, Vol. I, pp. 430-436.

world-view, altered according to the political situation, and it was incorrect to think that it was immutable. In *mulk tabī'ī* (literally, unbridled kingship), the autocrat imposed his will on his subjects while ignoring their own interests; but in *mulk siyāsī* (kingship based on rational laws) a king promulgated legislation for the welfare of his subjects.⁹² He urged rulers to refrain from commercial activities, allowing merchants to profit from their investments. Ibn Khaldūn was convinced that oppressive rule bred apathy and arbitrary governments were doomed to failure.⁹³ He observed:

The existence of group feeling without the practice of praiseworthy qualities would be a defect among people who possess a "house" and prestige. All the more so would it be a defect in men who are invested with royal authority, the greatest possible kind of glory and prestige. Furthermore, political and royal authority are (God's) guarantee to mankind and serve as a representation of God among men with respect to His laws.⁹⁴

Ibn Khaldūn agreed with the jurists that sultāns were those who either forcibly gained control of the sultanate or obtained power delegated by a caliph. He affirmed that:

...usurpers were not interested in adopting the caliphal titles, and they disdained sharing the same title with the wazīrs, because the wazīrs were their servants. Therefore they used the names "amīr" and "sultān". Those in control of the dynasty were called *amīr al-umārā* or sultān, in addition to the ornamental titles which the caliph used to give them, as can be seen in their surnames.⁹⁵

Like Ibn Qutayba⁹⁶ and Turtūshī, Ibn Khaldūn fully agreed with the proverb, "The common people follow the religion of their ruler".⁹⁷ He was convinced that governmental posts stemmed from the needs of men and the demands of civilization and that they were not "under the aspect of particular religious laws".⁹⁸

Although the *Muqaddima* of Ibn Khaldūn was read by Arabic-knowing intellectuals, his ideas made little impact on political

⁹² *Ibid.*, Vol. I, pp. 385-87.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 258-59; Vol. II, pp. 103-104; Vol. III, p. 305.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, Vol. I, pp. 291-92.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 11.

⁹⁶ Ibn Qutayba, *Uyūn al-Akbbār* (Cairo, 1930), pp. 1-2.

⁹⁷ *Muqaddimah*, Vol. I, pp. 58, 300; Vol. II, pp. 123, 306.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 5.

theorists and rulers, who adhered to the teachings of the "Mirror" writers, particularly Ghazālī. The influence of the Ḥanbalī jurist, Ibn Taymiyya (661/1263-728/1328) of Damascus, who was not always supported by his rulers, was also very significant. His determined war against sūfī innovation and Shī'īs, in conjunction with his leadership in repelling the Mongol threat to Damascus in 699-700/1301-02, raising the cry of *jihād*, greatly enhanced his prestige. Between 711/1311 and 714/1315 he wrote the *Kitāb al-Siyāsah al-Sharī'ah*, enthusiastically arguing for government based on the *Sharī'ah*, which bridged the gulf between the spiritual and temporal authorities. Naturally the ideal Islamic state was to be run solely under the '*ulamā'*' guidance.⁹⁹ In Egypt the Mamlūk Sultān, al-Zāhir Rukn al-Dīn Baybars I al-Bundaqdārī (658/1260-676/1277), however, had enabled a scion of the Abbāsīd dynasty (who managed to escape the holocaust produced by Hūlāgū) to take refuge in Cairo. The new 'Abbāsīd Caliph in Egypt assumed the pretentious title al-Mustanṣir Bi'llāh Abū al-Qāsim Ahmad, and his successors remained in Cairo from 659/1261 to 923/1517. The 'Abbāsīds in Egypt lived like other religious heads on a state pension, yet, when a new sultān acceded to the Egyptian throne, his ceremonial investiture by the exiled Caliph was performed with great splendour. Some members of the 'Abbāsīd family received stipends from other Muslim kings, such as 'Alā' al-Dīn Tarmashīrīn (726/1326-734/1334) of Transoxiana.¹⁰⁰

When his rule was torn by internal rebellion and dubbed irreligious and tyrannical by the '*ulamā'*' and the sufīs, Sultān Muhammad bin Tughluq (725/1325-752/1351) of Delhi discovered a unique method of silencing his opposition. He issued coins in the name of the 'Abbāsīd Caliph, al-Mustakfi Bi'llāh Abū al-Rabi Sulaymān (701/1302-740/1340), by then deceased. But as travellers were the only connection between the Middle East and India, this fact was generally unknown. Awaiting authorization from the Caliph, however, the Sultān stopped Friday and 'Id prayers, and coins in the name of the dead Caliph were issued between 742 and 744. Finally in 744/1344 Ḥājī Sa'īd Sarsarī, the envoy of the Egyptian Caliph al-Ḥākim bi-Amr Allāh Abū al-Abbās Ahmad (741/1341-753/1352), brought to Sultān Muhammad bin Tughluq an investiture of author-

⁹⁹ *Kitāb al-Siyāsah al-Sharī'ah* (Cairo, 1951), pp.2, 9, 10, 165, 167, 174.

¹⁰⁰ H.A.R. Gibb, *The Travels of Ibn Battūta* (Cambridge, 1971), Vol. III, p.679.

ity which was received with deep humility. The reception and gifts given by the Sultān to the emissary amazed Ibn Battūta (703/1304-770/1368-69 or 779/1377), who was present at the time.¹⁰¹ The poets wrote panegyrics, but the Indian '*ulamā*' and *sūfīs* remained unimpressed.

Muhammad bin Tughluq died fighting the rebels in distant Thatta. In 757/1356 his successor, Sultān Firūz (752/1351-790/1388), also received investiture and the title, *Saiyid al-Salātīn* (Chief of the Sultāns) from Caliph al-Mu'tadid Billah Abū al-Fath Abū Bakr (753/1352-763/1362). He also gave a warm welcome to the Caliph's envoy but the Sultān's patronage of the '*ulamā*' and *sūfīs* had already endeared him to them and the investiture achieved little.

No sultān in India prior to Muhammad bin Tughluq had applied for investiture from the 'Abbāsīd caliph in Egypt, although coins with the name of the last 'Abbāsīd caliph of Baghdād, al-Musta'sim (640/1242-656/1258), continued to be issued until 695/1296. Sultān Ghiyāth al-Dīn Balban (664/1266-686/1287) had been closely in touch with Hūlāgū, but he still believed that ideally a sultān should obtain investiture from the 'Abbāsīd caliphs. Like his predecessor and the later Delhi sultāns, Balban also considered himself a vicegerent of God and His shadow on earth.¹⁰² Balban exhibited awareness of the *farr* theory of the "Mirrors for Princes" when he remarked that "the king's heart is the mirror of the Divine attributes. As long as God does not inspire the heart of kings with general decrees relating to His slaves, matters concerning them which are dependent on the heart and tongue of the rulers are not accomplished"¹⁰³ Balban, like his predecessor Iltutmish, claimed to be the successor of Afrāsiyāb, the powerful Turānian monarch who, according to the *Shāhnāma*, was an arch enemy of the Irānī Pīshdādiān and Kayānian dynasties and was defeated by the Iranian hero Rustam. Nevertheless Balban introduced Iranian court customs and strongly adhered to the class and racial prejudices of ancient Iran.

Balban advocated strict justice¹⁰⁴ only for Sunnīs, with the exclusion of Hindus and discrimination against Ismā'īlīs and Muslim

¹⁰¹ *The Travels of Ibn Battūta*, Vol. I, pp. 223-226.

¹⁰² *Diya' al-Dīn Baranī, Tārīkh-i Firūz Shāhī* (Calcutta, 1860-62), p. 34.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, p. 71.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 146-47.

philosophers who followed Ghazālī and Niẓām al-Mulk Ṭūsī. However, he declared that only such rulers deserved to be called Kings in whose territory not a single person went hungry or naked.¹⁰⁵

Balban's grandson and successor, Mu'iz al-Din Kaiqubād (686/1287-689/1290) was a rake and a drunkard. Amīr Khusraw (651/1253-725/1325), however, who wrote panegyrics for all the Delhi sultāns from Balban to Ghiyāth al-Dīn Tughluq (720/1320-725/1325), observed that Kaiqubād was endowed with the *farr* of the Kayānī dynasty.¹⁰⁶ Both Amīr Khusraw and his friend, Amīr Ḥasan called the great Khaljī Sultān, 'Alā' al-Dīn Muḥammad (695/1296-715/1316, a *khalīfa*. In his *Khazā'in al-Futūḥ*, when describing 'Alā' al-Dīn Khaljī's victories, Amīr Khusraw wrote: "Through instituting justice and the insignia of his own caliphate he once again raised the 'Abbāsīd standards, which grievous calamities had broken into fragments".¹⁰⁷

In 717/1317 'Alā' al-Dīn's son, Qutb al-Dīn Mubārak Shāh (716/1316-718/1318), issued coins bearing the titles of the 'Abbāsīd caliphs. In fact from the time of Balban onwards, in Indian political terminology as elsewhere, the words "caliph" and "sultān" were interchangeable, but the assumption of the title, *al-Wāṭhiq Billāh*, ("Dependent on God" directly, and not through the Caliph) by the Sultān was a daring innovation.

The reign of Sultān Fīrūz Shāh Tughluq, although mild and politically ineffective, marked the revival of Sunnī orthodoxy in India. Early in the rule of Fīrūz, Diyā' al-Din Baranī (b.684/1285-86), whose grandfather, father and uncle had held high posts during the reigns of Delhi sultāns from Balban to 'Alā' al-Dīn Khaljī and who himself was a *nadīm* (boon companion) of Sultān Muḥammad bin Tughluq, wrote two important works, the *Tārīkh-i Fīrūz Shāhī* and the *Fatāwā-i Jahāndārī*. The former is a history of the Delhi Sultāns from Balban to the sixth year of Fīrūz Shāh's reign, but, like the latter, it was also intended to be an Indian "Mirror for Princes", and the same political theories are expressed in both works. In the *Tārīkh-i Fīrūz Shāhī* political ideologies are discussed in monologues and dialogues of the sultāns, and in the *Fatāwā-i Jahāndārī* the same concepts feature

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p.147.

¹⁰⁶ *Qirān al-sa'dain* (Aligarh, 1918), p. 22.

¹⁰⁷ *Khazā'in al-futūḥ* (Calcutta, 1953), p.6.

through stories from the 'Mirrors for Princes'. Most of these sources have not survived and some may be apocryphal.

The *Tārīkh-i Fīrūz Shāhī* rationalizes both the absolutism of kings and their use of state laws (*ḥawāḥāt*). Baranī unhesitatingly calls the first four successors of Muḥammad, *jahāndārs*¹⁰⁸ (world rulers), noting that each one strictly observed the practices of Muḥammad. As human beings, according to Baranī, they combined the grandeur of Jamshīd with the dervishhood of mystics. After this period caliphs and Muslim kings found themselves in a dilemma. If they followed the practices of Muḥammad, they were unable to govern. On the other hand if they ruled vigorously and ostentatiously like Khushrāw, they were forced to violate religious law. While spiritual life was to be attained only through humility, poverty and self-abasement, to the king pride, arrogance and self-glorification were indispensable, thus rendering the co-existence of spirituality and kingship impossible. A monarch could not survive without exhibiting lordship (*rububiyya*) and therefore kingship was the deputyship (*niyābat*) and vicegerency (*khilāfat*) of God. Muslim *khalīfas* and kings, in the interests of propagating the word of God, enforcing the faith of Muḥammad, annihilating the enemies of the faith, and self-preservation, were compelled to adopt the manners and customs of the great Iranian emperors. Baranī compared this situation with the eating of carrion, which is normally prohibited by Islam but in extreme conditions is permitted; in the same way, Muslim kings in the interests of Islam were allowed to display arrogance and ruthlessness. Using this example Baranī added that even such non-Islamic customs as ceremonial prostration, the amassing of huge amounts of treasure, and the collection of large harems could be accepted.¹⁰⁹

Baranī observed that the Rightly Guided Caliphs governed according to *ijma*¹¹⁰ and *istikhlāf*;¹¹¹ but, from the time of the Umayyads, the policy of annihilating the 'Alids ushered in a new era

¹⁰⁸ *Jahāndār-i jahāniyān shudand. Fatāwā-i Jahāndārī*, edited by A.S. Khan (Lahore, 1972), p. 140.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 140-41.

¹¹⁰ According to Sunnī juristic theories, *ijma* ' is the most important basis of *fiqh*. In theory *ijma* ' means the agreement of the *umma* to a regulation (*ḥukm*) imposed by God. The election of Abū Bakr was based on *ijma* '.

¹¹¹ Appointing a successor, as was done by Abū Bakr, who designated 'Umar as Caliph.

of *anarchy*.¹¹² From then on the reigns of many Muslim kings had been short and dynastic change had been the order of the day. On the other hand the governments of the Iranis or the Byzantines were more stable and they were never forced to submit to rulers from different races.¹¹³ Baranī therefore affirmed that kings should be members of noble dynasties and should promote an élite from among those of good birth.¹¹⁴ The Qur'ān affirmed: "Lo, the noblest of you, in the sight of Allāh, is the best in conduct",¹¹⁵ but Baranī interpreted the verse to mean that the lowly-born could never develop the degree of piety which was the prerogative of the nobly-born.¹¹⁶

Baranī reaffirmed his belief in theories on monarchy outlined in the "Mirrors for Princes", such as "The sultān is God's shadow on earth", "Religion and kingdom are twin brothers" and "People follow the faith of their kings". His exaggerated emphasis on nobility of birth was intended to discourage rulers from counteracting the dominance of the nobles by raising up a humbly-born governing class.¹¹⁷ The Hindu class and caste system strengthened the social prejudices Baranī had borrowed from the Persian "Mirrors". He endorsed the Iranian custom of promulgating state laws, and advised rulers strictly to refrain from associating with the lowly-born in their legislative councils. As far as possible state laws should not violate the *Shari'a* and the *Sunna*, but when expedient Baranī recommended that this should be no hindrance. Expiation could always be achieved through lavish gifts.¹¹⁸

The *Bādshāh-i Islām* or Ideal Muslim Ruler could not justify his divine commission without excluding Hindus from higher posts and forcing the Brahmans (whom he compared to the Muslim '*ulamā*') into bankruptcy and social misery. Those who departed from orthodox Sunnism, notably the Ismā'ilīs and Muslim philosophers, were to be annihilated, so as to glorify Sunnī Islām in India and to

¹¹² *Fatāwā-i Jahāndārī*, p. 306.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 303.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 304.

¹¹⁵ *Qur'ān*, XLIX, 13.

¹¹⁶ *Fatāwā-i Jahāndārī*, p. 298.

¹¹⁷ *Tārīkh-i Fīrūz Shāhī*, pp. 503-505.

¹¹⁸ *Fatāwā-i Jahāndārī*, pp. 218-220.

make it the leading religion. According to Baranī this justified and gave religious sanction to the autocratic rule of the Delhi sultāns.

Although Baranī received no encouragement either from Sultān Fīrūz or from his nobles and died in misery, his hero Fīrūz in fact liberally rewarded the Muslim religious classes, imposed *jizya* upon Brahmans who had hitherto been exempted, and took pride in crushing the Shī'īs and unorthodox Sunnīs. After his long and ineffective rule, however, the Tughluq dynasty disintegrated and Tīmūr so ruthlessly sacked Delhi that the capital took a long time to recover its prosperity.

Friendly relations between the Delhi sultāns and the court of Samudra (Pasai) in Sumatra led to the introduction of Perso-Islamic court ceremonial and political ideology into that island kingdom. In 1292 Marco Polo found only a part of Sumatra converted to Islam, but later the Pasai kingdom was formed and converted. At the Delhi court of Muḥammad bin Tughluq, Ibn Battūta had met Amīr Dawlasa, whom Sultān al-Malik al-Zāhir of Sumatra had sent as an envoy, and who, accompanied by the Sultān's deputy, was sent to give Ibn Battūta a royal reception when he reached Sumatran shores in 746/1345-46. Other notables travelling with Amīr Dawlasa bore such names as Qādī al-Sharīf, Amīr Saiyid al-Shīrāzī and Tāj al-Dīn Ispahānī. The predominance of Persian officials at Sultān al-Malik al-Zāhir's court, and his interest in theological discussions, would indicate that the Sultanate followed the Perso-Islamic theories of kingship of Ghazālī and that the ceremonials described by Ibn Battūta were the same as those of Indo-Persian courts,¹¹⁹ the only

¹¹⁹ C. Defremery and B.R. Sanguinetti (eds.), *Voyage d'Ibn Batoutah*, Vol. IV (Paris, 1858), pp.229-237. B. Schrieke suggests that "the tombstone of al-Malik as-Sālih, the founder of the Moslem realm of Pasai in north-east Sumatra who died in 1297, also appears to have come from Cambay". (*Indonesian Sociological Studies*, Part II, The Hague, 1957, pp.233-34). The main problem with this hypothesis is that it was only in 697/1298 that the Vāghela Rājā of Gujarāt was conquered by the Muslims. Although Muslim merchants did live in Gujarāt, the region was not then a centre of Muslim culture. In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries the descendants of Shaikh Abū Ishaq Kāzīrūnī (d.426/1035) had established *khānqāhs* along the sea route from the Persian Gulf to China. It would be more likely that Malik al-Sālih was a member of one such Kāzīrūnī establishment. Another likely connection of the Pasai rulers was with the warrior saints of Shaikh Jalāl of Sylhet. These, driven by the Mongols from their homeland in Turkistān in the middle of the thirteenth century, moved on to Baghdād, where they arrived in 1258. At the end of the thirteenth century they settled in Bengal. Ibn Battūta mentioned many ports between Bengal and Sumatra inhabited by Bengalis and Sumatrans and states that Sultān Malik al-Zāhir

difference being that the Delhi court followed Ḥanafī and Sulṭān Zāhir Shafī'ī practices.

The rulers of the kingdom of Malacca, Islamized around 1400, had marital connections with the court of Pasai, took Shah as a suffix to their names, and used the word Sulṭān as their title. The sixteenth century saw the establishment of Muslim rule in Aceh, Minangkabau, Java, north-west Kalimantan (Borneo), the Sulu Archipelago and the southern Philippines. No details of the forms of government in those regions survive, but their political ideologies were probably not very different from those of Pasai and Malacca. Pre-Islamic ideas of kingship in these regions were not in conflict with the mystical traditions of the merchants and ṣūfis who introduced Islam into the islands. For example the Javanese belief in a "cosmos divided into a micro-cosmos —the world of man— and a macro-cosmos— the supra human world"¹²⁰ was not difficult to reconcile with Ibn al-'Arabī's (560/1165-638/1240) concept of the Perfect Man as a microcosm in the universe, the Macrocosm.

Religio-mystical and hereditary rights in the great monarchies form the fifteenth to the seventeenth centuries.

Although a Muslim and a patron of the 'ulamā' and Muslim intellectuals, Tīmūr or Tamerlane (771/1370-807/1405) asserted his rule on the basis of his descent from the heathen Chingiz Khān (b.1167, d.1277). In fact he even outdid Chingiz by overthrowing the rulers of Persia and Mesopotamia and by sacking Moscow before turning to India. As a direct descendant of Chingiz he claimed hegemony over the Ottoman sultān, Bāyazīd I Yeldirim of Anatolia, who based his claim to rule on being heir of the Saljūqs. In 796/1394 Bāyazīd had secured from the 'Abbāsīd Caliph in Cairo, the title Sulṭān of Rūm, but neither his military success in Europe (which had made him a *ghāzī*) nor the recognition of the Caliph helped reverse Tīmūr's decision. In 804/1402 he defeated Bāyazīd, who died in captivity some months later.

himself was constantly engaged in *jihād* and *ghazw*. It would seem that the *jihād* and *ghazw* traditions of the *ghāzīs* under Shaikh Jalāl blossomed more favourably in Sumatra than in Bengal.

¹²⁰ Soemarsaid Moertono, *State and Statecraft in Old Java* (New York, 1963), p.26-27.

After Tīmūr's death his vast empire was speedily resumed by the local dynasties, his successors reigning only in Transoxiana and parts of Iran. Not only did the Ottomans revive their past glory but, under Selīm I Yavuz (918/1512-926/1520) and his successor Sulaymān II Qānūnī (known to Europe as the Magnificent (926/1520-974/1566), they became one of the most outstanding Muslim powers. Selīm conquered Egypt and Syria. On 22 January 1517 the *khatība* (reciters of the *khutba*) in the mosques of Cairo prayed:

O God, give victory to the Sulṭān, son of the Sulṭān, the king of the two continents and the two seas, the destroyer of the two armies, the Sulṭān of the two Iraqs, the servant of the two Holy Sanctuaries, the victorious King, Sulṭān Salīm Shāh.¹²¹

- Modern researchers have declared the tradition that the 'Abbāsīd Caliph formally transferred the caliphate to Sulṭān Selīm to be mythical. This transfer would have been in any case invalid as jurists recognized only a Quraysh as caliph, while, like all sulṭāns, Selīm and his successors considered themselves to be both caliph and sulṭān. Nevertheless Selīm did obtain the sacred relics from the 'Abbāsīd family —the Prophet's robe, some hairs from his beard, and the sword of the Caliph 'Umar. With the conquest of Egypt Selīm became the guardian of Mecca and Medina, a legitimate honour of which he was justly proud. The Indian kings Shēr Shāh Sūr (946/1539-952/1545) entertained a pious wish to annihilate the Shī'ī rulers of Iran, to resuscitate the bond of religious brotherhood with the Sulṭān of Rūm, and to share with him the privilege of serving one of the two holy places, Mecca and Medina.¹²²

The Shī'ī rule which Shēr Shāh so earnestly desired to extinguish had been established in Iran by Shāh Ismā'īl I (907/1501-930/1524), a descendant of a ṣūfī, known as Shaikh Ṣafī al-Dīn (d. 735/1334), whose headquarters were in Ardabīl in eastern Azerbāyjan (Iran). Shāh Ismā'īl, who gave the dynasty the name Ṣafawī after his ṣūfī ancestor, made Ṫhna' Asharī Shī'ism the state religion, thereby giving Iran an independent, national identity in the body politic of Islam. On the western front the Ottomans scrambled to devour the nascent Īrānī kingdom, as along the eastern border did the Sunnī Ozbegs, who

¹²¹ T. W. Arnold, *The Caliphate* (London, revised edition 1965) pp. 140-41.

¹²² Mulla 'Abd al-Qādir Bada'ūnī, *Muntakhab al- Tawārikh*, Vol. 1 (Calcutta, 1864-69), p. 370.

had seized the region from the north bank of the Syr Darya on the Aral Sea to the Farghāna valley. The correspondence exchanged between these three rival powers tends to indicate that only the might of the sword established the right to rule. Their three leaders all quoted the following Persian verse:

He who would tightly clasp Royalty to his breast as his bride,
Must (first) kiss the lips of sharp swords.

Shāh Ismā'il Ṣafawī claimed to be the descendant of Alī's family and continually reminded his enemies that the fall of Alī's enemies was inevitable and predestined, ascribing his own victories to the assistance of the twelve Imāms.

Shāh Ismā'il's inveterate enemy, Muḥammad Shaybānī (905/1500-916/1510), who seized Transoxiana from the Tīmūrīds and laid the foundation of the strictly orthodox (Sunnī) Ozbeg dynasty, asserted his right to rule eastern Iran as a descendant of Chingiz, at the same time reminding Shāh Ismā'il that he was descended from a ṣūfī family and should continue his father's calling as a beggar. His final insult was to send Shāh Ismā'il a woman's veil and a beggar's bowl, and for his pains he received this somewhat severe reply:

... if every man was bound to follow his father's trade, all being sons of Adam must adhere to that of prophets ... if hereditary descent conferred the only right to sovereignty, he did not see how it had descended from the Pishdādī to the Kayānī dynasties of Persia, or how it had come to Chingiz or to him whom he addressed. "Boast not thyself, O, vain youth, of thy father, who is dead; Pride not thyself on bones, as if thou wert a dog."¹²³

Both the Ozbegs and the Ottomans called the Ṣafawids heretics who had strayed from the path of the Sunnī *fırqa nājiyya* (the Sunnī community, which brings salvation). But to Shah Ismā'il and his followers, the Divine Light, passing from 'Alī to the other Ḥusaynid Imāms, was the basic factor in their claim to rule and their sole protector. The Ottomans dubbed the Turkoman nomad followers of the Shāh Qizil-bāsh ("Red-heads") because of their red headgear with twelve folds. The cap or turban which they wore symbolized the exclusive form of spiritual assistance given to the Ṣafawids by the twelve Shī'ī Imāms; thus to the Ṣafawids *Qizilbāsh* became a term of honour.

¹²³ Ghulām Sarwar, *History of Shāh Ismā'il Ṣafawī* (Aligarh, 1939), pp.59-60; A. H. Nawā'ī, *Shah Ismā'il Ṣafawī* (Tehran, 1347 Iranian era), pp.69-89, 111-117.

The only ruler to remain aloof from this sectarian in-fighting was Ṣāḥir al-Dīn Muḥammad Bābur. This enterprising descendant of Tīmūr, who succeeded to his father's principality of Farḡhāna at the tender age of eleven, made a daring attempt to control Tāshkent and Samarqand, but was repulsed by Shaybānī Khān in 906/1501. After vainly seeking refuge in friendly territories, frustrated but not disheartened, he seized Kābul, the kingdom of an uncle, in 907/1501. Although devoted to the orthodox Sunnī Naqshbandiyya teacher, Khwaja 'Ubayd Allāh Aḥrār (806/1404-895/1491), a great friend of the Tīmūrids, he quickly joined Shāh Ismā'īl and defeated and killed Shaybānī Khān at Marv in 916/1510. Appreciating the friendly support of the Shāh, Bābur promised to read his name in the *khutba* and stamp it on his coins, together with those of the twelve Imāms. The Shī'ī forces enabled Bābur to seize Samarqand and Bukhārā. During his short reign there, according to Faḍl Allāh Ruzbihān, Shī'ism was introduced for the first time in Transoxiana, that holy land of the Sunnis.¹²⁴ Smarting under many disappointments, Shaybānī's successor, 'Ubayd Allāh Khan (918/1512-946/1539), defeated Bābur in 918/1512. Driven from Bukhārā, Bābur began concentrating on the conquest of India, which he as a Tīmūrīd considered his to rule as of right.

Tīmūr's descendants had given themselves the title *Mīrzā*, but early in 1508 Bābur had already taken the title *Pādshāh*.¹²⁵ Thus he asserted his supremacy over all other Tīmūrīd princes and after defeating Rāna Sāngā of Mewar in March 1526, he assumed the title *Ghazi*.¹²⁶ In 937/1530, four years after founding his great Indian empire, Bābur died. His son, Humāyūn, was, like his father, a scholar, but, unlike him, an ineffective leader. It was Humāyūn's son Akbar (936/1556-1014/1605) in whose reign not only most of northern India was conquered but also a new impetus was given to foreign relations, politics and the art of government.

Between the reigns of Tīmūr and Akbar two major trends in political ideology crystallized, one being primarily Ghazālīan and the other, Nasīriān. The most prominent contribution to the Ghazālīan school was made by the *Dhakhīrat al-mulūk* of the sūfī missionary, Mīr Saiyid

¹²⁴ *Suluk al-mulūk* (Tashkent Ms), ff. 3b-7b; Nawā'ī, *Shāh Ismā'īl*, pp. 363-76.

¹²⁵ A.S. Beveridge (tr.) *Bābur Nāma* (Delhi reprint, 1970), p. 344.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 574.

'Alī Hamadānī (714/1314-786/1385). In his work the Saiyid observed that men were differently illuminated through the light of the divine attributes of *Jamāl* (Beauty) and *Jalāl* (Majesty) because of their instinctive differences; these in turn led to variations in the characteristics and beliefs of different communities. Some easily accepted guidance, while others were stubborn, exhibiting their innate vices. It was the need to overcome the conflicts and dissensions within human nature that had prompted God to appoint a just ruler, in order that he might guide human beings to follow the Sharī'a and strike a balance between elite and commoners. The main duty of rulers was to protect the weak from the tyranny of the strong.¹²⁷

In Adam, continued the Mīr, prophethood, the sultanate and government were united. As prophets were free from lust and self-will, only pious souls could be appointed to such an exalted office. They were few in number, and after Muḥammad only the first four caliphs ruled righteously. Rulers in general were dominated by lust and greed, perpetrating oppression, believing brute force an inevitable element in their governments. Quoting anecdotes, the Mīr advised Muslim kings to reconstitute their governments on the pattern of the Prophets and the Rightly Guided Caliphs. In such a regime kingly authority was united with the life of a dervish. He reminded them that the sultāns were chosen by God Himself and were His shadow. Being deputies of a Merciful God, their rule could be rationalized only through justice and benevolence. If they fell victims to lust and animal passions and violated the laws of the Sharī's, they broke their trust as deputies and took the path of the devil.¹²⁸

Mīr Saiyid 'Alī Hamadānī enumerated the following essentials for a good Islamic ruler:

1. While considering a petition, he should place himself in the position of his subject and make the decision according to what he would himself like if he were the petitioner.
2. Satisfying the needs of Muslims should be the highest form of worship.
3. In matters of food and dress he should follow the traditions of the Rightly Guided Caliphs.
4. He should be polite, and should not be vexed at lengthy petitions and discussions.

¹²⁷ *Dhakhīrat al-mulūk* (Tashkent Oriental Institute Ms. 2312/1, copied in 991/1582), f. 53b.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, ff. 54a-58b.

5. He should not hesitate to enforce the *Shari'a* in order to please all sections of his subjects, for in every regime half of the subjects are dissatisfied with the ruler. He should note that if God was satisfied with his orders and His words were honoured, the satisfaction of his subjects would follow automatically.
6. He should not ignore the fact that through government kings could acquire either felicity or damnation. The pride of worldly power drove most kings to destroy their faith, so through justice and righteousness kings should earn happiness for the world to come.
7. He should attempt to discover those who were pious among the '*ulamā*' and dervishes, and seek to gain every advantage.
8. He should not frighten his subjects by a show of vanity and ostentation, but should win their hearts by benevolence and justice.
9. He should not allow tyrannical and dishonest officers to molest his subjects, and should redress the evils inflicted on them.
10. He should penetrate the truth of disputes and deliver judgments in accordance with the *Shari'a*: he should not be misled by witnesses or by what appeared *prima facie* to be correct.¹²⁹

According to Mīr Saiyid 'Alī the rights of Muslim and non-Muslim subjects were distinct. The twenty-two rights of Muslims were covered by the duties of Muslim rulers. He believed the *ahl-al dhimma* (contractually protected subjects or non-Muslims) were to be governed strictly in accordance with the covenant of 'Umar,¹³⁰ which modern researchers have proved to be a later document embodying the intolerant practices of ninth century jurists.¹³¹ Mīr Saiyid 'Alī Hamadānī himself believed that monarchs should assist all their subjects with justice and equity and should not discriminate between their own kinsmen (*ahl*)¹³² and others. As both Muslims and infidels shared the generosity of God, the king who was God's shadow should show the same generosity. His justice and benevolence should embrace both the good and the wicked.¹³³ The question of whether justice should be

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, ff. 59a-62a.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, f. 66b.

¹³¹ T. W. Arnold, *The Preaching of Islam* (Lahore, reprinted 1961), pp. 57-59; see A.S. Tritton, *The Caliphs and their Non-Muslim Subjects. A Critical Study of the Covenant of 'Umar*, (Oxford, 1930).

¹³² *Ahl* also means "deserving", but here "kinsman" seems the better translation.

¹³³ *Dhakhīrat al-mulūk*, f. 63a.

exclusive to Muslims or impartial, however, kept Muslim political theorists in a continual dilemma.

Another important work on government was that of Fadl Allāh bin Rūzbihān Isfahānī known as Khoja Mullā. Born in Shīrāz in 860/1456, he developed a strong faith in Sunnism. He completed the *Kitāb Ibṭāl Nahj al-Bāṭil wa lhmāl Kashf al-Ātil* in 909/1503, refuting Shī'ī beliefs; but by that time Shī'ī rule was firmly established in the greater part of his homeland. Accordingly he migrated to the court of Shaybānī Khān in Transoxiana and became the Khān's favourite adviser, urging him to annihilate the Shī'īs and eliminate all non-Sunnī elements. Bābur's dominance over Samarqand and Bukhārā temporarily reduced him to a pitiable condition; but after 'Ubayd Allāh mounted the throne, he invited Faḍl Allāh to court and made him his leading adviser. In 920/1514 he wrote *Sulūk al-mulūk* and died seven years later.

Faḍl Allāh bin Rūzbihān Isfahānī considered only the first four caliphs and 'Alī's son, Ḥasan (3/624-49/699-70), as rightful caliphs, believing that their election had been unanimously confirmed by the companions of the Prophet and that it was during their tenure of office that most of the laws of the Sharī'a were codified. He endorsed the jurists' view of the appointment of caliphs and deemed legitimate the caliphate of the imāms who forcibly seized power. He defined a sultān thus:

In accordance with the *Sharī'a*, a sultān is one who rules Muslims either by his power or by the force of his army. The '*ulamā*' say that subjects are bound to obey his commands and prohibitions according to their capacity and competence, so long as the sultān does not violate the *Sharī'a*, and they are not entitled to question either his justice or tyranny. It is lawful to call the sultān an imām, or a caliph, an *amīr al-mu'minīn* or a caliph of the Prophet of Allāh, but it is not permitted to call him the Caliph of God.¹³⁴

Faḍl Allāh added that the appointment of an imām was an imperative duty (*fard kifa'i*) on the part of the community. If there were none suitable to fill the office or there were no volunteers for it, the community as a whole became sinful; but if a qualified person agreed to hold the post, the sin of the community was remitted. If a man qualified to become imām was not invited, it was his duty to assert

¹³⁴ *Sulūk al-mulūk* (Tashkent Ms), f. 17a.

himself and assume office. He whom the community appointed imām or who forcibly seized Muslim territories was known as sultān.

According to Fadl Allāh there were ten duties of a sultān. (1) To protect the faith according to the agreed principles of the ancestors (*salaf*) of the *umma*. (2) To settle disputes among hostile parties. (3) To drive out the enemies of the Muslims so that they may carry on their normal activities and to travel peacefully. (4) To enforce legal punishments. (5) To appoint competent soldiers to protect Muslim frontiers from infiltration by infidels. (6) To fight the enemies of Islam who do not accept an imām's invitation to surrender. (7) To collect *fay'*¹³⁵ *sadaqa*¹³⁶ and one-fifth of the war booty. (8) To grant adequate allowances from the *bayt al-māl* (treasury) to the needy. (9) To appoint honest and religious officers to discharge the functions of the *Shari'a*, in such capacities as vizier, *amir*, *qadi*, *muhtasib*, etc.¹³⁷ (10) To personally investigate all sections of the community so that anyone violating the *Shari'a* would be rightly punished. In short, if a king failed to enforce the *Shari'a* he was personally responsible for the sins of his subjects.¹³⁸

A great Naqshbandiyya *sūfi*, who unequivocally supported the rule of 'Ubayd Allāh, was Ahmad bin Jalāl al-Dīn Khwājigī, who wrote several treatises in support of orthodox Sunnism. In his *Tanbih al-salatin*,¹³⁹ modelled on Ghazali, Khwājigī wrote that sultans, also known as *khalifas*, were the manifestation of the caliphate and kingship of God. Justice consisted in strengthening the *Shari'a* and the *sūfi* path (*Tariqa*) of Muhammad, and Sultāns should promote the

¹³⁵ Theoretically everything seized from unbelievers without fighting and also the lands in conquered territories constituted the *fay'*. After the first century of Islamization, conversions to Islam made the use of the term in the conquered territories redundant. However kings did not strictly adhere to the rulings of the jurists, and the land, the *kharāj*, the *jizya* and all other tributes paid by unbelievers, including taxes on merchandise, came to be regarded as *fay'*.

¹³⁶ *Sadaqa* means alms, but generally *zakāt* (the obligatory poor tax) and *sadaqa* are synonymous.

¹³⁷ The *muhtasib* was responsible for the enforcement of good behaviour and Islamic morals. He also supervised the conduct of non-Muslims and acted as inspector of the markets. According to J. Schacht his office was a legacy of the Byzantines. 'Law and Justice' in *The Cambridge History of Islam* (Cambridge, 1975), Vol. II, p. 549.

¹³⁸ *Suluk al-mulūk*, ff. 19b-20a.

¹³⁹ A collection of eighteen treatises by the Khwājigī dated 1040-41/1630-31 is in the Oriental Institute Leningrad (B2818). Copies of his work are also to be found in Tashkent.

interests of both. Khwājigī asserted that he had been personally commissioned by God to associate with kings and thus further both *Shari'a* and *Tariqa*.¹⁴⁰

Khwājigī invited Bābur to believe that outstanding ṣūfis who were responsible for the maintenance of the world had, from among the sultāns, elected 'Ubayd Allāh as *khalīfa*. Forming an electoral college they sent word to him (Khwājigī) of their unanimous decision and sought his co-operation. Khwājigī advised Bābur of his decision to obey and hoped that Bābur would also concur.¹⁴¹ This curious method of electing the caliph was ignored by Bābur; perhaps it was never conveyed to the Sultān in Turkey and merely indicated a developing involvement of the ṣūfis in politics.

The lead given by Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī stimulated Jalāl al-Dīn Dawwānī (830/1427-908/1502-03) to compile his *Akhlāq-i Jalālī* along the lines of the *Akhlāq-i Nāṣirī*. The author harmonized orthodoxy and ṣūfism with the ideas of Plato, Avicenna and Naṣīr al-Dīn, stating explicitly that the sultāns were shadows of God on earth, bound by divine decree to be just judges and redress the wrong done to the oppressed.¹⁴²

A new slant to the Ghazālīan and Naṣīrian theories of kingship and government was produced by Abū al-Faḍl 'Allāmī (958/1551-1011/1602), inspired by a need to rationalize the broadly-based policy of peace among the multi-religious and multi-racial population of India initiated by his patron, Akbar the Great. Besides Arabic and Persian works on kingship and government, Abū al-Faḍl had access to the Persian translation of the *Mahābhārata* and the *Rāmāyaṇa*, to the Arabic translation of the *Cāṇakya Nīti* and to other works of ancient Indian *rājanīti* (polity) in Sanskrit.

Abū al-Faḍl refused to concern himself with theories legitimizing petty autocrats who forcibly seized power and were then automatically recognized as shadows of God. Lineage, wealth and military skill alone were insufficient bases for kingship, which was a gift from God to a chosen few who were paragons of such qualities as:

... magnanimity, lofty benevolence, wide capacity, abundant endurance, exalted understanding, innate graciousness, natural courage, justice, rectitude,

¹⁴⁰ *Tanbīh al-Salāṭīn* in Khwājigī's *Majmu'a*.

¹⁴¹ *Bāburiyya* in the *Majmū'a*.

¹⁴² *Akhlāq-i Jalālī* (Lucknow, 1957), pp. 221-29.

strenuous labour, proper conduct, profound thoughtfulness, laudable over-looking (of offences) and acceptance of excuses.¹⁴³

For Abū al-Faḍl, the institution of kingship, rather than the individual who held the office, was endowed with *farr-i ʿīzādī*. *Pādshāh*, he observed, was a compound word, *pād* meaning stability and possession, and *shāh* denoting origin and lordship. To Abū al-Faḍl the *Pādshāh* was neither the sulṭān nor the imām of Naṣīr al-Dīn Tūsī; neither was he the Mahdī (Ṣaḥīb al-Zamān or Lord of the Age), whose expected appearance at the close of the first Islamic millennium (1000/1591-92) had produced instability in the minds of many Muslims. Abū al-Faḍl's *Pādshāh* or *Shāhanshāh* (King of Kings, another term borrowed from ancient Iranian royalty and one which he loved to use) was a unique personality; he was the "Perfect Man" who, according to the ṣūfīs of Ibn al'Arabī's school, was the real vicegerent¹⁴⁴ of God on earth. He wrote:

Kingship is a refulgence (*furūgh*) from the Incomparable Distributor of Justice and a ray from the Sun, the illuminator of the universe, the index of the books of perfection and the receptacle of all virtues. The contemporary language calls it *Farr-i ʿīzādī* (the divine effulgence), and the tongue of antiquity calls it *kiryān khūra* (the sublime halo). It is communicated by God to the holy face (of the king) without the intermediate assistance of anyone; and men, in its presence, bend the forehead of praise towards the ground of submission. Again, many excellent qualities flow from the possession of this light.¹⁴⁵

The spate of translations into Persian during Akbar's reign included one of the *Sirāj al-mulūk* of al-Ṭurṭūshī. This served to remind Indian intellectuals that Ṭurṭūshī filled an important gap in the study of political theories, since he had had access to the works of the sages of Persia, Byzantium, China, Hīnd and Sind¹⁴⁶ which were not available to the Arabs. Ṭurṭūshī's assertion that an infidel king who governed his kingdom according to the right principles was preferable to a Muslim ruler who was slipshod in fulfilling his responsibilities tended

¹⁴³ *Akbar Nāma*, English translation by H. Beveridge (Calcutta, 1897-1921), Vol. II, p. 421.

¹⁴⁴ S.A.A. Rizvi, *Religious and Intellectual History of the Muslims in Akbar's Reign* (Delhi, 1975), pp. 190, 348, 356.

¹⁴⁵ *Ā'in-i Akbarī* (Lucknow, 1892), Vol. I, p. 3, English translation by H. Blochmann, second revised edition by D. C. Phillott (Calcutta, 1939), Vol. I, p. 3.

¹⁴⁶ *Siraj al-mulūk* (Tashkent Oriental Institute Ms), f. 3a.

to strengthen the basis on which Akbar's government was founded.¹⁴⁷

Having learnt that Jahāngīr (1014/1605-1037/1626) was interested in the traditions of the Prophet on kingship, Shaikh 'Abd al-Ḥaqq Muhaddith Dihlawī (958/1551-1052/1642) wrote a treatise, the *Nūriyya-i Sulṭāniyya*, covering all the traditions on this subject. Although a trained scholar of *Ḥadīth*, he never questioned the authenticity of the traditions which had become popular since the time of Ghazālī, and wrote:

No rank is higher than that of a king, and all words of conventional praise are insufficient to return thanks to him... The order and arrangement of worldly affairs depends upon the king. Were every king to go into retirement, the cosmic order would be shattered. Therefore kings should so regulate their activities that their existence is not a source of disorder.¹⁴⁸

Shaikh 'Abd al-Ḥaqq extolled only the *bādsbāh-i dīndār* (the king who upholds the Faith), who in fulfilment of his duty strengthens the *Sharī'a*. He continued:

The religion and holy law which the Prophets received from God are made illustrious by kings through the strength of their arms and through the justice they dispense. The entire community should co-operate with the king in the task of strengthening the faith and spreading it... The king is their ruler and his justice preserves order among them. It is in this sense that the relationship between the king and the pillars of the world and mankind is equated with the relationship between body and soul. If the soul is reformed, the body is reformed; if the soul goes wrong, the body goes wrong.¹⁴⁹

Shaikh 'Abd al-Ḥaqq's theory legitimizing the existence of a king was narrowed, to the exclusive benefit of Islam, when he considered whether heretics and unbelievers had an equal right to justice. He thought that heresy was incompatible with justice and that a heretic could never be known as a just ruler. At the same time, however, when reminded of Nūshīrwān, a non-Muslim renowned for his justice, the Shaikh admitted that justice was not the monopoly of Islam, but he did not carry the argument further. Returning to his favourite subject, he demanded that kings act according to the laws of the *Sharī'a* as interpreted by the ulama.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, f. 79a.

¹⁴⁸ *Nūriyya-i Sulṭāniyya*, India Office Library (Delhi Persian 659b), ff. 6-11a, 14a.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, ff. 10b-11a.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, f. 166.

Designing his theory of kingship to justify his own accession to the throne and to gain the support of orthodox Sunnīs for his rule, Aurangzīb (1068/1658-1118/1707) claimed that since "all actions are determined by the will of God" his victory over his brothers was a divine gift. He said that that ruler was truly great who was assisted by God in accordance with the Qur'ānic verse: "O Allah! Owner of Sovereignty (*mulk*)! Thou givest sovereignty to whom Thou wilt and Thou withdrawest sovereignty, from whom Thou wilt". From his prison Shāh-Jahān (1037/1628-1068/1658) accused Aurangzīb of usurpation, to which he replied:

Perhaps Your Majesty's '*ulamā*' have not advised Your Majesty of the correct position (about kingship) under the *Sharī'a*... The treasury and property of kings and sultāns are meant to satisfy the needs of the country and community; they are not private property and not an inheritance, and therefore *zakāt* is not levied on them. God most High selects someone from among the esteemed ones of His Court for the management of matters relating to the livelihood and destiny of mankind, under whose control He places the duties of binding and loosing, so that all sorts of people may lead their lives on the basis of equity.¹⁵¹

Shaikh Aḥmad Sirhindi, known as Mujaddid (971/1564-1034/1624), urged the Muslim nobles of Jahāngīr's court to persuade the Emperor to enforce the Sharī'a by state legislation, to revoke orders prohibiting the killing of cows, to reimpose *jizya* and to deprive Hindus and Shī'īs of all posts of responsibility and trust. Nowhere, however, does he advocate rebellion.

Aurangzīb directed the compilation of a compendium of *fatwas* according to the Ḥanafī legal code, but the *Āyīn* (secular institutions) introduced in Akbar's reign were not superseded. The Ottoman Turks, who had also assumed the status of guardians of the Sunnī *Sharī'a*, supplemented the latter with *Qānūn* (legal canons) or political and administrative ordinances. Writing in 1640, Khoja Beg stressed the hereditary right of the Ottomans to rule. He concluded with these words:

The order and arrangement of affairs is dependent on the noble heart of the *Pādshāh*. The *Pādshāhs* are the heart of the world. While the heart is in good health the body is healthy too.¹⁵²

¹⁵¹ *Ādāb-i 'Ālamgīrī* (British Museum, Or. 177), ff. 300a, b.

¹⁵² E. I. J. Rosenthal, *Political Thought in Medieval Islam*, pp. 226-27.

The historian and philosopher Ḥājī Khalīfa, called Kātib-Chelbī (1608-57), reiterated the ancient Iranian political theory that there was no authority (*mulk*) without an army (*rijāl*), no army without finance (*māl*), and no finance without subjects. He considered the Ottoman state to have been "caused by the normal course of the world ordained by God, and brought about by the nature of civilization and human society". Ḥājī Khalīfa further observed that:

The real *Pādshāh* is he who rules the world and to whom treasury, army and people belong; the human ruler is only his vicegerent. Those who think so will serve in justice, being of one heart and mind, will administer the affairs of state for the love and honour of God, and will maintain the realm.¹⁵³

Sixteenth and seventeenth century kings in Malaya, Sumatra and Java cannot be compared, in a material sense, to the Mughals and the Ottoman sultāns. Nevertheless they were also influenced by the Ghazālīan concept of kingship and the Persian "Mirrors for Princes". Ensuring stability in a kingdom was deemed to give the prime right to rule. 'Alā' al-Dīn Ri'āyat Shāh (1589-1604), the founder of a strong monarchy in Aceh, northern Sumatra, could assert:

In the past they (the Orangkayas, the great men of the country) made and unmade so many kings at their whim, that they abolished the whole line.... As king, he did not wish to be only a shadow, nor the plaything of the fickle humours of the Orangkayas, who, after having massacred him, would have relapsed into their former disputes, into which they would gradually have drawn the masses, who would have suffered the most.... Moreover his intention was to preserve peace for all, impose severe justice on evildoers, and reign equitably.¹⁵⁴

Iskandar Muda (1607-36), the most outstanding of the sultāns of Aceh, originated the codification of a legal system. The surviving, more recent, versions of his code, known as 'Ādat-Aceh, confirm the view that no sultān could successfully rule on the basis of *Shari'a* alone; state laws or 'ādat (*qawābiṣ*, *āyin* or *qānūn* in other Islamic governments) were indispensable to all Muslim rulers. Iskandar Muda defended his absolutism along the following lines:

His Orangkayas were wicked and cruel, and failed to realise that it was their own

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, p.232.

¹⁵⁴ Augustin de Beaulieu, "*Mémoires du voyage aux Indes Orientales*", p.111, in Anthony Reid, "Trade and the Problems of Royal Power in Aceh" in his (ed). *Pre-Colonial State Systems in Southeast Asia* (Kuala Lumpur, 1975), p.48.

wickedness which drew upon them the wrath of God, who made use of him to punish them They had no occasion to complain of him, since he had let them live with their wives, children, slaves, and sufficient wealth to nourish and sustain themselves, maintaining them in their religion, and preventing neighbouring kings from taking them as slaves from their homes, or foreigners from robbing them He had known Aceh formerly as a haven for murderers and brigands, where the stronger trampled on the weak, and the great oppressed the small; where one had to defend oneself against armed robbers in broad daylight, and to barricade one's house at night. The reason they hated him was that he prevented their wickedness, extortion, massacres, and theft; they would like to make kings at their own whim, and to have them killed when they grew tired of them.¹⁵⁵

Direct contacts between Aceh and the Mughal court, and Mughal ideas regarding kingship learnt by Aceh intellectuals in Indian seminaries at Mecca and Medina, stimulated the panegyrists of the Aceh kings, who called Iskandar Muda (1607-1636) 'the Perfect Man' (*al-Insān al-Kāmil*). 'Alā' al-Dīn Ri'āyat Shāh was given the title *Saiyid al-Mukammal* (Perfect Master). In the *Hikāyāt Aceh*, the Ottoman sultān himself is said to have declared that divine decree had assigned to him the Kingdom of the West and to the King of Aceh, the East, while between them they shared the glory of Alexander and Solomon.¹⁵⁶

In Java the rulers of Bantam, like kings in the rest of the Islamic world, called themselves sultān, but Sultān Agung (1613-45) of Mataram at first assumed the title Susuhunan (Most Revered) reserved for a deceased saint. Later, in 1641, in his bid to make his rule more widely accepted among the Muslims in Java, he obtained from Sharīf Zaid (1631-1666) of Mecca the title of sultān changing his name to Sultān 'Abd 'Allah Muḥammad Mawlānā Mataranī (that is, of Mataram). A Dutch authority sarcastically writes, "the sherifs of Mecca, themselves under Turkish 'protection', were glad to take to themselves as their due that not unprofitable authority".¹⁵⁷ Actually

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 51.

¹⁵⁶ From *Hikāyāt Aceh* written in the reign of Iskandar Muda (1607-1636). L.F. Brakel, "State and Statecraft in 17th century Aceh" in *Pre-Colonial State Systems in Southeast Asia*, p. 59; S.M.N. Al-Atas, *The Mysticism of Hamzah Fansūrī* (Kuala Lumpur, 1970), pp. 12-13.

¹⁵⁷ B. Schrieke says in his note on the rulers of Java: "That the title of *susuhunan*, synonymous with the earlier *prabhu* was higher than that of sultan appears from the negotiations with Mangkubumi to be found in Louw, *Successie oorlog*, 94-105. The title of sultan received by Agung from Mecca should rather be regarded as a holy

the *Sharīfs* exchanged embassies with the ruling Muslim powers and were offered gifts by them from the reign of Akbar to that of Aurangzib. The aura of religious sanctity surrounding the power of the 'Alid *Sharīfs* controlling Mecca, in conjunction with the growing awareness of the authority of the Pope in the Catholic world, was more significant for the prestige of Sulṭān Agung than was recognition by the Ottoman Turks, who enjoyed neither religious prestige nor legal authority.

The most interesting development in the ideology of Muslim kingship in Indonesia was the assumption of the title of *Khalīfat Allāh* (Caliph of God) by a Javanese king, Amangkurat IV (1719-1777). He called himself *Prabu Mangku-Rat Senapati Ingalaga Ngadbu's Raḥmān Saiyidīn Panatagama Kalīpatullah* (Illustrious Holder of the Universe, Commander in Battle, Servant of the Merciful, the Master and the Regulator of Religion). From 1755 onwards the Jogjakarta sulṭāns invariably used the title, *Kalīpatullāh* (*Khalīfat Allāh*). As ruler and Perfect Man, each sulṭān seems to have considered himself fully competent to be called Vicegerent of God.¹⁵⁸

The sovereignty of the Umma

In the eighteenth century the decline of Turkey, Iran and India, prompted theorists to diagnose the cause of their ills and to offer remedies. In Delhi, Shāh Walī Allāh (1114/1703-1166/1762), writing in both Arabic and Persian, attempted to determine the nature of the decay from its symptoms, and prescribed remedies on traditional lines. He believed that the first two caliphates came under the category of *Khilafāt-i Khāṣṣ* (Special Caliphate) and that during this period the victories over Iran and Syria had made the Muslim community as a whole God's vicegerent on earth.

It is not surprising that Shāh Walī Allāh considered Sulṭān sanction of his position as a Moslem ruler on Java accorded him by a Moslem authority presumed to have the right to do so. (The sherifs of Mecca, themselves under Turkish 'protection', were glad to take to themselves as their due that not-unprofitable authority...). The idea that a ruler might base a rightful claim to authority solely on such a title of sultan sent from Mecca was an invention sought out *pour le besoin de la cause* by Trunajaya in order to justify his refusal to recognize the authority of the rulers of Mataram... For did not Trunajaya himself value heredity, even if he gave himself the airs of a saint...?' (The Hague, 1957), pp.327-328, note 143.

¹⁵⁸ Soemarsaid Moertona, *State and Statecraft in Old Java* (New York, 1963), pp.28-29. Shāh Walī Allāh, *'Izalat al-khafa'* (Karachi n.d.), Vol. I, pp.37-194.

Maḥmūd of Ghazna the greatest ruler of Islam after the *Khilāfat-i ʾIkbālī* since he had launched the first real conquest of India. Maḥmūd's horoscope, the Shāh believed, was identical with the Prophet's, and this fact had enabled him to obtain his victories in wars to propagate Islam.¹⁵⁹

Nizām al-Mulk Āṣaf Jāh, Aḥmad Shāh Durrānī and the Ruhilla chief, Najīb al-Dawla, were in turn the great hopes of Shāh Walī Allāh, but he also tried to awaken the imbecile and licentious Mughal Emperor Aḥmad Shāh (1161/1748-1167/1754) to the need to revitalize the disintegrating empire. In a letter to the Emperor, Shāh Walī Allāh suggested a number of traditional schemes to streamline the Mughal administration, adding:

Strict orders should be issued in all Islamic towns forbidding religious ceremonies publicly practised by infidels (such as *Holī* and ritual bathing in the Ganges). On the tenth of Muḥarram Shī'īs should not be allowed to go beyond the bounds of moderation in the bazaars and streets, neither should they be rude nor repeat stupid things (that is, recite *tabarrā* or condemn the first three successors of Muḥammad).¹⁶⁰

The disintegration of the political influence of Indian Muslims did not in the least damp the Shāh's faith in the inevitable reassertion of their power. He was convinced that, were Hindu strength to re-emerge in India, the Divine Mystery would guide its leaders into the bosom of Islam.¹⁶¹ Shāh Walī Allāh was tempted to make such an assertion because of the earlier conversions of Berke (1256-1266), grandson of Chingīz Khān and the Ilkhānīd, Maḥmūd Ghāzān (694/1295-703/1304). Like other orthodox Muslims, the Shāh considered the Mongol conversions a great triumph for Islam, without concerning himself with the political factors behind them. Clearly the Shāh was neither separatist nor exclusivist, as many modern Muslims claim; his political mission was to bring about the restoration of Sunnī dominance over the world, the starting point being India.

Shāh Walī Allāh's call to return to the Arabic language, Arabic dress and Arab styles of living¹⁶² was a reaction against Irānī and

¹⁵⁹ Shāh Walī Allāh, *Qur'at al-a'ynain fi tafḥīl al-shaykhayn* (Delhi, 1893), p. 324.

¹⁶⁰ *Maktūbāt Shāh Walī Allāh* (Riḍa Library Rāmpur). Nizāmī omits this clause from the Shāh's letter to Aḥmad Shāh (*Shāh Walī Allāh Ke Siyāsī Maktūbāt*, Aligarh, 1950, p. 43), without assigning any reason. It is *kalima-i ḥashtum* (eighth advice).

¹⁶¹ *Tafhīmat Ilāhiyya* (Bijnor, 1936), Vol. I, p. 103.

¹⁶² *Waṣīyat-nāma* (Lucknow, 1290/1873), p. 7.

Hindu influence on the Mughal government. The downfall of Iranis and Hindus, the Shāh believed, was destined to restore the charisma of the Sunnī *firqa-nājiyya*.

By the nineteenth century European powers had extinguished all important Islamic monarchies, with the exception of Shī'ī Iran and Sunnī Turkey, whose survival hung by a thread. Naturally the image of the Ottoman Turks as guardians of Sunnism endowed them with a fresh halo and they came to be considered the true successors of the 'Abbāsids.

In 1774 the Treaty of Kuchūk Kaynarja conceded to the Ottoman Sultān the right to exert religious authority over the Muslims in the Crimea. After the Crimean War (1853-1856), fought by the allied armies of England, France, Turkey and Sardinia against Russia, a new dimension was added to the image of Turkey in the British colonies. For example, after the Indian mutiny and rebellion of 1857-58 some Sunnī mosques began to recite the *khutba* in the name of the Ottoman caliphs.

When Cyprus fell to Great Britain in 1878 and the British seized Egypt in 1882, the Muslims in the colonies of the Empire, particularly in India, were so shocked that the loyalty of their pro-British leaders was severely strained. The enthusiastic response of Muslims all over the world to the movement for pan-Islamism launched by the Ottoman Sultān 'Abd al-Hamīd II (1293/1876-1327/1909), and to his claims as *khalīfa*, were largely a new response to the modern political situation.

Messianic ideas predicting the global dominance of Islam even now stir the minds of Muslims, as they did in Sudan in 1298/1881, when Muḥammad Aḥmad b. 'Abd Allāh (1258/1834-1302/1885), on the self-asserted authority of his own mystical experiences, declared himself the *Mahdī al-muntaẓar* (awaited Mahdī). The deeply religious Sudanese and their mystical organizations, hostile to the dominance of the 'ulamā' in the administration's programme of westernization, enthusiastically supported their newly-found Mahdī, who courageously fought against severe opposition and obtained remarkable success. In 1898 the British general, Kitchener, decisively extinguished the movement. The Mahdī's revolt served to invigorate ideas of *jihād*, and abolished the differences between the various schools of *fiqh*; with a revival of mysticism.

In the nineteenth century the Javanese Prince Diponegoro, who between 1825 and 1839 was constantly involved in a series of desperate wars in an attempt to stem the tide of western colonialism, was ac-

cepted as the *Ratu 'Adil* (just King) or *Mahdī* by an overwhelming proportion of the Muslims of Java. Similar Hindu and Buddhist expectations stirred the whole country and belief in the appearance of saviours became the basis of Indonesian nationalism. The concept of the reappearance of the saviour or *Ratu 'Adil* was an important incentive in the struggle for Indonesian independence led by Sukarno in the fifties. Even now the people of Java and Sumatra patiently await the advent of another *Ratu 'Adil*.¹⁶³

The return (*raj'a*) of the *Mahdī* is the fundamental belief of Shī'ism and its followers patiently await the advent of the Hidden Imām. The Shāhanshāh of Iran is Shī'ī, but the object of his pride is his nation and its 2,500 years of monarchy. His throne inherits the traditional *farr*. It is not, however, absolutism but constitutional monarchy which he, and all other Islamic kings who survive, claim to promote. This signifies a return to the sovereignty of the *umma*, but the enduring wish to return to the form of government of the Rightly Guided Caliphs remains as a utopian dream.

The historical evidence relating to kingship in Islam suggests that the Muslim theorists and their rulers were unable to resolve the contradictions between the early practice of electing a caliph and the later development of hereditary kingship. The election of the first four caliphs was initially confirmed by the *bay'at al-khaṣṣa* (private *bay'a*) and was followed by the *bay'at al-ammā* (public *bay'a*). Under the Umayyad and the 'Abbāsīd caliphs, however, *bay'a* signified merely a confirmation and not an election. The institution of the *bay'a* continued under independent sultāns, but the word "sultān", as understood in Arabic, meant both government and ruler. After the downfall of the 'Abbāsīds, who based their authority on their descent from the Prophet, both theorists and rulers had to fall back upon the ancient Iranian belief that the divine aura that invested the king made obedience to authority obligatory on Muslims, and disobedience, not to mention rebellion, an abominable sin. Both Qur'ānic verses and traditions of the Prophet were quoted to reinforce obedience to the ruler who had managed to seize power. Muslim kings took a keen interest in the ancient theories of kingship of subject races but found their own Perso-Islamic theory of the vicegerency of God and posses-

¹⁶³ J. M. Van der Kroef, "Javanese Messianic Expectations", in *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 1, no. 4 (1959), pp.305-11; Bernhard Dahm, *Sukarno and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence* (Cornell, 1949), pp.2-20.

sion of *farr* equally acceptable to the local inhabitants. As vicegerents of God the rulers were not regarded as the owners of the land, which belonged to the cultivators. The *dihqāns* or *zamīndārs* were not landlords or landowners in the western sense, but local leaders and representatives of the government, collecting taxes on the governments's behalf.

Aspects of the Nature and Functions of Vedic Kingship

James A. Santucci

The institution of kingship in primitive Indo-European societies is wellnigh a universal phenomenon.¹ It is an institution that has been subjected to close scrutiny in a number of historical, political, legal, and religious documents. Evidence of its antiquity is found not only in the ancient literary and religious works of Greece and India but also in the survival of a proto-historic title of "king" that appears as *rēx*² in Latin, *rī* in Old Irish, *rhi* in Welsh, *ri* in Old Breton, *rui* and *ruy* in Cornish, *-rīx* in Gaulish³ and *rāj* (-an)- in Sanskrit.⁵ The existence of this title in those Indo-European societies that are farthest from the Proto Indo-European [PIE] homeland—Ireland, Italy, and India—together with the absence of the title in those lands nearer the homeland—Iran, Greece, Anatolia, and the Balto-Slavic region—would

¹ See O. Schrader, *Reallexikon der Indogermanischen Altertumskunde*, edited by A. Nehring, Volume I (Berlin: Walter De Gruyter and Co., 1917-23), pp.613f.

² Alois Walder and J. B. Hofmann, *Lateinisches Etymologisches Wörterbuch*. Third edition. Volume II (Heidelberg: Carl Winter's Universitätsbuchhandlung, 1938), p.432. For a discussion of the *rēx* see *Paulys Realencyclopädie der Klassischen Altertumswissenschaft*. Zweite Reihe, Erste Halbband [Ra-Ryton] (Stuttgart: J.B. Metzlersche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1914), pp.703f.

³ Alfred Holder, *Alt-Celtische Sprachschatz*. Volume II (Graz, Austria: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt, 1962), p.,1197. For a discussion of the Celtic king see D.A. Binchy, *Celtic and Anglo-Saxon Kingship*. (Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1970).

⁴ Holder, *op.cit.*, II. 1197.

⁵ Also related to *rēx*, *rī*, and *rāj* (-an) are Old High German *rīh*, Anglo-Saxon *rīca*, and Old-Icelandic (*land*-) *reki*. See Holder, II, 1197; Joseph Bosworth, *An Anglo-Saxon Dictionary*, edited and enlarged by T. Northcote Toller (London: Humphrey Milford, 1898), p.794; Julius Pokorny, *Indo-germanisches Etymologisches Wörterbuch* Volume I (Bonn and Munchen: Francke Verlag, 1959); p.856; Alexander Johannesson, *Isländisches Etymologisches Wörterbuch* (Bern: Francke Verlag, 1956), p.718. The Germanic forms are borrowed from Celtic. See J.Vendryes, "Les Correspondances de Vocabulaire entre l'Indo-Iranien et l'Italo-Celtique", *Mémoires de la Société de Linguistique*, vol. XX (1918), p.269.

seem to indicate not only the antiquity of the title but also the conservatism of the societies that have retained it.⁶

It is significant that the reconstructed PIE* *rēǵ-s* and its derivatives (*rēx*, etc.) have been associated with the PIE root **rēǵ*.⁷ This root in turn appears in Sanskrit as *ṛjyate*, *ṛñjate*, etc.; in Greek as *ῥέγιω*; in Latin as *regō*, *regere*; in Old Irish as *rig*; in Gothic as *ut-rakjan* (as causative); in Anglo Saxon as *reccan*; in Old High German as *recchen*; in Lithuanian as *režtis*; and in Lettic as *ruôžītis*.⁸ In all instances the basic meaning seems to be "to outstretch (oneself)"⁹ and/or "movement in a straight line".¹⁰ Upon examination of the derivatives of **rēǵ* we cannot help but be struck by the semantic developments exhibited within them. Among these developments we find the

⁶ Emile Benveniste, *Indo-European Language and Society*. Translated from the French by Elizabeth Palmer (Coral Gables, Florida: University of Miami Press, 1973 [Miami Linguistic Series No. 12]), p.308. Since most, if not all, ancient societies are conservative in nature, we should qualify this passage by stating that the Italic, Celtic, and Indic societies are "extremely" conservative with regard to the retention of institutions and vocabulary that have long disappeared elsewhere [Benveniste, p.308]. The conservatism of archaic and primitive societies has been mentioned by Charles Roberts Aldrich, *The Primitive Mind and Modern Civilization* (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co.Ltd., 1931), pp.143f.; and by Robert Redfield, "The Folk Society" (contained in *Human Nature and the Study of Society: The Papers of Robert Redfield*, edited by Margaret Park Redfield. Volume I [Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962] pp.239 and 241).

⁷ Pokorny, *op.cit.*, pp.854f.; Alois Walde, *Vergleichendes Wörterbuch der Indogermanischen Sprachen*. Edited and revised by Julius Pokorny. Volume II (Berlin and Leipzig: Walter de Gruyter and Co., 1927), pp.362f.; A. Ernout and A. Meillet, *Dictionnaire Étymologique de la Langue Latine*. Third edition, volume II (Paris: Librairie C. Klincksieck, 1951), p.1002.

⁸ For the relation of *rj* and **rēǵ*- see Karl Brugmann and Berthold Delbrück, *Grundriss der Vergleichenden Grammatik der Indogermanischen Sprachen*. Second Edition, Volume II, part 3 (Strassburg: Karl J. Trübner, 1916). p.288 [sect. 207, 2]; Pokorny, *op.cit.*, pp.854f.; Benveniste, *op.cit.*, pp.309-311; Émile Boisacq, *Dictionnaire Étymologique de la Langue Grecque*. Fourth edition (Heidelberg: Carl Winter Universitätsverlag, 1950), p.710; Ernout-Meillet³, p.1002; Sigmund Feist, *Vergleichendes Wörterbuch der Gotischen Sprache*. Third edition (Leiden: E.J. Brill 1939), p. 513; Bosworth, *op. cit.*, p. 788. and Ernst Fraenkel, *Litauisches Etymologisches Wörterbuch*. Volume 2 (Heidelberg: Carl Winter Universitätsverlag, 1965), p. 726.

⁹ See J. Gonda, "Semantisches zu idg. *rēǵ*- "Köing" und zur Wurzel *rēǵ*- (sich ausstrecken", *Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Sprachforschung auf dem Gebiete der Indogermanischen Sprache*, Volume 73 (1956), pp. 151-167.

¹⁰ After Ernout-Meillet³, p. 1002.

following: (1) "to raise up, erect";¹¹ "arrange, put in order";¹² (3) "upright, correct, honest (morally) straight";¹³ (4) "law, order, rule (moral or general sense)";¹⁴ (5) "declare, expound, explain";¹⁵ (6) "to care, aid, support, help; assistance"; "helper";¹⁶ (7) "wealth, prosperity";¹⁷ (8) "powerful, mighty".¹⁸ This list by no means exhausts all the various meanings that fall under this group. Nevertheless they help to reveal the true nature of the PIE *rēg*—.

In recent times two authors have speculated on the nature of the *rēg*—. On the one hand E. Benveniste¹⁹ has drawn attention to the

¹¹ Latin *subrigō*, *arrigō*, *ērigō* (= Irish *ēirgim*: Pokorny, p.855) [Ernout-Meillet (1959), p.568; Walde-Hofmann, op.cit., II.619]; Gothic *rikan* [Feist, op.cit., p.397]; Old Icelandic *rēttir* (adj.) [Jóhannesson, op.cit., p.717].

¹² Avestan *raz- rāzayēiti*, *rāšta* (past participle [Pokorny, p.855; Christian Bartholomae, *Altiranisches Wörterbuch* (Berlin: Walter De Gruyter and Co., 1961), p.1514]); Latin *corrigō* [Cassell's *Latin Dictionary*, revised by J. R. V. Marchant and Joseph A. Charles (N.Y. and London: Funk and Wagnalls Co., n.d.), p.139]; Gothic *ga-raihtjan* [Feist, p.197]; Old High German *ga-rihtan* [Feist, 197; Old Saxon *rekōn* [Pokorny, 856].

¹³ Avestan *ərəvav-* (= Skt. *rjū-*) [Bartholomae, op.cit., pp.351-352]; Latin *regere* [used both in a physical and moral sense in the translation "diriger en droite ligne": Ernout-Meillet³, p.1002] *rectē* (adv.) "in a straight line, rightly", *rectus* "straight, upright" [Cassell's *Latin Dictionary*, pp. 471-472]; Gothic *rahts*; Old Icelandic *rēttir* (adj.), Anglo-Saxon and Middle English *riht* (adj.), Old High German and Old Saxon *reht*, English *right*, and Modern High German *recht* [Pokorny, p.856 and Ernest Klein, *A Comprehensive Etymological Dictionary of the English Language*, volume 2 (Amsterdam: Elsevier Publishing Co., 1967), p.1348].

¹⁴ Avestan *razan*, *rāzan* [Bartholomae, pp.1514 and 1526]; Latin *rēgula* [Ernout-Meillet³, p.1004]; Old Icelandic *rēttir* [Jóhannesson, p.717]; Old French *reule*, *riule*, Middle English *reule*, *riule* 'rule' (from *rēgula*) [Klein, p.1364]; Old Irish *recht*, Welsh *rhaith*, Breton *reiz* [Pokorny, p.856].

¹⁵ Anglo-Saxon *reccan* [Bosworth, p.788], *ge-recenian*, Old High German *recchen*, Modern High German *reken*, English *reckon*, Old Saxon *rekkan* Old Icelandic *rekja* [Pokorny, p.856].

¹⁶ *ṛṇṇāw* "help", *ṛṇṇāw* "helper", *ṛṇṇāw* "aiding", *ṛṇṇāw* "helper, helping" [Gonda, "Sem.zu idg. *rēg*", p.155; Boisacq, p.76; Pokorny, p.857].

¹⁷ Old High German *rihi*, Middle High German *rih(e)*, Modern High German *reich*, Anglo-Saxon *rice* (adj.) "rich", Old Saxon *riki*, Old Frisian *rike* (*rik*). See Pokorny, p.856; Bosworth, p.1346; F.Holthausen, *Altsächsisches Wörterbuch* (Köln and Münster: Böhlau Verlag, 1954), p.60; Karl Freiherr von Richthofen, *Altfrisisches Wörterbuch* (Göttingen: Scientia Aalen, 1961), p.994.

¹⁸ OHG *rihi*, Modern HG *reich*, OS *riki*, OF *rike* (*rik*), AS *rice*, OI *riker* [see previous note for sources].

¹⁹ *Indo-European Language and Society*, pp.311-312.

development of the literal meaning of **reǵ* — as “tending in a straight line, outstretch” to the *moral* sense of “upright, correct, just, honest”. Employing evidence taken from Latin, he has noted that both the literal and moral senses are present in the Latin expression *regere fines* “trace out the limits by straight lines”, referring to a religious act performed prior to the building of a temple or town. This demarcation was intended to determine the sacred territory from the profane or the national territory from the foreign. The tracing of these lines, he asserts, was performed by the *rēx*. To this he adds:

‘Thus in *rēx* we must see not so much the ‘sovereign’ as the one who traces out the line, the way which must be followed, which also represents what is right.... In this way we can give definition to the concept of the Indo-European kingship. The Indo-European *rēx* was much more a religious than a political figure. His mission was not to command, to exercise power but to draw up rules, to determine what was in the proper sense “right” (“straight”). It follows that the *rēx*, as thus defined, was more akin to a priest than a sovereign. It is this type of kingship which was preserved by the Celts and the Italic peoples on the one hand and the Indic on the other.’²⁰

The second author, J. Gonda,²¹ has emphasized the sacral character of the PIE king as a mediator, protector, and the ideal representative of the land and people.²² Relying on Greek evidence: *ῥεῖν* “to help”, *ῥεῖν* “helper”, *ῥεῖν* “help, assist, protect”, and *ῥεῖν* “assisting, protecting; helper (in war and action [law])”²³ as well as Indic, et. al., he has sought to show that the title **rēǵ* referred to a “(mediator) who outstretches himself or his arms (protecting, helping, giving, blessing) and extends his power (majesty, riches) over land and people”.²⁴ Since Gonda derives his views from a far wider range of

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 312.

²¹ “Sem. zu idg. *rēǵ*”, pp. 151f. See also by the same author *Ancient Indian Kingship from the Religious Point of View* (Leiden: E.J.Brill, 1966), especially pp. 6f., 106f., 138f.; and “The Sacred Character of Ancient Indian Kingship”, in *The Sacred Kingship: Contributions to the Central Theme of the VIIIth International Congress for the History of Religions* (Rome, April, 1955). (Leiden: E.J.Brill, 1959), pp. 172-180.

²² “Sem. zu idg. *rēǵ*”, p. 152.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 155 and “The Sacred Character of Ancient Indian Kingship”, p. 180. See note 16.

²⁴ “Sem. zu idg. *rēǵ*”, p. 156. Binchy (*Celtic and Anglo Saxon Kingship*, p. 3) has summarized Gonda’s view (perhaps to an excessively simplistic degree) by stating that the primary meaning of the *rēǵ* is “to stretch forth, extend”, later “protect”, and

evidence it is my opinion that he comes closer to the true nature of the **rēg*/, although Benveniste's emphasis on the development of **rēg*/ to include the moral sense is far too important to ignore. Further examination, in fact, demands this inclusion. There is an ancient verse partially recorded in the first *Epistle* of Horace (1.1.59-60) sung by boys in a game which Bowie²⁵ calls King of the Hill: "You shall be king if you do right" (*Rex eris...si recte facies*).²⁶

Six hundred years later Bishop Isidore of Seville (c.560-636 A.D.) quoted this proverb in his *Etymologiae* (9.3) in a discussion on kings (*reges*) and kingship (*regnum*):

Kingship is called from Kings, Kings from ruling [*Regnum a regibus dictum, reges a regendo*]... Therefore by doing righteously the name of king is retained, by wrong-doing it is lost. Wherefore this was a proverb among the ancients: 'You will be king if you do right; if you do not do right, you will not be king'. [*Rex eris si recte facias: si non facias, non eris.*]²⁷

Bowle remarks that this etymological definition deeply influenced subsequent theories on the subordination of kingship to the Law during Medieval times.²⁸ This is evident in the writings of John of Salisbury (c.111?-1180) in his *Policraticus*,²⁹ Aegidius Romanus (c.1246-1316) in his *De Regimine Principum*,³⁰ Tholommeo of Lucca

ultimately "rule". He then adds that the Irish form *rigid* has both the normal meaning "stretches, extends" as well as the "secondary meaning 'rules', doubtless by way of 'protects' " [p. 4].

²⁵ Smith Palmer Bowie, translator, *The Satires and Epistles of Horace* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959), p.167.

²⁶ Edward P. Morris, editor, *Horace: The Epistles* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1939), p.23. The editor mentions that the Scholiast (note to *Ep.* 111.59-60) records the full verse (but converted to the third person and with the substitution of *qui* for *si*): "*rex erit qui recte faciet, qui non faciet non erit*". The date of the *Epistle* is put at 20 B.C. by Morris (p.15).

²⁷ John Bowle, *Western Political Thought* (London: Methuen and Co., Ltd., 1947 and 1961 under University Paperbacks), p.146 and note 3; Ewart Lewis, *Medieval Political Ideas*. Volume I (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1954), p. 143.

²⁸ Bowle, *op.cit.*, pp.146-147.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 184f.; Lewis, *op.cit.*, I.146. 170-172.

³⁰ Lewis, I. 290-291: "...it should be known that a king or any ruler is a mean between natural and positive law; for no one rules rightly unless he acts as right reason dictates. For reason ought to be the rule of human actions. Therefore, if the name of *rēx* is derived from *regendo*, and it befits a king to rule others and to be a ruler of others, a king must necessarily in ruling others follow right reason and consequently follow natural law, since he rules rightly only in so far as he does not deviate from natural law..."

(c.1236-1326-7) in his continuation of Thomas Aquinas's unfinished *De Regimine Principum*,³¹ William of Occam (c.1290-1350) in his *Dialogues*,³² and especially Henry Bracton (c.1214-1268)³³ who writes in his *De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Anglia*:

Therefore, when he does justice he is the vicar of the Eternal King, but he is the Devil's minister when he falls into injustice. For a king (rex) is so called from ruling (*regendo*) well and not from reigning,³⁴ because when he rules well he is a king, but he is a tyrant when he oppresses with violent domination the people entrusted to him. Therefore, let him temper his power by law, which is the bridle of power, that he may live according to the laws, since a human law has stated that laws bind the lawgiver himself, and elsewhere in the same source, 'It is a saying worthy of the majesty of rulers that the prince profess himself bound by the laws' [Codex 1,14.4.]³⁵

II

The semantic evidence presented heretofore on **reġ*, *rēġ*- and the derivatives contained within the daughter Indo-European languages allows us to gain some insight into the relationship between \sqrt{rj} and *rāj(-an)-* as well as the nature of Vedic kingship.

Whit regard to the relationship of \sqrt{rj} and *rāj(-an)-*, we have noted that \sqrt{rj} (*riyate*) shares with Greek, $\rho\epsilon\gamma\omega$ Latin *regere*, etc. the meanings of "extend, outstretch (oneself); movement in a straight line".³⁶ These meanings carry with them the connotations of "speed, rushing (towards)";³⁷ "drive";³⁸ "release";³⁹ "allow to pass, direct

³¹ *Ibid.*, I. 293f.

³² *Ibid.*, I. 301f.

³³ Bowle, pp.147, 212 (note 1), 213f; George Catlin, *The Story of the Political Philosophers* (N.Y. and London: Whittlesey House, 1939), p.153.

³⁴ "Dicitur enim rex a bene regendo et non a regendo": cited in Bowle p.217.

³⁵ Lewis, I. 283.

³⁶ These senses are found, for example, in *RV* 1.141, 6; 2.1,8; 2.2,5; 4.8,1; and 6.15,1.4.

³⁷ This connotation is employed to define the movement of arrows (*RV* 1.172.2), Soma (6.37,2), Agni (1.58,3; 96,3; 140,2; 5.48,5), and horses (4.38,7,8. and 6.37,3). The relation of \sqrt{rj} to the speed of horses may be compared to the Greek $\rho\epsilon\gamma\epsilon\kappa\alpha\tau\epsilon$ the perfect form of $\rho\epsilon\gamma\omega$, which is described as the "movement of horses which stretch themselves out at full length as they run" [Benveniste, *op.cit.*, p.311]. On the occurrence of this form in the *Iliad* see Georg Autenrieth, *A Homeric Dictionary*, translated by Robert P. Keep (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1958), p.211.

³⁸ *SB* 1.7.1,3 (= 2.5.3,16); 14.2.1,9.

³⁹ *SB* 3.7.2,4.; 4.5.8,11; *TS* 7.5.3,2. ("launch": *anvāryeyur*); *KS* 33.5: 30, 20 (*anvāryeyur* "launch").

through",⁴⁰ "afflict, trouble";⁴¹ "obtain, gain";⁴² "depart, leave";⁴³ "aid, protect";⁴⁴ "subject, conquer";⁴⁵ and "master".⁴⁶ The last three connotations belong to *ni-√rñj*, a verbal compound that appears to serve as a direct link to *rāj(-an)*. Leaving aside the first two senses of *ni-√rñj* (i.e., "aid, conquer"), the semantic development of "extending or stretching downwards" > "mastery over" coincides almost perfectly with the titles **reḡ*- and *rāj(-an)*/, both denoting essentially a "powerful or influential person" > "one who extends his power and influence".

In addition to the semantic development contained within *ni-√rñj* there is found in the R̥gveda the curious form *iraj-yá*—⁴⁷ "to extend over, to have power over". Among the passages in which it appears,⁴⁸ there is one that especially demonstrates the similarity, if

⁴⁰ AB 1.10; 3.42; JB 1.210.

⁴¹ AU 1.2.1 [= AA 2.4.2].

⁴² KS 10.3; 127.11; JUB 1.4.8.

⁴³ AB 2.8.

⁴⁴ RV 4.26.1c: *abām kútsam ārjuneyām ny rñje* "I aid Kutsa Ārjuneya". The translation of *ny rñje* as "aid" is based upon the actions of Indra as recounted in 1.51.6; 4.16.12 ab; and 4.26.2.

⁴⁵ RV 1.143.5d: *yodbō nā sātrūn śa śanā ny rñjate* "he subjects [or "destroys" "hurls down"] forests as a warrior enemies"; 8.90[79], 4ab: *tvām...vrtrā bhūri ny rñjāse* "you [Indra] defeat many enemies".

⁴⁶ RV 1.54, 2cd: *Yó dhr̥ṣṇūnā śāvasā rōdast ubhe/ vṛṣā vṛṣatvā vṛṣabho ny rñjāse*: "(Śakra), the vigorous bull with bull/ (-like) power, who with bold power makes/ him self master (over) both world-halves".

⁴⁷ Renou believes that *iraj-* may be a nominal stem from a secondary root *iraj-*, with the stem *-yá-* being the denominative formation [Louis Renou, *Grammaire de la Langue Védique* (Paris: Edition I.A.C.Lyon, 1952), p.37; *Études Védiques et Paninéennes*, Volume 4 (p.127), 7(p.31), 14 (p.99) (Paris: E. De Boccard, 1958, 1960 and 1965)].

⁴⁸ RV 1.7.9. (= AV 20.70.15); 55.3; 151.6; 6.60.1 (= TS 4.2.11.1); MS 4.10.5; 155.12; KS 4.15.39.18; TB 3.5.7.3; 7.23.2 (= AV 20.12.2); 8.39.10; 40.5 (*prā...irajyata*); 41.9; 46.16; 10.75.2; 140.4 (= SV 1819; TS 4.2.7.2; MS 2.7.14; 95.16-17; KS 16.14; 237.15-16; KKS 25.5; 115.9-10; VS 12.109; ŚB 7.3.1.32). The hapax *irajyá*, occurs in 10.93.3. The *Nighāntu* (2.21) connects *irajyāti* to *pāryate*, *kṣāyati*, and *rājati*: all terms referring to supremacy (*aiśvarya-karmanāb*). See Lakshman Sarup, *The Nighāntu and the Nirukta* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1967), p.15.

not identity, between this form and *rāj* (-an)-. The passage in question is *RV* 1.7.9:

(It is) Indra who alone extends his power over men [agriculturalists?], over riches, over the five tribes [lands?]⁴⁹

The occurrence of the phrase *ēkaś carṣaṇīnām ... irajyāti* in this verse agrees perfectly with Indra being termed a *rājā carṣaṇīnām* in *RV* 1.32, 15:5.39, 4.6, 30.5; 7.27.3; and 8.70 [59], 1.

The forms *niṣṛñj* and *iraj-yā-*, therefore, represent the semantical development "extend" > "extend over (down)" > "extend (power, influence, or oneself) over (down)" [= "master"][: thus agreeing with the sense of *rāj* (-an)- as expressed above.

The relationship of *ṣṛj* and *rāj* (-an)- *ṣṛj*, however, is not limited only to this semantic progression. In some passages where *ṣṛj*⁵⁰ appears as a verb, we find that it possesses the connotation of "speed",⁵¹ thus retaining one of the basic senses of *ṣṛj*. For example, *rāj* in *RV* 6.12.5d is equivalent to *ṛjyate* in *RV* 1.140, 2a.⁵²

III

No discussion of Vedic kingship can be complete without taking into account the Indo-European and Vedic evidence on **reǵ-*, *ṣṛj* and their derivatives. This evidence not only sheds light on the psychology of the people concerned, but also establishes a guide and paradigm for the interpretation of the explicit statements on Vedic kingship. But there is a note of caution. Because of the nature of the

⁴⁹ *yā ēkaś carṣaṇīnām vāsūnām irajyati.*

⁵⁰ *ṣṛj* originated from an old denominative of *rāj*. See William Dwight Whitney, *The Roots, Verb-Forms, and Primary Derivatives of the Sanskrit Language* (New Haven: American Oriental Society, 1945), p.138. This view is shared by Pokorný, *op. cit.*, p.855 and Gonda, "Sem. zu idg. *reǵ-*", pp.164-165.

⁵¹ *RV* 2.43.1; 5.81.2; 6.12.5; 9.96.18.

⁵² *abbī dvijānmā trivīd ānnaṃ ṛjyate* "the twice-born one [Agni] directs himself [stretches out] toward the threefold food". Compare the use of *ṣṛj* in 1.95.7; 4.38.7; and 6.37.3.

Vedic texts (essentially religious and sacrificial) it is impossible to discuss this subject with any degree of particularity. As such we must concede the possibility, and indeed the probability, that Vedic kingship may have differed in varying degrees amongst the Āryan tribes.⁵³ Be it as it may, enough evidence does exist to elucidate the general nature of Vedic kingship.

St. Thomas Aquinas wrote that "a king is given for the sake of the kingdom, and not a kingdom for the king".⁵⁴ This maxim has its equivalent in those passages in Sanskrit literature which proclaim the king to be one who gratifies his subjects.⁵⁵ The king is, therefore, first and foremost a benefactor to his people.⁵⁶ But this role

⁵³ The same holds true for Celtic kingship wherein exists a distinction between Irish and Welsh kingship [Binchy, *op.cit.*, pp.21f. and 24].

⁵⁴ *Rex datur propter regnum, et non regnum propter regem* [Catlin, *op.cit.*, p.264]. The translation is taken from Bowle, *op.cit.*, p.225. This maxim is later quoted in Sir John Fortescue's (c.1394-1484) *De laudibus legum Angliae* [Catlin, p.264 and Bowle, p.225].

⁵⁵ This has been mentioned by Professor Gonda [*Ancient Indian Kingship from the Religious Point of View*, p.13 and notes 99 and 100; "The Etymologies in the Ancient Brāhamaṇas", *Lingua* V (1955-56), p.82]. Three passages in the *Mahābhārata* may be cited in this regard: 12. 34, 32 cd. (*rañjayan prakṛtiḥ sarvāḥ paripāṇi vasuṃdharam*); 12.56, 36 cd (*dharmātmā satyavāk ca 'va rājā rañjayati prajāḥ*); and 13.152, 8 ab (*rañjayasva prajāḥ sarvāḥ prakṛtiḥ parisantvaya*). See Vishnu S. Sukthankar and S. K. Belvalkar, *The Mahābhārata*. Volumes 13 and 17, part 2. (Poona: 1961 and 1966). An additional source may be found in one of Līngayasūrin's explanations on the title *rājan-* in his commentary (*Amarapadavivṛti*) to the *Amarakośa* (2.8.1): *prajā rañjayati 'ti rājā: 'rañja rāge'* [A.A.Ramanathan, editor, *Amarakośa* (Madras: Adyar Library and Research Center, 1971), p.484]. Although popular etymologies are sometimes completely divorced from etymological and semantic reality, they sometimes accurately reveal the nature of the word under discussion. The above explanation of *rājan-* is not etymologically correct, but it does reflect what was believed to be the true nature of the king's function. Compare this statement of *rājan-* with that of the *Crith Gablach* (pp.444f.), an eighth century Irish tract on status, on the *rī* "king": "Rī, why is he so called? Because he rules (*riges*) over his peoples (tuatha) with coercive power?" [Binchy, *op.cit.*, p.4].

⁵⁶ Brugmann [*Grundriss*, II/3, pp.98 and 123] and Wilhelm Schulze [*Kleine Schriften*, edited by Wilhelm Wissmann. Second edition (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1966), p.172, note 3] have noted the connection between *rājati* (*rāsti*) with αἰτῶμαι "help" [Brugmann] And *rājan-* with 'αἰτῶ "helper" [Schulze], the latter basing it on the *rājan*'s duty of being a protector to his people. The relation of the *rāj(-an)*- to the Greek form is strengthened by the use of *nijñj* as "aid" in *RV* 4.26, 1c (see note 44), and especially by the hapax *rājāni* in *RV* 10.49, 4c (*abām bhuvam yā jamānasya rājāni*). According to the context of the hymn, it would appear that *rājāni*

is contingent upon his ability to exercise an influence over the forces of nature, an ability which makes the king a sacral figure.⁵⁷ The belief that he possesses this quality should not be surprising since it is a phenomenon found throughout the world.⁵⁸ It has been stated, quite correctly, that prescientific communities have viewed "man always as part of society, and society as imbedded in nature and dependent upon cosmic forces".⁵⁹ Both nature and society are

would best be translated as "helper" or "guide" (one who extends his influence). Thus the passage is translated as "may I [Indra] be the helper [guide] of the sacrificer". For a discussion of *rājāni* see Louis Ranou, "Infinitifs et Dérivés Nominaux Dans Le Rgveda", *Bulletin de la Société de Linguistique de Paris*, vol. 38 (1937), p.79; Gonda, "Sem. zu idg. *rēj-*", p.166; and Walter Neisser, "Vedica", *Beiträge zur Kunde der Indogermanischen Sprachen*, vol. 20 (1894) pp.39f. Derivatives appearing in other languages that appear to be similar in connotation are Latin *porrigō* "offer to, reach to" [Cassell's Latin Dictionary, p.426]; Anglo-Saxon *reccan* "to hold out to, give" [Bosworth, *An Anglo-Saxon Dictionary*, p.788]; Old High German *ruoh*, *ruohha* "trouble, attention, assistance" [Pokorny, op.cit., p.857]; Middle High German *ruoch* "care, concern" [Gonda, "Sem. zu idg. *rēj-*", p. 166]; *ruochlōs*, Anglo-Saxon *rēcelēas* = Modern High German *rochlōs*, English *reckless* "thoughtless, careless" [Pokorny, p.857]; Old Icelandic *rékja* "carefulness"; and *rēkr* "attentive" [Pokorny p.857].

⁵⁷ For a general discussion of the implications of the "sacred" see Mircea Eliade, *The Sacred and the Profane*. Translated from the French by William R. Trask (New York; Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1959); and Rudolf Otto, *The Idea of the Holy*, translated from the German by John W. Harvey (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1959). Eliade (p.12) writes the following on the sacred: "The man of the archaic societies tends to live as much as possible in the sacred or in close proximity to consecrated objects. The tendency is perfectly understandable, because, for primitives as for the man of all pre-modern societies, the *sacred* is equivalent to a *power*, and in the last analysis, to reality. The sacred is saturated with being. Sacred power means reality and at the same time enduringness and efficacy". To this I might add the statement of Robert Redfield [*Human Nature and the Study of Society: The Papers of Robert Redfield*. I. 245]: "...the congruence of all parts of conventional behavior and social institutions with each other contributes to the sense of rightness which the member of the folk society feels to inhere in his traditional ways of action... the ways of life are folkways; furthermore, the folkways tend to be also mores - ways of doing or thinking to which attach notions of moral worth. The value of every traditional act or object or institution is, thus, something which the members of the society are not disposed to call into question... This characteristic of the folk society may be briefly referred to by saying that it is a sacred society".

⁵⁸ An account of the sacrality of kingship is to be found in *The Sacral Kingship* (see note 21).

⁵⁹ Henri Frankfort, et. al., *Before Philosophy* (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1949), p.12.

considered to be governed by a force which might be best translated as "order", denoted by the terms *ṛtā*—⁶⁰ and *dhārma*—⁶¹ in the Vedic texts. As the mediator between the forces of nature and society it is the king's general responsibility to maintain and promote this Order. If he is successful then the blessings of peace, living space, material wealth, long life, descendants, and economically important animals such as cattle and horses are enjoyed by the community. If he is not successful, Order reverts to Chaos, and with it, privation and death.⁶² This failure often led to the expulsion (expressed by the verbal compounds *apa-√rudh*⁶³ and *ava-√rudh*) of the king by his subjects. This is confirmed by a number of passages which reveal either the wish of the subjects (*viś*—) to overpower their king,⁶⁴ or the desire of an expelled king to regain his former position.⁶⁵

The maintenance and preservation of Order for the purpose of assuring those qualities conducive to a good life for the community is illustrated by JB 3.231:

thus the *dhārma*— is prosperity [majesty]. *dhārma*— is the ability to exercise the function of a king, and by means of *dhārma*— the king is (the same as) law. He becomes the *dhārma*— among his kin.⁶⁶

⁶⁰ For a discussion of *ṛtā*— see Heinrich Lüders, *Varuṇa*, volume II (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1959); P. V. Kane, *History of Dharmasāstra*, volume IV (Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1953), pp.2-5; Louis Renou, *Études Védiques et Paninées*, volume I (Paris: 1955), pp.21-22; Herman Lommel, *Die Religion Zarathustras* (Tübingen: Verlag von J.C.B. Mohr, 1930), pp.40, 262f., 267f.

⁶¹ For a summary of the various views on dharma— see Bhasker Anand Saleatore, *Ancient Indian Political Thought and Institutions* (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1963), pp. 11f. Paul Younger [*Introduction to Indian Religious Thought* (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1972), pp.34f.] offers a good presentation on this term.

⁶² See G. van der Leeuw, *Religion in Essence and Manifestation*, Volume II. Translated from German by J. E. Turner (N.Y. and Evanston: Harper and Row, 1963), pp.578-580. Frankfort, *Before Philosophy*, pp.18-19, 59-70, 182-199; Henri Frankfort, *Ancient Egyptian Religion* (N.Y. Harper and Row, 1948), 50-58, 131-135; Eliade, *The Sacred and the Profane*, pp.29-32, 116f.

⁶³ On a discussion of *apa-rudh* see Saleatore, *op.cit.*, pp.131f. with note 273 (p.605).

⁶⁴ MS 2.1.8; 10.7-11; KS 10.11: 139, 10-15; MŚS 5.1.6, 44-46.

⁶⁵ MS 2.2.1: 14, 8-15; 2.2.9: 22.10-12; TS 2.3.1.; PB 2.10.4; 911.9; SB 12.9.3, 1-4; JB 1.137. See Wilhelm Rau, *Staat und Gesellschaft in Alten Indien* (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1957), p.129 and note 7.

⁶⁶ *tac chrī vai dharmo, rājyam vai dharmo, dharmena vai rājā dharmo, dharmo svānām bhavati.* Compare VS 20. 9ef [= KS 38.4: 105.14; TB 2.6.2.6; MS 3.11.8:

The association of the king, Order, and prosperity can best be described by recognition of the fact that the king is identified with those gods who possess the essential characteristics of kingship (i.e., victoriousness in battle and protection of the Order):⁶⁷ Indra and Varuṇa. Despite the controversy surrounding *RV* 4.42 involving the intent and purpose of the hymn, it is most likely that Lommel⁶⁸ and Brown⁶⁹ are correct in asserting that King Trasadasyu is the speaker in vs. 3a,⁷⁰ thus establishing the identification of this earthly king with the divine kings mentioned above. Lommel, following von Schroeder, argues that the author of this hymn is Vāmadeva who composed it for his king to recite sometime during the Rājasūya, or some other similar consecration ceremony such as the Mahābhīṣeka.⁷¹

152,11; *dhīro* is substituted for *dhārmo* in *MS*]; *jāṅghabhyam padbhyāṃ dhārmo 'smi, viśī rāja prāṇiṣṭitah*. With [my] two legs, with [my] two feet, I am *dhārma-*, the *rājan-* established over the subjects'. See also Rau, *op. cit.*, p. 95.

⁶⁷ Herman Lommel, "Vedische Skizzen", *Beiträge zur Indischen Philologie und Altertumskunde* [Walther Schubring Festschrift] (Hamburg: Cram, De Gruyter and Co., 1951), p.33.

⁶⁸ "Vedische Skizzen", pp.25-38.

⁶⁹ W. Norman Brown, "King Trasadasyu as a Divine Incarnation: A Note on *Rgveda* 4.42", in *Dr C. Kunhan Raja Presentation Volume* (Madras: The Adyar Library, 1946), pp.38-43.

⁷⁰ *abām indro vārunah*... 'I [am] Indra [I am] Varuṇa'. The view that Trasadasyu is the speaker is also conceded by Bernfried Schlerath [Das Königtum im Rig- und Atharvaveda (Wiesbaden: Deutsche Morgenländische Gesellschaft, 1960), p.42] and Vishwanath Prasad Varma [*Studies in Hindu Political Thought and its Metaphysical Foundations* (Bararas: Motilal Banarsidass, 1956), p. 184]. U.N. Ghoshal [*A History of Indian Political Ideas* (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), p.36, note 1] quotes a passage from N. C. Sengupta [*Evolution of Ancient Indian Law* (Calcutta, 1953), pp.37-38] which asserts that Trasadasyu is indeed both Indra and Varuṇa but only during the sacrifice ["...while initiated for the sacrifice becomes imbued with divine attributes, not that he is always so"]. Ghoshal disagrees with this qualification because it "reads into the Rigvedic text the developed dogmatic notion of the omnipotence of the sacrifice in the late Vedic period".

On Trasadasyu see A.A. Macdonell and A.B. Keith, *Vedic Index of Names and Subjects*, Volume I (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1958), pp.327-328.

⁷¹ "Vedische Skizzen", pp.34 and 36. This view originates in von Schroeder's *Mysterium und Mimus*, p.224 according to Lommel.

The identification of Trasadasyu with Indra is due to the latter's embodiment of an extremely important characteristic and quality of kingship: victoriousness in battle. This is quite obvious from verses 5 and 7 and from the fact that Trasadasyu, as Indra, shares one of the more common epithets of the god — *vṛtrahān* — (vs.9).

The significance of this quality of kingship is brought to light by the well-known Indra-Vṛtra myth, the most complete statement of which appears in *RV* 1.32.⁷² There can be no doubt that the conflict between these two is a form of creation myth.⁷³ Thus we find that subsequent to the slaying of Vṛtra ("Obstructor")-- the personification of Chaos⁷⁴ and those qualities associated with it (i.e., death, destruction, privation)— comes the engendering of the sun, heaven, dawn,⁷⁵ the establishment of the earth,⁷⁶ the expansion of the earth,⁷⁷ and the propping of heaven and the mid-region.⁷⁸

These actions, as well as the releasing of the waters,⁷⁹ are all extremely beneficial to man. Since man (i.e., Indra's followers) shares

⁷² This hymn has recently been translated and discussed at length by Peter Kwella, *Flussüberschreitung im Rigveda: RV III, 33 und Verwandtes* (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1973), pp. 55-101.

⁷³ Compare also Heinrich Lüders, *Varuṇa*, volume I (Göttingen, 1951), pp.183-198; and Kwella, *op. cit.*, pp.70f. The association or identity of creation with Order has been discussed by A.L.J.Wensinck [in *Acta Orientalia*, I (1932), p.174; quoted in Henri Frankfort, *Kingship and the Gods* (Chicago: University Press, 1948), p.150]. "Creation does not necessarily mean the bringing forth of something out of nothing; to the eastern mind it contains the idea of regulation, of cosmos. To a large extent the material is there already and the act of creation consists in forming the chaotic material into a living organism..." Thus "creation" is actually a transformation of chaos into cosmos. See Mircea, Eliade, *Cosmos and History* (N.Y.:Harper Torchbooks, 1959), p. 11.

⁷⁴ See Eliade, *Cosmos and History*, pp.19-20.

⁷⁵ *RV* I.32, 4c and 6.30, 5d; *sūryam janāyan dyām usāsam*. Compare 6.72, 2 ab.

⁷⁶ *RV* 1.103, 2a; *sā dhārayat pṛthivīm paprāthac ca*; 2.17.5c: *ādharayat pṛthivīm viśvādhāyasam*.

⁷⁷ *RV* 1.103, 2a; 6.17, 7a: *paprātha kṣām māhi dāmso vy uṛvīm*; 8.89 [78], 5c: *tāt pṛthivīm aprathayas*, 6.72, 2d: *āprathatam pṛthivīm mātarām vi*.

⁷⁸ 2.17, 5d: *āstabhnān māyāyā dyām avastāsab*; 3.30, 9c: *āstabhnād dyām vṛṣabhō antāriksam*; 6.17, 7b: *ūpa dyām rṣvō bṛhād indra stabbhāyay*; 6.72, 2c: *ūpa dyām skambhātū skāmbhanena*; 8.89 [78], 5d: *tād astabhna utā dyām*.

⁷⁹ The obstruction of the waters and their release by Indra is mentioned at 1.32, 1 and 8; 52, 2 and 6; 121, 11; 2.11, 2 and 9; 14, 2; 19, 2; 3.32, 6 and 11; 4.17, 1 and 7; 6.17, 12; 72, 3; 7.21, 3; and 10.111, 9.

so completely in these events, it is not difficult to understand the participation of his worshippers in it.⁸⁰ Thus the quickening power of the soma juice⁸¹ as well as the offering of praises,⁸² both intended to increase and strengthen the god, are offered to him by them. But participation in the cosmic event is far more involved than this. Just as there is a coalescence of nature and society, so too is there believed to be a coalescence of time and space on the part of pre-scientific man.⁸³ Both time and space are considered "qualitative and concrete, not quantitative and abstract".⁸⁴ Thus the belief that a ritual or sacrificial event is equivalent to the cosmic event is established. Frankfort has written that this

deliberate coordination of cosmic and social events shows most clearly that time to early man did not mean a neutral and abstract frame of reference but rather a succession of recurring phases, each charged with a particular value and significance.⁸⁵

Although there can never exist a plain and simple answer as to why men go to war,⁸⁶ it is fairly certain that they give meaning to any conflict by considering it to be a re-enactment of the cosmic event.⁸⁷ In the case of the Indians it is the Indra-Vṛtra conflict that serves as the archetype for such warring activities. Consequently, Kwella is quite justified in stating that *RV* 1.32 "probably belonged to a ritual performed prior to war".⁸⁸ If warfare is considered a sacred activity because of its being assimilated to a mythical, archetypal event, so too must all the participants. The association of the event and the participants takes place primarily in sacrificial performance, for it is in the sacrificial

⁸⁰ Compare Frankfort, *Before Philosophy*, p. 34.

⁸¹ Those passages in which Indra is invited to the sacrifice in order to drink the soma juice appear in 3.36,2; 46,1-5; 47,1; 6.20,1-13; 37,1-2; 10.167,1-2.

⁸² See 1.5,8; 2.11,2; 13,5.

⁸³ Frankfort, *Before Philosophy*, pp. 12f., 30f., 32f.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

⁸⁶ A discussion of the various motives that induce prescientific men to war are discussed by Harry Holbert Turney-High in his *Primitive War: Its Practice and Concepts* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1949), pp. 141f.

⁸⁷ Compare Eliade's statements in his *Cosmos and History*, pp. 5, 21-22, 27-29, 34-36, 76-78.

⁸⁸ Kwella, *op. cit.*, p. 131.

site where the cosmos and society converge.⁸⁹ Thus in the Rājasūya, for instance, the sacrificer is addressed by the Adhvaryu as Indra. This identification comes about precisely because the sacrificer is both a sacrificer and warrior.⁹⁰ In another sacrifice, the Aśvamedha, the wish is expressed that the king, presumably equated with Indra, may vanquish Vṛtra following the offering of the sacrificial horse.⁹¹

The warriors or members of the second class (*rājanyā*—⁹²) are often associated with the god. One text refers to the belief that since Indra killed Vṛtra in the summer season, the *rājanyā*— should do likewise if he desires to become successful or prosperous.⁹³ And in a myth⁹⁴ explaining the origin of the Vājapeya it is said that because Indra first performed it, so too should the *rājanyā*—, since he is Indra's earthly counterpart.⁹⁵ We find further that if a *rājanyā*— should offer the Vājapeya, then the sacrifice should be known as an Indrasava "the vivification of Indra".⁹⁶

The enemies of the king also take part in the sacred sphere. But unlike the king and his warriors, who represent Indra and his creative

⁸⁹ See Silvain Lévi, *La Doctrine du sacrifice dans les Brahmanas*, Second edition (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1966), p. 82.

⁹⁰ *indro vai yajamāno dvayena vā 'śa indro bhavati yac ca kṣatriyo yad u ca yajamānas* [SB 5.3.5.27]. This statement is made after the Adhvaryu addresses the bow as Indra's Vṛtra-killer [*indrasya vṛtragbham asi*].

⁹¹ TB 3.8.5.1: *anēnā 'svēna mēdhyene 'stva, ayam rājā vṛtrām vadhyād*. We find also in the Ratnin offerings to Indra Sutrāman and Indra Amhomuc this statement: "May this our king (and) slayer of Vṛtra, having become king, slay Vṛtra" (*ayām no rājā vṛtrabā rājā bhūsvā vṛtrām vadhyāt*).

⁹² Liṅgasūrin to *Āmarakośa* 2.8,1 (p. 484): *rājñāḥ kṣatriyasyā 'patyaṃ pumān rājany* D.D. Kosambi [*Ancient India* (N. Y.: Pantheon Books, 1965) p. 88] adds that the "word *rājanya*, 'fit to rule' is used equally for 'prince', 'king' or kshatriya in general".

⁹³ MS 1.6,9: 100,5: *grīṣme vā indro vṛtrām aban. vṛtrām khalū vai rāja3nyō bubhū-ṣan jighāṃsati*.

⁹⁴ KS 14.5: 204,6f.; MS 1.11,5; 166,7f.; TB 1.3.2.1-2; ŚB 5.1.1,1f.

⁹⁵ KS 14.5: 204,10; MS 1.11,5; 166,11-12; TB 1.3.2,3; ŚB 5.1.1,11. The ŚB (5.1.1,11) adds that because Indra performed the Vājapeya, it belongs to the *rājanyā* for Indra is equated with *kṣatrā*—, i.e., 'the ability to exercise ruling power', as is also the *rājanyā*— (*aśho rājanyasya yad enene 'indro 'yajata kṣatram bī 'ndrah kṣatram rājanyab*). The association of *kṣatrā* with the *rājanyā*— also occurs in SB 13.1.5,3; 4.4,1; 6.2,10; TB 3.9,14,2; AB 7.31; 8.6. and 8.

⁹⁶ MS 3.4,3: 47,11: *yādi rāja3nyō yājete, 'ndrasovō hy ēṣa*.

activity, the enemy represents an element of chaos; and, since they are embodiments of Vṛtra⁹⁷ they are therefore quite appropriately called Vṛtras.⁹⁸

War as a sacred activity is also revealed in passages expressing the belief that Indra himself participates in this activity on behalf of his worshippers. Thus he is often invoked to give aid to the Aryan warriors in battles against their enemies,⁹⁹ and indeed even intervenes directly to aid human kings in such examples as the famous battle of the ten kings, where he aids Sudās against his foes,¹⁰⁰ or that of Kṣātra, the son of Pratardana.¹⁰¹

The outcome of any conflict is, of course, victory. But the methods of obtaining a victory are basically sacrificial, since war is, as stated above, a repetition and reenactment of the archetypal Indra-Vṛtra battle. Thus in order to ensure victory, the king offered the Caturhotṛ just prior to the commencement of battle, for it is said that by means of this performance the gods engendered Indra, and whatever side possesses him as their ally wins the battle.¹⁰² Furthermore, in the *AV* there are a number of hymns devoted to the guaranteeing of a victory.¹⁰³

The significance of victory must reflect the nature of warfare. Just as the latter is sacred so likewise is the victory. This is not to say that the material results of such an accomplishment are to be ignored; they are, rather, placed in the sacral context reflecting the king's role as mediator and source of prosperity for his people. This is especially evident in the chariot drive occurring in the Rājāsūya and the chariot

⁹⁷ A.M. Hocart [*Kingship* (London: Oxford University Press, 1927), p. 30] writes: "Just as the gods are impersonated by the king, so the demons have their human representatives... An easy way of routing the demons is thus to destroy their human representatives, a sure and visible way, not left largely to conjecture like ceremonial success."

⁹⁸ See *RV* 1.4.8; 8.2; 3.30.22; 4.17.19; 22.9; 41.2; *TS* 2.4.13.1; etc.

⁹⁹ 5.35.1.5; 6.19.13; 25.2.9; 33, 1-3; etc. See also A.A. Macdonell, *The Vedic Mythology* (Varanasi: Indological Book House, 1963), p. 62.

¹⁰⁰ *RV* 7.33.3 and 5. See also Edward Washburn Hopkins, "Problematic Passages in the Rīg-Veda", *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, vol. 15 (1891), pp. 259f.

¹⁰¹ *JB* 3. 245-248 and compare *RV* 1.53, 9-10.

¹⁰² *KS* 9.14: 116, 6-8: *caturhotṛā yajayed rājānam saṃgrāme saṃyatte caturhotṛā vai devā indram aṇayan. yatareṣām indro bhavati te saṃgrāmam jayanti, 'ndram, evā smai janayanti.*

¹⁰³ *AV* 3.1; 2; 6.97-99; 11.9; etc.

race in the Vājapeya. In the Rājasūya the sacrificer mimics a raid on a herd of at least one hundred cows of a kinsman for booty.¹⁰⁴ During the giving of the sacrificial gifts (*dakṣiṇās*) the sacrificer gives one-third to the priests, one-third to those who take part in the Daśapeya, and one-third back to his kinsmen.¹⁰⁵ This raid reflects the actual winning of booty in battle which the king later distributed to the priests.¹⁰⁶

In the Vājapeya, a race is conducted involving seventeen chariots,¹⁰⁷ the victor being the sacrificer, who is equated to or represents Indra, if he is a *rājanyā*.¹⁰⁸ The purpose of the race is to win *vāja*,¹⁰⁹ a term that can be rendered as "wealth" and "booty", but pertains essentially to the generative power manifesting itself in vegetation, animals, and men.¹¹⁰ This fact, together with the association of the sacrificer with Indra, as well as the mutual natures of both the race and battle, suggest a "ritual re-enactment" of Indra's exploits.¹¹¹ Indra, for instance, is asked to come to his worshippers in the battle as charioteer of nourishment [*iṣo rathīb*] to bestow *vāja*—on them.¹¹² But especially significant is the passage found in *RV* 8.54 (*Vāl.* 6) 6ab:

O Lord of the race, O Lord of men, you indeed give us a share in *vāja*—, you of excellent mental-power.¹¹³

^{104.} *ŚB* 5.4.3, 1, 8-11.

¹⁰⁵ *Lāṭyāyana Śrauta Sūtra*, 9.1.14-22 [edited by A. Vedāntavāgīśa (Calcutta: Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1872)] *ŚB* 5.4.3, 12 instructs the sacrificer to return just as many cows to his kinsman.

¹⁰⁶ 6.47, 22-25 and 7.18, 24. See also Johannes C. Heesterman, "Reflections on the Significance of the Dakṣiṇā", *Indo-Iranian Journal*, vol. 3 (1959), pp. 241, 249-50.

^{107.} See Albrecht Weber, "Über den vājapeya", *Sitzungsberichte der Königlich Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin*, vol. XXXIX (1892), p. 767.

^{108.} *ŚB* 5.1.5, 9: *atha yadi rājanyo yajate: indra vājam jaye 'ndrāya vācam vadate 'ndraṃ vājam jāpayate 'ti kṣatram hī 'ndraḥ kṣatram rājanyah*. See note 90.

^{109.} *VS* 9.9; 11-12; 17-18 [dhāna-].

^{110.} See J. Gonda, *Aspects of Early Viṣṇuism* (Utrecht: M.V.A. Oosthoek's Uitgevers Mij., 1954), p. 48; Johannes C. Heesterman, *The Ancient Indian Royal Consecration* (S'Gravenhage: Mouton and Co., 1957), p. 133.

^{111.} *RV* 3.30, 11. Compare 5.36, 5 and see Heesterman, "Reflections on the Significance of the Dakṣiṇās", p. 250.

^{112.} *RV* 3.51, 2c; 4.17, 8c: *sāmitā vājam; 9c: ayām vājam bharati yām sanōti*.

^{113.} *ājipate nṛpate tvām id dhīno / vāja a vakṣi sukrato*. The reading of *ā bhakṣi* in the

Ajī— ‘race, contest, battle’, which occurs in the compound *ājapate* in pāda a, is the same term used to indicate the chariot race in the Vājapeya.¹¹⁴ What is evident then, is a mergence of the concepts of the battle and the race as well as the re-enactment of Indra’s conquest of *vāja*— on the part of the sacrificer. It is clear that both the chariot drive and race are means of awakening *vāja*—, the significance of which is related elsewhere in the Vājapeya, when the king is made to sit on the throne (*āsandī*—)¹¹⁵ to be firm and supporting for ploughing (*kr̥syāi*), for security (*kṣemāya*), for wealth (*rayyāi*) and for prosperity (*pōṣāya*).¹¹⁶

There is, finally, one result of victory in battle that brings it into conjunction with the outcome in Indra’s victory as a creative activity,¹¹⁷ and that is the extension of control over land by the king. Just as Indra extended the earth following Vṛtra’s defeat,¹¹⁸ so too does the king extend the earth that comes under his influence following the defeat of his enemies.¹¹⁹ The economic significance of this action is clear

Khila text [3.6,6a] would seem to make better sense. See Isidor Scheftelowitz, *Die Apokryphen des Ṛgveda* (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1966), p. 93.

¹¹⁴ TB 1.3.6.5: *yā ājīṃ dhāvanti*.

¹¹⁵ ŚB 5.2.1,22.

¹¹⁶ VS 9.22; ŚB 5.2.1.25. It is significant, too, that the chariot is identified with the *vāja*- (TB 1.3.6,1; ŚB 5.1.4,3) or “thunderbolt”, an “instrument used by Indra to generate the powers of life and nourishment” [Gonda, *Aspects of Early Vismuism*, p. 52]. Both *vāja* and *vāja*-, incidentally, are derived from the same root (*vaj*).

¹¹⁷ Henri Frankfort [*Kingship and the Gods*, p. 9] has remarked that victory “is not merely assertion of power, it is the reduction of chaos to order”. Closely allied to this idea is the statement of Eliade [*Cosmos and History*, p. 10]: “Settlement in a new, unknown, uncultivated country is equivalent to an act of Creation... a territorial conquest does not become real until after - more precisely, through - the ritual of taking possession, which is only a copy of the primordial act of the Creation of the World.”

¹¹⁸ See note 77. In RV 1.36, 8ab, it is said that the Fathers, upon slaying Vṛtra, crossed the two worlds and the waters and made for themselves a wide space for dwelling (*ghnānto vṛtrām ataran rōdasi apā urū kṣāyāya cakrire*). Compare 1.63,7 and 4.21, 10ab; the latter stating: “Indra is indeed a true *samrāj*- [king of all; ‘Cosmocrator’] of wealth the slayer of Vṛtra; you should make a wide space for Pūru’ [*evā vāsva īndrah satyāḥ sam-rāḍ dhāntā vṛtrām vāriṣaḥ pūrāve kaḥ*].

¹¹⁹ RV 1.112,22; AV 8.8,24; TB 1.7,3,8; 8.4,1-2; Rau, *Staat und Gesellschaft*, pp. 15-16; Gonda, *Ancient Indian Kingship*, pp. 100-105; “Sem. zu idg. *rēg*-”, pp. 154-155.

because the Aryans were primarily a pastoral people requiring relatively large tracts of land for grazing. In addition to this they were agriculturalists who very likely tilled the soil in an inefficient manner.¹²⁰ The importance of land for pasturage is very evident in RV 6.47, 20ab:

O gods, we have come to a land without pasturage. The earth, being wide, has become distressing.¹²¹

In conclusion the texts reveal that in warfare, one of the most important functions of the king, there is a close association between Indra's feat of destroying Vṛtra and the king's feat of conquering his enemies. Also significant is the mention of the importance of kingship for these actions. In TB 1.5.9.1 there is a myth that tells of the gods' request to Prajāpati to send to them his eldest son Indra to be their leader in their war with the Asuras. The reason for this request is stated in the same passage: there can be no battle without a king [*nā 'rājākasya yuddhām asti*].¹²² Not only is a king required for battle, one is also needed for victory. In a myth resembling the one occurring in the TB, the gods, contending with the Asuras, are made to say: "Through lack of a king they conquer us; let us make a king."¹²³

The results of the victory are, of course, extremely beneficial to man. Indeed, just as Indra is the source of all terrestrial, atmospheric, and heavenly wealth,¹²⁴ so too is the human king the source of all material wealth for man. Thus in the Aśvamedha the wish is expressed that the king will be beneficial to his subjects, so that they may have

¹²⁰ D.D. Kosambi, *An Introduction to the Study of Indian History* (Bombay: Popular Book Depot, 1956), pp. 106f.; *Ancient India*, pp. 85f.; E.J. Rapson, editor, *The Cambridge History of India*, Volume I (Delhi: S.Chand and Co., 1962), pp. 88f., 121f.; J. Gonda, "The Vedic Concept of *Aṃhas*", *Indo-Iranian Journal*, vol. I (1957), pp. 33f., especially p. 35; and *Loka: World and Heaven in the Veda* (Amsterdam: N.V. Noord-Hollandsche Uitgevers Maatschappij, 1966), pp. 15-24.

¹²¹ *agavyūṣī kṣētram āganma devā/urvi satī bhūmir ambūraṇābhūt*. Compare RV 3.62, 16; 7.62, 5; 65, 4; 77, 4; 8.5, 6-9; 78, 5.

¹²² Indra is also chosen by the gods and / or both worlds to slay Vṛtra in RV 4.19, 1-2, and 8.12, 22 ab. Compare 2.20, 8; 6.20, 2; 25, 8.

¹²³ AB 1.14: *arājatayā vai no jayanti; rājānaṃ karavāmahā iti*. The passage adds that the gods made Soma their king and thereby conquered the Asuras in all directions (*te somam rājānam akurvams te somena rājā sarvā dīśo jayann*).

¹²⁴ RV 7.32, 16.

many cows, horses, goats, sheep, rice, barley, beans, sesamum, gold, elephants, slaves, men, riches, and prosperity,¹²⁵ a statement made following the hope that the king, as Indra, would slay Vṛtra.¹²⁶ This would seem to conform with the statement contained in *JB* 3.231 quoted above.

The association of the king with the god Varuṇa lies in the latter's chief function of being maintainer of Order. This is apparent from the god's —sometimes conjoined with Mitra and Aryaman— close association with *ṛtā*.¹²⁷ Varuṇa, besides being a maintainer of *ṛtā*— is also a guardian of the fixed rules of conduct or ordinances (*vrata*).¹²⁸ He is, in conjunction with the latter, described as observing the truths and falsehoods of men,¹²⁹ seizing and punishing the miscreants¹³⁰ and protecting the righteous.¹³¹

It is in the sacrificial context that we find a definite relationship between Varuṇa and Order on the one hand, and the human king on

¹²⁵ *TB* 3.8.5.2-3: *aṇēnā 'śvena mēdhyene 'stvā/ajām rājā 'syai viśāḥ bahugyāi, / bahvaśvāyāi, bahvajāvīkāyāi, bahuvṛthi- /yavāyāi, bahumāṣatīlāyāi, bahuhiranyāyāi, / bahuhasṭīkāyāi, bahudāsapurujāyāi, rayimātyāi, /pūstimatyāi, bahurūyasposayāi rājā 'stv itī.*

¹²⁶ *TB* 3.8.5.1. See note 91.

¹²⁷ Mitra and Varuṇa are called protectors or shepherds of *ṛtā*— in 7.64,2a [*rājānā maha ṛtasya golpā*], as well as the Ādityas in 6.51,3. In 7.66, 13ab Mitra, Varuṇa, and Aryaman are called the "possessors of *ṛtā*—, born from *ṛtā*—, strengthened by *ṛtā*—, fear-some, and haters of falsehood or disorder" [*rāvāna rājānā rāvārdho ghorāso anṛtadvīṣaḥ*]. See also 1.23,5; 2.27,12; 5.63,7; 65.2; 7.64,2; 65,3; 8.25.4,7,8; and 7.40,4a; *ajām hi netā vāruṇa ṛtasya*. Gonda [*The Vedic God Mitra* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1972) p. 2] adds: "Varuṇa as well as Mitra-Varuṇa are credited with omniscience in human affairs; he is and they are vested with the authority of universal kingship guarding the *ṛtā*—."

¹²⁸ *RV* 7.83,9ab: "one [Indra] kills the Vṛtras in conflicts (while) the other [Varuṇa] constantly guards the rules of conduct." (*vrtrāny anyāḥ samitḥṣu jighnate vratrāny anyo abhi rakṣate sadā*). The term *vrata*— is discussed by Gonda [*Vedic God Mitra*, pp. 9-10]. See also P.V. Kane, "The Word *Vrata* in the *Rgveda*", *Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, Vol. 29. (1954) pp. 1-28; and Hanns-Peter Schmidt, *Vedisch vrata und awestisch urvata* (Hamburg: Cram, De Gruyter and Co., 1958). The epithet *dhṛtāvṛata*— is a popular epithet of Varuṇa's. See 1.25,8 and 10;44,14; 141,9; 2.1,4; 1.15,6 [Mitra and Varuṇa]; etc.

¹²⁹ *RV* 7.49,3; compare 10.124,5.

¹³⁰ *RV* 2.28,9; 7.65,3; *AV* 16.8,26.

¹³¹ *RV* 2.28,10. Varuṇa is often requested to free the worshipper(s) from distress. See *RV* 1.24,12-14; 7.86,5; *AV* 7.83(88), 2-3; 18.4,70; and 19.44,8 and 9.

the other. During the Devasū offerings of the Rājasūya, for instance, the king is made a lord of Order (*dhārmasya pātīḥ*) by Varuṇa himself following the offering of a pap of barley to Varuṇa Dharmapati.¹³² The identification of the king, Varuṇa, and *dhārma*—arises following the king's enthronement when the priest (touching him on the chest) recites the following verse [*RV* 1.25, 10: = *VS* 10.27]:

Varuṇa, the one who has maintained the fixed rule of conduct, sat down in the waters to exercise his authority as a ruler of all, the one possessing excellent resourcefulness.¹³³

In *SB* 5.4.4,5 the epithet *dhrtāvṛata*—(in pāda a) is transferred to the king because he should speak and do only what is right.¹³⁴ It is in this context that we can conclude that the king is a dispenser of justice because he is an image of—or, to put it more appropriately, he is—Varuṇa himself. As such the king wields the rod (*daṇḍā*) of punishment though he himself is exempt from punishment (*adaṇḍyā*).¹³⁵ This judicial function of the Vedic king would seem to have commonality with that of the Homeric king, who, in all probability, was a judge¹³⁶ as well. Thus the 'law' or Themis (θεμῖς), which has divine origin, is under the prerogative of the king (βασιλεύς).¹³⁷ Sinclair writes that:

either a god or king was capable of θεμιότευε laying down what is θεμιός, pronouncing θεμιότες [i.e., decrees or conventions]. Only while holding a staff or sceptre could a king so pronounce, for the σκηπτρόν conferred the divine authority.¹³⁸

¹³² *SB* 5.3.3,9. See Rau, *Staat und Gesellschaft*, p. 95. Compare *SB* 14.4.2,26 (= *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 1.4,14).

¹³³ *nó sasāda dhrtāvṛato vāruṇo paśtyāsu ā sāmrajaṇyā sukrātuh*. This verse is also recited in the Mahābhīṣeka of Indra (*AB* 8.13) and the king (8.18). Therein, Indra (in the former) and the king (in the latter) are called guardians of Order (*dharmasya gopā*) by the gods and "king-makers" (*rājakartārah*) respectively. (8.12 and 17). In the Aśva-medha ceremony the king is looked upon as an incarnation of Dharma (*TB* 3.9.16,2: *dhārmo vā ādhipatīḥ*). See Rau, p. 95 and Schlerath, *op. cit.*, p. 106.

¹³⁴ *SB* 5.4.4,5: *dhrtavṛato vai rājā... yad eva sādhu vaded yat sādhu kuryāt...* See Ghoshal, *History of Indian Political Ideas*, p. 23.

¹³⁵ *SB* 5.4.4,7. See Macdonell, *Vedic Index*, II, p. 213; and Saletore, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

¹³⁶ See Alan J.B. Wace and Frank H. Stubbings, editors, *A Companion to Homer* (N.Y.: Macmillan Co., 1963), p. 436; Thomas Day Seymour, *Life in the Homeric Age* (N.Y.: Biblo and Tannam, 1965), p. 88. See *Odyssey* 11.186,568f.: 19.111; *Iliad* 9.98f.

¹³⁷ Benveniste, *op. cit.*, p. 382; Sinclair, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

¹³⁸ *History of Greek Political Thought*, p. 17. Themis is defined as "family law" or

The maintenance of Order on the part of the king is considered to bring prosperity to the community, an opinion which rests upon the belief that the unimpaired functioning of the natural processes brings about the blessings of nature.¹³⁹ There is no reason to doubt that the judicial function of the king was a means of keeping social order in conjunction with the cosmic order, for the two are in fact related processes.¹⁴⁰ Thus in the *Odyssey* (XIX. 109-114) it is said that:

when a blameless king fears the gods and upholds right judgment, then the dark earth yields wheat and barley, and the trees are laden with fruit, the young of his flocks are strong, and the sea gives abundance of fish, all from his good leading.¹⁴¹

IV

The above remarks detailing the king's military and judicial functions reveal that these activities are not so much secular or profane in nature as they are sacred. The evidence presented gives credence to Eliade's opinion that "archaic societies tend to live as much as possible in the sacred",¹⁴² the reason being that it is efficacious, and, being efficacious, real. Since man and society are dependent upon the cosmic forces, it is not difficult to understand archaic man's belief that there was no substantial difference between the microcosmos and

"justice as it is exercised within a family group" by Benveniste (*op. cit.*, pp. 832 and 385). Themis is often personified as a goddess whose nature and functions are discussed by Jane Ellen Harrison in her *Epilegomena to the Study of Greek Religion and Themis* (New Hyde Park, N.Y.: University Books, 1962), pp. 480f. On p. 483 she writes: "The Greek word Themis and the English word Doom are... one and the same; and it is curious to note that their development moves on exactly parallel lines. Doom is the thing set, fixed, settled; it begins in convention, the stress of public opinion; it ends in statutory judgment. Themis like Doom begins on earth and ends in heaven... Out of many dooms, many public opinions, many judgments, arose the figure of the one goddess. Out of many *themistes* arose Themis. These *themistes*, these fixed conventions, stood to the Greek for all he held civilized. They were the bases alike of his kingship and of his democracy. These *themistes* are the ordinances of what must be done, what society compels;... they are also the dues, the rites, the prerogatives of a king, whatever custom assigns to him or any officials."

¹³⁹ Frankfort, *Kingship and the Gods*, pp. 50 and 57.

¹⁴⁰ Balandier, *Political Anthropology*, pp. 106. The relationship between Dharma, water [rain], and the king is discussed by Spellman. *op. cit.* pp. 216-218.

¹⁴¹ William A. Chaney, *The Cult of Kingship in Anglo-Saxon England* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1970), p. 86; Harrison, *Themis*, p. 532.

¹⁴² See note 57.

the macrocosmos.¹⁴³ To a large extent, therefore, he tends to homogenize rather than compartmentalize all objects and ideas into a larger framework.¹⁴⁴ It is in this context that we must understand the Vedic sacrifice, for it is this action that unites forces of nature with man's life processes. It is at the sacrificial site that man, society, and nature converge¹⁴⁵ to maintain, continue and fulfil the universal cyclical rhythms of birth and death, ascension and descent, concentration and dispersion.¹⁴⁶

If the sacrifice was uppermost in men's minds, then we must assume that participation on the part of those qualified in such an action was also of utmost importance. This is certainly true of the king because it was in the sacrificial performance that his efficacy rested. Thus it was here that the military and judicial functions are assimilated and given meaning and reality; in short, they were sacralized. The participation of the king in sacrifice, therefore, cannot be considered merely as a religious duty to be conducted by the king in addition to, and separate from, his other political functions. Political action preserves the order of society, but since society is imbedded in nature it (political action) cannot be separated from that ritual action which preserves the order of nature,¹⁴⁷ and, by implication, the universe (i.e., man, society, nature). As a result, the foundation of the royal function lies in the ritual sphere, since the actions therein guarantee the maintenance and continuity of the universal Order. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that the *Rāmāyaṇa* contains within it the opinion that the king's highest duty (*dharma*) is to undergo consecration, to perform the great sacrifices, and to protect the subjects of his realm.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴³ This is true in Hindu medicine. See Henry R. Zimmer, *Hindu Medicine*, edited by Ludwig Edelstein (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1948), pp. 109f; J. Gonda, *Some Observations on the Relations Between "Gods" and "Powers" in the Veda* ('s-Gravenhage: Mouton and Co., 1957), pp. 23-24.

¹⁴⁴ Compare Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, *The "Soul" of the Primitive*. Translated by Lilian A. Clare (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1966), pp. 15f.

¹⁴⁵ Lévi, *La Doctrine du sacrifice dans les Brahmanas*, p. 82.

¹⁴⁶ J.C. Heesterman, "Reflections on the Significance of the *Dāksīṇā*", *Indo-Iranian Journal*, Vol. 3 (1959), pp. 245-246; and Lévi, pp. 77f.

¹⁴⁷ Compare Balandier, *Political Anthropology*, p. 106f. Chaney [*The Cult of Kingship in Anglo-Saxon England*, p. 11f.] has also remarked on the indissolubility of the religious and political functions of Germanic kingship.

¹⁴⁸ *Vālmiki-Rāmāyaṇa*, Volume II (*Ayodhyākāṇḍa*), edited by P.L. Vaidya (Baroda:

Order, we have seen, is synonymous with fertility, fruitfulness, prosperity.¹⁴⁹ Of the many kinds of sacrifices mentioned in the texts, that rite which reflects the closest association of the king with Order-fruitfulness is the Uncction (Abhiṣeka or Abhiṣecanīya),¹⁵⁰ a ceremony wherein the king becomes the "pivot and source of the forces of fertility".¹⁵¹ For example, the "sun-wise [clock-wise] movement beginning in the east (or south) constituted by the order of succession in which the uncction is administered by the officiants",¹⁵² clearly represents a "rotation of the cosmic forces round the axis mundi".¹⁵³ The cosmic significance of such a rite is also reflective of the belief that the Uncction rites in particular, and the royal sacrifices in general,¹⁵⁴ influenced the fortune and prosperity of the entire community. In the Rājābhiṣeka, for instance, the royal candidate is addressed as follows:

Disperse to the chief directions; let all the folk desire you; do not let the king-

Oriental Institute, 1962), p. 568, number 2231 [= 2.113.23 of Gorresio Edition and 2.118.23 of Lahore Ed.]: *dharmo hy esa parah prokṣaḥ kṣatriyāsyabhiṣecanam; yad yajeta mahāyajñaiḥ prajāś ca paripālayet.*

¹⁴⁹ In JB 3.231 (passage quoted in note 66) *dhārma-* is equated with *śrī-* which signifies the "exhibition or display of welfare, well-being or capacity" [J. Gonda, *Aspects of Early Vismuism* (Utrecht: M.V.A. Oosthoek's Uitgevers Mij., 1954), p. 178]. The rendering of *dhārma-* as "law" in the translation of this passage is to be taken in a broad sense. E. Adamson Hoebel [*The Law of Primitive Man* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961), p. 266] has written that the main concern of law is with man-to-man relations whereas religion is primarily concerned with human-to-superhuman relations. Dharma would encompass both concerns here. Hoebel further adds that both "set norms for human behavior and both superhuman and legal sanctions can be applied to the same norms - and are likely to be if the norms express behavior related to highly valued basic postulates as to the nature of things."

¹⁵⁰ Rau, (p. 87) writes that Abhiṣeka refers primarily to the Uncction ceremony proper in a narrow sense whereas Abhiṣecanīya refers to all the ritual actions surrounding (and including) the Uncction. It should be noted that the Uncction was not unique to the king; it could be also administered to members of the three upper classes. See Rau, pp. 87-88. Examples of such uncctions are the *brhaspati-*, *vaiśya-* *brāhmaṇa-*, *soma-*, *prthi-*, *go-*, *odana-*, *sava* (TB 2.7.1-7 respectively). For the Brhaspati-sava see PB 17.11 and JB II. 128-131 The Vasor Dhārā [= Agner Abhiṣeka] is another example (SB 9.3.2, TB 3.11.3).

¹⁵¹ Heesterman, *The Ancient Indian Royal Consecration*, p. 120.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, See for instance AB 8.14 and 19 for the Mahābhiṣeka ceremony.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁴ Rau [*Staat und Gesellschaft*, p. 92] remarks that the royal sacrifices (Vajapeya, Rājasūya, Puruṣamedha, Aśvamedha, Sarvamedha, Sautrāmāṇī, and Vasor Dhārā) were state affairs designed to advance the fortune of the entire land.

dom fall away from you. The heavenly waters mixed with milk, those which are in the atmosphere, and those which are earthly, with all their radiance, with (their) vigour, I anoint you. Let me anoint you with the heavenly vigour, with milk; that you will be an increaser of the kingdom, so shall Savitṛ make you.¹⁵⁵

The last sentence of this passage is similar to a statement expressed in another Uction rite (the Punarabhiṣeka: *AB* 8.7), except for the fact that it is the unction waters, called 'kingdom-bearing' [*raṣṭrabhṛtaḥ*] and ambrosial [*amṛtāḥ*], that increase or prosper the kingdom [*raṣṭras-ya vardhanīḥ*].

Another example comes again from the Rājābhiṣeka [*TB*] 2.7.16, 4-5

Let yonder sun rise; up this my speech, rise, God Sūrya, with [this] cry of mine. I [attain] authority of speech; let speech be a support in me. Let the rivers swell, the clouds shower rain, let the plants [crops] bear good berries [fruit]. May I be a king of these [people] abundant in food, boiled rice, and curds.¹⁵⁶

The final passage is taken from the Vasor Dhārā ceremony of the Agnicayana (*SB* 9.3.3, 10-11):

This is your [Agni's] kingdom [*rāj*—]; a bestower and supporter are you for the friend; for nourishment, for rain, for the overlordship of creatures [do I anoint] you.' Nourishment [is] food, rain [is] food, [so] by food does this please him. (10) 'And when he says: 'This [is] your kingdom... [he means]: 'This is your kingdom [*rājyam*], you are anointed, you are the bestower, a supporter of your friend; for nourishment you are ours; you are ours for rain, you are ours for the overlordship of creatures.' They address this to him: 'For all this you are ours, for all this did we anoint you.' And therefore do they [the folk] address a human king who has been anointed.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁵ *TB* 2.7.15, 4-5. *viśayasva diśo mahib; viśas tvā sāvā vāñchantu; mā tvāḍ-ṛāstrām ādhibhṛśat; yā divyā āpaḥ payasā sambubbhūvāḥ; yā antāriksa utā pāṛthivīr yāb; tāsām tvā sāvāsāṃ ručā; abhiśincāmi vārcasā; abhi tvā vārcasā sicam divyena, pāyasā sabā; yātbā 'sā rāṣṭra-vārdhanah, tātbā tvā savitā karat.* See Gonda, *Ancient Indian Kingship*, p. 88 and compare *AV* 4.8.4-6. M. Bloomfield [*Vedic Concordance* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1906), p. 748] reads *yātbāso rāṣṭravārdhanah* and Sayana (to *TB*) reads *yātbā...āsa. yātbāso* should be construed as *yātbā āsas*.

¹⁵⁶ *ūd asāv etu sūryah; ūd idāṃ māmakām vācāb; ūd ibi deva sūrya; sahā vagnūnā māma; abhām vācō vivācanam; māyi vāg astu dharṇasib; yān tu nadāyo vārsantu parjānyāb; supippalā śadabhayo bhavanu. ānnavatām odanāvātām āmīśavatām eṣām rājā bhūyāsam.*

¹⁵⁷ *iyam te rāṇ, mītrāya yantiāsi, yamana, ūrje tvā, vṛṣṭyai tvā, prajānāṃ tvādhīpatyā-ya 'si. annam vā ūrj, annam vṛṣṭir, annenai vai 'nam etat pṛāṇā. {10} yad v evāba: iyam te rāṇ mītrāya... 'tī 'dam te rājyam, abhiśikto 'sī 'ty etanmītrasya tvam yantiāsi yamana, ūrje ca no 'si, vṛṣṭyai ca no 'si, prajānāṃ ca na ādhīpatyāsi 'ty upabṛuvata evai*

These passages not only reveal the importance of the Uction's ceremonies as prosperity-inducing rites,¹⁵⁸ they also reveal the importance of the sacrificer-king as mediator and central figure as well.

Conclusion

The evidence presented in this paper, both semantic and textual, bears out St. Thomas Aquinas's statement and the Indian etymology that the king is called so because he gratifies his subjects. He holds office, in the words of Dio of Prusa (A.D. 40-112), not so much for his own benefit as for the sake of the entire community.¹⁵⁹ The semantic evidence that is gleaned from the Indo-European word group based on **reǵ*— suggests a proximity between the Indo-European **reǵ*— and the ideas of wealth and power, a fact made very obvious in the Vedic texts. In *AV* 4.22.3ab there is the wish that the *rājan*— may become a lord of riches as well as of the sibs or clans.¹⁶⁰ Wealth comes about through booty obtained in successful battles¹⁶¹ as well as support from his own subjects through tribute.¹⁶²

Even more explicit is the opinion that the king's wealth and power ought to overflow.¹⁶³ Liberality was the hallmark of a true king, as is evident from the *Dānastuti* or praises of the donor's liberality.¹⁶⁴ A good example of the *Dānastuti* is *RV* 8.21, 17-18:

'nam etad: etasmai naḥ sarvasmā asy, etasyai tvā sarvasmā abhyaścāmahī 'ti. tasmād u he 'daṃ mānuṣam rājānam abhiṣikṭam upabruvate.

¹⁵⁸ Rau (p. 88) is of the opinion that the essence of the Abhiṣeka was originally a charm for fruitfulness and abundance.

¹⁵⁹ Barker, *From Alexander to Constantine*, p. 304.

¹⁶⁰ *ayām astu dhānapatir dhānānām / ayām viśām viśpātir asti rājā*. See Gonda, *Ancient Indian Kingship*, p. 13.

¹⁶¹ Compare *RV* 4.50.9; *MS* 1.10.16; 156.4-5; 4.3.1:40, 15-16; *KS* 28.3:156, 1,4-5; Rau *Staat und Gesellschaft*, p. 56; Macdonell, *Vedic Index*, I. 86.

¹⁶² *RV* 1.65.7; *AV* 4.22.7; *ŚB* 13.2.9.8; *AB* 8.17: *Sāṅkh* *Ā* 4.9. Tribute [*balī*] is also mentioned in the texts. See, for instance, *RV* 10.173.6; *AV* 3.4.3 and *ŚB* 11.2.6.14, and see Heinrich Zimmer, *Altindisches Leben* (Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1879), pp. 166-167; Saletore, *Ancient Indian Political Thought*, pp. 441f.

¹⁶³ Van der Leeuw, *Religion in Essence and Manifestation*, I, p. 117.

¹⁶⁴ For a discussion of the *Dānastuti* see Manilal Patel. *The Dānastuti of the Rg-Veda*. Translated from German by B.H. Kapadia (Vallabh Vidyanagar: B.H. Kapadia, Sardar Vallabhai Vidyapeeth, 1961).

Only Indra gives so much bounty or Sarasvatī, possessing good fortune, [gives so much] wealth, or you Citra, to the worshipper [i.e., the sacrificial priest]. Only Citra is king [*rājan*—] the others only seem like kings [*rājaka*—]¹⁶⁵ who [dwell] along the Sarasvatī [River]. Just as Parjanya shall give forth rain, he [Citra] shall grant a thousand, ten thousand.¹⁶⁶

This passage bears out in part a statement found in the *Arabian Nights*:

Forsooth, the king deserves the name of a king only *if he distributes gifts*, rules justly, is merciful and leads a noble life before his subjects.¹⁶⁷

It is obvious that the exercise of power and influence on the part of the king is practically synonymous with the possession and distribution of wealth. Bronislaw Malinowski¹⁶⁸ has written that wealth is conceived as an outward sign and substance of power as well as a means of exercising it. This is evidently the reason why some derivatives of **reg*— in the Germanic languages have both meanings: ‘wealth(y), power(ful)’.¹⁶⁹ Furthermore the association of the king’s power and wealth is often explained in the Vedic texts through his role as military leader. This association may be explained by means of the following

¹⁶⁵. The suffix *-ka* connotes ‘only similar to’ or ‘not equal to’. See Franklin Edgerton, ‘The K-Suffixes of Indo-Iranian’, *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, Vol. XXXI (1911), p. 97.

¹⁶⁶. *indro vā ghēd iyan maghām / sârasvatī vā subhāgā dadāt vâsu / . tvām vā citra dasūse. citra id rājā rājaka id anyakē / yakē sârasvatīm ānu / parjanya iva tatānad dhī vr̥styā / sabhāstram ayūtā dādat*. Other Dānastutis are located in RV 1.100,16-17; 122,7 15; 125, 4.15, 7-10; 32, 19-24; etc. See Patel, pp. 13-30.

¹⁶⁷. Van der Leeuw, I, p. 117. The italics are van der Leeuw’s. The importance of gifts is discussed by Gonda, ‘‘ ‘Gifts’ and ‘Giving’ in the R̥gveda’’, *Vishveshvaranand Indological Journal*, Vol. II, Part 1 (1964), pp. 9-30, especially pp. 10, 18-19. The Dakṣiṇā or sacrificial gift is discussed by Heesterman, ‘‘Reflections on the Significance of the Dakṣiṇā’’, pp. 241-258.

¹⁶⁸. *Argonauts of the Western Pacific* (N.Y.: E.P. Dutton and Co., Inc., 1961), p. 64.

¹⁶⁹. See notes 17 and 18. Germanic kingship is infused with the idea of ‘‘luck’’. As the embodiment of the ‘‘luck’’ of the people, the Germanic king assured that the actions of the gods were favourable toward the tribe. The outward sign of the king’s ‘‘luck’’ is his wealth and, as Chaney has noted, ‘‘the Anglo-Saxon terms *eadig* and *saelig* are used to mean both ‘lucky’ and ‘rich’, and wealth is taken as a token of the quality on which the gods shower their blessings’’. [*The Cult of Kingship in Anglo-Saxon England*, p. 13. See also p. 12].

sequence: military leader¹⁷⁰→battle→victory→booty→distribution of booty.¹⁷¹

The king exercised a judicial role as well. He maintained the fixed rules of conduct (*dhrtavrāta*—), protected the Dharma, and was himself Dharma incarnate. As the protector of Dharma and as bearer of the *daṇḍā*¹⁷² he punished those who transgressed it. It is also stated that he was exempt from punishment, although references to the expulsion of the king¹⁷³ and the story of King Tryarūṇa and his Purohita, Vṛṣa, would seem to suggest that the king was accountable for his actions.¹⁷⁴ Although textual references are not numerous in the Vedas concerning the king's judicial function, the semantic evidence¹⁷⁵ and developments in the post-Vedic Age¹⁷⁶ leave no doubt as to its importance.

It is, however, in the sacrifice that the military and judicial functions become subsumed in the sacral sphere when the king assumes affinity and identification with the gods Indra and Varuṇa. Victory and maintenance of Order, the two functions of kingship that these gods personify, assure the blessings of nature, as is evident in the Abhiṣecanīya ceremonies. It is also interesting and significant that during the Rājābhiṣeka these blessings are closely associated with the activity of the sun, as is evident in the two passages presented above. Sāyana's comment on the last line of the first passage (TB 2.7.15,4-5), reads: "just as Savitr himself is an increaser of the kingdom in the

¹⁷⁰ See Zimmer, *Altindisches Leben*, p. 165; U.N. Ghoshal, "Kingship in the Rig-veda", *Indian Historical Quarterly*, Vol. XX (1944), p. 41; "Kingship and Kingly Administration in the Atharvaveda", *Indian Historical Quarterly*, Vol. XX (1944), p. 109; Rau, *op. cit.*, p. 100.

¹⁷¹ RV 6.47, 22-25; AB 2.25.

¹⁷² The *daṇḍā* is explained by Gonda, *Ancient Indian Kingship*, p. 22; Salletore, *op. cit.*, pp. 15f; and Spellman, *Political Theory of Ancient India*, pp. 107-108.

¹⁷³ See Rau, pp. 128-129.

¹⁷⁴ JB 3.94-96. See Hanns Oertel, "Contributions from the Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa to the history of the Brāhmaṇa Literature", *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, Vol. 18 (1897), pp. 20-25; W. Caland, *Das Jaiminīya-Brāhmaṇa in Auswahl* (Wiesbaden: D. Martin Sandig oHG, 1970 [1919] pp. 239-243.

¹⁷⁵ Derivatives from *√jī* include words which possess a moral connotation. Examples are *jīu-* "straight, upright" (RV 4.1,17; 6.51,2; 7.60,2; 9.97,18 and 43; TB 3.3.7,10); *jīyū-* "upright" (RV 1.20,4); *rājīṣṭha-* "straightest, most upright" (RV 7.51,1). See note 14 and the remarks made by Benveniste above.

¹⁷⁶ Ghoshal, *History of Indian Political Ideas*, pp. 50f., 115, 127, 167f., *passim*; Salletore, *op. cit.*, pp. 15f., 332f., 460f., 489f.; Spellman, *op. cit.*, pp. 98-131.

world, so may he make you also an increaser of the kingdom''.¹⁷⁷ In the second passage quoted from the same ceremony (*TB* 2.7.16,4-5) Sāyana states that the king is similar or equal to the sun (*asau rājā sūrya-samo bhūtvā*). This association between the king and sun is evident in the type of unction fluids employed in the Rājasūya ceremony (*SB* 5.3.4,1-2). Among the seventeen types of unction fluids we find rain-water collected during a sun-shower (5.3.4,13) and water collected from a river where the waters are stagnant and where the sun is shining on them (*SB* 5,3,4,12). The anointing of the sacrificer with these fluids infuses him with radiance (*varcasā*) because the former is possessed of the sun's radiance [*sūryavarcasa*—] and the latter is 'sun-skinned' (*sūryatvacas*—). In the *MS* (4.3,10: 49,10-12) the king is called brilliant (*citrā*—) because he is anointed with the unction fluids, the ornaments of the waters.¹⁷⁸

It is a well-known fact that the sun and sunlight are synonymous with well-being, happiness, and good fortune.¹⁷⁹ As a result it would not be difficult to imagine the king—a source of well-being and prosperity for his subjects, who as sacrificer is regarded as the centre of the universe during his unction, who after the Rājasūya unction undertakes a chariot drive, a drive which corresponds to the course of the sun and is intended to renew or regenerate the productive forces of the universe¹⁸⁰—as the light, sun, or beacon of his people.¹⁸¹

¹⁷⁷ *yathā loke savitā svayaṃ rāstravardhana āsa tathā tvām api rāstravardhanam karotu.*

¹⁷⁸ *apam̐ vā etāni citraṇy. apam̐ va etāc citrāṇi sambharanty. apām̐ enaṃ citrāṇ abhīṣṭcanti citrām asmin dadhati. rāsmād vā eṣso 'bhīṣiktaṣ citrām rāje 'ti śrūyate, 'pām̐ hy enaṃ citrāṇ abhīṣṭcanti, citrām asmin dadhati.* Compare *RV* 10,78 lc: *rājāno nā citrāḥ suṣamāḍṣaḥ* '[the Maruts possess] brilliance as kings of excellent [or beautiful] appearance'.

¹⁷⁹ Gonda, *Loka*, p. 78; *RV* 1.115,1; 10.37,4. On the interrelationship of victory, light, lordship, and the sun see van der Leeuw, *op. cit.*, I, p. 67.

¹⁸⁰ Heesterman, *The Ancient Indian Royal Consecration*, pp. 67-68, 87-89, 119-121, 133-135.

¹⁸¹ This too may at least partially explain why *rāj* assumes the meaning 'to shine'. Examples are found in the *Nirukta* (2.3): *rājā rājateḥ*; *Dhātupāṭha* 1.874: *rājīr dīptau*; Sarup, *The Nighaṇṭu and the Nirukta*; and Otto Böhtlingk, *Pāṇini's Grammatik* (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1971).

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Ideas of Kingship in Hinduism and Buddhism

A. L. Basham

The classical Indian doctrines of kingship evolved from those of the Vedic period, discussed in the previous paper. As Vedic society slowly merged into the classical civilization of India, new ideas appeared concerning the status and function of the ruler, consistent with a more developed system of government. These ideas were mainly centred on the nature and person of the king, whose status rose with time, until he became divinity on earth, at least according to the learned brahmans and courtiers who surround him.

What elements of divinity the king possessed in Vedic times were chiefly connected with his functions as a sacrificer, and were bestowed on him by the sacrificial rituals performed by the priests. How far his divinity was effective in the day-to-day activities of kingship is uncertain, to say the least. A legend referred to in more than one source tells how the gods, discomfited in battle by the demons, met together and elected one of their number, Indra (*Tai.Sam.* ii.4.2.1) or Soma (*Ait.Brh.* 1.14), almost certainly originally the former, as their king, after which they got the better of their enemies. This tradition suggests a society where the king is looked on chiefly as a war leader, and as *primus inter pares*, ultimately owing his status to the suffrage of his subjects. But, even according to this essentially rational and secular legend, kingship began among the gods, and was a divinely ordained institution. It might be suggested that the legend evolved in circles where tribal democracies (for the existence of which there is considerable evidence in this early time) were developing into chieftainships or kingdoms.

A significant elaboration of the legend of Indra's election as king of the gods occurs elsewhere in the Vedic canon (*Tai. Brh.* ii.2.7.2.; ii.2.104). Here the gods, worsted in battle by the demons, meet together and decide that they need a king, but in this version, instead of electing their leader, they apply to their common progenitor Prajāpati, the Father God of later Vedic tradition, to provide them with one. He sends them his youngest son, Indra, whom he creates

ad hoc; but the gods refuse to accept Indra as their leader, since he is younger than they. The crestfallen Indra returns to his father, who invests him with a shining jewel (*rukma*) filled with splendour (*haras*). Indra then returns to the other gods, who, when they see the divine charisma, accept him without question as their leader, and gain the day over the demons.

This story implies a great development of the royal dignity, as compared with the earlier one. The king is not appointed by his peers, but by the High God at the request of the lesser gods. He is accepted by virtue of a certain supernatural splendour with which he is endowed. He is appointed to lead lesser beings, and he overrides the principle of seniority so widespread in the ancient world, particularly in India. This phase is that reflected in the later Vedic literature discussed by Dr Santucci in the previous paper, and a great deal of evidence from that literature shows that at the time (c. 900-600 B.C.) the king was rapidly gaining in power and prestige, evolving from a tribal chieftain to become a powerful ruler of a regional kingdom, often with sub-kings in a quasi-feudal relationship to him.

The succeeding period saw the birth and growth of Buddhism and Jainism, and also of Hinduism, as distinct from Vedic Brahmanism. The development of the latter is obscure, but it emerges quite clearly in the epics *Mahābhārata* and *Rāmāyaṇa*, which probably took their present form between the end of the Mauryan Empire (c. 185 B.C.) and the beginning of the second great Indian empire, that of the Guptas (A.D. 320). This development is also reflected in the famous *Arthashastra* ascribed to Kauṭilya (c. 350-300 B.C.) but in fact compiled in its present form much later, probably in the first century A.D.¹

The period from c. 500 to 200 B.C., culminating in the Mauryan Empire, seems to have been one in which imperialist ideas developed and flourished, but, as far as can be gathered from early Buddhist literature and the inscriptions of Aśoka, the ritual status of the ruler was not as high as it later became. The culmination of the expansion of

¹ Arguments for the authenticity of the *Arthashastra* as the genuine work of Kauṭilya, or at least as a genuine Mauryan document, have been finally invalidated by the research of T.R. Trautmann, who has shown that the work is a conflation of probably three original sources. Nevertheless, at least one of these sources may have been a Mauryan document. The second book of the text, dealing with the activities of heads of departments, may not exactly correspond to what we know from other sources of Mauryan administration, but at least it fits the Mauryan evidence better than that of any other period.

Magadha was certainly the reign of Aśoka (c. 270-230 B.C.), but the great emperor is merely referred to by the title *Devānaṃpiya* 'Dear to the gods', and not as a god himself. In the Pāli texts, however, kings are regularly addressed by their courtiers as *deva*, 'god'. The word has no very exalted overtones, however, since even nowadays an old-fashioned Hindu wife may address her husband as *patideva*, and a student his teacher as *gurudeva*. The author or compiler of the *Arthaśāstra* evidently has no illusions about the king's real status. In a model of an address to be given by the king to his troops on the eve of battle, he is advised to tell them that he is a salaried servant just as they are (*Arth.* x.3).

The propaganda value of the association of the king with the gods is very clear, however. In the *Arthaśāstra* the king while on campaign is advised to have his trusted agents disguised as gods, wearing splendid attire, and to allow these pseudo-divinities to be seen talking to him on equal terms, thus boosting his own troops' morale and demoralizing the enemy (*Arth.* xiii.1). Moreover his propaganda agents were to be instructed to spread among the people news of his divinity, and to repeat the story of how the gods established the first king to save the world from the evils of anarchy (*Arth.* i.13). These passages arouse uneasy suspicions that the Emperor Aśoka, whose good faith is generally taken for granted, may have resorted to such methods of strengthening his influence over his people; for in one of his rock edicts (M.R.E. Brahmagiri etc.) he speaks of the gods, who for many generations had not been seen on earth, now mixing with men as a result of his new policy of righteousness, while in another (R.E.4) he mentions the miraculous appearance of 'heavenly chariots, elephants, balls of fire and other divine forms' as evidence of the approval of heaven for his regime.

The decline and fall of the Mauryas, followed by a series of invasions from the Northwest, seems to have stimulated the revival in a new form of ideologies going back to the Vedic period and perhaps even beyond it, to remote traditions inherited on the one hand from the undivided Indo-Europeans and on the other from the proto-Mediterranean immigrants who proceeded them. By now a doctrine by cyclic time was universally accepted by Hindu, Buddhist and Jain. The world passed through innumerable cycles of immense length and at the present time it was declining towards a cataclysm which would initiate a new cycle. The ultimate cataclysm was inevitable, but the effects of cosmic decay could be mitigated by human action, with the help of

the gods. The Hindu legends concerning the origin of kingship must be studied with this in mind.

Two very important traditions are recorded in the *Śānti Parvan* of the great epic, the *Mahābhārata*. This book was added to the main narrative at various periods, but chiefly during the confused five hundred years between the end of the Mauryan Empire and the rise of that of the Guptas. It contains an immense body of brahmanical tradition on ethics, religious practice and statecraft, and the two stories, self-contradictory in many particulars, occur a few pages apart in a lengthy section devoted to the duties of kings, near the beginning of the book.

The tradition which appears to be the older of the two (*Mbh.* xii.67) runs as follows: At the beginning of this cosmic cycle men were protected by their righteousness (*Dharma*). They were naturally virtuous and therefore needed no government, no justice and no laws; but gradually they degenerated. Crime became rampant, ritual norms were not maintained, classes and castes lost their purity, and the bonds of matrimony were forgotten. The condition of anarchy led to intense insecurity. Property, and even life itself, were no longer respected, and civilized existence became impossible. Then the people gathered together and besought the god Brahmā (*Pitāmaha*) to help them by appointing a ruler who would enforce adherence to the law by coercion. Brahmā appointed Manu as the first king. Manu is a rather ambivalent figure in Hindu mythology, figuring sometimes as the first man, and sometimes as the first king; he is not himself a god, but is very close to the gods, and enjoys divine favour as no ordinary mortal does. At first Manu refused, since as king he would have to share responsibility for the sins of the people, and would become involved in acts of violence, which would result in unhappy rebirths for him. But the people insisted, and promised that their sins would remain on their own heads, while Manu might claim one fourth of the spiritual merit which they earned from their good deeds to offset the acts of cruelty which he would be compelled to resort to as king. Moreover, they promised him a share of their produce and their most beautiful daughters as his concubines. So Manu accepted the divine appointment and organized his kingdom, after which conditions improved and civilized life once more became possible.

The implications of this story are manifold. In the first place the king may not be himself a god, but he enjoys the divine blessing and receives his authority from the High God himself. He is divinely

appointed, but his appointment is at the request of men, in order to fulfil human needs. His office is established for the welfare of society and of the individuals who compose it, and it is an unfortunate necessity in an age of decline when, in a state of nature, the life of man was, in the words of Hobbes (*Leviathan*, i.13), "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short". Government is thus, in theory, the servant of society, a theme developed elsewhere in Hindu literature on statecraft.

The second legend (*Mbh.* xii.59) is significantly different. Once more we have the theme of cosmic decline, but the state of anarchy among men is differently evaluated. Men sin not so much against one another as against the gods, by neglecting their religious duties. Sacrifices are no longer performed, and brahmans no longer recite the Vedas, which are in danger of being forgotten and lost completely. In these circumstances it is the gods, not men, who take the initiative, since they are filled with fear at man's neglect of Dharma. So they go in a deputation to Brahmā, the High God, and urge him to take action. He produces an immense treatise of 100,000 chapters on statecraft, and sends the gods on to Śiva, who abridges the treatise to one tenth of its original size. (It was later further abridged by Indra and the sage Bṛhaspati). The gods then approach Viṣṇu, who produces out of his own being, *ad hoc*, the first king, Virajas, who is sent down to earth to restore the virtue of men.

The sequel is equally important, but meanwhile the first part of this legend demands comment. It must obviously have arisen in circles different from those of the other *Mahābhārata* legend. The two stories, which appear to us mutually exclusive, were obviously considered compatible enough to be inserted close together in the text, and there is no evidence that their incompatibility ever worried any Indian of earlier times. They represent originally two schools of thought, one of which granted a greater degree of divinity to the king than did the other, but for those who accepted both stories, as no doubt most Indians educated in the faith did, the king was simultaneously a man, endowed with a divine command to maintain law and order, and a divinity, the mind-born son of the Most High, produced in order to ensure the piety of men, without the consent of the latter. In the second story the king's only responsibilities are towards the gods. He is the divine servant of the divine order, and his first duty is to ensure that the sacred norms are not transgressed.

The miraculous birth of Virajas does not end the legend, however. Even the divine is capable of error and sin, and the king of the sixth

generation from Virajas, Veṇa, had so degenerated from the former's original perfection that he took to very evil courses and became oppressive. This enraged the ṛṣis, the sages of legendary times, who had through their sanctity and their extreme asceticism achieved supernatural powers. They appeared before Veṇa in a body, and solemnly urged him to abandon his evil ways. But Veṇa was incorrigible, and took no notice of their warnings. The ṛṣis held in their hands bundles of sacred *kuśa* grass, which they used in their Vedic rituals. Infuriated, employing their supernatural powers, they turned the blades of grass into spears, and there and then they slew the impious king.

From the thigh of the deceased Veṇa the ṛṣis produced another being, Pṛthu, and Viṣṇu, Indra and other deities descended from heaven to be present at the coronation of the new king. Viṣṇu himself entered Pṛthu's body, and this new ruler restored Dharma and ruled the world righteously. All Aryan kings of later times were believed to be descended from Pṛthu. The word means literally "broad" or "abundant" and its feminine form, *Pṛthivī*, came to mean "the earth". One of the many synonyms for "king" in Sanskrit was *pārthiva*, which might mean both "Descendant of Pṛthu" and "Lord (or Husband) of the earth". This links up with the mystical doctrine, which we discuss below, of the king as the husband of his land.

The legend of the slaying of Veṇa and the miraculous birth of Pṛthu seems to have been added to the story of Virajas and may have had a different origin. It evidently arose at a time when the Sacred Law was neglected by some of the rulers of India, perhaps under the influence of heterodox teachings such as Buddhism, and it was probably intended as a solemn warning to such princes. For all his divine descent, Veṇa committed the most reprehensible of sins and crimes, which shows that even gods on earth are not infallible. For his sins, he was put to death by the sages, which fact concedes, at least to the brahmins (all of whom claimed descent from the ṛṣis), the moral right of regicide if the king is irreligious. The story also implies that in such a case the brahmins have likewise the moral right to act as kingmakers, replacing the ruler whom they have destroyed by another of their own choice. And the new king is not merely the divinely appointed representative of god on earth, as was Manu in the first story, but the very quintessence of the greatest gods, and himself divine.

The divinity of the king is stressed in many later sources. Manu, the primeval king according to the first of the epic stories, is the reputed

author of one of the oldest and most important texts on Hindu law and custom (*dharmaśāstra*). Here (vii. 8) we are told that:

Even an infant² king is not to be despised (thinking he is a mere) mortal; for he is a great divinity in human form.

The doctrine of royal divinity was not without its critics, even among Hindus. For instance the author Bāṇa, early in the seventh century A.D., wrote the following in one of his stories (*Kādambarī*, i. 107; tr. Ridding p. 82). The speaker is a minister of state instructing a prince on the evils of sycophants:

Though subject to mortality, they consider themselves a piece of godhead come down (from heaven), endowed with divinity, and superhuman. They perform activities and assume a dignity appropriate only to the gods, and thus they get themselves laughed at by everybody... The delusion of divinity is so entrenched in their minds and they are so overcome by false ideas that they fancy they have another pair of arms as well as the normal couple and imagine that there is a third eye under the skin of their foreheads. They consider it a favour to allow themselves to be seen, and they think they can confer benefit even by a glance. Their very words, they think, are a gift, and (when they give) a command they look on (it) as (conferring) a favour. They deem even their very touch to be purifying.

This purely rationalist opposition to the divinity of kings was reinforced by Buddhism, which put forward a legend which seems a deliberate counterblast to the stories of Hinduism (D.N. 3.80 ff.). The account is attributed to the Buddha himself, but there is little doubt that it is of later origin. Like the first of the two *Mahābhārata* stories it presupposes a state of nature in which the life of men becomes progressively more difficult as a result of the growth of human greed, and the institution of private property and the family. As in the Hindu story, there takes place a great gathering of mankind, and they enter into a solemn agreement to respect the property and rights of others. The agreement is not kept, and therefore they hold another great meeting at which they decide to appoint one of their number to enforce their rights to life and property, and to maintain the family system. Their choice falls on the handsomest of their number, who is given the title *Mahāsammata* ('The Great Approved One') because he is approved by a great assembly, and is called *rājā* because he pleases

² *Bāla*. The word is ambiguous, having the secondary meaning of 'foolish'.

(*rañjēti*) the people. In return for his services the people promise to give him a share of their crops and herds, and their most beautiful maidens for his harem. He organizes the world's first government, and recruits the class of *kṣatriyas*, which, like the other three classes, has a purely human origin and is not the result of a division divinely made at the creation of the world, as the Hindus taught.

It has more than once been noted that this story clearly prefigures the theory of social contract later developed by such Western thinkers as Locke and Rousseau. This is a reasonable conclusion, for it is implicit in the story that the taxes paid by the subjects are given in return for the king's services, in protecting them and their possessions from violence and theft, Kingship is a purely human institution and no divine intervention or divine charisma is involved in it. The king is *primus inter pares*, depending for his status on the suffrage of his subjects. Thus we have here a return to the oldest doctrine of all, reflected in the earliest Vedic account of the election of Indra to kingship. Here, however, the king's functions are predominantly social rather than military.

How far the Buddhist doctrine of kingship was effective on royal conduct and policy is unclear. Aśoka gave no evidence in his edicts of having known it, and it may not even have been formulated in his day, but his solicitude for his subjects is consistent with it. In later times many of the Buddhist kings of Sri Lanka proudly claimed descent from Mahāsammata. But the story does not appear to have had much effect in opposing the growth of the Hindu doctrine of royal divinity. Indeed the Mahāyāna Buddhist were forced to compromise with the prevailing doctrine.

The *Suvarṇabhāṣottama Sūtra* (xii) contains a remarkable passage explaining the royal title *devaputra* ("Son of the gods") taken by the Kuṣāṇa kings, some of whom were very favourable to Buddhism, as being due to the fact that from his birth the king enjoyed special blessings bestowed on him by the great gods. This was evidently an attempt at compromise with the prevailing doctrine of the times.

The question of the moral right of revolt was also one on which there were several varying answers. Among the Buddhist *Jātaka* stories are two or three which describe the revolt of subjects against wicked rulers, and thus seem to give implicit approval to such drastic action, especially as in at least two cases the leader or inspirer of the revolt is the *Bodhisatta*, the Buddha himself in a previous birth (*Jātaka* nos. 73, 432). With the Hindus, the story of Veṇa, mentioned above, also

implies the justification of revolt against an irreligious king, at least when it has the backing of the brahmans. The most impressive passage of this type is found in the *Mahābhārata* (xiii, 60, 19-20):³

The subjects should gather together and slay that ruthless royal monster (*rajakali*) who does not protect (them), who confiscates (their property), who plunders and does not give (them anything). The king who says 'I will protect you' and does not do so should be struck down and killed like a rabid dog.

The opposing view was encouraged by the fear of anarchy, which is much in evidence in many sources. The usual term for this in Sanskrit is *matsya-nyāya*, "the analogy of the fish", implying the ruthless manner in which large and strong fish eat smaller and weaker ones. This condition is, from the point of view of religious orthodoxy, particularly undesirable, not only because of its obvious results in loss of life and property, but also because it leads to confusion of castes, break-up of families, and failure in the performance of sacrifices and other religious practices such as the recitation of the Vedas. It was in order to free mankind from anarchy that the first king was appointed, and the king's main function is its prevention. The period between the Mauryan and Gupta empires, when from time to time, with the various waves of invaders, *matsya-nyāya* did in fact occur, seems to have strengthened the fear of anarchy among the orthodox. Hence voices were heard advocating passive obedience. The passage from Manus which we have quoted above is an example in point. Quite explicit are the words of the lawbook ascribed to the sage Nārada (xviii, 20-22);⁴

Intelligence is the splendour of kings, and it is manifest in their speeches. Whatever they say, whether wrong or right, is Law (*Dharma*) where litigants are concerned. This Law (personified in) the king visibly, roams all over the land, thousand-eyed. His subjects cannot survive anywhere (in the kingdom) if they transgress his command. Through his majesty, arising from his protective authority, and his mien of benevolence towards beings, whatever the king does is right—that is the established rule. As a husband, though feeble, must always be worshipped by his wives, so even a worthless king must be worshipped by his subjects.

³ This reference is to the Poona critical edition of the text. In the Bombay edition it is xiii, 61.31-32.

⁴ This is a reference to Jolly's translation (not followed exactly) in *S.B.E.* xxxiii. In some editions of the text, including that which we have used, the chapters are arranged differently and the passage occurs as xvii, 20-22.

The royal divinity was expected to fulfil his functions in an exemplary manner, and if he did not do so it was not the fault of the many strict injunctions in the textbooks, both religious and secular. His main function was "protection" (*pālana, rakṣā*). He was certainly expected to protect his individual subjects from violence and oppression, and to protect the frontiers of his kingdom from foreign attack, but in theory his protective function was chiefly exercised on society as a whole. The main object of this protective care was *Varṇāśramadharma*, "The Rules of Class and Stage of Life". These were in fact the many customs of class (*varṇa*) and caste and of the four *āśramas*, or stages of life; the latter concept was an idealization of facts, dividing the life of man into four stages — the student (*brāhmacārin*), the householder (*gṛhastha*), the forest hermit (*vānaprastha*) and the homeless ascetic (*sannyāsin*) — and had little practical importance in daily life. The concept of *varṇa*, on the other hand, was much more influential, and the rules of class as laid down in the legal texts had virtually the force of law in many Hindu kingdoms. The king was expected to prevent miscegenation and to ensure that men of lower classes and castes did not follow the professions and arrogate to themselves the privileges of those of higher ones. He was recommended, for example, to mete out very severe punishment to members of the *Śūdra* order who seduced women of higher classes, (*Manu*, viii, 374), who insulted brahmans (*Manu*, viii, 270-72), or who recited the Vedas, from the hearing and learning of which they were rigidly excluded.

"Protection" was, however, generally interpreted in a wider sense. For the protection of society, the family and the individual also had to be protected. The king is advised that he should strive to ensure that no one in his kingdom suffers hunger, oppression, or deprivation of the standards of life normally expected by his class. After the family and the caste-council the king was the last line of defence for the widow, the orphan, the invalid, or the person stricken by misfortune of any kind. There is evidence to indicate that some kings at any rate tried to fulfil this function by providing rudimentary social services, and promoting agriculture and trade.

Second only to the king's duty of protection was that of "Pleasing the People". He had a positive responsibility not merely to preserve the lives and social status of his subjects, but also to do what lay in his power to make them happy. This function is brought out in the false etymology of the word *rājā*, which in more than one source is connected with the verb *rañjayati* (Pāli, *rañjati*) "he pleases". This function

was partly fulfilled by frequent festivals, accompanied by the bestowal of considerable quantities of largesse in cash or kind. It also involved the promotion of the people's practical welfare and the speedy administration of justice, together with the imposition of taxes considered moderate according to the standards of the times. In order to ensure that his people were satisfied the king was recommended to make full use of secret agents, not only to bring him information on the state of public opinion but also, as we have seen, to conduct positive propaganda on his behalf by spreading news of his supernatural powers and his exceptional benevolence.

The functions of the king are closely linked in some texts with the doctrine of the "Threefold Human Aims" (*Trivargapuruṣārtha*). These three are *Dharma* (righteousness, duty, religious observance), *Artha* (material gain, profit) and *Kāma* (the satisfaction of personal drives and desires, not necessarily sexual). If followed in a balanced manner, giving the first priority over the second and the second over the third, they were believed to promote the achievement after many lives of the fourth and ultimate aim, *Mokṣa* (release from transmigration, salvation). The frequent reference to the doctrine of the Three Aims in literature and inscriptions leads us to believe that it was more influential in earlier days than it became later, when popular devotionism tended to encourage ascetic virtues among the layfolk.

By "protecting" his people the king promotes their *Dharma* and his own; by "pleasing" them he also promotes their *Artha* and indirectly, his own, for his people will only yield him abundant taxes if they are prosperous. Also by pleasing them he promotes their *Kāma*, their pleasure, and indirectly his own. He is entitled to enjoy life to the full, in what time he can spare from his duties. For his is the "eater", the "enjoyer" (*bhoktr*) of his land and people.

The king's right to enjoy his land is expressed in his demand for taxes and the obsequious service of all his subjects when necessity demands. It is symbolized in the concept of the king as the husband of his land, expressed in the phrase commonly found in inscriptions: "Having won the sea-girt earth as a bride in a *svayamvara*"⁵ The textbooks on statecraft hardly mention this concept, but since it occurs frequently in inscriptions and literature it must have been influential.

⁵The free choice by a girl of a husband from among assembled suitors. This custom was an early one, and was rarely if ever followed in the period which we cover, but it was remembered in numerous legends and stories.

It is not always clear whether the king was thought of as the husband of the whole land and the living beings on it, or of the land alone, his subjects being his children by his wife, the Earth-mother. In some citations the former interpretation seems implied, but in general one would expect the latter. The common Sanskrit word for "subjects" is *prajā*, the first meaning of which is "progeny". Thus the whole kingdom, land, people, animals (who were also the king's subjects) and ruler, formed a great family of which the king was head.⁶

The concept of the kingdom as a family involved fairly obvious corollaries. The father is entitled to the respect and obedience of his children, who should assist and support him in every way. On the other hand he has very definite responsibilities towards them. He must ensure that they are fed, clothed, and trained in the family profession. He must care for their religious life and spiritual welfare, and must marry his daughters at puberty to suitable bridegrooms with the payment of dowries. Thus in ancient India we find the king fulfilling all these functions, even to providing dowries for the daughters of indigent parents. All children capable of earning their livings should contribute part of their earnings to the upkeep of the family as a whole, and taxation might be justified on this analogy. The paterfamilias has not, according to most systems of Indian law, complete rights over the family property. He should not sell it or transfer it to another owner arbitrarily, for it is not his property outright. He is rather the steward or manager on behalf of the family, which is a corporate entity including not only the living, but also the dead, who from heaven still participate in its religious feasts (*'srāddha*). Thus the king, while he was in a sense the owner of the whole land, has by custom only limited rights over it. In respect of recalcitrant family members the paterfamilias, in consultation with elder members of the family, had various sanctions at his disposal, the most drastic of which was the complete exclusion of the offending member, so that he lost all rights to the family property and all claims on the family for support. From the point of view of the family he was, at least in theory, a dead man. This may be paralleled by the king, after consulting with his officials, sentencing a criminal to death.

⁶For further development of this theme see a paper by Dr Ronald Inden (Chicago), "Ritual, authority and cyclic time in Hindu Kingship". This lengthy and very original paper reached me in draft form in 1976, and at the time of going to press I have no news of its publication.

It is hard, however, to find a political analogy to the practice of partition in the Hindu joint family. When the paterfamilias dies or retires from managership of the family property the headship normally passes to his eldest son, but it is possible for all the sons to ask for the equal division of the property, when they set up new families. This may be paralleled by the break up of larger empires (e.g. the Gurjara-Pratihāras, the Cālukyas of Kalyāṇi), and the establishment of powerful subordinate kings as completely independent sovereigns. We must emphasize that the analogy of kingdom and family was never worked out fully and explicitly, but the above paragraph may well reflect certain implicit assumptions in ancient and medieval India, which were more influential than is at first obvious.

The ideal king's relations with his wife, the Earth, show some analogies with the normal Hindu marital relationship. On the one hand the husband was entitled to the devoted service of his wife, but on the other he was expected to provide her with comforts, fine clothes and jewellery as far as his means permitted: thus the ideal king promoted agriculture, adorned his land with temples, and otherwise beautified it. While the husband had very wide rights over his wife, they were limited to some extent, for he could not lawfully kill her, sell her, or give her away; similarly the king was generally thought to be the owner of the land, but his rights of ownership were limited by convention, for he should not evict a peasant who paid his taxes and cultivated his land adequately. Far less had he the right to transfer the ownership of part or all of his territory to outsiders, unless, of course, compelled to do so by *force majeure*; he might give his officers the right to collect taxes, and certain other rights, in respect of a given area, but he was still the ultimate owner. As is shown in the next chapter, the doctrine of the royal ownership of the land became more influential with the passage of time.

It should be emphasized that all the rights and duties of king and subjects mentioned in the foregoing paragraphs were moral rights and duties only. There was no constitutional means whereby disgruntled subjects might enforce their rights against oppressive and negligent kings. If they did not rise in open revolt the only alternatives open to them were either to suffer silently or to pack up their possessions and move to another kingdom where conditions were better. In fact the latter practice seems to have been quite common in both ancient and medieval India and, strangely enough, we have no record

of a king forcibly preventing the emigration of groups of peasants from his territory or their immigration into it.

The king, as the husband of his land and the father of his people, was mystically linked with them by a supernatural bond, as husband and wife were, through the magic of the wedding ceremony, joined together in a superhuman union, which could not be broken in life and might even survive after death. The moral conduct of the king had effects on his land and people far deeper than the obvious ones. He was a kind of microcosm of the whole land, and his behaviour might therefore affect the health and fertility of the herds and crops, as well as of his human subjects. Irreligious conduct on the part of the king might even affect the weather.⁷ As in imperial China, drought, flood, plague, storm and earthquake might be blamed on the king, and lead to unrest among the populace.

The intimate connection of king, land and people seems to have had other corollaries, which are implicit in many of the royal panegyrics in numerous inscriptions found all over India. The king is praised, not only as a paragon of morality and piety and as a hero in battle, but also as a great lover, "the very incarnation of the God of Love". Passages of this type are so numerous that they cannot have been more than mere formalities, but at least they represent another aspect of the ideal of Hindu kingship. Such values can only be descended from the widespread conception among ancient peoples that the fertility of the crops and herds, and indeed of the human inhabitants of the land, was mystically linked with the virility and vitality of the chief or king. We know of no explicit statement to this effect in any text of this period, but the ancient Vedic *Vājapeya* sacrifice, which kings were strongly recommended to perform, was in essence a rejuvenation ceremony. Moreover it was quite common for aging or sick kings to resign their offices in favour of their sons. The practice of killing the king, when he was considered incapable of procreation, made so much of by Frazer, is not clearly attested in any Sanskrit or Pāli source known to us, though there are hints that it may occasionally have taken place in very early times. In his *Golden Bough*⁸ Frazer cites a few Indian examples, but these mainly refer to Dravidian-speaking chiefs of Kerala, and have little relevance to our subject.

⁷ Kalhana's *Rājatarāṅgiṇī*, the chronicle of Kashmir, attributes several floods, droughts and severe periods of cold to such causes (e.g. i, 246-66; ii, 50 ff).

⁸ *The Golden Bough* iii, 46-56. A few even less convincing legendary instances of ritually killing a king in North India are recorded in *Ibid.*, iii, 122-25, 154.

The king's relations with his neighbours were largely conditioned by the tradition of the great royal sacrifices, inherited from Vedic times, especially the horse sacrifice (*āsvamedha*), which involved the release of a horse to roam at will for a year. If it wandered into the territory of a neighbouring monarch he was compelled to do homage. Traditions such as this encouraged aggression, but discouraged annexation and the building of solid centralized empires. In post-Mauryan times the ideal of the great empire reaching from sea to sea was thoroughly established in the minds of Indian kings and their advisors. It crystallized in the concept of the *Cakravartin*, the "Wheel-turner", lord of all the land from the Himalayas to the Ocean, who conquered the whole of India in fair fight and became its overlord. In this ideal there was no conception of a strong centralized empire like that of China, but rather of producing a federation of kingdoms loosely subordinate to an emperor who was strong enough to be able to demand periodic tribute from them. The subordinate kings gave military assistance to the overlord in time of war, and the latter acted as arbiter in their disputes, but there was no question of direct annexation. For a king to make war on his neighbour, even with no other motive than aggrandisement, was looked on as right and proper; but his battles were to be waged according to a very chivalrous code of warfare calculated to mitigate unnecessary carnage and the sufferings of noncombatants, and he was instructed to replace conquered kings on their thrones as his subordinates. Breaches of this code were, according to the texts, utterly reprehensible, and resulted in severe suffering for many lives to come for the king who infringed it. Thus the Hindu ideology of kingship, though it encouraged royal ambitions, did not favour the building of an all-India empire. The unorthodox Mauryas had cared nothing for these precepts, and cases of direct annexation of conquered kingdoms are attested, notably under the early Guptas; but the Mauryas and Guptas were exceptional, and, though he may have had ambitions of becoming an all-India ruler, the Indian king in fact had in general to content himself with one region of the Sub-continent, beyond the borders of which other kings, often just as strong and ambitious as himself, were awaiting the opportunity to reduce him to vassalage.

In concluding this summary of the norms of pre-Muslim Indian kingship we must stress once more that they were norms only, and there is good evidence that they were frequently infringed. The aggrieved subject had no constitutional means of enforcing a claim

against the king, and the defeated monarch had no international court to which he could complain against the enemy who had broken the rules of Aryan warfare by burning his standing crops or looting his cities. Nevertheless, the benevolent and chivalrous precepts of ancient Indian statecraft have been wholly without effect. Our evidence for the day-to-day life of the Indian court is defective in many particulars, but from what we can gather it would seem that there were few Caligulas or Neros among the rulers of pre-Muslim India. On the other hand there is reason to believe that the Indian ideology of kingship was to some extent instrumental in producing a system of government which, at its best, was one of the most benevolent and urbane of antiquity.

Abbreviations

Ait. Brh.	Aitareya Brāhmana
Arth.	Kauṭīliya Arthaśāstra
D.N.	Dīgha Nikāya of the Pāli Canon
H.O.S.	Harvard Oriental Series
M.R.E.	Minor Rock Edict of Aśoka
R.E.	Major Rock Edict of Aśoka
S.B.E.	Sacred Books of the East
Tai. Brh.	Taittirīya Brāhmana
Tai. Sam.	Taittirīya Samhita of the Yajur Veda

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The Socio-Economic Bases of “Oriental Despotism” in Early India

R. S. Sharma

The pedigree of the idea of oriental despotism in Europe can be traced back to Plato and Aristotle. But it was only when the mercantilist and first-generation industrial powers had acquired colonies in India and other parts of Asia that the idea was popularized. Amongst others it is found in the writings of Adam Smith, Montesquieu, Richard Jones and Hegel, and was propagated by James Mill. They talked not only of oriental despotism but also of the unchanging East. Montesquieu postulates the immutability of laws, customs, manners and religion in the eastern countries,¹ and Hegel speaks of unchanging Hindus,² their one unbroken superstition,³ and stationary China and India.⁴ Evidently the idea of oriental despotism coupled with that of the unchanging character of the East infected not only the western orientalist of the second half of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries but also Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. What Marx and Engels really did was to discuss the different features of oriental despotism in their scattered writings and to link them up with the Asiatic mode of production, which was put forth as a reasoned explanation for oriental despotism. It would however, be wrong to attribute to the two thinkers any systematic and well-thought-out formulation of the Asiatic mode, for they kept on shifting their views, not only on its components, such as irrigation, absence of private property in land, autarchic villages, lack of towns, etc. but also on their relative importance. The problem of oriental despotism can only be studied by isolating and analysing these ingredients and by examining their applicability to ancient India.

We may begin with an ecological explanation of oriental despotism given by Montesquieu. As he puts it: “In Asia they have

¹ *The Spirit of the Laws*, tr. Thomas Nugent (Hafner, New York, 1949), i, p.225.

² *Philosophy of History*, tr. J. Sibree (New York, 1944), p.154.

³ *Ibid.*, p.167

⁴ *Ibid.*, p.173

always had great empires; in Europe these could never subsist. Asia has larger plains; it is cut out into much more extensive divisions by mountains and seas. ... Power in Asia ought, then, to be always despotic; for if their slavery was not severe they would make a division inconsistent with the nature of the country".⁵ This geographical factor leading to despotism cannot be applied to India. India, unlike Egypt, is not the gift of one river. Geographically several viable territorial units could be formed in pre-industrial India, and its history attests this process. If there are many units one would act as a check on the other. Montesquieu buttresses his theory of oriental despotism by emphasizing the unchanging character of the laws, customs, manners and religion of India. He states that the Indians easily succumb to all kinds of impressions,⁶ and once an impression is formed it cannot be easily wiped out. There is no change in laws, customs and manners because the Indians are indolent in both body and mind, and hence prone to inaction.⁷ This again is attributed to the excessive heat of the climate, which deprives the body of all vigour and strength.⁸ Montesquieu's ecological explanations of the inaction and submissiveness of the Indians should not detain us long.

But another explanation which is both ecological and sociological deserves more attention. The need for irrigation in arid zones is sometimes put forward as the main cause of oriental despotism.⁹ It is stated that irrigation facilities could not be organized by individual families or local authorities, but only by a strong central authority. The point has been developed in the theory of hydraulic despotism. Irrigation maintenance required a large number of officers so that bureaucracy became an important element in the Asiatic mode of production or in oriental despotism. The applicability of the irrigation theory to medieval India has been rightly questioned.¹⁰ Even theoretically, irrigation is not considered to be a monocausal explanation for centralization and despotism by anthropologists who have examined

⁵ *The Spirit of the Laws*, i. 269

⁶ *Ibid.*, ii, 224-25

⁷ *Ibid.*, 225

⁸ *Ibid.*, 224

⁹ Karl Marx, *Historical Writings*, i. (Bombay, 1944), 593

¹⁰ Irfan Habib, "An Examination of Wittfogel's Theory of Oriental Despotism", *Studies in Asian History*, Proceedings of the Asian History Conference held in Delhi, 1961 (Asia, 1969), pp.378-92.

its relevance in non-Indian contexts.¹¹ This has led some recent exponents of this theory to revise their stand,¹² and consider irrigation as one of the several factors leading to centralization.

Only the north-western part of the Indian sub-continent is arid, otherwise its major part has plenty of rain, which certainly must have been greater in ancient times when there was not so much deforestation. Irrigation would be needed still, but it could be a communal, a provincial or a central responsibility, as was the case under the Mauryas. There is nothing to show that a large bureaucracy developed in Maurya times in response to the needs of irrigation. Kauṭilya mentions about thirty departmental heads and eighteen high officers, all of whom are needed for looking after various economic and administrative activities, but none is provided for irrigation. The governors of Saurashtra took steps to repair the embankment of the Sudarśana lake under the Mauryas. The inscriptions of Rudradāman and the Guptas also show that irrigation was a provincial responsibility. Evidence of family and communal construction of irrigation works is not lacking.¹³

Basing his argument on Colebrooke's *Digest of Hindu Law*, which emphasizes the sovereign's proprietary right to the land on the strength of conquest, Richard Jones (1830-31) made the point that from brahmanical times onwards the sovereign had the right to the ownership of all the land¹⁴ and that all subordinate peasant (ryot) rights were either rendered precarious on account of constant war or else were completely nullified by the king, who was the strongest person in the realm.¹⁵ Since everybody depended for his livelihood on the sovereign, who was the sole proprietor of land, this perpetuated Asiatic despotism, which did not have any intermediate and independent classes.¹⁶ The thread was resumed by Karl Marx, who at the

¹¹William P. Mitchell, "The Hydraulic Hypothesis: A Reappraisal", *Current Anthropology*, xiv (Dec. 1973), 532-34.

¹²Steward, who advanced the irrigation hypothesis in 1949 (Wittfogel first did it in 1955), revised it later. *Ibid.* 532, fn. 2. For a summary as well as a theoretical critique of Wittfogel's hydraulic despotism, see Barry Hindess and Paul Q. Hirst; *Pre-Capitalist Modes of Production* (London, 1975), pp. 207-20.

¹³R. S. Sharma, *Light on Early Indian Society and Economy* (Bombay, 1966), Ch. VIII.

¹⁴Rev. Richard Jones, *An Essay on the Distribution of Wealth and on the Sources of Taxation* (Reprint, New York, 1956), p. 114.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 114-15

¹⁶*Ibid.*, p. 113

initial stage accepted Bernier's theory regarding royal proprietorship of all land in India. Marx looked upon the absence of private property in land as the key to the understanding of the Asian system.¹⁷ Later he came to stress the communal ownership of land, and eventually he seems to have realized that the question was not so simple. It has been ably shown that Marx recognised three forms of land tenure in India: (i) communal property, the "original form" of tenure which had survived in certain Indian villages; (ii) "private property" in the region south of the Krishna which had not come under British rule; and (iii) feudal property in areas such as Oudh, where tax-collectors had developed into feudal landholders on account of weakness in the central government.¹⁸ Of these the first two relate to ancient India, and there is some evidence for them in both texts and inscriptions.¹⁹ However in early medieval times there is strong evidence for the royal ownership of land,²⁰ as well as for some kind of feudal property in land.

Evidence for royal ownership of land in ancient times is weak. Under the all-powerful Kautilyan state royal ownership seems to have been enforced only in the waste lands, in which new rural settlements were founded and peasants allotted arable lands for life. However, the situation began to change in Maharashtra from the second century A.D. and over a considerable part of the country from the Gupta period. The royal right to grant land was extended to cultivable areas situated in the personal domain of the king. The term *rajakam khetam* (cultivable land under the king's possession) occurs as early as the second century in a Sātavāhana grant.²¹ Eventually the grants were extended to revenue-paying lands held by the peasants, so that the superior rights of the king covered all the three categories of land—waste, royal domain and revenue-paying (the last two belonging to the cultivable category).

The first important indication of the process by which the king claimed ownership of the soil is found in Manu, who calls the king *mahīpati* or lord of the soil;²² later Kātyāyana calls him *bhūsvāmin*

¹⁷ *Capital*, iii (Moscow, 1962), 771-72.

¹⁸ R.A.L.H. Gunawardana, "The Analysis of Pre-Colonial Social Formations in Asia in the Writings of Karl Marx", *The Indian Historical Review*, ii (1976), 377.

¹⁹ R.S. Sharma, *Indian Feudalism: c.300-1200* (University of Calcutta, 1965), Ch. IV.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ D. C. Sircar, *Select Inscriptions* i (Calcutta, 1965), no. 84, line 4.

²² VIII, 39.

or owner of the earth.²³ The synonyms for the term king found in Sanskrit and Jaina Sanskrit *kāvya*s are significant. The terms *kṣitīndra*, *kṣitīśa*, *kṣitipati*, *urvīpati*, *prthvipati*, *vasudheśvara*, *mahībhuk*, *mahīpati*, etc. represent him rather as the lord of the land than the protector or lord of the people. The use of such terms becomes common in early medieval law-books, which emphasize royal lordship over the land. The literary texts of early medieval times make the point that earth is like a wife to the king, meant for enjoyment. Hence the principle of possession and enjoyment rather than that of royal service, sovereignty and protection becomes the basis of the king's claiming taxes, both proper and improper, in this period.

Royal ownership of arable and revenue-paying lands in early medieval times is supported by the fact that the king claimed *bhoga*, *bhogakara* or *rājakīya bhoga*.²⁴ Initially *bhoga* stood for periodical supplies of fuel, flowers, fruits and similar things given by the peasants to the king; then gradually it came to include eight or eleven types of *bhoga* embracing the enjoyment of all possible agrarian resources.²⁵ The absence of *bhoga* in Kauṭilya's enumeration of taxes to be collected from the rural areas is as striking as that of Kauṭilya's *sītā* (income from crown lands directly cultivated by the king's agents) in the land grants. *Bhoga* is invariably used in the sense of possession or enjoyment, and is repeatedly mentioned in the *smṛtis* (legal texts) in that sense, either singly or in combination with other terms. It is therefore most likely that the king demanded *bhoga* from the peasant on the plea that the land lay within his overall possession (*bhoga/bhukti*).

But in addition to royal rights over land there developed in early medieval times feudal property in land. The king's dominion over the soil was limited by the intermediate landlords he created. In the earliest grants only the royal right to revenues was transferred, but in later grants the royal right to the enjoyment of all agrarian resources was transferred. What is more significant, the beneficiaries were given the right of evicting the existing cultivators and getting the lands enjoyed and cultivated by others. Naturally royal charters, called *śāsanas*, were bound to lead to land disputes between the

²³Verse 16.

²⁴For references see U.N. Ghoshal, *Contributions to the History of the Hindu Revenue System* (Calcutta, 1972), p. 394.

²⁵*Ibid.*

beneficiaries and peasants, and in such cases the king respected his charters. Medieval legal texts enjoin that, in trying a suit, if there are differences between *dharma* (law), *vyavahāra* (agreement), *caritra* (custom) and *śāsana* (royal ordinance), the last should override all the three other sources of authority.²⁶ Most probably this rule applied to land disputes which arose out of peasant claims to granted lands. Such disputes would be decided mainly on the strength of royal charters or *śāsanas*, and not so much on the basis of the other types of titles to the land. All the religious and secular beneficiaries who were granted lands by the king developed their own rights in these lands, as distinct from those of the king and peasants. So the fact that the king becomes the greatest landowner in the early medieval phase does not lead to royal despotism, for his power is restricted by the lesser landlords he creates and by the revenue officials who turn into hereditary landlords. The king could possibly intervene in an effective manner in the conflict between the peasants and beneficiaries, but of that we have no evidence. And then there were remnants of communal rights. Conflicts between these different types of land rights would pose problems for the stability of government. It is held that the combination of sovereignty and ownership of land in the person of the king led to oriental despotism. But there is nothing to show that this happened either in ancient or medieval India, for royal ownership had to contend with feudal property and peasant property.

An important ingredient of, and explanation for, "oriental despotism" is the self-sufficiency of villages, which led to the "unchanging" character of Indian society presided over by a despot. The idea was first advanced by Hegel. Hegel speaks of a fixed and immutable arrangement, subject to no one's will, existing in the villages, with the result that all political resolutions become matters of indifference to the common Hindu, "for his lot is unchanged". The arrangement may be described in his words:

The whole income belonging to every village is, as already stated, divided into two parts, of which one belongs to the Rājah, the other to the cultivators; but proportionate shares are also received by the Provost of the place, the Judge, the Water-Surveyor, the Brahmin who superintends religious worship, the Astrologer (who is also a Brahmin, and announces the days of good and ill

²⁶ Kātyāyana, quoted in Laxman Shastri Joshi, *Dharmakośa*, vol. i, Pt. I (Wai, 1937), 103; Harīta, quoted *ibid.* 106; Bṛhaspati quoted *ibid.* 99. To me it appears that a similar verse in *Arthasāstra*, III. 1 is a later insertion.

omen), the Smith, the Carpenter, the Potter, the Washerman, the Barber, the Physician, the Dancing Girls, the Musician, the Poet. ²⁷

As is well known, on this basis as well as on the basis of the early nineteenth century reports of some British officials, Karl Marx developed the theory of the self-sufficiency and autarchy of villages based on a happy combination of crafts and agriculture, which freed them from economic dependence on the outside world. Artisans did not have any “market” outside their village. These microcosms led a passive and vegetative life, and were incapable of combining horizontally, with the result that the oriental despot reigned supreme over them.²⁸ Recently the theory has been taken over by anthropologists and refined into the *jajmānī* system. But it would be wrong to postulate that the Indian social structure was based on this system from ancient times. Only in the Maurya period some kind of oriental despotism with a sizeable bureaucracy can be noticed, but the system was not exclusively based on the taxes collected from peasants living in self-sufficient villages. The contribution of state production, carried on with the help of slaves and wage labour in farms and elsewhere, seems to have been significant. Although the surplus was collected from the countryside, which also included state farms (*śītā*), urban settlements (*dhurga*) inhabited by artisans and traders formed a good source of income. In fact far more sources of taxes are mentioned under the urban head than under the rural one. These were supplemented by income from mining activities (*khanī*).²⁹ The detailed laws of Kauṭilya against the undesirable activities of artisans (*kāruka-rakṣaṇam*)³⁰ and traders (*vaidehaka-rakṣaṇam*)³¹ underline the importance of artisanal production. Obviously the commodities produced by state artisans and by guilds of artisans were used not only by people living in towns but also in the countryside.

Generally speaking, till Gupta times artisans and traders were mostly associated with towns, as would appear from Kauṭilya’s plan regarding the foundation of cities. In the settled, developed areas, clusters of villages seem to have existed around towns which satisfied their artisanal and other needs, such as cloth, oil, salt and agricultural

²⁷Hegel, *Philosophy of History*, p.154

²⁸Karl Marx, *Historical Writings*, i, 594-96; *Capital*, i (Moscow, 1965), 357-58

²⁹*Arthaśāstra*, II.6

³⁰*Ibid.*, IV.1

³¹*Ibid.*, IV.2

implements, in return for raw material, foodgrains, and cash payment. Kauṭilya provides for the establishment of various types of urban centres in the midst of villages. The theory that in India towns were princely camps superimposed upon a predominantly agricultural population without having any organic relation with it may not apply to ancient times. The continued existence of a good number of towns in north India from the fifth century B.C. to the third century A.D. and even later cannot be doubted. Archaeology, inscriptions and classical texts refer to several towns in western India, all connected with crafts and commerce, in the two centuries before and after Christ. Merchants from the Deccan evince a sense of pride in their cities, inasmuch as they mention them along with their names. The decline of trade and towns seems to have started in Gupta times and become marked in the post-Gupta phase.³² It is in this period that we notice many princely military camps called *skandhāvāras*, nine of the Pālas and twenty-one of the Candellas, from which land charters were issued.

With the decline of trade and towns in early medieval times artisans dispersed to the countryside and contributed to the formation of autarchic villages. A good deal of peasant needs were supplied by village artisans, who were remunerated at each harvest in fixed quantities of foodgrains. Big temples and landed magnates, living on rents collected from the peasant tenants, obtained the services of artisans in return for grants of land, with the result that artisans lost mobility and became more dependent on agriculture. Thus in early medieval times villagers obtained what they needed through the *jajmānī* system. However, all economic activities were not covered by this system, and occasional market fairs (*haṭṭa*) run by pedlars were held to meet the needs of the countryside. The *jajmānī* system therefore has neither been typical of India in all ages and all periods, nor all-pervasive even in the middle ages. Self-sufficient units seem to have originated and proliferated in medieval times, but they do not seem to have been so passive as they are depicted.

The concept of Asiatic despotism presupposes the absence of an exploiting class apart from the king and his bureaucracy.³³ Even those

³²R. S. Sharma, "Decay of Gangetic Towns in Gupta and post-Gupta Times", *Journal of Indian History* Golden Jubilee Volume, Trivandrum, 1973, pp.135-50.

³³For a theoretical critique see Hindess and Hirst, *Pre-Capitalist Modes of Production*, pp.197-99.

who argue for the limiting role of *dharma* ignore its class character. In the ancient Indian system the king was a member of the warrior-noble order. To us it seems that the exploiting orders were symbolized by *brahma* (priests) and *kṣatra* (warrior-nobles). The two upper orders may not have been in effective possession of land, the chief means of production, but the *varṇa* system was devised in such a way that taxes and tribute collected from the peasants, artisans and traders could be used to maintain them. The fact that the two upper orders did not have to pay taxes in the age of the Buddha is significant. Naturally the two orders were allied to the king for the protection of the rights and privileges conferred on them by the *varṇa* system as against the *vaiśyas* and *śūdras*. The two upper orders were opposed to the king when their rights and privileges were threatened from above. But by and large the texts stress the collaboration between these two classes. Constitutionally there may not have been any check on royal authority except the body of the *brāhmaṇas* which was called on to interpret *dharma*, but socially the king dare not ignore the power behind the throne. The Asiatic stereotype suggests the helplessness of the rural population in the face of royal despotism, but the Buddhist and brāhmaṇical texts mention several popular revolts led by the *brāhmaṇas* against the king. In the early Christian centuries there slowly emerges a class of landed magnates, mostly *brāhmaṇas*, as a result of land grants. In post-Gupta times they were supplemented by secular grantees. Although the landed beneficiaries do not seem to have formed a well-articulated class, they did constitute an important segment of the ruling order and certainly were a check on the power of the king.

The reason why the theory of oriental despotism was propounded by most western scholars is evident to students of the colonial history of India. It was woe to serve as a garb for colonial aggression. A disappointed French patriot and orientalist called Anquetil-Duperron writes: “Despotism is the government in these countries, where the sovereign declares himself the proprietor of all the goods of his subjects: let us become that sovereign, and we will be the master of all the lands of Hindustan. Such is the reasoning of avid greed, concealed behind a façade of pretexts which must be demolished”.³⁴ Obviously in adopting the theory of oriental despotism Karl Marx was deeply

³⁴ *Legislation Orientale* (1778), p. 178 quoted in Perry Anderson, *Lineages of the Absolutist State* (London 1975), pp. 465-66, fn. 9.

influenced by Hegel and by colonialist writers in India. But significantly enough he tried to explain oriental despotism in terms of the mode of production and not in terms of psychological make-up of the Hindus, as was done by Montesquieu and Hegel.

Ours is a preliminary examination of the socio-economic assumptions underlying the theory of "oriental despotism" in the light of the existing historical evidence from early India. We have touched upon such features as irrigation, royal ownership of land, self-sufficient villages, lack of towns, absence of intermediate classes, etc. It appears that generalizations regarding despotism in ancient India not only over-reached the existing evidence but were often even subjectively motivated. Of course it is easy to criticise theories of oriental despotism propounded in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries on account of the subsequent advance in historical research. But the theory of oriental despotism is not yet a dead horse, and is now being resuscitated by injecting a dose of religion into it. However our understanding can advance if we examine the social and economic formations in early India. In this respect credit must be given to Karl Marx for posing the problem of Asiatic despotism in quite a different manner, and thus making us think about the socio-economic bases of the state in India and other parts of Asia in ancient times. If orientalists, who have the advantage of keeping very close to the sources, get interested in the larger aspects of "despotism", they can make an effective contribution to the subject.

Ancient Kingship in Mainland Southeast Asia

M.C. Subhadradis Diskul

Mainland Southeast Asia has a fertile tropical climate subjected to the monsoon seasons which are favourable for wet rice cultivation. The seasonal changing of the winds after the monsoons also influenced navigation in the old days, the southwest wind from June to September and the northeast from November to April. From Yunnan in southern China four large rivers flow down into mainland Southeast Asia: the Mekong in the east, the Ménam and its four tributaries in the centre, the Salween and the Irrawadi in the west. Topographically, in the east there is a coastal plain which used to be the site of the ancient kingdom of Champa, and which is now the country of Vietnam. To the west of that narrow plain rises a mountain range and then a plateau which is now the country of Laos. Near the mouth of the Mekong river lies the large and productive Tonle sap (the Great-Lake) and a vast plain which was originally the site of the kingdom of Fou Nan or Fu-nan and later on of the powerful Khmer empire. The basin of the Menam river, also a fertile area, became the site of the Dvaravati kingdom and is at present the site of Thailand. Another long mountain range runs down from north to south into the Malay Peninsula. On the west of this mountain chain is another vast terrain which used to be the site of the Pyu kingdom in the north and that of the Mon in the south. It is now the country of Burma. All these ancient kingdoms except Fu-nan, which had existed from about the beginning of the Christian era, first appear in Chinese chronicles about the sixth or seventh century A.D. In ancient times the Menam, Salween and Irrawadi rivers, but not the Mekong, were much used for communication, as were the eastern and western coasts, bordered by the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean respectively.

For ancient kingship on mainland Southeast Asia we must first mention the most important influence, that of India. The contact between India and Southeast Asia may have begun much earlier, but it became more intense about the beginning of the Christian era. Archaeological evidence of this contact does not, however, antedate the second century A.D. Indian merchants probably came to seek

spices and gold and with them came also Buddhist monks and the brahmins of Hinduism. Inter-marriage between the Indians and the local people, especially if the daughter of a chief of a local tribe was involved, would have helped tremendously to propagate Indian civilization. The natives of Southeast Asia presumably did not find Indian culture very different from their own, since they may have had some contact with India even in the pre-Aryan period, and their cultures derived from the same common monsoon source. Southeast Asian natives, after their return from a sojourn or study in India, would also have been among the best propagators of Indian civilization. It is probably through this process that kingship arose in mainland Southeast Asia after the Indian pattern, except in Vietnam, which will be mentioned in the last part of this paper. There were probably two ways in which kingship was formed in mainland Southeast Asia. The first was when an Indian married the daughter of a local chief and then set himself up as king, as happened in the establishment of the kingdom of Fu-nan. The second was when a local chief called in Indian brahmins to perform rites for him according to Indian custom, a process illustrated by many cases in Indonesia. The Indian influence mostly came from the southern part of the country, but other parts of the sub-continent also contributed. It appears that it was largely relayed via the Malay Peninsula, as is indicated in Chinese chronicles.

In prehistoric times, before the arrival of Indian influence, the people of Southeast Asia were presumably animists and used to worship their gods on a high place such as a mountain top. When states came to be set up after the Indian pattern, the gods from many sites came to be united under a supreme god, who was usually identified with the great god Śiva of Hinduism. This transformation can be seen clearly in the kingdom of Fu-nan. This change of cult, however, seems to have occurred only as far as high class people were concerned. The lower still remained animist, though later they adopted Buddhism as their national religion. In more general terms, Indian civilization only affected the high class people, while the lower ones still remained what they used to be. With this introduction, we discuss ancient kingship in mainland Southeast Asia kingdom by kingdom, according to geographical position and chronology.

Fu-nan and the Khmer empire

It is now disputed whether the original cradle of the kingdom of

Fu-nan was in the central part of Thailand or in the southern part of Cambodia. The kingdom existed from about the first century to the sixth century A.D. in the lower valley of the Mekong and most of our knowledge of it comes from Chinese chronicles. According to Professor Georges Coedès, the eminent epigraphist and historian of Southeast Asia, the name Fu-nan probably means "mountain" and has some connection with the cult of worshipping the supreme god on a mountain top as mentioned. The kingdom originated from the marriage of an Indian brahman to the daughter of a local chief. According to the Chinese sources, a king of Fu-nan in the second century attacked and conquered the neighbouring kingdom; all gave allegiance to him. He took the title of Great King of Fu-nan. Then he had great ships built, and, after crossing the wide seas, he attacked more than ten kingdoms. Professor Coedès took this passage to mean that from the beginning Fu-nan was organized after the manner of an Indian kingdom, governed by a *mahārāja* with surrounding vassal states.

The Chinese chronicles mention that the people of Fu-nan were all ugly, black, and frizzy-haired, and went about naked and barefoot. They practised agriculture (a network of canals can still be seen from the air on the land that once formed the Fu-nan empire), and were fond of engraving ornaments and of carving. Taxes were paid in gold, silver, pearls and perfumes. They had books and depositories of archives, their writing being like that of the Hu (Indian script). Slavery was practised and raids carried out against neighbours to keep up the supply of slaves. There was trade in gold, silver, and silk, and gold rings, bracelets, and silver vessels were made. The king lived in a multi-storeyed palace and the common people in dwellings built on piles and roofed with the leaves of a large bamboo growing by the seashores. There were long boats, the bows and sterns of which were like the heads and tails of fish. The king rode about on an elephant. The pastimes of the people were cock-fighting and pig-fighting. There was trial by ordeal. They did not dig wells by their dwellings, but shared a pool, from which they drew water, between several tens of families (a practice later also followed by the Khmer). They had a custom of worshipping the deities of the sky. When the king sat down, he squatted with the right knee raised and the left on the ground (the Indian *mahārājāsīla* attitude). A piece of cotton cloth was spread before him, on which were placed gold vases and incense-burners. For mourning it was customary to shave the hair and beard. There

were four ways of disposing of the dead: by throwing the corpse into the river, by burning it to ashes, by burning it in a trench, and by exposing it to the birds. It was the custom to worship the god Maheśvara (Śiva), who ceaselessly descended upon Mount Mo-tan.

From the above descriptions one notes that the king of Fu-nan lived and ruled after the Indian pattern, and Indian religions were practised. Both Hinduism and Buddhism are attested by Sanskrit inscriptions. The people, however, though influenced by Indian customs and religious activities, still maintained their primitive way of life and remained more or less animist.

The kingdom of Fu-nan presumably reached its zenith in the late fifth century, and from the second half of the sixth it began to be attacked by its former vassal state, Chen-la, the precursor of the Khmer empire.

Here we may mention two kingdoms on the Malay Peninsula where the Chinese chronicles also point to a form of ancient kingship after the Indian pattern during the fifth and sixth centuries A.D. One of them, Lang-ya-hstu or Langkasuka, is described in the *History of the Liang*, where it is stated that the inhabitants, men and women, let their hair hang loose and wore sleeveless garments of a material they called *kan-man*, whose fibre was *ki-pei* cotton. The king and the dignitaries of the kingdom added over this a piece of dawn-red material which covered the upper part of the back between the shoulders. They girded their loins with a cord of gold and suspended gold rings from their ears. The women adorned themselves with beautiful scarves enriched with precious stones. The walls in this country were built of brick. The houses had double doors and terraces with pavilions surmounting them. The king left his palace seated on an elephant, sheltered under a white canopy, preceded by drums and banners, and surrounded by ferocious-looking soldiers.

Another state named P'an-p'an, to the north of Langkasuka, was recorded by the Chinese chronicler Ma Tuan-lin, who stated that most of the people lived on the shores of the sea. These barbarians did not know how to build defensive walls; they were content to set up palisades. The king half reclined on a golden couch shaped like a dragon. The important persons of his entourage went on their knees before him, bodies straight and arms crossed in such a way that the hands rested on the shoulders. At his court one saw many brahmins, who had come from India to profit from his munificence and were

very much in favour with him. In P'an-p'an there were also ten monasteries for monks and nuns who studied the sacred books of Buddhism, and who ate meat but did not drink wine. There was also a Taoist monastery. The rules of the latter were very strict; these monks abstained from both meat and wine.

As for the early Khmer empire, or Chen-la as it was called by the Chinese, according to the inscriptions of the tenth century, its kings claimed to be descended from mythical ancestors, the hermit Kambu and the celestial nymph Mera. The original cradle of Chen-la may have been near the present town of Bassac or Champasak in Laos, where there is on the summit of a hill nearby a huge natural *linga* in the form of a monolith, called in Sanskrit Bhadreśvara. This kingdom later on supplanted Fu-nan. A Chinese text describes the kingdom of Chen-la in the first half of the seventh century. The king resided in the capital city which contained over 20,000 families. In the centre of the city there was a great hall where the king gave audience and held his court. The kingdom contained thirty other cities, each with a population of several thousand families, and each administered by a governor; the titles of the state officials were the same as those of Lin-i (Champā). Those who appeared before the king touched the ground three times with their foreheads at the foot of the steps to the throne. If the king called them to him and commanded them to mount the steps, they then knelt down with their arms crossed and their hands resting on their shoulders. Then they sat in a circle round the king and deliberated on the affairs of the kingdom. When the discussion was over, they knelt again, prostrated themselves once more, and withdrew. Only the sons of the queen who was the legitimate wife of the king were eligible as heirs to the throne. The people regarded the right hand as pure and the left as impure. They performed ablutions each morning, cleaned their teeth with small pieces of wood, and never forgot to read or recite their prayers. They performed ablutions again before each meal, used their wooden toothpicks after it, and again said a prayer. When a death occurred, the offspring of the deceased went seven days without eating, shaved the head as a sign of mourning, and made loud cries of lament. The corpse was burnt on a pyre made up of all kinds of aromatic woods; the ashes were placed in a gold or silver urn which was thrown into deep water. The poor made do with an urn of terracotta painted in many colours. Some simply left the corpse in the open to be devoured by wild beasts.

Here again one can detect Indian influence, both on the royal court and on the population in general.

In the eighth century Chen-la was divided into two states and there was trouble in the country. King Jayavarman II (802-805) came back from Java and united the country. He is generally regarded as the builder of the Khmer empire. He performed the rite of becoming a universal monarch by receiving from a brahman, on the hill of the great Indra (Mahendraparvata or the hill of Phnom Kulen), the *linga* symbolizing his royal power, and was thus liberated from all dependence upon Java. With this act he initiated the Devarāja or the god-king cult, which continued to be observed by all the succeeding Khmer monarchs, though from the eleventh to the thirteenth centuries the *linga* representing Śiva might be changed to a statue of Viṣṇu, or of the Buddha in Mahāyāna Buddhism prevailed. From this time onwards one can learn from stone inscriptions, both in Sanskrit and in the Khmer language, that after his accession on the throne the Khmer king would perform three duties: having a large reservoir dug for irrigation purposes, building a small sanctuary containing images in dedication to his ancestors, and constructing a temple-mountain for the enshrinement of his personal *linga* in order to affirm his power. This temple might become his mausoleum after his death. At the end of the ninth century the capital city of the Khmers was moved to the town of Angkor near the Great Lake. The country became prosperous because of irrigated agriculture, but unfortunately the stone inscriptions mostly inform us only about the religious activities of the kings and dignitaries. Systematic research on inscriptions in the Khmer language and on objects discovered from archaeological excavations may one day shed more light on the local population. From the Sanskrit stone inscriptions one learns that the whole political organization of the country was centred on the king, who established order and was the final judge of disputes between his subjects. He was the protector of religions (Hinduism and Buddhism) and of religious foundations. He defended the country against its enemies without, and ensured peace within by imposing on everyone the obligation to respect the social order, which consisted in the division of the entire population into various classes and corporations according to hereditary occupation. The king, following the Indian pattern of kingship, was a god on earth, the representative of Indra, king of the gods. Whenever there was a usurpation, the usurper would try his best to have his genealogy connected with the old dynasty.

The capital of the kingdom was a representation in miniature of the universe with its encircling mountain chain and ocean. Its centre was marked by the temple-mountain in the form of a terraced pyramid, a replica of Mount Meru, the cosmic mountain. The important offices were held by members of the royal family, while the posts of chaplain to the king and tutor to the young princes were reserved for the members of several great brahman families and were inherited through the female line, usually by a sister's son or a younger brother. The brahman families could intermarry with the royal family, and brahmins and princes formed a class apart, above the mass of the people, and were the educated sector of society through which Indian culture was perpetuated. From the inscriptions it appears that there was a whole hierarchy of officials, indicative of a strongly centralized and fully staffed administrative system. They reveal little about the life of the common people such as the peasants and the villagers, except that many of them were brought into service to look after the shrines and hermitages which were constantly being founded all over the country through the piety of the ruling classes. This construction of religious foundations, however, was used as one means to develop the deserted land, as, after the completion of the construction, villages had to be created in order to maintain these religious establishments.

King Jayavarman VII, the last great monarch of the Khmer empire, who ruled at the end of the twelfth and early in the thirteenth century A.D., apart from constructing the new capital of Angkor Thom and building many foundations for Mahāyāna Buddhism, his favoured religion, built and maintained 102 hospitals scattered throughout the kingdom, set up 101 rest-houses for pilgrims placed at regular intervals along the roads, and constructed roads linking the capital with the main provincial centres. We have, however, to wait until 1296-97 to learn about the customs and daily life of the Khmer population, from the Chinese envoy Chou Ta-Kuan. His description more or less confirms what we have learned from the stone inscriptions.

The Khmer kingdom began to lose its power from the late thirteenth century onwards. One factor in the decline was probably the large schemes of construction executed by the Khmer monarchs. This wasted manpower and weakened the economy of the country. The kingdom began to be attacked by the newly founded Thai state of Sukhothai in the late thirteenth century, and Angkor Thom was captured by the army of the new Thai kingdom of Ayudhya in 1431. This event brought about the end of the already declining Khmer empire and the

beginning of the present-day Cambodia, which in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries received strong influence from the Thai both in its politics and in its way of life.

Srīkṣetra and Burma

In the territory between the Irrawadi and the Salween in western mainland Southeast Asia, from about the second century A.D. there existed the kingdom of the Mon in the south and that of the Pyu in the middle, near the present town of Prome. The kingdom of the Pyu was called by the Chinese pilgrims of the seventh century Śrīkṣetra. They also attested that two Buddhist sects coexisted there: the Theravāda, whose language was Pāli, and the Mūlasarvāstivāda, whose language was Sanskrit. The names of the kings written on their funerary urns follow the Indian tradition by ending in *-vikrama* or *-varman*. The Chinese chronicles say of the Pyu kingdom in the early ninth century that the walls embracing the area of the capital were built of brick with a coping of green enamel, and that they were pierced by a dozen gates, fortified with towers at the corners, and surrounded by a moat lined with bricks. The population numbered several tens of thousands of families, and the houses were decorated with plaques of lead or of tin. There were over a hundred Buddhist monasteries, where children of both sexes were given religious instruction until their twentieth year. The people were forbidden by the tenets of their Buddhist faith to wear silk, which can only be obtained at the cost of the lives of silkworms. No shackles, manacles, or instruments of torture were ever used, and accused persons were merely bound. Those found guilty received no greater punishment than some strokes of a bamboo on the back. Only homicide was punished with the death penalty. They traded with neighbouring countries, to whom they sold white cloth and earthenware jars. They had native forms of music and dance.

From architectural remains one can perceive that the Indian influence in the Pyu country came from northeastern India, where the influence of Buddhism was stronger than that of Hinduism. About the Mon country in the south not very much is known, except that the people also professed Buddhism of the Theravāda sect and had connections with northeastern India.

In the early ninth century the Pyu kingdom of Śrīkṣetra began to decline and the Burmese of Pagan in the north increased in power.

In the eleventh century they absorbed the Pyu and conquered the Mon in the south. Here one event should be related. The Burmese chronicles place the beginning of Pagan in the second century. At first it was a group of nineteen villages, each with its *nat* or local god. When the villages were combined to form a single city, the king, with the consent of his subjects, inaugurated the cult of a *nat* to be worshipped by all in common, whose status was above that of the local gods, in order to unite the various tribes into a national entity by means of the common cult. Mount Poppa, an extinct volcano not far from the city, which was already regarded as sacred by the Burmese, was the site chosen for the worship of twin gods, Min Mahāgiri, 'Lord of the Great Mountain', and his sister Taung-gyi Shin, a Burmese name with the same meaning. This information is interesting, as it again repeats the theme of the union of many local gods into a single great one on a mountain when a kingdom was formed. In this respect the Khmer advanced one step further than the Burmese by identifying this great god with Śiva, probably because of the influence of Hinduism.

Pagan was captured by a Chinese army under Mongol generals in 1287, and from that time onwards there were many Burmese dynasties ruling from various capitals. Though they ruled as absolute monarchs after the original Indian pattern, they were probably more or less bound by the ten kingly virtues in the *Dhammasattha*, which will be described later in detail in the part concerning Thailand.

Dvāravatī and Thailand

Of the Dvāravatī kingdom, which controlled the central part of the present-day Thailand from about the seventh to the eleventh century A.D., we hardly know anything except that the majority of the population were probably Mon and they professed Buddhism of the Theravāda sect. Chinese chronicles mention the name only, and say nothing about the population or the administration. Dvāravatī cultural influence, based on Theravada Buddhism, however, spread far and wide.

The Thai had originally lived in south-eastern China and they may have migrated down to the present-day Thailand much earlier, but only in minority groups. They were strong enough to declare their independence in the thirteenth century. They had been animists, but after they had moved down to mainland Southeast Asia and had been

in contact with the Mon, they turned to Buddhism of the Theravāda sect, which they still profess at the present time. Patriarchal administration has always been favoured by the Thai, as we can gather from passages in the first Thai stone inscription of the Sukhothai kingdom in 1292: "The ruler does not levy a tax on the people who travel along the road together, leading their oxen on the way to trade and riding their horses on the way to sell. Whoever wants to trade in elephants, so trades. Whoever wants to trade in horses, so trades. Whosoever wants to trade in silver and gold, so trades. When a commoner, noble or prince is dead and deceased, let his ancestral home, his clothes, his elephants, his family, his rice granaries, his servants and his ancestral groves of areca-nut and betel all devolve on his children. If commoners, nobles or princes have a difference and dispute, (the King) makes a true investigation and then only does he decide the matter for his subjects uprightly, without siding with him who steals or showing preference for him who conceals. On seeing the rice of others, he has no covetous desire. On seeing the wealth of others, he has no self-seeking desire. To anyone who comes on an elephant to see him, bringing his city to him (i.e. submits as a vassal) he affords aid and assistance. If he (the vassal) lacks elephants and horses, men and women, silver and gold, he (the King) gives them to him, helping him to count as a country. If he captures a fighting foe, he does not kill or beat him. At the gateway there is a bell hung up. If anyone of the public has a complaint or grievance of body or of mind to place before the King, it is not difficult. He goes to sound the bell that is hung up. King Ram Khamhaeng hears him call and, on questioning him, makes an upright investigation for him... The people in this Mūang Sukhothai are charitable, pious and devoted to almsgiving, King Ram Khamhaeng, the ruler of this Mūang Sukhothai, as well as the princes and princesses, gentlemen and ladies of the nobility and men and women, one and all, have faith in the Buddhist religion, everyone observing the precepts during Buddhist Lent (rainy season), at the end of which *kathin* offerings take place for a whole month."

Though it is evident from this that the Sukhothai people were zealous Buddhists, animism still overshadowed them, as can be noticed from another passage in the same stone inscription: "On the South of this Mūang Sukhothai, there are temple-cells for venerable teachers to live in, a dam, coconut and jackfruit groves, mango and tamarind groves, upland waters, and Phra Khaphung, the spirit-god

of that hill, greater than any spirit in this city. If any ruler of this Müang Sukhothai reverences him well and makes proper offerings, this city will be stable, this city will be good. If he does not reverence him well and does not make proper offerings, the spirit in that hill will not protect or respect him and this city will be lost." This passage gives further support to the theory that whenever a nation was formed in mainland Southeast Asia, there would be a chief or national spirit set up on top of a mountain to be worshipped by the king and his subjects.

The patriarchal system of the Thai monarch might have been partly inspired by the ten kingly virtues in the Constitution of the *Thammasat* (*Dhammasattha* in Pāli), which derived from the Mon. Its origin may have been very old and it may have come from a Buddhist source. The ten kingly virtues are also mentioned in the Sukhothai stone inscription of the middle of the fourteenth century. They are: almsgiving, morality, liberality, rectitude, gentleness, self-restraint, non-anger, non-violence, forbearance and non-obstruction. According to the *Thammasat*, the ideal monarch abides steadfast in the ten kingly virtues, constantly upholding the five common precepts, and on holy days the set of eight precepts, living in kindness and goodwill to all beings. He takes pains to study the *Thammasat* and to keep the four principles of justice, namely: to assess the right or wrong of all service or disservice rendered to him, to uphold the righteous and truthful, to acquire riches through none but just means, and to maintain the prosperity of his state through none but just means. There are also four other requisites for the proper conduct of an ideal monarch: *sassamedha*, knowledge of food organization, *purisamedha*, knowledge of men, *sammāpāsa*, the means of winning the people's hearts, and *vācāpeyya*, gentle words. This according to H. H. Prince Dhani Nivat appears to have been a Pāli adaptation of brahmanical sacrifices of old as laid down for Vedic monarchs in the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* and elsewhere.

According to one of the epithets of the Thai king, he is theoretically elected by the people, and in the coronation ceremony of the present day the king is still asked by eight representatives of the cardinal and sub-cardinal points to accept the throne before he is crowned.

The Thai kingdom of Ayudhya was set up in 1350, and after it had captured Angkor Thom; the last capital of the Khmer empire, in 1431, Khmer influence in both court life and administration poured into Ayudhya. The palace law was written after the Khmer system.

People were divided into classes according to their functions, and their status was indicated by the number of rice fields they might own. This, however, had unexpected results in matters of justice: the higher one was in the social scale, the greater the penalty one would receive if condemned. According to one of his epithets, the Thai monarch became a god on earth like the Khmer king, but as the Thai have always been Buddhist he would be referred to as a sort of living Buddha ("Our Master the Holy Buddha"), probably a reminiscence of Mahayāna Buddhist influence during the latter part of the Khmer empire. The crown prince was also regarded as *Buddhāṅkura* ("Descendant of the Buddha"). Like the king of Angkor, the king of Ayudhya was referred to by the epithet "Dust on the Holy Feet" and the whole Khmer vocabulary reserved for the person and actions of the king was taken over *en bloc* as the protocol of the Court of Ayudhya.

As to property, the old Law on Miscellanies promulgated in 1360 by the founder of Ayudhya laid down that all land belonged to the king, who was graciously pleased to allow his subjects to settle on it. They had every right to till it or otherwise earn their livelihood on it, but not that of proprietorship. Each social grade had its scale with a maximum allotment of land to which its members were entitled. King Chulalongkorn (1868-1910), however, initiated the system of issuing title deeds acknowledging the practical right of his subjects to land-ownership, although the old theory was not exactly abrogated. In any case the monarch continues to be called the "Lord of the Land" in conversation.

A feature worthy of notice is the legislative power of the monarch of old. The *Thammasat* divided law into two main categories: principles (*mūlagadī*) for the judicature, consisting of 10 titles, and principles for the people's litigation, consisting of 29 titles. Laws promulgated in those days were invariably based upon one or other of these titles. Beyond them the monarch seemed to have been curiously limited in his legislative power.

One must remember that the Thai have always professed Buddhism of the Theravāda sect, so the notion of the god-king is not as strong as in Cambodia. Moreover, the Thai monarch has also been governed by the ten kingly virtues, which are also derived from Buddhism. This has rendered the patriarchal system permanent in Thailand, even after the change in 1932 from an absolute monarchy to a constitutional one.

Champā and Vietnam

The Chinese chronicle gives A.D. 192 as the year when, in the region around the present city of Huế in the central part of present-day Vietnam, a kingdom was founded to which they gave the name of Lin-i, and which later Sanskrit sources call Champā. The Cham people belong to the Indonesian race as their language denotes, but they may have originally lived in southern China like the Thai. The narrow coastal plain along the east coast of mainland Southeast Asia which was the site of Champā was not favourable for a united country. Indian influence appeared in the second half of the fourth century, when a Cham king appeared bearing the Sanskrit name of Bhavavarman. He had many Sanskrit inscriptions made, and he erected a *liṅga* named Śiva Bhadrēśvara which was the name of the god linked with that of himself, the founder of the cult. It is the earliest royal *liṅga* on record in mainland Southeast Asia.

The Chinese chronicles again give some information on Champā during the fourth century A.D. The people built the walls of their houses with baked bricks covered with a layer of lime, and the houses were surmounted by a platform terrace known as *kan-lan* (in Cham, *kalan*). The people had deep-set eyes, straight prominent noses, and black frizzy hair. The women wore their hair in a knot on top of the head. Both men and women wore nothing but a length of *chi-pei* (cotton?) cloth wrapped round their bodies. They pierced their ears so that they could hang small rings in them. The upper classes wore leather shoes, while the common people went barefoot. The headgear worn by the king was a tall cap with flower embroidery in gold, decorated with a silk tassel. When he went about he rode on an elephant. The burial of a king took place seven days after his death, great mandarins were buried three days after their decease, and ordinary people the day following it. Whatever the social status of the deceased might have been, the body was carefully shrouded, carried to the seashore or the banks of a river to the sound of drums and the accompaniment of dances, and then delivered to the flames on a pyre prepared by the mourners. The bones which survived the flames were enclosed in a gold vase and thrown into the sea when it was the body of a king that had been burned. The remains of a mandarin were enclosed in a silver vase and thrown into the waves at the mouth of a river. For the dead who had enjoyed no special distinction an earthenware vase was considered good enough and it was consigned to the waters of a river.

The parents of the dead of both sexes followed the procession and cut their hair before leaving the river-bank, this being the only sign of mourning for a period which was brief.

Here again one notices the influence of Indian customs on the Cham. In Champā Hinduism was at all times preponderant, though there was a short period of Mahāyāna Buddhist expansion at the end of the ninth century. One can therefore suppose that the Cham monarch was probably the god-king on earth like the Khmer monarch. The history of the country is full of fighting with the Chinese at the beginning, with the Khmer in the middle period, and with the Vietnamese at the end, until the whole country, which had been gradually shrinking to the south, was totally absorbed by the Vietnamese about the early seventeenth century.

In Vietnam, China, during the time of the Ch'in dynasty (about 221 B.C.), spread its power southwards against the country of the Yüeh (Viet), the principalities of which lay along the coasts of Chekiang, Fukien and Kwangtung. During the Han dynasty Chinese power spread down to the Red River delta. The Nan-yüeh or the Yüeh were ancestors of the present-day Vietnamese and they were probably composed of Mon-Khmer and Indonesian tribes and Thai, who speak respectively non-tonal and tonal languages. At the beginning of the first century A.D. the Chinese began to change their policy towards the Nan-yüeh and tried to sinicize them as much as possible. According to the Chinese chronicle the Nan-yüeh, or the early inhabitants of the Red River delta, wore no clothes, blackened their teeth, chewed betel, tilled the fields with hoes of polished stone, and used poisoned arrows. The country around the delta then became a province of the Chinese empire during the later Han dynasty and the Chinese occupation lasted for nearly ten centuries. After the fall of the T'ang dynasty in 907 Vietnam became independent under the name of Nam Viet and was ruled by a native chief. Its name was changed into Dai Co Viet in 968, and it was accepted as a vassal state by the Sung emperor. A Chinese envoy who visited the capital of Dai Co Viet in 990 wrote that the palace was quite small and that the wooden towers raised for the defence of the city were as simple in construction as they were ugly in form. The country then changed hands, and came under the former Le dynasty in 980 and the Ly dynasty in 1010. The latter ruled the country more than two hundred years and is regarded as the first of the great dynasties of Vietnam. The name of the country was changed into Dai Viet in the second half of the elev-

enth century and a peace pact was made with China on a footing of equality.

During the rule of the Ly dynasty there were new regulations concerning taxation and rights of entry for imported goods. This period also saw the promulgation in 1042 of a new penal code, the granting of exemptions from taxation after a war, the distribution of rice in times of famine, the creation of a relay postal system, the construction of numerous pagodas of Mahāyāna Buddhism, and the quest for religious texts in China. The Lys reorganized the administrative system of the country, establishing a more rigid hierarchy of officials, replanning the armed forces, and creating social roles in the villages as a basis for tax assessment and for recruitment to the army. The dynasty also initiated a programme of public works to protect the rice-fields against floods, an important feature of which was the building of the first embankment of the Red River. They also encouraged Chinese studies as well as the cult of Confucius. A national university was created in 1076, a year after the first literary examinations were held. Thus it can be seen that the Chinese pattern was closely followed.

The Tran dynasty came into power in 1225 and was replaced by another dynasty in 1398. During this period China, now under the Ming dynasty, occupied Dai Viet again from 1407 to 1418, when Le Loi, the head of a peasant family in the Than-hoa province in the northern part of the country and the great hero of Vietnamese history, liberated the country and founded a new dynasty in 1428.

The period of the Le dynasty extended from 1418-1786. During this time Vietnam tried her best to free the country from Chinese cultural domination. Though many cultural traits that had been borrowed from China were still preserved, such as the language used by the educated, literature, art, religion, and the system of administration by officials, the Code of Hong-duc, compiled in 1483, attempted on the contrary to codify all the laws and regulations promulgated by emperors of previous dynasties within one traditional framework. This task in the field of national jurisprudence had been preceded by the carrying out of a similar task in the religious field in 1472, consisting of a revision of all the legends concerning the local gods which played the role of patrons of every village. The Le period is also the golden age of Sino-Vietnamese literature.

From the above description one can see how Vietnam received cultural influence through Chinese military expansion and total occupation over a long period. The Chinese culture was imposed on the people, whereas the propagation of Indian culture was peaceful and

operated through the normal channels of commercial contact. The Vietnamese, however, when opportunity arose, tried to free themselves from Chinese cultural domination though they could not dissolve it entirely. The Vietnamese kingship no doubt had to follow, at least at first, the Chinese pattern of the Son of Heaven.

Conclusion

Apart from Vietnam, which we have seen was influenced by Chinese culture imposed by force, the other countries of mainland Southeast Asia all received the influence of Indian civilization through peaceful means, and their style of kingship was also regulated by the Indian pattern. In the east of the mainland Hinduism predominated, so the king was more or less the Devarāja or the god-king identified with Siva, one of the greatest gods in Hinduism. Examples of this existed in Fu-nan, the Khmer empire and Champā. In the centre and west, Buddhism of the Theravāda sect prevailed from the fourteenth century onwards, especially that brought from Sri Lanka (Ceylon). For countries like the Mon country, Thailand and Burma, though they may have received some influences from eastern countries such as the Khmer empire, the Hindu pattern was overshadowed by that of Buddhism. The monarch in Thailand for instance, though some epithets might indicate his status as a god-king, has always been controlled by the ten kingly virtues which also derived from Buddhism. This has brought about a patriarchal rule which prevails until the present time. It is also to be noted that the king in mainland Southeast Asia, especially on the western side, did not simultaneously perform the duty of high-priest. He was only the worshipper or the protector of the faiths of his country, because in Southeast Asia Hinduism and Buddhism have always co-existed. One should also not forget about the "local genius" of the peoples on mainland Southeast Asia, who have adapted every tradition to suit their own characteristics, whether the original source was India or China.

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Some Aspects of Kingship in Ancient Java

S. Supomo

For more than ten centuries, from at least the fifth to the fifteenth century, Indianized states were a predominant feature in the political scene in the regions which now comprise the Republic of Indonesia. The first of these states emerged in the eastern part of Kalimantan (Borneo), southern Sumatra and West Java, but, since source material for the history of these areas is extremely sparse, for the present study I have to confine myself to the kingdoms of central and eastern Java — the homeland of the Javanese speaking people — which lasted from the eighth to the early sixteenth century. Those eight centuries of the history of the Indo-Javanese kingdoms may, if only for convenience, be divided into three periods: (1) the Central Javanese period (the eighth to the early tenth century); (2) the early East Javanese period, which covers the period from the reign of king Siṇḍok (ca. A.D. 930) to the fall of Kadiri (1222); and (3) the Singhasari-Majapahit period, from the thirteenth to the first quarter of the sixteenth century.

The earliest dated record from Java is a Sanskrit inscription — known as the Canggal inscription — which was issued by a certain king Sanjaya to commemorate the foundation of a Śiwa *lingga* in A.D. 732. It is perhaps appropriate, therefore, to begin our discussion with a quotation from this inscription:

(8) In that excellent island called Java, which is the great mark of footprints of Puruṣa, there was a king of very noble lineage and of great fame called Sanna who, by means of conciliation and gift, ruled the subjects in a proper way, out of attachment, just like a father (taking care of) his child from his very birth, and who, having subdued his enemies, protected the world for a long time with justice like Manu. (9) After the king called Sanna, the (very) Moon of the family... went to enjoy in heaven the happiness which is the accumulated reward of his deeds, the world wandered about in grief, from having no protector.∴ (11) The illustrious king called Sanjaya, who is eminent and respected by the assembly of the learned as an adept in the subtle meaning of the Sacred books; who, excelling in bravery and other virtues has, like Raghu, overthrown many circles of neighbouring rulers... is (now) ruling the kingdom justly (12) While he is

ruling the earth, with the waves as her girdle and the mountains as her breasts, people can sleep on the roadside without being frightened by thieves or by other dangers.¹

For students of Indian polity and culture in general, the phrases used by the author of this inscription as well as its underlying conceptions are all familiar. Comparing a ruler to Manu, the mythical first king of ancient India, or to a hero such as Raghu, the ancestor of Rāma, is common in Sanskrit literature; the notion that a king is protector of the world, and that the world is lost in grief when he is no longer there to protect her, is one of the most fundamental principles of Indian kingship — for the king is created by the Lord for this very purpose, as clearly stated, for instance, in the *Lawbook of Manu* 7, 3. The phrase “just like a father (taking care of) his child” is likewise reminiscent of *Manu* 7, 80; and the ideas behind the phrases “by means of conciliation and gift” and “who ... has ... overthrown many circles of neighbouring rulers” can be perhaps traced back to the well-known doctrine of *maṇḍalē*, thoroughly analysed by Kauṭilya in the *Arthaśāstra*, Books 6-9.

The unmistakably Indian character of this inscription, and indeed of most of the Javanese inscriptions of the earliest period, understandably could easily lead to the mistaken assumption that the Javanese kingdoms of the past were established by Indians, either by conquest or by mass migration from India. It is now generally accepted, however, that these kingdoms were Indonesian kingdoms, ruled by Indonesian rulers, who, for reasons about which we can only speculate, adopted Indian religions and, with them, the principles of Indian kingship.² How this process of Indianization — which was aptly compared to the process of fecundation by Professor Bosch — took place is still not very clear to us, and much of it will undoubtedly remain obscure, but the result of this process is clearly identifiable: it was “a new life that was predestined to develop into an independent organism in which foreign and native elements were merged into an indissoluble unity”.³

¹ See Poerbatjaraka, *Riwayat Indonesia* (Jakarta, 1952), Vol. I, pp.49-60; H. B. Sarkar, *Corpus of the Inscriptions of Java (up to 928 A.D.)*, (Calcutta, 1971-72), no. 3 (Sarkar's two-volume book will henceforth be referred to as CIJ).

² See e.g. J.C. van Leur, *Indonesian Trade and Society: Essays in Asian Social and Economic History* (The Hague, 1967), Chapter III; F.D.K. Bosch, *Selected Studies in Indonesian Archaeology* (The Hague, 1961), pp.3-22.

³ F.D.K. Bosch, *op.cit.*, p.20

As we have no records from the pre-Indian period, the Javanese elements in this "new life" are most difficult to determine. While the foreign elements can be identified with the help of Indian sources — often without much difficulty, as is obvious from the above examples — the Javanese elements can only be inferred negatively: if certain elements are unknown in the Indian sources, they are perhaps indigenous ones; and if these elements are also the properties of other tribes of Indonesia which had less contact with India or completely lacked it, then we may safely assume that they are indigenous.

Nevertheless, it is often difficult to be certain whether some elements which cannot be traced back to the Indian sources were "men-deled" out from the indigenous properties or whether they were the result of the merging of the Indian and Javanese elements. On the other hand, even if certain elements can be traced back to Indian sources, one may still be justifiably doubtful whether they were not, in fact, Javanese elements garbed in new, imported attire. Thus, for instance, the paternalistic government implied in the phrase "just like a father (taking care of) his child" occurring in the above quotation of the Canggal inscription may be found in Indian sources, but it does not follow that the idea of paternalistic government was unknown to the Javanese communities of the pre-Indian period. In fact, from the scanty data available to us, we have reason to believe that paternalism had been part of the Javanese concept of government since long before the establishment of Indianized states. In other words, this particular phrase, which can be traced back to the *Lawbook of Manu* or other *Smṛti* literature, was deliberately chosen for its suitability to characterize the ideal relationship between Javanese rulers and their subjects from time immemorial.

The smallest territorial community of ancient Java, comparable to the present-day *desa* (village), is called *wanua* in the Central Javanese inscriptions. At the time when Java was only sparsely populated, the establishment of a new *wanua* by a group of people who, for various reasons, had left their ancestral homes would not be uncommon.

The founders of such a new settlement, as a matter of course, would become the leaders of the new village community, as the village population would be either their children, their disciples — in the case of a religious community — or outsiders who were allowed to settle there. It is instructive in this respect, that the nuclear village population, the descendants of the village founders, are called *anak wanua*, that is "children of the village", and the village leaders are called

rama, 'father(s)'. The terms clearly suggest a father-son relationship between the village authorities and the village population as a whole. There were several *ramas* in the village, most of whom were in charge of certain functions, e.g. supervising the irrigation (*bulair*), supervising the bridges in the village (*bulu wuatan*), or acting as councillors (*tuba wanua*, literally 'the old ones in the village')⁴ As a group they seemed to form some kind of a board of elders, which supervised and conducted the affairs of the village. It was through them that the village made a complaint to the state authorities when they were overtaxed,⁵ and it was likewise through them that a ruler purchased the land of a village to be granted to a religious establishment for its upkeep.⁶

A newly established village might have been an independent, self-supporting community, but when the population grew and the arable lands available for their subsistence became less and less, then the need for some kind of arrangement with the neighbouring villages would arise. This is especially true in a country where wet-rice agriculture is practised — as Java has been since the neolithic period — because its success depends, to a very large extent, on the availability of good irrigation networks, which in most cases have to be built beyond the boundaries of one particular village.

As the whole population of the village involved in such an arrangement would directly benefit from it, it seems most likely that this could be achieved, at least in its inception, through voluntary cooperation among the villages concerned. If a new settlement happened to be not too far from the parent-village or its sister-villages, closer ties with them would be most likely. Another possibility was an arrangement based on the Javanese concept of cosmic order involving four villages — or a multiplication of four — plus a central village. The leader

⁴ In many inscriptions *rama* is often spelled with a long vowel in the first syllable, which, de Casparis suggests, 'could be compared with our use of capitals in similar cases. Thus we use the spelling 'father' to denote the family relation, but we write 'Father' as a religious title.' See J.G. de Casparis, *Selected Inscriptions from the 7th to the 9th Century* (Bandung, 1956), Vol. II, p. 216; p. 230, note 75.

⁵ See the copper-plate of Palēpangan (CIJ 68).

⁶ See the copper-plates of Panggumulan (CIJ 64); see also F.H. van Naerssen, 'Inscriptions van het Rijksmuseum voor Volkenkunde te Leiden', *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde*, 97 (1938), pp. 503-504.

⁷ See J. G. de Casparis, *Inscripties uit de Çailendra-Tijd* (Bandung, 1950), pp. 151-160.

of this new, larger territorial unit was probably originally chosen from among the *ramas* of the member-villages, and he assumed the title of *raka*, that is "elder brother". As van Naerssen remarks, this title suggests that "the wanua grouping was still a community very much dominated by kinship, and united only through voluntary submission to a paternalistic and benevolent overlord".⁸

It was from among these *rakas* that the kings of Java originated. Exactly when one of the *rakas* rose above their equals and assumed the title of king probably can never be known to us, but the occurrence of non-Indian words for king — *baji* and *ratu* — as well as words for a great number of titles of state and village officials in the Old Javanese inscriptions points to the existence of monarchical states with highly organised bureaucracies long before the adoption of principles of Indian kingship and court administration. Their continued use in the Indianized states is a clear indication that these states were merely a continuation of the older form of political organization.

Whereas the formation of a *raka*-dom was most likely based on the mutual need for co-operation, its expansion into a kingdom would not have been possible without the use of force. It is not surprising, therefore, to read in the Canggal inscription that it was only after subduing his enemies that King Sanna was able to protect the world with justice, and that his successor, Sanjaya, also had to overthrow "many circles of neighbouring rulers" — no doubt a reference to the *rakas* of adjoining territories — before he was able to rule the country. Territorial expansion and the accumulation of power, however, did not stop with the establishment of a kingdom. Indeed, as happened in all countries throughout the history of mankind, the foundation of a kingdom was merely the beginning of more serious and systematic efforts to bring the whole region, or regions, under one supreme ruler. Thus, while Sanna and Sanjaya seemed to be content with the simple title of *rāja*, the latter's successor, the *raka* of Panangkaran, assumed the more dignified title of *mahārāja*, "great king". Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that all the *mahārājas* of the Central Javanese

⁸ F. H. van Naerssen, "The Search for Central Power" in T. K. Tan (ed.), *Sukarno's Guided Indonesia* (Brisbane, 1967), p. 5.

⁹ For a discussion of *ratu* and *baji*, see L. C. Damais, "Epigrafische aantekeningen", in *Tijdschrift voor Indische Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde*, 83 (1949), pp. 18-25. For the use of *datu* — the word is etymologically identical — in Malay inscriptions, see J. Gonda, *Sanskrit in Indonesia* (New Delhi, 1973), p. 621.

period retained the title of *raka*. A ruler of this period is usually recorded in the inscription as, for instance, *Sri mahārāja raka i Watukura dyah Balitung śrī Dharmodaya mahāsambhu*, that is "The Illustrious Great King, the *raka* of Watukura, *dyah* Balitung, etc."

It is possible that *raka*, as a title, eventually lost its original meaning, but the idea of a ruler as "father" or "elder brother" of the whole population had not, and has not, completely disappeared from Javanese politics. Tantular, a fourteenth century Javanese poet, said in his poem, the *Arjunawijaya*, that "a king is truly the parent of the three worlds, the life of all people".¹⁰ In the royal edicts of the Muslim Mataram rulers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the subjects are often referred to as *momongan*, that is "children to be taken care of with love".¹¹ The Javanese civil servants are called *pamong praja*, "those who look after the country and the people", and the term is now used in the Indonesian administration. That the late President Sukarno and the present President Suharto are better known among the people as *Bung* (i.e. elder brother) Karno and *Pak* (i.e. father) Harto respectively is a clear indication that the idea of paternalistic government is still very much alive in present-day Indonesia.

Closely related to the idea of the "paternalistic and benevolent overlord" is the concept of a ruler as protector of his subjects and of the world in general. Thus in the above quotation of the Canggal inscription, for instance, we read that after subduing his enemies, King Sanna "protected the world for a long time with justice like Manu", and that when he passed away "the earth wandered about in grief from having no protector". Although, as has been noted, the concept of the ruler as protector is one of the basic principles of Indian kingship, and such phrases might have been derived from Indian sources, there seems to be little doubt that the same idea must have been part of the principle of the indigenous *raka*-ship as well. It is reasonable to suppose that, in the first place, a *raka* was chosen from among the *ramas* for his ability to provide protection to the whole population, to render help to those in need, and to maintain order in the region. Whatever the case may be, it was the idea of a king as protector that eventually

¹⁰ *Arjunawijaya* 71, 6c. For this poem, see S. Supomo, *Arjunawijaya: A Kakawin of mPu Tantular* (The Hague, 1976).

¹¹ See Soemarsaid Moertono, *State and Statecraft in Old Java: A Study of the Later Mataram Period, 16th to 19th Century* (Ithaca, New York, 1963), pp.25-26.

became the most prominent one in the conception of Javanese kingship. Many Sanskrit words for "king" found their way into the Old Javanese as well as New Javanese vocabularies, and *nātha*, whose original meaning is "protector", was one of the most often used by the Javanese poets in their poems.¹² Perhaps the fact that folk-etymologically it can be construed as being derived from the root-word *tata*, "order", had something to do with its popularity, for being *tata-tên-trêm*, that is being "in orderly arrangement and tranquil state" is, according to the popular Javanese view, the ultimate goal that a ruler has to strive for his kingdom. *Sang nata* thus can be interpreted as "one who puts things in order", implying that a world without a king is a world out of order.

In nearly every *kakawin* (Old Javanese poem), almost all of them products of the East-Javanese period, we read passages in which lengthy advice on *rājadharma* (the king's duty) is given, and the emphasis is always on his duty as the protector of the people and the world in general. Providing protection to the people and the world, however, implies that there are evil elements who will try to disturb the "orderly arrangement and the tranquil state" of the kingdom. To these elements, the king should show no mercy; he should perform the *Yama-brata*, "Yama's practice", namely "to punish evildoers, to slay thieves".¹³ The ideal world is, as the Canggal inscription says of king Sanjaya's kingdom, one where "people can sleep on the roadside without being frightened by thieves or by other dangers".

In order that this ideal state of tranquility and order should prevail throughout the country, it is necessary for the *rāja*, and later the king, to have means at his disposal to carry out his functions. Thus taxation was invented. From this point of view, then, taxation was not, at least at its inception, some kind of payment in return for protection rendered, but rather a provision which would enable the king to discharge his duties effectively. Wealth was not the end of his endeavours, but was merely the necessary means (*sādhana*) by which he would be able to protect the world. As most of the wealth in agricultural societies would come from the land, it is not surprising to read in many *kakawin* that the kings were urged to do their utmost to increase the welfare of the villagers and the prosperity of the countryside. The

¹² Cf. J. Gonda, *loc. cit.*

¹³ Old Javanese *Rāmāyana* 24, 14. For this poem, see H. Kern, *Rāmāyana Kakawin, Oudjavaansch Heldendicht*, ('s. Gravenhage, 1900).

prosperity of the rural districts in turn would bring about, as Prapanca, the author of the *Nāgarakṛtāgama*, puts it, "the increase of the king's due, as a means for him to protect the world"¹⁴

Two kinds of taxation were common in Java throughout most of its history. The first was in the form of part of the produce of the land or its equivalents, which was called *dṛwya haji* (king's due), and the second was in the form of part of the labour of the peasants, which was called *gawai haji* or *bwat haji* (works done for the king). For the welfare of the people and the prosperity of the country, kings were advised not to put heavy taxation on the people. Thus the Old Javanese *Rāmāyaṇa* says that the king should perform the *Sūryabrata* (the practice of the Sun-god), namely that in drawing taxes from his subjects he should act gently and gradually, like the sun drawing water with its rays.¹⁵ The practice that can be gleaned from the inscriptions, however, seems to be a far cry from the theory expounded in the literary works. The land-tax itself was not too harsh,¹⁶ but this basic tax was just one of the myriad taxes that the Javanese peasantry were liable to pay.¹ In addition to these taxes, which were payable in kind or in cash (silver or Chinese currency), people still had to spend part of their time and labour for the *gawai haji*, to provide the necessary facilities for agricultural and economic activities and to build royal residences and religious monuments. Judging from the most conspicuous remains of the Javanese past—ruins of temples that are scattered in and around the centres of the ancient kingdoms — a very great number of corvée labourers must have been employed by the Javanese rulers to build such monuments throughout the eight centuries of the Indo-Javanese period.¹⁸

¹⁴ *Nāgarakṛtāgama* 88, 4d. For this poem, see Th. Pigeaud, *Java in the 14th Century: A Study in Cultural History*, 5 vols. (The Hague, 1960-1963).

¹⁵ Old Javanese *Rāmāyaṇa* 24, 15; cf. *Nāgarakṛtāgama* 7, 1

¹⁶ A Chinese source says that the peasants of Ancient Java paid one tenth of the produce as taxes (see W.P. Groeneveld, *Historical Notes on Indonesia and Malaya, Compiled from Chinese Sources*, Jakarta, 1960, p. 16). This amount compared favourably with the sixth or even third of the produce which the Indian peasantry were liable to pay (see A.L. Basham, *The Wonder that was India*, New York, Evergreen ed. 9th printing, p. 107).

¹⁷ For a discussion of various taxes in fourteenth century Java, see Th. Pigeaud, *op. cit.*, vol. IV, pp. 303-304, 382-384, 422-428.

¹⁸ For an attempt to calculate the amount of labour involved in the building of

On top of this, the villagers often had to put up with unscrupulous state officials who were supposed to protect them. Thus we read in one inscription,¹⁹ for instance, that a village was unable to pay land-tax, because it was set too high. The tax-official asked the village to pay taxes for four *lamwits* of rice fields, while in fact it had only less than two *lamwits*. In this particular case, the *ramas* of the village concerned approached the higher authority for an appeal, won their case, and had their taxes lowered, but such a case was perhaps an exception rather than the rule. In so far as can be seen from historical sources — admittedly not many — peasant revolts against the kings because of the heavy burden of taxation, or indeed for whatever reason, never took place in ancient Java.²⁰ Rebellion, like warfare itself, was apparently the prerogative of members of the royal families, the aristocracy and courtiers in general. The most extreme step that common villagers could take as an expression of discontent against the government's oppressive measures was simply fleeing the country and establishing new settlements in remote places where the arm of the tax-collectors would not be able to reach them — at least for the time being. Many villages mentioned or described briefly in many *kakawins* — mostly in parts where the heroes of the poems were wandering through the forests and the mountains — give the impression of being newly established. They were usually small villages (*dukuh*), nestling in the green of tropical forests at some distance from the areas where wet-rice agriculture was practised. Such a village might have been an idyllic scene which was a delightful sight to behold and a constant source of inspiration for the Javanese poets — no *kakawin* in the true sense of the term is without at least a few stanzas portraying such a village — but for the state authorities its sudden appearance amidst the newly cleared forest must have been a cause for deep concern. To the former it was a symbol of spiritual tranquility, for the latter it was a sign of failure to keep the population happy in their old surroundings. For the king it

Barabudur, the best known monument of ancient Java, see B. Schrieke, *Indonesian Sociological Studies* (The Hague, 1957), Part II, pp. 298-299.

¹⁹ See the copper plate of Palēpangan (*CJJ* 68).

²⁰ See, however, note 39 below. For a thorough study of peasant uprisings in more recent times, see Sartono Kartodirdjo, *The Peasants' Revolt of Banten in 1888: Its Conditions, Course and Sequel: A Case Study of Social Movements in Indonesia* (The Hague, 1966); and "Agrarian Radicalism in Java: Its Setting and Development", in Claire Hold, *Culture and Politics in Indonesia* (Ithaca, 1972), pp. 71-125.

meant more than merely the loss of state revenue and statute labour — the necessary *sādhana* (means) to protect the world; it undermined the very basis of his claim to be a *nātha*, a protector, a provider of order and tranquility. It is in this light that we should view the emphasis given in the speech of the ruler of Wēngkēr in front of the assembly in Majapahit, as recorded in *Nāgarakṛtāgama* 88,3, that “every effort should be made for the welfare of the rural districts... so that the farmers will not leave for other regions to clear new land and to settle there”.

At a time when animism was the basic belief of the population and magic and ancestor worship were widely practised — in Java and other parts of Indonesia, before as well as after the adoption of Hinduism and Buddhism — the concept of the ruler as protector would inevitably lead to the idea of royal divinity. In the animistic tradition there was no sharp distinction between the world of the mortals and that of the spirits, between the living and the dead. Thus we find that not only both the kings who were already dead and those who were still alive were often referred to as “divine beings” or “gods”,²¹ but those who had already been dead for decades were also often invoked to render protection.²²

The introduction of the Indian deities into the Javanese religious scene did not fundamentally alter the picture. Instead of being identified with an indigenous god (*hyang*), the king would now be identified with a *dewa* from the Hindu pantheon. The comparison of king Sanna to Manu occurring in the Canggal inscription, like that of Aśwawarman to Anśuman (the Sun-God) in the Kutei inscription and that of Pūrṇawarman to Wiṣṇu in the Ciaruteun inscription,²³ was a timid, tentative step in this direction. The adoption of the names of certain deities, such as Wiṣṇu, Indra, Bhānu and Mahāśambhu by the Javanese rulers might be another means of identifying them with these deities.²⁴ However, in so far as can be seen from the epigraphical sour-

²¹ Thus in the Mantyasih I inscription of 907 A.D. (CIJ 70), for instance, the past rulers of Mataram are referred to collectively as *rahyangta rumubun*, “the deities of the earlier times”, while in the Talang Tuwo inscription of 684 the ruling king is referred to as *punta hiyam*, “His Majesty the Lord” (See Poerbatjaraka, *op.cit.*, pp.35-38).

²² As for instance, for the protection of a newly founded *śima*, “freehold”, established by the grace of the king (see, e.g., the Mantyasih I inscription).

²³ See Poerbatjaraka, *op.cit.*, pp. 9 and 12 respectively.

²⁴ See J. G. de Casparis, *Inscriptions uit de Cailendra-Tijd*, pp.198-199. This

ces —the main historical sources from the Central Javanese period—the Central Javanese rulers did not seem too eager to identify themselves with the Indian deities.

It was in literary works, almost all of them written after the shift of power from Central to East Java, that the Indian concept of divine kingship, and with it the identification of rulers with the Indian deities, began to appear most clearly. It appears for the first time in the old Javanese *Rāmāyana kakawin* and, as a matter of course, in the prose adaptations of the Sanskrit epics — the *Mahābhārata* and the *Rāmāyana* — which are the oldest products of Old Javanese literary activity that have come down to us.²⁵ Thus, in one of the two passages on *rājadharma* occurring in the Old Javanese *Rāmāyana*,²⁶ the anonymous author — through the mouth of Rāma, the hero of the story — emphasises that people should revere the king because “in his body assemble eight deities”, the eight *lokapālas* of the Hindu pantheon, namely Indra, Yama, the Sun, the Moon, the Wind, the Lord of Wealth (Kubera), Waruna and Agni, the Fire-god.²⁷ Then, elaborating the concept of the king as an embodiment of eight deities as solemnly declared in the *Lawbook of Manu*,²⁸ the poet says that because of this the king should perform the *aṣṭabrata*, that is the eight modes of life or conduct, each emulating the nature and the conduct of each of the eight deities who were in him. Thus like Indra showering the earth with rain, the king should shower the world with gifts; like Yama he should punish thieves and evil-doers; like the Sun drawing water gradually with his rays, the king should take (taxes) from the people gently and gradually; like the Moon he should make the whole world happy with his appearance and *amṛta*-like laughter; like the Wind he should be aware of what is in the mind of all his

argument, however, is not as strong as it appears to be, as names of deities were also used by people who obviously were not in high positions, and even by common people, e.g. Wiṣṇu in *Cij* 65 A, 8; Brahmā in *Cij* 68, 15; Śiwa in 87, 20; and Manu in *Cij* 16, 7.

²⁵ For these works see P. J. Zoetmulder, *Kalangwan: A Survey of Old Javanese Literature* (The Hague, 1974), pp. 68-100; 217-233.

²⁶ These passages occur in cantos 3, 53-85 and 24, 43-86.

²⁷ Old Javanese *Rāmāyana* 24, 11-20.

²⁸ The enumeration of the deities is in accordance with *Manu* 7, 4-7, but many of the details are similar to *Manu* 9, 303-311, with the exception that instead of the Earth, the Old Javanese *Rāmāyana* has, as in *Manu* 7, 4, the Lord of Wealth.

subjects; like the Lord of Wealth he should enjoy all kinds of material wealth; like Waruna he should capture all the wicked; and like the Fire-god he should annihilate his enemies.

It is clear from the *kakawin* literature, however, that by then the reverse process, the Javanization of the foreign elements, had begun gaining momentum. The main themes of the *kakawins* were almost without exception taken from the Indian sources, the protagonists were known from the epics and the *purāṇas*, the geographical names were Indian, but the stories were all placed in a Javanese setting. As Zoetmulder remarks: "Under the guise of Sanskrit personal and place names the poet is presenting a picture of his own country and his own society. These men and women with their Indian names are essentially Javanese, acting like Javanese, thinking like Javanese and living in a Javanese environment".²⁹

In such a cultural climate, the full identification of the Javanese ruler with an "Indian" deity was a thing which could be taken for granted. He was now not just *like* Wiṣṇu. He *was* Wiṣṇu. As the introductory part of the Old Javanese *Bhīṣmaparwa* says: "He can be called Hari because he is Wiṣṇu, being a bearer of Śrī; because he is a protector of the world; because he is a lion, fully showing in everything his leonine character".³⁰

Thus we read in various inscriptions from the East Javanese period that many rulers bore names that mean "Wiṣṇu's incarnation", as for instance Wiṣṇumūrti (for Erlangga in *OJO* 62), Madhusūdanāwatāra (for Jayabhaya in *OJO* 68), Triwikramāwatāra (for Kāmeśwara in *OJO* 72) and Narasinghamūrti (for Kṛtanagara in *OJO* 79). However, his being an incarnation of Wiṣṇu — or, rather, his being called an incarnation of Wiṣṇu in one or two inscriptions — obviously did not prevent other people from identifying him with other deities. Dharmawangśa Tēguh, for instance, who is called Wiṣṇu in the *manggalā* of the *Bhīṣmaparwa*, is called Śiwa in the *Ādīparwa*; Kāmeśwara is also an incarnation of Kāma in the *Smaradāhāna kakawin*, which was written under his patronage; and Kṛtanagara was buried in Śiwabud-

²⁹ P. J. Zoetmulder, *op.cit.*, pp. 187-188.

³⁰ Quoted from P. J. Zoetmulder, *op.cit.*, p. 100.

³¹ *OJO* stands for "Oud Javaansch Oorkonden. Nagelaten Transcripties door Wijlen Dr J. L. A. Brandes", published by N. J. Krom, *Verhandelingen van het Koninklijk Bataviaasch Genootschap*, vol. 60 (1913).

dhālaya, which implies that he was an incarnation of both Śiwa and Buddha as well.

In this way, the king could not be identified with just one particular religious group. He was the king and the god for the whole population, regardless of their religious persuasion. He was Śiwa for the Śiwaites, Buddha for the Buddhists, Wiṣṇu for the Wiṣṇuites, Kāma for the admirers of Beauty, Kuwera for the seekers of Wealth.

During the reign of Rājasanagara (1350-1389), the position of the highest god in the state pantheon of Majapahit was apparently occupied by a deity known by various designations which mean "Lord of the Mountains". The worship of the Lord of the Mountains, as I have argued elsewhere,³² had its origin in the indigenous practice of worshipping ancestral spirits residing in the high places mixed with the Javanized Indian concept of Mount Meru as the centre of the universe. It is not surprising, therefore, to read in the *Nāgarakṛtāgama* that Rājasanagara is the incarnation of this Lord of the Mountains. His superhuman nature and his close relationship with this Deity were evident from various natural phenomena that, according to *Nāgarakṛtāgama* 1, 4, accompanied his birth: an earthquake, a rain of ashes, thunder and lightning and the eruption of a volcano, Mount Kampud, the present-day Mount Kēlud. A new element, however, was now added to the concept of the king as an incarnation of god. Ranggah Rājasa, the founder of the Singhasari-Majapahit dynasty, was according to *Nāgarakṛtāgama* 40, 1, an *ayonijatanaya* (i.e. a son who was not born of the womb) of the Lord of the Mountains, and is known throughout the poem as "Son of the Lord of the Mountains". Rājasanagara, therefore, was an incarnation as well as a descendant of the Lord of the Mountains. To maintain his mystical relationship with this Deity, Rājasanagara made visits to the state sanctuary of Palah—which was the abode of the Lord of the Mountains—every year to pay devoted homage to the feet of the god. The visit and the devotions that the king, who was himself Lord of the Mountains, made at the feet of this Deity, thus constituted an act of yoga, leading to a mystical union between the microcosmic and macrocosmic Lord of the Mountains.³³

³² See S. Supomo, "Lord of the Mountains in the Fourteenth Century *Kakawin*" in *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde*, 128 (1972), pp. 281-297.

³³ For a discussion of the belief in the parallelism between microcosmos and macrocosmos in Southeast Asia in general, see R. Heine-Geldern, "Conceptions of State and Kingship in Southeast Asia", *The Far Eastern Quarterly*, 2 (1942-1943), pp. 15-30.

It is obvious, then, that the doctrine of royal divinity imbued the Javanese conception of kingship throughout the Indo-Javanese period, and indeed throughout Javanese history. For even after the adoption of Islam by the Javanese rulers of Mataram, many of the aspects of divine kingship discussed here were still clearly visible. In the state chronicle, the kings of Mataram are still described as descendants of gods —Indian as well as indigenous— and heroes from the remote past —mythical as well as historical; the prevalence of the idea of the Lord of the Mountains as the highest god is evident from the names they assumed— such as Amangku Rat and Hamengku Buwana —and from the dynastic burial ground which is situated on a hill —significantly called Imagiri— not far from the original *kraton*:³⁴ and the idea of *aṣṭabrata* and other teachings occurring in the *kakawin* literature continued to be regarded with high esteem by the Javanese rulers and the Javanese people in general.³⁵

As a descendant as well as an incarnation of the highest god, the king's power over his subjects and the whole kingdom would be absolute. There was no constitution to limit his sovereignty, nor a people's assembly to restrict his authority. He was an autocrat, often acted like one, and was normally accepted as such by his subjects. Yet there are instances from the historical sources and literature in general which indicate that there were other forces in the community that subjected the king's sovereignty to some limitation, that he could lose the awe and the respect that people had for him if he did something contrary to their expectations and that, like any other mortal, he was vulnerable.

One of the forces that acted as a check on the king's sovereignty was, paradoxically, also the force from which he derived his main support, namely his own family. Members of a royal family were often rulers in their own right of certain parts of the kingdom, which they apparently inherited from one of the king's predecessors or which they acquired through marriage. In the Majapahit period they assum-

³⁴ Amangku Rat and Hamengku Buwana are perhaps Javanese renderings of Sanskrit *bhūdhara* or *bhūbhṛt*, "earth-supporting" or "earth-supporter", that is, mountain. Imagiri may be derived from *himagiri*, which is, more or less, a synonym of *himālaya*. It is also possible that it is a contraction of *i Mahāgiri*, the Great Mountain i.e. Mount Meru.

³⁵ See Soemarsaid Moertono, *op.cit.*, pp.42-44. For study of the traditional (that is, later Mataram) Javanese concept of statecraft in the context of present-day Indonesian politics, see B.R.O'G. Anderson, "The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture", in Clair Holt, *op.cit.*, pp.1-68.

ed the title of *bhra*, perhaps an abbreviation of *bhaṭāra*, "Lord". They seemed to act independently in their respective areas, and some of them apparently also had considerable influence in the running of the affairs of the central government. Filial obedience and respect to the elder members of the family in general seem to have been always a strong element in the relationship among the members of the Javanese royal family. The king and the elder members of the royal family often had to have discussions before important decisions were taken. Even in appointing his ministers, the king apparently did not have a free hand. The best known example of this was the appointment of the successors of Gajah Mada, the great first minister of Majapahit for more than 30 years. Rājasanagara, who was on one of his many tours of the country, quickly returned to the capital city when he learnt of Gajah Mada's illness. After the first minister's death, nine members of the royal family met in private to decide who would be the successor of Gajah Mada. These nine, who apparently constituted a kind of dynastic council, were the king, his parents, his maternal aunt and her husband, and his two cousins and their husbands. After long deliberation, they came to the conclusion that Gajah Mada was irreplaceable. No one would be able to carry out the tasks which used to be the responsibility of Gajah Mada. Accordingly, six dignitaries were appointed to succeed him,³⁶ and according to the *Pararaton* (p. 29), Rājasanagara had no first minister for the next three years.

It may be true that there was no constitution in the Javanese kingdoms, but to say that there was no restriction on the king's sovereignty is definitely not correct. In highly traditional societies, as Java was—and still is—the king, as any member of the community, was required to observe customs and traditions that were rigidly handed down from generation to generation. The king in fact not only had to observe them, but also—as the protector of the world order—had to protect them with all his might. All these customs, traditions, laws and knowledge of the past were preserved in the sacred texts and the literature in general. Princes were required to study them in their youth—and in the process many of them indeed became consummate *kawis*.³⁷ Being well-versed in *śāstra* was one of the virtues which the king was supposed to possess. Passages such as that which occurs in the

³⁶ See *Nāgarakṛtāgama* 70, 3-72, 6.

³⁷ See P. J. Zoetmulder, *op. cit.*, pp. 151-154.

Canggal inscription, namely that "the illustrious king Sanjaya ... is respected by the assembly of the learned as an adept in the subtle meanings of the sacred books", are found in almost every *kakawin* when a poet is describing a virtuous king.

Now, if a king took action which was contrary to the accepted customs and traditions, the community seems to have considered itself justified in disobeying him. The case of Kṛtajaya, the last king of Kaḍiri, is instructive in this respect. Kṛtajaya, so the *Pararaton* (pp. 13-14) tells us, demanded that the clergy (bhujanggas), be they Śiwaite or Buddhist, had to make obeisance (*sĕmbah*) to him. The priests, however, refused to comply with the command, because, as they argued, since time immemorial the clergy had never made an obeisance to the king. Adamantly the king insisted that they make *sĕmbah* to him, even if it had not been the practice before, for he was, he declared, in truth *bhaṭāra* Guru, the highest god. Then he showed his divine appearance —three eyes, four arms and all— and demonstrated his supernatural power by sitting on the top of an upturned spear. The priests were not impressed, and they all left the country, seeking refuge with Ken Angrok, who was patiently biding his time to attack Kaḍiri. It was not long after this event that Ken Angrok defeated Kṛtajaya and his army in the battle near Gantĕr in A.D. 1222.

Migration from the established villages to remote places, as we have noted above, was also a rather common way of expressing dissatisfaction with oppressive rule and high taxation —in the form of shares of both produce and labour. Schrieke has even suggested, perhaps rather exaggeratedly, that such migration was partly responsible for the shift of power from Central Java to East Java in the tenth century and from the East back to Central Java in the sixteenth century.³⁸

Peasant uprisings, as has been noted, are not mentioned in any Old Javanese record so far found.³⁹ Rebellion against the ruling king, however, occurred fairly often, and indeed almost regularly throughout Javanese history. Usually it was led by one of the members of

³⁸ B. Schrieke, *op.cit.*, pp. 287-301.

³⁹ The story of Ken Angrok (see J. Brandes, *Pararaton*, Batavia, 1896), may be interpreted as an example of a peasant revolt in ancient Java (see e.g. Clametmuljana, *A Story of Majapahit*, Singapore, 1976, pp. 1-19), but, in my opinion, it was simply a variant of a palace coup—planned and executed, admittedly, by one who was born and spent most of his childhood in the countryside.

the royal family, a powerful vassal or governor, or one of the high dignitaries who felt that some injustice had been perpetrated against him by the king. It is obvious, however, that many such rebellions were caused by simple lust for power on the part of the rebels.

The belief in royal divinity notwithstanding, regicide was not uncommon in ancient Java. Thus of the eight rulers of Kadiri and Tumapĕl-Singhasari mentioned in the *Pararaton* (pp. 12-24), who between them reigned for less than one century (from about 1200 to 1293), only one, Wiṣṇuwardhana, died peacefully. Tunggalamĕtung was assassinated in his bed, Ken Angrok was assassinated at table, Anusapati while watching cock-fighting, and Tohjaya while trying to escape from being captured by rebels led by his nephews. Kṛtajaya died in battle, Kṛtanagara was killed during a sudden attack on his capital city, and Jayakatwang died in prison. This, however, is still far from the extraordinary situation which existed in Pasai, North Sumatra, where, if we are to believe Tomé Pires, a sixteenth century Portuguese traveller: "The grandees... have from time to time agreed that whoever kills the king becomes king; and they say that on one day there were seven kings in Pase, because one killed the other and another the other."⁴⁰ But what took place in the early years of Singhasari, as recounted in the *Pararaton*, clearly illustrates that belief in royal divinity did not make a king free from mortal danger.

⁴⁰ *The Suma Oriental of Tomé Pires*, trans. Armando Cortesso (London, 1944), Vol. I, 143.

Ideologies and Traditions of Monarchy and Government in Imperial China *

Hok-lam Chan

Introduction

It is a platitude to scholars familiar with East Asian history that China possessed the unique tradition of a monarchical system of bureaucratic government unsurpassed in scope and duration in the records of civilization. The ingenious Chinese rulers, inheriting a rich culture going back to the Neolithic Age, had developed a sophisticated and highly functional system of government many centuries before Christ, and one which, with some modifications, lasted for two thousand years until the dissolution of the monarchy by the revolution and the founding of the Republic in the early twentieth century.¹ To summarize this unique human achievement is easy as well as difficult - easy because the Chinese had a distinctive style of governmental organization, and difficult because there is an enormous amount of information to be sifted and digested. The greatest task, however, has been that of interpretation, which still remains controversial, as historians or various schools have tried to impose their own views, based on a partial understanding of the Chinese historical experience. The native historians, traditionalists and Marxists alike,

* The citations in the footnotes are confined to essential works bearing on the subject, and most of them are in English. It is not justifiable, given the limited scope and synthetic nature of this essay, to burden the reader with a full listing of the Chinese primary sources and other specialized studies in Oriental languages. Readers wishing to pursue further investigation into the subject may refer to the relevant titles cited for a more comprehensive bibliography of the primary and secondary literature.

¹ For a succinct account of the development of the Chinese monarchy and the bureaucratic system of government, see the relevant sections in Raymond Dawson, ed., *The Legacy of China* (Oxford, 1964); Étienne Balazs, *Chinese Civilization and Bureaucracy*, tr. H.M. Wright (New Haven, 1964); Michael Loewe, *Imperial China: The Historical Background of the Modern Age* (London, 1966); John K. Fairbank, *The United States and China*, 3rd. ed. (Cambridge, Mass., 1971); John Meskill, ed., *An Introduction to Chinese Civilization* (New York, 1973); and Charles O. Hucker, *China's Imperial Past: An Introduction to Chinese History and Culture* (Stanford, 1975).

have introduced such clichés as “feudal” or “despotic” to cover the whole sweep of their institutional heritage, whereas Western scholars of diverse backgrounds have likewise applied comparable generalizing labels to theorize about the Chinese phenomenon in the light of their respective intellectual traditions. Karl Marx, for instance, classified China as having a static and underdeveloped “Asiatic mode of production” in his categorization of pre-modern societies, while Karl A. Wittfogel, elaborating his thesis of “Oriental despotism”, labelled China a “hydraulic state” notorious for the application of terror as an instrument of government. Max Weber, on the other hand, characterized China as a “bureaucratic state” dominated by the literary élite, and Étienne Balazs and other historians followed suit with various qualifications of such generalization.² It is not possible, given the scope of the present paper, to document the Chinese institutional development at length, or to grapple with the complicated theoretical issues thus raised. What is modestly presented here is a highly impressionistic synopsis of the salient features of Chinese kingship and government from the sixteenth century B.C. down to the abolition of the monarchical system of government by the revolution in 1912. It is hoped that, even in this limited form, it will serve as a groundwork for reflection on the Chinese achievement and for comparative studies on political and institutional development in world history.

The genesis of kingship and government

It has already been confirmed by archaeological evidence that the ancestors of the Chinese possessed rudiments of material culture and organized communities settled in the North China plain as early as the Neolithic Age. The earliest political entity founded by the Chinese was the Shang state (ca. 1523-1122 B.C.), located in the Yellow River valley in modern Honan during the Bronze Age, antedated only by the semi-legendary Hsia dynasty about which evidence has yet to be unearthed. It was a proto-bureaucratic city-state ruled by the aristocratic clans of a semi-agricultural and semi-pastoral tribal people

² See Karl Marx, *Das Kapital* (Hamburg, 1890-1894), *passim*; Max Weber, *The Religion of China*, tr. Hans Gerth (New York, 1951 ed.) Chs. II, III; Karl A. Wittfogel, *Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power* (New Haven, 1957); and Étienne Balazs, *op. cit.*, Pt. I, Ch. 2. For other views and discussions, see the relevant sections in Joseph Needham, *The Past in China's Present* (London, 1960); Raymond Dawson, *op. cit.*; John K. Fairbank, *op. cit.*; and Mark Elvin, *The Pattern of the Chinese Past* (Stanford, 1973).

whose origin still remains obscure. The Shang people already possessed a developed culture: they had mastered the techniques of agriculture, built walled cities, developed bronze technology, and also invented an advanced system of writing, as evidenced by its extensive application in divination inscriptions. They were extremely religious, and religion played a prominent role in their daily lives and in the development of social and political institutions.³ The Shang people believed that the spirits and deities controlled their fate and dictated their activities; they had great fear of them and they offered elaborate sacrifices, not only to their ancestors, but also to a number of gods, to seek their protection and blessing. The most important of these gods was *Shang-ti*, or 'High Lord', who is purported to have been the progenitor of the Shang kings, but who later became the supreme heavenly deity, invested with the power of controlling all the spiritual forces and events on earth. The Shang people invoked the deities for advice through divination by inscribing their queries on ox-bones or tortoise shells: a small groove was carved on the side of the bone and heat was applied near the thin surface, producing cracks which the diviners might interpret as either a positive or negative response. They applied such arts of divination to practically all their daily activities, with the result that an enormous number of these 'oracle inscriptions' was produced and became the most important source for the reconstruction of their history.⁴

The basic political organization of the Shang state consisted of the royal house headed by the king, members of his family and those of the aristocratic clans distantly related in a common ancestry. The Shang king and members of his family, as well as other hereditary nobles and priests, lived and conducted business in walled cities, separated from the commoners and slaves; many of these cities were both administrative and ceremonial centres, and the most important of these was the capital of An-yang, which has been excavated in successive stages. The origin of the Shang king is rather obscure, except

³ On the development of the Shang State and of its political organizations and religious worship, see, among others, H.G. Creel, *The Birth of China* ... (New York, 1936); Cheng Te-k'un, *Archaeology in China*, Vol. II: *Shang China* (Toronto, 1960); Chang Kwang-Chih, *Archaeology of Ancient China* rev. ed. (New Haven, 1968), and Ping-ti Ho, *The Cradle of the East* ... (Hong Kong and Chicago, 1975).

⁴ For a useful summary of the discovery of the oracle bones and the importance of these inscriptions for the reconstruction of Shang history, see Matsumaru Michio, 'Oracle Bones', in *Essays on the Sources for Chinese History*, eds. Donald Leslie, et. al., (Canberra, 1973), 15-22.

that he was descended from a royal family whose ancestors had led their people to power. He called himself *wang* or king, and some of the later kings adopted the name *ti* ("lord"); he reigned and ruled as a spiritual leader and temporal ruler by the "divine right" inherited from Shang-ti, who would protect and bless him, but would also exercise restraint on his behaviour and activities. The succession to kingship was hereditary, most frequently passing to a son, but sometimes also to a brother, and, in the later period, the principle of primogeniture was established as the basis of royal succession.⁵ The Shang king performed many religious and secular functions with the assistance of a hierarchy of lieutenants recruited from the aristocratic clans. The basic religious duties consisted of conducting sacrifices not only to the royal ancestors, but also to the spirits of the earth, and above all, to Shang-ti, to seek benefaction for the royal house as well as the people. His secular duties included various kinds of state responsibilities, such as administering the government and promoting agriculture, supervising construction work, organizing hunting expeditions, conducting warfare against outside invaders, and sundry others. In most cases the actual administration of the individual settlements was left to a lesser lord, often a relative of the king or a great lieutenant rewarded for his meritorious services to the royal house, or else a local magnate of sufficient independent strength to induce the king to sanction his *de facto* power, in return for which he sent tribute to the king. This latter practice became more frequent, and established the basis for the development of a sovereign-vassal relationship between the king and the lesser lords during the succeeding Chou dynasty.⁶

In a nutshell, the Shang state may be considered as a theocratic and limited proto-bureaucratic monarchy, in which the king ruled under the shelter of the spirits and in some fashion delegated to members of the aristocratic clans considerable authority over the administration of the outlying parts of the royal domain. The king was a patriarchal and absolute ruler in the sense that he was the ultimate source of temporal authority, but he was limited as a despot because he was subject to the whims of Shang-ti, and he had to serve him and other deities by restraining his self-indulgence and attending to the interests and welfare of his subjects. The Shang state was conquered by

⁵ See the relevant sections in the literature cited in n. 3.

⁶ On the contribution of the Shang state to the Chou, see the references cited in n. 7 below.

the Chou people in the twelfth century B.C., but it had laid important groundwork for the formation of ancient kingship and government. This included the religious influence of Shang-ti, the worship of the ancestors and the deities, the delegation of authority in state affairs to royal dignitaries and able lieutenants, and, above all, the establishment of a sovereign-vassal relationship between the king and the lesser lords for the administration of settlements beyond the direct control of the Shang kings.

The Shang state was conquered by a confederation of semi-barbarian tribesmen from the western frontier of the North China plain, under the leadership of chieftains, later known as King Wen and King Wu, in the early twelfth century B.C. This inaugurated the Chou ruling house, which lasted until the middle of the third century B.C. and ushered in the feudal age of ancient China, distinguished for its social and political organizations and the advancement of literary and material culture. The Chou period has been conventionally subdivided into two eras, corresponding to the successive reduction of the power of its rulers: Western Chou (1122-771 B.C.), when the Chou kings installed the subject nobles to govern their domains; and Eastern Chou (771-256 B.C.), when they reluctantly sanctioned the independent political power of the regional nobles, who finally brought about the collapse of the Chou house. The most important developments during this period, which laid the foundation of kingship and government in ancient China, were the inception of a new political doctrine called *T'ien-ming* ("Mandate of Heaven"), which sanctioned Chou rule, and the genesis of a loosely-federated system of social and political organization comparable to the feudal institutions in medieval Europe.⁷

The doctrine of the "Mandate of Heaven" was developed during the reign of King Wu, who directed the campaigns leading the Chou people to victory, as justification for the annihilation of the Shang state; and the invention of the new ideology has been attributed to the Duke of Chou, the distinguished regent of the Chou state after the death of King Wu. During the Shang period, Shang-ti was worship-

⁷ On the founding of the Chou state and the organization of its feudal institutions, see, in addition to the literature cited in n.3, Derk Bodde, "Feudalism in China", in *Feudalism in History*, ed. Rushton Coulborn (Princeton, 1956), 49-92; Cheng Te-k'un, *op. cit.*, Vol. III: *Chou China* (Toronto, 1963); Cho-yün Hsü, *Ancient China in Transition...* (Stanford, 1965); and H. G. Creel, *The Origins of Statecraft in China*, Vol. I: *The Western Chou Empire* (Chicago, 1970).

ed as the principal deity, but the concept of *T'ien* ("Heaven") was not yet clearly articulated; if the latter existed at all, it was only considered as one of many spiritual deities. When King Wu completed his conquest of Shang, he attributed his success to Heaven, the supreme deity, in his speeches and pronouncements. It was claimed that Heaven delegated power to rule to the king (including the Shang kings), as he was his son, but Heaven would withdraw sanction if the ruler abused his prerogatives, and it was only when a ruler worthy of support emerged that Heaven conferred the mandate on the new king. King Wu then claimed that the Shang dynasty collapsed because Heaven withdrew its support and that he had risen to power because he had received the heavenly mandate through his meritorious achievements. The concept of Heaven in this case provided a powerful source of religious sanction and legitimation, and the Chou rulers who used to call themselves *wang* or "king", also declared themselves *T'ien-tzu* ("Son of Heaven"), which became the usual title for the later Chinese emperors. In many ways the theory of the "Mandate of Heaven" had a far-reaching impact on the development of ancient political thought and the perpetuation of the Chinese monarchy. According to this doctrine, the Chinese ruler became divine as the Son of Heaven, and since Heaven's power was all-encompassing, it meant that the earthly ruler enjoyed the same privilege. The Chou kings and later Chinese rulers, therefore, considered themselves the absolute rulers of the domain and people under their control, as attested by a popular ancient ballad: "Under the wide Heaven, all is the king's land; within the sea-boundaries of the land, all are the king's servants."⁸

If the invocation of Heaven's authority justified the ruler's absolute power, the same doctrine also helped to check the ruler's power, through the clause providing for Heaven's withdrawal of the mandate should the ruler abuse his prerogatives and delegated authority. This provided the justification for the change of rulers and dynasties and granted the people the moral right to revolt against their wicked sovereign; hence, in the Chinese tradition, the expression for rebellion or revolution became known as *ke-ming*, or "transferring the mandate", which is still in popular application in modern times."

⁸ From the Ode "Pei-shan" [Northern Mountain] in *Shih-ching* [Book of Odes]; see *The Shih King*, tr. James Legge, in *The Chinese Classics* (Hong Kong, 1960 reprint of 1893 ed.), Vol. IV, Pt. 2: Bk. VI, I, p. 360.

⁹ On the development of the concept of *T'ien-ming* or the "Mandate of Heaven"

In conjunction with the invocation of the doctrine of the Mandate of Heaven, which laid the foundation of ancient kingship, the early Chou kings developed a loosely centralized feudal-like political organization that provided much of the stability of the Chou state, which lasted until the third century B.C. This new system of government, which bore many distinctive features comparable to medieval European feudalism, was the product of the historical circumstances of the rise of the Chou people as rulers of the North China plain. When the Chou people rose from the western frontiers of China and annihilated the Shang state, they were not powerful enough militarily to impose direct control on their conquered territories and there still existed many regional nobles who were once the subordinates of the Shang kings. In due course the early Chou kings, allegedly advised by the Duke of Chou, while retaining their original homeland in modern Shensi — the so-called royal domain — for their own support, parcelled out the regions formerly held by the Shang rulers to their kinsmen and allied chieftains in the form of fiefs based on the theory that all the land in the country belonged to the Son of Heaven. All these feudal lords accepted a form of vassalage to the Chou king and were granted titles of nobility that are rendered into English as duke, marquis, earl, viscount and baron, based on the size of the land they received from the royal Chou house. They ensconced themselves in walled fortresses, undertook to pacify and govern the peoples and lands granted them, following the pattern of the royal house, and were required to pay regular pilgrimages to the Chou king, observe the prescribed rituals and protocols, present gifts, and come to the defence of the royal house if threatened by outside invasion, as the duty of a vassal to a sovereign. Theoretically, every feudal lord's status and powers were legitimized by royal decree, and had to be renewed every generation, but in practice they soon became hereditary. As centuries passed, the lords' fiefs became distinctive regional states, varying in size, military power, cultural traditions, and economic patterns, and began competing with one another for political hegemony, with the waning of the authority of the Chou house.¹⁰

Within the royal Chou domain, and in each of the regional fiefs, a proto-bureaucratic governmental apparatus emerged with differentiated functions, chiefly performed by the attendants at the ruler's

doctrine, see Derk Bodde, *op. cit.* 55-62; and H.G. Creel, *The Origins of Statecraft in China ...*, Ch. 5.

¹⁰ See the relevant sections in the literature cited in n. 7.

court recruited from among the royal kinsmen or members of the aristocratic clans. These attendants had various titles and designations such as "minister" or "great officer" and were given responsibility for different realms of activities, as chamberlains in the household, as stewards of the ruler's treasury and personal property, as collectors of revenue, as dispensers of justice, as masters of ceremonies, and as military officers or counsellors; and some were sent out to oversee the administration of settlements or sub-regional areas. They were normally appointed to serve at the whim of the ruler, but, in the course of time, like the feudal lords themselves, some came to hold their offices hereditarily. In lieu of salaries, they were generally assigned certain lands within the domain together with the farming families and slaves resident there. In addition, the feudal lord also depended on the service of the warriors who comprised the mainstay of the occupying forces in his domain for various domestic needs such as pacifying the people and maintaining order, and also for the fulfillment of his military obligations to the Chou king. In the course of time, these warriors became a hereditary knightly class, called *shih* in Chinese, and they also supplied much of the manpower for filling administrative posts, such as those of the "ministers" and "great officers" in the fiefdom, as need arose.¹¹

The Chou kings, the feudal lords, the ministers and great officers, and the warrior knights, though conscious of differences in rank and privileges among themselves, constituted a large nation-wide body of non-labouring aristocrats who lived off the peasants, patronized the craftsmen, were catered for by merchants, governed in the limited ways that were necessary, and devoted themselves to practising the military arts and pursuing a wide variety of amusements. In the beginning, they were preoccupied with conquest and pacification, but, as the country became stabilized, this élite group was increasingly drawn to more peaceful and genteel pursuits—fine arts, music, literature, learning, ceremonial ritual—and they behaved more like a group of cultured "gentlemen" (or what Confucius later called *chün-tzu*, or "superior men") than a corps of warrior knights. It was this hereditary élite class, well-versed in military arts and in letters, that staffed the major governmental offices, provided the leadership in civil and military matters, took the lead in the development of various forms of literary and material culture, and ushered the Chou period

¹¹ For a succinct discussion, see Cho-yün Hsü, *Ancient China in Transition* ...

into a golden era in Chinese intellectual and cultural achievement.¹²

The stability of this loosely centralized, feudal-like political system encompassing a vast territory depended, however, almost exclusively on the Chou royal house, which, by the end of the seventh century B.C. underwent a steady decline due to internal dissension and external invasion by the northern barbarian tribes. The grand alliance among the lordly fiefs of early Chou times before long broke up into competing leagues in which one group of states allied itself against the other, and even lip-service to the king was eventually neglected. Showing contempt for the religious sanctions that legitimized the Chou rulers, some feudal lords began calling themselves kings; by diplomatic and finally by imperialistic and increasingly rapacious wars, they set about to win the whole of China for themselves. This process was well under way in the sixth century B.C. and by the end of the following century China was immersed in endemic civil war; in due course, smaller states were swallowed up by bigger ones, and the Chou royal house was terminated in 256 B.C. It was through the last several decades of internecine warfare that the western state of Ch'in emerged as victor and established the political order that we know as the first unified Chinese empire.¹³

Summing up, the Chou state deserves all the credit for laying the foundation of the Chinese institutional norms, the social and political order, and intellectual and cultural development. In the realm of political organization, the doctrine of the Mandate of Heaven provided the ideological basis for the development of the future imperial institution; and Chou feudalistic institutions, though defunct in later times, were hailed for their lofty ideals and simplicity, while its sovereign-vassal relationship laid the groundwork for the conduct of diplomatic relations with foreign nations in later times. In time the totality of its achievement in the North China plain gave rise to the notion of *Chung-kuo*, the "Middle Kingdom", and the belief that China was the most cultured centre in the universe, an idea which has continually dominated the Chinese mentality even down to the

¹² The social and political role of this cultured elite class in feudal China was an important subject of discussion in Confucius' political philosophy. For details, see the literature cited in n. 16 below.

¹³ On the political development between the collapse of the Chou house and the rise of the Ch'in empire, see, for example, Richard L. Walker, *The Multi-state System of Ancient China* (Hamden, Conn., 1953); and Derk Bodde, *China's First Unifier: A History of the Ch'in Dynasty* ... (Leiden, 1938).

present day. It is no wonder that the numerous schools of philosophers who rose in the waning days of the feudal era always looked back nostalgically to the golden years of the early Chou for inspiration and guidance.

In the midst of the political chaos of the Eastern Chou precipitated by the weakening of the Chou house, and the growing intransigence of the feudal lords who fought among themselves for political hegemony, there emerged many thoughtful individuals who pondered on the causes of the trouble, and offered various proposals for its remedy, at the same time projecting their own version of the ideal state and society of the future. There were three principal schools: Confucianism, Taoism and Legalism; each was, in its own way, a response to the political and social disorder of the late Chou times.¹⁴

Confucianism, the dominant school of thought in classical China, was derived from the teachings of Confucius (551-479 B.C.), a great teacher but an unemployed statesman, who was later deified as the greatest of the Chinese sages. His was basically a humanistic philosophy that attempted to establish a harmonious feudal society, and to recapture the glory of the early Chou by inculcating in the rulers and the people the cardinal virtues that are innate in men: inner integrity, righteousness, loyalty, reciprocity and, above all, love or human-heartedness. Confucius believed that only the cultured gentlemen, whom he called *chün-tzu* (or the equivalent of *shih* in Chou times), possessed these virtues, but men could attain them through learning, through conformity to the established rites and customs and through self-cultivation, and it was the duty of these gentlemen to educate those who wished to rectify themselves. Confucius felt that men, because of differences in social status and in education, should play their proper assigned roles in a fixed society of authority. This idea is succinctly expressed in the famous statement: "There is good government, when the prince is prince and the minister is minister; when the father is father and the son is son".¹⁵ Later this concept was expressed by the

¹⁴ For general studies on the rise of the pre-Ch'in philosophical schools, see, among others, the relevant sections in Kuo-chen Wu, *Ancient Chinese Political Thought* (Shanghai, 1928); Fung Yu-lan, *A History of Chinese Philosophy*, tr. Derk Bodde, Vol. I (Princeton, 1952); H.G. Creel, *Chinese Thought from Confucius to Mao Tse-tung* (Chicago, 1953); Hsiao Kung-Ch'üan, *Chung-Kuo cheng-chih ssu-hsiang shih* (A History of Chinese Political Thought) (Taipei, 1961 ed.), Vol. I; and F.W. Mote, *The Intellectual Foundations of China* (New York, 1971).

¹⁵ From the "Yen-tzu" chapter of Lun-yü [The Analects]; see *Confucius' Analects ...*, tr. James Legge, in *The Chinese Classics*, Vol. I: Bk. XII, Ch. XI, p. 256.

term *cheng-ming* ("rectification of names"), implying that theory should conform to reality, or, as the Confucianists really meant it, that reality should be made to conform to theory. With regard to the ideal government, Confucius looked back to the Chou model in the belief that the kingdom should be ruled by a benevolent sage-king who would provide the people with adequate food, who would command enough soldiers to defend the country, and who would use moral suasion and ritual propriety rather than regulations and punishments to achieve his objectives. These were the basic messages which Confucius tried to communicate to the rulers of that time, and they were further elaborated by his disciples, mainly Mencius (372-289 B.C.?) and Hsün-tzu (fl. 298-238 B.C.). In time they developed into a comprehensive social and political philosophy that continually moulded Chinese intellectual thinking down to the modern era.¹⁶

In contrast to Confucianism, Taoism is primarily a philosophy of naturalism and eremitism, an echo of return to the original nature which is at once both anti-materialistic and anti-intellectual. The literal meaning of *Tao* is "roadway", hence, "the Way", and it came to mean to the Taoists the great Way of Nature, as opposed to the artifices and devices of human civilization. The basic philosophy of Taoism is elucidated in the famous canon *Tao-te-ching* attributed to the legendary Lao-tzu, and later in the works of his reputed disciple Chuang-tzu (fl. 369-286 B.C.). Its political message is one of simple naturalism; it advises that the best way to govern is the great Way of not governing at all. The Way of Nature, according to this, can be observed in water, and in *Tao-te-ching* the favourite metaphor is: "Water seeks low places, resists nothing, but fills and overcomes everything". "Reversal is the movement of *Tao*", the canon says repeatedly, meaning that all movement is circular, from zenith to nadir and back, each point succeeded by the other. It then follows that all human cravings end in vanity, since they bring in time the opposite consequences of those directly sought; therefore, better leave

¹⁶ For a succinct account of the political philosophy of Confucius and the development of the School of Confucianism, see, in addition to the literature cited in n. 14, Arthur Waley, *Three Ways of Thought in Ancient China* (London, 1946); and H.G. Creel, *Confucius and the Chinese Way* (New York, 1960). For a selected anthology of Confucius' sayings in English, see W.T. de Bary, et al., eds., *Sources of the Chinese Tradition* (New York, 1960) Vol. I, Ch. II; and Wing-tsit Chan, *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy* (Princeton, 1963), 14-48.

people alone rather than strive to regulate and guide them. The ruler "who does nothing (or contemplates no actions) can accomplish everything", and he "who tries too much can only end up empty-handed".¹⁷ This has been regarded by most Chinese as a profoundly subtle observation, cautioning simplicity and limitation of government. Taoism, in keeping with the Chinese world view, is neither ascetic nor unworldly. It accepts life in this world as a man's real life, but the Taoist sage is one who reasonably limits his pursuit of material gain and pleasure and concentrates on the freedom of the mind. In political language, the Taoist idea sounds very close to utopianism, but in fact it was not; it merely pointed to the futility of imperial power and the need for limitation of government. It thus provided a healthy antidote to the proliferation of laws and regulations, and opened up an avenue of retreat for people suffering under an absolute ruler and an oppressive government.¹⁸

Legalism, on the other hand, is not a comprehensive philosophy; rather it is primarily a set of methods and principles for the operation of the state, with the barest of ideological foundations. The Legalists, moreover, unlike all the other thinkers of early China, were concerned only with the ruler and his state apparatus, not with the happiness of the individual and the good of society. As its philosophical basis, Legalism drew largely upon socio-psychological observations about human behaviour, i.e. how to make people serve the state. It had no speculative interests such as cosmology or metaphysics, it could abandon logic since it did not need to worry about convincing people through argument, and it abolished ethics as irrelevant. The foundation of Legalism was laid by Shang Yang (d. 338 B.C.), who served as an adviser to the Ch'in state before it emerged as the unifier of China, and had written the earliest example of theoretical discussions on statecraft; both the great synthesizer of Legalism was Han Fei (d. 233 B.C.), who, like Shang Yang, also served as an adviser of the

¹⁷ See the translations of this classic by J.J.L. Duyvendak and D.C. Lau: *Tao-te-ching: The Book of the Way and its Virtue* (London, 1954), and *Tao-te-ching* (London 1963), *passim*.

¹⁸ For a general survey of the political philosophy of the Taoist School, see, in addition to the literature cited in n. 14, Arthur Waley, *The Way and its Power: A Study of the Tao-te-ching and its Place in Chinese Thought* (London, 1949); J.J.L. Duyvendak, *Tao-te-ching: The Book of the Way and its Virtue* (Leiden, 1954); Holmes Welch, *The Parting of the Way: Lao Tzu and the Taoist Movement* (Boston, 1957); and H.G. Creel, *What is Taoism ...* (Chicago, 1970).

King of Ch'in. He left behind a series of essays on Legalist thought in his collected works, *Han Fei tzu*, which makes it one of the universal classics of political theory. The essential elements are the definition of power, its sources, function and proper use to enhance the ruler's position by making his state larger and stronger in the economic and military spheres so as to permit him unrestricted attainment of his will; an analysis of the role of the people, who were to be made totally compliant and as productive and efficient as possible in agriculture and in warfare; and a definition of the role of *fa* (law, penal regulations, and administrative procedures), which were to be above everything else, even the ruler, who would not interfere arbitrarily with their design and operation, and which should be promulgated and enforced so perfectly that the state's machinery would run like clock-work. Legalist planners well knew how to make such a system function at low administrative cost by involving the whole population in mutual responsibility, much like modern totalitarianism's mutual surveillance techniques. Legalism is thus both a repellent view of human values and an effective political science. Fortunately, the Chinese empire was able to temper the former with Confucianism without losing too much of the latter.¹⁹

In addition, mention must be made of the cosmologist school of Tsou Yen (305-240 B.C.), who formulated a cyclical theory of historical change based on the interaction of the cosmic *yin* and *yang* forces through the pulsations of their Five Agents or Powers. According to this, the primal mechanism of change of all the myriad things comes from the cyclical rotations of the Five major Agents or Powers of the cosmic forces: earth, wood, metal, fire and water. These Five Agents or Powers are not physical substances but metaphysical forces or modes, which dominate or control certain periods of time, commonly the seasons, in a fixed sequence of succession. Four of these elements, wood, fire, metal and water, are assigned to the four seasons in successive order, with corresponding colours and directions, whereas the earth element commands the central position and co-ordinates the changes of the other elements and their corresponding associations. The succession of these Five Agents or Powers follows a regular pattern

¹⁹ For basic information on the Political Philosophy of the Legalist School, see, in addition to the literature cited in n. 14, J.J.L. Duyvendak, *The Book of Lord Shang* (London, 1928); W.K. Liao, *The Complete Works of Han Fei Tzu* (London, 1939); W. Allyn Rickett, *Kuan-tzu: A Repository of Early Chinese Thought* (Hong Kong, 1965); and H.G. Creel, *Shen P'u-hai...* (Chicago, 1976).

in which one conquers or overcomes the other in the order of fire, water, earth, wood and metal; this came to be known as the cyclical conquest formula of the Five Agents theory. Under this scheme, the cyclical rotation of the Five Agents which successively overcome each other is not only related to the changes in the cosmogonical realm, but also, by extension, to the changes in all realms of human activity, including political affairs. Thus the theory gave rise to a cyclical interpretation of history and of dynastic successions, and this assumed overriding political significance in later times. As each season is governed by an agent or power, so it was believed that each dynasty rules by virtue of a particular cosmic element which it honours by adopting the colour of the agent or power in its banners and pennons and by similar ritualistic observances. In all cases, the assignment of a particular cosmic power is supported by the appearance of auspices and portents of nature which presage the appropriate elemental virtue by which the rulers claim legitimacy for their power. Tsou Yen had provided such an example by assigning various cosmic elements to many of the semi-legendary rulers in antiquity, including those of the Shang and Chou states. In this way, the cosmologists injected new vigour into the classical notion of legitimate rulership expounded in the Mandate of Heaven theory, and provided the imperial rulers of China with a powerful ideology of legitimization.²⁰

In brief, it is apparent that each of these schools of philosophers offered only a one-sided formula for the reconstruction of post-feudal society, and it required a synthesis of all these ideas to broaden the theoretical bases of statecraft in order to accommodate the diverse interests of the political theorists as well as of the ruling constituencies. This was achieved under Shih Huang-ti, the unifier of China in 221 B.C., who skilfully synthesized the essence of Confucianism, Taoism, Legalism and the cosmological school, and laid the theoretical foundation and operational modes of the monarchical system of government which persisted throughout the next two millennia.

The foundation of monarchy and government

The unification of feudal China by the Ch'in founder, Shih

²⁰ For a succinct account of the development of the cosmologist School of Tsou Yen and the basic principles of the Five Agents Theory, see Fung Yu-lan, *op. cit.*, 159-169; W.T. de Bary, *op. cit.*, 198-206 and W.T. Chan, *op. cit.*, 244-250. On the application of the Five Agents Theory by the imperial rulers in dynastic China for

Huang-ti, in 221 B.C. ushered in the imperial era of Chinese history which saw the inception of the emperor institution as well as a bureaucratic system of government whose basic characteristics persisted until the end of the Ch'ing dynasty (1644-1912). During the next two millennia, successive dynasties appeared and vanished, and China at times suffered from political fragmentation as it had done in the late Chou era, as a result of invasions by nomadic barbarians from the north. Some of them seized part of the Chinese territories and established temporary kingdoms, and others, such as the Mongols and Manchus, succeeded in conquering all China and founding Chinese-style dynasties. In the meantime, significant socio-economic changes occurred: China slowly grew from a predominantly rural society into one containing basic urban elements; from T'ang (618-907) and Sung (960-1279) times its thoroughly agrarian economy gradually changed into one with large commercial and small industrial components. Traditional religious and philosophical attitudes derived from the pre-Ch'in era were gradually transformed, largely in response to the introduction of Buddhism from India, and from the twelfth century crystallized into a metaphysically oriented ethical and political syncretism known as Neo-Confucianism. The domain of the Chinese empire was also steadily expanded and its population grew and shifted, from 100 million in the Sung to about 265 million in the late Ch'ing period, with heavy concentration in the central and southeastern coastal provinces. In response to these changes, the government necessarily had to adapt itself to the new circumstances; it grew in size and in complexity, becoming increasingly more sophisticated if not more authoritarian and conservative, while new policies were successively experimented with, adopted, modified and discarded. There remained, however, a continuing tradition in the governmental organization in both theory and practice that set the imperial era apart from the feudal age, and that lasted until the dissolution of the monarchy in the early twentieth century.²¹

legitimation, see my forthcoming study, *Theories of Legitimacy in Imperial China: Discussions on Legitimate Succession under the Jurchen-Chin Dynasty (1115-1234)*, Introduction.

²¹ For a useful survey on the development of the Chinese state and civilization during the imperial era, see such general works on Chinese history as L.C. Goodrich, *A Short History of the Chinese People*, 3rd ed. (New York, 1959); E.L. Reischauer and J.K. Fairbank, *East Asia: The Great Tradition* (Boston, 1960); Raymond Dawson, *Imperial China* (London, 1972); and Wolfram Eberhard, *A History of China*, rev. ed.,

The main characteristics of this tradition, allowing for certain modifications but without basic structural changes, may be summarized as follows:

1. The ultimate source of sovereignty was vested exclusively in a hereditary monarch, absolute in theory and sometimes in practice, who imposed direct rule, normally and ideally, on all the people within the Chinese empire, with the assistance of a hierarchy of officials who shared the power of the sovereign. The monarch justified his absolute authority as the Son of Heaven and the parent of an extended hierarchical family by arguments based on a complex ideology harking back to the feudal era, and demanded complete submission from his subjects, who were to be the recipients of his grace and benevolence through various administrative and legislative mechanisms, as well as by ideological indoctrination and persuasion. His stature was steadily exalted and surrounded by mysticism, while his power continued to grow, but he was often susceptible to the manipulation of his subordinates and was thus insulated from his subjects, widening the hiatus between the monarchy and the general population.²²

2. The basic organization of government rested on a tripartite pyramid comprising a general administration, a military establishment, and a censorial system, and each was organized into a hierarchy of agencies or units, extending from the central government down to the regional and local levels, in charge of all aspects of state affairs. The government was staffed on bureaucratic rather than feudal principles, with officials appointed by and responsible to the ruler, whose

(London, 1977). On the expansion of the Chinese empire and the growth of its population, see Harold Wiens, *China's March towards the Tropics* (Hamden, Conn., 1953); P.T. Ho, *Studies on the Population of China, 1368-1953* (Cambridge, Mass., 1959); and C.P. Fitzgerald, *The Southern Expansion of the Chinese People* (Canberra, 1972). On the development of governmental institutions during the imperial period, see, in addition to the literature cited in n. 1, Ch'ien Tuan-sheng, *The Government and Politics of China 1912-1949* (Cambridge, Mass., 1959), introduction; Edward A. Kracke, jr., "The Chinese and the Art of Government", in *The Legacy of China*, 309-339; John L. Bishop, ed., *Studies of Governmental Institutions in Chinese History* (Cambridge, Mass. 1968); and James T.C. Liu, ed., *Political Institutions in Traditional China: Major Issues* (New York, 1974).

²² Michael Loewe, *op. cit.*, Ch. 3; John Meskill, *op. cit.*, 556-558. See also Lei Hai-tsung, "The Rise of the Emperor System in Ancient China", *The Chinese Social and Political Sciences Review* 20 (1936), 251-265; and James T.C. Liu, "An Administrative Cycle in Chinese History: The Case of Northern Sung Emperors", *Journal of Asian Studies* XX: 2 (Feb. 1962), 137-152.

powers were authorized by the ruler; and the general practice had been the subordination of the military in favour of the civil authority. The criteria for official appointment were first weighted heavily in favour of aristocratic origin or kinship with the imperial family, but, at least by T'ang and Sung times, they were based on individual merit through successful competition in the state civil service examinations and through actual performance in governmental service.²³

3. The imperial government, headed by the absolute monarch and a hierarchical echelon of bureaucratic officials, assumed manifold functions and various responsibilities. It not only undertook to defend the country against outside invaders, maintain internal order, conduct foreign relations, dispense justice, and levy and collect sufficient revenues to sustain itself, but also it exercised regulatory powers over all aspects of the life of the Chinese people—their moral standards, their intellectual and religious activities and development, their social customs and behaviour, their economic interests, their property, and their physical and material welfare, as well as sundry other matters. In short, the imperial government committed itself to a range of activities more thorough and broader in scope than what most modern governments have regarded as their legitimate functions and responsibilities.²⁴

4. This monarchical system of government was not only pursued by all the native rulers of China, irrespective of their origin or the circumstances of their coming to power, but was also emulated by the non-Chinese nomadic or semi-nomadic conquerors who founded dynasties and organized political administrations on Chinese soil. They adopted the Chinese imperial title alongside their native tribal designations, structured their government on Chinese principles and organization, recruited the literary élite for government service, and promoted the Confucian socio-political hierarchical order and value systems. They may have modified and even deviated from the Chinese pattern by their very nature as alien conquerors, such as in aggravating its authoritarian and despotic trends, yet in many ways they contributed to the perpetuation of the traditional monarchy and the bureaucratic system of government.²⁵

²³ Michael Loewe, *op. cit.*, Ch. 6; John Meskill, *op. cit.*, 558-564. See also John L. Bishop, *op. cit.*; and Edward A. Kracke, jr., *Civil Service in Early Sung China*, 960-1067 (Cambridge, Mass. 1953); *passim*.

²⁴ See n. 19, and n. 20.

²⁵ For a general account of the adoption of Chinese government institutions by

5. The imperial government was absolute and even despotic, if not totalitarian, in the sense that the monarch and the state, in theory as well as in practice, wielded the final authority and had complete control over all aspects of the life of the people in the empire. In no cases in imperial China did either an individual or an organized group of people possess any private status or right that could legitimately challenge the imperial authority or defend them against the encroachment of the power of the absolute ruler and government. There was no sense of citizenship, no separate identity of the individual as distinct from the community and the state, no viable ideology outside the state orthodoxy, no freedom of organization of political parties, or of open discussions on public issues, and no opportunity to hold public office except through direct government appointment.²⁶

6. The imperial ruler assumed that his absolute authority as the Son of Heaven and parent of an extended hierarchical family properly encompassed not only the Chinese, but also the "barbarians", i.e. non-Chinese, living on the fringe of the Chinese empire and in other lands, whether known or unknown to the Chinese. The latter, who were culturally inferior to the Chinese, were considered as the "vassal people" of the emperor, whose rulers should submit to his authority and regularly send tribute to court as a gesture of submission. In return, the Chinese emperor would offer them protection, gifts and material benefits, and inculcate in them the Confucian moral and ethical codes in order to convert them to Chinese civilization. In practice, however, the imperial ruler seldom interfered directly in the lives of these "barbarian" peoples so long as they did not threaten Chinese interests and acknowledged his overlordship, even in token fashion, by complying with the requirements of a subordinate vassal state.²⁷

the nomadic alien conquerors, see also K.A. Wittfogel and Feng Chia-sheng, *History of Chinese Society: Liao (907-1125)* (Philadelphia, 1949), Introduction, and J.K. Fairbank, "Synarchy under the Treaties", in *Chinese Thought and Institutions* (Chicago, 1957), 204-234.

²⁶In addition to the references cited in ns. 19 and 20, see also F.W. Mote "The Growth of Despotism: A Critique of Wittfogel's Theory of Oriental Despotism as applied to China", *Oriens Extremus* VIII:1 (1961), 1-41; and Étienne Balazs, *Chinese Civilization and Bureaucracy*, *passim*.

²⁷ On the development of sovereign-vassal relationships between the Chinese ruler and the non-Chinese barbarian kingdoms, see J.K. Fairbank and Su-yü Teng, *Ch'ing Administration: Three Studies* (Cambridge, Mass., 1961), 107-206; and J.K. Fairbank, ed., *The Chinese World Order* (Cambridge, Mass., 1968).

a. The emperor institution

The most spectacular development in the political organization of imperial China under the Ch'in founder was the inception of the emperor institution which laid the foundation of the monarchical system of bureaucratic government during the imperial era. This unique imperial institution drew upon the many strands of the ideologies and traditions of the feudal era, but it was also a product of the political and administrative realities associated with the establishment of a unified bureaucratic empire. In the course of time, the imperial ruler was raised to a supreme and mystical status, far more exalted than that of the feudal kings, and assumed an absolute power in theory, and sometimes in practice, as the ultimate source of sovereignty over the Chinese population as well as over those peoples living in lands known to the Chinese in the pre-modern era. During this long period of Chinese history, many individuals rose to power and founded different dynasties, and yet, regardless of their social origin or the circumstances of enthronement, they all assumed the role of the emperor with the traditional regalia and committed themselves to the monarchical system of bureaucratic government.²⁸

In many ways, the inception of the emperor institution under the Ch'in marked the culmination of various dominant trends in the concept of kingship in ancient China. In the feudal era, as already noted, the Chou ruler, who held nominal sovereignty over the lesser lords, called himself king (*wang*) and justified his authority by claiming to be the Son of Heaven, harking back to the doctrine of the Mandate of Heaven. He was, therefore, a descendant of the Heavenly God, called *Ti*, derived from the ancient worship of heaven, and he was the undisputed ruler on earth since he was delegated to rule by Heaven, although it was also stipulated that Heaven could withdraw sanction if the ruler was found to have abused his prerogatives. This supreme stature of the Chou king was challenged, however, during the waning days of the feudal era by the lesser lords who sought to bolster their prestige by usurping the title of *wang*, a few of them even claiming the exalted title *Ti* in their struggle for political hegemony. These two trends of development finally culminated in the unification

²⁸ For a succinct account of the development of the Chinese emperor institution, see Lei Hai-tung, *op. cit.*; Hsiao Kung-Ch'üan, *op. cit.*; Vol. II, Ch. 8; and Joseph Levenson, *Confucian China and its Modern Fate: A Trilogy*, (Berkeley, 1968), Vol. II, pt. 2.

of China by the Ch'in founder who, in an attempt to elevate himself to an unprecedented level of authority, adopted the title *Huang-ti*, which approximated the Western epithet of "august emperor". This was a combination of the designation of the ancient legendary ruler, *Huang*, and the heavenly god, *Ti*, a title which had never before been used in this joint form. The significance of this new title was most far-reaching, since it implied that the ruler possessed not only the divinity of the Heavenly Lord, but also the absolute power to rule over the country as the Son of Heaven in theory and in practice. In addition, the political theories developed by the pre-Ch'in schools of philosophy, such as Confucianism, Taoism, Legalism and the teachings of the cosmologists, further solidified the theoretical bases of the emperor institution. These included the Confucian ideal of benevolent government headed by a sage king and based on ethical and moral principles, the Taoist conception of the ruler as a wise man governing the people in harmony with nature even though he contemplated no action, the Legalist version of an absolute ruler ruling over the country on the basis of law and punishment and administrative techniques, and the cosmologists' theory of historical changes geared to the interactions of the *yin* and *yang* forces through the cyclical domination of the Five Cosmic Agents or Powers which dictated the rise and fall of rulers and dynasties. In various ways, these ideas fused with each other, embellished the ancient concept of kingship, broadened its theoretical basis, and legitimized the all-embracing, absolute authority of the monarch in the imperial era.²⁹

In theory, though not often in practice, therefore, the Chinese emperor enjoyed supreme authority and absolute power as the Son of Heaven and parent of the extended hierarchical family, with the blessing and protection of almighty Heaven and the spiritual deities. He was at once both spiritual leader and temporal leader, the intermediary between Heaven and men; he was wise, morally erect, just and benevolent, he was the supreme governor of all the land under heaven (*t'ien-hsia*) and chief executor of all affairs affecting the population. He made law, dispensed justice, provided his subjects with basic needs, looked after their welfare, upheld their moral and

²⁹ *Ibid.* On the theoretical basis of the emperor institution, see also Hsiao Kung-Ch'uan, "Legalism and Autocracy in Traditional China", *Tsing hua Journal of Chinese Studies*, N.S., 4:2 (1964), 108-122; and F.W. Mote, *The Intellectual Foundations of China*, Ch. 7. On the legitimation of imperial rulership and dynastic power in Chinese history, see my forthcoming study cited in n. 20.

ethical standards, patronized intellectual and cultural activities and, above all, defended his subjects against outside invasion as commander-in-chief of the armed forces. In short, the emperor's prerogatives were all-embracing and uncontested, and though he delegated power to his subordinates to administer the country and govern the people, he alone possessed the ultimate authority in all realms of activity. The position of the emperor was unique: there was no one else in the Land under Heaven who enjoyed the same prerogatives as he did. Hence a Chinese classical saying has it: "In Heaven there are not two Sons; in a country there are not two kings."³⁰ There were, of course, periods in Chinese history when China was politically fragmented, chiefly by nomadic invasions, so that more than one supreme ruler appeared in the Chinese empire at the same time. Nevertheless, the myth that there could ideally be only one legitimate imperial ruler in the Land under Heaven continued to persist. The Chinese emperors, divine as they claimed to be, did not assume immortality (though some had attempted this by taking the Taoist elixir; obviously no one succeeded), but they had early developed a system of succession based on the principle of primogeniture. This system did not always work, but it provided a viable institutional mechanism to sustain the durability of the emperor institution, and was followed by practically all the Chinese rulers down to the dissolution of the monarchy.³¹

The exalted status of the Chinese emperor as the divine Son of Heaven and absolute ruler of all the land on earth continued to grow through the refinement of the imperial ideologies and the injection of new ingredients as China developed a more complex and extensive bureaucratic system of government. There were already attempts by the political ideologues to surround the supreme ruler with mystery even as early as the inception of the emperor institution under the Ch'in, and the trend progressed through the Han (206 B.C. - 202 A.D.) and T'ang dynasties. Various magical attributes were imputed to the emperor, such as stories about his unusual birth, his extraordi-

³⁰ Attributed to Confucius in reply to the query of his disciple Tseng Ts'an, included in *Li-chi* [Book of Rites]. See *Li Chi: Book of Rites*, tr. James Legge and ed. by Ch'u Chai and Winberg Chai (New York, 1967), Vol. I: Bk.V, Sec. 1, p. 323.

³¹ On the issue of imperial succession in dynastic China, see Dison H.F. Poe, "Imperial Succession and Attendant Crisis in Dynastic China: An Analytic and Quantitative Study through the Five-Elements Approach", *Tsing hua Journal of Chinese Studies*, N.S. VIII: 1-2 (Aug. 1970), 84-153.

nary physique, his being endowed with supernatural gifts and the like, and he was steadily transformed from an exemplary sage ruler in the Confucian convention into a semi-human, godlike, awe-inspiring personality. In so doing, the political ideologues not only drew upon popular lore about extraordinary individuals, but also upon Taoist and Buddhist beliefs and traditions. Under their influence, many of the imperial rulers not only were deeply obsessed with these beliefs, but also they deliberately manipulated the prevailing Taoist and Buddhist sub-traditions as a source of legitimation. A few of these who patronized Taoism declared themselves personifications of the son of the Jade Emperor, the all-embracing ruler of the cosmos as well as of the earthly kingdom, and some of those who professed the Buddhist faith claimed that they were divinely ordained *Cakravartin* kings, Turners of the Wheel of the Law, and that their actions were sanctioned by the high goal of a universal Buddhist dominion.³²

In the meantime, the rise during the twelfth century of the Neo-Confucian schools, which attempted to rejuvenate the basic Confucian moral and ethical virtues by synthesizing classical Confucianism with Buddhist and Taoist elements within a metaphysical framework, also served to enhance the stature of the imperial ruler. These Neo-Confucian philosophers developed a cosmogonical interpretation of all the myriad forms of concrete reality, including social and political organizations, in terms of the interaction of the *yin* and *yang* forces. They traced the source of creation to the "Supreme Ultimate" (*T'ai-chi*), a shapeless and invisible cosmic entity which subsumed all the principles of the myriad forms of existence, and, relating this to human affairs, implicitly identified the imperial ruler with the "Supreme Ultimate", which endowed him with an additional layer of mystique and elevated him to a far more exalted status. In a similar vein, while offering a new interpretation of the Confucian moral and ethical virtues within a metaphysical framework, the Neo-Confucianists placed special emphasis on such qualities as loyalty, obedience, and the importance of maintaining the social hierarchical relationship, which

³² On the adulation and mythologization of the Chinese emperor in the dynastic period, see Lei Hai-tung, *op. cit.*; Arthur F. Wright, "Sui Yang-ti: Personality and Stereotype", in *The Confucian Persuasion* (Stanford, 1960), 47-76; Winston W. Lo, "The Monarchical Mystique in Chinese History", in *Essays on Chinese Studies Presented to Professor Lo Hsiang-lin* (Hong Kong, 1970), 381-390; and Hok-lam Chan, "The Rise of Ming T'ai-tsu (1368-1398): Facts and Fictions in Early Ming Official Historiography", *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 95:4 (Oct.-Dec. 1975), 679-715.

culminated in the Chu Hsi school; this came to be accepted as the state orthodoxy of Neo-Confucianism from Southern Sung times onwards. This trend of development strengthened the ideological basis of the existing social and political hierarchy and further bolstered the imperial ruler's position as the ultimate source of authority. In consequence, the Chinese emperor became the more mysterious and less human, and was increasingly insulated from the general population, who came to look upon him as a demigod rather than a benevolent sage king, as is well attested by a popular saying in the later imperial era: 'Heaven is high, and the emperor is far away!'³³

The persistence of the imperial mystique notwithstanding, it would be wrong to assume that the Chinese emperors could exercise their ultimate power without restraints in actual practice. This is because, in the first place, the imperial ruler, through education and the remonstrances of his councillors, aspired to be an enlightened sage-monarch, and the persistent Confucian ideal of benevolent kingship restrained him from exercising his absolute power beyond the limits warranted by established convention and the expectations of the literati. Secondly, he stood at the apex of a vast, complicated bureaucratic apparatus charged with the administration of the manifold state affairs, both domestic and foreign, so that no Chinese emperor alone could have the physical ability, experience or knowhow to handle all the technical details or make all the administrative decisions, especially after the end of the T'ang period, when China developed a far more complex and extensive bureaucratic government. In these circumstances, he had to listen to the advice of members of the imperial family or the aristocratic clans, but even more so to that of the scholar-officials who were the upholders of the Confucian tradition, and he was compelled to delegate power to the administrators whom he appointed to take charge of the day-to-day administration and even to share it with them. In so doing, the Chinese emperor was subject to pressure from two lower echelons of power: the executive power vested with the policy-critics or remonstrance officials, and in exercising his prerogatives he was liable to revision and remonstrance by his subordinates on the lower strata who often inadvertently modified or

³³ See, for instance, F.W. Mote, 'The Growth of Despotism ...'; James T.C. Liu, 'How did a Neo-Confucian School become the State Orthodoxy', *Philosophy East and West*, 23:4 (Oct. 1973), 483-505; and Julia Ching, 'Neo-Confucian Utopian Theories and Political Ethics', *Monumenta Serica* XXX (1972-1973), 1-56.

challenged, if not manipulated, his ultimate power, and undermined his supreme authority.

In addition, the extent to which a Chinese emperor could exercise his free will was dictated not only by Confucian ideologies and administrative realities, but also by the personality of the emperor himself. Professor James T.C. Liu, has recently produced a typology placing the Northern Sung rulers in four categories —the organizing-type, the maintenance-type, the reforming-type, and the ineffectual-type— in terms of their personality, and the strengths and changing balances between the ultimate power, the executive power and the power of public opinion. The first includes the vigorous, attentive dynastic organizers; the next, the less capable, second-generation successors; the third, the far-sighted dynamic restorationists; and the fourth, the “muddle-headed” weaklings who either abused, or allowed their subordinates to abuse, the imperial prerogatives. Perhaps with the exception of a few rulers of the foreign dynasties, such as those of the Yüan (1260-1368) or Ch’ing, founded by the Mongols and Manchus respectively, or the founder of the Ming dynasty (1368-1644), it is rarely in Chinese history that we find that the emperor imposed direct rule with an iron fist and exercised his power at will. The normal case seems to have been that of a precarious balance of power between the emperor, the councillors and administrative bureaucrats, and the policy-critics and remonstrance officials, with the ultimate power at times prevailing and at times subject to manipulation by these high officers of state. In the latter case, the emperor might be reduced to a mere figure-head, and hence we cannot label the monarchy as one of “imperial absolutism”, but rather, as Professor Liu puts it, of “bureaucratic absolutism”, in the sense that the bureaucrats perpetuated absolute rule in the name of the monarch.³⁴

In retrospect, while the Chinese emperor wielded ultimate sovereignty and legitimized himself by means of a complex of ideologies and traditions, he was not, in most cases, free to impose his own will or to exercise his power without restraint. Although he enjoyed an exalted status, and was increasingly insulated from the general population, he was not, with a few exceptions, a naked despot, let alone a tyrant, since he was tempered by the Confucian ideal of benevolent kingship and overburdened with political and administrative complexities. In view of these considerations, few Chinese imperial rulers

³⁴J.T.C. Liu, “An Administrative Cycle in Chinese History ...” (see n. 22).

qualified as "totalitarian despots", and the epithet "benevolent autocrat", even at the risk of oversimplification, may be a more appropriate characterization.

b. The bureaucratic tradition

The inception of the emperor institution at the time of the unification of China by the Ch'in founder was complemented by yet another accomplishment in the organization and development of a bureaucratic system of government. In various ways, this new system of government underwent many trials and errors after its establishment under the Ch'in and Han dynasties; it was expanded and modified under the T'ang and Sung, reorganized by the Mongol rulers, and persisted through the Ming and Ch'ing dynasties until the collapse of the imperial order in the early twentieth century. This unique and durable system was built on the foundation of many past institutions and traditions in response to the needs of governing a vast empire and a large flourishing population. It drew upon Confucian principles of benevolent government to provide moral leadership for the people, to cater for their economic needs, and to defend them against outside invasions; upon Taoist ideas of Harmony, non-interference and laissez-faire; and upon the Legalist conception of government based on law and punishment, and administered by men of expertise to maintain social order and domestic tranquility. There were several salient features in the formal structure and operational modes of this durable system of government. The most important of these were the early transformation of the ruler-oriented imperial household administration into a state-oriented national administrative organ; the formation of a tripartite hierarchy of bureaucratic administration based on principles of check and balance extending from the central to the local levels; the separation of the civil from the military authority, with the predominance of the former geared to the civil service examination system for the recruitment of bureaucratic officials; and a close rapport between the central and local governments, with the former increasingly encroaching upon the authority of the latter. There were also a number of basic principles of government, both ideological and operational, according to which these bureaucratic institutions discharged their functions and responsibilities. These included, among others, an ideal of government which rested on a synthesis of the Legalist concept of law and punishment and Confucian

moral and ethical principles; the maintenance of a social and political hierarchy which placed the literati over the peasants, merchants and artisans through legislative means as well as through ideological indoctrination and persuasion; the state monopoly of certain lucrative economic commodities, such as salt and iron, and their delegation to private individuals for their management; and the application of the traditional concept of the sovereign-vassal relationship between the feudal king and the lesser lords to the conduct of foreign relations with peoples outside the Chinese empire in the so-called "tributary system".³⁵ In its long history of development, this bureaucratic system of government evolved in complex ways and underwent numerous changes in form and function as the nation's area, population and economy grew, but the basic features and principles of government remained relatively constant throughout the imperial era of Chinese history.

The basic structure of the central government, as mentioned earlier, consisted of a tripartite hierarchical organization that included a general administration, a military establishment, and a censorial system with a subordinate echelon of officials and bureaucrats. The general administrative hierarchy was probably the most complicated and elaborate; it managed the ritual, fiscal, judicial, educational, personnel, diplomatic, and all other general aspects of state administration that directly affected the livelihood of the people. The military hierarchy included all the armed forces, which normally outnumbered all civilian government personnel, though its structural organization was comparatively less complex. The censorial hierarchy consisted of a group of agencies which traditionally had no direct administrative responsibilities, but were charged with maintaining surveillance over all governmental activities, civil and military (and in consequence could impeach corrupt and incompetent officials), and with reviewing government policies and operations, and proposing appropriate changes, sometimes even through direct remonstrances with the emperor. In principle, the Chinese monarch normally acquiesced in the independent character of the censorial officials in order to obtain their frank opinion and to achieve the objectives of check and balance

³⁵ For general studies on the development of the bureaucratic system in imperial China, see in addition to the literature cited in n. 21, Edward A. Kracke, jr., *Civil Service in Early Sung China 960-1067*; and Johanna Menzel ed., *Chinese Civil Service Career open to Talent?* (Boston, 1963). On the genesis and development of the tributary system, see the references cited in n. 27.

between the three hierarchies of governmental organization.³⁶

The central government in Ch'in and Han times was dominated by a triumvirate of officials who acted as the emperor's chief agents in the three hierarchies of government: a Grand Counsellor or Prime Minister presiding over the general administration, a Grand Marshal in control of the armed forces, and a Censor-in-chief dealing with surveillance activities. Under the general administrative hierarchy there existed a number of bodies whose functions were to serve the needs of the imperial household, such as the Court of Imperial Sacrifice, the Court of Imperial Entertainments, the Court of the Imperial Stud, the Court of State Ceremonial and the like. These central governmental organizations were greatly expanded and had become more complex and institutionalized by T'ang and Sung times, in order to cope with the multiplication of state functions and responsibilities as the Chinese empire expanded in size and in population. The military establishment, for example, was coordinated under the Bureau of Military Affairs, while the censorial system was split into a Censorate specializing in surveillance and impeachment, and a Bureau of Remonstrance charged with counselling and admonishing the emperor about his policies and even his personal conduct. The general administration, on the other hand, was expanded into a co-ordinated cluster of top level agencies—a Chancellery, a Secretariat, a Department of State Affairs—whose ranking officials served as a state council, which made policy decisions in consultation with the emperor, or, if the emperor chose to abdicate his responsibilities, made those decisions after reaching a consensus among themselves. Immediately subordinate to the Department of State Affairs were a group of six functionally differentiated ministries which assumed control over the routine administration and constituted the hard core of central government operations. These included the Ministry of Personnel, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Rites, Ministry of War, Ministry of Justice, and Ministry of Works. They discharged all governmental matters except tactical military operations and censorial activities, which were handled by the respective special agencies, and their authority extended into the various branches of the local governmental agencies, although the latter were sometimes given a certain autonomy in the implementation of major

³⁶ On the development and organization of the censorial system in imperial China, see Charles O. Hucker, *The Censorial System of Ming China* (Stanford, 1966), Introduction.

government policies and decisions.³⁷

The principal officers of these government agencies were at first recruited from members of the aristocratic clans, powerful families, or individuals related to the imperial family. They were most often elected on the basis of their calibre, moral qualities and expertise on practical subjects, but by Han times people of talent among the common folk were often summoned for government appointments through special recommendations. There were initially only rudimentary forms of tests or examinations for the selection of government officials, but by T'ang times a full-fledged civil service examination system had emerged and it reached its zenith under the Sung dynasty. These civil service examinations, to be held at the county, prefecture and national levels, normally once every three years, were designed to recruit men of letters and moral attainment for government service, and were in the form of competitive tests in the classical works, belles-lettres, and subjects on statecraft. All individuals who aspired to an official career, with the exception of those having a criminal record or of merchant origin, were qualified to sit for examinations, and the top honours went to those who passed the palace examination and were awarded the most prestigious title of *chin-shih* or "elevated scholar". The successful candidates were then assigned to serve in various government agencies and followed regular channels of advancement and promotion based on individual merit and their record of performance. The impact of the civil service examination system, which continued to function until its abolition in 1905, was beyond measure. It produced a hard core of ideologically homogeneous scholar-officials for government service, widened the opportunity for political participation, promoted social mobility, and moulded the intellectual outlook of the Chinese literati and the curriculum of their education. This was one of the unique accomplishments of the Chinese imperial government and has had a far-reaching impact on the general population even down to the present day.³⁸

There were no basic structural changes in the central governmental

³⁷ Michael Loewe *op. cit.*, Ch. 6; John Meskill *op. cit.*, 558-561; see also Étienne Balazs, *op. cit.*; and John L. Bishop, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

³⁸ See, in addition to the literature cited in n. 35, Chung-li Chang, *The Chinese Gentry ...* (Seattle, 1955); and P.T. Ho, *The Ladder of Success in Imperial China ...* (New York, 1962). On the dissolution of the civil service examination system, see Wolfgang Franke, *The Reform and Abolition of the Traditional Chinese Examination System* (Cambridge, Mass., 1960).

organization even under the alien dynasties, such as the Chin (1115-1234), the Jurchen, and the Yüan (1260-1368) founded by the Mongols, although there had been some changes of name for certain agencies and some consolidation and elimination of offices and organs. The only exception occurred under the Ming dynasty, when the first emperor T'ai-tsu (r. 1368-1398) abolished the office of prime minister to maximize his power, so that his successors did away with the old executive superstructures entirely, leaving the six co-ordinated ministries as the high-level general administrative agencies and five uncoordinated chief military commands as the highest-level military agencies. The need for coordination, however, soon became urgent, and in the second century of the Ming period a new, somewhat informal executive body called the Grand Secretariat was created, and the succeeding Manchu rulers of the Ching dynasty imposed on it an even more prestigious and powerful policy-making agency known as the Grand Council of State. In addition to these agencies, a vast assortment of lesser, more specialized organs was created through the centuries. There were several service agencies, some directly descended from the Ch'in and Han, to provide for the daily needs of the greatly expanded imperial household establishment. There were the educational and literary agencies, culminating in the National University, which helped prepare aspirants for the civil services, and the Han-lin Academy, staffed by various erudite scholars engaged in drafting and polishing the imperial pronouncements and in the compilation of imperially sponsored works, such as the regional records and dynastic histories. There was a relatively autonomous judicial agency, called the Grand Court of Revisions, which served as a court of review of severe penal sentences imposed by the junior administrative agencies. There were also the special Finance Commissions (first created during the Sung period) in charge of the state budget, finance, census records, and government monopolies of certain lucrative commodities, in order to cope with a rapidly expanding economy.³⁹

³⁹ For details of the adoption of Chinese governmental institutions by the alien rulers of the Chin and Yüan dynasties, see Jing-shen Tao, *The Jurchen in Twelfth-century China* ... (Seattle, 1976); and Paul Ratchnevsky, *Un Code des Yüan* (Paris, 1937), *passim*. On the institutional renovations under the Ming dynasty, see Charles O. Hucker, "Governmental Organization of the Ming Dynasty", *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* XX (1958), 1-74 and *ibid.*, *Chinese Government in Ming Times: Seven Studies* (New York, 1969). On the development of the other governmental institutions in the latter imperial period, see the literature cited in n. 21 and n. 35.

The development of local government followed closely that of the central government, since the two complemented each other and one could not function properly without the other. The local governmental system first took shape after the abolition of feudalism by the Ch'in founder, when the first emperor divided the country into a hierarchy of administrative divisions that included two basic units: the *chün* (commandery) and *hsien* (county), headed by officials appointed by the central government. These territorial administrative units were subsequently expanded and subdivided through the following centuries and they came to include such divisions as regions or circuits (*tao* or *lu*), prefectures (*fu*) and sub-prefectures (*chou*), under the administration of a hierarchy of officials chosen from successful candidates in the civil service examinations. These officials were the direct supervisors of the countries, each of which was administered by a magistrate who was the agent through whom the central government dealt ultimately with the people at large. The magistrate, assisted by a cluster of locally recruited functionaries and by government-sponsored private groupings of country elders, was answerable to the emperor through his intermediary supervisors for everything that transpired within his administration. He assessed and collected taxes, dispensed justice, organized and at times commanded local militia, patronized local schools, participated in religious ceremonies, regulated local business and industry, and above all set a good example for the people by his own conduct and performance. The various hierarchies of local government agencies enjoyed relative autonomy as long as they executed and responded to the orders of the central government, but, from Sung times onwards, they were subject to increasing interference from various different supervisory agencies of the central government. This interference first took the form of travelling commissioners despatched from the central government, but, by the thirteenth century, when the Mongols established control over China, a permanent form of provincial government (*sheng*) was instituted to impose stricter and more direct control over the local administration. Upon the founding of the Ming dynasty these provincial governments became tripartite, as was the central government, comprising a provincial military command, a provincial general administrative agency and a provincial censor-judicial agency. Then, beginning in the fifteenth century, the provincial agencies in turn were made subordinate to the grand coordinators delegated from the central government, serving as provincial governors, and groups of provinces were further coordinated for

strategic considerations under supreme commanders or viceroys. This laid the foundation for more direct control by the central government over the local administration, enabling the emperor to extend his authority down to the grass-root levels through the various intermediary hierarchies of governmental agencies, and the same devices were reinforced by the Manchu rulers of the Ch'ing dynasty.⁴⁰

In many ways, therefore, we cannot fail to discern a growing trend towards centralization of governmental authority over the local administrations, which implicitly enhanced the power of the emperor and reduced the autonomy of the local officials and the initiative of the general population. Throughout the imperial era there were many discussions among political theorists and statesmen as to what extent the government should be centralized or decentralized. It was recognized that either extreme would be harmful: one would lead to imperial despotism, but the other might give rise to political fragmentation. It is apparent that few governments were able to attain a balance between the two extremes and fluctuation between them seems to have been the norm in the millennia of imperial Chinese history.⁴¹

In the light of the foregoing, it can be expected that the Chinese bureaucratic institutions as they evolved encountered many complicated problems, and questions naturally arise as to how they maintained their durability and flexibility in upholding the monarchy, and sustaining the traditional value system, as well as meeting the anticipations of the Chinese population. There are also questions as to how well these institutions functioned, how they should be characterized, and why they failed to sustain the monarchical system at the turn of the twentieth century. In this case, we need to go beyond the formal structure of the governmental organizations and recapitulate the basic ideological as well as operational mechanisms that provided the driv-

⁴⁰ For studies on the local governmental organization in imperial China, see the relevant sections in Derk Bodde, *China's First Unifier ...*; Brian E. McKnight, *Village and Bureaucracy in Southern Sung China* (Chicago, 1972); Lien-sheng Yang, "Ming Local Government", in *Chinese Government in Ming Times*, 1-21; T'ung-tsu Ch'ü, *Local Government in China Under the Ch'ing* (Cambridge, Mass., 1962); and John R. Watt, *The District Magistrate in Late Imperial China* (New York, 1972).

⁴¹ These were the major concerns of the Chinese intellectuals during the late Ming and early Ch'ing periods. For a summary of their views and criticisms of the imperial institutions, see S.Y. Teng and J.K. Fairbank eds., *China's Response to the West ...* (Cambridge, Mass., 1961), pt. I, Ch. II, and Étienne Balazs, *Political Theory and Administrative Reality in Traditional China* (London, 1965).

ing forces for the development of these political institutions.

First, it appears that these imperial institutions, drawing on a synthesis of the Confucian, Taoist and Legalist ideologies, adequately met the basic needs of the state and the people through a vast network of bureaucratic establishments. They were premised on the principles of check and balance, separation of the civil and military authorities, and close rapport between the central and local governments, and were so structured that they could avoid the preponderance of one group or one set of agencies over the other at the expense of the ultimate power of the imperial authority. They were basically conservative in outlook, and vulnerable to revolutionary changes, but highly rational, and flexible enough to accommodate gradual innovative experimentation to cope with new demands in changing circumstances.⁴²

Secondly, the stability of these imperial institutions rested not only on the authoritarian nature of the monarchical system, which sustained itself by resorting to law and punishment through legislative and sometimes even through extra-institutional means, but also on the continued manipulation of the Confucian ideologies for indoctrination and persuasion at all levels of Chinese society. In the latter case, it aimed at inducing the conformity of individuals to established conventions for the maintenance of a harmonious, well-balanced social and political hierarchy. It was by means of this carrot-and-stick policy that the imperial government achieved its objectives without being too coercive, while at the same time maintaining the posture of a benevolent monarchy championing Confucian moral and ethical principles.⁴³

Thirdly, the continued existence of these bureaucratic institutions depended almost exclusively on the literati, who were recruited to governmental services through the competitive civil service examinations. These examinations not only opened the way for political participation by the literary elite, but also produced a hard core of ideologically homogeneous scholar-officials who had to conform to the prescribed interpretation of the Confucian classics to gain admittance

⁴² See, for example, the comments by K.C. Hsiao, F.W. Mote, James T.C. Liu and Edward A. Kracke, jr., in the references cited in ns. 21, 22 and 29.

⁴³ *Ibid.* See also Arthur F. Wright, "Propaganda and Persuasion in Imperial and Contemporary China", in *Rice University Studies*, 59:4 (Fall, 1973), 9-18.

to officialdom. They became the principal state administrators, upholders of the monarchical order, the guardians of the Confucian social and political hierarchy and of the established value systems and conventions, and they emerged as the most dominant and influential class in the social, political and economic arenas, the class to whom all the Chinese population looked up for leadership and guidance.⁴⁴

Fourthly, this monarchical system of bureaucratic government, with its vast network of hierarchical institutions, naturally had its weaknesses as it tried to expand its functions to keep pace with the new requirements of the state in a society undergoing steady transformation. It produced duplicate offices, supernumerary bureaucrats, and a multiplication of laws and regulations, and it became entrenched in established conventions and hence less flexible for innovative experimentation in changing circumstances. This resulted in a widening hiatus between ideal and practice, discouraged the initiative of the scholar-officials, and made the system more vulnerable to the manipulation of the monarch and unscrupulous state administrators in pursuit of their self-interest at the expense of the general population.⁴⁵

Fifthly, in relation to the above, the continued manipulation of the Confucian-Legalist ideologies for indoctrination and persuasion, while inducing the submission of individuals to the state and strengthening the authoritarian trends of the monarch, inadvertently resulted in the intellectual stagnation of the literary élite, who preferred to follow established ways instead of taking the initiative in experimentation. This reinforced the conservative outlook of the scholar-officials and intellectuals and made them less flexible in adapting to new ideas and coping with new demands, and further enhanced the rigidity of the established governmental institutions and the existing social and political hierarchical order.⁴⁶

Lastly, this monarchical system of bureaucratic government was developed exclusively within the confines of *Chung-kuo*, i.e., the predominantly agrarian domains of China bounded by the coasts on

⁴⁴ See, for example, the comments by Edward A. Kracke, jr., and Johanna Menzel in the references cited in n. 35. On the rise of the Chinese gentry class and their social and political roles, see the studies by C.L. Chang and P.T. Ho cited in n. 38.

⁴⁵ See n. 42, and also James T.C. Liu, "Sung Roots of Chinese Political Conservatism: The Administrative Problems", *Journal of Asian Studies* XXVI: 3 (May, 1967), 457-463.

⁴⁶ See ns. 42 and 45.

the one side and the mountain ranges on the other. It thus suffered from isolation and failed to meet the changes wrought by the intrusion of Western nations, with a comparatively high civilization and a different perspective of the world order, during the late nineteenth century. The continued application of the sino-centric sovereign-vassal relationship to accommodate the European powers under the "tributary system" in the late Ch'ing period, for example, was the result of this insulation, and the inability of the imperial government to modify its archaic institutions and practices to meet the interests of these stronger foreign nation-states eventually led to chaos and humiliation and precipitated the downfall of the Chinese monarchy.⁴⁷

On balance, however, we must conclude that the Chinese monarchical system of bureaucratic government had more merits than demerits, in consideration of its longevity and its application over a vast empire in the East Asiatic continent. It assumed manifold responsibilities and discharged numerous functions, more complex and extensive than those of many modern governments, and though it may be disparaged for its authoritarian, conservative character, it was highly functional and not overtly totalitarian, and was durable enough to sustain the Chinese state and civilization for two thousand years. In the light of these considerations, it must be hailed as a unique achievement in the history of the political organizations of mankind in pre-modern societies.

Conclusion

In retrospect, the evolution of kingship and government in imperial China mirrors the ingenuity of the ancient Chinese in political organization and their distinguished achievement in cultural development, unique in the records of civilization. As early as several centuries before Christ, the Chinese had developed a system of kingship and government on a comparatively sophisticated and rational level, when the European continent was still inhabited by barbarian tribes with only rudimentary forms of communal organization. This kingship was divine in origin, but it was soon stripped of its theo-

⁴⁷ See, for example, the comments of J.K. Fairbank and others in *China's Response to the West...* Pt. I, and the studies on the tributary system cited in n. 27. See also Mary C. Wright: *The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism: The T'ung-chih Restoration, 1862-1874* (Stanford, 1957), and Frederic Wakeman, *The Fall of Imperial China* (New York, 1975), *passim*.

cratic features and rested upon a complex of moral-ethical and legalistic ideologies; and it was steadily elevated to a supreme and all-encompassing status with the inception of the emperor institution. The monarch, as the Son of Heaven and parent of the extended hierarchical family, was an absolute ruler in theory, but in practice he was restrained from exercising unlimited power by the traditional concept of benevolent kingship, and by the necessity of delegating power to his subordinates for the administration of a vast empire. The monarchical system of government was distinguished by many novel features, such as its early transformation from a ruler-oriented imperial household administration to a state-oriented national administrative organ, the development of a bureaucratic institutional apparatus premised on the principles of check and balance, the separation of the civil and military authorities, a close rapport between the central and local governments, and the recruitment of a non-aristocratic literary élite for governmental service through competitive state examinations. It was conservative in outlook and vulnerable to revolutionary changes, yet it was highly rational, and flexible enough to accommodate innovative experimentation, and it sufficiently met the requirements of government responsibilities and the expectations of the general population, even by the standards of modern government.⁴⁸

Notwithstanding its pitfalls and shortcomings, therefore, we must marvel at the persistence of this monarchical system of government through two millennia, and at its enormous contribution to the Chinese state and civilization. It not only held the key to the stability of the Chinese state and sustained the integrity of its social and political order, but also provided a secure umbrella for the continuous development of its humanistic philosophy, arts, letters, and many forms of physical and material culture. Moreover it successively survived the onslaught of the nomadic invasions, as the alien conquerors found no alternatives to replace the existing institutions and value systems for administering the vast Chinese empire inhabited by a cultured population. The Chinese achievement, therefore, found no parallel in ancient civilization at any comparable period, and the monarchy collapsed chiefly through outside forces and circumstances beyond its control. Its downfall was a culmination of the insensitivity of the alien Manchu rulers to the Chinese tradition and to the needs of the people, their inability to adjust themselves to the changing

⁴⁸ See the remarks by modern scholars in the literature cited in ns. 1, 21, 22 and 29.

world order wrought by the intrusion of the European powers in the late nineteenth century, and the accelerated political, social and economic transformation in the Chinese empire.⁴⁹

The Manchu dynasty was brought to an end by the revolution in 1912 and the founding of the republic by Dr Sun Yat-sen, which meant the inauguration of a constitutional parliamentary form of government based on a synthesis of traditional values and Western liberal, democratic ideals. This new government, guided by the "Three Principles of the People" (*San-min chu-i*) —Nationalism, Democracy, and the People's Livelihood— of its founding father, thus brought about the extinction of the monarchical form of government and the disintegration of the traditional political, social and economic order. The Republic succumbed to warlordism until its re-unification by Chiang Kai-shek and his Kuomintang Party in 1928. This party ruled the mainland until the Communist takeover in 1949 and has continued to rule in Taiwan down to the present day; it has showed many discontinuities both in the concept and in the organization of government, although many of the traditional elements have still persisted.⁵⁰ The most radical changes in both the theoretical and organizational structure of modern Chinese government, of course, were wrought by the founding of the present Communist regime of the People's Republic of China under the leadership of Chairman Mao Tse-tung in 1949. The new regime, totalitarian in theory and in practice, replaced Confucianism and Western liberal, democratic doctrines with Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, and transformed the republican form of government into a centralized apparatus headed by the Communist party, with tightened control over the Chinese population in the name of the dictatorship of the proletariat. In every way, the present government in China has showed little resemblance to the past either in concept or in organization, even in comparison

⁴⁹ See n. 47.

⁵⁰ On the fall of the Manchu Ch'ing dynasty and the founding of the Chinese Republic in 1912, see, among others, Harold Z. Schiffrin, *Sun Yat-sen and the Origins of the Chinese Revolution* (Berkeley, 1968); Mary C. Wright, ed., *China in Revolution: The First Phase, 1900-1913* (New Haven, 1968); and Lucien Bianco, *Origins of the Chinese Revolution, 1915-1949* (Stanford, 1971). On the ideological foundation of the Republic and the political institutions of the new government, see Ch'ien Tuan-Sheng, *op. cit.*, Franklin W. Houn, *Central Government to China, 1912-1928* (Madison, 1959), and William L. Tung, *The Political Institutions of Modern China* (The Hague, 1964).

with the Republican government founded by the revolution in 1912. It ushered in a new era of revolutionary changes and catapulted the Chinese nation from being an insulated sino-centric *Chung-kuo* into becoming one of the modern giant nations and a vocal, dominant power in present-day international politics.⁵¹

It is true that these radical transformations in the Chinese polity dismantled all the traditional institutional apparatus and uprooted the Confucian-oriented ideologies which upheld the social fabric and the value systems of the empire. Nevertheless, the Chinese traditions of the past have not been totally eradicated, and rudiments of the imperial heritage may still be detected in the mentality and behaviour of the Chinese rulers and people of today. The most conspicuous of these vestiges can perhaps be seen in the authoritarian character and paternal role of the Chinese government, the intensive indoctrination and ideological manipulation for political objectives, the insecurity of organized opposition in politics outside the dominant party leadership, the ideal of an ideologically homogeneous élite for governmental services, the submission of the individual to higher authority, and above all, the underdeveloped nature of individualism and the sense of citizenship that have been the hallmark of the Western liberal, democratic ideals of government.⁵² We may debate endlessly as to what accounted for the development of such an attitude and mentality in the modern Chinese political leaders and in the corresponding modes of response from the Chinese population, yet it is safe to assume that a proper understanding of these phenomena cannot be

⁵¹ On the founding of the People's Republic under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party in 1949, see, among others, C.P. FitzGerald, *The Birth of Communist China* (New York, 1966); Lionel M. Chassin, *The Communist Conquest of China: A History of the Civil War, 1945-1949* (Cambridge, Mass., 1965), and Jerome Ch'en, *Mao and the Chinese Revolution* (Oxford, 1967). On the Communist system of governmental organizations, see, among others, H. Franz Schurmann, *Ideology and Organization in Communist China* (Berkeley, 1966); A. Doak Barnett, *Cadres, Bureaucracy and Political Power in Communist China* (New York, 1967); and Derek J. Walker, *The Government and Politics of Communist China* (New York, 1970).

⁵² For discussions on the continuity and change in the Chinese social, political order and cultural developments from the later imperial era to the People's Republic, see, among others J.K. Fairbank, *China, The People's Middle Kingdom and the U.S.A.* (Cambridge, Mass., 1967), Pt. I. Joseph R. Levenson, *op. cit.*, Vol. III; *China in Crisis: China's Heritage and the Communist Political System*, ed. P.T. Ho and Tang Tsou (Chicago, 1968), Vol. I, Bk. 1, 2; Ralph C. Croizier, ed., *China's Cultural Legacy and Communism* (New York, 1970), and Richard H. Solomon, *Mao's Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture* (Berkeley, 1971), Pt. I, II.

divorced from a sober, objective appraisal of the traditional heritage. In this case, we may argue, therefore, even at the risk of over-simplification, that many of these developments must have been reinforced by the traditional Chinese concepts of kingship and government, although it remains controversial and debatable as to what extent the Chinese heritage has left its imprint on modern government and society. It is beyond the limited scope of this paper to pursue these arguments, and yet, as the eminent Chinese poet Li Po (699-762) once wrote: "Sword may be drawn to cut the stream, but the stream continues to flow".⁵³ We may well reflect upon Chinese past experience for a better understanding of politics and society in contemporary China.

⁵³ Li Po, *Fen-lei pu-chu Li T'ai-po shih* [Classified and Annotated Edition of Li Po's Poetry] (*Ssu-pu ts'ung-k'an* ed., Shanghai, 1929), 18.12b; various versions of translations by modern scholars.

Monarchy and Government: Traditions and Ideologies in Pre-Modern Japan

Joseph M. Kitagawa

Introduction

This paper attempts to deal with two related religio-political principles of pre-modern Japan, namely, the imperial ideology based on a sacred kingship, and the notion of government as based upon an immanentist theocracy. Both developed from the intricate fusion of indigenous and Chinese features. In this connection, as Sansom rightly observes, "one of the difficulties in early Japanese history is to establish the extent to which Japanese ideas about sovereignty [and I might add government] were definitely influenced by Chinese political theory".¹

Our difficulties are compounded by the fact that the two major historical sources, the *Kojiki* (Records of Ancient Matters) and the *Nihongi* or *Nihon-shoki* (Chronicles of Japan) were compiled in the eighth century A.D., centuries after Japan came under the influence of Chinese civilization and Buddhism. Moreover, the compilation of these two documents was ordered by the Emperor Temmu in A.D. 673 in order to justify his accession to the throne after he had usurped it from another emperor.

Clearly, both the *Kojiki* and the *Nihongi* follow the model of Chinese dynastic histories.² But the chroniclers utilized —and rearranged— a variety of indigenous myths and legends to support the claim, unprecedented in China, that the Japanese imperial family had the divine mission to reign, as well as to rule the nation, in perpetuity by virtue of their solar ancestry. Here, as I have stated elsewhere,³ we confront difficult hermeneutical problems of untangling the intertwined processes of "historicization of myths" and "mythologization of history" in order to reconstruct, as it were, the archaic Japanese

¹ George Sansom, *A History of Japan to 1334* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958), p. 74.

² *Ibid.* "It cannot be said of any statement in either work (but particularly the *Nihon-shoki*) that it describes native institutions in their purity."

³ See my article, "The Japanese *Kokutai* (National Community): History and Myth," *History of Religions*, Vol. 13, No. 3 (February 1974), 209-226.

traditions of kingship and government, and to delineate how Chinese political theories were appropriated to articulate classical ideologies of sacred kingship and the immanent theocratic state in the seventh and eighth centuries. Then we may examine how these ideologies came to be modified by the reality of the Japanese situation in subsequent periods.

Archaic background

While this is not the occasion to trace various stages of the prehistory of Japan, it is safe to assume that those who inhabited the Japanese islands — the descendants of different ethnic and cultural groups who had migrated there — attained a degree of self-consciousness as one people by the beginning of the common era. By that time people in Japan knew the art of rice cultivation and they spoke proto-Japanese.⁵ Parenthetically, one of the most ambiguous words inherited from proto-Japanese is the term *kami*, which on the one hand refers to an impersonal quality, i.e. the *kami* (sacred, numinous or divine) nature, and also refers to specific beings endowed with the *kami* nature, be they human, divine, or other animate or inanimate beings. It is also worth noting that the social solidarity unit of archaic Japan was the precursor of what came to be called later the *uji* (clan) — a territorially based cluster of families sharing the same tutelary *kami* and, more often than not, kinship ties. Each solidarity unit was held together by its chieftain, whose authority over the land and people within his domain was largely derived from his priestly or cultic prerogatives.

As to the nature of the political organization of archaic Japan, available data in Japan are very fragmentary. But a third century Chinese record mentions that there were a number of principalities in Japan and that a female shamanic ruler reigned over one of them. We also learn from Korean sources that the Japanese held a military base in the southern tip of the Korean peninsula, while another Chinese record indicates that five Japanese monarchs had official dealings with the Sung Court during the fifth and sixth centuries. Evidently some-

⁴ See my article, 'Prehistoric Background of Japanese Religion', *History of Religions*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Winter 1963), 292-328.

⁵ As far as we can ascertain, the phonology of proto-Japanese was somewhat different from that of classical and modern Japanese, but the structure of the language has remained remarkably unchanged throughout the ages.

time toward the end of the fourth century the chieftain of a powerful "imperial" clan, presumably Ōjin, the fifteenth emperor mentioned in official chronicles, established the so-called Yamato kingdom, which was in effect a confederation of semi-autonomous clans, each of which owned and ruled their respective territories. The Yamato rulers paid tribute to China, and in return received the kingly title from the Chinese imperial court. Within Japan, however, the Yamato kings solidified their influence over other clans primarily on the basis of their claim to be the genealogical descendants of the Sun deity. As such they assumed the prerogatives of conferring court titles, granting sacred seed at spring festivals, and establishing sacred sites for the *kami* as well as regulating rituals for them. Be that as it may, the Yamato king, as rightly pointed out by Professor Waida, "was not the absolute monarch ruling over a centralized state but merely a *primus inter pares* who ran the politics, controlling and being controlled by [other clan chieftains who held titles in the court]"⁶ Significantly, his kingly activities, which were simultaneously political and magico-religious, were often dictated by the precarious will of the *kami* transmitted to him through dreams and divinations.

Foreign influence

The increasing contacts between Japan and the Asiatic continent resulted in the penetration of Sino-Korean civilization, especially Confucian learning and Buddhism, into Japan during the sixth century A.D. The introduction of the art of reading and writing Chinese script, new technologies, alien forms of art and architecture, sophisticated legal, philosophical and ethical concepts, and complex systems of administering government brought about a series of social, cultural, economic and political changes in Japan. It is to be noted that ideologies of both kingship and government articulated during the seventh and eighth centuries, under the combined inspiration of Confucianism and the indigenous Shinto ("Way of the *Kami*") tradition, came to be regarded as paradigmatic in the subsequent periods of Japanese history.

Internally, the Yamato kingdom suffered from dynastic changes during the sixth century — notwithstanding official accounts in the

⁶ Manabu Waida, "Sacred Kingship in Early Japan: A Historical Introduction," *History of Religions*, Vol. 15, No. 4 (May 1976). 323.

chronicles to the contrary — and rivalries broke out among chieftains of powerful clans who held positions as ministers in the court, especially between those who favoured the introduction of Buddhism and an alliance with the Korean kingdom of Paekche on the one hand, and those who were anti-Buddhist and anti-Paekche on the other. Besides this, there was constant tension between the imperial family and the ministers in the court. In this situation Japan lost its foothold in Korea, not for military reasons, but “because the central government in Yamato could not depend upon the obedience of the great territorial chieftains in western Japan, especially in Kyushu, or upon the loyalty of its representatives in Korea, or indeed upon the integrity of its Great Ministers at Court”.⁷ To make the matter worse, the unification of China in 589 by the Sui dynasty presented a potential threat to the very survival of Japan. Confronted by such internal and external difficulties, the Empress Suiko (reigned 592-628) and her nephew Prince-Regent Shōtoku (573-621), with the help of the chieftain of the powerful Soga clan, tried to unify the nation.

In order to solidify the national fabric, the Imperial Court attempted to articulate its ideologies regarding kingship and the government by relating the particular cultural experience of the Japanese as expressed in Shinto to the two universal principles — *Tao* of Confucianism and *Dharma* of Buddhism — which had been introduced from abroad. In so doing, the Japanese rulers followed the example of the Emperor Wen Ti of Sui China, who authenticated his claim to semi-divine authority by depending on Confucian, Buddhist and Taoist symbols. Following Wen Ti's model, the Japanese Court now tried to exalt the throne, as exemplified in the so-called Seventeen-Article Constitution, issued in 604, as a set of guidelines to the ministers and officials of the court. It states: “The Lord is Heaven, the vassal is Earth. Heaven overspreads, and Earth upbears ... Consequently when you receive the imperial commands, fail not to carry them out scrupulously”.⁸ The Sinification policy of the Japanese Court was such that a number of talented young officials and Buddhist priests were sent to China to study. Also officials in the Court were given “cap ranks” *à la* Chinese usage. It was not sheer accident that in the message to the Sui Court the Empress Suiko adopted the Sinified self-designation of

⁷ Sansom, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

⁸ Cited in Ryūsaku Tsunoda et al (Comps.), *Sources of Japanese Tradition* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), p. 50.

Tenshi ("Son of Heaven") and *Tennō* ("Emperor"), which reflected an imperial ideology markedly different from the archaic tribal notion of kingship.

The new ideology of the government, however, was not fully articulated until 645, when the Taika ("Great Change") Reform was commenced. According to the Edict of Reform, the government placed all administrative and fiscal power directly under the throne by abolishing private titles to land and peoples, by instituting registers of population for the purpose of allotment of rice land to cultivators, and by establishing a new system of taxation. The throne also claimed the prerogative of appointing governors of provinces, although in practice great landowners were appointed to the governorships and given court ranks and stipends as well to compensate them for the loss of private ownership of their lands. Thus, among all the reform measures the most problematical was the attempt to apply Chinese systems of land tenure and taxation, both of which were resisted by the hereditary aristocracy and undercut by the practice of granting exceptions and exemptions. Ironically, governmental reform during the latter half of the seventh century was stymied by social disorder, an unsuccessful Korean campaign, and a bloody war of succession.⁹ Notwithstanding the practical difficulties involved, the seventh century rulers of Japan were committed to the principle that the government must have written laws as its foundation. In this respect, the Taihō Penal and Civil Codes (*Taihō-ritsu-ryō*), promulgated in 702 (the second year of the Taihō era), formed the most conspicuous symbol of the Reform ideologies regarding monarchy and government, and came to be regarded as paradigmatic in subsequent periods in Japanese history.

Ritsuryō ideal — a classical paradigm

It goes without saying that written laws were not known in Japan before the introduction of Chinese civilization. It was only in the mid-seventh century that attempts were made to codify civil statutes, but not successfully.¹⁰ Thus, the Taihō Codes may be rightly regarded as the first written law in Japan. It was, however, soon replaced by

⁹ As mentioned earlier, it was the victorious emperor Temmu who in 673 ordered the compilation of the *Kojiki* and the *Nihongi*, although these works were not completed until the 8th century.

¹⁰ On the legal development of early Japan, see *Engi-Shiki: Procedures of the*

another law known as the Yōrō Penal and Civil Code. (*Yōrō-ritsu-ryō*), drafted in 718 but not enacted until 757. Understandably, both the Taihō and the Yōrō Codes copied most features of the T'ang codes. While the compilation of written laws was going on, the government established its first full-scale capital city in Nara, which became both the political and religious centre of the nation. And, although in the main, government structure was modelled after that of T'ang China, it did possess a peculiarly Japanese feature in the sense that the administrative structure under the throne was divided into civil and religious branches, i.e. the Great Council of State (*Dajō-kan*) presided over by the Chancellor (*Dajō-daijin*), and the Department of Kami- or Shinto-Affairs (*Jingi-kan*) presided over by the Head of Kami-Affairs. Both were directly accountable to the throne, following the principle of the unity of religious and civil affairs (*saisei-itchi*). It is to be noted that the foundation of the government and the law was the sacralty of the sovereign, not only as the genealogical descendant of the Sun deity but also as the Manifest Kami (*akitsu-kami*). Incidentally, Sansom also points out another feature of the Japanese system of official grades which differed from the Chinese system, namely that "the hierarchy in Japan was based upon birth and not upon talent".¹¹

The adoption of written penal and civil codes implies at least in principle that the government administration was no longer dictated by the precarious will of the *kami* transmitted to the emperor through dreams and divination but by legal principles and precedents based on the principle of Tao. Yet, as it turned out in practice, the universal principle of Tao was homologized with, and was subordinated to, the authority of the emperor who, by virtue of being the descendant of the Sun deity, was destined to rule and reign over the nation. Moreover the sovereign, now being considered the Manifest Kami, was expected to communicate his divine will through a series of "imperial rescripts". The religio-political structure thus developed in the seventh and eighth centuries, primarily based on the homology of Confucian-Shinto principles, is referred to as the "Ritsuryō (Imperial Rescript) State". It was in effect a form of "immanent theocracy".

It must be stressed in this connection that the Ritsuryō ideal was

Engi Era, Books I-V, Trans. with Intro. and Notes by Felicia G. Bock (Tokyo: Sophia University, 1970), pp. 6-11.

¹¹ Sansom, *op. cit.*, p. 69. He cites an edict of 682, "which provides that in selecting men for office the considerations are to be first birth, then character, and then capacity".

not simply to appropriate the classical Chinese idea of the nation as a "liturgical community" with its sovereign as the supreme mediator between Heaven and Earth as well as between Tao and mankind, but rather to create a "soteriological community" with the emperor functioning simultaneously as the chief priest, the sacred king, and the living *kami*. With the elevation of the throne to divine status, the imperial court now became the earthly counterpart of the heavenly court of the Sun deity.¹² Thus, just as the court of the Sun deity included various functionaries, the imperial court had similar functionaries who attended to cultic, administrative, military and household duties. The stylized daily court rituals were meant to present the earthly replica of heavenly rituals as told in myths. On special occasions the sovereign issued "imperial proclamations" (*semmyō*) which had the connotation of "revealed words issued by the Manifest Kami".¹³

Understandably, it was from this type of immanent theocratic perspective that the two chronicles as well as a series of Records of Local Surveys (*Fudoki*) were compiled. Moreover, in 815 the government issued the New Compilation of the Register of Families (*Shinsen shōjiroku*) in order to classify the aristocracy into the three arbitrary categories of *shin-betsu* (descendants of *kami*), *kō-betsu* (descendants of royal families), and *ban-betsu* (descendants of naturalized Chinese and Koreans) by fabrication or otherwise. In so doing, the compilers of the Register resorted to the mythologization of historical and genealogical facts for the sake of solidifying the nation around the throne. Side by side with this mythologization of history, the chroniclers indulged in the historicization of myths such as the account of the descent of the Sun deity's grandson from heaven to rule Japan. They also historicized the Yamato myths concerning the legendary first

¹² In this article the term 'Sun deity', is used to refer to *Amaterasu-O-kami* (the great Kami that sheds light through all the Heaven), i.e. the Sun as the Kami. "But this Sun Kami may also be interpreted as representing a legendary human character who was supposedly the founder of the Imperial line, from which standpoint this same personality is referred to by the appellation *O-Hirume-no-Mikoto* (the Exalted one who is the Great Light of Day)." Tsuda Sokichi, "The Idea of Kami in Ancient Japanese Classics", *T'oung Pao*, Vol. LII, Book 4-5 (Leiden 1966), 296. On various theories of the Sun deity, see Fumio Kakubayashi, "Amaterasu-O-kami no kigen (the origin of the Sun deity)", *Shoku-Nibongi Kenkyū*, Vol. 180 (August 1975), 1-12.

¹³ On this subject, see Zachert Herbert, *Semmyo, die Kaiserlichen Erlasse des Shoku-Nibongi* (Berlin, 1950).

emperor Jimmu, even at the expense of fabricating the year 660 BC. as the year of the founding of the Japanese nation.¹⁴

Admittedly, religions, especially Shinto, enjoyed prestige and respect from the government under the Ritsuryō system. At the same time it was the government, or more precisely its Department of Kami-Affairs (*Jingi-kan*), which controlled all aspects of Shinto. The Department not only supervised all the officially sponsored shrines, but "its duty was [also] to oversee the registers of the entire priesthood (*hafuribe*) and of the religious corporation (*kambe* or *kamutomo*), the personnel of the *Jingi-kan* itself and the staffing of the principal shrines".¹⁵ Buddhism, too, was successfully incorporated into the Ritsuryō scheme. Thus, while the government patronized Buddhist institutions extravagantly, it enforced the "Law Governing Monks and Nuns" (*Sōny-ryō*) and rigidly controlled the activities of clerics.¹⁶ Moreover, the government established the Bureau of Yin and Yang (*Ommyō-ryō*), which was in charge of astrology, calendar-making and chronology. The total character of the Ritsuryō system of government may be succinctly symbolized by the duty of the Chancellor which was defined as "ordering the state and deliberating on the (Confucian) Way" and also as "harmonizing Yin and Yang".¹⁷ In short, what developed during the seventh and eighth centuries in Japan were the two related ideologies of sacred kingship and immanent theocratic government, both of which were authenticated and supported by a "multivalue system" — an intricate homology of Shinto, Confucian, Buddhist and Yin-Yang traditions.

Ironically, while the Ritsuryō system came to be regarded as a classical paradigm in Japan, it never functioned as well as the architects of the system intended. Rather, the reality of Japanese life throughout the pre-modern period compelled the nature of both the monarchy and the government to be modified, without, however, rejecting altogether the Ritsuryō ideal as such.

¹⁴ Tsuda points out that the first emperor was also regarded as the Sun Kami. Tsuda, *op. cit.*, 299.

¹⁵ Bock, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

¹⁶ On *Sōni-ryō*, see Kenko Futaba, *Kodai Bukkyō-shisō-shi kenkyū* (A Study of Early Japanese Buddhism), (Kyoto: Nagata Bunshōdō, 1962), Part II "Sōni-ryō no Kenkyū", pp. 131-301, and my article, "Religions of Japan", in Wing-tsit Chan, I.R. al Faruqi, J.M. Kitagawa and P.T. Raju (Compls.), *The Great Asian Religions: An Anthology* (New York: Macmillan, 1969), pp. 258-59.

¹⁷ Sansom, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

Modifications of the Ritsuryō model

It must be admitted candidly that from the beginning the Ritsuryō system embodied a number of serious contradictions and inconsistencies. For example, the system of land allotments and taxation, which had been borrowed *in toto* from China, could not be applied to the Japanese situation without making a series of compromises, such as granting *de facto* private ownership of land and labour to the landed aristocracy and powerful religious institutions, and/or excluding newly reclaimed land from the allotment system. Such compromises undermined one of the cornerstones of the Ritsuryō system, namely state ownership and control of land and people. Moreover, the failure of the land law coupled with the decline in the efficiency of the administrative machinery resulted in the growth of private manors (*shoen*), which in turn precipitated the rise of the warrior class and feudal institutions in subsequent periods. In a similar vein, all the important government positions, both national and provincial, were occupied by former clan leaders and members of the aristocracy, whose descendants inherited these positions according to the hereditary principle. Moreover, large Buddhist monasteries, exemplified by the national cathedral, Tōdai-ji, acquired land, wealth and power, competing with the aristocracy.¹⁸ The prestige of Buddhism was greatly enhanced by the piety of Nara monarchs, one of whom declared himself the 'servant of the Three Treasures'. Taking advantage of the situation, one ambitious Buddhist monk even tried to usurp the throne. Understandably, with the development of private ownership of manors, a hereditary aristocratic officialdom, and powerful religious institutions, the authority of the monarchy and the government was greatly eroded towards the latter half of the eighth century.

The transfer of the capital from Nara to Kyoto in 794 marked a new page in the history of Japan. The leaders of the Kyoto regime were eager to restore the Ritsuryō ideal of imperial rule and the authority of the central government, free from ecclesiastical interference and power struggles among the aristocracy. Their eagerness to perpetuate sacred kingship and an immanent theocratic form of government led them to compile the 'Institutes or Procedures of the Engi Era' (*Engi-Shiki*), which was a collection of supplementary rules (*kyaku shiki*)

¹⁸ Yosoburo Takekoshi, *The Economic Aspects of the History of the Civilization of Japan* (New York: Macmillan, 1930), Vol. 1, Chapt. VIII, 'Monasteries Establish a State within the State', pp. 76-91.

to previously promulgated edicts and ceremonial rules.¹⁹ Paradoxically, by the time these procedures were put into effect in 967, the classical Ritsuryō scheme had already been modified by the emergence of the "regency" of the Fujiwara family. Here, the elaborate procedures of the Engi Institutes were applied only to the religious festivals and court ceremonies and had little or no effect on *Realpolitik*. The Ritsuryō system lost further ground by the rise of the "rule by retired monarchs" (*insei*) and finally by the "feudal regimes" of the warrior families. It is significant, however, that the sacrality of the emperor as well as his prerogative to "reign" over the nation were rarely questioned by the regents, retired monarchs and warrior rulers, at the same time that his power to "rule" the government was effectively usurped by them.

(i) Regency

Prior to the rise of the Fujiwara oligarchy, regency was exercised only by members of the royal family in order to assist the reigning monarch when such assistance was needed. Historically, the ancestors of the Fujiwaras were hereditary Shinto priests. The family became prominent in the seventh century, and thereafter members of it held important government positions. Meanwhile, they acquired wealth and power from their ever-growing land-holdings in the provinces and they also managed to intermarry frequently with the imperial family. It was in the mid-ninth century, when a child emperor was enthroned, that his maternal grandfather, Fujiwara Yoshifusa, then Chancellor, became the regent (*sesshō*), the first of non-royal blood ever to hold such an office. When the next child emperor ascended the throne, Yoshifusa's adopted son, Motosune, became both the regent and chief counsellor (*kampaku*).²⁰ From the mid-tenth to the mid-eleventh centuries the nation was ruled by the Fujiwara regency, called the *sekkō* (*sesshō-kampaku*) system.²¹

The institutionalization of regency implied a significant redefini-

¹⁹ See Bock, *op. cit.*, pp. 11-12.

²⁰ The combination of *sesshō* (regent) and *kampaku* (chief counsellor) implied that Motosune was to serve as permanent regent, regardless of the age of the reigning emperor.

²¹ For other offices unknown in the Ritsuryō system, e.g., the *Kurandōdokoro* (Palace Secretariat) and the *Kebiishi-chō* (Police Commissioners), see Sansom, *op. cit.*, pp. 113-116.

tion of the Ritsuryō system by the aristocracy. We may recall that the early Yamato kingdom was in effect a confederation of semi-autonomous territorial clans — precursors of the aristocratic families — which was held together by the magico-religious authority of the imperial clan. And, true to their heritage, the aristocratic families never fully accepted at face value the Ritsuryō ideologies of kingship and government. To be sure, they acknowledged the sacrality of the throne, but they expected the emperor to function literally and only as the “manifest *kami*”, that is to reign but not to interfere with the actual operation of the government, which they took for granted to be the prerogative of the aristocratic officials. This view was based on reading Japanese historical experience through the mental prism of the aristocracy, another form of mythologization of history. Parenthetically, this view of Japanese history was articulated by Jien — the son of a Fujiwara regent and a prelate of Tendai Buddhism — in his famous work, the *Gukanshō* or “Miscellany of the Personal Views of an Ignorant Fool”.²² Because of this view of the nature of kingship and government, the Fujiwaras relentlessly sought political power while venerating the throne. Thus it was no hypocrisy when a regent stated: “Great as are our power and prestige, nevertheless they are those of the Sovereign, for we derive them from the majesty of the Throne”.²³

The regency, however, came to be challenged by ambitious retired monarchs who in turn created another institution which was not anticipated by the architects of the Ritsuryō system.

(ii) Rule by retired monarchs (*insei*)

Throughout Japanese history emperors were known to have abdicated the throne for various reasons, but abdication for the purpose of ruling the nation behind titular sovereigns did not appear until the eleventh century.²⁴ In contrast to the Fujiwara regents, who derived their prerogatives from the fact that they were relatives on the maternal side of the nominally reigning emperors, the retired monarchs derived their prerogatives from the patriarchal principle. That is to

²² On the *Gukanshō*, see Charles H. Hambrick, *Gukanshō: A Religious View of Japanese History* (Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, The University of Chicago, 1971).

²³ Quoted in Sansom, *op. cit.*, p. 157.

²⁴ On the beginning of the *insei* system, see G. Cameron Hurst, “The Reign of Go-Sanjō and the Revival of Imperial Power”, *Monumenta Nipponica*, Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (Spring 1972), 65-83.

say, even when an emperor turned over the "charisma of the imperial office" to his son or brother, the abdicated monarch could still control the affairs of the court as the legitimate head of the patriarchal imperial family. Retired monarchs were usually provided with living quarters (*go-in*), staffed with a few servants and attendants, in the rear of the imperial residence. But when retired monarchs became *de facto* rulers, their quarters became the court and administrative offices (*go-in-cho*), well staffed with officials (*in-shi*) and guards. Also, an ordinance issued by the retired monarch (*inzen*) carried the same authority as imperial ordinances, if not more. Probably the most powerful *insei* ruler was Go-Shirakawa (r. 1155-58 as Emperor; 1158-92 as *insei*), who dominated the political scene during the reigns of five titular emperors. After his time, *insei* lost much of its influence, although the system as such lasted for another half a century.

The development of *insei* inevitably drove the Fujiwara regents closer to the neglected reigning monarchs, while the retired monarchs attracted those aristocratic families and local magnates who were disgruntled by Fujiwara rule. Also, the fact that some of the retired monarchs took priestly vows resulted in an alliance between *insei* and ecclesiastical institutions. For the most part, the *insei* era was characterized by an ugly power struggle among competing ex-monarchs or between ex-monarchs and titular monarchs and also between *insei* officials and the Regency officials, abuse of authority, nepotism, and administrative inefficiency. The result was the general erosion of even the residual structure of the Ritsuryō system, including the monarchy and the civilian form of government. This situation produced the rise of the warrior families who soon supplanted the aristocratic civilian rule centring around the throne and the *insei*.

(iii) Feudal regime (*bakufu*)

Originally, the warriors (*samurai*) were nothing more than armed attendants (*samurai-mono*), subservient to the aristocrats and ecclesiastical authorities who used them as armed guards to protect their manors in the provinces. In the course of time, the warriors developed their own solidarity groups, based on the feudal relationship of masters and vassals, as well as on regional and kinship ties. Some of the warrior families were charged with maintaining law and order in the capital, where they gained political influence. The two most prominent among these were the Taira and the Minamoto clans, and their rivalry became fierce as they fought on opposite sides in the complex

power struggle among emperors, ex-emperors and the Fujiwara family. For a while the chieftain of the Taira dominated the scene and even became Chancellor, which was the highest civilian position in the Ritsuryō scheme. Soon, however, the tables were turned, and the victorious chieftain of the Minamoto clan, Yoritomo, pressured the court to grant him the authority to appoint stewards (*jūō*) and constables (*shugo*) in order to keep order in the provinces and also to collect taxes in certain circumstances. By granting such authority, as Sansom astutely observes, the court "handed to the leader of the military class effective jurisdiction in matters of land tenure and the income derived from agriculture, the vital features of a land revenue economy".²⁵ Then in 1192 Yoritomo received the coveted title of generalissimo (*Sei-i Tai Shōgun*), and established the feudal regime (*bakufu*) at Kamakura, far from the court in Kyoto. Soon, however, power was assumed by the Hōjō family, which controlled the Kamakura regime as the Shōgun's regents (*shikken*).

The Kamakura regime was very simple in structure, consisting of three bureaus — military (*samurai-dokoro*), administrative (*kumonjo*, later renamed *mandokoro*), and judiciary (*monchū-jo*). It depended on stewards (*jūō*) and constables (*shugo*) to keep order in the provinces. Also, unlike the elaborate penal and civil codes of the Ritsuryō system, the legislation of the Kamakura regime, called *Jōei shikimoku*, consisted of 51 pragmatic principles. By training and by temperament the warriors believed in such simple virtues as frugality, fidelity and justice in the feudal sense. To them, the sacralty of the sovereign was also subordinate to the principle of justice, and thus was neither absolute nor inviolable. Thus in 1221, when the ex-emperor Go-Toba and others undertook an abortive military campaign to eliminate the feudal regime, the Kamakura leaders dared to fight against the imperial authority on the ground of social justice, and afterwards sent three ex-emperors into exile.²⁶ Even Kitabataka Chikafusa, a high ranking warrior and a chief theoretician of the short-lived imperial rule (1333-35), wrote in his *Jinnō-shōtō-ki* (Records of the legitimate succession of the divine sovereigns): "Although the Emperor is august, the gods would not allow him to make one person happy and cause many to suffer. According to the right and wrong of ruling there is always to be found a path to righteousness."²⁷

²⁵ Sansom, *op. cit.*, p. 318.

²⁶ See Takekoshi, *op. cit.*, pp. 187-188.

²⁷ Quoted in Toshio Kuroda, "Gukanshō and Jinnō Shōtōki," in *New Light on*

The second feudal regime was established by the Ashikaga family, and it lasted until 1573. Unlike the Kamakura regime, which directly controlled the warrior families, the Ashikaga regime controlled only the feudal lords (*shuga daimyo*), who in turn claimed the allegiance of their vassals. Also, unlike the Kamakura regime, the Ashikaga regime was established in Kyoto and absorbed the civilian government of the court into the feudal framework. Thus, the third *shōgun*, Yoshimitsu, became Chancellor and assumed the kingship in his dealings with the Ming court.²⁸ Following the devastating Onin War (1467-77), however, the authority of the Ashikaga regime declined. During the century of incessant warfare that followed, private manors that had supported the aristocracy and the court were ransacked by self-made *daimyō* (*sengoku daimyō*). Inevitably the centuries old Ritsuryō ideal lost its mystique, and the imperial family and the courtiers barely survived with the help of their magico-religious aura. This situation lasted until the close of the sixteenth century.

The third and last feudal regime, under the Tokugawa family, had the longest career (1603-1867), with its headquarters in Edo (present Tokyo). By design the Tokugawas established permanent martial law, as it were. The nation was divided into 260 fiefs (*han*) of different sizes and importance. The Shogun, with the assistance of advisory bodies at various levels, ruled his own territory directly, and other parts of the nation indirectly through the lords of the fiefs (*daimyō*). There were also many administrative posts, e.g., the commissioners of temples and shrines, of finance, and of cities, as well as censors. The populace was permanently divided into four main social classes, namely warrior, farmer, artisan, and merchant. In addition, ecclesiastics, courtiers and imperial families were recognized as special categories. In spite of lip service paid to the throne, the regime barely supported or tolerated the imperial institution. The Ordinances for the Imperial and Courtier Families (*Kinchū narabini Kegeshū shohatto*), issued in 1615, strictly regulated all the possible activities of the royal family and courtiers, even to the extent that the emperor needed the approval of the regime to appoint officials in his own court or to grant purple

Early and Medieval Japanese Historiography, trans. and an introd. by John A. Harrison, *University of Florida Monographs, Social Sciences* No. 4, (Fall, 1959), p. 37.

²⁸ It is said that the Court offered the title of ex-emperor (*dajōtennō*) to him upon his death.

robes to high ranking clerics. Under the constant surveillance of the Shōgun's Deputies (*Shoshi-dai*), the once powerful sovereign became in effect a glorified prisoner under the Tokugawa rule.

Postscript

In retrospect it becomes evident that the Ritsuryō ideologies of monarchy and government, which were developed from the intricate fusion of indigenous and Chinese features during the seventh and eighth centuries, characterized by sacred kingship and an immanent theocratic government, remained a classical paradigm throughout pre-modern Japanese history. However, the structure of government was transformed by various stresses which saw the rise of the regency, the rule by retired monarchs, and finally the feudal regimes. Furthermore the Ritsuryō ideal of sacred kingship was modified and reinterpreted by the regency, by the retired monarchs and by the warrior rulers, in that the sovereign's authority to reign was recognized, but not his prerogative to rule.

By far the most radical redefinition of the Ritsuryō system was carried out by the Tokugawa feudal regime, which developed its own form of "immanent theocracy" with its first Shōgun regarded as the manifestation of the "Sun God of the East" (*Tōshō*) and the guardian of the regime. Space does not allow us to compare in detail the difference between the Ritsuryō ideology of immanent theocracy and that of the Tokugawa regime except for some brief observations. It is probably fair to say that according to the Ritsuryō system the immanent theocratic state had an integral relationship with the sacred kingship, whereby the divine claim of the throne authenticated the soteriological character of the state as the nation of the *kami*. While this ideology was couched in terms taken from Chinese political theories, its theoretical basis was not derived from Chinese sources but rather from the archaic indigenous mythical tradition. In sharp contrast to the Ritsuryō scheme, the Tokugawa regime, which depended on Neo-Confucianism as its guiding "theology", developed its own ideology of immanent theocracy which did not need the sacrality of the sovereign except as a magico-religious embellishment for the continuity of national history. Accordingly, the Tokugawa ideology affirmed that "the order of heaven is not a transcendental substance but is inherent in the

conditions of human existence".²⁹ This form of immanent theocracy looks for its legitimation not in the mythological past, but in the regulative principle which is implicit in the concrete human, social, and political order.

But the fact that even the Tokugawa regime tolerated, and paid lip service to, the imperial institution — itself a vestige of the out-dated Ritsuryō system — may be a matter of some significance in our attempt to understand the nature of pre-modern Japan. It may also explain why the modernization of Japan, which commenced with the Meiji Restoration in 1868, owes a significant part of its impetus to the classical Ritsuryō paradigm.

²⁹ William S. Haas, *The Destiny of the Mind - East and West* (London: Faber and Faber, 1956), p. 140.

Kingship in Ancient Mexico

Pedro Carrasco

The area of Southern Mexico and Western Central America which we call Meso-America was occupied by civilized peoples for a period of approximately 2000 years before the Spanish Conquest of 1521. Written records are few and the Maya system of writing, the only developed one, has not been totally deciphered. Consequently most of our information about social institutions depends on the native traditions written down in Latin script in Spanish or native languages in the sixteenth century. They cover mainly the two or three centuries before the Conquest. During this time there were a large number of different political units. This paper deals with the most important of them, the so-called Aztec empire that was formed in 1428 and lasted until the Spanish Conquest. It consisted of three confederated cities—Mexico, Tetzaco and Tlacopan—located in the Valley of Mexico. It had conquered a large area of Central and Southern Mexico, from which it demanded tribute.

Central Mexico was a frontier area, adjacent to the regions of Northern Mexico inhabited by hunting and gathering peoples at a much lower level of cultural and social complexity. A few centuries before the Spanish Conquest the main political unit of the area, centred in the city of Tollan, had collapsed and a period of political fragmentation started, characterized by the migration and resettlement of people who had formed part of this Toltec empire, the shift of the Meso-American frontier towards the South, and the migration into the civilized area of peoples of previously barbarian ancestry. The civilized Meso-American peoples went through a period of reorganization and growth during which larger and stronger political units developed. The Aztec empire was the successor to political units of the same nature but covering a smaller area. It thus represented the highest political achievement during a period of growth in late pre-Spanish history.

The Nahuatl (Aztec) term for king is *tlatoani*, which literally means speaker, ruler or commander. The abstract noun *tlatocayotl* can be translated as kingdom, kingship or state.

In each one of the three confederated realms of the Aztec empire the "great king" (*uey tlatoani*) of its capital city ruled over a group of dependent cities, each with its own king. These kings were members of the royal lineage of the capital and close relatives of the great king, or if they were members of separate ruling lineages they took as wives daughters of the great king. The kings of the various cities in each realm formed a council which under the great king was the highest governing body. In each capital city and under the great king's orders were a series of councils or halls, each in charge of a different aspect of government. Each council consisted of men of a particular rank as defined by the overall stratification system and the grades in the officialdom, and each council combined judicial, administrative and legislative functions within its field of competence.

The highest council was that formed by all the kings of the realm; it was the highest policy-making body, it alone dealt with affairs relating to men of royal rank, and it was the highest court of appeal. A second council was formed by men of the rank of *teuctli*, heads of noble houses, each endowed with lands and subjects; it was the highest court dealing with affairs of the common people. In the "Hall of Princes" all men assembled who had the rank of king's or lord's son; the great king chose from among them those he wanted to entrust with various tasks of government. The "Hall of Eagles" or "Hall of Captains" included all the war generals and captains and formed the council dealing with military matters. The "Hall of Elders" included a group of officials described as executors of the king, in charge of sending embassies and carrying out death sentences. The heads of the various men's houses (in which all the young men to be trained in public works and warfare (used) met in the "Hall of songs". Here they received orders to take their men to perform the tasks ordered by the king. The "Store House" was presided over by a steward under whose orders were the tribute collectors of all the different provinces, who brought their tribute to the Store House. This was also the place where great public works were organized and the various stewards received orders to take their men to work. The "House of Birds" harboured a sort of zoo; it was also the place where skilled artisans worked, making luxury objects for the use of the palace and the temples. The "Row of Houses" or priestly residences connected with different temples is also described as a dependency under the rule of the great king.

All these halls are described as subject to the command of the

king, who also ordered the punishment of those members of each council who did not perform their duties.

The members of the two highest councils —the kings of dependent cities and the lord— were the closest consultants of the king. The native chronicles, when dealing with the reign of each king, always described how the king decided with these officials all important matters and assigned various tasks to them, usually as teams of officials. The most important of these councillors was the "Woman Snake", a post vested in a branch of the royal lineage. Ritually this official symbolized the earth goddess of the same name, while the king stood for the national god "Southern Hummingbird". The Woman Snake also acted as a sort of viceroy. Other high officials in Mexico occupied posts which were required to be held prior to the kingship.

Outside Mexico, in remote areas, there were colonies placed in strategic locations and these were ruled as direct dependencies of the city. However, most territories in subject areas were left under their own rulers, with stewards placed in charge of collecting the tribute imposed on them. Occasionally officials were sent from Mexico as visiting judges to decide special issues.

Thus the authority of the king was exercised in all aspects of government through a number of councils. The chronicles relate how the king might initiate economic measures by imposing tribute on a conquered province, ordering the building of an aqueduct to bring water to the city or of a dyke to protect it from floods; he would also order relief measures in case of famine. In addition the king initiated and directed wars; he always started a new campaign after taking office, and he ordered the distribution of spoils. The king was the highest dispenser of justice; all death penalties had to be given by him and he formulated new laws. In the religious sphere, the king saw to it that the priests performed their duties; he ordered new temples to be built and special rites to be performed. At ceremonial functions he personified gods and acted as priest, performed sacrifices and presided over public rituals.

Thus the king ruled with the help of officials, the most important of whom were his very close relatives. Even the officials of lower rank were for the most part distant descendants of previous kings, although some other officials were men of commoner origin. The royal treasury and the economic organization of the realm were basically an extension of the royal household. We are dealing then with the type of organization that Max Weber labelled patrimonial.

Yet some distinction existed between the king as a person and the royal office. In the economic organization the king as a member of the royal lineage had lands that he had inherited and that he could dispose of freely, apart from what was due to him as king; on the other hand, there were lands pertaining to the king's office, for the support of the palace regardless of who occupied the office.

Ritual texts and ceremonial speeches make the distinction between the fallible, even unworthy, nature of the man and the awesomeness of the office. In ceremonial speeches at the investiture of a king he was admonished to be humble and to properly perform his duties. Prayers are on record asking the gods to cause the death of an unworthy king, and in at least one case an unsuccessful king, Tizoc, is said to have been poisoned. But there were no clearly defined institutional checks that openly restricted the king's power or that defined procedures for his dismissal.

Nevertheless the high officials are described as influencing the daily decisions of the king and even as admonishing him for his errors. This is described in the case of king Auitzotl, who had ordered the death of the king of Coyoacan for advising him against bringing water from the Coyoacan springs to Mexico, an undertaking that resulted in a disastrous flood. And we must assume that the same group of high officers made the decision to bring about the death of the unworthy Tizoc.

The unrestrained power of the king seems to have grown during the rule of the last king, Moteuczoma. According to one tradition he decided that only men of royal rank should serve in his palace and he had put to death all the officials of commoner birth appointed by his predecessor Auitzotl. Although we might think here of a conflict between two sectors of the officialdom, the fact is that the outcome is described in the chronicle as an arbitrary act of the ruler. Along similar lines it is reported that when a merchant became too wealthy and proud, Moteuczoma found an excuse to have him killed and his wealth confiscated. On the other hand, Moteuczoma also placed himself under the rule of law. On one occasion a peasant reprimanded him for having taken a corn cob from his field, an action punishable by death. Moteuczoma praised him for having done so and appointed him king of one of his subject cities. The great king of Tetzcoco had his own son and heir put to death because he had committed adultery. The point is made that even the king's own son was subject to the rule of law.

Thus the checks that one can detect on the power of the ruler depended on the power of the high officials, that is on members of the ruling class. The commoners' role was to obey. Only in the case of the war of Mexico against the ruler of the Tepaneca did the commoners take part in making a political decision. They were fearful of the possibility of defeat and made a contract with the nobility that in case of failure the latter would take the blame for the revolt, but in case of success the commoners would be obliged to serve them from then on. This has been interpreted by some writers as a sort of social contract that explains the formation of the Aztec state. Yet it seems rather to reflect the practice of sacrificing the rulers of a defeated city while the commoners were spared, ordered to pay tribute, and given new rulers.

All the kings of the three realms in the Aztec empire and the dependent kings in the cities within each realm were members of certain ruling lineages; thus, inheritance always entered into the succession process. Only a few dependent and conquered towns had military chiefs who were not members of a local ruling lineage and were appointed by the great king.

The required ancestry always connected the ruling dynasties with the rulers of Tollan or their continuation in Colhuacan, the cities that had preceded the Aztec empire as the dominant powers in Central Mexico. According to some traditions the dynasty of Tollan had its origin in the god-like priest-ruler Quetzalcoatl, Feather Snake. The connection was established either by direct male descent or by intermarriage with a princess of Toltec ancestry, which was acceptable because of the bilateral kingship system of the ancient Mexicans.

Yet inheritance was not the only factor in the succession process. The great kings of Tenochtitlan (Mexico), Tetzaco and Tlacopan had to be confirmed in their position by the kings of the other two cities, and kings of dependent cities in each of the three realms were confirmed (or selected) by their great king. At least in the case of Tenochtitlan, the successor was selected from within the royal lineage by an assembly of high officials.

Two different succession patterns can be identified. One, of collateral succession, prevailed in Tenochtitlan during the period when it was the main city in the Aztec empire. The other, of lineal succession, was followed in Tlacopan and Tetzaco, as well as in Tenochtitlan itself during an earlier period in which it was subject to the great king of Azcapotzalco.

In the lineal succession system the king was succeeded by a son,

although there was no rigid system of primogeniture. The son was selected as heir by his father and, as stated above, had to be confirmed by the rulers of the other two cities. In the case of Tetzco, for which the best information is available, it seems that it was also normal for the king to take as his main wife a princess of the lineage ruling at Tenochtitlan, and that his successor was an offspring of this union. On the other hand, the king of Tetzco gave his daughters in marriage to the kings of his dependent cities where lineal succession was also followed, and as dowry they brought the lands that the great king held in those same cities.

In Tenochtitlan the kingship was transmitted to a collateral relative: a brother, nephew or cousin. In addition, the main wife of a ruler was a woman of his own lineage, in a few cases a daughter of his predecessor. Part of the selection procedure was election by an assembly of all the princes of the lineage and officials of government, who had to select the son of a former ruler (in some cases a grandson). At the same time that a new king was selected, four other high officials were also chosen. The new king had been one of those four, so that in addition to inheritance we have a system of promotion through a ladder of offices. The lower positions required before that of king were held by military commanders who had to prove their worth on the battlefield before being selected. The total pattern thus combines inheritance with promotion through merit and election.

Cases of irregular succession are of interest. The great king of Mexico, Tizoc, is said to have been done away with because of his failure as a war leader, but no regular procedure for dismissal is reported. He was succeeded according to normal practice by his younger brother Auitzotl, who, as a war general, was the expected successor. At the death of the great king of Tetzco, Nezualpilli, a conflict for the kingship developed between two different sons born of different mothers who found support in different parts of the realm. The son of a Mexican mother prevailed, thanks to the support of her brother the great king of Mexico, who at this time was the dominant power within the empire.

There are no clear-cut cases of entirely new dynasties being established as the result of revolts. Foreign intervention or outright conquest often caused changes in the ruling line of subject cities which acquired as a new king a scion of the conquering ruling lineage, who would then marry a local princess. At other times a male member of the local ruling lineage was kept as king and was given as wife a rela-

tive of the superordinate ruler. In either case, thanks to the bilateral kingship system of ancient Mexico, the new local rulers combined the ancestry of both the local and the conquering ruling lineages.

The governmental functions of the king and the modes of succession thus illustrate some of the bases of the legitimacy of the king's power: succession within the ruling lineage; election by an assembly consisting primarily of the high officialdom of the kingdom formed by members of the ruling lineage; promotion through the high ranks of the officialdom based on military achievement as well as birthright; and, in the case of subject kings, the sanction of a higher ruler. A successful rule as war leader was also necessary in order to keep the office.

Supernatural bases of power and legitimacy are also clearly evident. A sort of divine preordination is present in the fact that the national god spoke to his people, guiding them during their migration and promising them the achievement of power. The god often spoke to priests bearing his relics in a sacred bundle, or, in some other versions, he was a god who had come among men, or a deified culture hero. As pointed out before, Toltec ancestry of the rulers meant descent from the god-king Quetzalcoatl (Feather Snake) of Tollan.

The king also appeared as the gods' representative on earth. In ancient Mexican religion the gods were believed to have their *ixiptlas* (image, representative or lieutenant) on earth. These were the priests who impersonated the gods in the rituals, or the sacrificed victims who after death joined the deity they had represented. Upon taking office the king was said to become a god and he had an important ritual role. He acted as the representative of a god in a number of rituals, and in some cases as sacrificial priest. As a conqueror, he was depicted in sculpture and painting as a god and, after death, his body was also dressed as a god's. The personal names of some kings are variants of the names of some of the deities.

The king also had personal supernatural power of a magical nature. For instance, the king of Coyoacan killed by king Auitzotl of Mexico was believed to have the power to assume animal shape. Attributes of this sort seem to have been more prevalent among other Meso-American peoples such as the Quiche of Guatemala.

The strength of the king was necessary for the welfare of the kingdom and it had to be replenished by sacrifices every 260 days, an important time period in the Meso-American ritual calendar.

When king Moteuczoma came to meet the Spaniards, he walked under a canopy surrounded by four high officials and the ground he

walked on was swept before him and covered with blankets so that he would not touch it. Nobody might look him in the face, and his subjects had to approach him with downcast eyes.

A number of slightly different features of kingship are reported in other Meso-American areas. Among the most significant are the following:

Some political units in Central Mexico, such as Chalco, Tlaxcallan and Cholollan, were subdivided into a small number of territorial units, each one of them with its own king; the kings ruling jointly were apparently of equal status. In Cholollan the position of the two highest rulers was reached by members of the local nobility by promotion through a series of offices, primarily of a religious nature.

The traditions of some groups, and this includes the Mexicans, refer to a period when they had no kings. This seems to apply to groups who had not achieved the status of independent city-states and were subject to foreign kings, but it also applies to migrant groups moving into the Central Mexican area from regions to the North where they had a more simple level of cultural and social development. These groups seem to have had leaders, probably hereditary, who combined military and ceremonial duties, but the information on the subject is very scant. These same groups acquired kings when they came under the influence of a kingdom, and were organized as dependent cities. They then received a king who was a relative of the great king under whom they placed themselves, or one of their own leaders was invested as king by the dominant power.

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The Inka and Political Power in the Andes*

Franklin Pease G. Y.

In order to discuss the *Inka*¹ and political power in the Andean region, we must first consider the sources which are available for such a study. There are no indigenous sources, and our knowledge is therefore based on chronicles, the great majority of which were written by Spaniards and only a very small minority by natives of the Andes.² These chronicles have been habitually used without bearing in mind that their contents were based on oral information, substantially modified by translations which were not always correct, and fundamentally changed by the historical and europocentric criteria of their sixteenth and seventeenth century American authors. Not even indigenous Andean writers were wholly free of these prejudices, since otherwise they were potentially liable to the censure of the catholic priests or functionaries, whom they served or under whose tutelage they were placed; and moreover they wrote only for Spanish-speaking readers.³

* Translated from Spanish by A.L. Basham.

¹ This, the standard modern Quechua spelling, implies the pre-Columbian ruler of Cuzco. The word "Inca", with the usual Spanish spelling, indicates the people over whom he was king.

² General information on Andean written sources can be found in P. A. Means, *Biblioteca Andina*... (Connecticut Academy of Arts & Sciences, 29, 1928); John H. Rowe "Inca culture at the time of the Spanish conquest", in *Handbook of South American Indians* (original ed. 1946), vol. ii (second ed., New York, 1963); Raúl Párras Barrenechea, *Los cronistas del Perú* (Lima, 1962); Ake Wedin, *El concepto de lo incaico y las fuentes* (Uppsala, 1966); John V. Murra, *Formaciones económicas y políticas del mundo andino* (Lima, 1975); Franklin Pease, *Los últimos incas del Cuzco* (Lima 1972), ch. i; see also Pease, 'Las visitas como testimonio andino' in *Homenaje a Jorge Basad* (in press).

³ There are few examples of Andean authors: Felipe Guaman Poma de Ayala finished writing his *Nueva coronica y buen gobierno* in the first years of the seventeenth century (facsimile ed.: París, 1936); at almost the same time Juan Santa Cruz Pachacuti Yamqui Salcamaygua completed his *Relación de antigüedades deste reyno del Piru*

This Europe-centred attitude on the part of the chroniclers was clear in their picture of the *Tawantinsuyu* (the realm of the *Inka* centred on Cuzco), conceived along the lines of a European kingdom, with relations similar to those which existed between European feudal lords and their vassals. According to these texts the *Inka's* feudatories were gradually subjected to centralized authority by the *Inka*, whose dominion over people, land and other property was absolute. The same Europe-centred attitude is to be seen in the depiction of the *Inka* attired like a European king and linked to a court similar to any court in Europe. In spite of the insistence of the chroniclers on portraying the *Tawantinsuyu* as the violent usurper of earlier seigneurial rights, their writings give no evidence of the existence of regional powers previous to the state of Cuzco, which might have been capable of offering effective resistance to the expansion of the *Inka's* power, with the exception of the kingdom of Chimor, on the north coast of present day Peru. Even in the outcome of the conflict between the *Inkas* Huáscar of Cuzco and Atahualpa, who defeated him, and is connected with the northern regions of the *Tawantinsuyu* (i.e. Quito), it is recognized that the victor adopted Cuzcan manners and made a Cuzcan of himself, in conformity with the general tendency recorded by the chroniclers to identify the *Inka* with the city of Cuzco.¹ Various documents used by the chroniclers (chiefly the *visitas* organized by the Spanish administration to obtain reckonings of the population and tributaries, and the legal judgements in lawsuits between indigenous chieftains who either supported or resisted the systems of inheritance imposed by colonization) made it possible to distinguish the existence of powerful ethnic units in relations of conflict (negotiated?) with the *Tawantinsuyu*, a fact which is confirmed by archaeological researches initiated in the present century.

The organization of the Cuzcan state was seen at the time by the chroniclers according to European forms, and with a comparable administrative system, though the picture of the latter was also dis-

(ed. Marcos Jiménez de la Espada, *Tres relaciones de antigüedades peruanas*, 1950, first ed. 1879). The first was the assistant of an "extirpator of idolatries", Cristóbal de Albornoz, who took part in campaigns of this type in the last years of the sixteenth and the beginning of the seventeenth century. The writings of the second were found among the papers of Francisco de Avila (in the Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid), another "extirpator" who wrote a collection of myths published under the title of *Dioses y hombres de Hairochiri* (bilingual edition by José María Arguedas, Lima 1966).

¹ Pease, 1972, pp. 32, 47 ff.

torted by utopian criteria, influenced by tendencies to moralize, which surrounded the Andes with an aura of perfection. It was then believed that there had existed a Cuzcan "nobility" which extended its civilization over a world of barbarians, thus strengthening the moral criteria by which the European colonization of the whole of America was justified. The Inka was for the chroniclers a king who came to power through a system of inheritance, definitely based on "legitimacy" and primogeniture, as understood in the European manner. Nevertheless, we can discover, both in the chronicles themselves and in the *visitas* already mentioned (which have been widely used in studies on the subject during the last ten years), a new image of the *Inka* and of his power. This results from the study of the documentary materials of the sixteenth century, in the light and perspective of methods and results of anthropology, as well as from the actual results of anthropological surveys. We are moving steadily away from the simple identification of the *Inka* as the ruler, as we define more clearly the ideal figure of the *Inka*, certainly earlier than the *Tawantinsuyu*, and surviving after it even down to our own times, besides the political presence of the Cuzcan ruler described in the chronicles. The precise statements of the latter are fundamental for an understanding of the contemporary authority of the *Inka*, nowadays conceived of in the Andes in a messianic framework, thus allowing us to approximate more closely to a plausible explanation of the formation and expansion of the *Tawantinsuyu* as told by the chronicles.

As well as the image of the *Inka* as the ruler, we can find in the selfsame chronicles the presence of an *Inka* looked on as a paradigm of all things, an archetype; and he appears as such in the myths concerning the foundation of Cuzco.⁵ The chronicles show us *one Inka* constantly repeating himself through the members of a genealogical tree which was basically understood as a temporal regression, since the succession of its component members was the only way in which the oral memory could return to the sacred period of the origins of the Andean state. The chronicles show us how the primordial Cuzcan archetype, Manco Cápac, the first *Inka* of the list of known rulers or *capačkuna* (lords), prefigured all the norms which were to regulate the conduct of his successors, each of whom was to be looked on as the eponymous ancestor of one of the *panaqa*, the kinship groups of

⁵ F. Pease, "The Andean creator god" (*Numen* xvii, fasc. 3, 1970). Cf. *El dios creador andino*, (Lima, 1973).

Cuzco. Manco Cápac was succeeded by seven rulers, the last of whom bore the name of the most ancient creator god of Cuzco, Wiraqocha, and fought with Pachacuti, his son according to the historicized version given by the chroniclers, although the same authors recognize in passing, against the logic of their own statements, that it was "the son" of Manco Cápac, and so his equal, who refounded the city of Cuzco, dividing it into two halves which were in turn subdivided, thus symbolizing the division and lawful ordering of the world; but now the cosmic order continues, thanks to the patronage of *Inti*, the dynamic sun-god of Cuzco, who replaced Wiraqocha, who thenceforth was converted into a *deus otiosus*.⁶ Pachacuti figures as a new archetype, this time a solar one, who replaced Manco Cápac and also "solarized" him, establishing and maintaining a "genealogical" continuity which continued through five further rulers down to the coming of the Spaniards. It is interesting that, if we omit the two personages who play the part of archetypes in the list of the rulers of Cuzco, we are left with twelve rulers, corresponding to the eleven identified *panaqa*, plus that which corresponds to the power actually in command at the time

The myths telling of the creation of Cuzco give important information contributing to a more precise conception of the figure of the Inka. The oldest version of the story attributes the establishment of Cuzco to Ayar Manco, who figures with Mama Ocllo as the couple founding the central city, the origin of the world of the Incas; this event took place after a process of selection which eliminated three pairs of the four which emerged from a cave in the vicinity of Cuzco (Ayar Manco or Manco Cápac and Mama Ocllo; Ayar Cachi and Mama Guaco; Ayar Uchu and Mama Cura; Ayar Auca and Mama Ragua or Ragua Ocllo) "saying that they were the children of Viracocha Pachayachachi", the most ancient creator god, to whom the original foundation of Cuzco was also attributed. At the creation "at the time when the sun was about to rise (in the sky, by order of Wiraqocha) in the form of a dazzlingly radiant man he called the Incas and said to Manco Cápac, who was their chief: 'You and your descendants will be lords, and you will bring many peoples to subjection. Have me as your

⁶ M. Eliade, *Patterns in Comparative Religion* (London and New York, 1958). ch.ii, sec. 14.

⁷ Pedro Sarmiento de Gamboa, *Historia Indica* (Buenos Aires, 1947; first ed. 1572), pp. 117-18.

father..."⁸ When, at the beginning of the fifteenth century, the transformation occurred from which the *Tawantinsuyu* originated, we notice a change in the creation myth, which introduced a new dynamic divinity, *Inti*, the sun, and modified the name of the founding hero Ayar Manco to Manco Cápac, the first name in the mythical genealogy of the rulers of Cuzco, the Incas. Nevertheless, this change occurs in the chronicles not "in the earliest times" but in a new primordial age identifiable as the time of the organization of the state attributed by the chronicles to the *Inka* Pachacuti, the ninth of the traditional list, who reconstructed Cuzco after driving out the warriors of a powerful rival dominion, that of the Chancas, inhabitants of the territory north-east of Cuzco. Pachacuti is identified with Manco Cápac; the chroniclers look on him as the son of the latter, and explicitly declare that his name previous to his achieving the status of *Inka* was Titu Manco Cápac.⁹ At the same time as this the "official" version of the story of the foundation of Cuzco was changed, and it was now said to be brought about by a single couple, Manco Cápac and Mama Ocllo, surviving from the creation, as told in the most ancient of the creation myths.¹⁰

In this succession of myths we may discover elements which reveal the ideal model which the people of the Andes formed of the *Inka*, and which is to some extent still prevalent, even today.

Wiraqocha, *Inti* and the *Inka* appear as successive gods, creators of the Andean world both in the Cuzcan and non-Cuzcan versions of the legend. They are gods of order,¹¹ who construct the world on the ruins of earlier creations which have foundered. When the first of the three was transformed into a *deus otiosus*, the second arose as a dynamic fertilizing deity, the producer of maize, presiding over the organization of the *Tawantinsuyu*. When the Andean state perished as a result of the Spanish invasion the *Inka* (*Inkarri*, Inca king) took on the

⁸ Cristóbal de Molina, *Relación de las fábulas y ritos de los incas* (Lima 1943, first ed. 1575), pp. 11 ff.

⁹ Martín de Murúa, *Historia del origen, genealogía real de los incas...* (Madrid 1962-64, first ed. 1590), vol. ii, pp. 3-4; Garcilaso de la Vega, *Comentarios reales de los incas* (Madrid, 1960, first ed. 1609), p. 188; Guaman Poma de Ayala, 1936, pp. 85, 87; Sarmiento de Gamboa, 1947, p. 176.

¹⁰ Garcilaso de la Vega, 1960, vol. i, chs. xv and xvi.

¹¹ G van der Leeuw, *Fenomenología de la religión* (México, 1964), p. 551 (the passage referred to is omitted from the standard English translation, *Religion in Essence and Manifestation* tr. J. E. Turner).

characteristics of a divinity who was still creative, but who had been conquered by the Christian God, and of whose messianic resurrection there remained a latent hope, expecting the total transformation of the universe (a change of time and of the world, *pachacuti*), which would make possible a return to past time, when all was perfect and happy and when hunger did not exist. Some specialists have compared this succession of the three gods with a myth of three ages, a myth strengthened in the Andes by the influence of Franciscan preaching carried out according to the plans of Joaquín de Fiore. Nevertheless the chronicles also suggest that the three deities might be thought of as contemporaries, forming a divine triad, presided over at a distance by Wiraqocha, with the effective predominance of the Sun (*Inti*) during the *Tawantinsuyu*, and represented here below by the *Inka*, the sun on earth.¹² He was an orbiting divinity, a present and activating force who might be considered in the Andes as a centre of the living world, and be treated as such wherever he might be encountered.¹³ The *Inka* was an archetype on whom was modelled the conduct of men, who consulted him in the cultivation of maize, and in the construction of platforms or terraces for agriculture and of irrigation canals for the distribution of water.¹⁴ The ritual importance of maize was fundamental to the life of the Andean peoples, through its identification as a solar plant, and through its being the main ingredient of *chicha*, the ritual beverage of the Andes, which, certainly, the

¹² "They say that before he (the *Inka Pachacuti*) became the ruler..., when he came to a spring named Susurpuquio he saw a slab of crystal fall into the same spring, in which he saw the figure of an Indian in the following form: on his head, from the back of the neck, arose three most resplendent rays, in the manner of the rays of the sun; and in the joints of his arms with his shoulders were snakes, which coiled round his head like a headband, *as an Inca*; and his ears were pierced, and in them were placed earrings, *as an Inca*; and his dress and clothing were *as an Inca*. The head of a lion (i.e. a jaguar) emerged from between his legs, and behind his shoulders was another lion, the front legs of which appeared to clasp his two shoulders... (and) he called him by name, saying: 'Come here my son...for I am the Sun your father...'" (Molina, 1943, pp. 20-21).

¹³ "And at this time there came out all the people of Cuzco according to their *ayllus* and factions. They came as richly adorned as possible and when they arrived (in the square) they adored The Creator (Wiraqocha), the Sun and the Lord Inca" (Molina, 1943, p. 35). Beside the identity and simultaneity of the three (c.f. F. Pease, "En torno al culto solar incaico", *Humanidades*, 1, Lima, 1967), there is to be seen a succession in the primacy of each (Pease, 1973).

¹⁴ For the contemporary myths of *Inkarri*, c.f. Juan M. Ossia, *Ideología mesiánica del mundo andino* (Lima, 1973).

sun also drank. Cuzco, identified with the *Inka*, was the perfect model for pre-Columbian Andean cities, which in ritual terms were constructed after its image, and the establishment of which required the transportation of earth from Cuzco, the inclusion of which in the new town established its identity with the sacred city.¹⁵

In the myths referred to above we find the *Inka* appearing symbolically as a constructor, and the *Inka's* constructive capacity is identified on the one hand with the possibility of transforming the face of the earth,¹⁶ hurling rocks in the four directions, commanding stones to group themselves together to produce buildings, and transforming them into invincible soldiers; or on the other hand with dividing the world into four parts,¹⁷ repeating in the name of the sun the similar division made by Wiraqocha in the earlier creation myth.¹⁸

In the myth of the origin of the Ayar, Ayar Cachi threw four stones; 'He threw (one) at a high hill and with the blow which he gave it he knocked down the hill and made a ravine in it. Similarly he threw three other stones, and with each one he made a ravine in the high hills. These throws were and are, from where he threw to where the blow fell..., the space of a league and a half.'¹⁹ In an oral version collected 25 years ago in Puquio (Ayacucho) it is stated: 'Inkarrí drove the rocks with a whip, arranging them in order. He drove them towards the heights with a whip, arranging them in order. After that he founded a city', and also: 'Inkarría threw the rocks... Also he sank his feet in the rocks, surely just as though in mud. The rocks and the wind, he set them in order. He had power over all things.'²⁰ In another place,

¹⁵ 'There is another Cuzco in Quito, another in Tumi (Tumipampa), another in Guanoco (Guánuco Pampa), another in Hatuncolla (near Lake Titicaca) and another in Las Charcas (modern Bolivia)...' (Guaman Poma, 1936, p. 185; cf. also Pedro Cieza de León, *El señorío de los Incas* (Lima, 1967, 1st ed. 1550), p. 240; Pease 1972, p. 54.

¹⁶ 'Pachacuti' - the periods of destruction between each of the ages of the world. The chroniclers identify this word, like the name of the *Inka* Pachacuti, with the 'changing of the world', the 'transformation of the world'.

¹⁷ *Tawantinsuyu* — 'The whole of Peru, or the four parts of it, namely Antisuyu, Collasuyu, Contisuyu, Chinchaysuyu', González Holguín, *Vocabulario de la lengua general de todo el Perú, llamada lengua Qquichua...* (Lima, 1951, first ed. 1608), p. 336.

¹⁸ Pease, 1973, chs. i and iii.

¹⁹ Juan de Betanzos, *Suma y narración de los incas* (Lima, 1924, first ed. 1551), ch.iii.

²⁰ José María Arguedas, 'Puquio. Una cultura en proceso de cambio', in *Estudios sobre la cultura actual del Perú* (Lima, 1964), pp. 228, 231.

"Inkarripa camachisca pachamama santa tierra. Thus even today we believe that Inkarrí was as it were a god who worked miracles; for when water was wanted Inkarrí would say: 'Let there be water in this place!' and water appeared. That moment there came up a spring of water. He wanted to make *chacras* (cultivated lands), or terraces (and) they were made by themselves. The stones formed themselves into walls, they made terraces by themselves;"²¹ In a course of lectures given to country folk of the area of the archbishopric of Cuzco in 1971, a peasant asked me if the *Inka* was powerful. When I asked him to what kind of power he referred, he replied, 'Power to command the rocks to move of themselves'. Finally, when, according to the accounts of the chronicles, the *Inka* Pachacuti assembled his forces and people to fight against the Chancas, who had invaded Cuzco, to the defence of which the absent Wiraqocha had not come, he triumphed by invoking the sun (*Inti*) and then transforming the rocks into invincible soldiers."²²

Thus the texts we have referred to, both the chronicles and the oral mythology still prevalent, hold that the *Inka* had the power to move rocks in order to break up the earth with them, to arrange them in walls or to use them for constructing terraces. These data find interesting confirmation in the administrative records of the sixteenth century Spaniards, especially in the *visitas* carried out to estimate the tributary population. When in 1549 the *visitadores* at Huánuco asked the inhabitants of the place what tribute they had previously given to the Incas, they replied that among the principal offerings were "400 men and women to make walls..."²³ The current researches of Murra underline the importance of the human energy which was made available to the ruling power,²⁴ as well as the importance of its employment in the building of houses in the administrative urban centres, roads, terraces, irrigation channels and reservoirs. But the transforma-

²¹ Version collected by me in 1975 in the mountains of Arequipa, in the south of Peru. The first phase of the text may be translated as "Pachamama (the earth) was created (ordered) by Inkarrí".

²² Santa Cruz Pachacuti, 1950, p. 238; Bernabé Cobo S.J. *Historia del Nuevo Mundo* (Madrid, 1964, first ed. 1656), vol. ii, pp. 75, 161.

²³ Juan de Mori and Hernando Alonso Malapartida, "La visitación de los pueblos de indios", in Iñigo Ortiz de Zuñiga, *Visita de la provincia de León de Huánuco en 1562* (ed. John V. Murra, Lima, 1967-72), vol. i. p. 306.

²⁴ Murra, 1975.

tion of the human world is also included among the achievements of the *Inka*, for to him were attributed the movement of peoples destined to establish equilibrium in the relations of man and the earth, to colonize and to control the population subjugated to the *Tawantinsuyu* (the *mitimas* or *mitmaqkuna*).

Importing a European model, the chroniclers no doubt modified the Andean oral traditions, leaving the impression of the existence of a system of inheritance based on primogeniture and legitimacy, both of which were in turn based on monogamous marriage. Each *Inka* appeared as the head of one of the *panaqa* or Cuzcan kingship groups, and we should realize that all of these functioned simultaneously. There is still room for discussion as to how the ruler was chosen, and which of the *panaqa* could provide candidates for rulership; but we have evidence of a ritual of initiation thanks to one of the chroniclers (Anello Oliva), to which we may add materials obtained from other authors of the sixteenth century, who gathered their data in Cuzco and in other parts of the Andes. At first there appears to have been a system of election between two candidates, the beginning of which the chronicles attribute to the time of the *Inka* Pachacuti, and in which practically all the known cases involved a struggle for power between the two candidates, which suggests a ritual fight. But only in the case of the appointment of the "last" two *Inkas* of the well known official genealogy can we find a definite ritual of nomination. Huayna Cápac, shortly before his death, indicated two candidates who were to be subjected to the oracular ritual of the *callpa*, through which *Inti*, the Sun, indicated his choice.²⁵

Here the chronicles abound in extensive accounts of occurrences which led to a bloody conflict between the two sectors. Huayna Cápac had transferred the seat of power to Tumipampa, built where the city of Cuenca stands today in Ecuador, and had founded it as a centre

²⁵ Juan Avello Oliva, *Historia del reino y provincias del Perú* (Lima, 1895, first ed. 1631, p. 65); Cobo, 1964, book xii, ch. xviii; Molina, 1943, p. 22; Sarmiento de Gamboa, 1947, ch. xxvii, Rome, 1963, 302-8. Henri Reichlen, "Illustration d'un rite précolombien de divination", *Journal de la Société des Américanistes*, xxxix (Paris, 1950); Pease, 1972, pp. 82, 85 ff.; Guaman Poma (1936, p. 118) explicitly mentions the appointment of the *Inka* by the Sun-god: "To become king his father the Sun has to call him in the temple and nominate him to be king. They do not mind whether he is elder or younger, provided he is chosen by the Sun"; and even Martín de Murúa (1962, vol. i, p. 139) declares that "the perfect Incas should be chosen and ordained by the hands of the priests and of the Sun, and of the council of all the provinces and revered before the Sun..."

of the world comparable to Cuzco; for not only had he copied the essential ritual places, but, in establishing his headquarters there, the *Inka* did in fact transform it into a sacred centre. Towards the end of the twenties of the sixteenth century, Huayna Cápac became mortally ill, and the two candidates whom he proposed as his successors were submitted to the solar oracle, with negative results in both cases. When the priests went to request the *Inka* to make a further choice, the chronicles state that they found him dead. Various Cuzcan groups then forced the situation and enthroned one of the two nominees, Huáscar, who apparently had not moved from Cuzco and who better represented the interests of the Cuzcan élite, while the other candidate, Ninan Cuyochi, died mysteriously. There is mention of the efforts of the Cuzcans to "legitimize" their decision by marrying the mother of Huáscar with the corpse of Huayna Cápac,²⁶ but this statement would appear to be without foundation, for the ruler did not achieve power through legitimate affiliation or primogeniture, and the story certainly conflicts with the theory that the "legitimacy" of Huáscar was based on his being the son of the previous *Inka*.

The chronicles also tell that, some time after Huáscar gained power in Cuzco, a conflict arose between this ruler and Atahualpa, leader of the élite of Tumipampa, the city favoured by Huayna Cápac. When Huáscar triumphed, and captured Atahualpa in Tumipampa, the latter received a revelation from the Sun. There appeared before him Amaru Inka Yupanqui (*amaru* = snake), the first successor of Pachacuti according to the accounts of the chronicles, who, in the name of the sun, passed on to him the title of *Inka* and changed him forthwith into a snake, thus allowing him to escape from his prison through a subterranean hole.²⁷ Thus, having passed through the world of the dead, Atahualpa was recognized as *Inka* by the population, and only from that time did he gain victories in his conflict with Huáscar; for the *Inka* could not be defeated. The oral tradition from after the Spanish invasion confirms this by identifying the *Inkarri* with Atahualpa.

The invincible *Inka*, according to the ideal model provided by the chronicles, is also a mighty mediator, not only by virtue of his personal links with the world of the gods, but also in a second aspect,

²⁶ Santa Cruz Pachacuti, 1950, p. 266.

²⁷ Oliva, 1895, p. 65; Pease, 1972, p. 98.

suggested by the mediative function exercised by authority (for example the *kuraka* or chief of a people) over the two moieties (*hanansaya* and *urinsaya*) which composed the *ayllu* (clans) and peoples of the Andes, and which we find similarly, on a larger scale, in the *Tawantinsuyu* itself. The Andean *kuraka* held power thanks to relations of kinship and an asymmetrical reciprocity, the offering of human energy in exchange for the exercise of authority; together with the redistribution of the goods produced by that energy, provided by the ethnic units. His functions included the distribution of collective labour, the administration and sharing of the water supply, the decision, which was reached ritually and supported by ritual, as to where to sow and at what time, etc. But above all the prestige of the *kuraka* seems to have been derived from his status as mediator in personal conflicts, from his solicitous handling of ritual rivalries between moieties,²⁸ and from his participation in the mediation of boundary disputes between one group and another. At the time of the appearance of the *Tawantinsuyu* and the beginning of its conquests, we can understand why the chroniclers frequently mention the mediation of the *Inka* in conflicts of greater extent. Many of the conquests seem to have been brought about thanks to the *Inka*'s opportune mediation between rivals in conflict, which implied his status as supreme and final arbiter and at the same time his implementation of the redistribution of wealth by the state. In the course of his expeditions, the *Inka* shared out the most highly esteemed commodities among the people — clothing, especially of the wool of Andean camelids, maize, coca and *mullu*,²⁹ all of which were of ritual importance and needed much manpower to obtain them. Along the roads and in the urban administrative centres which the state founded, these products were accumulated in large state storehouses, as were the tubers and dehydrated foods which were most commonly used in the popular diet.

²⁸ The status of the *kuraka* as mediator in the conflicts between moieties is visible in the lawsuits of colonial *curacasgos*, and especially in those motivated by the necessity to determine boundaries, even in modern times. In fact this function seems present in the ritual battles such as the *chariaje*, a fertility rite still practised in the mountains of southern Peru, involving fighting between the inhabitants of neighbouring villages; but the function as conciliator in domestic situations figures among the activities of contemporary elders. Cf. R. and Ch. Bolton, *Conflictos en la familia andina* (Cuzco 1975).

²⁹ Coca, *Erythroma coca* the slightly narcotic leaf from which cocaine is prepared; *mullu* - a bivalve mollusc of the genus *spondylus*, only found on the coast of Ecuador, in waters warmer than those along the Peruvian coast.

That the *Inka* was able to command large quantities of human energy was largely thanks to the pressure which he exerted through military conquests or negotiated alliances - and when each *Inka* appeared these redistributive relationships were established anew, which suggests that each *Inka* created his own *Tawantinsuyu*. His control over labour was also obtained through the absorption of manpower dedicated solely to the state (*yana* or *yanakuna*).³⁰ and by the mobilization of the population to settle in zones different from their places of origin, by establishing colonies. These then expanded on a larger scale the methods available to the ethnic groups for the search for and use of resources in different ecological zones,³¹ for purposes of production or of demographic equilibrium. In contrast to Mesoamerica, where power appears to have been based upon the concentration of the population, in the Andes it would seem to have been exactly the reverse, for the ruling power made use of means which would bring about the controlled dispersion of its subjects.

One of the attributes of the *Inka* best attested in the chronicles was his activity as a conqueror. Nevertheless, the chronicles do not give a coherent description of the Inca victories, and, according to the sources of their information, they frequently contradict their own evidence as to the historical sequence of the conquests. Sometimes they attribute the occupation of lands very far from Cuzco to *Inkas* whose "successors" appear to be connected with the conquest of places near to the sacred city. Thus Pachacuti conquered Tumipampa, in the extreme north of the *Tawantinsuyu*, while Tápac Inca Yupanqui conquered only the region of Vilcachuamán, an intermediate area, much nearer to Cuzco. Similarly even Huayna Cápac figures as subduing for the first time the regions of Canas and Canchis, in the close vicinity of Cuzco.³² This may be the result of the fact that the *Inkas* who are treated as successive in the accounts of the chroniclers seem actually to

³⁰ The pre-columbian *yana* or *yanakuna* may be understood as a dependent whose status varied, but the word has frequently been loosely interpreted as "slave". It appears that the number of *yanas* was limited (Murra, 1975, ch.viii), and there were cases of *yanas* who held the post of *kuraka* before the Spanish invasion. W. Espinoza, "Los señoríos étnicos de Chachapoyas y la alianza hispano-chacha", *Revista histórica*, xxx (Lima, 1967).

³¹ Murra, 1975, esp. ch. iii.

³² See *Relaciones geográficas de Indias*, published by M. Jiménez de la Espada (2nd ed., Madrid, 1965), vol. i, p. 218; vol. ii, p. 267-82; also Åke Wedin, *La cronología de la historia incaica* (Stockholm, 1963) p. 49.

have been chiefs of *panaqas* who were contemporary one with another. Yet even when we can establish some kind of a standard version of the Incan conquests, based on the information of the chronicles and other evidence from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, we cannot fail to notice a constant tendency for the *Inkas*, especially the successors of Pachacuti, to carry out their conquests from their base of Cuzco, leaving the city for the different regions and returning to it before commencing the next campaign. If we examine the order of these successive expeditions, all radiating from the same centre, we notice that each *Inka* organized his campaign in the direction of the hands of a clock, in concentric circles each time more far-reaching. If we combine the successive movements of expansion we have the pattern of a clockwise spiral. This leads us to think that the "history of the conquests" which we have hitherto believed was transmitted by the chronicles, might be in fact the account of a *ritual of conquest*, which, since it was repeated in the case of each *Inka*, may have been part of the machinery of accession to power or connected with the right to the title of *Inka*. In the present state of our researches, we cannot be more specific than this. All that we can yet feel confident about in this respect is that the chronicles have not transmitted historical accounts, but systematizations governed by mythical categories, necessarily framed in a ritual context.

Inkarri is known nowadays in the Andes as a creative divinity, on whom depend the water supply and the produce of the fields, as well as the herds. He died during the Spanish invasion of the sixteenth century, conquered by his counterpart, the "*Inka* of the Spaniards", that is Christ. He dwells beneath the earth, where his head is at present creating a new body. When this is complete *Inkarri* will revive, and the world will be changed; the Andes will once more become an "ordered" world, as it was before the arrival of the Spaniards. There are versions of this myth which state that after the last judgement, that is to say after the return of *Inkarri*, the white invaders will work for the people of the Andes.³³ *Inkarri* is thus seen as an eschato-

³³ "When the first human race was extinguished, Tëete Mañuco (Christ, *Inkarri*) made the present one and divided it into two classes: Indians and *Mistis* ('Whites', the dominant class). The Indians for the obligaroty service of the *Mistis*... Heaven is exactly the same as this world, with one difference: there the Indians are changed into *Mistis*, and they use force to compel those who were *Mistis* in this world to work for them, even (going so far as) whipping them." J. M. Arguedas, "Mitos quechuas poshispánicos", *Amaru*, iii (Lima, 1967) p. 16.

logical figure who may be identified with Christ; we have even examples of myths developed since the European invasion in which we find that Christ "brings the foodstuffs formerly produced by the *Inka*".³⁴ Nevertheless I cannot identify an "Indian" Christ, as is mentioned in respect of various places in the Andes. Among the present day Andean people, *Inkarri* is still "the model from which all being originated",³⁵ that is to say an archetype, according to the Quechua-speaking population. Among the Aymara speakers of southern Peru "Enqa is the generative and vital principle. He is the source and origin of happiness, comfort and abundance. He is not directly represented by natural physical objects, nor is he to be seen in the articles which together form the *senalu-q'epi*, the bundle containing ritual objects connected with the fertility of animals, for which there are equivalents in agricultural rituals. Yet, as a principle, he is permanently present in it, because without his intervention it would not be possible for the herds to be kept in comfort and contentment."³⁶

There is an obvious problem in the transformation undergone by the *Inka* down to the present day, in which he still evidently survives. The contemporary image of the *Inka* wavers between the personification of a generative principle, which seems to have survived from the former Cuzcan deities, and the memory of the king of Cuzco. If indeed the prestige of Cuzco is still evident among the people, the basis of that prestige remains the *Inka*, whose return may change the world; even if this involves the killing of many people, it is the only assurance of hope.

³⁴ Version collected in the mountains of Arequipa in 1975. Cf. Pease (ed.) *Collaguas I* (in the press).

³⁵ J. M. Arguedas, "Taki Parwa y la poesía quechua de la república", *Letras peruanas*, iv, 12 (Lima, 1955), p. 74.

³⁶ J. A. Flores Ochoa, "Enqa, Enqaychu, Illa y Khuya humi (aspectos mágico-religiosos entre pastores)", *Journal de la Société des Américanistes*, lxxiii (Paris, 1976).

