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SEMINARS

THE ROLE
OF THE
INTELLIGENTSIA
IN
CONTEMPORARY
ASIAN
SOCIETIES

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El Colegio de México

The Role of the Intelligentsia in Contemporary Asian Societies

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Introduction

Sibnarayan Ray

I)

In his Republic, Plato visualised an ideal order in which the philosophers would be the sole *leaders, rulers,* and *guardians* of society. To qualify to rule they would have to be persons who "are capable of apprehending the ideal reality of things" or what is universal and unchanging, who are committed to truthfulness and abhor falsehood, who are "by nature of good memory, quick apprehension, magnificent, gracious, friendly, and akin to truth, justice, bravery and sobriety," and who have these qualities "perfected by education and maturity of age." In an ideal society, argued Plato's *guru* Socrates, "the state would be solely entrusted to such men."[1]

We do not know of a state where this Platonic ideal has been *realised* or empirically tested, but in every civilized society there have been people "given specifically to pursuits that exercise the intellect." [2] Quite obviously these pursuits require not only natural ability but also certain privileges and favourable circumstances, among them leisure and freedom to a large extent from manual labour for a living, and opportunities for study and reflection. By whatever name they may be called in different societies, the intellectuals constitute an elite group which sees

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[1] Plato, *The Collected Dialogues,* Bollingen edition, *Republic,* Book VI.

[2] *Shorter Oxford English Dictionary,* 1962, p. 1012. Among other definitions may be mentioned: "people who have competence in the mastery and development of culture systems" (Talcott Parsons); "persons with an uncommon reflectiveness about the nature of their universe, and the rules which govern society" (Shils): "those who seek their joy in the practice of metaphysical specutation" (Julien Benda); "custodians of abstract ideas and jealous guardians of moral standards" (Lewis Coser); etc.

itself, and is generally recognised as such by society. To be able to engage and persist in intellectual pursuits they need a more privileged material and cultural position than that of the average members of society. Besides, the skills which they develop through such pursuits increase their authority and influence, and thereby tend to perpetuate their superior status in the social hierarchy. No wonder, then, that the intellectuals are often found to be justifying and rationalising social orders to which they themselves provide guiding principles and their interpretations, and in which their own elitistic position is reasonably secure.

However, several factors have to be taken into account which qualify this position substantially. In the first place, the intellectuals constitute only one of a number of elite groups in any society.[3] Desirable though the Platonic Utopia may seem to some of the intellectuals, they do not, in fact, monopolize power; there are other vested interest groups in every society with whom they have to compete and seek compromises and arrangements which do not necessarily work in their own favour in every case. It is, therefore, not unusual for groups of intellectuals to criticize and even oppose an established order which they do not find satisfying to their ambitions and expectations. Thus, not only social stability but also social mobility and change are supported by certain groups of intellectuals. Secondly, intellectual pursuits develop a much higher than average degree of self-consciousness and self-expression which undermines group solidarity and encourages conflict and a diversity of views. This process is more favourable to social dynamics than may be expected of mere positions of entrenched privilege.

But more important than either of these factors is the inherently critical function of intellectuality. An intellectual analizes and evaluates the facts or the information and thereby tends to transcend the limitations of the latter. The need to create concepts, categories, and abstractions; laws and theories; finer tools and methods of inquiry and assessment, as well as standards of excellence and objective criteria demands the ability to see details within a universal frame to place one-self mentally above the confines of one's own time, one's specific socio-cultural setting and one's personal and group interests. Re-appraisal of

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[3]   Max Weber, *Essays in Sociology;* H.P. Dreitzel, *Elitebegriff und Sozial-struktur* (1962), Lasswell, Lerner & Rothwell, *The Comparative Study of Elites* (1952); Gaetano Mosca, *The Ruling Class* (1939); V. Pareto, *The Mind and Society*, 4 vols. (1935); C.W. Mills, *The Power Elite* (1956).

accepted formulations and norms in terms of universally valid criteria is a necessary condition of intellectual pursuits.[4] That no intellectual may fully meet this condition does not cancel the significance of this demand. Even the so-called *conservative* intellectuals feel the pressure of this demand, although the feeling would appear stronger in some intellectuals than in others.

Intellectuals have a diversity of roles and functions in society among which at least three may be briefly noted in the context of this discussion. The pursuit of knowledge for its own sake is clearly the most distinctive task of the intellectuals; this task has to be undertaken by scholars and scientists who are not burdened by considerations of immediate applicability or usefulness of their findings and formulations, but without whose selfless dedication to research any intellectual development of the human race would hardly be conceivable. Then there is the task of formulating symbolic systems of values, codes, norms, regulative principles, and institutional structures, rules and rituals which hold a society together, and which then have to be defended and justified against those who, for one reason or another, are dissatisfied with these systems. Some outstanding sociologists have called the intellectuals performing this type of functions *ideologists.*[5] Thirdly, there are the intellectuals whose principal role is to criticize and oppose the existing system and to visualise and canvass alternative possibilities and life styles. They are usually described as the *Utopians*, but whether the term is adequate would seem to depend on the degree of emphasis they place on the alternatives they propose. In any case, they constitute the radical wing of the intellectuals, while the reformers may be placed between the second and the third groups in that they advocate gradual improvements, thereby reflecting both their appreciation of the existing order and their commitment to social change.

During the nineteenth century the radical section of the intellectuals acquired a new name, *the intelligentsia,* derived from the Latin *intelligentia,* meaning intelligence, but developing a distinctive significance

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[4] Lewis A. Coser, *Men of Ideas: A Sociologists' View* (1965); F. Znaniecki, *The Social Role of the Man of Knowledge* (1940); G. Gurvitch, *Les Cadres sociaux de la Connaissance* (1966); Julien Benda, *La Trahison des Clercs* (1927); Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia* (1936); special issue of *Arguments* (Vol. IV, No. 20) on intellectuals.

[5] Mannheim, *op. cit.*; H. Hesslein, *Ideal and Interests* (1911); J.J. Maquet, *The Sociology of Knowledge* (1951).

from the context of its origin and usage. According to Martin Malia the term "was introduced in the Russian language in the 1860's by a minor novelist named Boborykin." [6] But the individuals and groups identified by this word had already emerged in Russia in the 1830's and 1840's. Chaadaev's *Philosophical Letters* of 1829 constituted one of the earliest landmarks; in them "a son of the soil" offered a most devastating and thorough-going critique of his own country's tradition, social and political organization, history and culture.[7] He was warned by his great friend Pushkin of the personal danger involved in this radical criticism. Chaadaev was, in fact, "officially declared a lunatic"; but he was followed by others like Herzen, Bakunin and Belinsky, *intelligenty* who were *conscience-stricken, alienated* and *déclassé,* and who not only made an impact on the course of Russian history, but became harbingers of developments in other parts of the world during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.[8]

Although the term *intelligentsia* was used and made widely known by its Russian exponents and critics, the phenomenon which it referred to has not been unique or peculiar to nineteenth-century Russia. In a way, Socrates may be seen as an early model; during the European renaissance there appeared many critical thinkers who rejected the formulations and the authority of the church; in the eighteenth century the *philosophes* in France and some of the men of the *Aufklärung* in Germany were outspoken opponents of the established order and its axionormative assumptions. [9] *Sapere aude* was their credo, and the daring to know demanded rejection of the *esprit de système,* both at the intellectual-moral and the institutional levels. The nineteenth century witnessed the beginnings of radical movements in various countries of Asia, initiated and led by groups of intellectuals who had been more or less alienated from their respective traditions and who sought far-reaching changes in their societies. In our own century, the intelligentsia is seen

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[6]   M. Malia, "What is the Intelligentsia", in R. Pipes (ed.) *The Russian Intelligentsia* (1961).

[7]   Chaadaev, *Philosophical Letters,* in *Collected Works,* ed. by M. Gershenzon.

[8]   S.R. Tompkins. *The Russian Intelligentsia* (1957); R. Pipes, *op. cit.*: V. Leontovitsch, *Geschichte des Liberalismus in Russland* (1957).

[9]   E. Cassirer, *The Philosophy of the Enlightenment* (1951); D. Mornet, *Les Origines intellectuelles de la révolution francaise* (1967); C.H. Van Duzen, *The Contribution of the Ideologues to French Revolutionary Thought* (1935).

by many as a very important agent of social revolution. The proletariat, which Marx had cast in the role of the revolutionary class in bourgeois societies, seems to have grown increasingly cautious and conservative since his time.[10] Some Marxists like Herbert Marcuse, in their disillusionment with the proletariat, have tended to place their faith in the *déclassé* intelligentsia who, according to them, constitute "the most advanced consciousness of humanity," and who may bring about social revolutions by joining forces with "mankind's most exploited force." The role of the intelligentsia in contemporary societies was highlighted by the student uprisings in the 1960's, and although they did not accomplish much, it is unlikely that the phenomenon of the intelligentsia will lose significance in an age characterized by dissolution of familiae value-systems, intensification of general discontent and great social turmoil.[11]

At the beginning of this century the historian Miliukov saw the *educated class* and *the intelligentsia* as constituting two concentric circles of which the latter formed the inner one. A somewhat different distinction has been made by the sociologist Theodor Geiger between the *academicians* or *objective intellectuals* and the intelligentsia proper or the *subjective intellectuals*.[12] Others are inclined to differentiate *dégagé* thinkers from those who are *engagé*. Various other independent and cross-cutting divisions have been proposed, for example, between intellectuals of the higher and lower strata (university professors/primary school teachers), between intellectuals in the humanities and the sciences, between *pure* theorists and those trained in *applied* disciplines, etc. There is in fact a very high degree of differentiation within what may broadly be called the intellectual community. However, it would seem that both historically and contemporarily, the *intelligentsia*, while constituting a section of such larger groups as the educated or the

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[10] Engels noted this development, but the point was made central by the first of many "revisionists," Eduard Bernstein in *Probleme des Sozialismus* (1898).

[11] However, the erosion of the role of "intellect" in modern "mass societies" has been stressed by many writers like Hannah Arendt, J.L. Talmon, W. Rothe, J. Habermas, George Steiner, etc. See Philip Rieff (ed), *On Intellectuals* (1969); J.P. Nettl, *Political Mobilization* (1967); H. Marcuse, *One Dimensional Man* (1964); Leon Bramson, *The Political Context of Sociology* (1961); J. Barzun, *The House of Intellect* (1959). I have discussed this issue in my book, *Ganatantra, Samskriti O Abakshyaya* (Democracy, Culture and Decadence, 1980).

[12] T. Geiger, *Aufgaben und Stellung der Intelligenz in der Gesellschaft* (1949).

scholarly, is to a considerable extent identified by its being alienated, déclassé, engagé, committed to structural change. Although it is an elite group, it is also (or at least sees itself as) what the Russians called the *raznochintsy* or "people of no class or estate in particular." It owes its élan and mobility more to its "aspiration to independent thinking" and its dedication to social change than to its class origin or material privileges.[13]

It would also seem that the role of the intelligentsia has somewhat less influence in a stable, traditional society than in one which has already been exposed to powerful forces of change — whether these forces develop from within through technological innovations or formation of new classes, or from without through wars and conquests by aliens. The intelligentsia itself may, of course, start the process of change; but its efforts are more likely to make an impact on society when that society is in a state of crisis. In other words, while intellectuality involves criticism of existing formulations, value-systems and institutions, that function is likely to increase in force and influence when a society is subject to pressures which escape the control of its established structures and norms. In considering the role of the intelligentsia in contemporary Asian societies it may be useful to bear these general and tentative observations in mind.

II)

In the vast and variegated continent that is Asia, at least two of the most populated and ancient civilizations have, from very early times, recognized the highly specialized role and elitist status of the intellectuals in social organization. In China this role and status were stated by Confucius, and for over two thousand years Chinese society was moulded and sustained by the Confucian system. Of the many striking features of this system, two may be especially noted because of their obvious bearing on the question of the intelligentsia. The intellectual or scholar, as modelled by Confucius, was not an inquirer, or metaphysician, or *gadfly*; he was essentially a moralist who accepted without question

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[13] The position proposed in this introductory note is necessarily tentative. As would be evident even from such symposia as Rieff (ed), *On Intellectuals*, or E.B. de Huszar (ed), *The Intellectuals: A Controversial Portrait* (1960), there is no consensus on the definition or role of the intellectuals or the intelligentsia. Several questions which need consideration and were raised at the 1976 seminar are mentioned at the end of the introductory note.

"the body of elaborate rules governing man—to—man relationships" which had been prescribed by Confucius, and who taught others to live according to these rules.[14] He protected himself and society from the insidious and destabilizing problems of axiology. The critical-dynamic functions of intellectuality would seem to have been carefully subordinated to the normative—conservative functions. Secondly, while the scholar—moralists were content to be teachers and guides whose authority did not depend on political power or material possessions, but was derived from the acknowledged authority of Confucius himself, an elaborate bureaucracy developed, whose members were trained and had to pass tests in Confucian principles. It would seem that the *examination system*, which became one of the most important pillars of the traditional order in China, permitted considerable social mobility. Detailed studies by Kracke, Chung-li Chang, Hsü, Ping-ti Ho and others indicate that for nearly a thousand years before our century between thirty to sixty per cent of government officials in China came from families which did not hold a *gentry status* nor civil service traditions.[15] To a certain extent these features help to explain why in China, while intellectuals constituted a substantially large and influential elite group, the phenomenon of the intelligentsia did not become conspicuous in that country's history untill the latter part of the nineteenth century.

In India the bearded figures of the proto-historic Indus Valley civilization may have already formed a powerful intellectual elite, but it would seem that in the early stage of Aryanisation there was a prolonged conflict not only between the Aryans and the non—Aryans but also between the two highest *varnas* among the Aryans themselves. The kshatriyas or warriors, constituting the nobility, had developed their own value—system differing somewhat from that of the brāhmanas or priests, and they do not appear to have readily accepted the higher status of the latter in the evolving social hierarchy. However, towards the beginning of the Christian era the social and religious organization of the Hindus had become established in its essential features; the

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[14] J.K. Fairbank (ed), *Chinese Thought and Institutions* (1957); W. Eberhard, *A History of China* (1950); Max Weber, *The Religion of China* (1951).

[15] E.A. Kracke, "Family vs. Merit in Chinese Civil Service Examinations," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, Sept. 1947; F.L.K. Hsu, "Social Mobility in China," *American Sociological Review*, November 1949. Also R.M. Marsh, *The Mandarins: The Circulation of Elites in China 1600-1900* (1961).

brahmanas not only claimed but were generally recognised to have the highest status in the social hierarchy; the Dharmasastras which, like the enunciations of Confucius, provided an elaborate system of rules and regulations regarding right conduct and relationships, were written by brāhmanas and left no doubt regarding their precedence. Claiming that they alone were possessed by *brahman,* a magical force like *mana,* the brahmanas placed themselves above the rest of society; their functions included studying, teaching, supervision of sacrificial practices and other rituals, as well as formulation and interpretation of the laws and codes which constituted the *dharma* for every group in society. Through the design of an intricate system of purity, pollution and penance and the development of the *karma* and rebirth doctrine the brāhmanas succeeded in perpetuating their privileged position in Hindu society. Like the scholar moralists of Confucian China, their authority did not appear to derive from material possessions or political power. But unlike China, India did not develop an elaborate bureaucracy or a centralized examination system in the past. Intead, kings, rulers, chiefs, and other elite groups in control of wealth and secular power sought legitimacy by patronizing brahmanas and recognizing their superiority. The only time this position was seriously challenged was during the hightide of the Buddhist movement, but on the whole the cultural hegemony of brahmanas has been an accepted feature of Indian society during the last two thousand years.[16]

Another feature which may be noted in this connection is the decline and eventual disappearance of the spirit of intellectual inquiry. This spirit was quite active in the early phase of Aryanisation as may be seen in certain segments of the Vedic literature, in the Upanishads, the various early philosophical schools (especially Sānkhya, Nyāya, and Vaiseshika), in the empirical—hedonistic views of the Chārvākas, and in the philosophical arguments of the Buddhists. However, the establishment of brāhmanism incorporated philosophy into religion claiming for revealed knowledge an absoluteness which was beyond questioning; at the same time, like the scholar—moralists of China, the brāhmanas propounded an elaborate system of rules of conduct, relationships, taboos and

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[16] P.V. Kane, *History of Dharmasastra;* J. Jolly, *Hindu Law and Custom* (1928); J. H. Hutton, *Caste in India* (1946); J. Auboyer, *Daily Life in Ancient India;* D.G. Mandelbaum, *Society in India,* 2 vols (1970); Max Weber, *The Religion of India* (1958). Some of the important points of contrast between the Indian and the Chinese intellectual traditions were noted by Weber.

rituals which, in the form of the Dharamasāstras, could only be inter-
preted but never disputed, and of which they themselves were the self-
appointed teachers. The metaphysical, cosmic and moral formulations
were invested with a magical trascendence which mesmerized not only
the common people but also the intellectuals. Even the impact of Islam
does not seem to have brought any freedom from this self-imposed
imprisonment. Like the Hindu brāhmanas, the Muslim intellectuals also
stressed the infallibility of their religious faith, and extolled the rulers
in exchange for their patronage. The only people who seem to have
been somewhat opposed to the institutional structures and value systems
of the established order were the mystics and saints of medieval India,
but their criticism was not made on an intellectual plane, and they did
not dispute the sacrosanctness of revelation and transcendence which,
in any case, were the sources of their own "spiritual" authority.

What would appear to have contributed most decisively to the
decline and disappearance of intellectual inquiry in India and to have
prevented the rise of an intelligentsia is the tradition of *guru—sishya*
relationship. The *guru* or the teacher was conceived as possessing the
key to ultimate knowledge, which he was believed to have received from
his own *guru* through blind obedience and service, and which he would
pass on to his *sishya* or disciple after exacting from him similar obedi-
ence and service.[17] From the early *āsramas* to the later monasteries,
mathas, maktabs, tols and *pāthasālas*, the tradition of revering the
teacher as the possessor of absolute knowledge and accepting his
formulations and commands without question became so thoroughly
established that like *dharma* and *karma* its axiomatic rightness became
an essential ingredient of personal and social life.

It would seem then, that although traditionally the intellectuals
held a very high position in Asian society, the so-called intelligentsia
was conspicuous for its weakness if not total absence. This is probably
equally true of the West during the thousand years preceding the renais-
sance. In the centuries which followed the renaissance, the intelligentsia
became a significant force in Western society. With the expansion of the
West and during the period of its dominance in the world, the emergence
of an intelligentsia becomes also noticeable in the countries of Asia.

However, there were two significant points of difference in the con-

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[17] The *guru-sishya* relation was already clearly defined in the dharmasāstras,
but acquired new meaning and potency in the bhakti movements. See Weber, *The
Religion of India.*

text of this emergence. Jacob Taubes and other scholars have stressed that in the West the rise of the intellectuals "who strive for independent thinking" went hand in hand with the rise of the bourgeoisie; that, in fact, the former functionally complemented the latter in the efforts to modernize traditional society.[18] In Asia, while traders, merchants, manufacturers and craftsmen had from early times formed groups in the traditional order, they did not have a particularly high status in the social hierarchy. In the nineteenth century, when much of Asia came under direct or indirect western dominance and control, the native entrepreneurs in the western sense did not become a major agent of social change or modernization. In India and China, as in Russia, the new intellectuals seemed to have had a much bigger share of resonsibility as agents of change, due to the traditional weakness of the enterprising groups, which did not improve with the new situation. Secondly, in the West, the forces of change were largely generated from within; but in Asia, changes were primarily introduced and largely determined by the aggressive and exploitative presence of western powers. In much of Asia the appearance, existence and functioning of the modern intellectuals took place with the framework of colonial and semi-colonial exploitation and dominance. Japan was the solitary exception; threatened by western aggression, a section of the traditional *samurai* undertook to modernize before the West could reduce the country to a colonial or semi-colonial state.[19] But even there much of the modern ideas, value-systems, techniques and institutions had to be adopted from the outside, presenting socio-cultural problems somewhat similar to those faced by other Asian countries though quite different from the problems of development in the West.

III)

In India, British conquest brought western education and a new system of ideas, values, methods, relationships and institutions in its wake. Colonial rule also contributed substantially to the rise of an Indian urban middle class, but unlike England, the dominant segment of this middle

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[18] Jacob Taubes, "Die Intellektuellen und die Universität," *Universitätstage* (1963). Also see A. von Martin, *Soziologie der Renaissance* (1932).

[19] Shigenobu Okuma, *Fifty years of New Japan* (1909); *The Autobiography of Fukuzawa Yukichi* (1934); C. Blacker, *The Japanese Enlightenment* (1964).

class was not formed by business, commercial and industrial groups. In fact, until the second decade of the twentieth century industrial development in India was very limited. The new middle class comprised mainly absentee landlords, some people engaged in trade and business, various professional groups and civil servants. Some knowledge of English was essential to get somewhere under colonial rule, but those who acquired this knowledge through the newly established schools, colleges and universities came very largely, if not altogether exclusively, from the high castes among the Hindus, who had traditionally been given to intellectual pursuits. The Muslim upper classes and intellectuals did not, for a long time, take to English education, while the low castes among the Hindus and the poorer classes of all communities had neither the opportunity nor felt the need to profit from formal schooling. Studies by Misra, Seal and others indicate that towards the end of the nineteenth century between 75 to 85 percent of the college students in Bengal, Madras and Bombay came from such traditionally high castes as the brāhmanas, kāyasthas, vaidyas and prabhus who were relatively small in number. Naturally, they also had a virtual monopoly of the learned professions and the lower echelons of government service.[20]

Since opportunity for industrial development was very limited under colonial rule, structural changes in Indian society during the nineteenth century were slow and superficial, and the overwhelming majority of the population continued to live in villages with their old fashioned agricultural economy and traditional value systems and institutions. The newly emerging English—educated groups came mainly from the traditional high castes, so their habits and attitudes were predictably conservative. However, English education also introduced new disciplines, attitudes, methods and tools for research, new value systems, perceptions and ambitions, new institutions, organizations and forms of relationship. History and the natural sciences, empiricism with its stress on observation, experiment and verification, the doctrines of natural rights and social equality, of representative and responsible government, of nationalism and the importance of the mother tongue, could not but make a strong impression on at least part of the English educated Indians. In consciously wrestling with these forces, this section emerged as the modern intellectuals of India; one of the most significant conse-

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[20] B.B. Misra, *The Indian Middle Classes* (1961); A. Seal, *The Emergence of Indian Nationalism* (1971).

quences of their efforts was the spectacular growth of the Indian ver-
nacular languages and literature. But only a very few among these intel-
lectuals (e.g. the Derozians in Bengal, Lokahitwadi and Phule in Maha-
rashtra) openly rejected the authority of tradition or of the sanctified
old texts, and claimed the right to complete intellectual independence.
After causing a brief initial turmoil, this intelligentsia largely faded out,
leaving the intellectual field to the conservatives and the reformers. The
latter advocated certain changes and improvements, but even they ten-
ded to rely more on the authority of selected scriptures than on reason,
and new values and perceptions. The piecemeal reforms which they
proposed hardly touched such fundamental issues as caste-hierarchy,
the metaphysics and morality of the *karma* doctrine, or the relation
between landlords and peasants. Besides, they depend on the foreign
rulers for support of their cautious reform proposals, thereby acknow-
ledging their inability to win over the majority even of the English
educated sections of the community. The conservatives, who were
pragmatically loyal to the foreign rulers, opposed even these minor
reforms with the support of the majority of the educated.[21]

Towards the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the
twentieth, the increase in the number of English educated Indians, their
rising expectations and ambitions, and the frustrations which they ex-
perienced in the colonial setting, began to turn many among them
against foreign rule, and a nationalist movement began to develop in
India. But if the intellectuals who became the ideologues of the nation-
alist movement opposed the foreign politic-economic establishment, in
their attitude towards the traditional order they were far from critical.
Instead, they chose to glorify their past and, in most cases, to turn
back on social reform and intellectual criticism of traditionally estab-
lished beliefs, institutions and practices. The combination of religious
revival and militant politics in the nationalist ideology contributed in
no small measure to increase tensions between the Hindus and the
Muslims in India. By this time the Muslims had begun to reject their
own English-educated elites reverting to their original ambitions and

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[21] Among general surveys, B.B. Majumdar, *Political Thought from Ram-
mohun to Dayananda* (1934); C.H. Heimsath, *Indian Nationalism and Hindu So-
cial Reform;* R.C. Majumdar, *British Paramountcy and Indian Renaissance,* Part
II (1965).

fears and their pride in their Islamic religious-cultural heritage. [22]

The end of the first world war saw not only the beginning of the decline and eventual disintegration of the British· Empire but also an acceleration of the process of change in India. Widespread discontent in both urban and rural areas gave a wider and more active popular.base to the nationalist movements, in the twenties mainly among the Hindus under Gandhi's leadership, and then in the late thirties and early forties also among the Muslims led and organised by M.A. Jinnah. Both these leaders leaned heavily on religion and tradition, strongly appealing to the masses. This deepened the rift between the two communities making articulation of an independent and secular intelligentsia even harder. Nevertheless, during the decades between the wars, the inflow of new ideas and ideals from abroad also increased and grew stronger, and in those parts of India with a relatively larger concentration of the English-educated people, this situation helped to rebuild an intelligentsia which was equally critical of foreign rule as of native tradition. In addition to nationalism, the new socialist and communist ideas began to attract a section of the educated youth, but their interest was confined to literary expression rather than through social movements or politics. Nehru, who might have organized and led the emerging radical forces, failed to do so, partly because of his own intellectually ambiguous position, but even more because of his compromise with the established leadership of the Indian National Congress. At the same time, the Indianization of the administrative system, which was hastened in the decades preceding division and independence, drew a significant section of the educated elite into the higher echelons of the civil service. Between the bureaucrats advocating minimal change, the mainly traditionalist politicians who were anxious to negotiate a transfer of power, and a people predominantly rural and religious, the intelligentsia was hardly able to make its independent presence felt, except in the area of literary essays. Even in the literary field before the division and independence movement important works were written only in a handful of regional languages, such as Bengali Maralth and Urdu. [23] The cultural

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[22] B.T. McCully, *English Education and the Origins of Indian Nationalism* (1940); W.C. Smith, *Modern Islam in India* (1946); P. Hardy, *The Muslims of British India* (1972); Ram Gopal, *Indian Muslims* (1959).

[23] I have discussed some of these developments in other places, e.g., "A Lite-

renaissance started in the nineteenth century did not prove to be self-sustaining, and in 1947 the sub-continent was divided on religious ground between the two rival organizations of the power elites, the Congress and the Muslim League. Division, which was the price of independence, evidenced the failure of the intelligentsia to provide effective leadership for the community.

IV)

China, unlike India did not become a colony of any western power, but experienced a series of shattering events which began with the Opium War of 1839-42 which climaxed in the communist victory of 1949. The extra-territorial rights of the western powers, exacted through the treaties of Nanking and Tientsin, and the humiliations and acts of savagery and vandalism which characterized the western presence 'in China, the Taiping rebellion and the destruction of many seats of traditional learning by the fanatical followers of Hung Hsu — Chuan, the corrupt and totally unscrupulous nature of the dowager empress Tzu Hsi, the Japanese aggression in Korea and the brief but decisive war which forced China to cede Formosa, the Pescadores and the Liaotung Peninsula to Japan, the doctrine of the "spheres of influence" and its aggressive operation — all these exposed the utter inadequacy of the traditional system and stressed the need for modernization.[24] A reform movement led by the literati began haltingly in the last decade of the nineteenth century. It was briefly but violently interrupted by the Boxer uprising of 1900 which was ruthlessly crushed by the troops of the western powers. Between 1903 and 1906 the old civil service examinations were abolished. During the first decade of the century a generation of intel-

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rary Revolution in India," *Times Lit. Supplement* (16 August 1957); "Decline of the Indian intellectuals", *Quest*, Oct.-Dec., 1958; "East Wind West Wind," *Soviet Survey*, April-June, 1959; "India: Urban Intellectuals and Rural Problems" in L. Labedz (ed), *Revisionism* (1962); "From Derozio to Nazrul," *New Quest*, Dec., 1977; "The Sikha Movement: a note on the Bengali Muslim intelligentsia," *The Radical Humanist*, Dec. 1977 and Jan. 1978; and my introduction to the anthology, *I have seen Bengal's Face* (1974).

[24] Henri Cordier, *Histoire des relations de la Chine avec les puissances occidentales 1860-1900*, 3 vols, (1901-1902); D.E. Owen, *British Opium Policy in China & Japan* (1934); S.S. Lin, *Extraterritoriality: its Rise and Decline* (1925); K.M. Panikkar, *Asia and Western Dominance* (1953); E.R. Hughes, *Invasion of China by the Western World* (1937).

lectuals began to emerge and come into prominence not a few of whom were trained abroad, mainly in Japan and the United States. Between 1894 and 1905, the scholar Yen Fu, who had studied for two years in England, translated into Chinese some of the major works of T.H. Huxley, John Stuart Mill and Herbert Spencer, and Montesquieu's *The Sprit of the Laws*. In 1902 his younger colleague Liang Ch'i-ch'ao began publishing his series of "Discourses on the New People" (Hsin Min Shuo) which criticized China's social and cultural stagnation and advocated politico-economic developments through intellectual inquiry and innovation.[25] In 1905 appeared the journal *Min Pao* (People's Journal) in which Sun Yat-sen editorially proclaimed his commitment to the ideas of nationalism, democracy and socialism.[26] Compared to Yen and Liang who were liberal reformers, Sun was a radical nationalist who had been active for quite some time in secret revolutionary organizations. Together they and several others like them signalled the beginning of a new phase in the intellectual life of China. This development was highlighted by the collapse of the Manchu dynasty in 1911.

However, the downfall of the Manchus did not hasten structural changes. The new Head of the state, Yuan Shih-Kai, ruled briefly and ingloriously with the support of the western powers; after his death in 1916, China was divided between various war lords and for the next eleven years did not have any effective central government. The Kuomintang, which Sun Yet-sen had organized, was unable to establish national authority until 1927, by which time Sun had already been dead for two years. But the Kuomintang owed its political power to the military victories of Chiang Kai-shek who, after his successful northern expedition on 1926, broke with the Kuomintang left, decimated the main body of his political rivals, the communists, and took upon himself the shoring up of a politico-economic regime based on vested interests and opposed to change. The new regime, however, failed to provide China with peace and stability. The prolonged war with Japan,

[25] M.E. Cameron, *The Reform Movement in China 1898-1912* (1931); C.K. Edmunds, *Modern Education in China* (1919); J.R. Levenson, *Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and Modern China* (1959).

[26] Sun Yat-sen, *Memoirs of a Revolutionary* (1922); L. S. Hsu, *Sun Yat-sen, His Political and Social Ideas* (1933); C. Hsueh, *Huang Hsing and the Chinese Revolution* (1961). *Min Pao* was the organ of the Alliance Society, jointly formed by Sun and Huang in 1905.

preceded and followed by the war with the communists, reduced much of the country to a shambles. The People's Republic, which was proclaimed by the communists in October 1949, was the issue of a long period of violent struggles and upheavals; in the new order all power was concentrated in the hands of a highly organized political party which had created its own army, which was ideologically committed to structural change, but which would not tolerate any independent criticism that might undermine its totalitarian control.

In the decades which preceded the establishment of the People's Republic significant intellectual developments had been taking place in China. Modern education had been introduced and there was a sizeable increase in the number of foreign educated intellectuals. According to a detailed study by Y. C. Wang:

> From 1902 on, college professors in China were either aliens or Chinese trained abroad, and after 1922 all of the important teaching and administrative positions fell to men educated in the west.[27] However, the majority of the foreign trained intellectuals were dedicated to professional careers and personal achievement; they had little interest in the peasants or in social change; even their appreciation of intellectual independence was very much qualified by their greater concern for security and continuity. Nevertheless, by 1915 a radical wing of the intellectuals had appeared; its institutional centre was the National Peking University which had been founded in 1898, and its principal organ was Ch'ing Nien (Youth), started in 1915 by Ch' en Tu-hsiu, who declared that "Confucianism . . . is incompatible with a new society, a new nation, a new faith . . . Unless the Confucian system is demolished, no new order will arise. [28]

In 1916 the magazine was renamed *Hsin Ch'ing-Nien or New Youth* (with a French title, *La Jeunesse*), and in 1917 Ch'en was invited by the liberal chancellor of the Peking University, Ts'ai Yuan—p'ei, to be dean of the School of Letters. Ch'en gathered round his journal a group of radical intellectuals. In his "Solemn Appeal to Youth," he asked for commitment to six basic principles: "independence, not security; progress, not conservatism; aggressiveness, not timidity; world mindedness, not narrow nationalism; practical attitudes, not ceremonies;

[27] Y.C. Wang, *Chinese Intellectuals and the West 1872-1949* (1966).

[28] *La Jeunesse*, vol. II, No. 3.

scientific approach, not speculation." He openly pitted the value system of "science" and "democracy" against the authority of Confucius and tradition.[29] He was joined by Hu Shih who in a famous article on the "Historico-Evolutionary Conception of Literature" argued that the literary language of China had lost all vitality due to Confucian traditionalism and artificiality, and pleaded for a "revolution in literature" which required a likeness of the written to the spoken language of the people and openness. to modern intellectual influences from outside China. Hu's eight-point programme was endorsed by Ch'en; the twenties marked the high point of what is often called the Chinese intellectual-literary renaissance. [30]

For various reasons, however, the renaissance was short-lived. The leader of the Nationalist movement, Sun Yat-sen, was strongly attached to the Chinese tradition, and his political pragmatism and intellectual superficiality did not encourage the growth of the new spirit of criticism and inquiry among his followers. After his death, the Kuomintang soon came under the control of conservative nationalists. The radicals, strongly influenced by the Russian revolution, moved towards Marxism, but it was Marxism of the Leninist variety, mainly concerned with the question of power, demanding subordination of all inquiry to the requirements and directives of the Soviet Union, which had adopted Marxism-Leninism as its official ideology and, through its newly created instrument, the Communist International, sought to control radical movements everywhere, including China.[31] Ch'en, who had devoted a special issue of his journal in May 1919 to Marxism, and had become one of the founders of the Chinese Communist Party in 1921, found it increasingly difficult to keep his intellectual integrity and independence in a situation where he had perforce to follow the strategic line laid down by Moscow. After the virtual annihilation of the communists in

[29] *La Jeunesse*, vol. VI, No. 1. For accounts of Ch'en, B. Schwartz, "Ch'en Tu-hsiu, pre-communist phase," *Papers on China*, Vol. II (1948); Y.C. Wang, *op. cit.*, pp. 308-320; Tse-tsung Chow, *The May Fourth Movement* (1960).

[30] Hu Shih, *The Chinese Renaissance* (1933); Hu Shih, *A Literary Revolution in China;* Wen-han Kiang, *The Chinese Student Movement* (1948); Y.C. Wang, *op. cit.*

[31] On Leninist Marxism, Rosa Luxemburg, *The Russian Revolution* (1922) and *Leninism or Marxism* (1961); A. Pannekoek, *Lenin as Philosopher* (1948); and on Moscow's use of the Comintern, F. Borknau, *World Communism* (1962).

1927, he was made a scapegoat and removed from his position as the secretary general of the party. In 1929 he was expelled from the party; during the thirties he spent five years in Kuomintang jails; before his death in 1942 he had become a strong critic of what he called the "religious courts of the G.P.U. politics of Russia.[32]

Hu Shih, a much more scholarly critic of tradition and Confucianism than Ch'en, made important contributions to literary and historical research, refused to be "led by the nose either by a Confucius or by a Marx, a Lenin, or a Stalin,"[33] and campaigned through his journal *The Independent Review* during the thirties to promote the ideal of an "independent intellectual elite" committed to objectivity and tolerance. However, his close association with the Kuomintang government, his acceptance of ambassadorship to the United States in 1938, and his support of Chiang Kai–shek cast doubt on his independence and undermined his intellectual influence and authority. Other radicals like the novelist Lu Hsün and the scholar Ku Mo-jo, who opposed Hu Shih, became closely identified with the communists and ensnared by a power-oriented ideology. Lu Hsün never became a party member; his best-known works, *The Diary of a Madman and Ah Q*, are caustic indictments of Chinese society and culture; in 1928, he was attacked by the communists as "a spokesman of the petty bourgeoisie"; but by forming the Federation of Leftist Writers in 1930, he provided the communists with "a powerful auxiliary force," and he was canonized after his death in 1936. Kuo Mo-jo, who had become a political commissar in the army in 1926 and in the same year published his famous essay on "Revolution and Literature," would be appointed vice-premier and chairman of the Committee of Cultural and Educational Affairs after the communists came to power in 1949. Despite his immense erudition and literary gifts he did not conform to the model of the intellectual who could maintain his integrity against political pressures or the temptations of privilege.

Thus, while a succession of crises and upheavals produced an intelligentsia in China, its development as an independent force and accomplishment of a self-sustaining cultural renaissance would seen to have

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[32] Y. C. Wang, *op. cit.* For Ch'en's expulsion, C.Brandt, B. Schwartz and J. Fairbank, *A Documentary History of Chinese Communism* (1952).

[33] Hu Shih, *Wen-ts'un*, vol. IV (1953); Li Shu-hua, *Hu Shih's Life and His Contributions* (1962).

been prevented by the hardening conservatism of the nationalists on the one hand and the ideological-organizational demands of the communist party on the other.[34] The dominant role of the military and the weakness of the native entrepreneurial class may also be considered important factors which, while burdening the intellectuals with historic responsibilities, also limited their chances to function in an independent and effective manner. In any case, by the time power was transferred to the Congress Party in India and the Muslim League in Pakistan, and captured by the Communist Party in China, the intelligentsia would appear to have fallen to the background, and the majority of the intellectuals were ready and willing to become tools of the political power elites.

V)

During the last three decades the number of educated people has increased enormously in most countries of Asia, but it is questionable whether there has been a corresponding growth in critical and independent thinking. In India, under Nehru, and subsequently under Indira Gandhi, the proliferation of universities and research institutions has gone hand in hand with an expansion of bureaucracy. There has been much specialization and diversification of intellectual pursuits, but a pervasive subservience of the intellectuals to those in control of political and economic power seems also to have grown. The old brahmanas would appear to have been replaced by the new brahmanas. In the rural areas, structural changes have been effectively slowed down by the emergence and consolidation of a relatively prosperous farmer middle class, by the process of what some social anthropologists call "Sanskritization," and by the lack of organization and leadership of the potentially explosive agricultural proletariat.[35] The absence of any effective opposition party on a national scale, the growing reliance of all public and many private institutions on government support and subsidy, the official policy of bestowing awards, prizes and honours on intellectuals

[34] For some details, Brandt, Schwartz & Fairbank, *op. cit.*; R.C. North, *Kuomintang and Chinese Communist Elites* (1952).

[35] M.N. Srinivas, *Caste in Modern India* (1962); A. Bétcille, *Castes: Old & New* (1969); F.R. Frankel, *India's Green Revolution* (1971); G. Rosen, *Peasant Society in a Changing Economy* (1975).

and artists, the trends towards centralization and regimentation, – all these and other similar factors, singly and combined, would appear to have contributed to the erosion of intellectual independence. It is conceivable that a future alliance of the educated unemployed and the rural proletariat may bring about a social upheaval, but currently the intelligentsia would seem to be in the doldrums.

In China, structural changes in the last three decades have been considerable, but they have been brought about by the totalitarian state controlled by the Communist Party. Both ideologically and organizationally, communism does not permit any form of intellectual independence, but accommodating intellectuals enjoy a large share of the privileges of the new power elite. Army officers, bureaucrats, managers and technocrats have become elements of the new mandarinate, but ultimately power vests with the party leadership. It would seem that for a while Mao Tse-tung tried to combine in his own person the roles of the supreme executive and the radical visionary, the upholder of the new establishment and its "gladfly"; but the experience of the so-called "cultural revolution" showed the power elite the great dangers of such a dialectical role.[36] In recent years, the power elite in China has definitely turned its back on any form of radicalism, and the possibilities of the emergence of an independent intelligentsia seem to be more remote now than even in the preceding decades.

Wissensoziologie is a relatively new branch of sociology; any inquiry into the role of the intelligentsia is part of the sociology of knowledge which "seeks to analize the relationship between knowledge and existence. . . (and) to trace the forms which this relationship has adopted in the intellectual development of mankind." [37] There is now a growing body of literature, both theoretical and empirical, devoted to the study of the intellectuals, and while books like *The intellectuals: A Controversial Portrait* highlight the absence of consensus, the efforts of the intellectuals to see themselves in the context of society have not been unrewarding.[38]

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[36] J.R. Townsend, *Politics in China* (1974); R. Dumont, *Chine, la revolution culturale* (1976); J. Domes (ed), *Chinese Politics after Mao* (1979).

[37] K. Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia* (1960), p. 237.

[38] Besides books mentioned in notes 3-9 and 11-13, the following may also be

However, much of this literature is written by western historians and social scientists, and their frame of reference is, in the main, Euro-American. To some of us it seems appropriate that on the occasion of the 30th International Congress of the Human Sciences in Asia and North Africa the programme should include a seminar on the subject of the role of the intelligentsia in contemporary Asian societies. The proposal was accepted by the Congress organizers, and I was entrusted with the responsibility of conducting the seminar, jointly with Dr. Enrique Krauze of the University of Mexico.

The papers included in this volume were written for and presented at this seminar in August, 1976. Due to various reasons several invitees (especially those from Japan, Korea and Pakistan) were not able to attend or send their papers. The actual editing and supervision of the publication have been done entirely by the staff of the Congress in Mexico; my own contribution is strictly limited to the introductory note, for which I alone bear responsibility. However, at the seminar a wide range of issues did come up for discussion. What constitutes "the fundamental and necessary quality of intellect?" Do ideas have a structural order of their own which is not subordinate, or explicable with reference to the structures of society? To what extent, if at all, is "objectivity" attainable in the human sciences? Can ethical-political norms or value systems be derived from analysis of facts, or are our modes of perception of human facts moulded and conditioned by the norms themselves? Is there an insoluble antinomy between committment and inquiry? What historical processes are involved in the emergence of intellectuals and are they different in different societies? What is the social derivation and composition of this group, and how far is it pertinent or useful to distinguish between the educated, the intellectuals and the intelligentsia? What are the specific functions of the intellectuals in traditional and modern societies, and have these functions been radically affected by the increasing differentiation of structures and functions in contemporary societies? What relationships do the intellectuals and/or the intelligentsia have with other elite and non—elite groups in society? What constitutes an ideology, and how are ideologies related to tradition,

noted: G. Lukacs, *Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein* (1923); K. Korsch, *Marxism und Philosophie* (1930); A. Gramsci, *Gli intellettuali e l'organizzazione della Cultura* (1955); Daniel Bell, *The End of Ideology* (1960); E. Shils, *The Intellectual between Tradition and Modernity* (1960); L. Bodin, *Les Intellectuels* (1962); Talcott Parsons, Essays in Sociological Theory (1966); Sang-eun Lee (ed), *The Problems of Modernization in Asia* (1965).

maintenance of existing orders and interests, and social change? Is the East-West distinction valid, or at least useful, to the study of the role of the intelligentsia in contemporary societies, or are the traditional-situational differences among non-Western societies, so great as to make the East-West distinction an obstacle to inquiry?

These and other related issues require much more thorough and careful examination than could be made either in the papers included in this volume, or in the discussions of the Congress seminar. The purpose of this publication will be amply served if it stimulates such examination. I am deeply grateful to the authors who prepared the papers at my request, and to Professor Graciela de la Lama, President of the 30th Congress, but for whose interest and continued support neither the seminar nor this publication would have been possible.

Bangladesh: An Intelligentsia in Search of its Role

Kamal Hossain

To understand the situation of the intelligentsia in Bangladesh, one must examine the conditions in which the intelligentsia grew in East Bengal, the circumstances in which different groups among them became involved in the pursuit of divergent objectives, and the short-lived alliances among some of these groups to achieve certain common objectives. One must also examine the post independence environment in which contending social forces had achieved only a precarious equilibrium, which has since been rudely disturbed by the recent outbursts of violence. It is only within such a framework of analysis that one can begin to find explanations for the seemingly contradictory tendencies which are being manifested by different groups among the intelligentsia of Bangladesh with regard to fundamental national issues.

I)

Twice within twenty-five years the people of Bangladesh have been involved in the creation of a new state. In both cases political leadership, drawn largely from the emerging Muslim middle class, succeeded in persuading the masses, composed largely of Muslim peasants, that 'salvation' and 'emancipation from exploitation' could only be achieved through that course. In both cases, an alliance of different sections of the intelligentsia had supported the fundamental objective, for widely divergent reasons, and, consequently, had very different conceptions about the kind of society that was to be built after the state, which was their common objective.

The socio-economic structure within which the Muslim middle class
began to emerge has been described thus:[1]

> The socio-economic structure of Bengal had changed so much in a
> century that the 1871 census report recorded: 'Hindus, with ex-
> ceptions of course, are the principal *zamindars, talukdars* (owners
> of large subinfeudatory estates), public officers, men of learning,
> money lenders, traders, and (are) engaging in most active pursuits
> of life and coming directly and frequently under the notice of the
> rulers of the country; while the Musulmans, with exceptions also,
> from a very large majority of the cultivators of the ground and of
> the day laborers, and others engaged in the very humblest forms
> of mechanical skills and of buying and selling.'
> The middle class that developed in Bengal by the end of the nine-
> teenth century was thus composed almost entirely of Hindus,
> which affected the previously established harmony in Bengal's
> social structure and was felt more keenly in East Bengal because
> of its Muslim majority... The Muslim leaders persuaded the govern-
> ment to offer special facilities for education and jobs for the
> Muslims, and a Muslim middle class began to grow in Bengal,
> especially at the beginning of the present century... The concur-
> rent shift in the agrarian economy of Bengal helped in the growth
> of the Muslim middle class... At the close of the nineteenth cen-
> tury, crops in Bengal were steadily acquiring commodity value...
> Accordingly, ...the peasants with substantial holdings which
> could not be cultivated solely by their own labor ceased to
> settle their surplus holdings on other tenants... Instead, they
> began to have these holdings cultivated by share croppers recruited
> from the ranks of the impoverished peasants, since in this way
> they could acquire more land... Thus a category known as *jotedar*
> (landholder) emerged in rural Bengal... in the Muslim majority
> area of East Bengal an appreciable number of *jotedars* were Mus-
> lims, and the number increased in the course of time... Since
> most of the *jotedars* could afford the cost of higher education for
> their sons or provide them with capital to invest in businesses in
> neighboring towns, a large number of *jotedar* families forged
> links with the urban middle class, as one or more members of the
> family became a school or college teacher, a lawyer, doctor,
> businessman, government or civic official, clerk, etc...

[1] Ramakrishna Mukherjee, 'The Social Background of Bangladesh,' in *Im-
perialism and Revolution in South Asia*, New York, Monthly Review Press, 1973,
pp. 403–405.

The impact of these social developments on the politics of Bengal has been perceptively analyzed:[2]

> In thus appeared that the emergence of a new economic structure in the first quarter of the present century would override the regional and religious distinctions of th: 'Bengali' people.
>
> It seemed likely that the growing propertied class of Hindus and Muslims would unite in relation to the impoverished but increasingly unified Hindu and Muslim peasantry and their like, and that further changes in Bengali society would be effected primarily on the economic plane, with repercussions in the social and ideological life of the people. There were indications to support this conjecture. Leaders of the Muslim middle class, such as Moulvi A.K. Fazlul Huq and Md. Azizul Huq, organized the *Krishak Praja* (literally Peasants' and People's Party). The party refrained from taking a religious or communal stand, and found members and allies among the Hindu middle class...The Hindu middle class, however, was solidly entrenched in Bengal's economy. The corresponding Muslim interest could not compete with it even though it held political power from 1937. The urban population, the educated community, the landed interests, and the bureaucracy of Bengal were still predominantly Hindu. Regionally, moreover, West Bengal (with its Hindu stronghold) held East Bengal (with its Muslim stronghold) as its hinterland. . . In the circumstances the Bengali Muslim middle class envisaged a quicker and easier way to further its interests by responding to the call of the All India Muslim League, which was steadily gaining strength with the demand for a Muslim homeland. Therefore, instead of pursuing only the Krishak Praja Party, Muslim leaders first aligned themselves with and later joined the Muslim League. They began to maneuvre the Muslim peasantry (especially in East Bengal) through the influence they wielded in the countryside as *jotedars* and other variants of rural elite. The Congress Party with its core leadership representing the Hindu landed and business interests, was regarded by the Muslims as a Hindu organization. The Communist Party and other left wing parties were not strong enough to check the communal drift.

In the twenties and thirties, there were significant middle class attempts to promote non-communal politics in Bengal. C.R. Das,

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[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 406–407.

as a leader of the *Swarajya Party*, entered into an understanding with the Muslim leaders of Bengal, the Bengal Pact of 1923, whereby the Muslims of Bengal would get separate representation in the Provisional Council on population basis, and fifty-five percent of all government posts. His death in 1925 represented an irreparable loss to the cause of communal harmony. There is moving testimony to this effect in Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy's unpublished *Memoirs*, lamenting the loss of C.R. Das:[3]

> Deshbandhu C.R. Das. . . was the greatest Bengali, may I say Indian, scarcely less in stature than Mahatma Gandhi, I have ever had the good fortune to know. He was endowed with a wide vision, he was wholly non-communal. . . I believe with many that had he lived, he would have been able to guide the destiny of India along channels that would have eliminated the causes of conflict and bitterness which had bedevilled the relationship between Hindus and Muslims and which, for want of a just solution, led to the partition of India and the creation of Pakistan.

During this period there were other currents entering into the political environment of Bengal. The thirties witnessed a resurgence of terrorist activity, and the historic Chittagong Armoury raid, carried out by young terrorists of the *Jugantar* Party when 'revolutionaries' like comrade Muzaffar Ahmed, one of the founders of the Communist Party of India and M.N. Roy, began to exert an influence on the youth of Bengal. The origins of the peasant unrest which eventually led to the *Tebhagha* Movement[4] in the forties have been traced back to 1939, when the first agitation began in the Dinajpur district of East Bengal in which small peasants challenged the illegal imposts levied by the *jotedars* and their manipulations of produce markets to the detriment of the small peasants.[5]

The University of Dacca, which was to become the citadel of the modern intelligentsia of East Bengal, and to provide leadership to the

[3] H.S. Suhrawardy, *Memoirs* (unpublished).

[4] The Tebhaga Movement which involved the middle and poor peasantry of North Bengal, demanded that the *jotedar's* share of the crop due from the sharecroppers be reduced from one half to one third. Tebagha literally means one third.

[5] Hamza Alavi, 'Peasants and Revolution,' in *Imperialism and Revolution in South Asia*, pp. 320–325.

major political movements of the coming decades, was established in 1921. There is an interesting account of how, with Dacca becoming a University town, small groups of Muslim intellectuals began to pioneer the formation of associations 'to promote rational thinking,' and how such efforts ran into opposition from the traditional Muslim leadership:[6]

> Some of the leading littérateurs and teachers under the leadership of Mr. Abul Husain M.L. and Prof. Kazi Abdul Wadud founded a literary forum in 1926. It was known as 'Dacca Muslim Shahitya Samaj.' The ideal was to create a movement for the emancipation of intellect and conscience and to promote the study of rational thinking among the Muslim intelligentsia. . . This was only an intellectual movement but the leaders were not spared persecution at the hands of ignorant and superstitious (members of the) public led by the Nawab of Dacca.

Students and the new graduates drawn from rural backgrounds started to grow in numbers. Their urge for greater opportunities in government, trade, commerce and industry made them especially susceptible to the appeals of the Muslim League, and Suhrawardy, who in 1937 became Secretary of the Bengal Muslim League (when A.K. Fazlul Huq became its President), was able to enlist the support of the bulk of the Muslim student community.[7] Student demonstrations against opponents of the Muslim League were to become a regular feature in the coming years.

The Muslim League thus came to embrace contradictory elements ranging from traditionalist, conservative 'right' forces such as were represented by the Nawab family of Dacca, to the sons of peasants, the new entrants into the middle class, who had progressive attitudes and an urge to promote social change.

Kamruddin Ahmad, who was one of the young 'progressives,' describes the schism which was developing within the Muslim League, dividing the reactionary leadership from the young progressives, thus:[8]

[6] Kamruddin Ahmad, *A Socio-Political History of Bengal and the Birth of Bangladesh,* Dacca, 1975, p. 28.

[7] *Ibid.,* pp. 34–36.

[8] *Ibid.,* pp. 61–74.

Towards the end of 1943, Abul Hashim was elected the General
Secretary of the Bengal Provincial Muslim League. . . He declared
that he would do his best to liberate the Muslim middle class in-
telligentsia of East Bengal from the shackles and bondage of the
reactionary forces and the vested interests; with his knowledge of
both Islam and Marxism (he) could inspire the younger generation
– a generation disappointed with the reactionary leadership dur-
ing the Second World War and the great famine. The Muslim
League was clearly divided into left and right. The rightists were
led by Maulana Akram Khan and Sir Nazimuddin and the leftists
were headed by Abul Hashim. The latter groups began to agitate
for the total abolition of the rent receiving interests in land (and)
for redistribution of cultivable land to the tillers. The approach
of Abul Hashim and his followers was never communal. They
believed in making a common front of all parties and organ-
izations against British imperialism. They were more secular in
approach than any other group of Muslim Leaguers in those days
in the sub-continent.

But these 'newly emerging forces' within the Muslim League could
not consolidate their position. The communal passions aroused by
the riots of 1946, and a determined challenge by the rightist leader-
ship which drew support from the party high command from outside
Bengal sent Abul Hasim into virtual retirement. His followers, though
left leaderless and isolated, did not, however, withdraw from the
field. According to Kamruddin Ahmad:[9]

The socialistic spirit introduced by Abul Hashim in the younger
generation in Bengal did not vanish with his virtual retirement
from the Muslim League. His group of workers had shifted their
center of activity to Dacca. . . They were disillusioned at what
had happened and was happening in the name of religion and
decided to draw the attention of the people of East Bengal to the
realities of life. They decided to re-dedicate themselves to the
economic emancipation of the common man, to fight the evils of
religious fanaticism, and to lead the country gradually but de-
finitely towards socialism. They left the Muslim League and were
working out a program which would make the people more ra-
tional in their views. They knew all the time that the reactionary
leadership which was definitely growing in strength would per-

[9] *Ibid.,* pp. 75 ff.

> secute and oppress them but they had faith in the people. . . Even before the actual partitioning of Bengal, leftist elements of the Muslim League resigned from that organization and formed. . . The People's Freedom League. Their program was secular and emphasized economic problems. Its formation was followed by a conference of youth. . .and the 'Democratic Youth League' was set up.

Thus, as independence from British rule was approaching, the basic divisions which were to characterize the intelligentsia of East Bengal began to manifest themselves. The traditional intelligentsia, the *mullahs* and the *pirs*, would remain a conservative and communal force: they would be utilized to foment communal sentiments and otherwise to act in aid of the privileged minority groups who stood to lose their privileges if secular, progressive politics would take root. There were the small but growing number of government servants and professionals – lawyers, doctors, university and college teachers – for whom the creation of a new state and the departure from East Bengal of the large number of Hindus who had occupied these positions meant a tremendous expansion of opportunities for personal advancement. For all but a few of this group, their main concern would be to make the most of these opportunities.

There was, however, a small but significant section of the intelligentsia, consisting of students, new graduates and the young political workers, who had through the campaigning among the rural masses, developed an awareness of their problems and an urge to bring about a social transformation. They were to become the political activists, who would constitute the hard core of the opposition to the communal and rightist politics of the ruling party, and to provide leadership to the popular movements which would take place in East Bengal. They were to champion the cause of the Bengali language, through launching of the Bengali State Language Movement, which was to make a seminal contribution to the growth of Bengali nationalism. It was from them that students derived guidance on national issues, and it was largely through their influence that the universities and colleges became 'centers of opposition' and students came forward to take leading roles in the popular movements which swept through East Bengal from 1948 to 1971.

II)

In the early days of Pakistan, when the predominance of the ruling par-

ty was overpowering and for anyone to oppose it was to be branded as 'anti-state,' the campus of the University of Dacca was an enclave where determined young men could hold and propagate views and opinions "critical" of the government. It was in the University precincts that Mr. Jinnah was shouted down when he insisted that Urdu alone should be the State language. The spirit of defiance which was reflected in this early confrontation between the students and government was to characterize the role of students in East Bengal. The Students' League was formed in 1948, and the Committee of Action formed in 1948 to press the claims of Bengali to be a State language was composed mainly of students. The Students' League in 1948 led the agitation for pay increases for lower grade university employees; students suffered arrest and expulsion for their participation in this agitation.[10] The Youth League and the Students' League were to spearhead the State Language Movement which surged forward in 1952, after the police firing on February 21 gave the cause its first martyrs. This day is observed as the National Martyrs Day in Bangladesh.

The State Language Movement had a profound impact upon politics and society, for it led to active involvement of youth and students in national politics, and in the mass campaigns that were undertaken to mobilize support for the cause. Students and youth were brought closer to the rural masses. These contacts between students and the masses provided a vital bridge between the cities and the villages. The urban intelligentsia was to launch movements, the success and effectiveness of which were to depend on the support it could enlist of the masses who lived in the multitude of villages which make up Bangladesh.

A massive compaign in the villages by students was crucial to the overwhelming electoral victory of the United Front of opposition parties, which routed the ruling Muslim League in 1954. This election demonstrated the growing strength of the force of linguistic nationalism and of the progressive tendency in the politics of East Bengal. The importance of the language issue in the elections was reflected in a symbolic act of the new United Front government which converted the official residence of the former Chief Minister into the "Bangla Academy," an institution for promoting the Bengali language.

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[10]It is noteworhty that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, who was then a first year law student, was expelled from the university for participating in this agitation and his subsequent refusal to submit a 'good behavior' bond.

The non-Bengali Military- bureaucratic oligarchy which was ruling Pakistan intervened to negate the electoral verdict, and ultimately in 1958, imposed military rule on the entire country. During this period, the Bengali intelligentsia suffered from increasing frustration. True, with the departure of the Hindus, they had found some openings in government employment, in the professions and in business. But now they were to face competition from non-Bengalis who had enjoyed the support of the non-Bengali ruling group. The suspension of political processes and the establishment of a military regime meant that the possibility of Bengalis improving their prospects by an excercise of a legislative majority was foreclosed. It was in this background that a demand for greater regional autonomy began to gather support. Bengali economists presented convincing demonstrations of discriminatory economic policies which were accentuating regional economic disparity and resulting in the transfer of resources from East Bengal to the western wing of Pakistan. The "two economies theory" which they propounded and the issue of disparity, was to be the dominant issue of the 1960's and provided valuable underpinning for the six point autonomy demand which was presented by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's Awami League in 1966.

The demand for regional autonomy and the growing sense of alienation felt by the Bengali middle class reinforced the emerging force of Bengali Nationalism. The regime, sensing the dangers ahead, set about to suppress what it regarded as the resources from which such nationalism was succoured. Simultaneously with the repression of the political forces demanding autonomy, there was an onslaught on the press. The editor of the largest circulation and influential daily the *Ittefaq*, was arrested and the paper was forced to close down; similar action followed against the *Sangbad.* Government propaganda was directed against 'cultural imperialism' which according to them had led the literary intellectuals, influenced by an alien culture, to taint the rest of the population; a government directive banned the broadcast of Tagore songs on radio and television. A Council for National Integration was set up to synthesize a 'national culture'; it was also given large resources through which they could buy the support of different sections of the intelligentsia. On the political plain, the regime's local functionaries of the revived Muslim League did all it could to rouse communal sentiments and to play up the bogey of India. The climax of these efforts was the prosecution of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman for conspiring with India to bring about secession.

The strategy of the ruling group proved to be counter-productive, and although they were able to enlist the support of small groups who were drawn from the communal elements and from some who regarded themselves as the revolutionary left, a broad based unity among Bengalis in general, and the Bengali intelligentsia began to develop.

The 1969 movement, led by students, different groups of whom had united to form the Students Action Committee, committed themselves to an '11-point program' which included the realization of regional autonomy. The militants amongst the students had already begun to talk of independence. Another powerful tendency which was manifested by the militants was for radical social change, which led them to talk of socialism.

The reaction of the middle class to this movement has been described thus:[11]

> The attitude of the newly created nucleus of Bengali bourgeoisie towards the politics of Bengali nationalism was one of qualified support. They profited greatly from the pressures created by those politics; but at the same time they were apprehensive of its leftward gravitation. Moreover, their extraordinary privileges were brought into existence because there was a central government which could be pressured. The continuance of their privileges in an independent East Bengal was perhaps a little problematic. Not all of them supported the movement wholeheartedly. They also supported right wing movements and collaborated with the ruling oligarchy. They were particularly demoralized after the winter of 1968-69, when nationwide protest against the Ayub regime, which brought about his downfall, threatened to develop into a revolutionary movement, especially in East Bengal. While they supported a movement for regional autonomy and for diversion of a larger share of economic resources to East Bengal, they also looked upon the bureaucratic-military oligarchy, which is based in West Pakistan, as a bulwark for the defense and protection of their class interest.

This view, however, does not take into account the perception of the ruling oligarchy that the 'secessionist movement' was led by Bengali intelligentsia. The regime stuck to the view that communalism still infect-

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[11] Hamza Alavi, 'The State on Post Colonial Societies,' in *Imperialism and Revolution in South Asia*, p. 170.

ed the rural masses, so that if communal elements were supported with resources they could contain the forces of nationalism. The 1979 elections belied this expectation, as the intelligentsia and the masses came together, uniting the nationalist forces and isolating the communal elements of the right and those on the left, who gave them tactical support. Bengali nationalism could no longer be contained, and despite the genocidal onslaught of the military it realized its goal of a sovereign, independent Bangladesh.

It is noteworthy that amongst the first targets of the military onslaught was the University of Dacca. The slaughter of the intellectuals began on March 25, 1971, when prominent scholars, including some of the leading professors, were shot in their residential quarters on the university campus. Students were prime targets for summary executions. A basic document recovered from military headquarters after their surrender contained an analysis of the population of East Bengal, in terms of the political attitudes. The definitive finding recorded against the intelligentsia, which is defined to include students, teachers, lawyers, politicians, and clerks (!), is that they constitute the hard core of the anti-Pakistan elements. The policy recommendation that was recorded was that they should be eliminated. In the exodus which took place, a significant section of the intelligentsia sought sanctuary outside the country. Among those who stayed behind, a large number of the most prominent university teachers, journalists and professionals, were victims of an organized massacre.[12]

III)

The creation of Bangladesh was a victory for the progressive and nationalist tendencies in the politics of East Bengal. The young militants, who had formed the hard core of the freedom fighters, emerged as the most powerful pressure group. They were a force to be reckoned with, as many of them still bore arms. The communal forces and those on the extreme left who had opposed the liberation struggle, for the moment, were exposed and isolated. The owners of industry and businessmen,

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[12] Among them were: Serajuddin Hussain, Editor, *Ittefaq;* Shahidullah Kaiser, writer and editor, *Sangbad;* Professor Munir Chowdhury, writer and head of the department of Bengali of the University of Dacca; Ghiasuddin Ahmed, one of the finest of the young historians, and a host of others.

many of whom were non-locals, were no longer powerful. The urban middle class intelligentsia had been rudely shaken by the nine months of terror which they had lived through; different sections of them had divergent expectations from independence. Each had thought of the greater opportunities which it would bring. Few had anticipated the terrible cost and the transformation of the social enviornment which an armed struggle would bring about.

The political leadership, sensitive to the pressure of the young militants, declared democracy, socialism and secularism as the fundamental principles of the State-nationalism. This reflected a consumation of the struggle of the progressive forces, and a consensus which no group felt able to oppose overtly. Problems, however, were to arise since there were large sections of the intelligentsia who, if they had a degree of emotional commitment to nationalism and democracy, had little commitment to secularism and even less to socialism. Of those who had a positive commitment to these principles, a number of the most gifted were the victims of massacre. Of those who had survived, a good number fell into the category of those who have reaped the fruits of the struggle (and) become disassociated from the intellectual class.[13] In the days of the struggle many of them had provided intellectual nourishment to the youth, and had enlisted their support for the cause. Now they had taken up high posts in government and become involved in the complexities of administration. The problems they had to deal with were pressing and urgent — setting up the machinery of government, restoring the economy, meeting the day-to-day problems. They saw their role in terms of doing the job entrusted to them conscientiously and effectively, and by so viewing themselves, abdicated the role of providing 'intellectual leadership.' They underestimated the importance of ideas and ideals in nation building.

Intellectual groups who were not in government consisted of both those who had supported the struggle and its ideals and those who had opposed it. The main concerns of the latter were survival and rehabilitation. Some lapsed into silence and inactivity; others adopted the path of sycophancy; still others set about to work insidiously to undermine support for those ideals. Those who had supported the struggle now had their friends in power. They were in a position to draw upon this

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[13] Edward Shils, 'Intellectuals in the Political Development o the New States', in *The Intellectuals and the Powers,* University of Chicago Press, 1972, p. 418.

resource to promote different objects, ranging from personal advancement to securing support for pet projects. Few, if any, involved themselves in grappling with the major task of working out, intellectually, the implications of building a new social order, based on those principles to which they professed commitment.

A host of new institutions were established for the advancement of knowledge and the arts, and to promote research. These included: the *Shilpo Kala* Academy (Academy of Fine Arts), Institute for Development Studies, Institute for Bangladesh Studies,and the Institute of Law and International Affairs. The Bangla Academy acquired higher status and could claim larger resources. It is perhaps a sad comment on one of the post-independence tendencies that the Director of the Academy thought it important to have himself designated as 'Director-General'.

The Press in the first year was intoxicated by its newly found freedom. Over a dozen dailies, and a proliferation of weeklies appeared in Dacca.

The intellectual output, however, from the universities, the institutes and the press, has not been impressive. There was little contribution towards discussion of the major public issues. The 'opposition press' did little to promote a critical discussion of the real issues; instead they also contributed to undermining the institution of the press through indulging in personal vilification and rousing communal and other irrational tendencies. The government press lapsed into a poor quality of propaganda. There was hardly any intellectual discussion, let alone debate, on the contents of the draft Constitution of the First Five Year Plan. It may be said that the predominance of the ruling party had created an atmosphere in which free and open debate was inhibited. But Bengali intellectuals had not felt inhibited even under alien military regimes. A combination of factors perhaps explains why the intellectuals appear to be inert. The psychological aftermath of the terror they had lived through, and which had claimed the lives of their colleagues, euphoria of independence, preoccupation with personal advancement or specific projects, involvement with government and, in some, just the feeling that they should not 'rock the boat,' are some of the elements which explain the intellectual inertia in post-independence Bangladesh.

A post-independence situation, and especially that in Bangladesh, presents a great challenge and a great opportunity to intellectuals. The liberation struggle had generated new social forces which, properly directed, held promise of transforming the traditional society of Bangladesh. A massive intellectual effort to explain the implications of change,

to educate the masses, to dispel their misgivings and to liberate them from the prejudices which had made them susceptible to exploitation in the past, was required. For, after all, this had been a society which had for a long period undergone authoritarian rule, where communalism had been preached and exploited by the ruling oligarchy, and where the elite had long enjoyed privileges which they were loath to lose. The intellectuals have yet to understand and perform this role. In the vacuum which existed, the young militants have suffered disillusionment and frustration, while the reactionary conservative forces have been provided with opportunities for revival. The impatience of the young is expressed in cynicism with constitutional politics. A substantial section of the young supporters of the ruling party broke off to form a new party, committed to promoting 'scientific socialism' through 'class struggle.' Even the young supporters of the party began to share this cynicism about democratic processes. An environment was thus created in which support for the principle of democracy began to erode. Even the middle classes were intimidated by the prospects of violence into resigning themselves to an erosion of democratic processes. In this situatuion, the forces which had suffered defeat and had been lying low, could re-group to assail the principles to which they were opposed. The economic difficulties which the people faced due to spiralling inflation and commodity shortages provided them with an opportunity to present false explanations. The causes for the sufferings of the people were not ascribed to the impact of global inflation or to lower levels of production, but to the 'socialistic' policies of the government, to nationalization, and to 'smuggling to India ' Thus the opponents of socialism and secularism could exploit the economic situation to undermine the support for these principles.

The consensus on basic principles, which had made the task of making a constitution appear easy, is now assailed, because the failures and difficulties of day-to-day administration created abjective conditions in which those opposed to these principles could call the principles themselves into question.

The consensus can, therefore, no longer be taken for granted, as was the tendency in the first few years of independence. These are principles which had been fought for over a quarter of a century. To enshrine them into the constitution and to ritually express support for them in speeches tended to reduce them to mere 'slogans.' Now that these principles are threatened, there lies the hope that those who have fought for them in the past and in particular the intelligentsia, will realize that

these principles would only be truly established when their implications are fully understood by the masses and they become aware that their true interests would be realized and they would be liberated from the insidious exploitation of indigenous oligarchs. It is to this task that the intelligentsia of Bangladesh must address itself. The role which has thus far eluded it is waiting to be performed.

Professional Estates as Political Actors: The Case of the Indian Scientific Community

Ward Morehouse

The Politics of Indian Science

The ultimate objective of this paper is to analyze the role of the Indian scientific community as a professional estate in the political system. Essential to understanding the way in which the scientific community is related to the political order is understanding how power is acquired and used within the scientific community in the conduct of the affairs of that community. This leads us in the first instance to examine the politics of Indian science.

Politics refers to the organizational structures and processes through which power is allocated and exercised at socially significant levels in society. The allocation and exercise of power is by no means confined to the formal institutions of government. Since science is a human activity undertaken on a considerable scale in India, it is inevitable that this activity should involve the exercise and allocation of power at socially significant levels and that there should therefore be a "politics" of Indian science.

The politics of science refers, in Avery Leiserson's words, "to the *controversial aspects* of recruiting, training, selecting and replacing leaders in the scientific community; organizing, financing, and directing scientific research; the articulation, representation, communication of common and conflicting interests of scientific workers; and the active efforts of scientists to influence and modify the controls and requirements imposed by the political system upon the scientific enterprise itself, segmentally or as a whole."[1]

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[1] Avery Leiserson, "Science and the Public Life," *Journal of Politics*, 1967, p. 241. Throughout the paper I have frequently used the single word "science".

It is in this sense that the politics of Indian science will be examined. Our first concern will be with how power is acquired and used within the organizational system of Indian science. In other words, the discussion will be focused largely on the decision-making processes and the nature of participation in these processes as they occur within the network of scientific organizations and institutions in India.

The Science Establishment

Within this network of organizations and institutions there is a relatively small establishment or elite, the principal functions of which are to mediate between the scientific sector and the government and to exercise power within the scientific sector. How effectively the scientific establishment performs the first function is another question to which we shall return. Suffice it to say at this juncture that there is a widely held view that the relationship between scientists on the one hand and the senior civil servants and politicians on the other is so unequal that no mediation, only domination of the former by the latter, occurs. Let us first explore the function of exercising power by this small elite within the scientific community.

An effort needs to be made to define the use of the phrase "establishment" in this particular context. It cannot be used in its original and proper sense ("a set of institutions supported by tax funds but largely on faith and without direct responsibility to political control," as Don Price puts it) nor even quite in the sense in which it has been used more recently to describe the web of influence and inter-relationships in British politics which included a great many graduates of Oxford and Cambridge as well as the professionals of London and constituted a sort of informal Tory frame of governmental support, although this analogy is closer.

According to Richard L. Park:

> The use of the term in reference to India is different. The establishment here includes institutions and individuals, both public and private, which support a style of government and a form of economic growth and social change that reflect constitutional continuity. This style, both in its informal and formal aspects, assures

when in fact I mean science and technology. I do not mean to blur the distinction between the two, which is in fact a vital one, but excuse the imprecise use of terminology on the grounds of economy of expression.

relative political stability and the only transition to ends that are generally acceptable in the national consensus.[2]

The rapidly accelerating "Indianization" of Indian political life in the 1970's may force some modifications in this description of the nature of the establishment in Indian politics. It does not mean that an establishment will cease to function in Indian public life but rather that the character of that establishment is likely to change. This may likewise be the case with respect to the establishment in Indian science. At the moment a new generation of scientific leadership, consisting for the most part of individuals who have spent their active professional lives in *independent* India, is moving into positions of dominance in Indian science affairs. These are individuals who have made their mark primarily *since* independence. The relationship of the new generation of scientific leadership to emerging political leadership is difficult to determine, but the older generation of scientific leaders clearly belongs within Professor Park's larger establishment, which dominated Indian national life for the first quarter century of independence and which supported "a style of government and form of economic growth and social change that reflect constitutional continuity."

Strictly speaking, while there is not a "constitutional continuity" in Indian science, there are "organizational continuities" which provide a legitimizing framework for science activities in much the same way as the constitution provides a legitimizing framework for political activities. These organizational continuities are to be found in the major research councils and science organizations of the central government, which absorb some 90 per cent of the funds spent on research, and to a lesser degree in the science academies and professional societies (although for the most part these bodies exercise far less influence than, say, the Royal Society in Britain, the Soviet Academy of Sciences in the U.S.S.R., and the National Academy of Sciences in the United States).

The establishment in science has no precisely delineated outer limits, but there is a focal point. In its most minimal sense, the establishment includes the principal officials of the major research councils, senior scientific advisers to the government, and a handful of other scientists,

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[2] Richard L. Park, "India after Nehru," *American Education in a Revolutionary World: Conference on India,* New York: Metropolitan School Study Council, 1965, p. 15. One of the few references to the "establishment" in Indian science affairs appears in an unsigned article, "Scientific Research in the Universities and

some of whom would be members of the apex scientific advisory body
to the government, the National Committee on Science and Technology
or comparable *ad hoc* advisory bodies at the upper levels of government
– perhaps 15 to 20 individuals. Within this restricted definition would
be the Chairmen of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Space
Commission, the Director-General of the Council of Scientific and In-
dustrial Research and his counterparts in the Indian Council of Agricul-
tural Research and the Indian Council of Medical Research, the Secre-
taries of the Departments of Electronics, and of Science and Technolo-
gy, the Chairman of the University Grants Commission if he happens to
be a scientist, the Scientific Adviser to the Ministry of Defense and
head of the Defense Research and Development Organization, directors
of some of the leading research institutions in the country such as
Indian Institute of Science in Bangalore, Indian Statistical Institute in
Calcutta, Tata Institute of Fundamental Research in Bombay, Indian
Agricultural Research Institute in Delhi, a handful of senior university
scientists, and perhaps a few others such as current and past presidents
of the Indian Science Congress and the Indian National Science Acade-
my (formerly, National Institute of Sciences in India). There is, how-
ever, a high correlation between presidents of these bodies and the per-
sons holding the positions already identified. For example, the cur-
rent President of the Indian National Science Academy is the former
Director General of the Indian Council of Agricultural Research.

At its outer extremities, the establishment in science may consist of
200 or so, including directors of principal government –supported re-
search institutes and government laboratories, group heads of the
Atomic Energy Establishment at Trombay, directors of the Indian In-
stitute of Technology and vice-chencellors who happen to be scientists,
and professors in the stronger science departments in Indian universi-
ties. Individuals holding these positions would constitute a significant
proportion of the Fellows of the Indian National Science Academy,
and the more prominent members of the other two science academies,
National Academy of Sciences and Indian Academy of Sciences.

A Profile of the Science Establishment

If there is an "inner circle" to the Indian Science Establishment, it is probably composed in the first instance of the seven or eight individuals who occupy the major administrative posts in the institutional network of Indian science. These posts are:

> Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
> Director-General, Council of Scientific and Industrial Research
> Secretary, Department of Electronics
> Secretary, Department of Science and Technology
> Director-General, Indian Council of Agricultural Research
> Director-General, Indian Council of Medical Research
> Scientific Adviser to Ministry of Defense and Head of Defense
> Research and Development Organization
> Chairman, Space Commission
> Chairman, University Grants Commission (if he happens to be a scientist)

To give a more concrete dimension to this discussion of the Indian Science Establishment, biographical data on the present incumbents of these positions are given in the appendices. (One individual currently occupies two posts simultaneously — Secretary of the Department of Electronics and Scientific Adviser to the Ministry of Defense. The Chairman of the University Grants Commission is a historian, although he sits on the National Committee on Science and Technology, and is certainly not without influence in Indian science affairs.)

In the last ten years, the average age of these individuals has markedly declined, thus indicating what we have said earlier, that as Indian politics become more Indianized, persons who have spent their active professional life in independent India became more influential. The average age of the members of this "inner circle" in 1970 was 59.3 years but by 1976, had declined to 52.4 years. In terms of age at the time of appointment of the "inner circle" in 1970, all were in their fifties or sixties except one. Of the current "inner circle," all were in their forties at the time of appointment. Thus, the current "inner circle" of the Science Establishment represents in many ways a new generation in the exercise of power in Indian science affairs. Whether they will be better able to mediate between the political system which sustains Indian science and the rank and file of Indian scientists than the previous inhabitants of the "inner circle" of decision-makers remains to be seen.

There is also a fair measure of "interlocking" among this "inner circle," at least in terms of formal linkages. The significance of some of these linkages (for example, membership in the governing body of another organization) seems to be rather limited, if the function of the linkage is to enhance in any substantial way administrative and programatic coordination between large, complex research organizations, each with its own network of R and D establishments. On the other hand, the sheer number of interconnections indicates how frequently this small group finds itself sitting around the same table. The tables in the appendices give a schematic view of these interconnections.

It would be wrong to leave the impression that all decision-making in Indian science affairs was concentrated in the hands of these seven or eight individuals. Obviously, power in Indian science affairs is more widely distributed than that. The most appropriate way to visualize the distribution of power is a series of concentric circles of diminishing significance, much like the ripples caused by throwing a stone in a pond. After the point at which the circles encompass some 200 individuals (more or less the outer limits of the Science Establishment at the national level), decision-making is primarily significant at local institutional levels where power is wielded by literally thousands of scientists and technologists.

Decision-making by Committees

One of the principal modes of decision-making by the science establishment is through committees. This phenomenon is not peculiar to science but permeated a good many other aspects of Indian life. Nor it is restricted to Indian science affairs but exists in virtually all other countries with a sizable scientific community of any kind, with complex organizational patterns similar to those in India.

"In the Tizard-Lindemamm story," C.P. Snow has written in his illuminating account of that famous controversy of wartime British science, "we saw three of the characteristic forms of closed politics. These three forms are not often completely separable and fuse into each other, but they are perhaps worth defining." The three are, in Snow's analysis, what he calls "Committee Politics," Hierarchical Politics," and "Court Politics."

> The first is committee politics. There is, of course, a complex morphology of committee politics, and anyone who has ever lived

in any society, in a tennis club, a factory dramatic group, a college faculty, has witnessed some of its expressions. . .The second form of closed politics I think I had better call "hierarchical politics" the politics of a chain of command, of the services, a bureaucracy of a large industry. . . The third form of politics in the Tizard-Lindemamm story is the most simple. I shall call it "court politics." By court politics I mean attempts to exert power through a man who possesses a concentration of power.[3]

Most significant choices of alternatives in Indian official science, which means for all practical purposes Indian science, are made through the medium of what Snow calls "closed politics." These choices, taken collectively, amount to the Government of India's "science policy," or more accurately, its policies toward scientific research for there is no such thing as a single, coherent policy toward all scientific endeavor in contemporary Indian society. "I mean any kind of politics in which there is no appeal to a larger assembly in the sense of a group of opinions or an electorate, or on an even bigger scale what we call loosely 'social forces'," C.P. Snow has written in amplification of the phrase "closed politics." "The most obvious fact which hits you in the eye is that personalities and personal relations carry a weight of responsibility which is out of proportion greater than any they carry in open politics."[4]

To describe Indian science affairs as being characterized by "closed politics" is not to pass judgement negatively. In science perhaps more so than in other fields of human endeavor, it is the quality of the individual which counts. And if the right individuals are in the right places at the right times, they may be able to accomplish far more than would be the case if they were surrounded by the constraints of "open politics," with all of its constitutional and legal formalities, and the inertia imposed by continuing appeals to larger communities of interest. Nor should it be assumed that this situation is in any sense unique to Indian science. There is clear evidence of these phenomena in the science affairs of other nations such as Britain, France, and the United States. And Britain itself provided the very case from which the phrase used to characterize this aspect of scientific activity in India has been drawn.[5]

[3] C.P. Snow, *Science and Government*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1961, pp. 57, 59-60, 63.

[4] *Ibid.*

[5] See, in addition to Snow's *Science and Government*, such studies as J. Stefan

It should be emphasized that Snow's analytical scheme does not fit the Indian case exactly but only approximately. But if his three categories of politics are regarded as points on a continuum or as interacting planes of activity, they do provide a useful way of looking at Indian science affairs. For purposes of the present analysis, "committee politics" is viewed largely as an internal phenomenon within the organizational system for research and development, "hierarchical politics" as both internal and external, and "court politics" as largely external.

The committees which form such a vital part of the working of the establishment in Indian science clearly involve both "committee politics," and perhaps more the latter than the former. Committees are, needless to say, used for many purposes such as appointing people to jobs, granting fellowships, deciding on support for research projects, and determining research priorities. One needs only to look at the annual reports of major research councils, science academies, and research laboratories to see the variety of committees involved in making decisions. (A listing of some of these committees is provided in the appendices.)

Among some scientists, there is considerable dissatisfaction with the way the system works. For instance, the meeting of a technical committee allocating funds for research may last for only a day and a half, during which time decisions on some 200 to 250 research proposals must be reached. Most of these decisions are decided by pre-arrangement, or the sense of the meeting is to "leave it to the chairman." The sheer bulk of the material circulated (often only a few days before the committee meets, if not at the meeting itself) is self-defeating, for no committee member (the more so if, as a member of the establishment, he serves on a great many other committees) can possibly wade through all that is provided for him with any comprehension prior to the meeting itself.

To balance the picture, however, note must also be made of committees which reach decisions through genuine and active participation of the members of the committee. Cases also exist in which committees have reached "awkward" or "unpopular" decisions (for example, rejecting the research proposal of a senior scientist whose prestige would or-

Dupre and Sanford Lakoff, *Science and the Nation: Policy and Politics*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1962; Daniel S. Greenberg, *The Politics of Pure Science*, New York: the New American Library 1967; and Robert Gilpin, *France in the Age of the Scientific State*, Princeton University Press, 1968.

dinarily be sufficient to assure more or less "automatic" acceptance). Some of the ICMR project selection committees provide examples; no doubt there are additional examples in the other research councils.[6]

One indictment of the committee procedure is reflected in the following comments by a senior scientist who has done his fair share of service on committees. "The committee method of working which prevails at all levels is a defective technique not suited to our requirements, " he writes. "It has no sense of urgency. Committees meet once in a few months and postpone decisions to the next meeting on flimsy pretexts. The same experts serve on many widely different committees. So the expertise the Government gets is obviously not in depth. These experts are briefed by their junior colleagues or come unprepared. In many cases their expertise is outdated as these experts are so busy in so many fields that it is not physically possible for them to know modern developments in any field thoroughly."[7]

Committees also function on a broader scale than appointments, fellowships and research projects. Perhaps the most obvious case in point are the "reviewing committees" which undertake periodic assessment of the performance of major research councils.

There is probably a rough inverse correlation between the complexity and size of the organizational structure being reviewed and the ability of a reviewing committee to achieve meaningful comprehension of how the organization is functioning and how it can be improved. The difference between an outside body trying to understand what is going on in, say, the Indian Institute of Science in Bangalore or the Indian Institute of Technology in Bombay on the one hand and the CSIR with its chain of 30 laboratories and other units all over the country on the other is considerable. To the extent that this comprehension is limited, reviewing committees tend to serve as legitimizing devices for the policy and organizational ideas of existing leadership within the organization being reviewed.

Regardless of the degree of their comprehension, however, reviewing committees serve as important instruments in the exercise of power in Indian science affairs. They also often reflect an effort to reach out beyond the Indian scientific and technological establishment to involve

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[6] Interview with a member of an ICMR project selection committee, February, 1970.

[7] Interview with a CSIR institute director, March, 1967.

representatives of other elite groups in Indian society in decision-making on Indian science affairs, as the table in the appendices, giving the membership of several reviewing committees, reveals. Rarely, however, does the wider participation include individuals in the Indian science and technology community not already close to the "inner circle" of the science establishment.

Ad hoc committees are also used to confront controversial questions in an effort to reduce personal bias or collectivize responsibility for a particular decision. One example from CSIR is a body which has come to be known as the Ray Committee after its chairman, Dr. Niharranjan Ray, the former Director of the Indian Institute of Advanced Study in Simla.

The Ray Committee was appointed in the mid-1960's, to look into the possibility of integrating the work of the Indian National Scientific Documentation Centre (INSDOC) and the Publications and Information Directorate of CSIR. The Committee's conclusions were reported to the CSIR governing body meeting of July 16, 1967. The principal recommendation was the establishment of a "Central Institute of Scientific Information and Publication," which would include, insofar as possible, all the documentation, library, and publication activities of CSIR. The Committee also made several other suggestions, including the possibility that there be further study of transferring the activities being performed by the National Register of Scientific and Technical Personnel to the Institute of Applied Manpower Research.[8]

Leaving aside the wisdom of the Ray Committee's recommendations (a somewhat academic point in any event since they have never been acted upon), the interesting aspect of this situation from the point of view of an examination of the exercise of power in Indian science affairs is the rapidity with which the Committee and its activities became politicized, both within the organizational system of Indian science and through this system's linkages with the political system.[9]

[8] Council of Scientific and Industrial Research, Governing Body, 53rd meeting, "Recommendations of the Niharranjan Ray Committee," (Item No. 9), July 15, 1967.

[9] See, for example, P.K. Naidu, "Story of a Strange Committee: Crisis in Science Policy—III," *Mainstream,* May 27, 1967, pp. 32-33; *ibid.,* "CSIR: Wanted a Bold Leadership: Crisis in Science Policy—IV," *Mainstream,* June 24, 1967. At the July, 1970, Governing Body meeting the basic recommendation of the Ray Committee of merging INSDOC and the Publications and Information Directorate was accepted but has never been implemented.

One important reason for this rapid politicization is that, while no jobs would have actually been lost under the "fail-safe" conditions of job security in Indian civil science, status and responsibility were at stake. These are critically important factors in a social envornment in which there is all too limited scope for exercise of challenging professional responsibility and very few alternative job options since there is so little job mobility. Because of job security and the fact that a substantial proportion of the budgets in both units goes for salaries, it is a moot point as to whether one of the major stated objectives in appointing the Committee (namely, to economize by streamlining CSIR's "ancillary" activities and concentrating on research) would have been achieved, although it is possible to argue, as the Ray Committee did, that the effectiveness of these units would be increased by their consolidation.

The major weaknesses of committees as instruments for decision-making in Indian science affairs are thus infrequent meetings, too long an agenda for meaningful discussion, and too many memberships concentrated in a relatively small number of individuals who are senior in the establishment. (One study reveals that the director of a CSIR laboratory is on the average a member of 14 committees, and in the case of one of the senior officials of a major research council, it appears that he was involved in 50-odd committees and councils, quite apart from all the other bodies within his own organization of which he was a member *ex officio*.)[10] A forceful and negative view of the work of committees has been set forth in the following passage:

> The malaise with the institution of committee functioning in our country is due to the extra-academic means adopted by the men in power to give legalistic baptization to their personal whims. If one wants to condemn an organization, the administrator chooses a group of people who do not like the director of that organization. If extension of the empire of the same director is the aim, another set of persons is chosen. Yet, if the matter is likely to face objections from effective sources it is kept secret until the stamp of a committee of sufficient authority is obtained. It is thus all the

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[10] A. Rahman, A. Ghosal, N. Sen, N.R. Rajagopal, S. Dasgupta, S.H.M. Husaini, and A.K. Roy, *A Study of Expenditure in National Laboratories* (Survey Report No. 2), New Delhi: Survey and Planning of Scientific Research Unit, Council of Scientifc and Industrial Research, 1964, p. 11; interview by the author with a former CSIR official, January, 1967. See also P.K. Naidu, "Science Policy and its Implementation," *Mainstream,* April 29, 1967, pp. 29-30, 38.

more necessary to expose the discussions and decisions to a wider section of the professional people and unless the Government can evolve a system to do so it is impossible to build up any healthy scientific tradition. . .[11]

While certainly not all committees in Indian science affairs fit this description, many do. But the uses and abuses of committees in Indian science are hardly unique. Consider this account of the ways in which committees have been employed in defense research and development programs in the United States by Admiral Rickover, the maverick naval officer who has played such an active role for so many years in the Navy nuclear research program:

> Rickover also had a few words on the practice in the DOD (the Department of Defense) of naming advisory panels or committees. After carefully distinguishing such committees from those of Congress, with which his own relations have always been most warm, he observed that the appointment of special *ad hoc* committees served three purposes: to provide support for the project desired by those making the appointment, or, after the project is in existence, to praise its operation; to permit an incoming director to find out what is going on without relying solely on what his own administrators tell him; and to "axe somebody or force a new project to be started."[12]

Hierarchical and Factional Politics

Research politics, that is to say, jockeying for positions of power or access to positions of power within the organizational apparatus of science, is widespread in most large, complex national scientific communities, and India is no exception. Given the relative importance of good jobs and the lack of any significant job mobility, since jobs are the key to power, recognition, and influence, some measure of "politicization" in Indian science affairs is inevitable. The critical question is whether the level of politicization is of such magnitude that serious scientific work is substantially inhibited.

There are no easy answers to that question, although there are cer-

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[11] Naidu, *op. cit.,* June 24, 1967.

[12] Dupre and Lakoff, *op. cit.,* p. 165.

tainly examples where the impact of "hierarchical politics" has engendered such factionalism as to make effective scientific work difficult. Even if scientific work may still be possible, those directly involved frequently feel that, in order to protect their own positions, they must invest considerable time and energy in defending themselves against factional attacks from others.

"Factionslism" in the politics of Indian science stems from the hierarchical nature of the exercise and allocation of power in Indian science affaris. "Practitioners of science in our country," suggests one critical observer, "are divided into a certain number of *muths* or 'churches. Each *mu th* has a powerful *mahant* who derives his 'temporal' and sometimes even 'ecclesiastical' power from one of the gods of the Indian scientific pantheon."[13]

In the analysis of decision-making by committees, it has been pointed out that while some committees function as legitimate instruments of decision-making, other committees are used by individuals in key administrative posts within the organizational system for Indian science as a means of legitimizing their own decisions or realizing their own aspirations. To the degree that this is the case, the tendency is to emphasize the hierarchical nature of the politics of Indian science, because the individual matters most who is able to influence decisively the appointment and instruction of committees, which are ostensibly the means of reaching decisions through wider participation.

Hierarchical politics is also an inevitable consequence of what some observers have seen as an increasing bureaucratization of Indian science. Because such a large proportion of all scientific activity is government-supported in India, it is to be expected that governmental patterns of organization will tend to assert themselves in a good deal of scientific work within the country.

Because the internal affairs of the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research have been much more widely scrutinized in Parliament, the press, and other public forums than is the case of any other major science organization, it is easiest to look at the phenomenon of "hierarchical politics" in CSIR. This phenomenon manifests itself most frequently within CSIR around relationships between CSIR headquarters in Delhi and the various research laboratories and institutes throughout the country.

[13] A.D. Bhogle, "Challenge to Indian Science," *University News*, January, 1969, p. 3.

In spite of formal organizational arrangements which seem to suggest otherwise, individual laboratory directors are subject to substantial controls by headquarters. Where networks of such controls exist, they can be interpreted strictly or loosely in terms of the assessment which a particular Director General may make about the effectiveness of a particular director and the nature of the relationship which that director has to the Director General, including a willingness to respond to the director General's policy initiatives and leadership.[14] That various Directors General of CSIR have used the powers available to them as a means of trying to secure adherence to their policy views and responsiveness to their leadership is to be expected. As long as the web of administrative controls exist, this phenomenon will be found, regardless of who is Director General, although because styles of leadership vary, some Directors General will make more use of these powers for such purposes than others.[15]

Hierarchical politics in Indian science may be enhanced by another factor. Analysts of Indian political behavior have suggested that a characteristic form of conflict resolution is continuing escalation of the conflict to higher levels of authority within society, particularly by an "outsider" who is not an immediate party to dispute. Thus, if there is a dispute between two scientists or groups of scientists within a laboratory, the dispute goes beyond the immediate supervisor to the head of the laboratory for resolution and from there through successive stages to the concerned Cabinet Minister or even the Prime Minister.[16] This nat-

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[14] It was CSIR's pattern of formal organization, seemingly giving individual laboratories considerable autonomy, which inspired a "model construction" for other government-supported research laboratories on recommendation of the Scientific Advisory Committee to the Cabinet. See Government of India, Cabinet Secretariat, Department of Cabinet Affairs, Memorandum No. 84/13/CF-64, "Model Constitution for Institutions and Laboratories Concerned with Scientific Research," New Delhi, April 16, 1964.

[15] Polemical literature on this question is very extensive. See, for example, various writings of K.K. Sinha ("On Indian Science Policy," *The Radical Humanist,* May 22, 1966, and his Institute of Political and Social Studies, "Memorandum Submitted to the Review Committee of the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research," reprinted in *Minerva,* Spring, 1964), which are highly critical of the regime of the third Director General of CSIR, or a pamphlet by two Members of Parliament, Arjun Arora and Mushir Ahmed Khan, *CSIR and Its Affairs,* New Delhi: *Mainstream,* May, 1970, which is equally critical of his successor. Much of this tension appears to have been dissipated under the current Director General.

[16] A good example is a controversial pilot plant project undertaken at one of

urally accentuates the role of hierarchy in decision-making, both with-
in the organizational system for research and development and in terms
of its linkages with the formal structure of government and the political
system in general.

Choosing Scientific Leaders

This "hierarchical" nature of the politics of Indian science suggests that
there is no greater single category of decision-making in Indian science
with more substantial consequences for the use of power than the choice
of scientists for key administrative posts. Here the familiar analogy of
the iceberg emerges. The visible part of this kind of decision is likely
to represent only the one-seventh of the iceberg above the surface of
the water, with remaining six-sevenths obscured beneath the surface.
But some data are now available on how this process has functioned
within the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research through the
Committee of Enquiry into CSIR under the chairmanship of Justice
A.K. Sarkar.[17]

It seems clear that the role of the Director General is a critical one,
naturally enough, in identifying prospective directors of different re-
search laboratories. The decision-making process is, to be sure, legi-
timized through the usual committees which undoubtedly act as a
check on unduly arbitrary exercise of authority and influence by the
Director General.

As the level of the position moves upward, the role of political
elites and the senior-most civil servants in the governmental bureaucra-
cy play a larger role. This again is to be expected as the political con-
sequences of such appointments are all the greater, both within the or-
ganizational system for science and within the political system.

Still, the scientific community does play a crucial role in the selec-
tion process at this level as well as at less exalted levels. Whether through
seniority or through career recognition, the range of possible choices
available to political and administrative elites within the government
tends to be determined by that community.[18] Thus, the Prime Minister

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the CSIR laboratories. See Ward Morehouse, "Scuttling the Coal Gasification Pilot
Plant," in a volume of essays on Indian science policy and planning, being edited
by K.D. Sharma (forthcoming, 1976).

[17] Committee on Enquiry (CSIR), *(Part I) of the Committee,* New Delhi:
The Committee, February, 1970.

[18] The phrase "scientific community" is used here and elsewhere in this paper

was confronted with a relatively limited number of possibilities in se-
lecting a successor to Homi J. Bhabha as head of India's atomic energy
program in the mid-1960's, and similarly to his principal successor,
Vikram Sarabhai, in 1971.

Likewise, the choice of directors general of the major research coun-
cils tends to be limited by career patterns which are determined within
the organizational system for science in the first instance. For example,
the present Director General of the Indian Council of Agricultural
Research was previously the Director of the Indian Agricultural Research
Institute, the premier research institute in the field of agriculture in the
country. In a similar fashion Directors General of the Council of Scien-
tific and Industrial Research tend to be selected from among the senior-
most laboratory directors within the CSIR network of research institutes.

In the case of CSIR, the selection process for the Director General is
in the hands of an *ad hoc* selection committee which is dominated by
other members of the Science Establishment.[19] The formal procedure is
that such a committee makes a nomination to the Prime Minister, who,
in his or her capacity as the President of CSIR, makes the formal ap-
pointment. Certainly, the Prime Minister or any other political leader

in a general descriptive sense as denoting an occupational group of both scientists
and technologists engaged in advanced training, research, development, and to a
lesser degree, extension work in science and technology. Some would argue that
in a more explicit sociological sense there is no "scientific community" in India.
The most comprehensive data on the sociological characteristics of the Indian
scientific community is now beginning to emerge through the work of G.S. Au-
rora, formerly at the Administrative Staff College of India in Hyderabad and now
at the Northeast Hill University in Shillong, who has been engaged in an extensive
study in this field over the past five years.

[19]   As an example, the committee which selected the fourth Director General
of CSIR included the Minister of Education (as chairman of the committee),
Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (who did not, however, attend the
meeting of the committee), Science Adviser to the Minister of Defense, Chairman
of the University Grants Commission, the Director General of CSIR at that time,
two senior professors from Delhi University, and the Cabinet Secretary. The Ca-
binet Secretary is said to have exercised a significant influence on the choice
reached by the committee. It is also said that the previous Director General had
other preferences than the one finally chosen by the committee and submitted to
the Prime Minister for her approval. The rules and reuglations and by-laws of
CSIR are singularly silent on the subject of appointing the Director General stat-
ing only that he is to be "appointed by the Government of India" (Rule No. 2)
and that he "shall exercise his powers under the direction, superintendence, and
control of the President and Vice-President of the Society" (Rule 62). See Coun-
cil of Scientific and Industrial Research, *Memorandum of Association Rules and
Regulations and By-Laws*, New Delhi, the Council, 1970.

who may be responsible for some other sector of scientific activity has
it within his power to influence the selection through the selection
committee, and indeed, to reject a nomination brought forward by a
committee composed largely of scientists. Only rarely would the situa-
tion arise in which the nomination of a selection committee for a senior
administrative post in Indian science would be rejected by the political-
ly responsible minister.[20] Rather an effort would be made to influence
the choice of the selection committee once it had been constituted (or
the composition of the committee before it was selected).

But the fact that the power exists is critically important to our con-
sideration of the politics of Indian science. For it is a fact that while
substantial powers are exercised within the organizational network of
Indian science, they are in a very real sense derived from what is the
most critical set of external linkages for the organizational network of
Indian science and technology, namely, its linkages with the political
system. It is to this subject that we now turn.

Science and the Indian Political System

India's political leadership has attached great significance to modern
science and technology. Jawaharlal Nehru indeed suggested that he did
not see "any way out of the vicious circle of poverty except by utilizing
the new sources of power which science has place at our disposal."[21]
Any kind of human endeavor with this potential pay-off, whatever else
it may be, is bound to be political.

Although the formalities of the relationship of science to the struc-
ture of government need not detain us for long, it should be noted that
the Indian Constitution fixes the locus of a number of scientific matters
in the Indian federal union with considerable precision. Among the
items on the central government list of responsibilities in the Constitu-
tion are atomic energy, patents and inventions, the whole field of stan-
dardization (not only of weights and measures but also the "quality for

[20] The selection committee for the third Director General of CSIR forwarded
two names to the Prime Minister (Mr. Nehru), who sent the names back, instruct-
ing the committee to make its own choice and forward one name to him. The
committee then chose one of the two names previously submitted and the Prime
Minister made the formal appointment on that basis.

[21] Jawaharlal Nehru, "The Tragic Paradox of our Age," *New York Times
Magazine*, September 7, 1958, p. 111.

goods to be exported out of India and transported from one state to another"), development of mineral resources, and the like. Entry 64 on the union list specifies that the center will be responsible for "institutions for scientfic or technical education financed by the Government of India wholly or in part and declared by Parliament by law to be institutions of national importance," while entry 65 refers to union agencies and institutions for "professional, vocational or technical training" and for "the promotion of special studies or research." Entry 66 states that "coordination and determination of standards in institutions for higher education or research and scientific or technical institutes" shall be the responsibility of the union government. Also on the union list are the major survey departments of the Government of India – the Survey of India, the Geological, Botanical, Zoological, and Anthropological Surveys of India and the Meteorological Department.[22]

While the concurrent list has relatively little of consequence for scientific work beyond the general provision for statistics and other studies and surveys, the list of responsibilities allocated to the states contains three very important provisions – education, agriculture, and health.

One of the interesting consequences of this distribution of responsibility is to give constitutional sanction to one of the persisting and underlying problems confronting science in India, namely, the relative isolation and neglect of the universities and separation of scientific training from research.[23] Aside from the universities and the delivery systems for research in agriculture and health, however, the central government tends to dominate the scientific scene by both constitutional presciption and political practice.[24]

[22] Constitution of India, Seventh Schedule, List I.

[23] Constitution of India, Seventh Schedule, Lists II and III. The constitutional position of education in particular was a controversial issue in the framing of the Constitution, although questions were also raised about enlarging the center's role in agriculture and health. See Granville Austin, *The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation*, London: Oxford University Press, 1966, especially pp. 199-205.

[24] Funding for R and D activity comes overwhelmingly from the center (some 95 per cent, according to the National Committee on Science and Technology, *Research and Development Statistics: 1973-74*, New Delhi: Department of Science and Technology, 1975, p. 75), suggesting that control of public revenue is a key factor in maintaining the dominance of the central government in science and technology affairs.

Scientists, Administrators,and Politicians: "Court" Politics

Three decades ago, according to Gerard Piel, American physicists were singing a nostalgic ballad which went in the following manner:

> Take away your billion dollars,
> take away your tainted gold,
> You can keep your damn ten billion volts,
> my soul will not be sold.
> Oh, dammit! Engineering isn't physics,
> is that plain?
> Take oh take, your billion dollars,
> let's be physicists again.[25]

Since the taxpayer pays most of the bills for scientific endeavor in India, some form of civil service and political control of science is inevitable.[26] The critical question is the nature and extent of the control.

This brings us to C.P. Snow's third form of "closed politics," namely, "court politics," which he defines as "attempts to exert power through a man who possesses a concentration of power."[27] There are many who feel that the relationship of the Indian scientific community to the political system is largely characterized by "court politics."

Thus, the basic complaint made by scientists in India, as well as by foreign scientific observers of the Indian scene, is that scientists are almost invariably subservient to the administrators and politicians in the hierarchy of decision-making, even with respect to matters which might otherwise be left to the scientists. The question here is more one of degree than of kind because wherever public patronage of science looms large, the administrators and political elites within the formal system of government have the final word.

[25] Gerard Piel, "Role of Science in India's Self-Discovery," *Nature,* June 20, 1964 (Vo.. 202), p. 1155.

[26] I have developed this thesis elsewhere, particularly in "The King as Philosopher: The Influence of Political Environments on Science and Technology in Developing Countries" in H.E. Hoelscher and M.C. Hawk, eds., *Industrialization and Development,* (Proceedings of an International Conference on the Interdisciplinary Aspects of the Application of Engineering Technology to the Industrialization of the Developing Countries. Held October 20-25, 1968, at the University of Pittsburgh), San Francisco: San Francisco Press, 1969.

[27] C.P. Snow, *op. cit.,* pp. 57, 59-60, 63.

One of the most sharply critical accounts in recent years of science in India was made by a British scientist, Dr. Kurt Mendelssohn, who had this to say:

> . . .The Indian Civil Service is admirably designed to deal with huge, poorly educated masses. So it is meticulous, but painfully slow. It takes little account of the fact that scientists are literate and well educated people whose time is wasted and whose enthusiasm is blunted by having to wait for a piece of equipment until research they intended to undertake has become out of date because it has been done better somewhere else. . . It is not the know-how of science that Indian professors need so much as the know-how of talking to their Government. However much helped from outside, Indian science and technology will remain ailing and sterile until India's leaders realize that these subjects must be given the same strong support they receive in China, if India wants to take her place among the great nations. . .[28]

The most celebrated case of "brain drain" *to* India, Professor J.B. Haldane who had come from Britain to settle in India after the Suez crisis in 1956 and became an Indian national, eventually resigned from his appointment as Professor-in-charge of a new research unit in genetics and biometry being established by CSIR because of a variety of frustrations which had prevented him and his staff from doing satisfactory work. "This is entirely typical of the official treatment of scientists in India," Professor Haldane was finally provoked into observing. "It is the intolerable conditions imposed by bureaucrats and not the low salaries and lack of equipment which cause so many Indians to take up posts abroad."[29]

Such observations over the frustrations of the civil service domination of Indian science are hardly confined to foreigners. "The climate of research and original thinking can never develop in a Government establishment. . ." one Indian scientist insists. "The reasons are very obvious and simple. The future of the worker in a Government labora-

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[28] Kurt Mendelssohn, "Science in India," *The Listener*, September 24, 1964 (Vol. 72), pp. 458-459.

[29] J.B.S. Haldane, Letter in *Blitz*, Bombay, June 30, 1962, as quoted in Amar Kumar Singh, "The Impact of Foreign Study: The Indian Experience," *Minerva*, Autumn, 1962, p. 51.

tory depends upon the progress report and the confidential report submitted by his officer and this fear is enough to kill initiative and independent thinking."[30] Another scientist has complained of the "increasing tendency towards centralization and government control of scientific research. . . as not being very congenial to the growth of science."[31]

The natural reaction to this state of affairs is a quest for at least equal status with the senior members of the civil service. To some degree, this effort has been successful. Bhabha, throughout his tenure as Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, was also Secretary to the Government of India in the Department of Atomic Energy. His successors have enjoyed the same status, as do the Directors General of CSIR and ICAR, the Scientific Adviser to the Ministry of Defence, and the Secretary of the Department of Science and Technology. It is said of one of the former Directors General of the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research that, having accepted the post of Director General, he threatened to resign when he discovered that it did not carry with it the post of Secretary to the Government of India until the Prime Minister interceded.[32] (This situation also works in reverse i.e., senior civil servants being unwilling to accept posts which appear to place them hierarchically at a lower level than scientists. In implementing the first part of the Sarkar Committee's report on CSIR, concerning allegations or irregularities in certain personnel actions, a retired ICS officer was designated "Director-General (Vigilance)" because the ICS officer was reportedly unwilling to accept a lesser status than that of the ranking science administrator within CSIR, who also carries the title of Director-General.)

The major advantage of having the status of a Secretary to the Government of India, of course, is that it provides direct and continuing access to the responsible political minister. Lack of this kind of access has been a long standing complaint on the part of the senior science ad-

[30] Krishnaji, "Development of Scientific Research in India – A Casuality," *Science and Culture,* March, 1961, p. 129.

[31] P. Ray, "Scientific and Industrial Research in Modern India," *Science and Culture,* December, 1958, p. 251.

[32] Interviews by the author with senior CSIR scientists, Udaipur, March, 1967; *Nuclear India,* July, 1966, p. 5; Indian Institute of Public Administration. Organization of the Government of India, Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1958, pp. 336-337.

ministrators in those agencies which do not have it. The consequences
of direct access, where it does exist, are mixed and vary from minister
to minister. There can be advantages in having a minister who is not
too well informed or too actively interested, or even if he is interested,
unable because of the pressure of other responsibilities to give very
much time and attention to a particular area of scientific activity that
may fall within his ministerial responsibility.

This point has been made by way of comparing the last Minister of
Scientific Research and Cultural Affairs, the late Professor Humayun
Kabir (who, although not a scientist by training, had a lively interest in
scientific developments) and his successor (after scientific research and
cultural affairs were shifted to the jurisdiction of the Minister of Edu-
cation), M.C. Chagla, a lawyer by profession and former Chief Justice
of Bombay High Court, with high-level diplomatic experience abroad
and subsequently India's Minister for External Affairs. Although Pro-
fessor Kabir played a more active role, Mr. Chagla was sometimes easier
for the senior scientific officials to deal with because he was less well in-
formed and less concerned with details.

These considerations arise most of all with regard to the role of the
late Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, in science affairs. It has some-
times been said that India's science policy, as long as Nehru was alive,
was essentially based on a series of personal interactions between Nehru
and a small group of scientists holding senior posts in or serving as ad-
visers to government, including Homi Bhabha in atomic energy, S.S.
Bhatnagar, the first Director-General of the Council of Scientific and
Industrial Research, S. Husain Zaheer, the third Director-General of
CSIR, Professor P.C. Mahalanobis, a member of the Planning Commis-
sion and India's most eminent statistician, and J.C. Ghosh, also a
member of the Planning Commission.[33]

This kind of relationship reflects "court politics" in its classic form.
But it would be a misleading over-simplification to suggest that it was
only the relationship of these individual scientists to the late Prime
Minister which mattered, important as those relationships were. While
Nehru no doubt did make a number of significant decisions affecting
Indian science affairs, on the basis of representations by these individuals,
his formal role and official position in many cases made it only logical

[33] Interviews by the author with an atomic energy official, a university scien-
tist, and a senior government science administrator, Bombay and New Delhi,
November, 1966, and February and March, 1967.

for him to do so. He was the responsible minister (as in the case of atomic energy) or an office-bearer of the organization concerned (as in the case of CSIR). The implementation of his decisions, furthermore, typically found expression in the formal structures and procedures of government. The Cabinet Secretary, for example, is said to have played an important role in channeling issues to Nehru and in seeing that his decisions were carried out. As another illustration, while Homi Bhabha's relationship with Nehru was certainly important, Bhabha was always careful to maintain alliances with other key elements in various decision-making processes within government.

The "court politics" characteristic of Indian science affairs in Nehru's time, furthermore, appear to be diminishing. Decision-making processes have become more "institutionalized" and less personalized. The general picture today is one of greater reliance on formal channels rather than personal interaction in decision-making on Indian science affairs than was the case in the Nehru era.

The appointment by Mrs. Gandhi in 1970 of a special assistant for science and technology seems to have facilitated this change. The presence of a "subject matter specialist" in the Prime Minister's Secretariat should provide the Prime Minister with better informed advice on science and technology affairs and on policy issues with an important scientific or technological content, while simultaneously increasing the likelihood of implementation of the Prime Minister's decisions and policy objectives in this field of governmental concern. When the original incumbent shifted to another post outside the Prime Minister's Secretariat last year, he was not replaced; it would be useful to have a comparative assessment of the quality of decision-making on science and technology matters by the Prime Minister during periods when the position has been filled and vacant.

The critical issue in the interaction of scientists with administrators and political elites is not how to avoid the interaction but how to make it constructive in advancing scientific work toward the policy objectives and program goals on the basis of which science is supported by society. Scientific endeavor, which makes demands on the public exchequer while it offers more and more promise for the solution of important economic, social, and political problems, requires the sort of protection and sponsorship which only political leadership can provide.[34] There is

[34] On this question, see, for example, Clinton Rossiter, *The American Presidency*, New York: Harcourt Brace, second edition, 1960, pp. 239-241; Don Price,

to be sure, a subtle line between sponsorship and protection on the one hand and domination and intervention on the other. In the Indian case, the risk of the latter occurring in the process of seeking the former seems inescapable because, for the most part, "institutionalization" of the organizational network for research and development has not proceeded very far and this network is only beginning to acquire the autonomy necessary to protect itself and to attract support on its own by virtue of having demonstrated its ability to achieve objectives widely accepted as important and worthwhile in Indian society.

Science is an indisputable source of political power in the industrialized countries. This is what has given scientists significant participation in policy development, allocation of resources, and other matters affecting scientific work in those countries.[35] But in military technology and national security, which have been such important factors in the positions of power achieved by scientists in more developed countries, India is still substantially dependent on imported technology developed elsewhere. Atomic energy is a partial exception. The influence of nuclear scientists has certainly increased with the successful underground nuclear explosion in Rajasthan in May, 1974. But only when research in reproductive biology comes up with cheap, easily administered techniques of birth control to produce a dramatic drop in the rate of population growth or when there is a break-through in agricultural research to generate equally dramatic increases in yields through dry farming, will the other sectors of the scientific community begin to increase their influence on political decision-makers in any substantial way.

As matters presently stand, however, and for the most part with the exception of nuclear technology and related fields, the lack of demonstrated ability to "deliver the goods" has not kept pace with the efforts of India's scientific leadership to command the more resources and achieve greater organizational autonomy from the political system. The relative lack of "self-regulating" critical scientific standards and professional control, furthermore, creates a decision-making "vacuum" which invites administrative and political intervention.

Government and Science: Their Dynamic Relation in American Democracy, New York: New York University Press, 1954, pp. 52-53, 173, 186, 198, 201-202; Lord Hailsham, *Science and Government* (Eighth Fawley Foundation Lecture), Southhampton: University of Southhampton,' 1961; C.P. Snow, *Science and Government, op. cit.*

[35] Cf. J. Stefan Dupre and Sanford A. Lakoff, *Science and the Nation: Policy and Politics,* Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1962, p. 177.

The limited development of "professional authority" in Indian science enhances the role of "democratic authority" (for example, the pressure for automatic advancement through seniority rather than merit as serving the broadest range of interest within lower level staff members in a research laboratory), and "administrative authority" (the dominant role in internal decision-making played by the director, and in some cases also administrative officer, of many Indian research institutes).[36] Lack of development of "professional authority" also substantially enlarges the involvement of external elements in decision-making in Indian science. The result is close control over finances and the personnel system maintained by senior-level civil servants in the government and intervention in appointments or organizational decisions by political leaders.

But there are exceptions also. The Department of Atomic Energy has been relatively successful resisting routine application of government rules to many of its internal decisions. And some individual research institutes have exhibited a fair measure of autonomy in matters of this character.

The lack of development of "professional authority" or "colleague control" is reflected in the relatively limited growth in power and significance (but not in numbers) of the whole organizational apparatus of "quality control" which plays such an important role in other countries, such as the scientific academies, professional societies, and scientific publications. "Indian science," J.D. Bernal wrote, some years ago "is noted at the same time for the originality of many of its conceptions and experimental processes, and for the extreme unreliability and lack of criticial faculty in carrying out the work itself."[37]

But there are exceptions here also. The Guha Research Conference has brought together annually, since 1958, younger scientist in biochemistry and related fields of biology. The means of admission to

[36] See Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, eds., *Education and Politics in India*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972, for a discussion of these phenomena in Indian universities.

[37] J.D. Bernal, *Social Function of Science*, London, 1939, p. 208, as quoted in A. Rahman, "Science and Cultural Values in India," *New Orient*, December, 1966; P.C. Mahalanobis, *A Note on Problems of Scientific Personnel, op. cit.*, pp. 18-19; J.B.S. Haldane, *Science and Indian Culture*, Calcutta: New Age Publishers, 1965, p. 3; Edward Shils, *The Intellectual between Tradition and Modernity: The Indian Situation*, The Hague: Mouton, pp. 50-51, 76-78; "Indian Science

this informal lively group is not formal position but scientific accomplishment and potential as judged critically by one's peers.[38]

Formal Structures for the Interaction
of Science with the Political System

One antidote to "court politics" and "undue" influence on political leadership by a few individual scientist advisers and administrators is collectivization of advice through committees or panels of experts. There have been several such efforts in Indian science affairs, none of which appears to have had much impact.

Apart from *ad hoc* iniciatives (such as a short-lived advisory body created in the early 1960's to "coordinate" different sectors of scientific activity) and occasional panels in individual ministries (a good example being the Panel of Scientists which advised the then Minister of Food and Agriculture, C. Subramanian, in the mid-1960's), the most elevated and comprehensive effort at collectivizing policy advice on scientific matters is the National Committee on Science and Technology, established in December 1971, and its predecessors the Committee on Science and Technology (COST) to the Cabinet, which was established in August, 1968 and which was in effect replaced by NCST, and the Scientific Advisory Committee to the Cabinet (SACC), which was set up by Prime Minister Nehru in May, 1956. The stated functions of NCST are, in the words of the official gazette notification of its most recent reorganization:

1. Continuous updating of national scientific and technological plans, both Five Year Plans and perspective plans. This would have to be carried out in close association with the Planning Commission and be intimately related in terms of relative priorities of allocations and resources, to the national socio-economic development plans.

2. The pattern of development of scientific and technological research including inter-sectoral resources allocation and measures needed for correcting imbalances that may arise.

Congress Association, 1914-38," *Science and Culture,* December, 1957, pp. 310-311; P. Ray, "Scientific and Industrial Research in Modern India," *op. cit.,* p. 249-254; A. Rahman, M. Sen, and N.R. Rajagopal, "Scientific Societies in India," *Nature,* December 26, 1964 (Vol. 204), pp. 1250-1252.

[38] P.M. Bhargava, *Guha Research Conference: A Brief Report on its Genesis, Objectives, and Activities,* Hyderabad, 1975 (draft).

3. The pattern of development for further utilization of the nation's scientific and technological resources towards maximum self-reliance and export promotion.

4. Cooperation and communication between Government, Semi-Government and non-Government scientific and technologial institutions and professional bodies in the country.

5. To review the organizational and managerial practices of scientific establishments and recommend necessary steps for improving their effectiveness.[39]

Those 'apex" advisory committees have worked under several limitations. The committees have always been dominated by "official science," as the table in the appendices reveals, and except for a three-year period when NCST was first organized, have included all the major government research organization heads. (In considering priorities for scientific work, it is too much to expect an agency head to sit in disinterested judgement on his own agency's budget.)

A second major limitation has been the lack of an effective secretariat for the committee. Even the establishment of a very small secretariat with the formation of COST did not resolve the problem because the secretariat was "sub-minimal" in terms of its ability to perform meaningfully. The situation has certainly improved by the establishment of an NCST secretariat within the Department of Science and Technlogy, although few observers think the quality of staff work for the committee is yet at an optimal level.

A third limitation has been the difficulty which SACC, COST, or NCST have experienced in securing implementation of their advice, even when that advice is adopted by the Cabinet or the Planning Commission as official government policy. The organization of NCST in December 1971 tried to take into account these various limitations, and certainly the individual members of NCST during the first three years of its existence (all non-agency heads selected on the basis of individual

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[39] Government of India, Department of Science and Technology, Communication No. F. 20019/1/75-Adm.I, January 25, 1975. Not a great deal is known about the work of the Scientific Advisory Committee to the Cabinet and the Committee on Science and Technology to the Cabinet, as the proceedings of their meetings were not made public. One useful article is by the Cabinet Secretary who has participated actively in the work of these committees, B. Sivaraman, "Machinery for Formulating and Overseeing the Implementation of National Science Policy," *Indian Journal of Public Administration*, July-September, 1969, pp. 475-488.

qualifications and interest in science and technology planning) worked very hard to overcome the limitations of past efforts, including a major initiative in developing for the first time a national science and technology plan. Yet even some of the initial members of NCST concede that implementation of their recommendations by the government and its major research organizations has been spotty at best.

We now come to another anomaly. In an economy of scarcity there must be priorities, and priorities involve planning. Planning of scientific research is therefore inevitable in the Indian context, however effectively it may be done. Planning, and the instruments of planning, have, furthermore a special meaning in the Indian situation.

India's chief proponent of planning, Nehru, regarded planning as intimately related with and essential for India's economic modernization which in turn had to be based, in his view, on modern science and technology. These various circumstances should have resulted in a major role for the Planning Commission in the development of India's scientific capabilities since independence. The Planning Commission has not, however, played an effective role in relation to Indian science.

It is not that no effort has been made. A Scientific and Industrial Research Section was established in the staff of the Commission in 1955, and since then various members of the Planning Commission have held the portfolio for scientific and industrial research, including J.C. Ghosh, A.N. Khosla, P.C. Mahalanobis, B.D. Nag Choudhuri, and Pitambar Pant. Of these, Professor Mahalanobis made perhaps the most concerted effort to develop effective planning of research and certainly had the greatest influence of any of those mentioned on Indian planning in general.

The prevailing consensus among those intimately concerned with these matters, including Professor Mahalanobis himself, is that relatively little has been accomplished by way of truly comprehensive planning of science and technology. The basic and persistent difficulty has been an inability to achieve any truly coordinate planning for all sectors of scientific activity. Defense, and therefore defense science, is entirely outside the purview of the Planning Commission, and yet what the Defense Research and Development Organization does obviously has an impact on other sectors of scientific endeavor in the country. The Department of Atomic Energy, furthermore, was beyond the scope of the Commission during the First and Second Plan periods, although it was brought under the umbrella of the Commission in the Third Plan (1961-66). Furthermore, a number of important areas of scientific research

are dealt with by sections in the Planning Commission responsible for different ministries and not those primarily concerned with planning of scientific research — for example agricultural research which falls within the planning activities for the Ministry of Food and Agriculture, medical research with a similar status under the Ministry of Health and Family Planning, and so on.[40]

The first serious attempts at comprehensive planning of science for the Third Plan were largely abortive. Efforts of Professor Mahalanobis in 1964 to develop an overall frame of reference for scientific research for the Fourth Plan (1966-1971) were equally unsuccessful. Each major sector of scientific activity or research council organized its own working group to develop proposals for consideration and possible inclusion in the Fourth Plan, but no comprehensive plan was drawn.[41]

Another effort was made in 1965. The National Development Council set up a Study Group for Scientific Research with Professor Mahalanobis as Chairman and D.S. Kothari, S.R. Sen Gupta, K.T. Chandy, A.C. Joshi, and Vikram Sarabhai as members. The Study Group declared that "for the formulation of policy, planning of research as a whole was essential. The Fourth Plan outlay for scientific research should be considered as a whole inclusive of the outlays to be provided for research in other fields, e.g., agriculture, medicine, irrigation and power, etc."[42] This attempt was likewise not successful, although scientific research was given a separate section in the Plan document for the first time, and the Study Group went out of existence in February, 1967. There is a feeling among the Planning Commission's skeptics and critics that actual allocations for research in the Fourth Plan were decided by the

[40] H.K. Paranjpe, *The Planning Commission: A Descriptive Account*, New Delhi: Indian Institute of Public Administration, 1964, p. 91; A. Rahman, K.D. Sharma, Uma A. San, and Sudarshan Malik, *Science Policy in India* (Occasional Papers Series No. 1), New Delhi Research, Survey, and Planning Organization, Council of Scientific and Industrial Research, 1967; Interviews by the author with a CSIR scientist, New Delhi, January and March, 1967.

[41] Interviews by the author with officials of CSIR, New Delhi, January, February, and March 1967. Only the Fourth Plan Proposals of the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research have been published — Council of Scientific and Industrial Research, *Fourth Five-Year on the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research*, (Part I), New Delhi: The Council, 1965.

[42] Government of India, Lok Sabha, Estimates Committee, *Ministry of Education, Council of Scientific and Industrial Research: National Physical Research Laboratory* (One hundred and Third Report, Third Lok Sabha), New Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat, April, 1966, p. 11.

Commission on an *ad hoc* basis in the absence of any overall effort at comprehensive planning. Since the convention is now well established that all requests are highly inflated, or at least are so regarded by the Planning Commission, the Commission simply whittled them all down without attempting in any systematic way to relate the nature of the requests to national priorities in economic and social development.[43]

The most ambitious effort at planning of science was that mounted by the National Committee on Science and Technology, beginning in 1972, for the delayed implementation (1974-1979) of the Fifth Five Year Plan. Some 20 sectoral panels on different areas of research (natural resources, meteorology, marine resources, transportation, chemical industry, etc.) were formed, and over 2,000 scientists and engineers took part in the panels in an attempt to broaden in a substantial way participation of the scientific community in deciding future priorities for their work. A somewhat controversial "approach paper" was issued by NCST to guide the sectoral panels, and a number of the sectoral plans have also been published.[44]

While many useful ideas for scientific tasks of "national importance" were generated, the whole effort was in a sense ahead of itself since overall economic and social priorities, with which scientific and technological priorities must necessarily be coordinated, were not sharply enough defined to be useful in guiding the NCST exercise when it was getting underway. The attempt, furthermore, to link meaningfully

[43] CSIR, for example, originally drafted plans for the Fourth Five Year Plan totaling Rs 1.4 billion in 1965, was allocated Rs 700 million in the draft Fourth Five Year Plan which appeared in 1966, and eventually received, in the revised Fourth Five Year Plan released four years later (the initiation of the Fourth Five Year Plan was delayed by three years) Rs 500 million. See Council of Scientific and Industrial Research, *Fourth Five Year Plan: Part I* (Draft Fourth Five Year Plan submitted to the Board of Scientific and Industrial Research and the Governing Body of the CSIR by the Working Group for Scientific Research), New Delhi: The Council, 1965; Government of India Planning Commission, *Fourth Five Year Plan, 1966-71: A Draft Outline,* New Delhi: The Commission, 1966; *ibid., Fourth Five Year Plan: 1969-74,* New Delhi: The Commission, n.d. (? - 1969 or 70).

[44] See B.D. Tilak, "Planning of Science and Technology in India," (H.K. Sen Memorial Lecture, Calcutta, January 31, 1976). National Committee on Science and Technology, *An Approach to the Science and Technology Plan,* New Delhi: Department of Science and Technology, January 1973. This "approach paper" became controversial when it was pointed out that several passages come, with minor modifications, from unacknowledged sources. The paper nonetheless contains much wisdom about developing and implementing a more effective science and technology policy in the Indian context.

science policy and planing with economic and social planning by having the same minister hold both portfolios (and, *inter alia*, serve as Chairman of the NCST), lasted only for a relatively short period of time, and in the next Cabinet shuffle, the portfolios were again separated. And as before, getting various agencies and ministries to act upon NCST recommendations has proved to be difficult.

Still NCST did for the first time come up with a national plan for science and technology which no doubt can be improved in future versions. With the reorganization of the Committee in January 1975, a link with economic and social planning was re-established by designating the Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission as the Chairman of NCST, leading to the hope that, with the Planning Commission's power to influence priorities in budget allocations across government departments and ministries, more effective implementation will result.

One of the difficulties encountered by these various efforts to achieve more meaningful planning of the country's scientific effort is that government supported R & D effort is in substantial measure "mission-oriented" in terms of the basic organizational structures of government. By this is meant simply that R and D activity is spread among the number of different departments and agencies where the substance of the research is related to the overall mission of that department or agency. The obvious exceptions are atomic energy, which in a sense constitutes a mission of its own (at least in initial conception − as it has been diversifying its activities in recent years, this is less true) and the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research, which was for many years attached to the Ministry of Education and in more recent years has been part of the porfolio of the Minister of Planning and then the Minister of Industrial Development.

Consequently, the basis organizational structures of government through which the interaction between science and the political system takes place are at the departmental and ministerial levels. Because these are so basic, alternative organizational arrangements for the government's scientific efforts have been mooted from time to time. The alternatives which have been advanced range from an effort to bring together the Department of Atomic Energy and CSIR in a Ministry of Science to the possibility of linking CSIR with the Directorate General of Technical Development in a Ministry of Technology.[45]

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[45] Among propositions advanced for alternative ministerial and departmental

A step in the direction of giving separate departmental status to science and technology was taken in 1971 with the establishment of the Department of Science and Technology. Within this Department have been grouped a number of units formerly in the Ministry of Education such as the scientific surveys, a scheme of assistance to scientific societies and institutes, and the secretariat for the National Committee on Science and Technology.[46] But this arrangement does really alter the basic proposition that most research agencies are enmeshed in departmental structures with other primary purposes. What is significant about the Department of Science and Technology is not what is included but what is left out — agricultural, medical, defense, atomic energy, and space research and the universities, just to cite some of the most obvious examples.

The "ideal" arrangement appears to be one which combines "scientific-technological inclusiveness" (i.e., encompassing as much of the innovation chain as possible from research to utilization) at the task coordination or research council/department level and "scientific-technological togetherness" at the task implementation level. But except where the government has substantial direct control over utilization of the R and D activity (as in the case of atomic energy and defense), this is difficult to bring about. Linkages and relationships between potential users on the one hand and among kindred scientific organizations on the other can, however, be strengthened through different kinds of ministerial arrangements for science, and that should be the principal objective in considering any alternatives to the existing situation.

But there is a potential hazard in ministerial reorganization, and that is the temptation to think that reorganization at the top will solve underlying problems which determine the effectiveness of scientific institutions. More important than the formal ministerial arrangements for science are the quality of leadership, both scientific and administrative-political, and the character of the interaction between science and the political system which occurs as a result of the relationships of

arrangements for science and technology are the following: M.M. Suri, Unpublished Note on the Need for a Ministry of Technology, 1967; Government of India, Administrative Reforms Commission, *Report of the Study Team on Scientific Departments*, New Delhi: Manager of Publications, January, 1970; ARC, *Report of the Study Team on the Machinery of the Goverment of India and its Procedures of Work*, New Delhi: Manager of Publications.

[46] Governement of India, Department of Science and Technology, *Annual Report: 1974-75*, New Delhi: The Department, 1975.

the individuals involved. The principal value of one ministerial arrangement over another is that it may provide for certain kinds of formal linkages which make this interaction easier and more "natural."

Scientists as Participants in the Political System

Another form of interaction between science and the political system involves the direct participation of scientists and science organizations in that system. Edward Shils has suggested that a great many intellectuals in India (scientists being a major element in the intellectual community) are "alienated from the centers of public life."[47] One measure of such participation is membership in elected bodies, and generally in India, representation of those with scientific or technical background has been small (7 per cent in the third Lok Sabha, 1962-67, for example).[48]

This circumstance prompted one leading Indian scientist to comment:

Scientists by nature are largely inclined to shun involvement in political strife. Political parties, therefore, will have to go a little out of their way to persuade some of them who have retired or are about to retire from active scientific research or teaching to stand for election and take to parliamentary work. The younger scientists also, wherever possible, should be encouraged to take interest in the political affairs of the country, although on account of a great shortage of high level scientific and technical personnel in the country, it may not be just now in the national interest to divert too many of them from the laboratory to the public platform.[49]

[47] Edward Shils, *The Intellectual between Tradition and Modernity: The Indian Situation, op. cit.*, pp. 17, 116.

[48] Government of India, Lok Sabha, *Who's Who 1962*, New Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat, 1962. The British House of Commons has even smaller representation of scientifically and technically trained persons – less than 5 per cent (see S.E. Finer, *Anonymous Empire: A Study of the Lobby in Great Britain*, London, Pall Mall Press (2nd ed. 1966). The corresponding figure for the Canandian Parliament of members with scientific and technical background is approximately 15 per cent and for the American Congress, 7 per cent.

[49] A.C. Joshi, "Science Policy and the Coming Elections," *Science and Culture,* October, 1966, p. 474. See also *Lok Sabha Debates,* May 1, 1958, and Edward Shils, *Political Development in the New States,* The Hague: Mouton, 1966, p. 23.

If the definition of political participation is broadened, and if those scientists in leading administrative positions (which carry with them important policy functions) in high-level advisory posts and the like, are included, the number is, however, substantial. "In every new State, and particularly in those which live in the tradition of British rule," comments Shils, "there is a group of civic spirited, realistic, and responsible intellectuals, devoted to the public good, critical and yet sympathetic, interested in the political growth of their society and yet detached enough for immediate partisanship to constitute a corps of custodians of the public good in the present and the future."[50] While it is true, as Shils also notes, that they form only a small proportion of the intellectual class, the potential role which they can play in the political life of a nation like India is important.

Beyond the individual participation of scientists and technologists as senior administrators, advisers, or active political workers in the political system is the question of group participation of science organizations as organized professional interests. Scientists and engineers represent one of the major professional constituencies in Indian society and as such have, at least potentially, an important role to play in the political process by articulating and trying to advance positions on public policy questions related to their professional competence or affecting their professional status.

Interest groups of all shapes, sizes and descriptions abound in India. Interests organized around traditional loyalties to caste and religious community are clearly important. There are also innumerable trade unions, student organizations, industrial associations, and scientific and professional societies, organized around "non-traditional" ties. But for. the most part voluntary or occupational, or more narrowly professional interest associations are not very well developed in India, nor do they participate very effectively in the political system.[51]

The organizational apparatus of scientists and engineers exists in the professional societies and academies. But these "associational" interest groups in science and technology (with some exceptions especially in

[50] Shils, *ibid.*, p. 23.

[51] Myron Weiner, "The Politics of South Asia," in Almond and Coleman, eds., *The Politics of Developing Areas*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960, pp. 208-218; W.H. Morris-Jones, "India's Political Idioms," in C.H. Philips, ed., *Politics and Society in India*, New York: Praeger, 1962, p. 152.

the field of medicine) have yet to become effective and vital factors in representing their own interests in the political system. The failure to develop a really effective national elite science organization, and the continued dependence of the closest thing to that, the Indian National Science Academy, so heavily on government patronage with all the controls which that implies in India, is a case in point.

There is little evidence to suggest that the scientists and engineers have been able to achieve significant impact on the implementation of public policies directly related to their professional concerns. This stands in contrast to the practitioners of "modern" medicine, who have been reasonably successful in fending off attempts by practitioners of indigenous medicine to secure equal recognition from the government, and business and industrial groups which, while they have not have much impact on policy formulation, have apparently been able to influence its implementation where their "vital interests" are affected.[52]

The challenge to the scientists and engineers in India in the future is to develop this "associational" dimension by strengthening professional societies and academies. It is often said that there are scientists in India but no scientific community in the sense of a group within society which has a sufficient sense of self-identity, adequate internal communication, and widely accepted leadership to enable it to press forcefully for consideration of its interests within the political system.

The potential significance of the occupational group of scientists and technologists as a "professional estate" in the Indian political system is greatly enhanced by the fact that unlike most interest groups in that system which constitute parochial rather than integrating forces, scientists and technologists represent a national contituency, notwithstanding the regional pulls to which they are subjected.[53] If it is to achieve

[52] Paul R. Brass, "The Politics of Ayurvedic Education: A Case Study of Revivalism and Modernization in India," in Susanne Hoeber and Lloyd I. Rudolph, eds., *Education and Politics in India: Studies in Organization, Society, and Policy*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972; Stanley Kochanek, "The Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry and Indian Politics" (Paper prepared for annual meeting of the Association for Asian Studies), April, 1970. Interest groups in Indian politics have generally concentrated on gaining access to the executive and bureaucracy and on influencing implementation of public policy rather than its formulation, as Kochanek makes clear in his study of Indian business, and to a somewhat lesser degree, Brass in his study of Ayurvedic medicine. The point is also been made by Weiner in the work cited in the next note.

[53] See, for example, Myron Weiner, *The Politics of Scarcity: Public Pressure*

this potential the scientific and technological estate must be able to function increasingly as an "associational" interest group with a measure of independence from the government but with an equal measure of involvement in the political system. Along with other major professional and intellectual constituencies in Indian society, to the extent that they are able to retain a national, rather than regional identity, it could become an important cohesive factor in maintaining the national political system as an effective instrument for economic and social advancement.

Political Change and the Future of Indian Science

In sum, the activities of Indian scientists and the organizations which they inhabit, like any other significant form of social endeavor, are inevitably intertwined with and affected by the political system which in turn is conditioned by changes in society at large. The impact of the professional estate of Indian scientists and technologists on the political system is primarily in creating new policy options or helping to resolve economic and social problems, such as keeping open the military nuclear option or increasing food production.

The impact of the political system on the scientific community is substantial and varied. Priorities for scientific work, funding, personnel arrangements and conditions of work, including internal administration of science organizations, and circumstances of utilization of the results of research and development conducted by scientists and technologists are all significantly determined by or within the political system. Some of these determinations are to be expected and would be found anywhere — for example, overall priorities for research and levels of funding. Other forms of intervention by the political system, such as involvement

and Political Response in India, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962, for an analysis of the role of interest groups in the Indian political system. Don K. Price, in his work, *The Scientific Estate* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), defines professional estates as "groups of institutions and individuals that are distinguished not by formal public office, nor by economic or class interest, but by the differences in the nature of their training and their skills" (p. 135). Price in fact draws a careful distinction between various professional estates, such as medicine and engineering which are organized around some concrete social purpose, and the scientific estate, which serves the more abstract purpose of advancing truth and knowledge. But his differentiation is of doubtful validity in the Indian context where science is patronized because of the presumption that it does serve a concrete, if not always immediate, social purpose.

in appointments of personnel and determination of internal administrative and other procedures affecting scientific work, stem from the relative lack of autonomy of the organizational network for science and technology.

The Indian political system, like all political systems, is changing. One of the imponderables for the future is how the Indian scientifc community will be affected by these changes. On the one hand, continuing centralization of power at the center would appear to enhance the potential role of this community in helping to further important nation-building tasks in which research and development in such fields as atomic energy, defense, and industrial development may open up new options for policy makers, as they have already done in the past 30 years. On the other hand, decentralization of political power is likely to generate pressures for reorientation of the scientific community to address itself to local and regional needs, especially those of the economically depressed rural sectors of society. Time alone will tell which trend becomes dominant, but in this process, the Indian political system and the prevailing social order will, as in other countries, exercise the decisive influence on the scientific community rather than the other way around.[54]

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[54] The dominance of the political system over the scientific community has been well established by Joseph Haberer in a series of case studies of national scientific communities in such countries as Germany, Britain, and the United States, in his seminal study, *Politics of Science.*

Intellectuals in Post-Independence India

Suma Chitnis

Intellectuals: A Clue To the Ethos of a Society

The behavior of the educated elite within a society provides one of the most revealing clues to the understanding of its ethos. In order to gauge whether a society is dynamic or static one has merely to look at whether the academics, professionals, scientists, technologists, artists, and writers function as intellectuals at all, that is whether they are or not involved in reflecting and acting upon social and political issues, whether or not they function as responsible professionals and whether they do or do not contribute creatively to thought, literature or art. In order to gauge whether a society is well integrated or fragmented, one has but to examine whether these intellectuals share common concerns, or are isolated within their own specialities, whether the issues they take up are in tune with the interests of the masses or are highly elitist. This paper is a mosaic of impressions regarding the educated elite in post-independence India, put together with a view to describing some aspects of the ethos of life in Indian society today.

A Contrast With the Past

It is often commented that one of the most striking contrasts between post-independence India and India during the century and a half of the British rule prior to independence lies in the difference between the social and political involvement of the university educated elite in each of these two periods. Looking back upon the British period one is impressed with the leadership for thought and action on social and political issues provided by the university educated elite of these times. That kind of an involvement seems to be lacking these days. Since the pre-

independence elite were largely a product of the British system of education in India it would be pertinent to start with education as a factor in the development of intellectuals.

The British launched the Western system of education in India with two basic objectives. The first was to obtain the clerical, supervisory and petty administrative staff that they required for commerce and government. The second was to transmit Western culture to Indians. It was believed that this transmission of Western culture would help cultivate a loyal elite — loyal because, though Indian by birth, they would be British in thought, feeling and out-look. The first purpose was admirably accomplished. Both, the "babus" and the "brown sahibs" that the education system produced were eminently suited to their respective niches in the British Raj. In fact some of the products of the British system of education rose far beyond the initial expectations of educational planners. They qualified for further education at Oxbridge or at the English bar, turned out to be eminent professionals in law, and even measured up to standards suited to their appointment in the prestigious Indian civil service.

The second purpose was also accomplished but not quite in the manner visualized by the British authorities. The system did produce a university-educated elite who were British in thought, feeling, and attitude but they were an elite loyal to British ideals, culture and philosophy rather than to British rule. Committed as they were to the liberal outlook prevalent in England, and in most of Europe during the nineteenth century, these elite were highly critical of such British practices and attitudes in India as seemed to be contrary to liberal notions of fair play and justice. They formed the thrust of social reform movements in the country from the early nineteenth century onwards, and of movements for political reform and eventually for self-rule from the mid-nineteenth century on. Throughout the nineteenth and half of the twentieth century their involvement in social and political issues was distinguished as much for quality in thinking and articulation as for purposiveness and dynamism in action. Their achievements are evidenced, to start with, in reforms like the abolition of suttee, female infanticide and thugee, later in movements like those for the promotion of widow remarriage or for the education and social uplift of Harijans, and finally in the accomplishment of freedom, the designing of the Constitution and the launching of the government of independent India. The names of leaders like Raja Ram Mahan Roy, Pandit Ishwar Chandra Vidyasagar, Dadabhai Nowroji, Tilak,. Gokhale and Rande shine

through history while Gandhi, Motilal and Jawaharlal Nehru, Sarojini Naidu are leaders of only yesterday.

Impressed with the manner in which education had contributed to the development of leadership for independence and social reform, the planners for independent India invested heavily in education. As a consequence of this investment, education has grown enormously. The number of universities in the country has increased from 17 in 1947 to 94 in 1974, and the number of university students from 237,546 to 4,102,211. Expansion of higher education has been marked not only by quantitative growth but by the establishment of highly sophisticated centers of learning such as the institutes of technology, institutes of management, the All India Institute of Medical Sciences and several research institutions and laboratories. This super-structure of university-level education is supported with a base of expansion of school level education as well. The number of primary schools has increased from 172,681 in 1947 to 429,888 in 1974, the number of middle and secondary schools from 21,970 to 160,218. The number of school students at all levels has increased from sixteen and a half million in 1947 to about eighty-five and a half million in 1974. Now, at the end of two and a half decades of continuing investment the government is faced with serious doubts as to whether the pay-off has been proportionate to the investment made. Has education contributed adequately to development? The contribution of the educated elite is particularly in question. And in fact some critics have openly stated that the educated elite do not function as responsible intellectuals and do not contribute to the country in the measure expected of them. What, one may ask, is the situation?

An Evaluation of the Criticism

Granting that responsible intellectuals are expected to provide leadership in thinking and in action, the comment that the educated elite have not been reflecting and articulating adequately on social, political or professional issues, not been generating thought and dialogue that could provide guidelines for policy and for action, and not been offering candid, considered, and creative criticism of the plans and the programs that operate. It could also be taken to mean that Indian literature has not been incisive in portraying and analysing Indian life and its problems. Or, that Indian scientists and technologists have not been taking enough initiative in innovation, adaptation and organization, towards development.

Initially, one is inclined to admit that criticism on most of these counts is justified. As compared to their counterparts of the pre-independence era, the reaction of today's intellectuals to social and to political issues is lukewarm. They are not particularly reflective or constructively critical as professionals either. Nor do they lead socio-political reform-oriented religious movements such as those that led to the birth of the Brahmo Samaj, the Arya Samaj, the Prarthana Samaj, in the nineteenth century, and to the establsihment of Shri Aurobindo's Ashram at Pondichery, or later even to Gandhi's efforts to reform the Hindu outlook on the caste system. Serious reflection, conceptualization or theorizing on social change or development, and the transition for tradition to modernity, or upon specific policies and issues, is extremely limited. The latter shortcoming is particularly striking in contrast to the indulgence of educated Indians in arm-chair criticism of policies and performance of the government, and their practice of making derogatory comparisons — both between post-independence and pre-independence India and between India and the developed countries of the socialist or the capitalist world. Indian scientists and technologists seem to have failed to make an adequate breakthrough in research oriented towards solution of the country's problems in food, health, population control, education or industrial development. And, what is probably the worst, many Indians with sophisticated education have chosen to migrate to the developed world rather than harness themselves to the solution of the country's many problems.

Yet, even in making an initial admission of the validity of such criticism one is drawn back with strong reservations. The reservation does not stem either from belicose patriotism or from defensiveness on behalf of the university educated. Rather it is prompted by an awareness of the need to probe an issue that is in danger of oversimplification, by a feeling that there are many fine aspects to the reactions of the educated elite in India today that need to be understood, and that it is more valuable to sort these out than to dub the behavior of intellectuals as evasive, indifferent or inadequate in some other way. The following is a discussion of the role that the educated elite of post-independence India have played in some significant spheres.

The Intellectual as Social Critic and Commentator

The social context: Since reflection upon, reaction to, and criticism of the established order is considered to be one of the primary functions

of intellectuals in any society, it would be pertinent to examine this issue first. In considering the contrast between the role of the intellectual as a social critic and commentator in the periods prior to and after independence, it is necessary to recognize that pre-independence India offered a highly favorable setting for this aspect to the intellectual's role. British imperialism in India exhibited many features contradictory to the British liberalism which Indians had consciously been educated to respect, and the policies and practices of the government provided a ready target for criticism on the part of the educated elite. The fact that the government was alien, further legitimized the role of the intellectuals as critics, inasmuch as their criticism carried an aura of nationalism and patriotism and therefore received approbation from the masses. Thus, with their base in liberalism and nationalism, the social reform movements and the struggle for freedom, together, provided both a rallying point for the integration of the elites and a common front for their opposition to the existing order.

With the achievement of independence, the relevance of opposition to the existing order was lost. The elite could not be expected to contradict the order that they themselves had struggled to establish. On the contrary, there was conscious recognition and articulation of the need to integrate towards the consolidation of the gains of independence and to discourage fissiparous criticism. Looking back upon the two and a half decades since independence, one is inclined to feel that this consciousness overshot its purpose and inhibited constructive criticism on the part of intellectuals. This inhibition had repercussions in all areas of life, but probably its most visible impact has been in politics. In spite of the acceptance of a system of parliamentary democracy and of the recognition of the need for a strong and a committed political opposition to the ruling party, the country has failed to produce a responsible, committed, and effective political opposition to the ruling power.

Education: Another important factor that needs to be taken into account while considering the role of the intellectual as a critic and commentator is the change in the character of higher education since independence. Higher education in India had never been structured to cultivate the qualities essential to the functioning of the educated elite as intellectuals, viz., critical questioning, dialogue and articulation on the part of students and scholarship, creative writing, research and application of knowledge on the part of teachers. But in spite of the structure of higher education these qualities could somehow be cultivated in the pre-independence period. Since independence the situation has changed.

For instance, the lecture system does not encourage students to question the viewpoints of their teachers and to develop their own outlook and perspectives as scholars. But when the number of students enrolled at universities was small and when the student population was drawn from an exclusive and fairly homogenous social elite it was possible for teachers to interact with their students, invite comments, and to nurture, ar least among some of them, the capacity to formulate and articulate a viewpoint. With independence and the consequent expansion of education this possibility has vanished. There is no room for interaction between teachers and students in or outside the classroom, and learning has deteriorated into a one way process. The capacity for dialogue, discussion and development of a viewpoint cannot be cultivated in this situation.

Similarly, the manner in which the role of the university teacher is defined and in which promotions and rewards for the teaching faculty are structured, have never been such as to encourage teachers to cultivate themselves as academics and as scholars. But prior to independence, because positions as university teachers were limited and carried a high social status, teachers were motivated to measure up to their social image and develop themselves as scholars. Moreover, regardless of structural limitations, the ethos of the academic community happened to be favorable to acholarship because a large sector of the academic community, especially the norm setters, belonged to the I.E.S. This prestigious service consisted of teachers who had been trained at good European universities and who looked upon these universities for reference in defining their own academic norms. The high social status available to college teachers, together with the attitude of I.E.S. teachers helped generate an academic ethos which not only generated but almost demanded high academic standards on the part of academics.

After independence the rapid expansion of higher education generated a massive need for university teachers. Since high caliber persons were not available in adequate numbers, relatively poor scholars had to be employed. This led to a dilution of standards. The dilution was further accelerated by the fact that with the growth of new, attractive, challenging and lucrative job opportunities in the developing economy, university teaching ceased to be one of the high status occupations and ceased to attract well qualified scholars. To top it all came the abolition of the I.E.S. which had functioned as the norm setter. All this led to a deterioration of scholarship on the part of the university faculty, and to a situation wherein the teaching community grew to be a community

of "lecturers" rather than of "academics." Inevitably, the quality of the graduates produced by universities declined proportionately.

The situation has been somewhat remedied by the appointment of a faculty with high academic standards at eminent centers of education such as the institutes of management or of technology. But the repair is not enough to restore creative and independent scholarship or critical ability of a high order among academics at the mass of less prestigious institutions. Students are severely affected both by the shortcomings of a system that is not structured to cultivate critical scholarship on their part and by the poor academic example of their teachers. They graduate with less and less capacity to function as reliable intellectuals.

There is yet another change that must be taken into account while discussing education as a factor in the behavior of intellectuals viz. the post-independence shift away from a liberal education in the humanities, to pragmatic education in pure science and technology. Education in the humanities, particularly in history, philosophy and literature, exposes students to a wide range of social issues. It encourages dialogue and discussion of social problems and situations, cultivates the inclination to speculate upon alternatives and builds the inclination to articulate one's own preferences and prejudices. As against this, education in pure science and technology tends to confine students to the sphere of their expertise. It cultivates a sharp consciousness of the need for precision in perception and articulation and inhibits statements that are speculative in character. In view of this difference between education in science and technology, and education in the humanities, it is possible that the post-independence movement of the cream of the student population into science and technology has a great deal to do with the reluctance of the educated elite to comment or speculate upon social and political issues.

Intellectual tradition in India: Apart from these factors relating to post-independence changes in the social context and in the education system, one must take into account some of the other relevant features of the role of the intellectual as a critic commentator. Most important among these is the fact that until the coming of the British, and even thereafter, intellectuals came exclusively from the higher castes. As a consequence their concerns were essentially high caste concerns viz. religion, philosophy, literature, and at the most, law and administration. Further, in keeping with the ethos of a culture that placed high premium on tradition, these intellectuals functioned as interpreters of tradition rather than as critics or as generators of new thought. It is inter-

esting to observe that even authors of eminent treatises in law or states-
manship, scholars like Manu or Kautilya for instance, are considered to
be 'consolidators' and 'interpreters' of tradition rather than as innova-
tive thinkers.

The concept of the intellectual as a critic and commentator con-
cerned with issues drawn from the mainstream of life is essentially Euro-
pean. It has its origins in the Socratic tradition and has flowered through
the industrial era into the present times in Western society due to sup-
portive factors such as liberal philosophy, democratic or constitutional
rule and government, universal literacy, the mass media and the institu-
tion of several mechanisms for the promotion of discovery, innovation,
creative expression and freedom of thought and articulation.

India does not have a tradition of a corresponding role for intellec-
tuals. Nor are the listed supportive factors available in the country in
the same measure as they are in the West. The Indians who functioned
as critics and commentators in British India were in effect stepping into
a role that belonged to the British culture in India. Together with the
ruling powers they, as Western-educated Indians, constituted a small
orbit to which the role was relevant. It lay outside the periphery of the
rest of Indian life. With the exit of the British, the orbit in which the
educated elite has functioned as intellectuals was broken. Much of
intellectual expression was channelled into planning, policy making, ad-
ministration and technological development. Some of it sought an out-
let in literature, fine and folk art. In order to evaluate the role of the in-
tellectual in India today it would be useful to examine what the educat-
ed elite of the country have done in each of these spheres.

The Intellectual as a Creative Artist

The flowering of drama, of the novel, of biography and of the short
story in some of the regions of the country that had been noted for the
alertness of its intellectuals during the pre-independence period seems
to be the outcome of this happening. In Maharashtra, for instance,
there has been a spurt of Marathi writing during the last twenty-five
years. Some of it has focused on looking at historical or traditional
characters from the viewpoint of modernity. Ranjit Desai's biography
of Madhavrao Peshwa (Swami) for instance, or of Shivaji (Shreeman
Yogi), Joshi's biography of Anandi Gopal, Irawati Karve's Yuganta and
Vijay Tendolkar's Ghashiram Kotwal, belong to this category. Some,
like Pendse's Rathachakra and Garambicha Bapu (about life in the Kon-

kan districts of Maharashtra), Geeta Sane's Chambal chi Dasya Bhoomi (about the life of the dacoits of Mayda Pradesh), Arun Sadhu's Mumbai Deenanka (about life in Bombay), Anil Awchat's Purnea (about land problems among the tribes of Maharashtra) Godavari Parulekar's Manus Jaga Hoto (about the awakening of the awareness of the rights due to tribes in Maharashtra) have concentrated on exploring and portraying the life, the problems, and the moods of a local area or region. There have been historical analyses of social reform movements such as N.R. Phatak's analyses of Ranade and Gokhale and Ranade's restatement of Shiva ji, and plays such as Tendolkar's Udhvastha Dharmashala which is an exploration of disillusionment with ideology, or P.L. Deshpande's Tuze Ahe Tuzapashi, which is a cynical questioning of the Gandhian way of public leadership and service. The list is long and the themes are varied. They range from frivolous farce to pointed criticism of current beliefs and practices such as the treatment of the untouchables and tribals. In between lie explorations into historical happenings and characters, into relationships, modes of behavior, situations, moods and sentiments which were hitherto seldom probed. Most of this writing is sensitive and has depth. Some of it has a fierce realism which was unknown a few years ago.

However, regional language writing has limited circulation and therefore fails to make a national impact. In a country which, with at least fourteen officially recognized languages, each with several dialects, has very limited facilities for translation, the consumption of regional language writing is bound to be restricted to specific language groups and linguistic regions. Even within such groups and regions, its consumption is limited to those who are educated. The restriction in the consumption of the writing makes for restriction in the response to it. Reaction, revibration and regeneration of thought are limited to the region in which it is born or expressed. This is a major tragedy. It makes for a situation wherein criticism and creative thought remain ripples in isolation in spite of their potential for growth into major movements.

There are other pitfalls that regional writers face. Since readers who are only equipped with a regional language are restricted in their exposure to thought, they appreciate translations. Consequently, regional language writers have an important role to play as translators and communicators. Since the role is rewarding, writers are tempted to confine themselves to it. Some writers have succumbed to this temptation, slipped into the comfortable role of translator and seem merely to be conveying to their audiences thoughts, ideas and feelings expressed in other

cultures. But, by and large, the regional language literary movement in at least some states in the country is alive with a new dynamism.

The same cannot quite be said of literary expression in English. There has been a new wave of writing and the emergence of a distinct Anglo-Indian literature such as, to mention a few, the novels by Manhar Malgaonkar, Praweer Jhabwala and Raja Rao, or the poetry of Kamala Das. But English literature in India lacks the breadth, the depth, the dynamism and the earthy realism that characterize some of the regional language literature of the post-independence era. This is largely a reflection of the fact that the Western-educated English language authors are divorced from the masses and from the mainstream of life. They can feel with, and speak for, only a thin veneer of urban, upper class India. Although their expression as members of this class exhibits a new confidence, few among them are able to come to grips with the core of Indian life.

The films, music, the fine arts and the folk arts are less affected by this gap between the elite and the mainstream of life, and the entry of educated Indians as experimenters, organizers or critics in films and in the arts is a major happening. Its consequences are evident in a big way. Films like Satyajit Ray's famous trilogy, Sham Benegal's Ankur; music by instrumentalists like Ravi Shankar, Alla Rakha, Bismillah Khan, Ali Akbar Khan, Amjad Ali Khan or Pandit Shiv Sharma and by the several eminent vocalists of the north and the south Indian traditions; the magnificent revival of traditional woodcraft, ivory and sandal wood-work, carpet making, brassware, papier mâché, weaving, embroidery, fashioning of jewellery and pottery would not have been possible without the involvement of the educated Indian elite in fields into which they had never really condescended to stray before independence.

Religion and the Educated Elite

Post-independence contribution to religion is probably best known through the religion that the country exports. In response to the West's growing interest in Indian religion, philosophy, trascendental meditation and yoga, there has been an explosion of writing and discourse in these fields by Indians for audiences abroad. Though not so well known, there have been religious developments for indigenous consumption as well. Except for Ambedkar's massive movement for the conversion of Hindu untouchables to Buddhism in the early fifties, there has not been much of the social reform-linked examination

and revision of religious concepts and practices that marked the religious movements of the nineteenth century. But there has been a tremendous revival of the Geeta cult and a massive generation of literature on this cult. There are active yoga and transcendental mediation groups in major cities and there has been a marked increase in the sophistication of religious discussion at ashrams such as those at Pondicherry in the south or Rshikesh in the north.

Another important current of intellectual involvement in religion is the effort to Indianize the Christian church. Initially, Indianization started with the adoption of external practices from Hindu worship — the substitution of oil lamps for candles in Christian churches for instance and of grass mats for pews in Christian chapels, or the practice of squatting crosslegged instead of kneeling at prayer. It has now proceeded to the inclusion of Sanskrit shlokas in Christian liturgy and prayer and to explorations on the part of some Christian religious individuals to combine Christian religion with Hindu philosophy. The latter effort is small, but it is significant in terms of the radical change it involves in Christian thinking. In fact the acceptance of the legitimacy of such exploration by Christian authorities and institutions is something of a minor revolution.

Similarly there have been impressive efforts, on the part of Christian missionaries, particularly missionary educators, to sort out their loyalties and commitments and to examine and redefine their objectives and values in the context of nationalism, secularism and egalitarianism.

Technology: the Contribution of the Educated Elite

While the absorption of the post-independence educated elite with literature, the fine arts and religion is remarkable, their involvement in technology is by far the most significant aspect of their role in post-independence India. Indian technologists have been enormously successful in the transfer of technology from the West. They have been equally successful in designing and managing the massive technological organizations set up in the country. The steel complexes, chemical plants, refineries, thermal and hydroelectric power projects, heavy electrical and engineering plants, the textile, jute, automobile and bicycle industries and, above all, the nuclear and atomic energy establishments in the country, present massive evidence of technological achievements both in terms of technical accomplishment as well as organizational expertise and skill. Nevertheless there are two major criti-

cisms made against the technologists in the country and both seem to be fairly valid. The first is criticism to the effect that there is tendency on the part of highly trained scientists and technologists to migrate. The second is the criticism against their heavy reliance on highly sophisticated technology developed in the West and their unwillingness and inability to develop intermediate technology, geared to the optimal utilization of the labor and the indigenous resources available in the country.

The migration of educated Indians to the developed countries is largely the consequence of an imbalance between the growth of higher education and the development of the economy. A large number of technically qualified people migrate because there has been an overproduction of highly trained manpower, and jobs are not easily available. The overproduction of highly trained persons is, in turn, the consequence both of the inability of planners to gauge manpower needs and the inability of the government to check the demand for higher education in fields that were beginning to be saturated with employment and to channel it into areas and at levels more pertinent to the needs of the economy.

However, the miscalculation of manpower needs and overproduction of highly trained manpower is only part of the problem leading to the migration of qualified Indians. A more serious and a more complex problem has been that elite educational institutions seem, indirectly and unconsciously, to be generating the motivation to migrate. Most of these institutions have been modelled after universities and colleges in North America and Europe. They duplicate not only the content and the technology of instruction, but the physical facilities, life style and values of these institutions without making adequate allowance for the difference in the context in which Indian students have to function. They communicate sophisticated knowledge and skills without making students adequately aware of the importance of adapting these to Indian needs. While they equip students with skills that are sophisticated enough to make it possible for them to compete for opportunities in the world employment market, and whet their aspirations for work situation, economic returns and mobility and opportunity of the kind available in the developed world, they fail to build students' anchorage in India. Inevitably, a large number of students from these institutions are attracted to seek their prospects abroad. It is not surprising that they find it easier to slip into life in these countries than to make the strenuous effort of applying themselves to the complex problems of development in their own.

The inability of Indian scientists and technologists to innovate towards better utilization of the labor and the natural resources of the country may also be traced in part to some features of education in science and technology. Prominent among these are the over-sophistication of the knowledge and skills communicated and lack of the cultivation of a commitment to adapt to local need. However, the organizational structure of the Indian economy is at least as much to blame as faulty education for the slow and halting contribution of the educated elite on this front.

For instance, it could be argued that the semi-feudal character of Indian agriculture has prevented its modernization. One of the hypotheses put forward by those who hold this point of view is that feudal landowners do not utilize the irrigation potential in the country because they are afraid that it may lead to an improvement in the condition of their sharecroppers and laborers and cost them not only cheap labor and interest income accruing from the chronic indebtedness of these people, but also the political power derived from having them in debt. Another hypothesis is that the character of the tenant/owner contracts is such that tenants have neither the ability nor the inclination to invest in improvements such as fertilizers or pesticides in agriculture.

Similarly, with respect to the industrial sector there is considerable truth in the argument that facilities like tariff protection, subsidized finances, underpriced foreign exchange, protected markets for import-substituting industries, and the provision of intermediate goods through the public sector have distorted labor-capital ratios, and inhibited competition of the kind that forces entrepreneurs to seek out economic ways for the utilization and development of resources. The argument that the encouragement of foreign collaboration in import-substituting industries has cultivated a tendency to import and to transfer technology rather than to stimulate rigorous research for the development of indigenous practices, skills and technology is equally valid.

The Educated Elite and Conceptualization for Development

Looked at from this point of view, then, the entire issue of the inadequate contribution of scientists and technologists is basically a matter of inadequate leadership in the choice and the provision of strategies for development. One is forced to ask some basic questions that pinpoint the responsibilities of intellectuals. Are agricultural and industrial policies in the country conceived with vision? Are they based on ade-

quate facts and analyses? Where do the thinking and the conceptualization that guide plans and policies come from? From university academics or scholars at prestigious research institutions? From politicians, planners, scientists, technologists or administrators? What are the constraints under which these intellectuals function? And what does the situation hold for the future? It would be presumptuous to undertake to answer all, or any, of these questions exhaustively in this paper. Nevertheless, some brief comments would be in order.

Most planning both at the policy and at the administrative level is done by eminent administrators and politicians. A few scholars from elite research institutions, and occasionally some professionals, do figure in planning committees at various levels, but by and large university academics are minimally involved. Planning has been heavily handicapped by the fact that relevant information and figures are not easily available. In retrospect one is inclined to say that planning has also been complicated by a philosophy of "neutrality" as reflected in the effort of planners to ensure that they are not swayed totally towards either the capitalist or the socialist models of development. Because of this, planning has lacked an integrated, overruling perspective. Programs and policies have grown to be a patchwork of reforms adapted in fragments because they have worked elsewhere.

Indian intellectuals could be criticized for their failure to provide planners with the facts required, and for their failure to develop a clearly defined and integrated ideology for action. On the latter issue, Indians have been under special fire since the Chinese displayed their capacity for leadership and action. The social scientists in the country have been most vulnerable to criticism, particularly in view of the fact that Indians started with some advantages that many newly independent countries of the twentieth century never had. Data from the decennial census from 1910 onwards for instance, or from the archeological survey of India.

It must be granted that the census and the archeological survey of India were fact-finding organizations well established before independence. However, that was about all. Basic data of the kind available for planning in developed countries had never been built up during British rule. Nor had research in the social sciences been properly institutionalized. With the advent of self-rule the country was faced with the challenge of immediately producing data of the kind that the advanced nations had developed over decades.

The borrowing of social science research technology from developed

societies has not been as successful as the transfer of other technologies. Research models used in modern industrialized societies cannot easily be duplicated in India. They call for an elaborate infrastructure of information, are designed for more compact and homogenous cultures and are expensive to operate. After some initial waste of effort in trying to transfer sophisticated social science research methods to India, Indian social scientists have now begun to discover more practical compromises. The institution of research grants, of research departments at several government departments and at universities, of special institutes for research and, more recently, the establishment of the Indian Council of Social Science Research, have given a tremendous boost to social science research. As a consequence social scientists are beginning to provide substantial data particularly in fields like education, community development, and family planning.

As regards criticism of the Indian intellectuals' failure to develop ideology or a conceptual frame for action, the problem is more complicated. The country has its share of committed ideologists belonging to well defined schools both right and left, and these ideologists have their neat strategies for action. But, the majority of the Indian intellectuals — and this includes university academics, social scientists, writers, politicians, technologists and others — do not seem to be in a position to define their options. Their hesitation is partly rooted in a tradition which discourages polarization and favors compromise in thought and in action. But it seems also to be a reaction to the current world disillusionment with the operation and implementation of ideology. The credibility of democracy as led by the United States has suffered damage due to Watergate and the CIA exposures. Socialism is suspect not only because of the emergence of power structures and of accompanying struggles for power in socialist societies, but also because of actions on the part of socialist countries that smack of opportunism in world politics.

Conclusion

Those who watch India from the outside may be irritated and impatient with the failings of the Indian intellectual. Many in India are likely to share these sentiments. But the post-independence achievement of Indians in literature, religion, science, technology, management and many other fields in far from negligible. Twenty five years is a short span in the life of a nation. To have faced the trauma of liberation, to have consoli-

dated a newly discovered nationhood, and to have helped the country take the great leap forward from an early nineteenth century existence to its present status is no small achievement on the part of Indian intellectuals. If their contribution was slow and halting during the first decade and a half of freedom, it has picked up pace since the sixties. Indians are beginning to display a new self-respect and confidence in the quest for their own path of development. This augurs well for the future — this, at least, is the view of an optimistic Indian.

In Search of Saraswati:
The Ambivalence of the
Indian Academic[1]

Philip G. Altbach

"In the land of the guru, the profession which has taken over its obligations is held in low esteem both by those who practice it and by others."[2]

The theme of this paper is ambivalence, and its topic is the Indian academic profession. This is a broad topic, since there are 156,562 teachers in the university system, with all but 26,569 of these in the undergraduate colleges affiliated to the universities.[3] India's higher education system is the third largest in the world, after the United States and the Soviet Union, and currently enrolls more than 3 million students. The teaching community is, thus, a large and important element of India's society. Further, it has a long tradition. Universities date from the mid-nineteenth century, and some colleges are even older. This discussion concerns, for the most part, college teachers, who constitute the large majority of the teaching community. It is in part a case study

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[1]   This paper is part of a study of the Indian academic community. A related article will appear in *Higher Education* and the data will be more fully reported in P.G. Altbach, Suma Chitnis, and Jyoti Kulkarni, *The Academic Profession in Maharashtra* (in preparation). Further detailed discussion can be found in Suma Chitnis, "The Teacher Role in the College System," (Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Bombay, 1969). I am indebted to Dr. Suma Chitnis and Dr. Sheila McVey for their comments on this paper.

[2]   Edward Shils, "The Academic Profession in India, *Minerva*, 7 (Spring, 1969), p. 345.

[3]   For a description of the Indian post-secondary educational system, see P.G. Altbach, "Higher Education in India," in B. Burn. P.G Altbach, C. Kerr and J. Perkins, *Higher Education in Nine Countries*, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971), pp. 317-344. See also P.G. Altbach, *The University in Transition: An Indian Case Study*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Schenkman, 1972).

of the University of Bombay, but has relevance to the rest of India, since conditions do not differ markedly throughout the country. [4]

It is my argument that the college teaching community finds itself in a particularly difficult situation and that, as a result of many factors, it has not developed fully into a profession and has not contributed substantially to the broader intellectual life of the nation. Perhaps more seriously, the standards of teaching are low and the teaching staffs seemingly have neither the power nor the will to make the kinds of changes needed to improve standards. College teachers feel that they are not adequately paid, that they have little control over their conditions of work, that independent scholarly endeavor is not rewarded, and that standards of education are inadequate. While many teachers work to the best of their abilities and some colleges manage to engender a sense of commitment, in general the teaching community has little feeling of autonomy. College teaching, for most teachers, is not a "calling" but rather a job, and a poorly paid job at that.

The college has an important but somewhat subservient place in the Indian higher education system. Colleges are responsible for undergraduate education of virtually all Indian students, and handle approximately 90 per cent of post-secondary education in India. In that sense, they are the key element of the system. However, most colleges are "affiliated" to a parent university. This means that the university, which is generally physically separate from the college and has relatively little intellectual contact with it, has minimal standards for the affiliation of new colleges in terms of collegiate facilities. The university sets all examinations and gives degrees — the colleges have no power to grant degrees. The university sets the syllabus which is designed to dovetail with the examinations, and the colleges have little control over their curriculum.[5] Finally,

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[4]   This study is based on 'pilot' interviews conducted in Bombay in December, 1975 and on available secondary materials. Dr. Suma Chitnis' thesis, *op.cit.* was a valuable source of data. For comparisons with Bihar, see B.N. Sinha, "The Problems and Attitudes of University Teachers in Bihar," (Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Ranchi University, 1969). There is, in general, very little empirical data on this topic.

[5]   This system is now in the process of modest change. After a decade of debate, some of the better colleges will be made "autonomous," with the ability to grant their own degrees, set examinations, and design the curriculum. While a major step forward, these new "autonomous" colleges will not change the basic nature of the system.

the university sets salaries for college teachers and often legislates the means of hiring – and firing – teachers. In short, the university bureaucracy, which has some college representatives on various committees, maintains significant control over undergraduate education but has little direct role in it. This situation contributes to a situation of unique powerlessness, both on the part of the teachers in the undergraduate colleges and on the part of the colleges themselves.

Undergraduate or college teachers have a somewhat ambivalent position in many countries, and India is one of these. They are, for the large majority of students, the embodiment of higher education. In a sense, they set the tone for post-secondary education. But they are not in the forefront of intellectual life. College teachers are seldom "creative intellectuals" in the sense that they do not produce research or creative writing. They are, however, very much part of the intellectual system in that they transmit knowledge and culture to large numbers of students. [6] College teachers are often not fully professional in that they do not have real autonomy over their working conditions and often do not control key elements of their teaching situations. In most university systems the main burden of research and scholarship is carried by professors in university settings that offer a full range of graduate studies. These institutions have adequate research facilities and libraries and faculty members are expected, in many countries, to actively participate in the research enterprise. College teachers stand somewhere in the middle, and their situation is one of ambivalence. On the one hand, they are part of the post-secondary educational system and have many of the expectations of their colleagues in universities in terms of social prestige, roles, and income. On the other, they do not often perform the "prestigeful" functions of research and graduate teaching that are the hallmarks of the university teacher.

Much of the research and discussion concerning the academic profession has focused on that small minority of teachers at the top of the academic hierarchy. This paper deals largely with the large majority who are responsible for the education of most students. In the Third

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[6] For further discussion of intellectuals, see Edward Shils, "Intellectuals," in International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, (New York: Macmillan, 19.) See also Edward Shils, "Toward a Modern Intellectual Community in the New States," in E. Shils, *The Intellectuals and the Powers and Other Essays*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972), pp. 335-371.

World, college teachers are especially crucial since they shape the educational experiences of that section of the population which usually becomes the articulate and politically potent middle class.

College teachers, in India and the Third World especially, are in a particularly ambivalent situation. Academic tradition are largely Western in origin and orientation, and indigenous roots are sometimes weak. As a result, roles are often not well established. The post-secondary teaching profession has expectations based on Western models, and sometimes on a past in which the educational system was small and aimed at a small elite. Post-independence reality has generally seen rapid expansion of the educational system and sometimes a declining standard of education. The teaching profession has been caught in this rapidly changing situation. Their own expectations relate to Western ideals of professionalism and autonomy, but reality dictates a different function for college teachers — a function more related to secondary education than to the university. The purpose of this paper is to describe the reality of the Indian college teacher and to place this reality in the broader educational and social environment of Indian society.

The Indian Context

The Indian academic profession emerged from a tradition of subservience and remains subordinate to the present time. [7] Colleges and universities were patterned after British institutions, and the British colonial authorities were more interested in creating a reliable and obedient class of middle level bureaucrats than in creating a high quality educational system. Even the prestigious Indian Educational Service, which constituted the pinnacle of the teaching profession until its dissolution, was very much under the thumb of the British authorities. Bureaucratic rules predominated, and academic freedom was restricted in many areas. [8]

The post-independence colleges and universities stem from an academic tradition which was both restrictive and bureaucratic. Indeed, it is

[7] For a historical analysis of the origins of the teaching profession in India, see Irene A. Gilbert, "The Indian Academic Profession: The Origins of a Tradition of Subordination," *Minerva*, 10 (July, 1972), pp. 384-411.

[8] *Ibid.*

a tribute to the civility of post-independence India and to the example set by Nehru himself that academic freedom flourished as much as it did until the recent emergency. But the higher educational system, stemming as it did from government initiative and control and depending to a considerable extent on government for funds, is characterized by bureaucracy and by the norms of the government agency rather than the academy. The entire system is laden with written rules, regulations, and by endless forms. The mentality of the academic profession, not surprisingly, has become very much involved with these bureaucratic norms.

Like the Hindu family, the academic system is hierarchical and this hierarchy provides relatively little mobility. Once placed in the academic caste system, it is very difficult to move. The *sudra** college teacher, particularly in a rural college, seldom has the opportunity to reach the *nirvana* of the Brahmin university professor. And the life style, remuneration, and ethos of the lower levels of the academic system differ from those at the top. [9]

The curious bifurcation of higher education into undergraduate and postgraduate spheres contributes to the low status of college teachers, as does the system of "affiliated" colleges. While some work at the master's level does go on in some of the better colleges, and an occasional college teacher who obtains the doctorate is able to move to a university department, the gulf between the university departments — and hence research work, upper level teaching and prestige— and the colleges remains very wide. University teachers have a moderate teaching load (between four and nine classroom hours per week plus supervision of research), a higher salary scale, office facilities and some secretarial assistance in most castes, and often housing or other fringe benefits. Most university teachers hold a doctorate and many have been trained abroad.

*Sudras are the lowest caste in the Hindu caste system.

[9]   In the British system, "postgraduate" translated into "graduate" work in the American context. "Affiliated" colleges are independent institutions which are affiliated to a university, which examine students, set the syllabus, legislate certain regulations, and in general maintain a minimum of standards for the colleges which are affiliated to it. The "affiliating" system is the standard form of undergraduate education in India, although there have been recent moves to provide the best colleges a degree of independence, freeing them from the lockstep of the present system.

The standard degree for college teachers is the masters, and often a second class* masters at that.

Even among the colleges in a large university like the University of Bombay there is a considerable hierarchy. While salary scales are legislated by the university and teaching responsibilities do not differ markedly from college to college, there is a clear hierarchy. The prestigious colleges tend to be located in the central part of the city, to be older, to attract students from upper-middle class or upper class backgrounds and with experience in English-medium schools. Facilities tend to be better, the libraries larger, and the amenities for teachers more adequate. The teaching staffs from the prestigious colleges tend to have better qualifications and often to be graduates of those colleges. [10] There is more a sense of community among the teachers at the prestigious "downtown" colleges than in the rest of the academic community in Bombay. Of the 43 arts, science and commerce colleges located in Bombay, perhaps five could be considered as having a separate identity and a degree of prestige.

Most studies of the teaching profession indicate that, at least in recent years, college teaching is not an occupation which attracts very many of the incumbents. Observers have pointed out that the academic qualifications of college teachers have declined, as very able individuals tend to take jobs in the private sector or in government, where remuneration is better, prestige higher and working conditions more favorable. Many teachers freely admit that the academic profession was not their first choice. Within academia, the sciences tend to have greater attraction than' arts subjects, with students with high examination scores going into science subjects more often than into arts subjects. As a result, it is likely that better qualified teachers are in the scientific subjects.

The "arts" subjects such as sociology, English, foreign languages, and some other areas have become increasingly female in recent years, as the prestige hierarchy of subjects has moved to science and commerce fields. It has been estimated that in many Bombay colleges up to 90 per cent of the students in some arts fields are women, many of whom will not be seeking remunerative employment after graduation but who are in col-

*The Indian academic system, like the British, awards degrees with differing ranks, first, second or third, according to performance on final examinations.

[10] Many of these generalizations reflect the situation in Bombay, but probably fairly accurately reflect the situation in other parts of India.

lege to improve their marriage prospects. This situation provides drama-
tic evidence that women are increasingly well represented in the educa-
tional system (of the 141,714 students enrolled in the University of
Bombay and its affiliated colleges, 93,126 are men and 48,588 women)
although women seem to be concentrated in fields which are less pres-
tigious and less remunerative. The teaching staff in these fields is grad-
ually becoming predominantly female, and this may have long-term im-
plications for these fields and for the role of women in college teaching
in India. It might be noted that college teaching has traditionally been
a field which has attracted women, provided scope for advancement,
and in which women have played an active role. [11]

The teaching profession is less attractive mainly for economic rea-
sons. As early as 1954, more than half of the teachers at the University
of Bombay interviewed in a study of the conditions of faculty members
complained about the inadequacy of their income. [12] Given inflation
and the fact that academic salaries have not kept up with the cost of
living, a larger proportion of college teachers find it difficult to live ade-
quately on an academic income. It is commonly felt that remuneration
is better in other fields and thus the teaching profession cannot attract
the best qualified applicants. Many teachers report that they do not
advise their best students to enter academic life. Clearly, the economic
burden weighs heavily on the teaching profession and is a crucial factor
in its decline as a viable professional field.

The college teacher is in an ambivalent situation in contemporary In-
dia. Teaching as an occupation still offers a degree of prestige, linked as
is not only with the tradition of the *guru* but as well with the "modern"
sector of Indian society. But in India's mass educational system, teach-
ing has become an increasingly underpaid job, and with the expansion
of other segments of the economy, teaching has lost much of its econo-
mic attractiveness. The tradition of bureaucracy has been reinforced by
the rapid expansion of recent years, adding to the anomie of the teach-
er. The academic profession finds itself threatened by many internal
and external forces, and has not been able to create a sense of profes-
sionalism or an adequate standard of living for its members.

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[11]   The role of women in Indian academia deserves further research since women
constitute a significant minority of the profession, and are perhaps a majority in
some fields.

[12]   *Report of the Inquiry on the Problems of Teachers in the University of
Bombay*, (Bombay: University of Bombay, 1954).

The Situation in Bombay

The University of Bombay is one of India's oldest institutions (1857) and remains among the more prestigious universities in the country. It is typical of the organizational structure of most Indian universities and is among the larger institutions in the country, with 141,000 students enrolled in its departments and affiliated colleges and with a total of 4,768 faculty members, the vast majority of whom are in the colleges. The university has a full range of postgraduate departments, some of which, such as economic and chemistry, have a national reputation. This analysis is largely concerned with the affiliated colleges, of which there are a total of 73 in Bombay, including medical and engineering institutions. The university's affiliated colleges are located throughout the metropolitan area of some 7,000,000 people, and most are situated a considerable distance from the main university centers. Most college teachers seldom go to the university campus or the library and their professional lives are very much centered at their colleges. While the University of Bombay has a considerable influence over their academic situation, they feel that the university is quite distant geographically as well as intellectually, from them. Their hopes – and frustrations – are focused on the colleges. The university is responsible for setting the syllabus, devising and administering examinations, awarding degrees, deciding conditions of work for teachers in the colleges and setting salary scales. As such, it has direct relevance to the lives of college teachers but most feel that the levers of university power are far from their control. Indeed, many college teachers express considerable frustration at being unable to influence the policies of the university. Some feel themselves hamstrung by a curriculum which is rigid and difficult to change. But most seem to accept the university and its pervasive regulations and try to function effectively within these parameters. When discussing the situation of the colleges, however, it is necessary to keep in mind that the often heavy hand of the University of Bombay impinges on policies, orientations, and conditions within the colleges.[13]

The College Environment

The college determines the working situation of the teacher and, as such, has the primary impact on professional life. While all colleges

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[13]   For a further discussion of the interaction between university and college in Bombay, see Philip G. Altbach, *op. cit.*

must function under the umbrella of university regulations, there are considerable differences among them, and some colleges have managed to create distinctive environments. A key element in the collegiate equation is the nature of the "management," or the group of individuals who are responsible in the corporate sense for the college and who make basic decisions concerning the internal management of the institution, including such matters as hiring and firing of staff and administrators, the nature of facilities, and other matters. These questions are decided within the context of university regulations, but the managements of the colleges are left with considerable power. The management is able, if it wishes, to create an atmosphere, an ethos, in its college which can have a profound effect, negative or positive, on the staff. [14] Most colleges are managed by "private" groups, usually reflecting caste, regional, religious, or linguistic interests which seek to serve their communities by providing collegiate education. Colleges have also been founded by political interests or occasionally by profit-making groups. Most of Bombay's colleges are run by such private groups. Some of the city's best colleges are administered by Christian missionary elements, both Roman Catholic and Protestant. While missionary colleges remain among the most prestigious in India, they have declined as a proportion of the total. A few, such as St. Xavier's in Bombay, exercise a national influence in terms of maintaining high standards and instituting innovative programs. A few colleges are managed directly by the state government, and these also have a distinctive flavor.

The managing committees of the individual colleges regulate various aspects of the lives of the teachers, such as setting maximum teaching loads (within university guidelines), and making various policies concerning other aspects of college life. One Bombay college, which adheres to an orthodox version of Hinduism, forbids its teachers to smoke on campus and legislates the attire of staff and students. The management also hires staff members – and can fire them. Much of the staff gossip concerns the policies of the management. The chief administrative officer of the college is the principal, who has substantial control over the college in its day-to-day operations. The principal is the direct instrument of the management, and is hired by the management and can be fired by them at any time. Most principals are very cognizant of their

[14] For a further discussion of colleges, see Philip G. Altbach, "Bombay Colleges," *Minerva*, 8 (October, 1970), pp. 520-541.

responsibility to management, and must carefully balance the interests of management with the sometimes divergent pressures from university policy, staff wishes, and student demands.

The basic structure of the college is autocratic. There is little pretense of collegial decision making or of participation by teachers (not to mention students) in policy making. Indeed, the university structure allows for more participation from the teaching community through its boards of studies, senate and syndicate, all of which have at least some teacher representation. A few colleges have instituted means of allowing staff members a role in decision making, but this is not the norm. In general, policy within colleges is made by the management, usually in consultation with the principal. Staff members have no role, and therefore little sense of participation in an ongoing educational enterprise. It is very significant that managements can fire teachers with only minimal procedural safeguards required by university regulations. There are virtually no legal safeguards for job security or academic freedom beyond some procedural guarantees which are part of university regulations. Teachers are "confirmed" in their positions after a period of two years (prior to confirmation, they can be fired without cause), but even this confirmation does not provide strong protection or job security. The fact is that very few teachers are dismissed from their jobs once confirmed, but the lack of legal safeguards seems to weigh heavily on many teachers. [15]

The college management and its administrative embodiment, the principal, have considerable impact on the college teacher. Day-to-day working conditions are determined to a significant extent by the atmosphere created by the management. Physical facilities and amenities are determined by the management. Teachers generally have no role in policy making and only a limited voice in determining their own teaching schedules. In some colleges, department heads consult with the principal on most key matters relating to the academic affairs of the institution. But there is basically no involvement of the rank and file of the teaching community in any of the key decisions affecting their working conditions or environment.

The college environment helps to determine the nature of teaching and to some extent the orientations and attitudes of faculty members.

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[15] Suma Chitnis, *op. cit.*, has most adequately discussed the impact of the college on the teacher.

In general, the colleges in Bombay do not provide the kind of physical environment which encourages professional development and quality academic work. [16] Few college teachers have their own offices or even their own desks. In many colleges, department heads cannot claim a space of their own to work. Typically, the teacher has only a seat in the staff common room where it is possible to relax, discuss with colleagues, or engage in academic work such as preparation for class, grading of papers, and the like. And common rooms are often fairly noisy, ill-lit, and in general not conducive to serious work. Teachers seldom have a place where they can meet informally with students, and it is rare that a faculty member will be found in the student canteen socializing with students. Students are not allowed in the staff common rooms.

The general facilities of most Bombay colleges can provide undergraduate students with minimum standards of quality. College libraries, with a few exceptions, are small, fairly poorly maintained and inadequate for faculty research. Classrooms are antiquated and the opportunities for teacher-student interaction are quite limited. Laboratory facilities, again with some exceptions, are only minimally acceptable for undergraduate science teaching. Many of Bombay's colleges are housed in old buildings which are in need of renovation. Some of the newer colleges, located often in the suburbs, boast new buildings but these facilities were constructed with limited funds and meet only the minimum standards set by university authorities for affiliation.

Working conditions in the colleges also directly affect the morale, orientation, and professional standards of the teaching community. The University of Bombay has legislated a maximum of 19 45-minute lectures per week for any teacher. Most teachers work at or near this maximum and thus have very heavy teaching schedules. In some subjects "tutorials" are part of the teaching responsibility, although in many cases tutorials are more like classes since they involve up to fifteen students at a session. Similarly, some science teachers include laboratory sessions as part of their teaching responsibilities. College teachers who are professionally ambitious will often attempt to teach post-graduate classes in their subject. While there is a modest financial renumeration attached to such teaching, the main motivation is to qualify for a higher

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[16] It should be noted that Bombay colleges are, in general, better endowed physically than similar institutions in most other parts of India. The newer colleges which have been founded in large numbers in smaller towns are particularly deficient in terms of physical facilities.

salary scale as a result of competence in post-graduate teaching. Thus, there is considerable competition for opportunities to teach these classes despite the additional work that is involved. There is generally a small reduction in the number of undergraduate lectures given if post-graduate courses are offered.

Teaching schedules are often not very well coordinated, as many staff members teach in the "morning colleges" (classes beginning as early as 7:40 am and aimed at students who also hold full-time jobs) as well as in the regular college program. Many teachers complain that they have little time for preparation of new lectures because of a heavy teaching load. Classes in most subjects tend to be large – up to 300 students in a single lecture, and this inhibits much direct interaction between teachers and students. There are few innovations made in teaching methods. This is due in part to the lockstep curriculum which is dictated by the university-sanctioned syllabus and reinforced by the pervasive centralized examination system. The individual instructor does not have the opportunity to examine students, and assessment is provided through university-administered tests.

It is clear that there is little professional autonomy in the teaching community. Class schedules are heavy and would leave little opportunity for research or reflection even if there were stimulus for this element of academic life. Schedules are not usually under the control of the individual staff member, and the teacher does not have control over the curriculum or over the assessment of students. There is no assessment of teaching quality in most colleges, and teachers have little incentive to spend much time improving their teaching. The dominant method of teaching is lecturing and there is neither incentive nor much opportunity to vary this method. Indeed, many teachers "dictate notes" directly to their students. This is done in part because it requires little imaginative effort by the teachers, and in part because many undergraduate students, particularly in the newer colleges which attract students with limited academic ability and backgrounds, demand that the teachers provide information which will be clearly understood and useful in the examinations.

Academic salaries do not permit a professionally rewarding life, even by the standards of the Indian urban middle class. Exact salary scales are now in flux in many parts of India, and it is likely that there will be some improvement, particularly for those at the upper reaches of the system in the universities. However, the income of the college teacher will improve only marginally in most cases and the basic situation will

not change much. In Bombay, the basic college lecturer's salary ranges between about Rs 400 and about Rs 1,000, with some additional compensation for Bombay's high cost of living. This salary structure has not changed much in the past decade, despite a dramatic increase in the cost of living. It is considered possible for a college teacher who has some other source of income — often a working spouse — to barely make ends meet and to survive in Bombay's middle class. But few amenities are possible, and a medical bill, family crisis, or other economic disruption can cause havoc.

The majority of teachers in Bombay seem to have some alternative source of income. Some come from wealthy families and have income from family sources. Many teachers have working spouses, and rely on these earnings. Quite a few teachers are forced to take outside jobs of various kinds. Some of these are related in some way to academia, but others are not. Most teachers grade university examinations, and thereby earn a modest additional income. Some teachers do "tuitions," or tutor students privately for a fee. Both of these sources of income are officially sanctioned by university rules. Some faculty members participate in "coaching classes" or private-enterprise tutorial schools which flourish by providing students with "cram" sessions aimed at passing university examinations. Such activity is against university regulations. Faculty members also author "guides" which are widely used by students as quick reference sources for examinations. While both the writing — and the use — of such reference books is not considered academically respectable, this can be a source of considerable income to authors. A few college teachers write textbooks in their fields. Since publishers will favor authors who can hope to get their books adopted as part of the university syllabus, it helps to be a member of the Board of Studies or somehow able to exercise influence. The author of a popular textbook can earn considerably more than his college salary in royalties. In addition to these activities which are related to academic life, many teachers hold jobs which are entirely unrelated, work in family businesses, provide consultation to business firms, or have other sources of income. While exact figures on the proportion of teachers who must earn income in addition to their academic salaries are unavailable, it is likely that, in Bombay at least, a large majority have alternative sources of funds.

Few college teachers can afford to live lavishly. Most seem to be able to participate in an urban middle class life style, but only with considerable struggle. Most teachers must commute considerable distances to

their jobs, and often under uncomfortable conditions. It is not unusual for a teacher to spend more than one hour each way in commuting, since academic salaries do not often permit living in the expensive neighborhoods close to many colleges. Few teachers can afford to purchase books and few use the major libraries available in Bombay. Thus, it would seem that college teachers read relatively little, although interviews indicate that they participate in various kinds of cultural activities, such as films and drama.

In addition to fairly low salaries, college teachers have virtually no "fringe benefits," thus contributing to their economic insecurity. There is no medical insurance available from the university, and only a fairly insignificant provident fund to which teachers may contribute as a kind of retirement insurance. It is not uncommon for salaries to be paid late, and in some colleges, teachers are often faced with administrative deductions which are not allowed officially under university rules. As a result of these elements, it is clear that the economic status of the academic profession leaves much to be desired, and certainly contributes to insecurity, fear, and low morale and job commitment.

There is relatively little mobility in the Indian academic profession, and this is also the case in Bombay. It is uncommon for a teacher to move voluntarily from college to college, although there is a good deal of circulation at the junior ranks when a teacher fails to achieve confirmation and tries to find a position at another college. This situation makes the average teacher more dependent on the particular college in which he is employed than would be the case in a more "mobile" academic system. Individual teachers must, therefore, be especially careful not to alienate powerful elements in their colleges so as to maintain their positions.

The background, orientation, and training of the college teacher helps to determine his professional role. College teaching is clearly an occupation which has lost a good deal of its social prestige and economic rewards in the post-independence period. As higher education expanded, salaries remained steady, and the elite role of teaching declined. Relatively few teachers interviewed in several studies indicate that they chose college teaching as their first occupational choice. [17] It also seems that the social class origins of the teaching community have declined in recent years as well, although in Bombay some individuals from wealthy families enter college teaching more as an avocation than

[17]   See Sinha, *op. cit.*, and Chitnis, *op.cit.*

as a profession. An increasingly large number of teachers, especially at the newer and less prestigious colleges, come from families which have not traditionally been educated, and for whom a college teaching career is a matter of importance and considerable upward social mobility. This segment of the teaching community sees itself as highly successful and is generally content with current salary levels. These individuals are not often research-oriented, and are tied to their colleges. It has been mentioned that the proportion of women in the teaching community has risen, particularly in arts subjects. Many of the women entering teaching are married and have family responsibilities. They are unable to take on a full professional role due to lack of time. Many of these women are also from fairly affluent backgrounds and see college teaching as a supplement to family income rather than as a career.

The educational qualifications of many college teachers are not outstanding, and have probably declined somewhat in recent years. Many college teachers hold second class Master's degrees, largely from the University of Bombay. Some teachers hold doctorates or are working on a research degree, particularly at the older downtown colleges. At present, there is little or no incentive to complete the advanced degree, as added qualifications result in no higher salary or other benefits. There is now some discussion of requiring college teachers to pursue an advanced research degree, and this might change the situation. It is often the case that an individual, especially in the sciences, who does well on the university examination will be able to obtain a remunerative job in government or industry, and thus the academic profession is left with those individuals who could not qualify for these better positions. The public image, as well as the internal perception, of the expertise of the academic profession has clearly declined in recent years.

All of these elements mitigate against an orientation toward research and scholarly work. The educational background, reward structures, internal socialization process, time and schedule contraints and other factors all work against the college teacher having any concern with making scholarly contributions. Most teachers seem to try to do their best within the constraints of the situation and their own abilities, but this does not generally include participation in any broad intellectual community or scholarly enterprise.

Bombay's Current Crisis

The final section of this paper deals with the contemporary situation with regard to the teaching community in Bombay. This situation

embodies many of the key elements of controversy concerning higher education and the teaching profession. The impact of the emergency on the political activities of teachers, efforts to improve working conditions for teachers, and issues of unionization of academics are all intertwined in Bombay's crisis. While the situation is at present tranquil, due in large part to the restrictions of the emergency, the potential for considerable unrest exists. There is no question but that the teaching community is in turmoil, and that many frustrations and contradictions lie under the surface.

The University of Bombay, traditionally one of India's most orderly universities, has in the past year been involved in a struggle concerning staff-related issues. The basic issue has concerned the implementation by the University of higher salary scales mandated by the University Grants Commission. The new scales would have modestly raised the bottom of the salary scale by about Rs. 100 per month and would have substantially raised the top of the scale so that college lecturers would have the potential of earning up to Rs. 1,100 per month (about $130). In fact, due to technical elements such as adjustments in salaries for "dearness allowance" (additional income to offset Bombay's high living costs) and other matters, the new scales would not have meant dramatic increases for most college teachers – they were more impressive for post-graduate university staff. The university authorities, on orders from the government of Maharashtra, refused to implement the new scales, and the teaching community engaged in efforts to get the increases implemented. [18] In addition, there were a number of other disputes agitating the academic community.

Issues such as uncertainty about the possibility of large scale retrenchments of staff under a reform plan proposed by the Maharashtra government, the firings of several teachers in local colleges, and other matters stimulated the growth of the Bombay University Teachers Union,

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[18] Bombay is the capital of Maharashtra and since education is the responsibility of the states in India, the government of Maharashtra has a major role in educational policy. Suggestions for new salary scales and other reforms came from the University Grants Commission, a central government agency. The UGC, however, can only make recommendations and provide financial incentives. Thus, the university is involved in a delicate balance between the recommendations of the UGC and the more conservative policies of the state government. This is not at all uncommon in the Indian context.

which was founded in 1967 but achieved real strength only in 1972.[19] The BUTU leadership, consisting of a small number of college teachers, most of whom had some background in political affairs, was able to mobilize considerable support around the salary scale issue, and the fears of college teachers that what little job security they had would be damaged by the possible broad scale retrenchments, a proposed revision of the Bombay University Act, and several moves by local colleges to retrench individual teachers. It is significant that the BUTU mobilized around "trade union" issues and attempted to use "trade union" tactics to achieve its goal.

The BUTU has worked to obtain legal safeguards for job security, and more clearly defined and improved working conditions for teachers. After considerable pressure, the BUTU convinced the University that the requirement that college staff be confirmed after a maximum of two years probation or dismissed should be implemented —it had been widely ignored and many teachers remained on probation for long periods. The result of this initiative was that a large number of probationary teachers were fired. This was very much contrary to the result that the BUTU had desired. Similarly, the present dispute concerning the implementation of the UGC salary scales has resulted in a solution which is probably not in the best interests of the teachers, although the matter is under litigation in the courts and has not reached a final conclusion.

In order to force a recalcitrant Maharashtra government to implement the new and improved salary scales, the BUTU organized a boycott by the teachers of grading the university's final examinations, thus bringing the operation of the university to a halt and massive pressure on university authorities from parents and others demanding examination results. This pressure was successful in forcing the government to agree to the implementation of the UGC scales. However, shortly after this agitation, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi declared the emergency, effectively stopping all political activity and outlawing strikes and other forms of agitation. The government of Maharashtra, taking advantage of

[19] Information concerning the BUTU comes from interviews with members and from an unpublished paper by a BUTU activist. See also "Code of Conduct for Teachers." *Economic and Political Weekly*, (November 15, 1975), pp. 1754-55, and "The Sen Committee and After," *Economic and Political Weekly*, (November 22, 1975), pp. 1790-91.

this situation, attached to the new salaries a series of additional conditions which were unacceptable to the BUTU and to most teachers.[20]

These conditions are significant as they indicate some of the issues which are of concern to the government with regard to the teaching profession, and the matter indicates the degree to which the University is dominated by government authorities in terms of major policy decisions. Perhaps most important in the financial sense, the new scales were tied to an elimination of additional payments to teachers for grading examinations. Teachers would be expected to grade examinations without remuneration and as a part of their normal academic duties. In addition, in order for teachers to be permanently given the new scales, they would be required to obtain an additional research degree beyond the Masters — either the PhD or the newly established research-oriented M. Phil degree. Teachers not completing this degree within a specified period of time would revert to the old salary scales. A series of very specific rules of conduct were promulgated, which would effectively remove many elements of the limited academic freedom available to the teaching community and would make it easier for administrators to discipline or dismiss teachers for infractions of these rules. The Maharashtra authorities, with the approval of the University of Bombay administration, chose to implement all of the recommendations of the UCG for upgrading and systematizing the teaching profession without regard to local conditions. [21] The new conditions and scales would result in considerably less autonomy for the teaching community, would increase qualifications for teachers which would be difficult to implement and place a tremendous burden on the university departments which would have to greatly increase the number of postgraduate degrees conferred, would place teachers under increased administrative rules and constraints, would further limit the possibility of political involvement, and would only marginally increase the salaries of most teachers.

The response of the teaching community and the BUTU was wholly negative. But it was impossible for the teachers to mobilize against the new rules, since under the emergency political and trade union activity is strictly controlled. Police officials would not permit a public meeting

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[20]   "Code of Conduct . . . ", *op. cit.*, p. 1754.

[21]   *Report of the Committee on Governance of Universities and Colleges: Part II-Teachers*, (New Delhi: University Grants Commission, 1973).

to discuss the matter, and several of the BUTU leaders were imprisoned without charges under the emergency regulations. The BUTU did institute a legal action against the university in order to stop the new rules, and as of this writing the matter remains in the courts. The situation has left the teaching community demoralized and essentially powerless. The outcome cannot be a positive one for the growth of professionalism and commitment in the academic community in Bombay.

This recent crisis points out several significant factors concerning the teaching community. The Bombay University Teachers Union has been able to mobilize support only for issues which are related to economic benefits or job security. This has seemingly fit into the "trade union" approach of the BUTU leadership. The teaching community has not been very interested in having the BUTU concern itself with educational issues, even though many teachers agree that the educational system is in need of considerable reform. Despite the BUTU's impressive victory in forcing the government to implement the UGC scales, the organization does not have very solid support from the teaching community. Indeed, many teachers support it on specific issues, such as the salary scales, but do not trust its leadership.

The outcome of this crisis is as yet unclear. Given the present situation, it is unlikely that the matter will be settled to the satisfaction of the teaching community. Teacher morale has been damaged and it is likely that the small degree of self-esteem and autonomy which the teaching community has had will be further eroded. Teachers will have less academic freedom, and less control over their working situations. The perquisites of administrators will be increased, and while salaries for many teachers will increase to some degree, the added income of grading examinations will be lost and the final result is not likely to be a significant increase. It is very possible the substantial numbers of teachers – there is disagreement about exact figures – will be fired as a result of proposed structural reforms in the educational system which are scheduled for implementation in 1976. Most of those who are fired will be from the ranks of the "unconfirmed" younger teachers.

Bombay's "crisis" indicates a number of elements of the situation of the teaching community. In Bombay, as in most parts of India, there is no strong trade union movement among college teachers, although it is possible to organize the teaching community around specific issues, usually relating to their own working conditions or salaries. Despite a common perception that teaching conditions are in need of improvement and that, in fact, the entire educational system requires basic reforms, there is no consensus concerning these reforms and very little

militancy concerning direct improvement of conditions. The leadership of the BUTU has been somewhat "ideological" in the sense that some key figures have been involved in political activism, but the BUTU itself has kept away from political questions and ideological matters. The teaching community is pragmatic, not notably radical in its orientation, and not basically committed to either social or educational change.

The role of government, particularly at the state level, is crucial in the educational equation. Few university decisions anywhere in India can be made without direct government approval. This is the case in all matters requiring expenditure of funds, but also in some other areas which in many countries would be solely in the purview of the academic community such as some curricular decisions, internal management matters, and the appointment of key administrative officials. This government involvement – and Maharashtra has been relatively free of direct meddling in academic affairs – colors the entire academic environment. [22]

Conclusion

The Indian academic community is in an ambivalent and in general an unenviable position. The graduate level university teachers do have the time and occasionally the facilities to engage in research, produce scholarly writings, and in general contribute professionally to the development of high quality academic work. But even in the universities, the impact of politics, the tradition of subservience, and a lock-step bureaucratic environment inhibits scholarly production. The lack of a widely respected scholarly community in India has prevented the establishment of an effective reference group for academics. University faculty members have made some contributions to knowledge, and support a range of scholarly journals. Despite this impressive performance, it seems clear that even at the top levels, the Indian academic community could be contributing more in terms of scholarly work. Some university professors serve in policy making positions – at least three are currently ministers in the central government – but by and large the academic community is not very close to the levers of political power in India.

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[22] For an analysis for the relationship between politics and higher education in India, see Lloyd and Susanne Rudolph, eds., *Education and Politics in India*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1972).

The college teaching community is in a considerably more difficult position. College teachers are not expected to contribute directly to scholarship through publication. Yet, they have a key role in terms of training virtually all Indian undergraduate students. This educative function should require considerable professional commitment and a high level of expertise. It seems clear that the many problems discussed in this paper limit both the professionalism and the competence of many college teachers. The limitations of the teaching community are particularly apparent in rural areas where many new colleges have been established in recent years. [23] Centralization, bureaucracy, the current atmosphere of intellectual repression, poor working conditions, low salaries and other elements, contribute to the current status of college teaching in India.

It would be unfair to expect college teachers to become creative scholars since their function is largely teaching-oriented. Yet, there is very little possibility that the standards of teaching will improve substantially if conditions within the colleges are not improved and the teaching community is not permitted and encouraged to develop enhanced professional orientations and commitments. Given the current Indian educational context, it is perhaps utopian to expect much change to occur. It is, indeed, surprising that the standards of teaching are as high as they are and the professional commitments of many teachers as well developed as seems the case. The present situation does not bode well, however, for the creation of a high level of quality in higher education or for the emergence of an active intellectual class able to contribute creatively to Indian society.

[23] See Jyoti Kulkarni, "The Teaching Profession in the Marathwada Region," (Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Bombay, in preparation).

Ivory Tower - Control Tower

Enrique Krauze

The Liberals in Power (1867-1876)

Throughout all of its eventful history as an independent country, only once has Mexico's government been formed almost entirely by intellectuals, during the so-called Restoration of the Republic, from 1867 to 1876.

A complex combination of circumstances gave liberal intellectuals access to power. First, of course, was the defeat of the conservative party, which by then had no political or military leaders and no political bearings. Undoubtedly, another influence was the public position in the struggle between liberals and conservatives, particularly in its final stage, from 1856 to 1867. Theirs was clearly an ideological war, in which men were ready to die for their ideals. So much devotion to ideals must have conferred a considerable amount of political legitimacy to the intellectuals. A further influence was the rise of liberals in Europe, and the decline of the Catholic Church signalled by the imprisonment of Pope Pius IX in 1870. Finally, the rise of Juarez, as the leader of the group, whose superb political talent led the intellectuals to the highest government positions and was able to maintain a fairly stable situation during almost nine years, which at the time was an amazingly long period.

Montesquieu himself would have approved of the straightforward national representation formed by a few hundred politically-active individuals. The power of the executive office was reined in by a brilliant house of representatives, whose members were alert and so fiercely independent that it usually prevailed over the executive. Court judges were also independent. There was absolute respect for former enemies, including the conservatives. The press was, to say the least, a fourth

power, and enjoyed complete freedom, which it wielded with intelligence, imagination, and passion. It was, to a large extent, the last truly committed press in this country.

All the powers, except the executive held by Juarez, were dominated by intellectuals who, in their youth, had written highly sensitive poetry: lawyers, public speakers, teachers, authors of treatises on public welfare, sworn enemies of the old colonial order. They were so intent on destruction that history justly called them: "The pickaxe of the Reform." They were obsessed with an urge to wipe out the Spanish past and install constitutional liberalism in Mexico. During the nine years they were in power they worked feverishly to adapt Saxon political systems to Mexico and to discuss their merits.

The man who gave his name to this group was Sebastian Lerdo de Tejada, who succeeded Juarez in the presidency upon his death in 1872. Lerdo had been the dean of the best-known Jesuit school in this country. In a psychological—intellectual turnabout very common among men of that time, he went from Catholic religious dogmatism to liberal extremes and, once in power, tried to convert the world to his ideas.

Lerdo's unpopularity began when he incorporated the laws of the Reform (partially written by him) in the Constitution and decreed their rigorous enforcement, cancelling clerical immunity and privileges. This led to the first "Cristero" revolt recorded in Mexico's history, around 1873. In his determination to enforce respect for the law, Lerdo's role was more that of an interventionist than of a liberal. With the same vehemence with which he dealt with the Church, he attacked a number of provincial political bosses, perhaps because he realized that the progress of the Mexican state depended on wiping out the many small fiefdoms and the tremendous power of the church.

Few statesmen have been treated more harshly by history and posterity than this intellectual. When referring to Lerdo his contemporaries and members of several later generations called him "extremely self-centered," "selfish," "dangerous," "epicurean," "complicated," "shifty," "listless," "arrogantly proud." Justo Sierra had a somewhat better opinion of Lerdo. He described him as an exceptionally gifted man, who mastered the "new oratory" without pedantic expressions of fancy rhetoric. According to Sierra, he was direct and clear in his thinking, as well as ruthlessly logical. On the other hand, another historian, José López Portillo, described him as "incompetent," "a man with no sense of reality" who, considering himself "unassailable in his cogitative tower, contrives new radical laws." According to the same chronicler, Lerdo had carried his respect for freedom of the press to the extreme

of making it "dangerous and impossible." It was for this reason, even more than te coup d'état by Porfirio Díaz, that he was thrown out of office.

This case will sound familiar to experts in the study of philosopher-kings. Some will recall the "Trotsky syndrome", and will refer to the incompetence or unconcern for everyday political management and practice shown by intellectuals throughout history. The case of Lerdo and the liberals in office is a good example of this. All kinds of conflicting situations were seen during those ten years: disunity, utopianism, a superlative climate for discussion and criticism of executive action, which was always obstructed, and tremendous moral, intellectual, and factual resistance to action. In the words of one intellectual, this was a typical case of "a man who turns answers into questions."

But the history of Mexico's only philosopher-king (aside from Netzahualcoyotl) did not end there. Lerdo went into exile in 1876, and lived more or less comfortably in a New York hotel until his death in 1889. One would have expected him to write a serene memoir of his life and times, but in all those idle years Lerdo did not write a single line. From some apocryphal memoirs of Lerdo, Cosío Villegas was only able to extract a few isolated phrases, such as the one referring to the new leader Porfirio Díaz:

> "This man's ideal was to become president of the Republic. Once in office his other ideals evolved spontaneously, like water running down a slope. . ."

Faced by the defeat of his ideals, and perhaps by an intimate knowledge of his own impotence, Lerdo had decided to fade not only from politics, but also from life. He did not believe in posterity. Intrigued by the mystery of Lerdo, the same historian Cosío Villegas ventured an explanation that partially lifts the veil:

> "His life was like a comet: the light shed by its tail traced its orbit. Lerdo was not a soldier, nor a writer, nor an agitator, and much less a conspirator. What, then, did he accomplish? He thought! That is to say, Lerdo's downfall was due to his being an intelligent man and, as such, he did not know how to do anything but think, and this, naturally and inevitably, disturbs a lot of people, both near and far."

Tho Rooster and the Corn (1876-1911)

Even before the end of their ephemeral republic, the intellectuals had begun to offer public testimony of *mea culpa*. True, the men of the Reform had sought freedom, but freedom for what? The allure of an-

other ideology imported from France, that great purveyor of ideologies and furnishings, Comtian Positivism, was beckoning to our ideologists. The country could not achieve progress without order and peace, without "practical freedom." Material well-being must prevail over freedom. "The Mexico of our forefathers," wrote young Justo Sierra, "was not progressing, and the most learned scholars could not find anything better to do with power than to limit it. . . for themselves, to the point of self-effacement."

In 1878, only two years after the coup d'état that brought Porfirio Díaz to power, Justo Sierra made a deal with him that was a perfect prediction of the kind of relationship which would prevail between intellectuals and government during almost forty years of dictatorship. Carried away by the "Essay on Liberty," Sierra requested the president's financial support to publish a newspaper that would be called "La Libertad." In it, Sierra proposed to discuss the government's actions, claiming that "a strong government does not fear truth, and it is the government's friends who should say it."

In actual practice, "La Libertad" did not follow Stuart Mills' postulates too closely. Paradoxically, in the name of a "poor society that has Sierra advised that crimes of the press should be judged by the ordinary courts. But not only this; in its pages, Sierra provided the government with the ideology that would sustain it to the end. The sacred goal of "freedom for everyone," of "negative freedom" (as understood by Isaiah Berlin) was replaced by a more "scientific" freedom, more in accordance with Comte's or Spencer's conceptions of material well-being, order, and progress. "Science," Sierra was to say towards the end of his life, "protects the fatherland."

With the intellectuals' annulment as a critical conscience, Porfirio Díaz was able to practice a dictatorship that was actually more a "soft than a hard dictatorship" (Cosío Villegas). He governed with a minimum of terror. When an opposition journal (and they existed throughout his entire administration) began to bother him, he did not order its repression but, in the worst of cases, resorted to the indirect method of blocking its circulation. It was only late in life, when facing determined action by a group of anarchist intellectuals, that Díaz resorted to the harsher methods of prison and banishment. The quality and belligerence of the press declined considerably, as did the brilliance of the Congress, which in fact maintained a lengthy silence from 1888 on.

Referring to the intellectuals, Porfirio Díaz coined the phrase, "the rooster wants corn" and acting accordingly, embarked on a wholesale "purchase" of brains through offers of privileges and jobs, most of

them quite modest. His great slogan, "just a little politics, a lot of administration," was poison for any true liberal because it meant turning public life into a private affair. Everything was transacted behind the doors of the national palace. General Díaz personally settled all disagreements, and in this way, by gently taming them, he frustrated the brilliant political possibilities of an entire generation. Most of these promising talents became panegyrists, interpretating Mexico's history in Porfirian terms.

There was no place in the Porfirian regime for the intellectual truly committed to freedom. On the other hand, ideologists who supported the government were pampered but not nearly as successful as the group dubbed "the scientists," formed by the first technocrats recorded in our history. "Science protects the fatherland" might very well have been the slogan of these members of the governing elite who stood to gain power, prestige and, particularly, money when Díaz needed an "intellectual general staff" to implement the projects for material progress: railroads, immigration, colonization, modernization of the banking system, rehabilitation of international credit, etc. If Justo Sierra (who, incidentally, was one of the "scientists") gave his name to the group of Porfirian ideologists, the eponym of technocracy was José Ives Limantour, Díaz' financial wizard from 1893 to 1910. Urbane, pragmatic, not at all romantic, a member of the closed circle of the Porfirian elite, Limantour and his scientists wielded considerable power through tight control of the entire economic policy, although they were practically excluded from political policies. Their affairs progressed in reverse order to their interest in academic life, which was nil. They did not form disciples or economic schools. Their respect for Díaz is reflected in this statement made by a member of Congress, Francisco Bulnes, in 1888:

> A good dictator is such a rare animal that a nation possessing one should not only protect his power but also his life.

Only once, in 1892, did they dare mention the possibility of restricting the executive power. It was the first and last attempt, because Díaz, who was aware of the value of these fellows, immediately recruited them for the administration; but he never tolerated trespasses in his own territory. Submission reached an extreme when, towards the end of his rule, one of the "scientists" declared that his group would follow Díaz even "to disgrace." The Revolution went further: it sent them to exile.

Monopoly of power, money, and prestige positions by the "scientists" and the total domination of Positivist thinking in the Porfirian

Academy, with their plans drawn up strictly in accordance with Comtian philosophy, relegated younger intellectuals to a sort of anonymity. They held minor civil service positions. Most of them were poets, slaves to the intellectual purism imported from France at the end of the century. They despised the rabble of progress. They took on the role of a Baudelaire character to its ultimate consequences; they were social critics, drunkards, bohemians, diabolic, superb craftsmen of the Spanish language, frivolous, splendid conversationalists, and sensitive men. They formed the "modern generation," also called the "blue generation." These intellectuals were the only ones in Mexico who – as a group – preferred the ivory tower the control tower (Luis González), although their works and behavior clearly showed some resentment towards those in power, their somewhat disdainful, cynical criticisms seeming to reflect extreme weakness. At the end of the Porfirian period the modernists fumbled in trying to preserve the status quo and support the dictator. But they made their biggest mistake in 1913, when they became enthusiastic followers and accepted official posts in the darkest period of Mexican history, that of the "usurper" Huerta.

Towards the end of the Porfirian era there was a group of even younger intellectuals who opposed Díaz' regime openly. They were mostly readers of red, rather than blue, literature; passionate, determined men, and just as bent on destruction as those of the Reform. Since they did not have access to the political, academic, business, or even bureaucratic circles of the Porfirian regime, in the early years of the century these young men started a movement to oppose the administration. Their position was mainly political, although some of them were already beginning to adhere to a new intellectual trend: discovery of the "other" Mexico, a society developing on the outskirts of culture and beliefs, oblivious to and overrun by the march of "progress" of the governing elite.

The biggest asset of this group of intellectuals was their courage in creating and sustaining combative organizations and publications at a time when the Díaz regime adopted a hard line and was still strong enough to crush them. Some of them took part in the strikes declared towards the end of the regime which ended in a bloodbath. They endured hunger, exile, jail, and death. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that the intellectual value of their criticism matched their moral strength; none of them had an objective concept of the prevailing social and economic situation, nor did they discover its roots, and much less did they try to imagine the possibilities of a better future.

This group sprouted a man who wrote a book which would greatly influence Mexico's history: Francisco I. Madero, the comfortably established scion of one of the country's ten wealthiest families. During a trip to France, he was swept away by libertarian ideas and new spiritual trends, and the vowed to save his country. Late in 1908 he wrote a book, "The Presidential Succession," a clear, sharp, critical analysis of the regime, although dealing easily with the president. Towards the end of the book he wrote:

> In spite of the foregoing, it is probable that the people will again rise up in arms if oppression increases. Although the nation is normally calm and in peace, it is because there are only occasional cases of aggression. However, should these increase, there would be a violent reaction which would be difficult to control.

A mere 3,000 copies of the book were printed, in two editions, but it achieved a surprisingly wide circulation. Madero himself distributed it diligently, even among his opponents. The book was read even in a number of farms in northern Mexico, and convinced its readers. It was the clearest example of a "self-fulfilling prophecy." Without it, it is difficult to imagine the ensuing revolution.

Disbanded During the Revolution (1911–1920)

With few exceptions, none of the top ranking intellectuals in the Porfirian administration suspected what was to happen in the country in 1910, an evidence of their indifference towards observation and intelligent assessment of national problems, which would have enabled them to find adequate, peaceful solutions. When the revolt broke out, the role of the intellectuals could not have been more unfortunate.

A majority eluded involvement in the revolution through voluntary, permanent exile in Europe (lead by the members of the group of the "Scientists"). Other intellectuals were actively involved with one or another of the contending factions which, until 1920, tore themselves to pieces in their fight for power, frequently being defeated and exiled. Still others remained in Mexico City, disclaiming any allegiance in an effort to find security; ironic, dispairing "spectators of the world's sad spectacle", as one of them was to declare. To make matters worse, a large group of intellectuals –mainly of the so-called "blues" –had accepted to form the cabinet of the military government that assassinated Madero. None of them would ever recover from that mistake. Exile was

again the only way out, but they would never be able to obliterate the mark of disgrace left by their association with the Huerta band, and the burden of shame thwarted lives, political careers, and promising intellectual achievements.

If the intellectuals were not the instigators of the revolutionary movement, they might at least have supplied the generals with an ideology, but even in this they refused to assume their responsibility, with the single exception of Soto y Gama. At the point where ideology prevailed over fighting — at the time when the new Constitution was drafted in 1917, only a handful of the intellectual elite was willing to get involved. In spite of this — or because of it — the new charter included an ideological innovation that was not to be despised.

The intellectual works that fluorished during the revolution were directed more at condemning its savagery, diatribes, or laments, rather than attempts to understand it or, still less, to speculate over the new society that was to arise from it. The intellectual who, somehow or other, had been ensconced in government circles during the Porfirian administration, was not spared from the shattering effects of the storm. Alfonso Reyes, one of the greatest of Mexican writers, exiled in Paris in 1913, called the entire group of intellectuals the "sacrificed generation."

Under the Sonorans (1920–1934)

The victors of the Revolution were mostly men from the north, former businessmen and farmers, whose proposed economic policy for the country was no different from that of the Porfirian era. However, in the political field, the Sonorans immediately searched for ways to expand the political base through inclusion of large middle class sectors, most of the generals who had survived the revolution, and even a number of labor groups. In 1920 they declared a general amnesty and the advent of a new era of "reconstruction."

Again, the leit motif was "just a little politics and a lot of administration," but the country's eleven years' turmoil could hardly be calmed down by decree. The newborn Mexican state had to steer slowly and carefully to dodge many more pitfalls than those faced by Porfirio: the revolutionary generals, many of them eager to reach the presidency, or at least to amass enormous political and economic privileges; a workers' aristocracy that had already become a first order urban political force; a blown up, demanding bureaucracy; an incredible multiplication of parties at national, regional, and local levels; and finally, an

unstable international situation, deteriorated even further by the stress of the American "big stick" policy.

During this entire period the main problem faced by the Sonoran clan was political, and the mastermind in control was President Calles who, from 1924 to 1928, shared leadership with Obregon and was the uncontested leader from 1928 to 1934. Calles was the true creator of the extraordinary Mexican political system, basically formed by an all-powerful executive and a single party which, through "institutionaliza-tion of the revolution," closed the door to military uprisings and opened the door to another, more civic oriented type of influence.

The intellectuals went through two clearly distinguishable phases in their relationship with the administration: exultation and disillusion-ment. In 1920, when the national reconstruction was heralded, Presi-dent Obregón brought José Vasconcelos, the country's most respected young intellectual (38 years old), back from exile, and appointed him to the newly created position of Secretary of Education. According to the historian Cosío Villegas, this was the only instance in the country's recent history when a government trusted an intellectual implicitly, and also allowed him ample freedom for independent action.

From 1920 to 1923 Mexico was a paradise for intellectuals. Only the amnestied members of the Huerta group attacked the "Mexican renais-sance" in the newspapers. The other members of the intelligentsia went to work with "pick and shovel", leaving their pens aside. Their natural standard-bearer was Vasconcelos, who set up an education program patterned after the "Franciscan model," to redeem the people through culture. He published editions of the classics and flooded the country with free copies. He set up different types of public libraries. He started the literacy campaign. He sent educational missions to the remotest villages. For some of these tasks he recruited a large number of the exiled intellectuals of his generation plus many more young students who believed that the intellectuals could at last, and should, "do some-thing for Mexico." One of them, Cosío Villegas, the creator and dispen-ser of cultural mana during those years, would much later look back nostalgically:

> At that time a brilliant dawn appeared in Mexico, heralding the arrival of a new day. Education was no longer understood solely as a privilege of the urban middle class, but as a religious, apos-tolic mission to all corners of the country, carrying the good news of the nation's arousal from its lethargy towards progress.
> There was indeed an atmosphere of religious zeal to teach others to read and write. Every Mexican felt in his heart that education

programs were as vital and as Christian as quenching thirst or assuaging hunger. It was at this time that the first great mural paintings were started. as a means to illustrate the country's centuries' old distress, problems and hopes. There was a general faith in the widsom and boundless good of books; they were printed by the thousands. Establishing a library in a small, remote village seemed to have as much significance as building a church and covering its dome with brilliant tiles to alert the traveller that he was nearing a hearth where he could rest and find shelter. Folk music and dance festivals were not staged for tourists, but for us Mexicans, to stimulate and entertain us. The theater was meant for the people, staging plays of free political satire, but above all, it was a mirror of customs, vices, virtues, and hopes.

The student of this brief honeymoon period   between the administration and the intellectuals may at times discover that Vasconcelos conceived the most generous of Utopias for Mexico, one of the most ambitious ever dreamed of by a Mexican and perhaps by a Latin American (so much so that Unamuno referred to him as "the great dreamer.") The reconstruction effort was viewed and directed as an attempt to rescue the nations roots, cut off and forgotten during centuries of political quarrels: Present day Mexico, nationalist and socialist; the latent, silent Mexico of the provinces; colonial Mexico; indigenous Mexico; and even western Mexico, and offspring of its classical past, both Hispanic and . . . Greek. Vasconcelos dreamed of a cultural melting pot in our countries, from which a Latin American version of the superman: "the cosmic race" would emerge. If these dreams had been confined to literature, they might perhaps have fared better. But the problem was that Vasconcelos actually believed that politicians would grant him − or people would bestow on him − the power to carry them out. The wealth of utopian load carried by this man made him politically vulnerable. Exile was again the answer to the collision with crude reality, in which bullets were still the order of the day. Vasconcelos believed the era of the philosopher−king had arrived for him and for Mexico, and he sought the governorship of his native state; but the people did not rally to his support. The Sonorans, recognizing his moral, intellectual, and even political merits, could not readily grant him power (although they considered it on two occasions), and the philosopher went into voluntary exile again in 1925.

However, Vasconcelos' disillusionment was not shared by all the members of the intelligentsia. A group of young college graduates (Gómez Morín and Gonzalo Robles, among others) were called to form

President Calles' first team of advisors and were responsible for the design of a new economic policy implemented in 1925. This was the most ambitious economic plan the country had ever known. Among its main points were: the establishment of a central bank; a complete revision of the fiscal, monetary, and banking legislation; a financial bank for agriculture; agricultural colleges; creation of an extensive highway network and irrigation works; consolidation of the public debt, modernization of public administration and economic austerity; control of natural resources; institutionalization of the labor movement.

President Calles' economic policy was only partially successful, due, mainly, to unfavorable economic conditions abroad and a still explosive domestic political situation. The group of intellectuals (technologists) responsible for its design who, at times, also held management positions in the newly created institutions, gradually lost faith in their work and grew restless. The impatient technologists dreamed of becoming "scientists" (while at the same time holding high ranking government posts) and when the path of technocracy was blocked for them, they went into politics. In 1929, the main collaborators in Calles' NEP were out of the government. At the end of 1928, when Vasconcelos decided to run for president on an independent platform, he created a situation unseen in this country since before the Porfirian era. The displaced intellectuals who had collaborated in Vasconcelos' Ministry of Education, and some technologists who were disenchanted with the "political distortion" inflicted on the institutions they had created, rallied around Vasconcelos in a "civic" opposition to the administration. A new generation of college-educated young men followed and collaborated with their "Professor" in his election campaign and, through this turned the university into an island of independence, opposed to the state. Some even dreamed of forming a political party that would "legally wrest power from the Sonoran group.

Criticism of the men in the administration was expressed more in moral than in technical or political terms. The intellectuals were unable to grasp the political complexity of the moment, the number and strength of the dissenting forces aroused by the revolution. The majority concurred with Vasconcelos' claim that Mexico was reverting to ancient blood thirsty Aztec gods.

Under pressure of this denouncement and Vasconcelos' campaign, the president formed the P.N.R. (National Revolutionary Party), a political maserpiece, a stroke of genius even by today's standards. From that platform he spoke out to attack the reactionary forces entrenched in

the university. The Vasconcelos movement failed, and once again its leader left the country. In exile, and sincerely believing in his role as the only Mexican prophet, he wrote philosophical and autobiographical works of the highest aesthetic, intellectual, and moral quality.

Intolerance, technical radicalism, or simple political convenience drove the intellectuals from the administration. Some of them went back to their intellectual pursuits, wrote important works, founded newspapers and formed literary societies that were to change the country's cultural history. The best critical works about the revolution and the revolutionaries were written at that time; on the extent of power (written by Luis Cabrera, a former revolutionary and lawyer); within the shelter of the university (written by Jorge Cuesta, an excellent political critic); on exile, written by Vasconcelos.

Finally, it cannot be said that the Sonorans were allergic to intellectuals, since they sought their collaboration and appointed them to relatively minor government positions. It was perhaps intrinsic to the intellectuals' character to show a certain moral reticence, which forced them to withdraw from a still too rough situation. Even so, the projects designed by these intellectuals, carried out by educators or technologists, were so outstanding that to some extent they are operative even today. But like true utopians, they would not conform: he who has tasted the sweetness of power, even though it is the power to do good, cannot easily relinquish it.

Dialogue with the Sphinx (1934-1940)

Lázaro Cárdenas was the only president of postrevolutionary Mexico who tried to govern for the "other" Mexico. The political system devised by Calles had by then been tested under fire, proving its resilience even after Calles, the leader himself, had been ousted. Cárdenas, who inherited and later wiped out the Calles policy, embarked on a brief program of social reform in rural areas; the most important was land distribution on an unprecedented scale, with over 17 million hectares distributed, as well as the establishment of several collective farms (ejidos). Unlike his former Sonoran bosses, Cárdenas came from a town in Michoacán, rooted in ancient Mexico. Therefore he had a first hand knowledge of the people's hopes and merely tried to make them happy, not to seek progress.

Cárdenas' personal style was shocking to the intellectuals technologists of the Calles administration, even to those who were no longer part

of it. They were appalled by the general's insistence on seeing the problems "with his own eyes," and manner of travelling, as no other president (or Mexican) before him had done, — on muleback, rather than comfortably seated in an airplane — to attend to these matters in person. They considered him totally unable to look at problems in an over-- all perspective, and thought him incapable of setting priorities for his social and economic policies.

The members of the cabinet baffled them even more. Cárdenas distrusted the intellectuals, much more than they distrusted him. His loyal followers were more or less unknown men, and the continuity of the political staff was broken. There was talk of utter chaos in public finances and the country's economy managed by decree. Miguel Palacios Macedo, a brilliant technologist and economist, drafted a new law for the central bank, establishing precise limits to the powers of the central bank and its relations with private banks in order to prevent the state from causing inflation. In 1937, the government started to draw on the central bank's funds to finance its social programs. For Palacios and for many other technologists, this was the last straw, leading to their resignation.

Cárdenas' education policy also drew criticism from the "doer" intellectuals, former followers of Vasconcelos or Calles, in spite of the fact that it was not Cárdenas, but Calles, who drafted this policy. In 1934 the government started a state crusade to "win over the consciences of the children" (Calles) through socialist education. In the face of this state invasion of culture and education, the intellectual world of the time reacted almost unanimously. Mexico turned into a battlefield of ideas, and the clash was worse than anything seen since the days of the reform, fought this time between intellectuals in official positions (its new legitimizers) and those who had been displaced and now lived in the no-man's land of the university. 1933 was the year of confrontation of government and culture. But Cárdenas was more tolerant than Calles and, as in other thorny fields (relations with the church, for example), carried out a good, neo-Porfirian policy of conciliation.

Nevertheless, then and later these same technologist critics of the Cárdenas government adopted an incredibly ambiguous attitude in their relations with the general. They denounced the disregard for technical systems in his economic and social policies, but admired his instinct to serve the people's causes; the people's respect for him; and basically, the indubitable moral integrity of his actions. Cárdenas was not a utopian nor a simple man, and therefore he could not arouse simple feel-

ings. Besides, his government was practically beyond reproach insofar as it did not persecute or repress. Like Madero, he adopted a policy of laissez-faire, and he tolerated attacks by the press as much as Lerdo. There was harsh criticism and satire of his "non-government"; he was a "bull in a china shop"; but then and later, he was respected for his character and moral strength. Moralist critics and the critics of the left were silent during his entire presidential period.

The young intellectuals who opposed the dogmatism of "socialist education" particularly admired Cárdenas' foreign policy. The world was not yet divided into two blocs, as it was after the Second World War, and independent stances were still strong and effective. From the outset, Mexico sided with the Republican Party in the Spanish Civil War. In an act of open defiance of Stalinist Russia's power, Cárdenas offered asylum to Trotsky, and this decision really captivated the young people. But Cárdenas was admired above all as the great redeemer of nationalism; the only round clearly won by Mexico in its century-old fight against the heavyweight to the north was that of the oil expropiation.

There was never really a dialogue between the intellectuals and the "sphinx from Jiquilpan," as Cárdenas was called. He did not call on the intellectuals, and he always mistrusted them. They admired him with reservations, because the generosity with which he acted in other areas was belied by his cultural policy, the "worst cultural policy in post-revolutionary Mexico." The "contemporaneans," an outstanding group of poets and intellectuals who produced their best work during those years, were denounced by the administration as "reactionaries and homosexuals."

There was only one exception in the ambivalent atmosphere of respect and mistrust between the sphinx and the intellectuals: Vicente Lombardo Toledano, the labor leader. Lombardo was at the same time a teacher, a philosopher, and a member of Congress. He had amazing rhetorical skills, in the days when public speeches appealed to the people both in Mexico and in Europe. Cárdenas admired the articles published by Lombardo in "El Universal" from 1930 to 1934, articles about a kind of socialism that was more sentimental, humanitarian, Christian, literary, and pious than strictly "scientific." Lombardo was not only a successful essayist, but a leader who electrified the masses. At first he was known as the "maestro," and the unions and leaders formed in his shadow displayed a degree of orderliness and discipline that would soon be used for Cárdenas' political purposes, or rather for those of the Mexican state.

The formidable pyramidal structure of the working class, concluded in 1936 through the creation of the Mexican Workers' Confederation, was Lombardo's priceless service rendered Cárdenas. With such a tremendous popular backing his social policy was secure. This feat could not have been accomplished by any other labor leader lacking Lombardo's imagination and rhetorical force. Once the period of unrest was over, giving way to a climate of conciliation, Lombardo's services were no longer needed.

There was another political area in which the intellectuals reigned as ·gray eminences: the Ministry of Foreign Relations. From the time of Calles, the intellectuals had established international policy guidelines, and had even devised controversial, though valuable and novel policies, such as the Genaro Estrada doctrine. At that time, the international affairs expert Isidro Fabela was highly respected and Mexico began to enjoy the prestige of an independent country, based on first-rate, intelligent, effective diplomacy, maintained until a very short time ago.

In 1939, Manuel Gómez Morín, the creator of economic institutions during the Calles era, decided unexpectedly to found a political opposition party, the P.A.N. (National Action Party). At first his political success was negligible and deteriorated even further with the passing of time. Some moral success must be granted him, although in the final analysis, in providing the government with a "loyal opposition," his party bestowed some degree of legitimacy to Mexico's political establishment.

Another unheard-of undertaking was Daniel Cosío Villegas' project started in 1934. Perhaps under the conviction that the era of the philosopher-king would   never come, and aware that too much familiarity with power on the part of the gray eminences would   dry out their brains, he concentrated his efforts on the establishment of decentralized cultural enterprises, with the support, but not under the supervision, of the state. Thus, his efforts led to the creation of the *Fondo de Cultura Económica* and *El Colegio de México*. Jesús Silva Herzog followed suit with his *Cuadernos Americanos*. Both believed that information could also be used to govern. The *Colegio de México* was also instrumental to another miracle: it offered government grants to intellectuals, with practically "no strings attached." These grants bore fruit, as evidenced by the number of books now filling the shelves of libraries.

Triumphalism (1940–1959)

Halfway through World War II, Mexico heralded right and left a change

of direction. It was Cárdenas himself — and his Secretary of the Treasury, Eduardo Suárez — who started talk about a new industrial era. The astounded "revolutionaries" heard of such "reactionary" policies as promotion of tourism. The first steps along the road towards achievement of well-being and development were to drop Cárdenas' social policy (the healthy decision to cancel socialist education was only part of this trend), leaving political quarrels for some other future time. The pass word was national cohesiveness and former presidents and presidential candidates showed themselves symbolically united on the national platform. Incidentally, Vasconcelos also returned and collaborated diligently with the new president Avila Camacho, who was known as the "gentleman president."

During his administration, the intellectuals were again called to fill government positions. Jaime Torres Bodet became Secretary of Education. He had been Vasconcelos' private secretary in 1921, and he wanted to repeat the feat of his former boss; his efforts bring to mind Marx's memorable quotation about men and their caricatures. On the other hand, Torres Bodet embarked on a new course: he strove to become the prophet of legitimation, or at least an ideologist: he wrote the president's speeches for him, and thus every year, on the first day of September the Mexicans heard the best state of the union addresses in history.

This period was marked by total silence and extensive adjustment. When a series of articles appeared in the newspaper "El Universal" criticizing the administration's financial policy, which obviously protected big business and fostered a new bourgeois class at the expense of the neediest part of the population (29 articles written by Miguel Palacios Macedo in 1944), the Secretary of the Interior wondered: "Well, what does this man want?" Criticism was silenced, not because it was dangerous, but because it seemed to challenge the triumphal spirit of the moment. Jesús Silva Herzog, another man who, like Palacios, had known and steadfastly participated in Mexico's struggle of the '20s, also denounced the moral crisis and corruption pervading the administration. So did Narciso Bassols in his magazine *Combate.*

Miguel Alemán, the new president, declared during his campaign that he intended to form his government with intellectuals. Actually, he should have said "college-educated people" because he dragged with him a throng of technologists into the administration, who were fascinated by the new project for development and industrialization; men whom Luis González aptly called the "neo-scientists."

Criticism of the new national project came forth here and there from lone members of the generation of post-revolutionary "doers," particularly Daniel Cosío Villegas. Significantly, Cosío thought that Mexico was lapsing to Porfirian lines, thus belieing the revolution's social, political, educational, and nationalist promises. The ensemble of his critical writings was called "The Crisis of Mexico." In it, the word crisis was used, perhaps unconsciously, in the sense given it by Ortega y Gasset in his works. "Life as a crisis," wrote Ortega, "is when a man has negative convictions . . . When he does not feel certain about anything, and therefore is unable to make up his mind in a precise, strong, confident, passionate manner; he cannot conform to anything, or direct his life towards a clear destiny." According to Cosío Villegas, Mexico was experiencing a crisis in its national projection, a situation that might very well lead, in a not too distant future, to the even more painful loss of its identity.

Cosío was not jailed nor sentenced to death; he was merely ignored in government circles. But the reaction he called forth was unexpected. The men in power were more affected because criticism had come from a man who had not only served the establishment, but helped to build it. The Secretary of the Interior declared that in Mexico dissenters were not punished.

At the time when this publication appeared in 1947, Vicente Lombardo Toledano, who had been Cárdenas' political supporter, adopted the idea and project of Gomez Morín, another member of his generation, and founded the Popular Party in an attempt to bring progressives and leftists together. Although at first the P.P. attracted a considerable number of intellectuals and artists, it soon lost appeal because it did not have effective popular support and was torn by internal strife. Very soon it was disintegrated by conflicting trends and began to flirt with the administration, thus losing political force as well as moral and intellectual influence, and in passing frustrated quite a few youthful hopes.

Triumphalism in government circles, the supposedly permanent installation of Mexico's development, did not mean tolerance for the dissenters, but the tactics resorted to were as subtle as those employed by the Porfirian group. In 1952 the presidential candidate Adolfo Ruiz Cortines gently coaxed the intellectuals into explaining openly in Mexico City's main newspaper why they intended to vote for him; the famous "reasoned vote." And thus there were several "reasoned votes" even from the bitterest critics, such as Cosío Villegas. Furthermore, the entire Ruiz Cortines administration was dominated by the neo-scien-

tists; the old intellectuals were fed crumbs: they were constantly flat-
tered and "asked for advice."

Throughout the whole triumphalist era, leftist critics remained silent,
due to their inveterate faith in progress. When in 1950 Frank Tannen-
baum criticized the development strategy in his book "Mexico, the
Struggle for Peace and Bread," and advised Mexico to turn to Switzer-
land or Denmark as a model for development, rather than to the United
States, the left clamored against him. Manuel Germán Parra published a
passionate defense of Mexico's right to progress and industrialization
which no foreigner could deny. Evidently, neo-scientist thinking also
pervaded the left.

Moral criticism by the old intellectuals, who had dreamed and, in
part, succeeded in "doing something for Mexico," was hardly effective.
But midway through the "gay fifties," literature began to gain ground
as a critical vanguard. Juan Rulfo wrote a collection of short stories and
a novel describing the terrible, final disaster wrought by the revolution
in rural areas. In his novels, Carlos Fuentes told of the corruption of the
revolutionary generals and their urban neo-Porfirist associates. Octavio
Paz returned to Mexico after several years in the United States and, in a
visit to the countryside, was appalled at what he saw. The first issue of
the *Revista Mexicana de Literatura*, an independent publication, pub-
lished "The Broken Vessel," a poem by Paz in consonance with Rulfo's
work, a view of the situation obscured by the City's triumphalist boasts:

> Tell me, drought; tell me, burnt-out land,
>   land of ground-up bones;
> Tell me, dying moon;
> Is there no water?
> Is there only blood, only dust, only the
>   prints of bare feet on the spine?
> Only rags and food for insects and stupor
>   in the cruel noon, like a golden
>   chieftain?

The New Left (1959—1968)

The government's repression of railroad workers, teachers and students
who, in 1958, publicy demonstrated against the administration, marked
the end of triumphalism. Shortly thereafter the Cuban Revolution
seized power. This event shook the intellectual's image of himself, his
role in society and his position vis-à-vis the administration. There

emerged an American (Mills), a Latin American, and as well as a European (Fanon, Sartre) variety of the new left: the intellectual as a critical conscience committed to action. During the '60s, the intellectuals were captured by what one sociologist called the "culture of the left." One of them, Víctor Flores Olea, emphatically declared:

> I believe that the intellectuals' commitment to the people's struggle is more than ever a necessity of our times. It is the sign of the new era. Through participation, intellectuals will discover the true problems, those of the Mexicans, those of mankind. Let us face that a rekindling of the people's struggle expands our perspectives and offers us the opportunity to justify ourselves. Our duty? To state clearly and loudly what the needs of our people are: education and service.

In actual practice these intellectuals did not live up to expectations. The bond established with the masses was more symbolic than real. They founded and directed several political organizations, among them the National Liberation Movement which, significantly, was only that: a movement whose political projections were so vague that it did not even achieve the status of a party. It spawned factionalism – the chronic disease of the Mexican left – and the political accomplishments of these intellectuals were nil.

Their intellectual work was more important than their political actions. They founded some outstanding newspapers and collaborated in many others. One of them, Pablo González Casanova, published the first critical essay about national politics written by a Mexican sociologist, under the somewhat ironical title of: "Democracy in Mexico." Actually, most of their energy was wasted on discussions over the fairness of the methods of the other small leftist groups, in denouncing each other and in waiting to be called to some post in the administration. No wonder they were popularly known as "the mafia."

The Crisis of 1968

The intellectuals did not instigate the student movement. Caught in the midst of their verbal disputes, they watched how the students spontaneously rallied and took to the streets to voice their protests over the hypocritical, condescending manner in which their problems were handled. Immediately some exalted intellectuals sided with the students and talked big about starting a revolution; others were seriously committed to the movement. Carlos Monsivais' best pages were written

at the height of the movement, and many youths found humor, and
even a new language in a magazine called *Siempre*. In 1968, the situa-
tion in Mexico was dangerously close to what it had been in 1908. At
the age of seventy-two, Daniel Cosío Villegas published a series of critical
articles, in the style of a strictly political writer, relegated along many de-
cades of triumphalism. Octavio Paz resigned from his position as Am-
bassador to India as soon as he learned of the massacre of Tlatelolco.
Avid readers cropped up everywhere, restoring something that writers
had not experienced since the '30s, when Vasconcelos' autobiography
appeared: public credibility, both intellectual and moral. They began to
tell the truth and to act in accordance with their convictions.

The tragedy of Tlatelolco is still too fresh in the minds of the people
to be able to talk about it. It is too close and weighs heavily on the con-
science of both the government and the governed. One thing it accom-
plished: it uncovered the conflicts underlying the relationship between
the intellectuals and the administration, forcing the former to take a
stand. Bayonets cut short the visions of a guerrilla warfare, which some
were caressing in their delirium (though comfortably seated in their
homes, with a glass of expensive brandy in their hands). Only the
worn-out collection of alternatives remained: to seek influence through
collaboration with government officials lending them ideological legiti-
macy; to denounce the administration openly, or to get away from the
city into self-imposed exile in some distant place in the country or
abroad.

Although President Echeverría was Secretary of the Interior at the
time of the Tlatelolco killings, and in spite of the fact that — perhaps
behind his back — there was another massacre of students on June 10,
1971, the "weary intellectuals," according to Ciran's formula, yielded
to arguments (verbal and private) that at last a man of good will, a new
Cárdenas, had come to power.

Echeverría had to ventilate the rarified political atmosphere and
he immediately adopted the political tactics of preceding administra-
tions: freedom of expression (Madero); bribing of dissenters and paying
for good-will (Porfirio); verbal flooding (Lombardo), and personal
mobility (Cárdenas). In the meantime, thanks to the movement of '68,
Excelsior became firmly established as an independent newspaper. For
those who wished to see, it was clear that, also thanks to '68, the intel-
lectuals had captured a ready made audience — basic material for a slow
but steady improvement of public life.

Unfortunately, very few opted for the line of service. There were
many spontaneous offers to act in an advisory capacity, but in spite of

the complacency of those in power, they have had very little influence on major decisions. However, their pliability won them juicy privileges and even ambassadorial posts. There was also an abundance of legitimizers or ideologists anxious to prove that for the country there is only "one road: Mexico," a prodigious synthesis of freedom and social justice. They went even as far as to postulate: "Echeverría or fascism", "Failure to support Echeverría is a historical crime".

The people would have lost faith completely in the moral dignity of the intellectuals if it had not been for the independent stance taken by some newspapers and magazines (*Excelsior, Siempre, Plural, Diorama*) and a handful of writers, like courageous old Cosío Villegas who, at the end of his life won a gold medal for his four essays on the Mexican political system, which disturbed the ordinary intellectuals, upset the politicians, and delighted the public. A considerable part of the Mexican middle class, the same who participated in, or supported the student movement, was eager to buy the tens of thousands of copies of Cosío's books and tasted, if only fleetingly, any liberal's basic premise: Public personalities should be judged publicly.

New Rooster, Old Corn

The present situation is clearly more neo-Porfirian than liberal. Carlos Fuentes, who as recently as 1967 wrote that the intellectual's sole mission is to criticize those in power, became a Limantourian ambassador to Paris and a quite simplistic provider, a posteriori, of legitimizing arguments for the administration. Academic circles have lost their independence and are in the hands of true "dark powers". The academic, cultural, and intellectual levels have deteriorated. Many intellectuals have joined the exodus from the university, to seek refuge in the administration, mainly due to the need to earn a living. In Mexico, practically nobody can support himself through writing alone. Thus, for the sake of sheer survival many intellectuals are compelled to vie for a position with the government, armed only with the flimsy prestige of an intellectual aura or work.

Others live in the world of journalism, enjoying some margin of freedom and independence, which, though precarious, is not to be scorned. Thanks to them, Mexico still has a few publications, a few honest, critical, intelligent writers, without whom our public climate would come close to ideological pan-statism.

Finally, many others have chosen to hide behind the parapets of

their intellectual work, in their ivory tower, internally exiled as disdain-
ful, private critics of the power elite. Surely they will produce impor-
tant intellectual or literary works, because inevitably, it is the call of an
"unhappy conscience" that leads the intellectual to produce his best
work.

In the final analysis, it might be said that the intellectual has played
a prominent role in Mexico. For a century he has remained in positions
of authority together with the clerical, military, political, and entrepre-
neurial elite. In every generation the Mexican intellectual has yielded,
without much resistance to the seduction of politics; he has lived in,
prowled around, and longed for the control tower.

As a philosopher-king, in power or seeking power (founding politi-
cal parties), he has always failed. He is unpopular, ephemeral, does not
show much capacity for practical political organization, and generally
cannot build a political following of his own, even among fellow intel-
lectuals. As a "gray eminence," he has frankly done very well for him-
self: a considerable part of the fiscal, diplomatic, education, and labor
pyramiding has been the work of intellectuals. Countless state-sup-
ported cultural institutions created and managed by intellectuals (de-
centralized cultural concerns) were prosperous and profitable until a
short time ago, when the politicians began to interfere with them.
As legitimizers of those in power, they thrived under Porfirio Díaz,
but during the revolutionary and neo-Porfirian periods, they were
conspicuously absent, possibly because – also until a short time ago –
the Mexican state required few ideological justifications. In the six
years of the Echeverría administration the president himself has been
the ideologist, but his theses have not been new and have not been
adopted in domestic policies. Basically, his theses are derived from
the Constitution of 1917. The only ideologist Mexico had had since
1934 was Vicente Lombardo Toledano, the craftsman of the Mexican
blend of socialism, nationalism, freedom, industrialization, indepen-
dence, anti-imperialism, etc.

As critics, their position has been a difficult one, because of the ori-
ginal unforgivable sin *of lack of any financial support other than that of
the state.* Even so, whenever they have stepped onto the public square
with written criticisms of those in power, they have provided them with
weapons. Madero's book paved the way for the Revolution in 1931;
Luis Cabrera damaged Calles considerably with his criticism of the
"current revolution" and was expelled from the country. Cosío twice
caused a commotion: in 1947 and in 1975-1976.

Exile, in short, has offered them sanctuary many times. Far from their country they have produced good literature and even – like Amos – some dark prophesies. When they have chosen exile – due to neglect by those in power – the intellectuals have produced works of a quality not to be disdained, and against the wildest prediction, have partaken in the feast of world culture.

The Changing Role of Intellectuals in Indonesian National Development
(A socio historical interpretation)

Selo Soemardjan

As is common in the social sciences in the past and also today it is not an easy matter, indeed, to construct a definition of a concept in such a way that it can carry general agreement among social scientists, and at the same time offer a correct clarification and delineation of the principles included in the concept. The same difficulty applies to the definition of the words intellectual and intelligentsia. The Philippine expert paper entitled "Motivating Intellectuals for Development," presented at the ASEAN [1] Regional Seminar on "The Social and Cultural Aspects of Development in ASEAN Countries" in December 1974 in Bukittinggi, Indonesia, lists a number of definitions from different authors without offering a specific definition for use in the paper itself. It is true though that the definitions create largely the same understanding of the subject, but with the emphasis on different aspects. But nevertheless the reader is left to determine for himself what to take of the various explanations of the word and then try to check in his mind the validity of the interpretation in the framework of his social and cultural environment.

For the sake of exactness the present paper would like to take the Oxford advanced learners' dictionary of current English as a starting point.

This dictionary defines the adjective "intellectual" as having or showing good reasoning power while interested in things of the mind, such as the arts and ideas for their own sake. It further determines that the concept of "intelligentsia" should be understood as that part of a community which can be regarded or which regards itself as intellectual and capable of serious independent thinking.

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[1]   ASEAN: Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore & Thailand).

On the basis of these interpretations, the concept of "intellectual" in the sense of those who are regarded or regard themselves as intellectuals should be taken as identical with the word "intelligentsia."

What distinguishes an intellectual in the present sense from a non-intellectual is not his ability to use his reasoning power, for every normal individual is endowed with that ability. It is rather his ability of independent thinking as distinct from placating the opinion of others, which makes the intellectual stand out from the non-intellectual.

The concept of independence thinking in this respect includes careful observation of phenomena in the intellectual's environment, his understanding of the causes of those phenomena and their correlations with other phenomena, and ultimately the formulation of a conclusion which can be communicated to other individuals in clear language.

Whether the process of independent thinking is colored by established belief systems or ingrained ideologies, and whether the outcome can be accepted as objective or subjective does not affect an individual's quality as an intellectual.

After all, every individual socialized in a living culture can hardly escape the power of that culture which shapes his world of feeling and thinking or in other words, which determines the network of values and norms that envelop his basic way of life.

Few people, if at all, can build up their capacities for independent thinking without systematic and purposeful training, generally obtained in formally organized educational institutions. Even there it requires a long, arduous and disciplined process of learning and training before one arrives at a point where the mind can operate autonomously from the thinking by others. It should be mentioned here that not everybody enjoying the highest level of education can make such an accomplishment. In commenting on the role of university graduates who have joined village communities in a volunteer rural program of development, a Kompas correspondent remarked pointedly, that the people in the rural areas do not need university graduates as much as they do intellectuals [2].

As pointedly as this article heading has expressed the felt needs of village communities for real intellectuals above the needs for individuals carrying university degrees only, to help in rural development, it should be admitted that in a society where higher education is not yet institu-

[2]   M.J. Kasiyanto, Pedesaan bukan sekedar butuh "Sarjana," tetapi tenaga intellectuil, in the daily newspaper Kompas, Monday, March 8, 1976, page IV.

tionalized, formal symbols stand in higher esteem than the actual qualities which those symbols are supposed to stand for.

In this social situation it is therefore understandable that formal regulations render a high rank to those carrying a university degree when entering government service without submitting them to any test or examination of their actual capabilities. It was also until recently a common attitude of university diploma owners to be satisfied with no less than a job with leadership requirements even if they don't have a single day of experience in real working life.

A student of the economic faculty of Universitas Indonesia in Jakarta, involved in a discussion with business managers, was heard saying in serious honesty that before too long he would carry his doctorandus degree (equivalent to an M.A.) and that therefore nobody would be able to fool him in matters of economics and business.

That student can be hardly be blamed of bragging or consciously overestimating his knowledge and capacities, for large sectors of the population do believe that a university diploma is a guarantee of supremely trained intellect, and therefore supersedes all other faculties in society. In fact, it can even be said without exaggeration that a university degree in modern Indonesian social life functions in the same way as the now desocialized aristocratic titles before the 1945 revolution for national independence and democracy. It gives the bearer a status of distinction, although not necessarily one of social usefulness. The quality of this status-symbol, however, is declining in the last five or six years, particularly in large urban areas, although less so in the countryside.

The rapid increase of university graduates, inadequately matched by an increase in employment possibilities, has created inflationary pressures which cause considerable damage to this university generated symbol of social prestige. Sharp competition for jobs between them is forcing many of the less fortunate to accept employment below the level considered due to them by social stratification standards.

The Position of Intellectuals
in Relation with Other Social Groups

Up to the year 1945, when the people successfully started an armed rebellion against foreign colonial regimes, there were three different indigenous social groups which concurrently competed in the exercise of influence on the population in Indonesia. Neither of the three groups had been able to gain a position on what can now be termed a national level. Their sphere of influence was always local, limited in many in-

stances by physical boundaries created by nature, but more often by the differences in culture between numerous ethnic groups. A man, a group, or a dynasty in power in a specific territory over a specific ethnic group, could not expect to be of much significance even in an adjacent area but with a different ethnic group.

The oldest group, emerging since the dawn of Indonesian history, were the aristocrats, members of the extended royal family which in the course of time developed into an institutionalized dynasty. Such a power dynasty could be so firmly integrated in the local society that its roots penetrated deeply into the entire network of social institutions. The stratification system of the population, its system of values and norms, and its set of customs were organized in such a way that they accorded the most favorable position to the ruling dynasty. There even used to be a standard cultural belief system which proclaimed the monarch in power as an indispensable link between the world of human beings and the cosmological powers which rule the universe.

Modern democratic observers may find such a social system feudal and irrational, but as a reality it has socially and culturally survived all major political and other changes, and even in the present new order in Indonesia one can observe its manifestations, of course in modified versions, all over the country. It is worth mentioning that this feudal aristocracy was, through the policy of indirect rule, kept by the Dutch colonial administration in controlled power to exercise the administration over the population.

The second group, generated after the introduction of Islam in Indonesian society, comprises the religious leaders. The overwhelming part of this group is made up by Islamic cadres, since more than 95 per cent of the population regards itself as Moslem. But where another religion is locally dominant, like Hinduism in Bali, and Christianity in a number of islands in East Nusa Tenggara, the priests or other recognized office holders enjoy an unchallenged confidence of the congregation.

Although these world religions have been superimposed on the previously existing native belief systems, the fact that through a long-drawn process of mutual influence both factors became inextricably integrated, has made those religions an integral part of the culture. On this basis the prestige and influence on the population of the respective religious leaders became institutionalized. The process of institutionalization is continously reinforced among others through socialization in the family and by way of religious education and training in langgar, madrasah, pòndok and pesantren from the large urban centers to the most remote

villages in Indonesia's sprawling archipelago. The strength of Islam and the power of its leaders over the population is convincingly evidenced by the failure of the Dutch after their efforts of more than three centuries to submit the province of Acheh, the countries bulwark of Islam, under its effective colonial regime. Another evidence is offered by the Darul Islam movements in West Java and South Sulawesi, which challenged the secular national government of Indonesia in favor of an Islamic State. This armed and political movement started in 1948 and only after fourteen years of incessant political and military operations the Indonesian government managed to capture its top leader and supress the religiously inspired insurgency.

The last group to come into being is that of intellectuals. This group developed largely as a product of formal secular education. Though under the Dutch colonial regime, starting in the first half of the 17th century, this kind of education was introduced with great hesitation and very sparsely among the population, it managed in some way to enhance the training in rational thinking. Like in Thailand, Malaysia and other foreign ruled colonies in Southeast Asia, education was organized primarily to train indigenous young people for administrative functions below the policy making level. In other words it was the purpose of the colonial system to train them for clerks and other low ranking office or field personnel who were only required to carry out orders and were not supposed to do any independent thinking. The haunting fear was of course that government sponsored education would create a critical intellectual class which would endanger the foreign ruling regime.

In order to prevent this from happening the Dutch designed a policy whereby popular education, primarily for the rural population and the lower class in urban settlements, was kept on a three or five year primary school level. A seven year primary school system with Dutch as the principal language of instruction, was maintained in towns, but largely for the children of loyal government employees. The best of the graduates, whose parents could afford to pay the cost, might be admitted to junior and perhaps later on senior high schools which until the nineteen thirties numbered less than ten for a population of sixty million.

Senior high schools provided for a very long time the top level type of education for Indonesians, since only in the nineteen twenties was higher education inaugurated in the form of three separate colleges of engineering, medicine and law.

Needless to say, where students were mostly selected from dependents of government employees and where in the near absence of an

indigenous private middle class the government was the largest, and under the existing system the most prestigious employer, the most logical way for graduates to seek employment was to enter government service. Only a relatively small number of them, who for some reason could not join the government, remained in low earning private employment. Enforced by colleagues with university training in the Netherlands, this group had more liberty than their associates in government service to develop nationalist political movements which ran counter to the Dutch colonial regime. Summarizing the positions of the three groups at the time of the pre-war colonial dominance, we find the traditional aristocracy under firm control of the Dutch. Being predominantly Christian, the Dutch were not effective in keeping the Islamic population in their administrative network. The group of educated intellectuals was partly kept in discipline as government employees, whereas the other part remained with critical attitudes outside the government.

The group of intellectuals at the time of the Netherlands East Indies occupied diverse social roles in their relationships with the other groups and the colonial government. Their status and role at that time was to a large extent influenced by the social dichotomy between the ruling group and the non-ruling group. At the summit of the ruling group were the Dutch, the indigenous aristocracy, and the Dutch speaking Indonesian intellectuals in the government.

To be included in Dutch social circles was considered the ultimate of an Indonesian's social status. As a consequence, adequacy in mastering the Dutch language, the most important instrument for relationship with the Dutch, was a much used yardstick for measuring an individual's position in social life. Since that language could only be learned in Dutch controlled formal educational institutions, and since college education was considered of unequalled supremacy, it was only logical that people accorded the highest social esteem to college degree holders, particularly if the degrees were earned in the Netherlands. This esteem could only be matched by the aristocracy titles of the indigenous nobility, who understandably looked at the intellectuals as rivals contending in the search of social prestige.

Other intellectuals, those who were in good command of the Dutch language, who did not occupy a position in the government bureaucracy, were placed in the next lower group, on account of their detachment from the ruling group and their distantiation from Dutch, and eventually from aristocratic, circles.

In this stratification system one can understand the low social status accorded to the non-Dutch speaking millions of the population, includ-

ing the formally non-educated Moslems. Social interaction between the Dutch-speaking intellectuals and this group was friendly, but never intimate and with a minimum of mutual respect. The former were proud of their knowledge of and eventual orientation to Western cultures, whereas the latter could not help feeling socially and intellectually ill at ease, even if they maintained strong allegiance to their traditional or religious way of life.

It was from this non-intellectual group that the aristocracy enjoyed recognition as their social superiors within the same social structure and native culture. Relationships between the outstanding aristocratic personalities and religious leaders was usually imbued with mutual understanding, respect and a spirit of cooperation. Unfortunately however, there were many occasions whereby local aristocracies, favored by the Dutch as their administrative intermediaries with the population, assumed positions more in compliance with Dutch policies rather than protecting the people in case of conflicting interests. These occasional attitudes were instrumental in creating the image among the people that the aristocracy everywhere functioned as loyal associates of the colonial regime.

In this respect there was a better integrated system of relationships between the non-governmental intellectuals and the leaders of the religious group. Both occupied positions outside the administration, and for that reason they felt as having a common platform cooperation, especially on the political level. Being no part of the ruling group, they both integrated themselves with the people to become popular leaders. The most outstanding political leaders at that time inevitably emerged from their ranks, much to the dismay of the Dutch colonial government. It seems that the Dutch were more afraid of anti-Dutch intellectuals as of anti-Dutch Moslems, for more prominent intellectual leaders, like Sukarno, Hatta, Ratulangie were exited, than were Islamic politicians.

The Period of the Japanese
Military Occupation

In March 1942 the Dutch surrendered to the Japanese armed forces and Indonesia was put under the Japanese occupational forces. There was no doubt that Japan, under the disguise of an East-Asian co-prosperity program, wanted to settle in Indonesia as the new colonial master.

The aristocracy was kept in charge of the local administration, but under strict Japanese control. But in order to gain popular support for their war efforts they secured the cooperation of both intellectual and

Islamic leaders. A foursome national leadership was put together with three members recruited from the most respected anti-Dutch intellectuals and one from the prominent leaders of the Islamic group. It should be mentioned in passing that the three intellectuals were all Moslem, but their political influence on the Indonesian people originated primarily from their being intellectuals, while their religious affiliation was only a supporting factor.

To organize the youth for military support the Japanese created an army, called the defenders of the Netherlands, armed with only light weapons and trained in Japanese style by Japanese officers. The commanding officers of this hurriedly organized army were almost without exception Islam leaders.

When the Japanese announced that Indonesia would be made independent, and a committee was formed to make the necessary preparations, members of this committee were carefully selected exclusively from the intellectual and Islamic groups.

The prohibition to use the Dutch language both in school and in the administration opened the opportunity for non-Dutch speaking intellectuals to rise in the government bureaucracy by learning Japanese. Through this language vehicle they hoped to come closer to the Japanese ruling class and thus to secure a better social position, which they had no hope to occupy under the Dutch regime. Unfortunately, the chance they obtained did not last long. While the Japanese army command on the national level on the island of Java took every major effort to win the support of Indonesian influential intellectuals, the Japanese navy command in charge of occupation of the island of Kalimantan seemed to maintain quite a different policy. Indonesians who were able to run away from that island could tell of apparently systematic and persistent killings of local intellectuals by the Japanese military. The Japanese, most probably working under military orders, summoned their prospective victims from their homes or offices, to which they never returned. Among the victims were medical doctors, lawyers, engineers, and many prominent officers of the civil administration. It was not clear what motives drove the Japanese navy command to design such a policy, and so far no documented evidence can be produced of the number of victims, but rough estimates run into the hundreds all over the island. Considering the scarcity of educational facilities in Kalimantan, this purge on the local intellectuals deprived the people from potential modern leadership which they so badly needed for their development in the coming years.

Intellectuals in the
Post Independence Period

When the second World War came to an end in 1945 with the defeat of the Japanese armed forces, the Indonesian intellectuals were very quick in using the right moment for their popularly supported proclamation of national independence. So the Republic of Indonesia was born.

What then followed in the way of building a new nation, organizing a national government, and at the same time defending the proclaimed independence against powerful armed and political attacks by foreign colonial forces, was of truly gigantic dimensions. The entire population of 80,000,000 was mobilized and moved under the leadership of a small number of anti-Dutch intellectual and religious political leaders.

The group of aristocrats in almost all levels of the population were politically, and on a number of occasions also physically, swept away in the upsurge of democracy that accompanied the revolution of independence. So far they never had the chance to reemerge and it seems most unlikely that such a chance will ever come in the near future.

This left the group of intellectuals and Moslems with the tremendous task of creating substance to the national revolution. The religious leaders with their institutionalized role as solidarity makers applied all their authority and experience to keep the masses organized as their following. Specific aspects of the religious teachings were used to keep the revolutionary spirit burning and to channel the movement into active participation in the revolution.

The group of intellectuals was faced with the multiple task of organizing the entire state bureaucracy and educating the people in the basic principles of theoretical and operational democracy. The intellectuals, being an active and selective part of the Western educated section of the population, were widely expected to play the role of modernizing agents in the changing society. It was a mission silently assigned to them by the people as a logical consequence of the revolution which had quickly reached the point of no return.

A constitution, drawn up by the preparatory committee for national independence during the last weeks before the collapse of the Japanese war machine was announced and, perhaps for lack of other competing concepts, unconditionally accepted by every individual in the country as the basic infrastructural institution in the ensuing process of building the new Indonesian nation. Strangely enough this constitution, which is now popularly referred to as the 1945 constitution, and which in its preamble includes the Pancasila or five basic principles of the state,

has in the course of time gained a sacred recognition of the people far beyond the intentions of its original conceptors.

It was conceived in a tumultuous situation of war and under incalculable pressures of time. Therefore, and to the best of Western democratic legal theories, a provision was made in the body of the constitution itself which opens the way for making amendments and additions. Once in 1950 this constitution, which calls for a unitary Republic of Indonesia, was set aside and replaced by an intellectually more correct institution of a federal structure of the republic. The people, in their spontaneous actions, refused to accept the federal republic and its constitution, both considered as the result of some Dutch-sponsored conspiracy to reestablish colonial power in the country. Eight months after its inception the federal republic was dissolved, its constitution abandoned, and the original unitary republic was reinstalled with the reacceptance of the 1945 constitution and its inherent Pancasila.

Since then twelve armed uprisings rocked the country, some of them originating from Islamic parts of the population and demanding the transformation of the Pancasila republic into an Islamic state. Communist-sponsored rebellions, the most serious being those of 1948 and 1965, were violently attempting to mold Indonesia into a "democratic republic" or a "people's republic." But the country's intellectual leaders were able to warn the people against the anti-1945 constitution and anti-Pancasila nature of the insurgencies. After this was successfully done, the national government had a firm political platform to destroy the insurgent movements with the strength of the armed forces.

The proven effectiveness of the 1945 constitution and Pancasila to help the country over so many political and military crises has lent to both institutions a sacred nature which resists any attempt, legal or illegal, of amendment, addition and, let alone, replacement. In fact the two concepts have now been made, as President Suharto has repeatedly enforced, the inalterable cornerstone of the anti-communist and development-oriented new order in his policies.

In their efforts to design a political system suitable to an independent Indonesia the intellectuals, in the nineteen fifties and early sixties, guided by agile President Sukarno, split themselves into two broad factions, the nationalist and the communists which, together with the religion-oriented group, formed what was then known as Nasakom (nationalism, religion, and communism).

President Sukarno, a master orator and politician, who in 1959 successfully seized all powers of the state by dissolving the conflict-ridden Constitutional Assembly and Parliament, decided that the best pattern

of political education and reconstruction was the mobilization system, by which the whole population was expected to rally around him as President for life and the Great Leader of the Revolution. The intellectuals, being part of the population, were also expected to render full "support without reservation" to the leader.

In this respect many academics at universities, particularly at Universitas Indonesia in Jakarta, who were trained to do independent and critical thinking underwent severe pressures from the president and communist influenced political groups. In his speeches for mass rallies President Sukarno ridiculed them as bald headed non-political individuals and text-book thinking teachers. The politically passive attitude of the academics at that time was even called by a communist group "intellectual prostitution" which did not deserve a place in the revolution.

The mobilization system at that time called for the highest priority for political education in national development. It was determined by the national leadership that what the country needed most of all was nation and character building. For the attainment of this overriding objective, loyal politicians were given stronger preference over educated and trained intellectuals. When the President, in 1960, decided to have a national development plan drafted, he recruited representatives of the Nasakom and functional group to form a national Development Council, but no experts in any academic discipline were called to render their services, not even as staff members or consultants. There were of course among the council members those who were experts in specific fields, but they were selected on the basis of their political affiliations rather than for their expertise.

Typical of the social atmosphere in those days was the great significance accorded to the physical structure of the planning product which covered 17 sectors of development, comprised in 8 volumes containing 1945 paragraphs. The figures 17,8, and 1945 symbolized the proclamation of national independence on August 17, 1945. The plan failed to reach even initial programming because of its over-ambitious objectives and inconsistencies with economic and social realities in the country.

The succession of president Sukarno by general Suharto marked a radical change in the state policies which guided the development of the nation. It also pushed the educated intellectuals from the dark corners of the past to the limelight of development in all procedural aspects from data collecting, planning, programming, implementation and evaluation. The focus of national development was shifted almost overnight from the political to the economic.

Communism was banned and the communist party dissolved as a result of an unsuccessfully attempted coup d'etat. Other political parties were reduced in number and their activities diminished to make way for political and social stability. National ambitions, previously elevated to make Indonesia a towering lighthouse in the political development of all nations in the world, were pulled down to realities and operational feasibilities. An era of rationalism and realism set in to replace a long period of romantic idealism. In power came the armed forces to save the country from falling into the hands of the communists and from further economic deterioration.

Perhaps because of the fact that president Suharto and many of his close associates come from the Javanese ethnic group where the culture is known to show strong humanitarian overtones, the regime of the armed forces presents itself in only mildly military concepts in the administration, although an irreconcilable attitude is retained against the communists in the country.

The military, by its own nature harboring a high value on organization and discipline on the basis of a rational and realistic way of thinking, quickly realized that for the further development of the country a well conceived plan was needed that would reflect the true need of the country on the one hand, and on the other hand could effectively make the best use of available resources both on the domestic and international level. For this purpose, it was recognized, the services of the intellectuals in the country were indispensable.

A development planning agency, Bappenas, was organized, manned exclusively by professors and other university graduates, working with consultants from international development organizations. Fifteen out of the twenty-two members of the cabinet, excluding the president and vice president, are technocrats, professors who for a large part are still active at their universities. In addition to this the policy making management of each ministry, particularly those concerned with economic affairs, is entrusted to other university affiliated intellectuals.

To prepare the first and second five year plan, 1969-1973 and 1974-1978, frequent and intensive bull sessions were held by selected intellectuals on various subjects of development. Participants in these sessions came from both government and private circles, and the views they expressed were highly valuable as building stones in the development planning.

Universities and other research institutions were widely utilized to do surveys and research to supply reliable data and systematic analysis

thereof. Each ministry is now equipped with a department of research and development, run by intellectuals with appropriate training. Wherever local expertise falls short, foreign experts are called in to help, but decisions are made by Indonesians themselves.

To help governors in drafting provincial development plans an instruction was sent by the national government to governors and university rectors in the region to organize a close cooperation in that endeavor.

In the present system of administration there is no parliamentary approval required for a development plan, neither is a provincial plan to be submitted to the regional representative councils for debate and decision. The signature of the president, or that of the governor in the regions is all that is needed for a development plan to start operating. There are in fact two occasions which can be used by the elected representative of the people to exercise some influence on development planning. The first occasion is in the five yearly session of the People's Assembly — the nation's supreme power assembly — where the broad outlines of the republic's policies for the next five years are determined. In this respect it should be known that many intellectuals, employed or not employed by the government, have been made instrumental in drawing up the draft outlines.

The second occasion is the debates on the annual budget in parliament, which includes of course debates on the development budget for the forthcoming year. So far, however, no major changes have been made either by the People's Assembly or by parliament in the draft policy outlines and the annual budgets.

Not only publicly financed development, but the private economic sector also makes extensive use of Indonesian intellectuals perhaps more successfully because of the considerably higher wages they can pay than the government.

The demand for intellectuals to work in private business has steeply increased since the influx of foreign capital investments following the foreign investment law of 1967, which was in fact an open invitation with facilities and guarantees for foreign capital to enter the country.

There seems at present to be a strong desire for further economic and social progress among large parts of the population in Indonesia, and people can hardly tolerate any event which hampers the process of development.

In this respect there is a tendency to overexpect the intellectuals, especially the academics, to solve all development problems. Said the commander of the second defense territory on the occasion of the

twelfth anniversary of the Purwokerto university, that if social scientists could fully work like a medical doctor through examination of the patient, followed by a diagnosis and therapy, then society could be saved from unnecessary suffering, pressures, and destruction. [3] The commander forgets that the role of social scientists is limited to the study and analysis of society and social problems, but that they have no authority to take actual measures themselves which would intentionally affect the course of development. Such measures require political decisions, which can only be taken by top executives in either public or business administration.

But whatever their arguments, intellectuals in less developed countries cannot ignore the mission assigned to them by society to utilize their trained intellect for the development of the country and the people.

Summary

Indonesia has in the past half century been consecutively subjected to four different political systems, e.g. Dutch colonialism, Japanese militarism war administration, a post independence political mobilization system with strong emphasis on nation and character building, and finally a system of planned national development that gives top priority to the economy of the country.

The leading social role of the intellectuals in the development of the country is recognized through all four periods, but their actual involvement in that development is determined by the particular political system prevailing in each period. In the first two alien dominated systems, intellectuals are subjected to tight political and administrative controls so as not to run counter to the interests of the foreign colonial regimes. They are carefully kept away from national policy making positions, and their roles are confined to those of administrators and implementors of foreign determined policies.

In the formative years of the new national republic, which emerged after independence, a political mobilization system was enforced as a reaction to more than two decades of a confusing search for the most suitable political system for the country. This mobilization system, which demanded a regimented compliance of all available sources and

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[3] Kompas newspaper, February 13, 1976, page IX.

forces to the romantic idealism of the national revolution, had no room for intellectuals with independent opinions.

Today intellectuals have been given full responsibility, either in their capacity as intellectuals as well as in the position of policy making members of the national cabinet, to create a development plan and its programs of operation, all in an atmosphei of rational realism. The present political system has replaced the concept of political development in the spirit of an all-encompassing revolution with a sober plan of economic and social development which has to be supported by security and stability on all levels.

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The Muslim Elite in India

A. B. Shah

The Muslim elite in India is distinguished by a number of traits which set it apart from its non-Muslim counterparts. Some of these traits are rooted in history, while the others are the outcome of the new situation in which the Muslims found themselves after the partition of 1947. These traits reinforce one another, particularly in the North and the Deccan, and together define the elite's sense of identity which it seeks to project on the all-India scene in the name of the Muslim community as a whole.

Historically, the Muslims came to India in two different ways. In the South, they came as traders from Arab lands as early as the seventh century, and were welcomed by the local kings who often granted them special facilities and honors in recognition of the services they rendered through maritime trade. Thus in Kerala they were allowed to marry local women and were called 'Mahapillais' (which in the course of time became 'Moplahs'), and occupied an important place in Kerala society. Except for religion, they became as good Keralites as the autochthonous people in matters of language, dress, food habits, and the like. Coming mainly from a trading and agricultural community, their elite did not suffer from the superiority complex of a ruling class.

Muslims also came to India in the wake of the military conquests of Islam from the north. Beginning with the invasion of Sind by Muhammed ibn Kasim in A.D. 712, but particularly since the establishment of the Delhi sultanate in the 13th century, a steady stream of Muslim scholars, theologians, poets, artists and artisans, and other groups of fortune-seekers, mostly of Turkish, Persian of Afghan origin, began to flow into India. By the time the Mughal empire was consolidated under Akbar, they held nearly 70 per cent of the superior posts in the army and civil life, the balance being shared almost equally by the Indian

converts to Islam and the Hindus who had already come to terms with the Muslim rulers. With the expansion of Muslim power in the South, a section of the North Indian Muslim elite also moved to the Deccan, carrying with it Urdu and the Hindustani culture which by that time had evolved in the North. By the beginning of the nineteenth century the revival of Hindu power under the Marathas and the Sikhs had reduced the Mughal empire to a shadow of its past glory. But the cultural supremacy of the Muslim elite in the North and the Deccan did not suffer on this count. The indigenous Hindu culture had been in a moribund state throughout the period following the death of Harsha in A.D. 647 and the Hindu elite had willingly reconciled itself to the supremacy of Islamic culture.

With the growing consolidation of British power in India, first in Bombay, Madras and Bengal, and then in the North, the Muslim elite was confronted with a kind of challenge it had never faced before. Along with British power had also come British law, British education and the British system of administration, which made no discrimination between one religious group and another in matters of public policy. The Hindus welcomed the British system, for now they were no longer discriminated against as under Muslim rule, eagerly took to Western education and sought to understand Western culture. For the first time in their history, they also began to examine critically their religious and social institutions and measure their relevance against the standards provided by Western learning, British political philosophy and social life. The Muslim elite too on the western coast and in the South reacted in an essentially pragmatic manner. However, in the North the end of the Mughal empire was a traumatic experience to the Muslim elite. Till then they could consider themselves heirs to a glorious tradition, to which non-Muslims too paid deference even if the writ of the Mughal Emperor did not run beyond a few miles of Delhi. With the failure of the mutiny and the deposition of Bahadur Shah Zafar, the last and puppet Mughal emperor, the Muslim elite felt that they were no longer in a dominant position culturally as well as politically.

As a matter of fact, the process had started earlier. For instance, in 1835 Persian was replaced by English as the language of the courts in Bengal. And though the personal laws of the Hindus and Muslims were not interfered with, the British had already started to create a modern system of law and to introduce modern secular education in place of the traditional, religious education which till then had held the field. The Muslims also saw that because of their early start, Hindus were

rapidly advancing in the services and in other spheres of economic life. The Muslim elite, mostly consisting of theologians, writers and the landed aristocracy looked upon Western education as anti-Islamic and therefore gradually began to lag behind the Hindus, over whom they had earlier enjoyed a decisive advantage. The world in which they had lived for centuries seemed suddenly to have collapsed.

Two kinds of movements arose in response to this situation. One was the revivalist movement started by the followers of Shah Wali-Ullah for the restoration of Islamic rule over India. This movement was led by Syed Ahmed Barelvi in the north and Haji Shariatullah in Bengal. Their fate was a foregone conclusion. After the mutiny of 1857 the successors of Syed Ahmed Barelvi decided to withdraw from politics and concentrate on religion. They started the Deoband seminary in 1867 with the intention of preserving the purity of Islam and keeping alive the spirit of liberty among the Muslims of India. The Bengal movement died down after a few years and did not leave any permanent mark.

The other kind of response that the Muslim elite made to the establishment of British rule is best illustrated by what later came to be known as the Aligarh movement. Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, who had seen the steady decline of the Mughal empire, had already come to the conclusion that Muslims had no future unless Islam were reinterpreted in tune with modern times. He therefore made efforts first to offer a new interpretation of Islam in conformity with the findings of science on the principle that the Word of God (the Quran) must be in harmony with the Work of God (Nature) [1]. To this end he established in 1862 the Scientific Society to translate and publish in Urdu, works in English of scientific and historical interest. He visited England in 1869-70 and came back with the firm conviction that the only way to rehabilitate the Muslim community in India was through spreading modern education. He therefore began working for the establishment of a school and then a college at Aligarh. The Muslim Anglo-Oriental College, founded in 1875, was the outcome.

Sir Syed had to face strong opposition from the orthodox *ulama* on

[1] Syed Ahmed Khan, 'Principles of Exegesis', in Aziz Ahmad and G.E. von Grunebaum (eds.), *Muslim Self—Statement in India and Pakistan 1857—1968*, Otto Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden, 1970, p. 34. Sir Syed's statement, which appears as part of the Fourteenth Principle of the 'Exegesis' as translated by Aziz Ahmad reads as follows: 'It is not possible that what He declares be opposed to what he has created, or vice-versa. . . agreement between the word and work of God is essential."

account of his rationalist interpretation of Islam. Consequently, his plan to give Western education to Muslims was likely to be stillborn for want of support. As a compromise, he therefore left the teaching of Islam in his institution in the hands of orthodox theologians and thereby ensured the support of the conservative Muslim aristocracy for the rest of his educational program. However, this compromise proved costly, for it prevented the loosening of the grip of traditional religion on the mind of the Muslim elite and ensured the perpetuation of its separatist attitude.

The MAO College got immediate patronage from the British government. By the end of the century it was looked upon by the British as an important instrument for keeping the Muslims away from the nationalist movement led by Congress. Sir Syed's own ideas on political reform were also such as could be easily exploited by the British. For instance, he opposed the Congress demand for a wider elective base for the Imperial and Provincial Councils. His opposition was based on the ground that such elections were likely to place plebeians on the Councils and this would never be acceptable to the Hindu or Muslim aristocracy.[2] The British, who themselves had at the time a limited franchise at home and were in any case unwilling to increase the size of the elective element in the Councils, could not have wished for more by way of support from Sir Syed.

There was another aspect of Sir Syed's attitude which was equally incompatible with the growing democratization of the nationalist movement. He was unable to appreciate the demand of the North Indian Hindus for the adoption of Hindi as a court language along with Urdu, which was till then the sole official language in the North, on the ground that most Hindus could not read or write the Urdu script. Sir Syed saw in this demand a threat to the supremacy of Muslim culture and came to the prophetic conclusion that in the future it would be-

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[2] Cf. 'Would our aristocracy like that a man of low caste or insignificant origin, though he be a B.A. or M.A., and have the requisite ability, should be in a position of authority above them and have power in making the laws that affect their lives and prosperity? Never! Nobody would like it. A seat in the Council of the Viceroy is a position of great honour and prestige. None but a man of good breeding can the Viceroy take as his colleague, treat as his brother, and invite to entertainments at which he may have to dine with Dukes and Earls'. Speech at Lucknow on 'Muslim Attitude to the Indian National Congress and the British Government', 28 December 1887, in Shan Mohammad, *Writings and Speeches of Eir Syed Ahmad Khan*, Nachiketa, Bombay 1972, pp. 204–5.

come increasingly difficult for the Hindus and the Muslims to work to-
gether. During a talk with Mr.Shakespeare, the Divisional Commissioner
of Banaras, he said in 1867: 'Now I am convinced that the two commu-
nities will not be able to cooperate sincerely in any matter. It is only
the beginning. In the future I envisage mutual opposition and conflict
increasing day by day on account of those who are educated people. He
who lives, will see.'[3] Sir Syed's prophecy was fulfilled over the next eighty
years. But his own contribution to its fulfillment was of no mean order.
It is not necessary to trace in detail the development of Muslim politics
in India from the failure of the mutiny to the partition of the sub-
continent. A brief statement of the important stages through which it
passed would suffice.

During the first few years Sir Syed and his colleagues confined their
work to the educational sphere. They eschewed not only politics but
also social reform, in the hope that once the educational gap between
the Hindus and the Muslims was bridged and the British rulers' suspi-
cion of Muslim intentions was sufficiently cleared, the Muslim elite
would regain its original position. In the meantime, Sir Syed wanted to
keep the Muslims away from nationalist politics without creating an
openly political organization for that purpose. A year after the foun-
dation of the Indian National Congress in 1885, he therefore started the
Mohammadan Educational Conference, from whose platform the polit-
ical as well as educational problems of the Muslim elite were discussed
and Muslims were warned against being misled by the propaganda of
the seditious Hindu Congress. After his death in 1898, one of his asso-
ciates, Viqar-ul-Mulk tried to set up a political organization of the
Muslims, but Sir Syed's influence was yet too strong to allow the pro-
ject to succeed. However, the partition of Bengal by Lord Curzon in
1905 and the strong protest it evoked from the Muslim as well as Hindu
leaders of Bengal persuaded the British that it was no longer safe to
keep the Muslim elite away from politics. Lord Minto, who had suc-
ceeded Curzon within three months of the partition of Bengal, therefore
encouraged the creation of a Muslim political platform as a counterpoise
to the Congress. His private secretary, Dunlop Smith sent word through,
Archibold, Principal of the MAO College, to Muhsin-ul-Mulk who had
succeeded Sir Syed as Secretary of the MAO College, to lead a deputa-

[3] Quoted in S. Abid Husain, *The Destiny of Indian Muslims*, Asia, Bombay
1965, p. 30.

tion of leading Muslims to wait on the Viceroy at Simla.[4] On October 1, 1906 a deputation of 35 eminent Muslims led by the Agha Khan waited on the Viceroy at Simla and presented to him a memorandum asking for special treatment to the Muslims, commensurate with 'their political importance.' The Viceroy made an encouraging reply. Three months later, on the occasion of the Mohammadan Educational Conference, the Muslim League was formed at Calcutta on December 30, 1906. From this time onward the Muslim elite of North India and Bengal consistently opposed the Indian National Congress and demanded growing privileges from the Congress or the British Government as the price of its support. Reservations and weightages in elective bodies and in services constituted the main demand. The British were willing to play the game since from their point of view, as a British official wrote to Lady Minto after the 'command performance'[5] of the Muslim delegation in October, 'nothing less than pulling back 62 million people from joining the ranks of the seditious opposition' had been achieved at Simla.

The Congress leadership tried to win over the Muslims by going more than half-way to meet their demands. For instance, at the Lucknow session of the Congress, Tilak persuaded his colleagues to agree to reservations and weightages to the Muslims in the Imperial and Provincial Councils in spite of the strong opposition of a small section led by Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya. Malaviya was opposed not to the reservations but to the weightages, whereas Tilak was keen on bringing the Muslims into the mainstream of the nationalist movement. He was prepared to go to any length to satisfy Muslim demands, provided it would facilitate the creation of a united front against the British.[6]

Before the seeming unity forged by the Lucknow Pact could be tested, two important developments took place. The end of World War I

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[4] For an interesting discussion on the origin of this deputation, cf. M.A. Karandikar, 'Perspective on Muslim Indians,' in *Humanist Review*, vol. 1 No. 3 (July—September 1969), p. 348.

[5] The words are Maulana Muhammad Ali's, who used them in his presidential address to the thirty-eighth session of the Indian National Congress at Coacanada on December 28, 1923; *The Indian Annual Register 1923*, p. 27.

[6] C.S. Ranga Iyer, who was present at the negotiations, wrote '(Tilak) would not listen to any arguments against the Pact. . . if it would satisfy the Muslims, if it could bring them to the Congress, if it could replace their extra-territorial patriotism by Indian nationalism, the agreement was worth reaching.' For further details, cf. my 'Bal Gangadhar Tilak: a Study in Stereotypes' in *Quest 71* (July-August 1971), and the sources mentioned in it.

put the future of the Ottoman empire in grave doubt and exercised the minds of Indian Muslims to a great extent. By the time the Treaty of Sèvres was signed, Gandhi had already appeared on the scene. Under his leadership the Congress supported the Khilafat movement in the hope that thereby the Muslims would be convinced of its goodwill and sinceri- ty, and would support the nationalist movement even after the aims of the Khilafat movement were achieved. Actually, the Khilafat movement collapsed after Mustapha Kemal abolished the institution of Caliph it- self, but it also put an end to the unity between the Congress and the League. Except Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, practically all the leaders of the Khilafat movement left the Congress and went back to the Muslim League, which once again resumed its separatist posture.

The next major effort to bring about unity took place in 1928 in the form of All-Party Conference called by the Congress and the com- mittee appointed by it under the chairmanship of Motilal Nehru to draft the constitution of future India. The Nehru Committee's report anticipated a number of provisions of the constitution of free India so far as the federal structure and the fundamental rights of the citizens were concerned. It provided in explicit terms for a secular state in which there would be no discrimination on the basis of religion and, like the Lucknow Pact earlier, reassured the Muslims that they would be free to profess, practice and propagate their religion. However, the Muslim elite was not satisfied with these reassurances. It wanted a limit- ed franchise, the continuation of separate electorates and weightages as before and, at a later stage, the recognition of Urdu as the national lan- guage of free India.[7]

The 1935 Act by which provincial autonomy was introduced, marked a further stage in the growing alienation of the Muslim elite from the nationalist movement. The Congress assumed power in six provinces and tried to introduce certain reforms in the interests of the peasantry. The Muslim League, most of whose patrons belonged to the landed aris- tocracy, could not agree with the Congress on this program and ruled out the possibility of coalition ministries on the basis of a common legislative program and joint cabinet responsibility as is common in the parliamentary system By this time the tacit alliance between

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[7] For the recommendations of the Nehru Committee's report, see C.H. Philips, *The Evolution of India and Pakistan, 1858–1947: Select Documents,* OUP, London 1962, pp. 228 ff. For the demands of the Muslim elite, see M.A. Karandikar, *Islam in India's Transition to Modernity,* Orient Longman, New Delhi 1968, pp. 192, 252.

the British and the Muslim League was complete and when the Congress ministries resigned in October 1939 on the issue of support to war efforts, the Muslim League under Jinnah's leadership took the opportunity to mount an offensive against the Congress. At its Lahore session in March 1940 it adopted the famous Pakistan resolution, which asserted that the Muslims were a separate nation and that nothing less than the creation of a sovereign Muslim state or states would be acceptable to them. The subsequent events are well-known and need no recapitulation.

After the creation of Pakistan, a considerable section of educated urban Muslims from the Muslim-minority states of India in the West and the North migrated to Pakistan. The Muslims in these areas had been more enthusiastic about Pakistan than their co-religionists in the Muslim-majority states of Punjab, Sind, the NWFP and Baluchistan.However, with the creation of Pakistan they were left without leadership and found themselves in a situation which, though not anticipated, ought to have been foreseen. The proportion of the Muslims in the population of India was reduced from about 23 per cet to about 10 per cent and they were now looked upon with suspicion by their Hindu countrymen. At a convention of India Muslims held at Delhi on November 14, 1947, Maulana Azad advised them to dissolve their separate political parties, abjure communal politics and join non-communal parties of their choice on the basis of their programs and policies. Azad's advice was not heeded; the Muslim League lay dormant but did not dissolve and the Muslims continued to sulk in their own self-created ghetto.

For the first few years after partition nothing special happened. The Muslims were too demoralised and Gandhi's assassination at the hands of a Hindu fanatic had ensured that for some years at least, no matter what the Hindus felt about Pakistan and its treatment of the Hindus, they would not insult the Mahatma's memory by persecuting the Muslims in India. But by the beginning of the sixties a new generation of educated Muslims had come up and the leadership vacuum created by the earlier exodus of the Muslim elite to Pakistan was filled. This new Muslim elite was divided mainly in two groups. Politically, most of them supported the Congress party though some, including a number of former Muslim Leaguers, went over to the Communist Party of India. Another section consisting of the followers of Maulana Mauddoodi's Jammat-e-Islami constituted the orthodox leadership of the community and sought to prevent its integration into the national mainstream. Except in Jammu and Kashmir, the Jammat avoided direct participation

in elections, but sought to create a single united political platform of the Muslims in India in the name of the Islamic way of life and their legitimate rights. The intellectual elite, too, by and large adopted a similar stand.

Such a common platform came into existence in 1964 in the form of the Muslim Majlis-e-Mushawarat, which brought together Muslims of different political persuasions, including those belonging to the Congress and the traditionally pro-Congress Jamiyat-ul-Ulama i Hind, to press their sectional demands more or less on the lines of the pre-partition Muslim League. The educational and economic backwardness of the Muslims was blamed on the government and the Hindu majority, wild allegations of discrimination against Muslims and their culture were made, recognition for Urdu as a second official language even in states where Muslims constituted less than five per cent of the population and proportionate representation in the army and the civil services were demanded. Gradually, even otherwise enlightened Muslims came under the influence of the Jammat-e-Islami. They did not agree with its fundamentalist stand on Islam and its ultimate aim to establish theocratic Islamic rule in India; but neither could they think of subjecting Islam and its tradition to a critical scrutiny, and evolve a modern outlook on life and a suitable approach to their problems in a non-Muslim secular state.

The new Muslim elite in India suffers from three major handicaps. Economically, the Muslim community is not homogenous all over the country.[8] In Western and Southern India, its situation is no different from that of the Hindus or other religious groups. Muslims are to be found in business and industry, in agriculture and the services, roughly in the same proportion as their educational level and past traditions of business enterprise would lead one to except. But in Bengal, Bihar and UP, they are significantly backward compared to the Hindus and suffer from nostalgia for the past to a much greater extent than in other parts of India. In the former princely states like Hyderabad, where Muslims constituted 10 per cent of the population but held about 90 per cent of the posts in government and where Urdu was the official language as well as medium of instruction in all government schools, colleges and

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[8] For a good study of this aspect of the Muslim problem in India, cf. Imtiaz Ahmad, 'Economic and Social Change,' in Zafar Imam (ed.) *Muslim in India*, Orient Longman, New Delhi, 1975.

the university, the Muslim elite found it particularly difficult to adapt itself to the democratic system which came into existence after independence. It was used to enjoying special facilities under Muslim and British rule without having to compete with non-Muslims on the basis of competence and initiative. Besides, the political tradition of Islam, like that of Hinduism, is essentially anti-democratic and glorifies power at the expense of the civic virtues necessary in the modern state. This makes adaptation all the more difficult.

Psychologically, the Muslim elite has still not been able to reconcile itself to the position of a minority. Earlier, too, the Muslims were in a minority, but till the British came they constituted the ruling group and even under the British, except for a few years, they used to receive privileged treatment because of their political usefulness as a couterpoise to the Congress. In independent India they do not have these advantages and have to rely on their own efforts and on the goodwill of the Hindu majority. But this presupposes a breaking away from the moorings of the past and developing a new identity as citizens of a secular state, in which religion and the culture based on religion are of secondary importance.

The Muslim elite has not been able to achieve this breakthrough — mainly because it is part of a society which is still medieval in its outlook and does not yet make a distinction between the sacred and the profane. Unlike the Christian West, which had its Renaissance nearly 500 years ago and subsequently went through the Reformation and the Enlightenment, or the Hindu society which experienced at least a partial renaissance in the 19th century and witnessed a number of reform movements, some of them radical, the Muslim society in India has had no renaissance at any time in its history. Indeed, all over the Muslim world this has been the basic handicap in its ability to meet the challenge of the modern age.

The Muslim elite in India, unlike its counterparts in predominantly Muslim countries, is in a happier situation in this respect. In view of the Hindu concern over the integration of the non-Hindu minorities into a modern secular polity, if the Muslim elite were to work for the liberalization of Muslim institutions and attitudes in India, it would get unreserved support from the Hindu majority. But such work would presuppose a willingness on the part of the Muslim elite to resist the temptation of political power and patronage which it can buy against the mass Muslim vote it can promise to bring to the ruling party. It is unfortunate that a majority of the members of the Muslim elite in India,

whether political or intellectual, have opted for this latter course.

It is only now, during the past eight years, that a new beginning seems to have been made. Groups of young Muslims, most of whom do not belong to the *Ashraf* class, are coming forward to challenge the outdated Muslim social system and demand its modernization on the basis of the human values embodied in the Indian constitution. The most important of such groups is the Muslim Satyashodhak Mandal under the leadership of Mr. Hamid Dalwai. Dalwai is a creative writer in Marathi, was for a number of years an active member of the Socialist Party and hails from a small village in the Konkan. His book *Muslim Politics in Secular India* (first published in 1968 as *Muslim Politics in India*) created a stir not only among orthodox Muslim circles but also among the sophisiticated Western-educated Muslim elite. Dalwai was in turn accused of being an agent of the government of India, the Jana Sangh, the Christian missionaries and, of course, the CIA. However, his group and the Indian Secular Society to which it is affiliated have succeeded in articulating the grievances and demands of the weaker sections of the Muslim society in India. They were the first in the history of the Muslim world to organize a Muslim Women's Conference at Poona in December 1971, which demanded the enactment of a uniform civil code based on the principle of equality of sexes for all citizens of India as directed by the Constitution of India. The present personal law of the Muslims is based on the Shariat which governs marriage, divorce and succession and treats women as an inferior being in comparison with man.

Dalwai's efforts are now being blessed by some eminent leaders of Muslims thought in India. Professor A.A.A. Fyzeé, the well-known Islamic scholar, agreed to inaugurate the Muslim Women's Conference referred to above. Another Muslim, Mr. M.R.A. Baig, who was formerly India's ambassador to Iran, has come out in open support of the Muslim Satyashodhak Mandal and its demand that religion should be completely separated from law and be treated as man's personal relationship with his God.

Similar groups in Gujarat, Bengal and Kerala have come into existence though they are still in an embryonic stage. However, the impact of this new development is still limited. Political parties are not yet prepared to take a forthright stand on the Muslim question for fear alienating the Muslim vote. Even leftist Muslim academicians with very few exceptions, still try to have the best of both worlds. A recent publica-

tion[9] edited by an academician who is on the faculty of the Jawaharlal Nehru University in Delhi, is typical of the attitude of the educated Muslim elite. A majority of its contributors are Marxists and one would therefore expect them to look at the Muslim problem from a secular, if not anti-religious, point of view. As a matter of fact, except two of the Muslim contributors, all the others write in a vein which would have pleased the late Jinnah if he were alive today. For instance, one of the contributors asserts that the Muslims are not a minority like the Christians or the Parsees, but a 'national minority' which needs 'extra-national consciousness' (a euphemism for 'extra-territorial loyalties') in order to realize its aspirations.[10] Another contributor, while making out a case for Urdu, charges the protagonists of Hindi with a desire to see the *Muslims of India* and their language *banished'* (emphasis added). Now it is true that in the state of Uttar Pradesh, Urdu received a raw deal till recently for reasons we need not go into here. But it is totally wrong to suggest that the protagonists of Hindi —who are not confined to Up alone — wanted 'to see the Muslims of India banished." Had it been so, the Muslims would not have only registered a steady rise in numbers, but also consistently maintained a higher rate of increase than the Hindus.

How strong the hold of such groups on the Government of India is, is illustrated by the fact that the Indian Council of Social Science Research has not yet been able to sponsor or support a single good study of the Muslim problem in India. Some years ago, at the instance of the present writer, the ICSSR constituted a study group for the purpose. However, after one meeting the group was reconstituted under pressure against the inclusion of the present writer and Mr. Hamid Dalwai. The reconstituted group was also soon dissolved without accomplishing anything. The ICSSR, it may be mentioned, is a creation of the Union Ministry of Education and is supported by the Government of India and the Ford Foundation.

The most important aspect of the Muslim problem in India is that the Muslim elite itself is not seriously interested in solving it or even in allowing a serious study of it being undertaken. Like its counterpart in the pre-independence period, it is content with aligning itself with the powers that be and let the rest of the community take care of itself.

Zafar Imam (ed.), *op. cit.*

[10] Syed Jafar Raza Bilgrami, 'Nationalism and Indian Muslims,' *Ibid.*, p. 153.

This is not to suggest that individual members of the elite cannot be found who realize the nature and magnitude of the task thay have to undertake if their community is to come out of the blind alley in which it finds itself. Scholars like M. Habib, M. Mujeeb, S. Abid Husain and A. A.A. Fyzee would like to see far-reaching reforms take place in Muslim institutions and attitudes. However, they do not command the organized backing of any articulate section of Muslim society and, in any case, belong to a generation which has outlived its role. Among the younger ones, most are unwilling to go beyond narrow, 'harmless' specialization, lest they should invite on their heads the wrath of the highly organized and sectarian Muslim press. In the book mentioned above, only one contribution comes near the mark in assessing the nature of the Muslim political elite. He describes it as 'dogmatic in religious attitude, narrow in social matters, parochial towards social change and separatist in outlook.'[12] This characterization would, *mutatis mutandis*, apply to the Muslim intellectual elite equally well.

The unwillingness of the Muslim elite to swim against the current has not only been responsible for prolonging the social and economic stagnation of the community; it has also kept critical Islamic scholarship at a depressed level. It is significant that no Muslim scholar of the Indian sub-continent — or indeed, as far I know, of any other country — has produced a single study of Islam that compares with the work of Ignaz Goldziher, G.E. von Grunebaum, S.D. Goitein, Joseph Schacht, Maxime Rodinson, Bernard Lewis, or Montgomery Watt. Even men like Abul Kalam Azad, Muhammad Iqbal, A.A.A. Fyzee, Abid Husain and Mujeeb give one the impression of putting Islam on the Procrustean bed so as to make it yield the values of liberal humanism to which most of them subscribe. Thus, in an otherwise magnificent historical study, Mujeeb finds it advisable to make the following obeisance to Muslim orthodoxy at the very outset: 'It is the author's firm belief that the Indian Muslims have, in their religion of Islam, and in the true (*sic*) representatives of the moral and spiritual values of Islam, the most reliable standards of judgment, and they do not need to look elsewhere to discover how high or low they stand.'[13] Whether Mujeeb believed this — he was reputed to be a Marxist of some sort — is not so important as the light it throws on the lack of interest in analytical self-understanding which, as von

[12] Moin Shakir, 'The Muslim Political Elite,' *Ibid.*, p. 169.

[13] M. Mujeeb, *The Indian Muslims*, Allen & Unwin, London 1967, p. 24.

Grunebaum has pointed out, iş perhaps related to the 'basic anti-humanism' or the Islamic civilization. [14] Till the Muslim intellectual elite develops such analytical self-understanding, there is little hope of its playing a creative role in the history of the Indian sub-continent.

[14] G.E. von Grunebaum, *Modern Islam* (Vintage edn.), New York 1964, pp.. 55, 62.

The Role of the Intelligentsia in Contemporary Indian Society

Amlan Datta

In India over the centuries the intelligentsia has been drawn chiefly from two overlapping sections in society, viz. the Brahmins and those holding the higher posts in the administrative apparatus of the State. The Brahmins themselves may be sub-divided into certain groups, not all of which have been equally distinguished in intellectual pursuits. In the earliest times there were the famed *rishis,* who composed the Vedic hymns, and there were also ordinary priests, who performed specialized duties pertaining, to sacrificial rituals. Something of that distinction echoed down through time. In Tamilnadu the Brahmins traditionally fall into a few distinct groups among which the Archakārs and the Panchāngakārans are mainly associated with the performance of religious rites and ceremonies, while the Vaidic Brahmins devote themselves specially to the study and teaching of the holy scriptures, thus constituting an intellectual section par excellence. The administrators have been drawn traditionally from the upper castes, notably the Brahmins again, but also some non-Brahmins, such as the *Kāyasthas.*

Traditional Indian Society has been structurally rigid and hierarchical, but pluralistic rather than monolithic. Religious revivalism, philosophical revolutions or new interpretations of ancient texts, and movements of social reform appeared from time to time and attempted to break down rigid barriers and soften the harshness of dogma with a kind of spiritually touched humanism. However, there were certain elements of long term stability about the prevalent social hierachy. These heterodox movements contributed to the variety of social life by leaving behind new sects. The leaders of these movements were sometimes Brahmins themselves, but this was not always the case. Some of the sages of the Upanishads were Kshaniyas. Gautama the Buddha was a prince, and among his followers some, notably, were traders. Religious revivalism, in the form of the Bhakti movement became common in

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Northern India around the fifteenth century and quite a few of the new saints at that time sprang from the ranks of the ordinary people.

If the Bhakti movement in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries owed something to the confrontation of traditional Hindiuism with Islam, the extraordinary turmoil and quickening of the cultural life of India in the last century, sometimes called the nineteenth century Indian renaissance, was, in its specific form, largely due to the British impact. The merchants, missionaries and scholars from the West stood for a way of life and a set of values which were, in many respects, significantly at variance with the main strand of Indian culture. They represented a spirit of adventure and continous movement and the idea of the freedom of the individual to experiment with his life in new situations, in contrast with the Indian conception of the fixed position and duties of the individual in the expanded family and the caste hierarchy. In the Hindu scheme of things, the individual had the freedom to renounce society, but he could not be in society and freely change his station. Again, Indian society, being pluralistic, was conceived as a confederation of villages and tribes, and this was reflected in the supremacy of local customs and in the acceptance of a kind of qualified polytheism. In Indian religious conception the ultimate reality is formless and ineffable, but it manifests itself in diverse forms of different degrees of fineness or crudity in actual historical and local situations. Hinduism was typically more concerned with preaching a kind of reverence for all these varied forms than with criticizing the lower forms from the standpoint of the higher, and thus encouraged, in effect, the coexistence of a mass of diverse superstitions with a metaphysics of great subtlety in contrast with the uncompromising monotheism and the militant rationalism of the West.

The West brought to India, at one and the same time, a critical attitude based on these inter-cultural differences and that universalist idea of the unity of human history which was a significant outcome of the age of the enlightenment. As Sanskrit was linked to the main family of European languages, a new challenging perspective of history opened up and the ancient civilizations of India and the West appeared to have common roots in a forgotten past.

To contemplate and reassess the differences between the cultures of India and the West from the point of view of universal and humanistic principles and thus to arrive at a true conception of what was permanent and beneficial in Indian culture and what was degenerate and false, which might serve as a compass for the social reformer; this was the principal objective of such pioneers of the Indian renaissance as Raja

Rammohun Roy (1774-1833) and Mahadev Govinda Ranade (1842-1901).

Monier-Williams described Rammohun as "probably the first earnest-minded investigator of the science of comparative religion that the world has produced." The Raja had a universalist outlook and, particularly in his maturer years, a religious temper of mind. He believed in reason, at least up to a point, which he applied to some of the leading religions of the world to extract from them their common spiritual and ethical kernel, which he found in devotion to God and a active good neighborliness. This, he believed, was consistent with both the utilitarian philosophy, which he seemed to accept at one level, and the spirit of religion which he wished to retain.

The European renaissance harked back to a 'golden age' in ancient Greece. The Indian renaissance started by glorifying the Vedic age and the philosophy of the Upanishads. At least in its early phase, this glorification of the past had a 'progressive' content. The early leaders of the Brahma Samaj, which Rammohan founded, were staunch monotheists and fundamentally hostile to idolatry, and this was supported with an appeal to reason, on the one hand, and by ancient scriptures and Vedic practices on the other hand. The pioneers of the Indian renaissance, including the leaders of the Arya Samaj, were opposed to the caste system, particularly in its rigid form, which was again supposed to have been absent in the Vedic age.

But the reformist zeal of the pioneers cooled down fairly rapidly. This is a transformation worth noting with some care because of the light it throws on the role of the Indian intelligentsia, the dilemma with which this particular social formation has been repeatedly faced and the nature of the constraints to which it has been subject all through the modern age. But let us briefly recall a few fairly well know facts and incidents before we try to generalize.

The Brahma Samaj, founded by Rammohun in 1828, might have died quietly and fairly soon had it not been revived in 1842 by another remarkable person, Debendranath Tagore. Debendranath shared Rammohun's faith in monotheism and was a convinced and determined opponent of idolatry. But he decided very soon to compromise on the question of caste. Satyendranath, son of Debendranath, wrote as follows in an introductory chapter to the *Autobiography of Maharshi Devendranath Tagore:* "My father, though an uncompromising enemy of idol-

atrous worship, was essentially conservative in his instincts."[1] Referring
to the breach between two powerful groups within the Samaj, Satyen-
dranath goes on record in the following words: "The rupture between
the two parties was widened by an intermarriage between two persons
of different castes, solemnized by Keshab (Keshab Chandra Sen) in
1863; this was a reform of a radical character which my father was not
prepared to adopt, in opposition to the sentiments of the entire Hindu
community."[2] It may be added that Keshab himself soon abandoned
his radical posture when he shocked his admirers by "allowing idolatrous
rites to be observed" in connection with the marriage of his daughter,
whom, moreover, he allowed to enter into wedlock even while she was
still a minor.

Debendranath represented a combination of theological radicalism
with social conservatism. The main reason for his conservatism is, I
guess, fairly simple. It is not prejudice that made him come to terms
with caste. It was by prudential instincts that he was led to make that
choice. He attached importance, above all, to monotheism as he under-
stood it. To him it was fundamentally more important to preach that
faith than to effect any particular piece of social reform. He must make
himself acceptable to the people at large, if he was to communicate to
them his central message. This must have decided him not to oppose
"the sentiments of the entire Hindu community" on the question of
caste. It is precisely the revolutionary significance that he attached to
his theology which made him compromise with popular prejudice at a
baser level.

There is certain contrast, which should not, however, be overstressed,
between the renaissance based on Calcutta and the related movement
which arose on the western coast of India. Ranade was less interested in
theological radicalism, but he and his followers were more consistent in
their patient advocacy of all-round social reform. In 1887 Ranade found-
ed the National Social Conference about which it has been said, perhaps
with some slight exaggeration, that it "became to Indian social reformers
what the National Congress was to be to her politicians."

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[1] *The Autobiography of Maharshi Devendranath Tagore,* tr. from the origi-
nal in Bengali by Satyendranath Tagore and Indira Devi, Macmillan, London,
1914, p. 16.

[2] *Ibid.,* p. 16.

In a sense the movement in Bombay reached farther than that in Bengal. It counted among its leading figures a line of stalwarts drawn from the lower castes, such as J.G. Phule in the nineteenth century and B.R. Ambedkar in the twentieth, while no social reformer of equal eminence arose from that stratum of society in Bengal. It had also greater chances of drawing sustenance from a bourgeois environment and of cultivating certain civic virtues which are distinctive of that environment. Native entrepreneurial activities showed greater continuity and growth on the western coast. The movement in that region was marked by a more constructive spirit. For example, the cooperative movement there received greater active guidance and support from the intellectual leaders than was the case in the eastern region of India. Significantly, again, political radicalism in Bombay usually appeared under the banner of democratic socialism while in Calcutta revolutionary Marxism became more popular.

The constrast should not, however, be overdrawn. By the turn of the century, militant nationalism started gaining ground both in Bengal and in Maharashtra. Tilak represented the new spirit in western India. Populism, or a call for solidarity with the people, meant also a readiness to compromise with popular prejudice. On such questions as prohibition of child marriage by means of legislation, Tilak and his followers showed a marked propensity not to fall foul of popular sentiments.

Thus, the British impact in India had culturally two conflicting kinds of effects. On the one hand, it brought to India certain new ideas concerning liberty and the rule of law, reason and science. These ideas had an undoubted appeal, although often a somewhat abstract appeal, for the new intelligentsia. But, on the other hand, since English education, introduced in the early nineteenth century, remained confined to a small section of society to the end of the British period in India, the new elite had a sense of cultural alienation from the people. Moreover, the intelligentsia was soon affected by the psychology of a struggle for power. It provided leadership in the movement for national independence, and a negative attitude towards the British, and the West in general, came inevitably to be a component of Indian nationalism. The common form in which this cultural antipathy expressed itself in the early phase of the growth of nationalism in India was a verbal attack on the supposed materialism of the West. In a later phase, anti-imperialism provided the common vocabulary of nationalist criticism of the West. Thus, the Indian intelligentsia developed a deep and persistent ambivalence, being simultaneously drawn and repelled by the cultural heritage of the West.

In the case of the Indian Muslims, the situation was further complicat-
ed by tensions arising from relations with the Hindus. The point may be
illustrated with reference to the life and work of Sir Syed Ahmed Khan
(1817-98), a great leader of India in the nineteenth century. In the
early part of the century, the Indian Muslims had a strong aversion to
English education as well as to British rule, for understandable histori-
cal reasons. Sir Syed perceived that this collective and irrational aversion
was an obstacle to the modernization of Islam and set out to overcome
it. Just as Rammohun tried to bring out a common kernel of truth of
the Bible and the Upanishads in terms of their ethical message, so Sir
Syed made a painstaking study of the Bible and attempted to overcome
doctrinal disagreements between Islam and Christianity and underlined
their similarities. He also laid stress on the importance of studying West-
ern science and stood for a new reconciliation of religion with science.
He is particularly remembered for the College he founded at Aligarh in
1875, but the establishment of the Scientific Society at Ghazipur in
the 1860's was more unambiguously expressive of the spirit of the edu-
cational movement led by him at that time.

By the time the institution at Aligarh was established in 1875, there
was already a rift within the lute. "It is appropiate," we are told, "to
draw a line in Syed Ahmed's career at 1870. Before that, his appeals
were invariably addressed to his "countrymen" and after it to his "com-
munity alone."[3] Some would draw the dividing line in his life a little
later, but that is a minor detail. With the growth of the urban Hindu
middle class in north India, Hindi started developing as the major lan-
guage of that class. Increasingly, the culture and languages of that class
appeared to the Muslims as a challenge and a threat to their own culture
and language. Inevitably politics also got mixed up with that question.
Sir Syed, in his later years, was affected by the defensive outlook aris-
ing from the confrontation between the two major communities of In-
dia. Communalism, or a collectivist outlook based on religion, became
soon a major factor inhibiting the growth of a rational and tolerant spirit
in India. Issues get strangely distorted when seen through a communal
mirror. Thus, there is no legislation against polygamy among the Mus-
lims in India because any legislative enactment of this nature is apt to
be resented by the Muslims as an imposition by the majority. This in
spite of the fact that polygamy is today unlawful among the Hindus in

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[3] *A History of the Freedom Movement,* Vol. II, Pakistan Historical Society,
Karachi, 1961, p. 520.

India and among the Muslims in many Muslim states. It is easier for the intelligentsia in many Muslim states to be critical of ancient Islamic rites and customs than it is in India, for dissident Muslims here are likely to be branded as agents of the dominant Hindu community.

Nationalism has a negative aspect as well as a positive one. It will be useful to pause for a moment and consider what its positive aspect might be. In traditional India the expanded family and the caste, or in some cases, the tribes, were the basic units of society. Duties owed to any wider organization of society existed only in an abstract sense, expressed chiefly in the form of some holy verse and ceremonial oblation to all living beings and the universe. The positive side of nationalism consists in making an organization of society including and going beyond families, castes or tribes a practical reality and in promoting an ethic and a code of duties appropriate to that wider organization, an inwardly realized matter for individual members of society. A system of ethics of this order is necessarily incomplete. In its fullness it must be rooted in a larger ideal of humanity and its value lies in giving a certain concreteness at an intermediate stage to the duties owed by a person to those who are not connected to him by blood and kinship ties.

In reality, nationalism has been a rather different thing. Everywhere it has tended to put the nation above humanity. Gandhi insisted that the nation must be prepared to sacrifice itself, if need be, for the sake of humanity. He wanted to accept the idea of nationalism and transform it. Rabindranath, the poet, was frightened by certain aspects of nationalism as he saw it and expressed his misgivings in no uncertain terms. "Even though from childhood," he wrote, "I had been taught that the idolatry of Nation is almost better than reverence for God and humanity, I believe I have outgrown that teaching."[4] But Tagore was a special case; he was very far from re~   :ting the Indian intelligentsia either in his own time or now. The same remarks would hold true of M.N. Roy, the dissident Marxist, who started as a militant nationalist and later evolved into a major critic of Indian nationalism. The Indian intelligentsia, by and large, remained faithful to nationalism in their own fashion.

'   Indian nationalism has derived its strength and appeal from two different sources. To the youth it represents a call for sacrifice, a call which appeals to the blood as well as the spirit. It can look back on a'

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[4] Rabindranath Tagore, *Nationalism*, Macmillan, London, 1917, p. 106.

history of heroism and martyrdom. Even now it can inspire people to lay down their lives in moments of crisis. But it has shown little capacity to promote civic virtues or to raise the standards of ethics of people in the ordinary business of life. Beyond this, nationalism has provided an ideological tool in politics,   that is, in the struggle for power. The Hindu intelligentsia never doubted that communalism was adopted and prized by ambitious leaders of the Muslim middle class as useful in their bid for power. Many Muslims felt equally convinced that Indian nationalism was the chosen ideology of the Hindu middle class in the struggle for control over the machinery of the state. These assessments do not give the whole truth, but they are in their own way largely correct.

To a certain extent, socialism arose to supply a positive content, particularly an economic content, to nationalism in India. Looked at in a larger cultural perspective, there is a certain parallelism between the character and course of development of these two ideologies. For Marx, criticism of religion was the beginning of all criticism. Indian socialists, including communists, have been guided by an entirely different cultural perspective. Leaders of the socialist movement are drawn mainly from the middle class just like nationalist leaders. Socialism is a banner under which the struggle for political power is conducted by a section of the middle class in the name of the poor and the dispossessed. Socialists believe that they must wrest power in the name of socialism before a permanent improvement in the conditions of society can be accomplished. Hence everything must be subordinated to the exigencies of the struggle for power. Consistent with this philosophy, socialists have compromised with popular prejudices for fear of being cut off from the people, just as the leaders of the nineteenth-century India did before them. With this outlook criticism of religion or, for that matter, a program of cultural revolution, cannot obviously be granted priority since any such course is likely to alienate the leaders of the movement from the common people. In its combination of ideological radicalism with cultural conservatism, the socialist and the communist movements in India today recall the history of the Indian renaissance of the last century. Only a few heretics like M.N. Roy, who believed that a philosophical revolution" must precede a radical change in society, chose a different course.
. Jawaharlal Nehru was among the more enlightened socialists of his time in India. He did not have much taste for a sustained interest in philosophical systems. "I have sometimes found," he wrote in *The Discovery of India,* "a certain intellectual fascination in trying to follow the rigid lines of metaphysical and philosophical thought of the ancients or

the moderns. But I have never felt at ease there and have escaped from their spell with a feeling of relief."[5] This gave him a certain freedom from dogmas. He was a practical idealist. "The better type of the modern mind," as he wrote in the same book, "is practical and pragmatic, ethical and social."[6] This "better type of the modern mind" he had himself. But India made little progress towards developing a positive socialist ethic during the decades when he was the leader of the country.

The problem may be re-stated. Gandhi pointed out that rights ought to be derived from duties. In India this is well understood in terms of the ideal family. A grown up son has certain duties in relation to the family and he would be ashamed to live in the family without making his best contribution. No such obligation is felt by the individual in relation to the wider society. This poses a practical problem of growing magnitude. With the modernization of society people are more and more involved in their practical activities with associations other than their kinship groups. Positive socialist ethics must mean an adequate code of conduct for the individual in relation to these non-kinship associations where he is required to make his productive contribution to society. But this is, in fact, lacking. Half a century of the socialist movement in India has made the individual more self-righteously dependent on public institutions without making him any more conscientious about his public duties. Socialism, or a healthy modern society of any sort, cannot be built on such foundations. This is the historical context in which Gandhi's remarks about rights and duties needs to be interpreted. How can the imbalance be corrected?

With the proclamation of a special state of emergency in India in June 1975, India has come to the end of her liberal era, at least temporarily. The fundamental rights of the citizen now stand suspended. The press in India has been gripped by a fear unknown in recent history. The radio has been made a subservient instrument of the government. There has been surprisingly little mourning by the Indian intelligentsia at the demise of liberalism. If there has been some protest or murmur of disapproval by writers, intellectuals and jurists in Bombay and its neighborhood, there has been much less of that in Calcutta, where anti-establishment feelings once used to be strong.

[5] Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Discovery of India*, Asia Publishing House, New Delhi, 1966, p. 27.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 592.

This may be partly due to fear. But that is too simple an explanation. The emergency was proclaimed under circumstances which made it appear very much as an episode in the struggle for power. Yet events in history have often a significance which goes beyond the immediate circumstances and motives which give rise to them. After the first shock was over, it came to be felt by many that the emergency might provide the historic mold within which a new sense of discipline and ethics of work would take shape in India. A fairly large section of the intelligentsia in India gradually veered towards a certain willingness to give the emergency the benefit of the doubt on that score. That is what Acharya Vinoba Bhave's utterances indicated clearly towards the end of the year 1975. The ultimate reconciliation that India needs cannot be produced under the pressure of emergency. For the moment, however, this is how history is going to be made. Among the intelligentsia a few will protest; their voices will be smothered, perhaps to be remembered again at another turning point in history. The majority will fall in line.

In the West the will to work and the sense of discipline needed for industrial progress were produced by a mixture of "protestant" ethics and harsh legislation in some of the pioneer countries, and the new industrial culture was adopted elsewhere and took different forms. Nowhere did a combination of gentle reason, pragmatism and humanism suffice to do the job. The emergency in India promises to be the political equivalent of the "Protestant" revolution. But can it be that? Even if it can, the whole process can hardly escape a certain crudity. There is an essential difference between the kind of discipline that is needed in offices and factories and other places of work for material production and the freedom required for the creative work of writers and artists. Such distinctions are easily overlooked when the problem is sought to be solved by political means and administrative fiats. Those in authority have to be extraordinarily discriminating and forebearing or they cannot avoid gross errors of judgement in such matters.

The intelligentsia can help the government avoid such errors by active criticism. But criticism is, under these circumstances, an act of courage. The intelligentsia in India, as already noted, used to be drawn traditionally from among the Brahmins and people in the higher echelons of the administration. It is not very different from that today. The great majority of the members of the intelligentsia in contemporary India are in teaching, administration and the liberal professions. Most of them are used to a high degree of security and certain standards of comparative comfort in a very poor country. They enjoy the role of social cri-

tics only so long as it does not involve a sacrifice of that security and comfort. Few of them will dissent on grounds of conscience or criticize the powers-that-be simply as an act of moral courage.

In the perspective of history, the emergency is a passing phenomenon. Through it and beyond it loom those larger discords which belong to a whole age and wait patiently to be resolved. There is, in the first place, the question of reconciling the major religions of India, particularly Hinduism, Islam, Sikhism and Christianity, so that people professing these faiths can retain something of their individual distinctions and yet feel that they belong to a common history and a common land. Then there is the great question of arriving at a reconciliation between science and modern technology, with their power to tame nature, and that "idealistic" or spiritual view of life which, as Radhakrishnan, the great modern Brahmin from the South, put it, would lead man from a "mastery of things" to a "mastery of self" and help him live inwardly at peace with what is outwardly a capricious world. These are the more permanent tasks before the Indian intellectuals and by these they are the more permanent tasks before the Indian intellectuals and by these they are united with their counterparts all over the world. To these they must continue to make their contribution as best they can through the passing storms and stresses of contemporary history.

Some Dilemmas of University Development in Anglophonic Africa

Philip Foster

In 1971 there were approximately 114 thousand students attending -institutions of higher education in the whole of sub-Saharan Africa excluding Rhodesia and the Republic of South Africa.[1] They represented some 0.04 per cent of the population of the region and, more appropriately about 0.6 per cent of the eligible age cohort of youth. Thus in spite of a massive effort in education over the last decade or more, Black Africa presents a profile typical of most less developed areas: a broadening base of primary education that now enrolls just under 50 per cent of the younger eligible age cohorts capped by a very restricted provision of secondary and tertiary education. To be sure, over the last decade the growth of university education has been extremely rapid: between 1960 and 1970 enrollments registered a sevenfold increase but it is still true that sub-Saharan Africa remains the least educated of the continents. In 1970 India, by contrast, had well over 2 million students in almost 3,000 universities and university affiliated colleges representing 0.37 per cent of the gross population or almost four times the level of per capita tertiary enrollments prevailing in the most educationally favored nations of Black Africa.

We are concerned here, however, with the problems of the 18 universities that existed in 1971 in what is now termed Anglophonic Africa. At that time there were roughly 58 thousand students enrolled in these institutions, thus approximating to the sub-continental average. Even within this cluster of nations, however, there was considerable variation in the extent of university provision, ranging from approximately 1 student per 1000 gross population in the Sudan, down to 1 student per 4000 in Nigeria. Thus although it is generally true that both the stock

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[1] Unesco, Annuaire Statistique, 1973. In the following discussion on Anglophonic Africa we shall be referring to developments in Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Tanzania and Zambia.

and supply of university trained manpower is very small in all of Anglo-phonic Africa, it would be unwise to classify all nations together in our analysis. We shall return to this point at a later juncture, but it is suf-ficient to note here that universities in the region stand at very different levels of quantitative development, thus suggesting that educational strategies may vary as between nations in the years ahead. However, granted this caveat, it is still clear that certain problems of university development are beginning to emerge that are transcultural and transna-tional in character.

In view of the statistical summary provided above, it is possible to argue that since the higher educational sector in anglophonic Africa is so pitifully small, there is absolutely no reason for placing constraints on its quantitative development: even if a tenfold increase in enroll-ments were projected (supplemented by an equal influx of overseas trained graduates) the stock of university trained manpower would still only represent a tiny fraction of the total labor force by the end of this decade. Moreover, in view of the growing size of the eligible age cohort it would seem likely that even under optimal circumstances no more than one to two per cent of it will be entering universities at that time. If we accept the fact that access to the university will continue to be restricted to a tiny minority and also espouse the view (which I do not) that limitations in the supply of high level manpower place a major constraint on economic development, then it would be easy to con-clude that educational priorities should focus upon further develop-ment of the higher educational sector. Indeed, a few years ago this strat-egy, along with the development of the secondary level, seemed almost axiomatic to one school of educational planners. I shall argue to the contrary, however, in this paper that if there is one sector that needs to be expanded with great caution then it is the university sector and if it is to be expanded then these efforts must be parallel to some change in both its structure and financing.

The first serious issue confronting African universities, therefore, is the question of quantitative expansion and it was this theme that under-lay a good deal of discussion of the Addis Ababa plan of 1961 and the Tananarive conference on higher education in Africa organized by UNESCO in 1962. [2] However, earlier preoccupation with achieving

[2] See Unesco. *Regional Educational Targets and Achievements 1960-65* Paris, Unesco–OAU/CESTA/Ref. 2, April, 1968.

quantitative targets (the rationale for which was never very clear) tended to blind observers to a much more serious set of issues that center upon the purpose and function of the university in the African context. Increasingly, debate tends to focus on the university conceived as essentially a "service" institution whose purposes must be bent to the immediate tasks of development as opposed to an institution concerned essentially with basic teaching and research. Conjoined with this issue are a number of sub-themes that focus upon the "Africanization" of universities and the role of the academic intellectual within them. I am sure, as I consider these issues in turn, that observers acquainted with the earlier pattern of university development in India, for example, will recognize some very familiar themes.

The post-war pattern of development of universities in Anglophonic Africa is particularly instructive insofar as their history has been far more exhaustively documented than that of their Francophonic counterparts. Moreover, the course of their growth has been much more subject to African initiatives and direction than has been the case in formerly French territories, for in the latter areas university structure, curriculum and staffing are still substantially dominated by metropolitan precedent and personnel. By contrast and in spite of ritualistic references to "metropolitan academic imperialism" (whatever that may mean) it is largely true that for over a decade the universities of Anglophonic Africa have been far more "African" than many of their critics would admit and their future course of development will remain firmly in African hands. Indeed, I hope to show in subsequent pages that a great deal of the debate that continues to rage over "Africanization" is partly spurious in nature and has tended to divert attention away from some of the more serious long-range problems that confront African universities.

In 1971 there were, as we have seen, approximately 58 thousand students studying at some 18 institutions in Anglophonic Africa that awarded a first degree. Although some of the more recently created universities have tended from their inception to diverge in some measure from metropolitan structures and practice, it is fair to say that the older institutions within the cluster were largely modelled along the very general lines suggested in the Asquith Report of 1945.[3] They

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[3] Great Britain, Colonial Office, *Report of the Commission on Higher Education in the Colonies* Cmd 6647 (London: HMSO, 1945).

were essentially institutions of high quality providing residential facilities to a select minority of academically talented students within a constitutional framework essentially based upon those of English civic universities. It is important to note, however, that the pattern of development of these universities differed, from that prevailing at an earlier period in colonial India, insofar as they were not created essentially as examining bodies. In the latter country the policy pursued in the nineteenth century led ultimately to a profusion of university affiliated colleges and institutions and arguably to a decline in the standards of higher education except for a few centers of excellence. It seems clear enough that the Asquith Commission was anxious to avoid such quantitative expansion if the price for it were to be mediocrity, and to this end the general supervision of African universities by the University of London and the creation of an Inter-University Council were designed to exert a degree of quality control for a period until these fledgling institutions were firmly established. In the event, the Asquith universities are now self-governing, degree granting institutions and up till now have maintained a farily high level of academic quality.

It is, of course, to Sir Eric Ashby that we must turn for the most scholarly account of the development of these universities and I find little reason to dissent from his narrative of events.[4] However, it is possible to disagree with his interpretation of these events and the inferences that he draws from them and in this paper I shall attempt to do so since his line of argument centers very much on the central purpose of institutions of higher education in Africa and other less developed areas.

First, as I understand it, Sir Eric's general conclusion is that the Asquith institutions have failed to become genuine African universities that could be responsive to African needs and priorities. They are, indeed, transplanted institutions, in some indefinable way not "African" and responsible, indeed, for the deracination and alienation of the university educated African himself.

To be sure, Sir Eric makes his point with far greater subtlety than those critics who assert that the reason for this situation is the fact that the Asquith universities were "carbon copies" of the University of London (no one really acquainted with their history could assert this). Moreover, he clearly recognizes that the original Asquith Report pro-

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[4] See Sir Eric Ashby, *African Universities and the Western Tradition* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1964) and *Universities: British, Indian, African* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966).

vided considerable latitude for local experimentation in terms of structure and curriculum and is well aware that pressure to adhere to metropolitan precedent was as much a function of African opinion as it was of European initiative.[5] It is, in fact, one of the ironies of Ashby's writing that he makes such a thoroughly convincing case (more convincing, indeed, than that of his sharpest critic, Sir Alexander Carr-Saunders)[6] that, given the historical and sociological constraints of the late colonial period, the Asquith universities almost *had* to emerge in the form they did, that one is surprised by the severity of his commentary.

I hope I am not unfair in suggesting that Sir Eric reaches his conclusions because implicitly he has a model of what a "real" African university would look like. One never really has a clear idea of what this university would consist of although one sees elements of it: more vocationally oriented to manpower needs, less "elitist" in orientation, concentrating more heavily upon African studies and with a more genuinely African structure of university governance. One infers, in fact, that this ideal institution would resemble the American land grant university in many respects and Sir Eric has kind things to say about the University of Nigeria at Nsukka although it would be difficult to infer in what ways this institution has equalled or surpassed the performance of the Asquith universities.[7] Performance apart, however, one can well ask why the University of Nigeria was in any substantive sense more "adapted" to African conditions than alternative models, and this is a point that is never satisfactorily addressed.

One can, therefore, take issue with a number of substantive arguments raised by Sir Eric but the main point is that the kind of rhetoric used in his analysis tends to appear in nearly all subsequent commentaries on university development in Anglophonic Africa. In a very recent symposium, for example, the issue of "Africanization" runs like a thread throughout every contribution and receives its most succinct expression in an observation by Professor J.F.A. Ajayi wherein he hopes that in the 70's, African universities "will make a definite advance over the effort of African universities in the 1960's to evolve an identity of

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[5] Ashby, *African Universities. . .* pp. 30-34.

[6] A.M. Carr - Saunders, "Britain and Universities in Africa" *Universities Quarterly*, XIX, (3) 1965 pp. 227-239.

[7] Ashby, *Universities . . .* pp. 277-281 and *African Universities . . .* pp. 65-67.

their own, and adapt the alien form of the university to one that is reorganizably part of the African social and cultural enviroment."[8]

One can, of course, be profoundly sympathetic to the sentiments that give rise to this statement and yet feel compelled to ask precisely what it means. The trouble with such generalities is that there is always great difficulty in rendering them into such terms that they could constitute any meaningful guide to the practical planning of university development. It is perhaps not too harsh a judgment that pieties of this kind can even be positively harmful in that they serve to prevent any really systematic evaluation of the contribution that universities can make to the national welfare. In effect, such ill-defined notions as "Africanization" or "adaptation" need to be examined far more closely, since they tend to be catch-all phrases that mask a number of more substantial issues.

First, it is neither a facetious nor ethnocentric observation that, in the broadest terms, we cannot speak of an African university any more than we can speak of an African refrigerator. As with refrigerators there will be accommodations to local styles, tastes and conditions and as African universities develop they will tend to move further away from metropolitan precedent in response to local political and economic circumstances. At the same time, such accommodations need not necessarily involve any massive transformations in the basic functions of universities: however diverse in structure and form higher institutions may be, the "genus" university is identifiable on a world-wide basis and there is considerable consensus as to what distinguishes institutions of high from those of low calibre. If African universities, in Sir Eric Ashby's phrase, wish to remain on the "international gold standard" of learning then they are unlikely to undergo any really radical transformation.[9]

In general, African academics are committed to the maintenance of high intellectual standards and if the future development of the universities were left in their hands what would occur would be a series of small-scale adaptations involving a greater degree of Africanization of the curriculum, particularly in the area of history and the social sciences; a growing Africanization of the faculty of universities as the supply of

[8] J.F.A. Ajayi, "Towards and African Academic Community" in T.M. Yesufu (ed) *Creating the African University* (Ibadan: Oxford University Press, 1973) p.11.

[9] Sir Eric Ashby, "A Contribution to the dialogue on African Universities" *The Universities Quarterly* XX (1), 1965, p. 82.

qualified personnel increases and a restructuring of degree requirements away from earlier metropolitan models.

Most observers would regard these kinds of changes as salutary, for no one would wish African universities to remain permanently shackled to metropolitan forms and precedents. Indeed, over the last decade or so, most of the Anglophonic universities in Africa have made substantial progress in this direction. But is this all that Africanization means? Perhaps African academics believe that once the faculty and a proportion of courses of study have been "Africanized" then the most serious problems of university development will be solved. Unfortunately, this is far from the truth and, as Shils has observed in the case of India, the earlier "Indianization" of faculty and curriculum in the universities of that nation has in no sense saved many of them from subsequent demoralization and decay.[10]

The fact is that academics deceive themselves if they believe that it is they who will be largely in control of the future pattern of development of African universities: the main challenge, indeed, to the future of these institutions is, in my opinion, likely to emerge from the problematic nature of their linkages with the broader polity and economy of the new states and this will manifest itself in an increasing number of confrontations between governments and universities. The latter will not save themselves by making vague statements that the universities should be responsive to the social and economic needs of society, for what is at issue is a growing and profound disagreement as to what the functions of universities should be.

These growing lines of cleavage between state and university in Africa are not simply matters that can be resolved by restructuring the constitutional arrangements that govern their external relationships and it is perhaps unfortunate that Sir Eric Ashby has seen the problem largely in these terms. For him the major issue of the relation of the university to the broader society is in large part a matter of devising a system of governance wherein the representation of faculty, government and other citizens should be assured and their interests given expression.[11] His conclusion was that the constitutional structure of the English civic university bequeathed to the Anglophonic universities

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[10]Edward Shils. "The Implantation of Universities: Reflections on a Theme of Ashby" *Universities Quarterly* XXII (2) 1968, p. 155.

[11]Ashby, *Universities* . . . pp. 290-343.

and consisting of a lay council and academic senate has not worked well in the African context and there is a need to experiment with new constitutional forms. I would not disagree with the need for experimentation if it could be demonstrated that existing constitutional forms have failed. In point of fact, up to the early 70's, at least, the Asquith constitution appeared to work remarkably well in terms of the maintenance of academic freedom and university autonomy: in spite of the notorious incidents at the University of Ghana in 1961 and the Vice-Chancellorship crisis at Lagos University in 1965, the history of the university development in Anglophonic Africa has been one of remarkable tranquillity in contrast to the turmoil that has characterized the scene in most less developed countries. It is, however, a tranquility that is fast disappearing for in the last five years the number of "incidents," student strikes and government closure of universities has steadily increased and in contrast to Ashby I do not believe that the frequency of such confrontations will diminish as a result of any form of constitutional reorganization. In his view, problems have arisen largely because in Africa the lay council and academic senate relationship have not been sustained by the unwritten conventions that have governed them within the British context: there is, therefore, a need for the creation of formal covenants between governments and universities that would make explicit the areas of jurisdiction and authority of these bodies.[12] But surely this is to mistake the alleviation of symptoms for the treatment of the disease, for no form of constitutional organization or covenant will insulate the universities from increasing attack so long as there is substantive disagreement about what the primary functions of the university should be. In this context, any arguments about what constitute the "legitimate" spheres of academic, governmental and lay authority are essentially meaningless.

In the last resort, I would contend, the basic cause that underlies nearly all manifestations of governmental/university conflict in Africa stems from the fact that the universities are major instruments for the allocation of income, status and power in African societies. Contrary to the common view that the problems of African universities arise largely because of their remoteness from the "realities" of African life and the fact that they are "ivory tower" institutions, it can be contended that their difficulties arise precisely because they are too *close*

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[12] *Ibid.*

to the realities of African social and economic life. It is sheer nonsense to talk about "remoteness" when these institutions are both heavy consumers of national resources and at the same time control access to elite positions in the new states. From this perspective it is inevitable that they will become the focus of conflict and find themselves increasingly exposed to governmental censure and criticism.

It would seem, indeed, that many observers have failed to see that the relation between the university and the broader society in Africa differs in one profound respect from that which was obtained until very recently in many western nations. Typically, universities have always enjoyed the most insulation from the direct pressures of the broader polity in those societies that were culturally highly differentiated and where, for the most part, access to higher education was conceived as the prerogative of a relatively exclusive socially defined minority. In these circumstances, the university was in many respects so remote from the world of the ordinary citizen that its existence passed almost unnoticed and the conflicts of academics had little relevance to the broader world of affairs. This situation hardly exists in contemporary Africa, where access to the university is ideally conceived as relatively open to the suitably qualified without respect to social provenance. Thus it is that even where the masses are by no means clear about what functions universities perform, they are perfectly well aware of the occupational and status rewards that accrue to higher education and are thus vitally concerned with the conditions that govern access to it.

Moreover, this concern with access is not only linked to the question of individual but also to that of group mobility and status and consequently, the issue of ethnic representation at the faculty and student levels become an object of very general public concern. Inevitably, therefore, the universities are centers where the elaborate games of "ethnic arithmetic" that are so characteristic of African politics have a particular salience and the implications of these activities are not lost on local populations: far from being "ivory towers" the walls of the university are all too permeable to patterns of social and political conflict that have their provenance in the wider society.[13] Whether desirable or not, the university has a peculiar centrality as a *political* institution that it lacks in many other societies.

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[13]   See Pierre Van den Berghe, *Power and Privilege at an African University*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman, 1973) for an interesting analysis along these lines.

It is evident that nearly every African government looks askance at both university faculty and students as a potential source of viable opposition to the regime and where faculty have advanced their putative right to act as informed critics of the *status quo,* the government is all too likely to see this as constituting a threat to the legitimacy of the whole political order. This accounts for the increasing degree of over-reaction by regimes to commentary emanating from the universities but, in fact, up till now academic communities in Africa have behaved in a remarkably docile fashion in the face of government pressure: in general, it would seem that regimes have little to fear from the overt political activities of academics and students. Yet criticism of the university as an institution continues to mount and over the next decade will, in my opinion, focus upon three general but closely related issues that stem from the mobility function of the university: these are the "elitist" nature of the institution itself; the degree of nexus between the university and the occupational structure and the question of financing the whole higher educational enterprise. Each of these issues constitutes a potential source of serious university/government conflict and each could lead to a major erosion of university autonomy. It seems appropriate, therefore, to see where government criticism is based on spurious premises and where it has some legitimate basis.

First, in Africa (as elsewhere) it is fashionable for government critics to brand the university as "elitist" in nature. Yet the word is used in several senses and in two of these, criticisms can be summarily dismissed. As we have noted, since only a tiny proportion of any of the relevant age cohorts will be able to gain access to the university in sub-Saharan Africa over the next few decades, then universities are by definition "elitist" institutions. But then, of course, they re everywhere and even in those nations where the statistical chances for access to higher education have been maximized one could still argue that university students constitute an elite. From this viewpoint the definition of elitism is almost tautological but, as we shall see later, the real issue concerns the *criteria* of access to higher education, not its purely quantitative provision.

The second definition of "elitism" has a little more substance to it, but not much. This consists of the charge that the universities produce a culturally deracinated minority, remote from the realities of African life and suspended, as it were, between two worlds, into neither of which they can comfortably fit. As Ashby once put it when speaking of the African graduate:

From this altitude it is virtually impossible for him to·remain in close sympathy with the great mass of his fellow countrymen. Part of the price which the African graduate pays for his higher education is loneliness. One often hears that the conscious aim of many Africans in seeking education is to break out of the continuum of their traditional society and to avoid the indignity of manual labor. This is doubtless true, but it does not diminish the danger and the spiritual discomfort. There is a no-man's-land between European culture and African culture. In this no-man's-land thousands of African graduates pass their lives, not assimilated to Europe yet strangers to their own folk, insufficient in numbers to form a self-sustaining intellectual community. One of the urgent tasks for education in Africa is to cut channels of communication between the intellectuals and the people, "to avoid the sense of separation of the university graduate from his much less well-educated countrymen."[14]

Now this is striking rhetoric, but what substantive evidence is there for it? To be sure, African students are likely to acquire new tastes and a desire for new life styles as a result of their educational experience, but does this make them deracinated "misfits."[15] Ironically, although African academics are occasionally given to talking in these terms, I have never met one who was personally prepared to admit that he was an alienated misfit (it was always the other fellow). The fact is, of course, that any form of social change involves changes in life styles and modes of behavior and if people are really serious about this issue then, rather than talk about "Africanizing" the university to prevent "cultural alienation," they would do better to abolish the schools and universities altogether and attempt to return to some mythical state of traditional "Gemeinschaft." Basically, Africans who talk in these terms are talking nonsense and I suspect that most of them know it.

The third sense in which the term "elitism" is employed has, I believe, more substance to it and can become the basis of legitimate controversy. It concerns not the issue of gross access to the universities but

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[14]   Ashby, *African Universities* . . . p. 101.

[15]   Interestingly enough one of the only studies that has attempted to empirically probe the relation between "alienation" and western education in Africa came out with the opposite conclusion: the more educated students were, the less alienated they felt. See Michael Armer, "Formal Education and Psychological Malaise in an African Society" *Sociology of Education*, 43 (2) 1970 pp. 143-158.

the social and, particularly, ethnic imparities that occur and tend to persist as a result of current selection procedures. It is not necessary here to recapitulate the historical circumstances of the colonial situation that originally gave rise to these imparities, except to suggest that they are extraordinarily difficult to eradicate. The few empirical studies that exist on university recruitment in Africa demonstrate considerable inequalities in access to higher education in both ethnic and social terms and though it would be misleading to label the universities as ethnically or socially "exclusive," the problem can be particularly serious in those circumstances where minorities that are under-represented at the university level come from areas that may contribute more than their share to national revenues.

From the perspective of the academic community itself this question may not seem to be of major importance ("Creating the African University" contains hardly a mention of it) and, understandably, faculty are largely concerned with the development of instruments of selection that will maintain an inflow of students of high quality. But from the viewpoint of government, the issue is of supreme significance and anyone acquainted with the history of the development of Nigerian universities, for example, would be deceiving himself if he thought that the proliferation of new institutions in that country has been the result of calculated "manpower needs" of the economy: this proliferation was largely a response to demands for ethnic parity of representation at the university level and it is interesting that presently, in the context of Nigerian educational politics, people currently talk less of the need for a Nigerian university than a "Northern" university, a "Yoruba" university or a "Rivers" university.

In other African nations besides Nigeria the question of university access is merely one form of the equity/efficiency dilemma in education, but academics would be foolish to dismiss it as simply a matter of bending university standards in the interests of "political expediency," for this would be to denigrate the intrinsic importance of the political issue in the context of the new states and in India, for example, the problem of university access has become so politicized that it has been one of the factors leading to the progressive deterioration of higher education in that nation.[16] African universities, it would seem to me, are still in a po-

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[16] See, for example, the discussion "Studying Education and Politics" in S. R. and L.I. Rudolph (eds) *Education and Politics in India* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1973) pp. 3-12.

sition to take steps that would forestall future government criticism of their selection procedures and thus enable them to reach some *modus vivendi* between the pursuit of academic standards and criteria of equity in access to higher education.

The first task is, of course, for the universities themselves to undertake a serious evaluation of the social and ethnic consequences of their own selection criteria. It is striking, for example, that nearly all of the few serious evaluations of patterns of university access in Anglophonic Africa have been done by visiting expatriate social scientists: at a time when African academics appear to be increasingly resentful of overseas research and opinion concerning educational development, it is ironic that virtually no serious research on higher education is being undertaken by Africans themselves when this research has vital and immediate implications for their own admissions policies.[17]

The gathering of data concerning both short and long term trends in patterns of recruitment could, I suggest, provide the basis for a fruitful reorganization of selection procedures in which governments and universities could usefully collaborate. Where substantial and long-term imparities exist, it would seem that reform could mitigate the worst of them without lowering the current high standards of performance in African universities. But reforms of structure and procedure cannot be effected without the existence of sound data upon which policy can be formulated. So long as academics are content to intone pieties about the need to relate the universities to the African environment without undertaking the kinds of investigation that would give the phrase some meaning, they will lay themselves open to future government criticism and fiat. In this sense, if not Sir Eric Ashby's, it could be argued that the Anglophonic universities will have failed it they have not concerned themselves sufficiently with the problem of access to higher education.

The second major area of potential dispute concerns the issue of the relation between the universities and the emerging occupational struc-

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[17] I am rather fearful, indeed, that the degree of heightened sensitivity (some of it justified) on the part of African academics to overseas social scientists may cause them to ignore some extremely important findings. See, for example, the discussion by Eicher of the work of Edwards and Todaro in *Creating the African University* pp. 30-32 and the reaction of African academics to their conclusions on p. 86. If African academics are prepared to reject these kinds of findings on the basis of what seems little more than cultural sensitivity one wonders whether the latter really conceive the problems of educational policy in the LDCs to be worthy of any serious investigation at all!

ture of the new African states: university officials and government alike
aver that a primary function of universities must be to meet the pres-
sing "manpower needs" of the nation. Whether university personnel are
very sincere in this protestation is another matter, but undoubtedly
African governments are and, inferentially, their criticism of universi-
ties often rests upon the contention that these institutions provide
insufficient "vocational" type courses that would be of more immediate
relevance to the nation. It is extremely difficult, for example, for the
universities to respond to criticism that they are providing too many
openings in the humanities and not enough in agricultural science, with
the result that they become increasingly vulnerable to the charge that
they are ivory tower institutions and largely irrelevant to the issues of
national development. Under these circumstances, it will be surprising
if in the future increasing pressure is not placed upon the Anglophonic
universities to develop a range of more specifically vocational careers.

It would be salutary, however, if in discussing this question both
sides had a clearer concept of just what universities can do to fulfill na-
tional manpower needs. On the one hand the universities applaud any
statement that stresses the overwhelming need for high-level university
trained manpower for the simple reason that it enhances their bargain-
ing power vis-a-vis government in the allocation of scarce resources to
higher education. On the other, government conceives that the man-
power function of universities is best undertaken within the framework
of vocationally oriented training courses. Both views, in my opinion,
are mistaken and these misconceptions need to be cleared up before a
sensible working relationship between government and university can
emerge.

First, there is an all but universal assumption that it is essentially the
shortage of university trained manpower that places a major constraint
upon economic development: Africa's needs for such manpower, it is
asserted, are almost unlimited. To be sure, specific bottlenecks do occur
but the evidence suggests that in terms of actual market conditions the
effective demand for university trained manpower is relatively low
under present conditions. For a few years after independence, at least,
most African nations felt constrained to increase the supply of high
level manpower in order to replace expatriates holding senior adminis-
trative positions. This is a perfectly understandable policy that can be
amply justified in terms of political priorities but it is necessary to point
out that such attempts at "localization" may contribute very little to
the *economic* development of the African nations. Indeed, a mere

change in the provenance of top personnel makes little difference if the existing allocation of skilled manpower resources is inefficient and not justifiable in terms of effective demand. For some years, of course, the Africanization of high level positions has had top priority but once these positions are largely manned by relatively young local university graduates, then the question arises as to how to absorb subsequent co- horts of university products. It may well occur that in the years ahead very expensive university trained manpower will merely force indivi- duals with somewhat lower qualifications out of occupations which the latter can effectively perform. Such is the situation, for example, when university trained teachers are regarded as being vital for the manning of the lower classes of secondary schools and it is possible to cite numer- ous other examples where the recruitment of relatively expensive man- power is difficult to justify on the grounds of efficiency. Moreover, it is possible to pass from a situation of apparent shortage of university graduates to a surplus within a relatively short time; the initial general stage of high-level manpower shortage is very rapidly replaced by a growing volume of economically redundant graduates even while short- ages may exist in certain specific areas. This situation has already oc- curred in the Sudan and will, I hazard, rapidly reproduce itself in a number of other nations in Anglophonic Africa.

Thus both Africa governments and universities alike have been un- duly impressed by the views of those manpower specialists who have argued that the high level manpower needs of the African nations are well-nigh inexhaustible: this is simply not the case and it is perhaps more appropriate to suggest that the high-level manpower problem con- sists in part of effectively utilizing the resources that already exist ra- ther than being one of simple shortage. Recent evidence supports the view that in many less developed areas the universities have already been over-expanded, at least in terms of economic criteria: whatever limitations may attach to rate-of-return analysis as a mode of evaluating investments in education, the cross-national evidence clearly suggests that in the less developed countries the expansion of higher education should have a lower priority than investment in lower level schooling, particularly at the primary school level. [18]

This kind of findings hardly commends itself to university adminis-

[18] See G. Psacharopoulos, *Returns to Education* (San Francisco: Jossey Bass, 1973) passim.

trators bent on expanding the higher educational sector but, in a narrower context, governments tend to have a rather distorted notion of the potential manpower functions of universities: they still seem to be persuaded that it is possible to calculate national manpower needs with some degree of accuracy and then convert these estimates into specific vocational training equivalents. Although it would be inappropriate here to attempt a review of the literature on high-level manpower planning, it is safe to say that, by and large, attempts in the less-developed countries to adjust university outputs to presumed manpower requirements have been conspicuous failures. [19] The inadequacy of such attempts has not been the result of technical limitations but stems from a basic misconception of the relationship between higher training and the economy. At present, manpower estimates can provide little rationale for the planning of university programs since we lack the kind of data that would give us some indication of the functioning of the high level manpower market in African economies. Some years ago Professor John Ferguson, in attempting to justify the continued existence of the Department of Classics at Ibadan University, asserted that in any meaningful evaluation of university performance:

> the only reasonable approach for a scientist would have been to examine the subsequent careers of Ibadan Classics graduates and ask whether those careers are giving service as effective and relevant to twentieth century Nigeria as those from apparently more relevant disciplines. [20]

He also noted, in arguing the case for humanities, that frequently in African nations "the peculiar advantages of a scientific training will be wasted if the graduates filter into the routine of the civil service."[21] Presumably, Professor Ferguson would have been the last person to see himself as a practical economist but, in essence, his observations speak to the central question. The problem of the "productivity" of university trained manpower cannot be discussed within the framework of the

[19] See B. Ahamad and Mark Blaug (eds) *The Practice of Manpower Forecasting* (San Francisco: Jossey Bass, 1973) passim.

[20] J. Ferguson, "Ibadan Arts and Classics" *Universities Quarterly* XIX (4) 1965 p. 403.

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 407.

"vocational" or "non-vocational" issue. We need rather to learn a great deal more about the subsequent occupational performance of succeeding cohorts of university graduates by area of study and level of academic achievement before we can begin to make assessments of the value of university training. We must, moreover, examine the degree of substitutability between types of training and investigate the hiring practices of both the public and private sectors of African economies before we are in any position to assess the contribution of university trained manpower to national development. Without such investigation, controversies about high-level manpower needs are largely exercises in futility. [22]

In summary, therefore, potential conflicts between university and government with respect to manpower needs and priorities rest in part upon mutual misunderstandings. Government is probably right when it seeks to place some constraint on the rate of university expansion in relation to development of other sectors of the educational system but it is almost certainly misguided if it believes that the contribution of the universities can be maximized within the framework of a highly "vocationalized" university structure.

Finally, it should be apparent that government pressures on universities are always likely to be greater when public agencies have been saddled with the overwhelming bulk of the capital and recurrent costs of higher education. Under African conditions it would be idle to expect that governments will act with the same degree of benevolence as the University Grants Committee in the United Kingdom. At present, educational costs are rising rapidly at all levels to the extent that in some African nations approximately one quarter of central government expenditures on education are allocated to a group of institutions that contain less than one half per cent of the entire school population. Under these circumstances, what might be regarded as governmental "intrusion" into university affairs is readily understandable in terms of what government legitimately conceives to be the public interest and African universities will be in no position to resist increasing pressure so long as they are almost totally dependent upon the public exchequer.

Retrospectively, for example, it seems to have been a serious error when most universities in Anglophonic Africa decided to base admis-

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[22] See also Mark Blaug, *Education and the Employment Problem in Developing Countries* (Geneva: International Labor Office, 1973) p. 88.

sion policies upon the award of substantial or total scholarship to cover tuition and maintenance to all students who were deemed academically qualified to enter university. Ironically, in fact, although the Asquith Report has been castigated for its lack of perceptivity in failing to adapt the university to African conditions, it made one recommendation that would have made eminent sense: student financing should be undertaken, at least in part, through a revolving loan fund. [23] I am not aware that this recommendation has received any attention in the literature, but in the event it seems to have been ignored. Doubtless the decision to award full scholarships to most African undergraduates was made from the best of motives but what it represented was the transfer into poor countries of an even more generous version of university student financing than existed in the United Kingdom itself.

Serious questions can be raised as to this mode of student financing in more affluent nations, but in Africa its consequences have been inequitable, to say the least. Given the conditions of access to the high-level manpower market in most African states, the policy of almost total subsidization of students has generated relatively high rates of private return to university education combined with substantially lower rates of social return (at least as measured in fiduciary terms). In other words, a university education tends to be a remarkably good investment for the individual but the returns to society remain much more problematic. Moreover, insofar as a significant percentage of government revenues in most African nations is derived from lower income groups, then the latter are subsidizing a tiny minority that tends to be disproportionately drawn from certain social and ethnic groups within the population. Although no precise studies of the flow of costs and benefits has been made in the African context, it should be clear enough that, in general, current methods of student funding are both expensive and inequitable. Moreover, they generate precisely those conditions wherein government, with some justification, attempts to establish greater control over the higher institutions in the interests of national economy.

There are, then, substantial savings that could be made with respect to the financing of university education that would provide the universities with greater flexibility in their dealings with government. Current-

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[23]   Great Britain, Cmd 6647, p.48.

ly, faculty/student ratios in most Anglophonic universities are higher than in most developed nations and undoubtedly reductions in unit costs could be effected through a more efficient utilization of faculty and physical facilities. Beyond this, however , a total overhaul of present methods of student financing either in the direction of student loans or fixed percentage taxes on the future earnings of university graduates is long overdue. Some efforts are being made in this direction, though so far they have been met with violent student opposition and in one case had to be abandoned.[24] Negative student reaction is a result of the overly generous funding policies pursued by the government in the past; once the principle has been established that all suitably qualified individuals are entitled to substantial aid, then it becomes all too difficult to reverse it and inaugurate new methods of student financing that are more realistic in the light of resource constraints. In the long run, however, these new policies are not only likely to be more commensurate with general welfare, but they will lessen tension between government and university: under African conditions, university claims to autonomy will not be taken seriously so long as the latter remain entirely dependent on generous public funding.

In conclusion, therefore, I have tried to argue that the Anglophonic universities should take a closer look at themselves and be prepared to make some changes that seem necessary in the light of an increasing demand for higher education. Universities that show a degree of responsibility over financing and recruitment for example, are far more likely to enjoy greater autonomy of action than those that are merely content to extract as much from public resources as they are able to. A degree of fiscal independence cannot, of course, guarantee autonomy and academic freedom but at least it maximizes the chances that universities can continue to enjoy these privileges. It is true that in Africa the university is tolerated but hardly understood, but this is probably the case

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[24] For example, attempts were made early on in Nigeria to fund all students but the burden of subsidy proved so great that at present, no more than 40 per cent of all undergraduates obtain bursaries. As a result, the Federal Military Government has approved a loan scheme though not without opposition. See Fafunwa, A. Babatunde, *The Growth and Development of Nigerian Universities* (Overseas Liaison Committee, American Council on Education), paper No. 4 April 1974, p. 29. Likewise in Ghana attempts to introduce a loan scheme met with bitter opposition and were ultimately abandoned. See P. Williams, "Lending for Learning: an Experiment in Ghana," *Minerva*, XII, (3) pp. 326-345.

in most areas in the world, including the most developed nations. [25]
Perhaps universities do not really *need* to be understood, provided that
they can function in an atmosphere of tolerance. Tolerance, however, is
becoming an increasingly scarce commodity in sub-Saharan Africa and
the universities, as we know them, will survive only if they are prepared
to react constructively to increasing public criticism, some of which is
by no means ill-founded.

[25]   See Ajayi, *op. cit.* p. 13.

The Filipino Intelligentsia
Three Generations of Betrayal

F. José Sionil

For purposes of this presentation, I would like to define the terms "intellectual" and "intelligentsia." I agree with Stanislav Andreski's definition and even with his borderline cases —that the intellectual is the individual who has contributed to the articulation of creative and critical thinking in his society. "A crime reporter is not an intellectual until he begins to comment seriously" on the nature of his society; so is a doctor who may be his country's best surgeon, until he does something creative or critical. A poet or "a novelist who merely entertains is not an intellectual" unless his work, again, falls in the category of creative criticism.

And to this I would add the old definition of the intelligentsia as propounded in pre-1917 Russia — that this is a community of thinking men who are basically critics of the established order and are, therefore, "outsiders." By inference, therefore, those who have joined the Establishment automatically cease to be members of the intelligentsia.

There is much in the Philippine tradition to support this view, from Jose Rizal — the novelist-martyr and Filipino National Hero — to Jose Maria Sison, the poet-ideologue who is now underground in the Philippines. It is this intelligentsia, this highly sophisticated Westernized intellectual community, this minuscule segment of the society which has — through three generations — acquired influence and, in recent times, real power in the reshaping of the Philippine polity.

This intelligentsia may be understood better if it is broken up into sections not only in terms of activity and class —economic and social— but also in terms of their position in the political spectrum and in their generational chronology.

It is also necessary for this presentation to describe the culture of these intellectuals as a phenomenon both of history and geography. Although we Filipinos are in Asia, we have not really been affected much by it. In the recent past, a romantic tendency among our leaders to be

identified with Asia – to which we really belong – has evoked widespread approval from the intellectuals.

Not the least of the reasons is a reaction against the pervasive Western influence in the society and the growing alienation of the Western-educated elite from the masses of our people. By seeking community with the rest of Asia, we could, perhaps, achieve for ourselves a national culture and, in the process, become one with our people.

The truth of the matter, however, is that though we have had contacts with Japan and China and continental Southeast Asia before the coming of the Spaniards in 1521, none of Asia's great religions –Hinduism and Buddhism– had impinged upon us in force. If our manner of thought and institutions are "Asian" at all, they have nothing to do with these great religions and their cultural appendages; rather, we share with other Asian societies those attitudes and habits of mind that are peculiar to all feudal and agrarian societies.

We respect the old, for age means experience and, therefore, wisdom. But there is none of the mandarin, the sensei or the guru tradition in the Philippines. The poorest farmer knows the value of books, of education, not so much because he is a convert of the public school system; he knows that his children can never escape the dreadful drudgery of the village and the farm if they are not educated. This same farmer holds the view that reading is not necessarily a virtue, for reading is almost always associated with those who have nothing to do and therefore, he who reads is an idle man.

Thus, though we are often considered the most Westernized nation in Southeast Asia, a thin patina of Westernization hides the fact that our society may be considered non-rational and even superstitious. Only with this in mind can we explain the excesses of our leaders and the appalling lethargy of our people to such excesses.

This description is self-evident to students of modernization in the new states. We are often frustrated by the fact that we have to deal with two cultures all at once. In many instances, the gulf between these cultures is wide and unbridgeable. But they also overlap.

I refer, of course, to the urban-rural difference and confrontation. And in this, it is the rural culture which dominates the country for it represents the peasantry, the workers, the people who live off the land, in contrast to those who live in the cities – the urban Western-educated sector, basically more economically advanced, a minority which holds the reins of government as well.

This is not to say that the masses have no intellectual leaders or that the rural people are denied access to government. In the last three gen-

erations, for instance, we were witness to social upheavals which rose to the degree of their organization and mobilization, all of them led by men who came from the lower classes but nonetheless had intellectual prowess. Emilio Jacinto, who wrote the philosophical underpinnings of the revolutionary Katipunan, and Apolinario Mabini, who was the "brains" of the Revolution against Spain that was spawned by the Katipunan, were poor.

The nativistic uprisings in the recent past were led by men of peasant extraction. Pedro Calosa, who led the Colorum revolt in Pangasinan in 1931, would be "illiterate" by urban standards but he knew how to communicate a basic theology to the masses and could identify the enemies of the people to them — the landlords and the army. Benigno Ramos, who led the Sakdalista uprising in 1935, was a brilliant speaker, a good organizer, and a nationalist — but was not held in high esteem by the urban intelligentsia. And finally, Luis Taruc, who led the Huk uprising that almost captured Manila in 1949-53; he had a peripheral college education and compared to the towering intellect of the Lava brothers who were the leaders of the Communist Party, he was no equal. But he had an innate understanding of peasant psychology, a flair for organization, and a socialist commitment which remains granite-strong to this day. At the height of his power, he had more than 20 thousand armed men knocking at the doors of Manila. And all these — without the ideological crap of the Manila radicals who tried to control the plebeian force he had created.

The First Generation

The Philippine intelligentsia had its origins in the last decades of the Spanish regime. In fact, the century 1872-1972 may well be the era which shaped the character of this intellectual community. In 1872, a mutiny of Filipino soldiers in the Spanish army broke out in Cavite —a town close to Manila. It came at a time when the first educated Filipinos — those who had joined the priesthood — were asking for more recognition from their overlords — the Spanish friars. As a result, several Filipino priests and businessmen were arrested and exiled. And three of the priests —Fathers Mariano Gomez, Jacinto Zamora and Jose Burgos were later executed.

The Cavite Mutiny had a profound impact on the Filipinos, particularly the Filipino clergy. It must be remembered that Spain ruled the Philippines for more than 300 years since Magellan first came to the island of Cebu in 1521. It was through the Church — particularly the

religious orders — that the colony was administered. The priests were also teachers and started seminaries and universities, notably the University of Santo Tomas, founded in 1611 and much later, the Ateneo, both of which survive to this day. The institutions of higher learning were not open, however, to all Filipinos. They were for the children of the Spaniards, the mestizos or the wealthy. In the latter part of the 19th century, those who went on to Europe to study were called the *ilustrados* — the enlightened — young, well-born men who imbibed the ideas of European liberalism. They strove for reforms in their homeland and for equality with the Spaniards.

Dr. Jose Rizal stood out among the *ilustrados*. Dr. Rizal was born of well-to-do parents in the town of Calamba near Manila. He was educated in the Ateneo and proceeded to Spain for his studies. There, he joined the other young Filipinos, notably Graciano Lopez Jaena and Marcelo H. del Pilar and they put out a fortnightly newspaper, *La Solidaridad*, in whose pages they wrote of the Philippines. For Rizal and the other writers of *La Solidaridad*, it was enough that the Filipinos were treated as equals, the Philippines as a province and not as an exploited colony. Rizal also wrote two novels, *Noli me tangere* and *El filibusterismo*, both of which were banned by the friars in the Philippines. The work of the *ilustrados* in Spain was abhorred by the friars in Manila and consequently, when Rizal returned to the Philippines, he was arrested and eventually executed.

But the deed was done; the consciousness of nation and of change which the *ilustrados* had worked for had been sown; Andres Bonifacio founded the revolutionary Katipunan which took up arms against Spain. The Revolution was to claim him in its early stages, but it continued under the leadership of Emilio Aguinaldo, who relied on another lower-class Filipino, Apolinario Mabini, for the ideology and guidance that were sorely needed particularly when the Americans obtruded on the scene and aborted the Filipino dream of independence.

What transpired had been instructive; the surviving *ilustrados* did not really want freedom from Spain; they joined the Revolution when there was no other alternative and left it when the Americans came.

The brains of that revolution, Mabini, was exiled to Guam for two years and was to die shortly after his release. Aguinaldo was captured and the Malolos Republic — the first in Asia — lasted only so long, but during those few years, the men of the Revolution showed their capacity in running a Republican government; they also created a constitution which showed how profundly they understood the democratic ideal.

Mabini wrote in his *True Decalogue:* ". . .You shall not recognize in

your country the authority of any person who has not been elected by you and your countrymen; for authority emanates from God and God speaks in the conscience of every man; the person designated and proclaimed by the conscience of a whole people is the only one who can use true authority."

"You shall strive for a republic and never for a monarchy in your country; for the latter exalts one or several families and founds a dynasty; the former makes a people noble and worthy through reason, great through liberty, and prosperous and brilliant through labor. . ."

The Second Generation

If imperial America had no mind for these niceties, many of the intellectuals of the Revolution saw their opportunities clearly; they gladly joined the Americans in running the government, and held the highest poitions allowed them. They even formed the Federal Party which sought to make the Philippines part of the American Federation.

Yet, in afterthought, there is much that can be said for the enlightened American Occupation which ended in 1949. By setting up a public school system — epitomized today by the presence of a village school even in the remotest barrio — the Americans extended literacy and broadened the intellectual base of society. Bright young Filipinos were brought to the United States as pensionados; now they came not just from Manila and its environs — the traditional seat of the intellectual class — but from all over, the Ilocos, the Visayas in the South. What was an American instrument for administering a diverse country also became America's brighest legacy to it.

There is no shortage of critics to this legacy from the intellectuals themselves and these criticisms are often valid; they refer to the irrelevance of so many courses at college level, the resulting high number of educated unemployed, the existence of schools for the rich and schools for the poor, but the assets are just as impressive — the large number of mid-level technicians from these schools, some social mobility for the lower classes, a high literacy rate, without which modernization cannot be achieved. And thousands upon thousands of lawyers, so much so that many of them have ended up as clerks or small-town shopkeepers.

To this day, the intellectual leadership has been dominated by them, particularly those who had gone into politics, for politics has been the best avenue for mobility and the most mobile politicians were always those who knew how to skirt the law.

The lawyer-intellectuals included the late Claro M. Recto, who was

ahead of his time when he set down the nationalist ethos as opposed to
the Americanization of Philippine postures in foreign affairs and in the
economy. He had allies among fellow lawyers like Lorenzo M. Tañada,
the late Jose P. Laurel, who collaborated with the Japanese, Jose W.
Diokno, Jose Lansang and Jovito Salonga.

When the Japanese came in 1941, as in the war with the United States,
many intellectuals again collaborated with the Japanese. This time,
however, they did not do it as a class, for that war is teeming with evi-
dence of intellectuals who did not succumb to the blandishments of
Japanese nationalism, men of stature like Jose Abad Santos, whom the
Japanese executed for his refusal to serve them.

The issue of collaboration is now politically dead, but as a moral
issue it is not. We have long memories and I may be able to forgive the
Japanese for their atrocities, but I will never forget that it was they two
killed one of our finest writers, Manuel Arguilla.

The Third Generation

The third generation of intellectuals spanned the war years; graduates
of the public school system, they now came from a broader economic
and social spectrum. Still, most of them were from the upper and the
middle classes and the wealthiest were those who were in business, men
of perception like Sixto K. Roxas, Jr., and David Sycip. Both have ex-
pressed themselves not just on nationalist politics but also on govern-
ment and economic planning. Because of the nature of their training
and enterprise, they are on the right of the political spectrum but in
terms of age, they belong to the post-war generation of economic and
social thinkers.

As in the days of the Propaganda Movement against Spain, many of
the intellectuals have pursued careers in journalism which underwent
total transformation when President Marcos declared Martial Law in
September 1972. It was a period of freewheeling opinion giving, during
which even beat reporters and gossip mongers with daily columns
fancied themselves as intellectuals. Actually, only a handful could stand
out among them: Nick Joaquin of the defunct *Philippines Free Press,*
Alfredo Roces and Maximo Soliven of the defunct *Manila Times,* the
late I.P. Soliongoo of the defunct *Manila Chronicle.* The list is not long
and I personally do not mourn the closure of some of the newspapers.
Many of those who wrote for them were prostitutes, and the news-

papers themselves were almost always mouthpieces for their rich and powerful owners who served not the truth but their narrow personal interests. This was most acutely illustrated by the *Manila Chronicle* which was totally subservient to the whims of its owner.

The press in the Philippines today, with the few intellectuals who have been forced by circumstances to continue working in it, is hardly any improvement; a cursory daily reading of the three major newspapers in English would reveal that though there is no harsh or actual censorship as such, there is so much timidity and conformity in all three that, for all intents and purposes, they may just as well be labelled as properties of Mr. Marcos. The traditional source and venue of the intellectual is the university. Whereas Indonesia, upon the granting of its independence in 1949, had only less than 200 college graduates, at that time the Philippines already had thousands of college graduates and the best usually came from the University of the Philippines, the State University. As the government's highest institution of learning, the UP has traditionally been manned by the most distinguished scholar-administrators. In the last two decades the University had become — like the elite Catholic universities — too expensive for the poor. More than that, it had also deteriorated into a cesspool of academic intrigue often carried under the guise of academic freedom.

Under the presidency of O.D. Corpuz, the University will start within the year to increase the ratio of poor students in its enrollment. Under this present regime, too, the University is contributing more expertise to government than any other period in history. Cabinet ministers like Cesar Virata, Gerardo Sicat and other technocrats are the UP's contribution to the regime.

Like many Third World institutions, the Philippine university system is plagued by a bloated regard for Ph.D.'s. The truth of the matter is that many of the Filipino Ph.D.'s do not really belong to the intellectual class by virtue of their having no credentials, other than their doctoral theses. There are a few exceptions to these: the most perceptive thinking being done on Philippine history and culture today are by Ph.D. scholars like Felipe Landa Jocano, Cesar Adib Majul, Serafín Quiazon, Juan Francisco and Aurelio Calderon.

On the other hand, the Philippines' foremost historian, Teodoro Agoncillo, and Mary Racelis Hollnsteiner who is the sociologist head of the Ateneo Institute of Philippine Culture, have no Ph.D.'s; their work and insights into Philippine problems could easily merit more than a fistful of Ph.D.'s.

I have cited these names rather arbitrarily if only to illustrate how little work is being done by Philippine scholars primarily because of the over-valued Ph.D. which should be junked for more relevant measures of scholarship and intellectualism.

The attitudes of the Filipino intellectuals, no less than those of their own people, are a creation of the past and their perception of what is valuable to them. It is an accepted aspiration of academics, for instance, to be published in foreign journals, to attend conferences abroad and, in the process, achieve some prominence. There is no denying the existence of an international community of scholars but it is of greater importance to the nation if the Filipino academic did his homework first, before seeking recognition of his peers in London, Paris or Boston.

Enter the Technocrats

It was evident after World War II that many of the old arrangements would no longer suffice. The country had to industrialize and improve its battered agrarian economy. It was a necessity dictated not just by the ravage of war or as a requirement for its expanding population. It was one of those stern compulsions of nationalism – for a new nation to have its own steel mills, its own textile industries and, of course, its own poisons. Although agriculture –particularly the sugar industry– had already been commercialized, there was a need to upgrade coconut and rice production as well as to further exploit the mines and other industries based on natural resources.

The drift towards the cities, particularly Manila was inevitable and by the fifties the squatter phenomenon was already well established. Manila's population, which was at the Liberation a mere one million, doubled.

The population increase, the rapid commercialization of agriculture, the burgeoning of industry brought not just a new lifestyle in the city but also a new element in leadership – the technocrat. His emergence was part of the inevitable changes that were coming. It is not that the old slogans of government had changed – rather, it is because the politicians were now forced by competition from the young and from the new forces engendered by the changing economy, to be more than loud-mouthed patrons; now they had to deliver the goods as well. Where they had been inept, the public service suffered; where they had been shortsighted or incapable of planning, the economy faltered.

The need for technocrats was not only in government but also in

the private sector where the family corporations of old were also under-going changes.

Like the *ilustrados* of the 1880's, most of the new elite were educat-ed at upper-class schools of La Salle, Ateneo, and the University of the Philippines, and later in the Ivy League schools in the United States.

Because of their American background, it was inevitable that the goals of the technocrats were also American influenced.

The impetus towards hugeness, towards efficiency with machines, and not so much with the extensive use of labor, of which we have a surplus, was the unmistakable imprint of the technocracy. Says Sixto K. Roxas, Jr: "If there is anything I am critical of, it is our obsession with bigness, with buildings and machines — and not with human orga-nizations."

But the technocrats, determined to succeed, could not help them-selves. The evidences of their irrelevant American orientation are now all over the landscape. Take the planned urban town of Makati where Manila's business houses and banks had moved to in the early fifties. Designed in the American tradition of the forties, its tall office build-ings have no air spaces between them. Whole sections of the Ayala and Makati avenues are dead after office hours and so are the shopping malls after eight in the evening.

The Filipinos who built this city were of course twenty years late; by the time the Americans discovered their mistakes in urban planning, Fi-lipinos has started to make them. Today, Makati — for all its antiseptic virtues — illustrates precisely what one should not do with cities unless they are meant to be nocturnal cementeries. In Manila, too, one sees giant buildings, the Central Bank complex, the splendid new hotels, the centers of administration. The technocrats approved of these buildings; they are examples of irresponsibility illustrating the fact that the best technical minds are, after all, just instruments which, by themselves, cannot do more than they are ordered to do.

Low Priority for Land Reform

More than any Philippine president, Mr. Marcos has hired the greatest number of academics and technocrats.. But before social justice is achieved, it is perhaps necessary to bake the pie so that there will be something to be divided. And in making this pie big enough, it is neces-sary to have the best men do it faster.

The public sector, however, it is worst enemy. The bureaucracy, as most of us in the Third World know, is often the biggest obstruction to

development. In the Philippines, because of its lack of both motivation and expertise, its faults, which we cannot afford, are easily compounded.

One of the most significant efforts to improve this sector however, has been made with the creation of the Development Academy of the Philippines. The Academy has a permanent program to train the government's higher echelon officials. It is also involved with think-tank projects, studies in social indicators of progress, and in human settlements. Set up by former Secretary of Education Onofre D. Corpuz, it has some of the brighest and most articulate minds in the country on its staff. Corpuz himself is a product of the public school system, and as one of the President's advisers, he brings to Malacanang Palace not just academic excellence but an integrity and a sincerity that gives credibility to the regime.

It is difficult to argue against material progress, against any regime which builds public housing, roads and hospitals for its people. The intelligentsia may condemn Mr. and Mrs. Marcos for their megalithic excesses, but they cannot bring the regime down if the government shows itself capable of achieving even a modicum of improvement over what had transpired in the last decade. And it is here, precisely, in agrarian reform where Mr. Marcos' regime has had its telling successes.

Ironically, it is in this particular area where the intellectuals have been least interested and this very disinterest could be laid down on their doorstep as another evidence of their betrayal.

The agrarian problem which afflicts seventy percent of the Filipinos is an ancient one − a product not only of history but of the feudal nature of most agrarian societies. If the Spaniards did not impose their system of rural exploitation on the country, it would have been done just the same by the Filipino elite.

The intelligentsia's apparent avoidance of the agrarian problem could stem from two reasons. Since the beginning, many of them came from the upper or landlord class and, as such, they could have really mouthed the slogans of egalitarianism without quite thinking that it could apply to their own backyards. The other plausible reason is the fact that the championing of the peasantry has been for them terra incognita − and the champions of the peasantry were almost always of peasant origin themselves, like Calosa of the Colorums and Taruc of the Huks.

There have been, however, some very notable exceptions and these are from the elite Jesuit school, the Ateneo, starting with former Senator Raul S. Manglapus, who, in his college days, had taken up the cause

of the common *tao* and carried this passion on through his career in the defunct senate. The list includes other Ateneo intellectuals: Jeremias Montemayor, who comes from the landed gentry in Pangasinan Province. He started the biggest farmers' union in the country — the Federation of Free Farmers. Also from Ateneo, from the landed Batangas gentry, Sixto K. Roxas, Jr; he helped set up the Federation of Free Workers and later was instrumental in the formation of the Land Bank which is the financial institution responsible for payments of the expropriated lands. Also, Batangas senator, Jose W. Diokno; he took up the defense of embattled tenants; like senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. from Central Luzon.

Is Freedom Relevant?

The Filipino intelligentsia now suffers its most agonizing days. The restriction on academic freedom and the censorship — both open and devious — have diminished discussion and therefore, thought.

More than this, it is no longer possible for even old friends in the intellectual community to be frank with one another. And with the death of candor came the birth of a new sickening conformity, the compulsion to please those in power. The carcasses of idealists now litter the road of Martial Law's good intentions.

Mr. Marcos knew all this, of course; that the intellectuals when faced with sheer naked power would equivocate. An old friend, for instance, had tried to evade this infringement on the basic right of genuine scholarship; he had claimed that he was involved with ancient things, with artifacts of aeons past and he did not feel constrained or inhibited in his work. I had posed a hypothetical situation where it has become a supreme state policy for all thinkers and writers not to denigrate our past, but instead, to glorify it. Suppose there is no glorious past that can be dredged even after you have dug up every nook and cranny of the archipelago? What then? If we are not already altering history, will we also alter archaeology?

I will be the last to pass any moral judgment on those intellectuals who, before Martial Law, were most vocal in their criticism of Mr. Marcos but upon the closure of their papers, they were employed in government as pious drumbeaters.

The truth of the matter is that the Filipino intelligentsia does not have a real economic or social base. In many instances, they are totally dependent on their jobs and if their employer is the government, then there is no option at all.

As a consequence of Martial Law, many intellectuals are delving into their own consciences and motivations. For now they are being confronted with the realities of dictatorship, no matter how mild it has been. Together with this self-scrutiny is the examination of the long-accepted assumptions about freedom, and those institutions which we have inherited from the West.

To be in touch with reality, there must now be direct access to people even on a difficult one-to-one basis, for the kind of information that is sought may no longer be found in our mass media.

It was his ignorance of reality that made former President Diosdado Macapagal seek the convening of parliament in April 1976; he did not quite realize that most Filipinos – intellectuals included – do not want to have parliament, or congress revived. Not the old congress, its corruption and its wanton wasting of government funds. And this thinking should not be misconstrued as approval of dictatorship.

We also know now that men are not really interested in democratic processes, in free discussion; that they simply want to be allowed to do their jobs in peace although at times this peace may be the peace of the cemetery. It is thus a matter of debate now whether or not Western-style democracy can work in the Philippines; and as stories of rape, anarchy and crime in large American cities are brought to bear upon us, these serve to justify the belief that even in America itself, democracy is a failure.

The fact that the Maloles Constitution of 1896 was liberal and democratic, that we have been having elections since 1907 or that we have a highly urbanized intellectual community – these were no guarantees that democracy would survive.

And with democracy under question, would we now question, too, the idea of freedom? Is it a Western transplant? And Revolution, too? If we are to answer these questions with nothing to guide us but our own experience, then we can firmly state that the institutions of freedom are neither Western nor Asian. They belong to humanity at large, for one does not have to be American or Chinese to know how the lash can oppress, how hunger can deform, not just the body but the spirit, and how culture and thought cannot thrive without the free spirit to sustain it. Lapulapu – the Cebuano chieftain who killed Magellan in 1521 on the island of Mactan, may not have been aware of a Filipino nation for this national configuration is our heritage from Spain, but he did know it was shameful to pay tribute to a foreigner who laid claim on his island without any right to it. And ideas of a just society which were foremost in the minds of those who led the Revolution against

Spain – Mabini and Jacinto – need not have been inspired by European liberalism; they knew what it was like to be slaves in the Spanish realm. That was enough.

The Fourth Generation: The Redeemers?

The betrayal of the masses cannot be charged against this young generation of intellectuals   the first real heirs of Mabini and Jacinto. It was they who led the student demonstrations in the late sixties and the early seventies, who acted   perhaps rashly and too soon in their eagerness to resolve the inequities of Philippine society. The politization of this generation came about in the early sixties and seventies. Unlike the *ilustrados*, they belong to a very wide social class and to a yet wider political spectrum. Some were reared in the elite Catholic schools, the children of wealthy Filipinos or the genteel middle class. Some even came from the traditional sugar families of the South, and quite a few are from the Muslim minority of Mindanao and Sulu. Whatever their political persuasions, which have been described by the oligarchy as Muslim secessionist, clerico-fascist, CIA-supported or even Maoist, their views were often unabashedly Marxist although they may not be spelled as such, drawing as they merely do from the Marxist analysis of society. Some had visited China and were pro-Mao. Highly urbanized like their fathers, they were often removed from social realities in the rural areas, from the peasantry whom they hoped to win over to their side. They had gone to the peasants promising earth and high heaven and social change to boot without quite realizing that droves of politicians had campaigned there since 1907 when we had our first elections. They had nothing to offer but their saliva whereas the councilors, town mayors, the congressmen who had rampaged in the boondocks, had patronage to distribute. What if they were corrupt – they gave the folk bridges that were washed away with the first flood, roads that sank with the first rains of May, a few jobs and, yes, they did stand as godfathers in baptisms and weddings. To the folk who sold their votes for five pesos, these were what mattered.

Worst of all, they were pro-Chinese and anti-American in a country that has nurtured traditional anti-Chinese sentiments and whose people by and large consider the Americans as incapable of deceit or doing wrong.

It was not just a matter of wrong perceptions that were a result of the uncritical application of foreign models to the Filipino setting. They had also believed that if there was no revolutionary situation at

hand, they could hasten it when they neither had the organization net-work to blanket every nook and cranny, nor a peasantry that was fully politicized. Since Martial Law, some have been thrown in jail and tor-tured. Others have fled to the mountains. Some who were released from jail are now working in government offices or in journalism. And some have been killed.

Only the other day I attended the wake of one — a young poet and writer who was killed in Mindanao. His end is a tragic waste and I could have told him that no matter how I sympathized with his cause, he and his colleagues did not read the Filipinos very well in the same way that Mr. Marcos had done; like many of his friends in his particular revolu-tionary group, he had failed to assess the objective reality.

He had perhaps expected too much from the urban intellectuals of the generation behind him but it is precisely this sector that is gutless.

Together with a few others writers at the end of the second year of Martial Law, I had prepared a simple draft pleading with Mr. Marcos that since Martial Law had already brought about a sense of security and order in the country, may he now release the imprisoned writers? I had been overly optimistic and had expected to collect at least a hun-dred signatures. I had gone around meeting writers individually for I did not want anyone embarassed if he refused. I was able to collect only 17 signatures! Yes, Mr. Marcos read the intellectuals correctly and I do hope that his reading of the future is just as good.

For the truth of the matter is that he has merely created a pause in the revolutionary momentum. It is here, in the wings, and will explode if the deep-rooted cause of discontent — the gross inequality between the many who are poor and the handful who are rich— is not resolved soon.

The last decade has borne out several important developments that were not present in the uprising of the Huks in 1949-53. Today, as I have already stated, the young members of the intelligentsia came not just from one class; they are from all levels of society. Though in many instances they have been able to unify, their ideas and their organiza-tions have already spread away from Manila and Central Luzon — the traditional centers of radicalism. Their organizations extend all the way to Northern Luzon, to Bicol and to the Visayas and Mindanao — areas which were not covered by the Huks. There is far more cohesion today, too, than what existed during the Huk rebellion and this cohesion cuts across ethnic lines. The leaders are not just Tagalogs or Pampangueños; they are Ilocanos, Visayans, Muslims.

Luis Taruc and Alfredo Saulo, leaders of the Huk rebellion, both agree that the young intelligentsia "made the same mistakes" they had made.

Will the intelligentsia of the next generation be guilty of the same errors?

Will those in power commit the even graver mistake of not knowing the truth or ignoring the motive force for which my poet friend and scores of others laid down their lives?

The Solitary Singer

In the Third World the philosopher-king is an anachronism — and a very expensive one. We have seen all too often in leaders like Sukarno of Indonesia how intellectual revolutionaries deteriorated once they captured power; having assumed the kingship, they did not create the institutions that would stabilize their regimes, mesmerized as they were by the cult-adulation they themselves engendered.

The king, then, must keep his sanity; he must have at his side his jesters and his clowns. But he must listen, too, to that solidarity minstrel outside his window, telling him of what lies beyond the moat; the fields that are blighted, the peasants that are in agony. Only if he knows these can he act and give the people what they want; only then, too, will the crown rest easily on his head. And on his passing, it will be, The King is Dead, Long Live the King!

As we know, the passing of Sukarno brought the deluge. In the West, it had been the tradition of his minstrel to stand and often sing alone, harbinger of news, conscience of his people, innovator, prophet, mentor of princes.

Perhaps, those of us in the Third World who have been conditioned to this definition and to this role would now have to recast a new image of the intellectual, no longer a recalcitrant outsider, but a well-meaning critic who must now conform so that he could be more useful in the pursuit of holy causes, of national development or whatever the self-anointed leader has come to understand as the need of his people.

This depends on his acceptance of the leadership which demands his participation. There have been great intellects, great artists who have, in the past, collaborated with dictators.

It may be stated here, for the record at least, that of all the regimes in Southeast Asia, it has been Singapore which has been able to co-opt many of its scholars. Indeed, they have served as ambassadors and cabinet ministers. This has been so, I think, because the leadership in

Singapore has been singularly honest and effective and has used the nation's intellectual resources not for the cult of one man but for the welfare of the people.

Still, there is intellectual disaffection in Singapore as in fact there always will be wherever governments are strong. Rulers — because they are rulers — want the status quo and they are always uncomfortable with those who question them and their habits; and that is what, after all, the intellectuals do, finding out ways by which governments can function better, if not produce better fertilizer.

The intellectual who dissents is not after the crown; he may not even want to live in the palace. Knowledge is often its own reward and it is only with dissent and free discussion that knowledge and its concomitant — human progress — can come about. It must be a very insecure leader indeed who will not heed the intelligentsia and it is insecurity which eventually creates the paranoia and the disaster that goes with it.

Some Conclusions

To recapitulate, the growth of the intellectual class in the Philippines was determined by economic status. Since the Spanish regime, and to this day, the elite schools are open only to the wealthy. The thinking of this intellectual class was conditioned by the Church. As a class, the intellectuals betrayed the Revolution against Spain; they did not side with it and those who did, did so only after it was obvious that other alternatives were closed. The arrival of the Americans presented the intellectuals again with an opportunity to pander to the rulers; they accepted high positions in the new government. This pattern of collaboration was repeated during the Japanese occupation. By then, however, the base of the intelligentsia had already broadened widely.

Three generations of intellectuals have propounded the ideology of nationalism but not of change. This was to be expected from an urban intelligentsia that grew up lisping the slogans of the imperial power and eventually, perhaps, acquiring the same values as those of the former colonial master. And with the values, the sins — for it is a fact that the Filipinos have not really acquired the American ethic of hard work, of excellence and the sense of equality which one witnesses so often in American daily living.

It had to be the intellectuals from the peasantry who had to give a social dimension to nationalist thinking, to equate nationalism with the struggle of the masses not just to be free from the foreign master but

more importantly, from the native comprador and exploiter. This was a far more difficult objective for it meant fighting not some unidentified foreigner but your own kith and kin and in some instances, your own benevolent patron and landlord.

Even with the mistakes that had cost them so much, the young intelligentsia were able to understand this basic ideology; more than this, they were able to cut across ethnic and class lines. It is not difficult then to make this prognostication knowing as we do that, in the words of the Sakdalistas in 1935, "No revolution fails; each is a step closer to freedom."

But revolutions, martial law regimes and all governments can claim the loyalty of the people — the intellectuals included — only if they are credible, as long as they can deliver the goods. Or, if they cannot, as long as the people believe that the good will come eventually, they can even stand suffering, just as Filipinos suffered the Japanese occupation, if they are convinced that eventually, there is hope, and also, if they know that even in their sufferings, there is justice — that sacrifices are made by everyone. Mr. Marcos had one slogan which unfortunately is no longer repeated: *Pantay-pantay tayong lahat.* We are all equal.

I now come to what is, perhaps, one of the most trite yet the most fundamental issue which the intelligentsia has avoided facing in its articulation of Philippine problems. It is not, I think, due to ignorance but because we have, perhaps, been more preoccupied with the habiliments of power, with visions of ideal societies and in the process, we have forgotten to stoke the little fires that are dying out in our hearths — those virtues make up man's sinews if he is to prevail in a jungle of dinosaurs.

I am now referring to morality, to simple human decency — not the bland esoteric stuff which has been spieled off pulpits, which we often brush aside because it is irrelevant to the creation of new highs in GNP.

It is perhaps in response to the common man's continuing search not just for social justice but for a lasting moral order that until the imposition of Martial Law in 1972, all opposition presidential candidates campaigned on the issue of honesty in the government. If, again, elections were to be revived, there is no doubt at all that the same charges will be levelled against some generals and government hierarchs. This is not to say that the Martial Law regime is just as infested with thieves as the old bureaucracy but there are upstairs people with Mr. Marcos, like O.D. Corpuz and Cesar Virata, first-rate minds who have managed to remain untarnished even with power at their command. Men of words that intellectuals are can easily be changed with insincerity when they do not conform with the very ends which they have promoted with

their ideas. Sincerity as a virtue should not be difficult to see for it follows honesty.

The jargon of technocrats, the hypocrisy which is so common in a society where the intellectuals really have not much survival capital except their mental faculties, should be examined in a brighter light, particularly when they champion such ideas like nationalism. Shorn of its verbal trappings it simply means love of one's country which is not an abstraction but flesh and blood people — forty-four million of them. In other words, patriotism. They cannot talk about socialist democracy, of uplifting the lives of the poor, when they go around living in utter profligacy. They cannot claim to be nationalists when they grow rich. Patriotism demands sacrifice — not just of time and property — but even, perhaps, of that ultimate figt which one gives one's country — his life.

It is when the highest officials and technocrats do otherwise that they lose their credibility, but most of all, their capacity to weld so many diverse views and groups into a consensus without which no national effort can succeed.

The moment of truth, however, comes too often and too soon; as the writer, Adrian Cristobal, who has joined Mr. Marcos' think-tank, has aptly put it, " . . . the intelligentsia more often than not compromise themselves . . . the problem is integrity with less influence, or more influence and less integrity."

I would sum it all up, perhaps in no different terms. Our intelligentsia — particularly the artists — have attempted to banish their growing alienation, some by an authentic communion with the masses. In so doing, they may have been compelled just as well by the demands of art which transcends nationalist sentiments. But their search could be less difficult, less complex and yet more soul-satisfying if it was welded with that conviction that intellect and technology are never enough unless they are possessed first by honest men.

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Students as Intelligentsia: The Indonesian Experience

Arief Budiman

I

In western society the topic of intellectuals has long been discussed. These discussions have produced many definitions to explain the nature, the role and the interest of the intellectuals. Intellectuals are men, says Lewis Coser, "who never seem satisfied with things as they are . . . They question the truth of the moment in terms of higher and wider truth" (Coser, 1965 : VIII). Similarly, Shils defines them as those who search "for the truth, for the principles embedded in events and actions or the establishment of a relationship between the self and the essential, whether the relationship be cognitive, appreciative or expressive" (Shils, 1972: 16).

What is the motive of persons who assume the role of an intellectual? The non-Marxist scholars point to their passion to serve the truth. This is related to the religious origin of the role. For it was the priest who traditionally played the role of an intellectual. Religious intellectuals had no worldly interest. They ought not to gain social or political benefits. Thus, Julien Benda spoke about the treason of the intellectuals in the early twentieth century when they became mixed-up with politics. Intellectuals, for Benda, should be "essentially those whose activity is *not* the pursuit of practical aims, all those who seek their joy in the practice of an art or a science or metaphysical speculation, in short in the possession of non-material advantages, and hence in a certain manner say: "My kingdom is not of this world!" (Benda, 1928: 43) Manheim presents a similar viewpoint when he states that intellectuals as a group are a kind of free-floating stratum in the society who have no relation to any specific class.

The Marxists totally disagree with this perspective. How can a per-

son's consciousness be unrelated to his material existence? It is existence that determines consciousness, not the other way around. Thus, the early Marxist fathers identified intellectual radicals as being drawn from the deprived or unsuccessful members of their stratum, thus, suggesting that protest politics reflect discontent with an inferior social position. Ernest Mandel pointed out that it is related to "profound change in intellectual employment," "to the downgrading in status, opportunity, freedom of work, and reward, inherent in the mass growth and consequent bureaucratization of the occupations subsumed in the stratum" (Lipset & Basu, no date:17)..

In a different sense, Benda's notion that intellectuals hold power exactly because they have no practical interests, is valid in Javanese political thought. (The Javanese are the most important group among the many ethnic groups in Indonesia in terms of numbers and in terms of social and political influence — this group has been dominating Indonesia since the country got its independence in 1945). The concept of power in Javanese culture is different from that commonly held in the West. Western political thought considers power to be abstract, as merely a word used generally to describe a relationship. The Javanese believe power to be concrete, existing independently of its possible users. Power is that intangible, mysterious and divine energy which animates the universe (Anderson, 1972: 5,7). To a certain extent, power manifests itself in the *pusaka*, or sacred articles with magical powers inherited by the Sultan. "These *pusakas* are an essential part of the Sultan's authority; without them, it is believed, a Sultan cannot enjoy the faith and loyalty of the people and thus he cannot rule over the state. But the *pusakas* without a human being functioning as a Sultan cannot express their magical powers in terms of the wisdom of the statesman, which brings happiness, harmony and prosperity to the people" (Selosoemardjan, 1962: 18). In this position, the Sultan acts as a link between the cosmic power and the mundane world. It is power which chooses him as its agent. Thus, "each word of his Sultan is not just a word from a human being who happens to have the power of the state in his hands; it is also a word from the heavenly world . . . " (Selosoemardjan, 1962: 20).

Power affords the ability to give life. If power were in the hands of the right person, nature and society would be in total harmonious order. If not, the power will slip out of the ruler's hands, no matter how hard he tries to keep it. Power is the ability to maintain a smooth tautness and to act like a magnet which aligns scattered iron filings in a patterned

field of force. Thus, the signs of a lessening in the tautness of a ruler's power and of a diffusion of his strength are seen in the manifestation of disorder in the natural world — floods, eruptions, and plagues — and in inappropriate modes of social behavior — theft, greed, and murder, One should bear in mind that in Javanese thought, there is no reciprocal effect between declining power and the appearance of these undesirable phenomena. Antisocial behavior arises from a ruler's declining power but does not cause his decline. Therefore a ruler who has once permitted natural and social disorders to occur finds it particularly difficult to re-constitute his authority (Anderson, 1972: 19). Hence, a Javanese ruler will try to institute preventive measures whenever he senses impending disorder. Therefore, there is a tendency to become an authoritarian ruler.

How can social criticism exist in this kind of political culture? In-terestingly enough, culture has mechanisms for expressing criticism. First, criticism is possible if presented in a delicate form that cannot be associated with social disorder. The *form* or way of presentation is more important than the content of the criticism. It should not be ag-gressive, it should be very polite or else presented as a half serious joke, often by the clowns in the *wayang* performance or puppet theatre. Sec-ondly, a more serious or aggressive criticism can be presented by the *resi (begawan, ajar* or the hermits and the sages). The *resi* usually reside in isolated caves, or lonely mountainsides, removed or withdrawn from society in order to cultivate clairvoyance, study the secrets of the cosmos and prepare themselves for death. Their typical role is to diagnose decay within the kingdom and to give warning of the impend-ing downfall of the dynasty. Since the *resi* have no worldly interests, if a ruler beat and tortured or put a *resi* to death, it would reveal to the people that he is dominated by personal passion. Thus, for the *resi*, the withdrawal from society and politics or, in Benda's words, the absence of "non-material advantages" is an essential element in his prestige, and hence, his power. But while Benda's intellectuals derive their power from the moral and ethical realm, the Javanese *resi* derive prestige from the mystical world of power itself.

Hence, Javanese political culture strongly emphasizes the absence of personal interest in political activity. The ruler has the legitimate author-ity to put down any person or group, based on personal interest which opposes him — and of course heavenly power aids him. Suppression of such a person or group is seen as revealing, augmenting his power. But if suppression is directed against the *resi* who have no personal interests.

this is taken as a sign of the center's impending disintegration (Anderson, 1972: 57).

So far, the analysis of Javanese system has been discussed only on a cultural level. A structural approach will bring a more practical understanding of this phenomena. The concept of state in the Javanese political system is one of concentric circles revolving around the Sultan as its common center. Although the Sultan is the embodiment of the whole state, his effective power is limited to the capital. Outside of the capital he has to rely on the princes. The area outside the capital is divided into appanages, sectors of land with their population, over which a prince or occasionally a high ranking *priyayi*, is granted the right to levy taxes in kind in the name of the Sultan (Selosoemardjan, 1962: 25). The system is similar to what Max Weber calls the patrimonial-bureaucratic state.

The prince or other local lords under his rule collect taxes and levies as much as possible. Part of these taxes in kind have to be sent to the capital, to support the court. There is no limit on how much the local ruler can tax the villagers. The limits are determined by tradition, which brands any increase in the charges as abuse. Transgression, moreover, gives rise to the danger of active resistance from the peasants (Wertheim, 1965: 110), which would be read culturally as a sign that the ruler is losing power. Therefore, the ruler is very much concerned with obtaining information about the abuse of power. A sort of signaling system exists to warn the ruler, which the clowns from the *wayang* or the *resi* provide. Thus, the political-cultural mechanism or the superstructure supports the underlying socio-economic organization of the society.

II

Recently, the role of students in bringing about social and political change has been considerable. One can see their strength in the overthrow of Peron in Argentina in 1955, Perez Jimenez in Venezuela in 1958, *the toppling of Sukarno in Indonesia in 1966, in the downfall of Ayub* Khan in Pakistan in 1969 and in many others. However, it is important to note that students are not the group that brings revolutionary movements to fruition, but are important catalysts in political action.

To a certain extent, we can say that students belong to the intellectual group. But, unlike the intellectual who has, more or less, a definite social position, "the most important social characteristic of students is that their situation is always transient. . . Any characterization of stu-

dents as a social group must simultaneously encompass student *origins*, the student *situation* itself and the social *direction* of students. . . those who dismiss students as a petit bourgeois group, concentrate almost exclusively upon students origins. . . It is the very transience of the, student situation and the uncertainty of destination which makes stu- dents irreducible either to their origins or their destinations. It is there- fore not surprising, as even casual observation reveals, that the particular sub-culture and cultural values, are those neither of the petite- bourgeosie nor of the proletariat" (Jones, 1969: 28, 34, 35).

The debate in western countries seems to be focused on the place of the students in the social structure: to which class do they really belong ? Of course, this is a derivative of the debate on intellectuals. The same applies to Indonesia, more specifically, in the dominated Javanese cul- ture; the problem of the role of the students as the intelligentsia (in the sense used in Russia in the 1860's, referring to the educated strata's op- position to the system) is also a derivative of the problem of the role of the intellectuals. Since the students combine criticism with mass movements, they have difficulty in presenting a *resi*-like image rather than in being a political force challenging the ruler's power.

But before we proceed, we have to answer an important question: To what extent is this old Javanese culture still alive today? Scholars who follow the political development of modern Indonesia closely have to admit that the old Javanese value system, especially after general Su- harto came to power in 1966, is still alive although not in pure form. It is alive now on a symbolic level in the sense that people try to find sym- bolic meaning in their actual experiences and become uneasy when the symbolic meaning of experience is not positive. An Australian scholar observes: ". . .the trend under the New Order has in some ways been towards a revival of the pattern of the pre-colonial Javanese monarchy. The court atmosphere is returning. . ." (Castles, no date: 7).

The revival of "the pattern of the pre-colonial Javanese monarchy" among the power elite is understandable when we look back on history. Unlike British or Spanish colonialism, the Dutch did not destroy the existing bureaucracy and social structure of the Javanese. In fact, they profited from them, by using the Sultan and his local lords to exploit the village people in order to sell certain crops in the European market. The Dutch, as a matter of fact, did strengthen the existing feudal society in Java. Dutch way of life and religion only affected urban people. Not until the beginning of this century did the Dutch try to spread western education. The result was the emergence of what is called "the modern

Indonesian elite" (Niel, 1960) which became the political leaders who led Indonesia to independence. Sukarno, the first president, an engineer, was a product of this policy. Together with Hatta, an economist graduated from a Dutch university in Netherland, then vice-president, Sukarno tried a western democratic political system. It did not work since politics were played only among the small urban elites who had their own vested interests – the common people were left outside the system (see Feith, 1962). Sukarno then tried to establish what he called the guided democracy until the military took over in 1966.

The army officers that were active in bringing about this political transformation belonged to the *Generation 45,* the heroes of the revolution. During the revolution, those who joined the army were mostly people from the villages, who were less influenced by western education. Coming from the village surroundings, it appears that he is still very much influenced by the old Javanese value system. For instance, when he became president, he appointed Hamengkubuwono IX, the popular Sultan form Jogjakarta, as his vice-president. Knowing that there is a political tradition that a vice-president should be a non-Javanese (since there is still a strong anti-Javanese feeling among the non-Javanese), Suharto's decision to take the Sultan as his vice-president is considered as a daring political action. It is interpreted as an effort on Suharto's part to legitimise his political position culturally.

It is also interesting to note that Suharto is still trying to show that he was not interested in the presidency, but that the social conditions pulled him in. Very recently, in an interview with an historian, he said that in 1966 he did not ask Sukarno to give him power, but that it was Sukarno who voluntarily gave it to him. He simply told the three generals who were going to see Sukarno to discuss the latest situation (there were student demonstrations and unidentified military persons around the Jakarta palace) that "if I were still trusted, I could manage the situation" (*Kompas,* March 4, 1976). Suharto is concerned that people think he took the power from Sukarno by force. He wants them to believe that he did not usurp power, that power came to him without his effort to get it.

There are many other examples which illustrate that the old Javanese culture is still alive. Within such a situation, students, in order to play the role of social critics, should stress their disinterest in power or lack of personal ambition. The debate over which class students or intellectuals belong to does not exist in Indonesia, since they are not supposed to serve the interests of any social group. When they talk about exploi-

tation of the poor, they do so to save the nation and forewarn the ruler that something is wrong and that, if no action is taken, social disturbances might occur. It is in this way that the students try to show that they are playing the role of the *resi*. On the other hand, understandably, the ruling elite keeps trying to accuse the students of having political and other personal interests. Suharto, on January 5, 1970, accused the students of being backed by some illegal political groups and some ambitious persons who wanted the presidency. He said he would face them with the armed forces if the students continued demonstrating. A typical *resi* reply was issued by the students: "we are helpless if we are threatened by a physical confrontation. We are nothing if faced by fully-armed and compact armed forces... We will retreat, for we are certainly helpless... To pak Harto, in remembrance of our friendship formerly in 1966, we want to convey the message in order to distinguish who are friends, and who are enemies; who truly loves pak Harto and who wants to cause him to trip and fall. We hope pak Harto still remembers our old friendship and still wishes to hear what we are saying. With tears in our eyes we wave our hands to you pak Harto: Good luck...!" (Budiman,   1973: 87-88). This is a reply of a *resi* being beaten. In this sense, the battle seems to be fought in the symbolic realm. First, Suharto, by saying that there were political interests behind the students, was trying to say that the students were not *resi*. So, he felt legitimate to crush them down. Then the students reacted by saying that they were *resi*, they had no physical power – they only wanted to tell what was right and what was wrong.

III

After what was known as the abortive coup of September 30, 1965, led by young officers from the palace guard and believed to be backed by the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI), there had been two major student demonstrations. The first was the 1965-1966 student demonstrations that helped Suharto to assume power. The second was the 1970-1974 student demonstrations that criticized Suharto's administration and development policy.

During the last period of his administration, Sukarno relied on his ability to balance two major opposing political groups: the PKI and the army. PKI was a well organized party which got more and more support from the rural areas, especially in Java where 82 per cent of the population lives. (In the 1955 election, the PKI had been in fourth place in

Java and South Sumatra; in 1957, it became the first party. Lev, 1966:
97). By 1965, the economic condition had deteriorated: running infla-
tion (for Jakarta, the consumer price index was 100 in 1958; 267 in
1966. *DBITNI*, 1968: 107), balance of payments crisis, accumulating
foreign debt, repayment obligations etc. With decreasing exports and
very low national savings, foreign debt repayments had already become
an impossibility. In addition, there was an extreme shortage of goods,
of essential goods (such as textiles and rice), raw materials, spare parts
etc. Given this situation, the rumor that Sukarno was ill made people
feel anxious, most especially, the PKI and the army. Then came the
abortive coup.

Suharto, who could gain control over the military, did not act quick-
ly to take the power from Sukarno for himself. As already mentioned,
he was concerned about the requisites of power: it should be that power
comes to a ruler rather than the other way around. In this process, it
appeared that the students' role was to instigate social disturbances, es-
pecially in the capital. From October 1965 to March 1966, there were
demonstrations in Jakarta every day, causing traffic jams and other dis-
turbances. While it is true that student leaders kept in touch with the
military generals, Suharto in particular, it is an over-simplification to
say that they were merely the instrument of the army.

During his last years in power, Sukarno, in order to gain control,
centralized all social and political activities. All groups such as women's
organizations, youth and student organizations etc. became either a sub-
group of, or related to a political party. The same applied to news-
papers. As a result, the political conflicts among the political parties
were also transmitted to these sub-organizations.

The conflict was located mainly between two political camps, the
religious and the communist, with the nationalist in-between (and thus,
prior to 1965, this party was split in two, with the left-wing group
dominating the party). Due to the encouragement of Sukarno, the left-
ist parties became more and more aggressive, taking most of the political
initiatives. The abortive coup gave the rightist parties a chance to fight
back, with the military on their backs. The non-communist students
formed *KAMI* (United Indonesian Student Action), dominated by the
Moslem, Christian and right-wing Nationalist student leaders. Influenced
by western education, they were more radical in pushing the political
transformation vis-a-vis the Javanese style of Suharto. Conflicts did
exist between the students and the military that caused some casualties.
At this time, it was difficult to determine exactly who was using who,

but since the military was stronger, the students most likely felt they were being used by the military, despite their belief that they could push the military back to their barracks after things had been put in order again.

It is clear that in this 1965-1966 student movement, the students had no need to play the *resi* role. From the beginning, there had been two opposing political forces, the Old and the New Order as they called it. From the onset the students had committed themselves to the New Order. Perhaps initially they did try to appear like the *resi*; for they were still weak and had to act in the context of the Sukarno political realm. But basically, I would argue, they knew they were not *resi*-like, without any political interest.

Contrariwise, in the 1970-1974 student movement, the students believed and rigidly played the role of the *resi* as social critics. By 1970, Suharto had become a full constitutional president and thus could provide political order, economic stabilization and, to a certain extent, economic development. Yet he still could not control corruption, especially among the top government officials. The students were concerned about this as well as about the gap between the rich and the poor created by capitalistic-type development. The students started to demonstrate in January 1970; most of their leaders were veterans of the 1965-1966 movement. They stated that "they were not a political group trying to gain power, but a moral group who wanted to see this nation actively achieve its ideals" (Budiman, 1973: 79).

Suharto reacted positively to this demonstration of approximately fifty students. At the end of January, he formed a commission under the leadership of old political leaders, including the respected ex vice-president M. Hatta, who had a reputation of being honest, to investigate the problem of corruption. In response to Suharto's action, the students disbanded, giving the image of the non-vested-interest *resi*.

By the middle of the same year, because the government had not taken any concrete steps towards solving the problem of corruption, although the commission was still working, the students again started to demonstrate. They tried to press the government to act faster. Again Suharto reacted positively. He invited the students to meet with him and to present some proof of corruption among the government's top officials. The students did, and the first meeting seemed to be quite successful (Budiman, 1974: 225-228). Understandably, some top officials who felt themselves to be potential targets, arranged counter action. They told Suharto that the students were not without political in-

terests and that political parties were behind them. This was Suharto's reaction at the next meeting. The information itself now became secondary, the main issue being that the students were not *resi* at all but that they were only creating disturbances in order to undermine Suharto's power. Therefore, they had no right to criticize. Next, the armed forces were used, still softly though, to act against the students.

There were still further demonstrations in June 1971 and then in December 1971, with different issues, but ineffective as compared to previous ones. They kept emphasizing their role as "moral forces" rather than "political forces." It is important to note that the June 1971 demonstration, protesting the unfairness of the general election, organized by this "moral force" group, was allowed to continue its activities while the other similar group formed by the youth organizations of the political parties, protesting the same issue and using the same technique with small group demonstration, was immediately banned. The reason seems to be quite clear as a cultural explanation: the group formed by the political parties' youth was not considered as *resi*, since political parties do have political interests. Political parties are considered a part of the ruler's political system; thus to criticize they have their own platform, e.g. parliament, but certainly not in the streets. In the latter case, they will be considered as creating social disturbances.

In the December demonstration, Suharto further acted by arresting some of the student leaders and putting them in jail for about a month. A columnist, interestingly enough, commented on the arrest as follows: "He is now locked away and not even his family has been informed of his whereabouts. Under the Sukarno regime he was never subjected to interrogation by the authorities, and that regime is regarded as having been "totalitarian." So what's wrong here? The mistake appears to have been Arief's. He believed that the government was strong" (Rasuanto, 1974: 241). The columnist pointed out that a strong government is more tolerant of criticism, especially when it comes from a small group (this December 1971 demonstration was staged by the "moral force" group that had no ties with any political party) having no political interest. Similarly, there was then a feeling that by sending the *resi* to prison, the government was manifesting its weakening power.

The climax came in January 1974. Protesting strong influence of the Japanese in the Indonesian economy, and also protesting over the top government officials who were bribed by the Japanese businessmen, the students took to the streets. This time they were joined by the poor of Jakarta and more violence occurred. They burnt Japanese cars and

luxury shopping centers. They created great disturbances, similar to those in 1965-1966. Suharto reacted strongly — he ordered the armed forces to shoot anybody who was creating a disturbance — some persons were killed. Two-hundred people were arrested and after an intensive interrogation, about 50 people were detained, mostly student leaders, as well as some intellectuals and political leaders. There were around trial and were sentenced to from four to six years. The students were accused of being the instruments of the banned socialist and Moslem parties.

IV

To a structuralist, my approach to the problem using cultural variables to explain the behavior of the actors, may appear artificial. A structuralist would argue that the slow transformation process from Sukarno to Suharto had nothing to do with Suharto's Javanese style, but was due to the fact that Sukarno maintained political support outside Jakarta. Suharto reacted positively to student demonstrations in 1970 because he saw no political danger in them. And so on.

But there are some phenomena that cannot be explained satisfactorily by a structural approach. For example, why did Suharto choose the Sultan as his vice-president (a pragmatic politician would not do that) or why did the government refuse to call the government political party a party instead of a "functional group"? (Legally, they have the same rights and duties).

Let me make it clear that basically I am a structuralist. However, being in the center of events, I could not help but feel that cultural factors were in operation. The question then is upon what factor is Suharto's decision based: cultural values or pragmatic speculation? If both, how would I explain the relation between the two factors? I would answer that Suharto is first of all a pragmatic politician, who uses rationality to solve problems. But at the same time, Javanese values are still a part of him. Most of these traditional Javanese values are not in contradiction to his political interests; as a matter of fact, these values serve him quite well. In making political decisions, I would assume that he tries to find the symbolic meaning according to the old Javanese pattern. For his own psychological balance, he probably avoids, as much as he can, disjunctions between his Javanese values and his practical political actions. When he cannot avoid the conflict, I would argue that he takes the path of rationality. In short, cultural variables can be used as explana-

tions only to a certain extent, although this certain extent is quite great.

The intellectuals, the students and other social critics are aware that they must be concerned with cultural factors. Otherwise their activities will be viewed as improper, impolite. The message they want to bring out will be neglected. Of course, for them it is quite frustrating to realize this limitation, especially since there are no clear limits. The limits should be explored and experimented with, as the students have done and keep doing. They know they have reached the limit when they find themselves locked up in prison. They become aware of the arbitrariness of the limits.

After the 1974 student riot, more than ten newspapers and magazines were closed down and hundreds of people were detained. Hence, people were afraid to voice criticism. If the aim of the government was to discourage people from criticizing, the misssion was successfully accomplished. But interestingly enough, in 1975, only a year after the disaster, the chief of staff of *Kopkamtib* (the most powerful military institution to control all political activities) made a serious campaign within the universities, to tell students not to be apathetic. This campaign is unthinkable without the consent of Suharto. *Kopkamtib* also invited some academicians and intellectuals to discuss how to make students and intellectuals active again. But at the same time, under the present minister of education, a military general, student activities are tightly controlled. Very recently, he prohibited a student march on campus to introduce newly admitted students to their university buildings, despite the permission that had been granted by the police and the president of the unversity (*Kompas,* February 27, 1976).

Similarly, this phenomenon could also be explained by using a cultural or structural approach. The administration cannot feel at ease unless it allows the *resi* the possibility of voicing criticism. On the structural level, the explanation will simply be the need for feed-back information which comes from outside the bureaucracy. But nevertheless, the result is the tightening of control by the government over the students.

As a consequence, most students now, including those who genuinely believed that they could be effective by assuming the "moral force" role, have begun to think that the concept of "moral force" can only be effective to a limited extent, while what needs to be corrected is not only technical (e.g. corruption), but structural (e.g. the system). The correction cannot be partial, but must be total. There is a strong relation between corruption for example, and the economic system and political structure. In other words, they have become more ideological,

they have begun to consider different systems and different ideologies of development.

In becoming more ideological, they realize that they will never be effective if they limit themselves to the role of the *resi*. They have started to look for political alliances and it seems the most potential alliance is with the young officers in the army. As Sundhaussen noted, ". . .there are signs of discontent among the *generasi muda* (in this case, the young officers, AB) with the authoritarian politics of the present regime, which, however, do not emerge easily into the open because of the strict observance of professional norms by young officers. For instance, in the recent campaigns of the students against government policies, the symphathies of many young officers seem to have been quite clearly with the students." Sundhaussen gave an illustration: "As a young officer put it to me after the January 1974 riots: 'I was genuinely in agreement with the students. But if I had been ordered to shoot at them, I would have obeyed orders'" (Sundhaussen, 1974: 63).

To conclude, I would argue that in the future, if the Indonesian students are to play a significant role, it will not be that of a moral force. It will be the role played by the 1965-1966 students. To discuss how soon the change will come, if at all, or in which direction it will go, although a critical and interesting subject, is beyond the scope of this paper.

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