30th International Congress of Human Sciences in Asia and North Africa

PROCEEDINGS

MIDDLE EAST 2

El Colegio de México

30ᵗʰ International Congress of Human Sciences in Asia and North Africa

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El Colegio is supported through grants from the Mexican Ministry of Public Education and other governmental sources. In addition international agencies, foundations and others provide funds for special projects.

In 1976, *El Colegio* served as host to the Thirtieth INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF HUMAN SCIENCES IN ASIA AND NORTH AFRICA. It then undertook the task of publishing the papers presented at that Congress. To this end, the editors arranged the material in two series. The first consists of the papers discussed at the seminars, which have been compiled in eleven volumes (Seminars). The second is comprised of the papers that were read in English at the ordinary sessions. These have been published in fourteen volumes (Proceedings). In the case of the latter, *El Colegio* received assistance from UNESCO and the Mexican *Fondo Nacional para Actividades Sociales* (National Fund for Social Activities).

The persons responsible for selecting, translating and editing the materials we now present have respected the style of the authors to the extent possible, although they have made certain changes necessary for publication. The editors were especially concerned with the problem of transliteration, preference always being given to each author's own system.

30th INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF HUMAN SCIENCES
IN ASIA & NORTH AFRICA
1976

Middle East 2

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EL COLEGIO DE MEXICO

240342 Area Coordinators: Rubén Chuaqui
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LIST OF AUTHORS

Caesar E. Farah, University of Minnesota, USA.

Uriel Dann, Israel.

Gabriel Warburg, University of Haifa, Israel.

Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, Northwestern University, USA.

Gary Joiner, Louisiana Tech. University, USA.

Marnia Lazreg, New School for Social Research, USA.

Mourad Wahba, Ayn Shams University, Egypt.

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The Middle East: Politics and Society

METTERNICH'S ROLE IN THE 'SYRIAN QUESTION'

Caesar E. Farah

The 'Syrian Question' had its inception in the mid 1830's when Palmerston of Great Britain decided Muḥammad 'Alī's governorship of Syria posed a threat to his country's imperial interests. The Egyptian viceroy had close working arrangements with France, Britain's arch rival in the eastern Mediterranean with a strong base for political influence among the uniate Catholics of Syria.

Once convinced of this threat Palmerston set in motion diplomatic trends aimed at reducing this influence or neutralizing it at the least. Two deterrents barred him from eliminating such influence completely: 1) Muḥammad 'Alī's powerful army built on the latest French technical knowhow and officered often by French renegades, and 2) France's ability to mobilize the uniate Catholics in the east by virtue of her conceded role as the official guarantor of their "traditional rights" before the Sublime Porte.

Mount Lebanon witnessed a heavy concentration of such uniates and Palmerston was fully aware of their role in making possible the Egyptian conquest of that region in 1831, aided materially by the grand emir who owed Muhammad 'Alī a number of favors.

The grand emir was in defiance of his sovereign lord, the sultan who vowed not to rest until he was brought to account and Muhammad 'Alī forced out of Syria. This was the entré sought by Palmerston, the Achilles heel, as it were, of Franco-Egyptian imperial policies in that part of the Mediterranean. It is on account of this that the British secretary could now strike up common cause with Metternich, the arch champion of the principle of legitimacy. In his eyes Muḥammad 'Alī was a usurper of sultan's sovereign rights. Syria therefore should revert to the status quo ante 1831 when it was conquered. This suited Palmerston well, for in his estimation direct Ottoman control over Syria posed less threats to British imperial interests than a Franco-Egyptian presence there. Thus with Metternich's blessing, Palmerston proceeded to rally together the

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same European power alliance that ended Napoleon's hegemony in Europe. And so Austria, Prussia, Russia and Great Britain formally acceded to the Protocol of London of 1839 and as the Quadruple Alliance encouraged Sultan Mahmud to undertake military initiatives which, though disastrous at first, ended on a successful note by December of 1841. Muḥammad ' Alī was forced out of Syria and France's contradictory policy during the crucial phase of the military operations ended in her being discredited in the eyes of her Syrian Catholic protégés whose champion, Grand Emir Bashīr was forced into exile.

While the sultan did not live to witness the final triumph, his son, 'Abd al-Majīd was particularly grateful to the "friendly nations" as they were dubbed and surrounded himself by liberal ministers and envoys, the likes of Reshid Pasha, who were prepared to elicit the counsels of the European cabinets involved, particularly those of London and Vienna, even on matters pertaining to the internal administration of the key provinces of Syria. Indeed, Richard Wood, who served as agent provocateur in raising the Lebanese against Muḥammad ' Alī's administration, was now appointed officially by Rifaat Pasha to counsel him directly on how to improve the internal administrative machinery of Syria.

But the basic conservatism and anti-Western attitude of the Syrian Muslim population, abetted in turn by the conservatism of the Russian consul general, only served to insure that conservative Ottoman governors and high officials would be tolerated by the native population. This attitude, however, became a major stumbling bloc in achieving the reforms necessary to enforce stability and maintain tranquility in the Syrian provinces, thus enhancing rather than diminishing pretexts for outside interference in the internal affairs of the Ottoman state. Such dependence on foreign advise was greatly resented by the powerful conservative factions in Istanbul and encouraged their resistance to reformist measures initiated by liberal ministers. Indeed, the conservatives would much rather tolerate Muḥammad ' Alī's presence in Syria than to see it guided by the consuls of the major powers.

Metternich, himself a champion of conservatism, viewed with sympathy the arguments against encroaching on Ottoman sovereign rights in the internal governorship of Syria. Yet while he called for scrupulous respect of such rights, he was nevertheless confronted with strong arguments from uniate Christians and their symphathizers for honoring what they construed as their historical and traditional right to autonomous rule in a land notorious for its rivalries, factional bickerings and violent feuding. The compartmentalized structure of Syrian society based on sectarian separatism and feudal divisiveness only served to

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abet foreign inspired rivalries. The complexity of the ensuing situation proved beyond any rational range of resolution, militating commensurately against the basic principle of constructive reform which representatives of the powers themselves deemed essential for safeguarding those so-called rights.

The crux of the problem lay in the notion that there can be no autonomous Lebanon without maintaining rule in the family of the Shihāb's, notably the Maronite branch. In the past the family had succeeded in controlling the situation only by suppressing powerful rival feudal families with the support of uniate Maronite clergy who under Bashīr II enjoyed much political power. In so doing the family incurred the strong opposition of the feudal party that listed both Uniat Christian and Druze/Muslim chiefs. Moreover, the strong Catholic bias of the previous administration alienated the Greek Antiochan Christians who as a body were then the largest such sect in Syria, and enabled the Russian consul to emerge as their spokesman before the local Ottoman authorities, thus giving him a powerful voice in the counsels of the pashas. And so the opposing forces emerged sufficiently powerful to block any concerted attempt to restore the status quo ante which would have favored the papal forces, as they were named.

The Ottoman authorities were not in turn prepared to endorse the return of the house of Shihāb to rule if it meant reestablishing the Egyptian connection. So Catholic interests were now on the defensive, a situation that favored the rapid recovery of French influence among the Catholics of Syrian and soon enabled France to exercise an equally important voice in the Syrian Question. This in turn exacerbated the position of Austria, a leading Catholic power that had quickly demonstrated its concern by large grants to the Maronite patriarch for the relief of the sufferers in the 1840-41 war against the Egyptians. Catholic interests in Syria were now equated with the restoration of the house of Shihāb to the government of Mt. Lebanon albeit Austria was one of the powers that led the military cum naval expedition against its alleged promoters in Syria. Metternich confronted the initial dilemma by endorsing the appointment of Bashīr III in 1841, himself a Catholic Shihāb. But Bashīr by demonstrating political ineptness and subservience to British consular dictates in Syria, quickly alienated both feudal and papal factions and in a bloody upheaval against him enabled the sultan's government to prevail upon Metternich and the British themselves to permit the appointment of an Ottoman governor. Ömer Pasha, a renegade Hungarian Catholic, was deemed a wise political choice; and indeed he

quickly demonstrated a willingness to deal justly with all factions for the common benefit of the country. Metternich had endorsed the sultan's government policy which enabled the appointment to take place. The Russians had not opposed it because their protégés in Syria would not have settled for the other alternative. The strongest opposition to it came from France and the Maronite patriarch both of whom labored assiduously to foil Ömer's efforts to stabilize the country politically. The British, though not opposing the principle underlying the appointment, were distressed by Ömer's harsh policy towards their sympathizers, the Druze feudal chiefs who were now represented as championing Protestant interests in Syria as opposed to the Catholic by France and the Greek by the Russians. It was this harsh policy that precipitated the military uprising against Ömer on the part of the Druzes and brought on his downfall.

It was at this point that Metternich promoted the principle of dividing the Mountain into two subgovernorships, one dominated by the Christians and the other by the Druzes. The idea for the division had occurred to Col. Rose, the British consul general in Syria almost simultaneously and Rose quickly prevailed upon his ambassador Stratford Canning to recommend its approval by the British government. The division was to be provisional, to see whether stability could not be achieved by catering separately to Druze and Catholic interests. But the flaws in the plan quickly developed, and the French, consistent opponents to any administrative scheme that did not insure a unified government for the Lebanon headed by a Catholic member of the Shihāb family, had agreed to go along with the understanding that should the plan prove unworkable they would have the support of the other powers to restore a unified system of government for the whole country. The unworkable features of the plan were conspicuous from the start. The Christian subgovernor with the prodding of the French and Maronite clerical party insisted on governing all Christians including those that fell geographically in the Druze sub-governorship, albeit neither the Druzes nor even the Greek Christians would accept the governorship of one influenced by their opponents, the Maronite Catholics.

Tensions mounted and before the end of the year another bloody war took place between Druzes and Maronites. Still Metternich and the British insisted the plan was not given a fair chance to prove itself. Tension, intrigue, bickerings and artificially stimulated incidents continued with the French and their protégés seeking to prove the plan unworkable and the rest of the powers and the Ottoman government deter-

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mined on making it work. Such maneuvers continued into 1884 when once again the Maronites launched an assault on Druze country to force a military decision in their favor, only to suffer defeat at a great cost in life and property to their co-religionists. Prior to the military show-down the French government launched a heavy diplomatic campaign aiming at enlisting the moral and political support of Catholic powers, such as Spain, to pressure the sultan's government into reversing the administrative situation and also to embarass Metternich into closing ranks behind what was termed Catholic interests in Syria.

Metternich, a man moved more by sober political judgements than religious emotion, was not prepared to back down. And when the Cath-olic party lost the military battle he did exert his considerable in-fluence in Istanbul to prevail upon the Sublime Porte to send a high-powered commission to Syria, headed by the foreign minister himself. Chekib Effendi, the minister, hammered out the details that made the dual sub-governorship workable and the Catholic party had to wait an-other fifteen years before it could come up with another pretext to undo the system.

It was a true mark of Metternich's statesmanship that he never allow-ed considerations other than those he deemed proper and just in every given situation evolving from the Syrian Question to sidetrack him from a course he had embarked upon, however sensitive and close-to-home the consideration. He was a visionary who always saw beyond the im-mediate confrontation which only too often confused the lesser diplo-matic luminaries who represented the European powers in Istanbul. The system he propounded for the solution of the Syrian question respected Ottoman sovereign rights by insisting the sub-governors be immediately responsible to the Ottoman vali and allowed for the protection of fac-tional interests, traditional to the land and in this respect "legitimate". He surmounted French attempts in such staunch Catholic capitals as Madrid and Rome to compromise his position by making his policies appear detrimental to Catholic interests in Syria and the alleged welfare of the Christians of that strife-torn land. In so doing he was doubtlessly abetted by the thinly disguised egocentricity of French politics both at Istanbul and in the field, which also in no small measure aimed at dis-crediting the solution he propounded and promoted. That this policy should also conform to British notions of a solution, was not the result of British proddings, but rather of his rational diagnosis of the basic principles and issues underlying the Syrian question. Indeed, this paral-lelism in Austrian and British policy interests, enabled Metternich to

count on the diplomatic skills of Stratford Canning, the "Buyuk Ilçi", for whom Metternich had little personal respect, as indicated in his assessment of him to his Internuncio in Istanbul. Thus with Metternich masterminding strategy and Canning serving as field general, the rival interests of the other two great powers, France and Russia, were effectively contained in Syria and their imperial ambitions in that part of the world neutralized for three quarters of a century. One cannot help but speculate whether the bloodiest and most destructive of all the factional civil wars in Syria, that of 1860-61, might not have been averted had Metternich survived until then . . .

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THE UNITED STATES AND THE RECOGNITION
OF TRANSJORDAN, 1946-1949

Uriel Dann

On 17 January 1946 Mr. Ernest Bevin, The British Foreign Secretary, informed the General Assembly of the United Nations that his government intended to grant independence to the emirate of Transjordan, hitherto a British mandate. The intention materialized in the Treaty of Alliance signed between the governments of Great Britain and Transjordan on March 22, 1946. The USA recognized the kingdom – so styled since May 25, 1946 – on January 31, 1949.

This paper deals with the circumstances and considerations that caused the major Western power to delay its recognition of an undoubtedly friendly state for almost three years. The episode takes its place in the emergence of Transjordan/Jordan as a major factor in Middle East politics. It also throws light on the process of micro-foreign policy making in the United States.

The "Current U.S. policy towards Trans-Jordan" was set out in a secret memorandum proffered by the Near Eastern Affairs Division of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs in the State Department on February 26, 1946.

U.S. policy is stated as based on two principles: "Recognition of the responsibility of Great Britain for the administration of the Palestine mandate, of which Transjordan forms a part, under the terms of a mandate from the League of Nations, to which administration the United States consented in the American-British Mandate Convention of December 3, 1924; and the specific rights guaranteed the United States in Transjordan, under this same convention of December 3, 1924." As to Transjordan, the British Government had recognized there in 1923 "the existence of an 'independent Government' (not however an independent state)". The British intentions as declared by Mr. Bevin clearly create "a new situation... welcomed by most Arab states [and] attacked by the Zionists". "The United States could not take any obstructive position with respect to the proposed indepen-

dence of Transjordan without jeopardizing its relations with the whole Arab world". The memorandum concludes: "... it is our present policy, subject to the approval of the Secretary, to recognize the independence of Transjordan, on securing a satisfactory assurance of the continuation of the rights guaranteed the United States under the American-British Convention of 1924... The United States would, however, view with concern any treaty between the British Government and an independent Transjordanian Government that would accord the British Government or its nationals any special position or privileges in Transjordan".

Of the two provisos governing the case for recognition, one was evidently conceived as a near-certainty – safeguards for U.S. rights under the 1924 convention. The other was more cautiously formulated, and obviously really mattered: that independent Transjordan should not remain too palpably a British domain in a different guise. In passing from the Memorandum to the world of action it is useful to keep the two points as foci of attention.

Obviously, there had been relations of some kind between the USA and mandated Transjordan all along. The emirate came under the jurisdiction of the American Consul General in Jerusalem. This was – in the absence in Palestine of diplomatic representatives proper – an official of very senior standing who could address the Secretary of State directly, but who communicated on everyday matters with the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs in Washington whose departmental superior was the Director, Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs. Since 1941 the Consulate-General was headed by Lowell C. Pinkerton who with his successors will appear frequently on these pages. The tangible interests of the United States or her citizens as regards Transjordan were at the time modest and chiefly concerned with educational or missionary affairs. An exception was oil. The Kirkuk-Haifa pipeline crossing Transjordan was mainly a British concern with the American share of 23.75 per cent safely anchored in the concession of the Iraq Petroleum Company; in 1946 no particular problem loomed from that quarter. On the other hand, the Arabian-American Company – Aramco – depended for the development of its concessions in Saudi Arabi on the laying of pipeline to the Mediterranean, and this too would in fact have to cross Transjordan. The Trans-Arabian Pipeline Company (Tapline) set up in July 1945 by Aramco was just about to start negotiations with regard to the pipeline when the British announcement concerning the future of Transjordan introduced a new factor. As Abdallah's neediness was notorious, the going was not likely to be smooth.

On February 13, 1946, three days before the Near Eastern Division pronounced on U.S. policy in the memorandum quoted above, the British took what seems to have been the first step to assure American support for their new policy. It was done with much circumspection. On that day, Mr. Michael Wright, counsellor at the British Embassy and an old Middle East hand, rang up Mr. Loy Henderson, director of the Near Eastern and African Affairs Office, and told him that "in the opinion of the Embassy" his government envisaged the conclusion of a treaty with Transjordan in connection with the proposed granting of independence; he implied that the treaty would be along the lines of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930. It would be helpful for Mr. Wright to know the position of the United States. "He understood that the State Department did not look with favor upon the conclusion of treaties which would grant a great power a special position in the territory of a small power... What kind of special privileges would be objectionable... to the American Government?... Was he correct in understanding that we [the USA] would not like to have the British diplomatic representative in Transjordan given a position of precedence?"[1] Mr. Henderson replied with equal caution that he had no instructions in the matter. He believed that the government would look with disfavor upon automatic precedence granted to the British diplomatic representative; it would probably also disapprove of clauses obligating the Government of Transjordan to give preference to British nationals in selecting foreign advisers – as the Iraqi treaty did. Then, Mr. Wright asked what struck Mr. Henderson as the crux of the problem: was the United States likely to object to an agreement under which Britain would be permitted to maintain troops "or perhaps a base" in Transjordan? Henderson said it was possible that if Transjordan "of its own free will, should express a desire for the stationing of British troops in its territory... the U.S. Government would not register objection".

Considering Abdallah's well-known "free will" so far as his relationship with Britain was concerned, Mr. Wright could only have understood Mr. Henderson as giving Britain the green light to go on with the treaty. The Treaty, as signed on March 22, 1946 and ratified on June 17, clearly reveals the importance attached in London to the Wright-Henderson conversation. It did not accord to the British diplomatic representative

[1]   The Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930 gave the British Ambassador automatic precedence. This privilege caused much resentment, and the British Government waived it in August 1946.

automatic precedence, nor did it, in so many words, constrain Transjordan to prefer British advisers over other. It did not grant British nationals commercial or other privileges. It obliged Abdallah to honor every "international instrument" not legally terminated, and thereby took care of the 1924 Convention. An annex to the treaty turned Transjordan into a British military base – absolutely, with hardly any verbal decencies observed.

The United States Government took issue with emergence of the new state in a press release issued by the State Department on April 23, 1946. *"The Department considers, that it would be premature for this government to take any decision at the present time with respect to the question of its recognition of Transjordan as an independent state".*

This decision is obviously opposed to the recommendation of the area experts. The background of this attitude must be examined.

The source recently opened to research make it clear that the State Department regarded the 1946 Anglo-Transjordanian Treaty as insufficient for the recognition of Transjordan's "sovereign independence". This is spelled out in a comment on the treaty which Consul-General Pinkerton despatched to the Secretary of State on May 29, 1946 at the latter's request. In this secret assessment Pinkerton remarks that "it is difficult to see how the Emir [Abdallah] can exercise his sovereignty so long as his country is occupied *ad libitum* by foreign troops". He continues: "It seems to me that by the *Treaty Great Britain may have divested herself of the obligations* devolving upon her by reason of the Mandate, *but has retained the privileges* she had thereunder and *in addition has eliminated the possibilities of evoking criticism"*. In his recommendations Pinkerton exceeded the newly declared policy of his government in harshness: "the [Transjordanian] Government should be informed... of the impossibility of considering recognition". About a week later Mr. Henderson, summed up what proved to be the essential U.S. position on the question for the following two years: "We should not... take definite steps... until we have an opportunity to observe how the new arrangement between Great Britain and Transjordan works out, *to make sure that the country is in fact independent... The Zionists of course are pressing us not to recognize Transjordan..."*

The last sentence quoted above from Mr. Henderson's memorandum brings up a major factor. Mr. Bevin's declaration released a campaign among American Jewry which lasted a year or more, intense to a degree which our generation conditioned to the concept of "Hashemite moderation" finds some difficult in comprehending.

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The first institutional protest seems to have come from the Hebrew Committee of National Liberation, a body close to the Irgun Zva'i Le'umi (*Etzel*), and from its ideological ally, the New Zionist (i. e. Revisionist) Organization of America — in memoranda despatched to the Administration immediately after Mr. Bevin's announcement to the General Assembly.

Neither the Hebrew Committee of National Liberation nor the New Zionist Organization were representative of the mainstream of American Jewry. This was emphatically not the case with another contender who now entered the stage. On January 25 the joint chairmen of the American Zionist Emergency Council, rabbis Abba Hillel Silver and Stephen S. Wise, sent a telegram to the President "respectfully [drawing his] attention to the... British Government's intention to bring about the permanent separation of Transjordan from Palestine and its recognition as an independent state."

The Emergency Council followed up its telegram to the President with representations to the State Department on January 31, and finally with a 15-page memorandum, addressed to Secretary Byrnes. The grant of independence to Transjordan is defined as converting a mandate of the League of Nations into "a mere puppet of the British Empire", in contravention of the 1924 Convention. This later claim is expounded with great care, as it was the only conceivable foundation on juridical grounds for the demand that the U.S. Government refuse recognition to Transjordan as an independent state. On a different level of argument the memorandum seeks to prove that the granting of independence did indeed threaten American interests — not so much in Transjordan proper as in exposing Palestine west of the Jordan to the rule of "a possibly hostile independent sovereign, for whose acts England will have no accountability to anyone". Such contingency "plainly makes all the difference in the world to the Jewish National Home".

The reader of the Memorandum is left with the impression that the *juridical* case arguing an infringement of the 1924 Convention is proven. But the question was one of policy-making and not of international law, as the authors well knew.

Rabbis Silver and Wise stood high among the best names of American Jewry; the American Zionist Emergency Council for which they spoke could mobilize, in the aftermath of the Holocaust, the emotional resources of the community as no other organization could. The appeal to the trusteeship ideal and the chances of an agreed American-British approach to the Palestine problem struck — in the beginning of 1946 —

a cord genuinely common to the senders of these messages and their addressees. Clearly, by all rules of American politics here was a departure which the Government had to take seriously. In the meantime, a lobbying campaign was in full swing in Congress which drew, in its turn, the attention of the Executive. Congressional interest in the subject culminated in two House Resolutions and one Senate Resolution which condemned the British initiative and requested the Executive "to take no action which in any way recognizes the Transjordan area of Palestine as a separate or independent state".

The importance which the State Department attached to the "sense of the Senate" comes out in the fact that the press release of April 23, 1946 which outlined American policy for the time being on the question of Transjordan's independence is in form of the reproduction of an exchange of letters between Senator Myers from N.J. and the Secretary of State.

What were the main motives behind the action of the Jewish organizations mentioned? A common factor is the mistrust of official Britain. This was fast becoming a general trend with Jews everywhere to the point of obsession, though in the first half of 1946 the feeling had not as yet developed its full strength. The two Revisionist bodies were plainly anguished that a large portion of the Promised Land was about to be alienated. The motives of the Emergency Council are more difficult to gauge, as befits people of the middle way. There was the fear that Abdallah "independent"would prove more dangerous to Jewish Palestine than Abdallah mandated. But the underlying strain seems to have been a misgiving that American recognition of the British policy, too easily accorded, meant the waste of a valuable bargaining counter, which might yet play a role in the post-mandatory disposal of Palestine.

One would expect Abdallah to have exerted himself strenuously during these crucial six months in the history of his country in order to gain acceptance from the leading power of the West. He did in fact very little.

The cause of his reserve, may in part have been natural caution vis-à-vis a great power with which he had few dealings before, and for which he had little need; he still felt himself very much in the British orbit. But there was probably a more specific reason. Although his British advisers assured Abdallah that they did not object to contacts aimed at obtaining American recogniton, they made it clear that they would not put up with any attempt at double-dealing. Washington was

remote, London near and the Arab Legion headquarters on his door-step; it was natural that Abdallah should have considered discretion the better part of wisdom.

The first phase of the theme under review ends with the failure of Transjordan to obtain admission to the United Nations Organization late August of 1946. During this period the State Department was distinctly averse to diplomatic relations with the new Kingdom, despite the urgings of its own area specialists. The reason was partly antipathy to "British colonialism", by then already somewhat atavistic. Partly it was response to˅ Jewish lobbying over a point which engendered a lot of heat on the Jewish side and which was not very important in the view of the Department.When changing circumstances reactivated the problem after more than a year, the impulses differed, and so did the considerations.

The second phase starts in the second half of 1947. By now it was Abdallah who set, or tried to set, the pace. The reasons are connected with Palestine. In February the British Government had declared its intention to submit the problem to the United Nations "without recommendations".As chaos threatened, American goodwill achieved an importance undreamed of when the fate of Palestine lay virtually in British hands alone.. Significantly, Abdallah made his first step in the American direction with his British advisers well out of the way. On the occasion of a visit to his kinsmen in Baghdad, Abdallah had two conversations with the American Ambassador, George Wadsworth. According to Mr. Wadsworth's report, Abdallah stressed that he attached the highest importance to American recognition. The Treaty with Britain did not imply discrimination against Americans. As to Palestine, Abdallah said that he had favored partition since 1938 and believed it to be the "most practical escape" even at the present.

With partition looming ever larger, the issue gradually assumed prime importance in Abdallah's eyes.

After further representations to the President and the State Department, Abdallah was informed on the authority of Secretary Marshall that "due [to] excitation of feeling and sensitivity in the U.S. appertaining to the Palestine problem we do not feel the present time opportune for pursuing the matter"..

The U. S. Government stuck to its Transjordanian line for about nine months longer. Courtesy, professions of goodwill, hopes of future relations, occasional contacts on a pragmatic basis – but not recognition, no negotiations on recognition, no timetable for recognition.

The breakthrough came some time in August 1948. One should not

look for any single occurrence that was responsible. The heating up of the Cold War (the Berlin blockade started on June 24) may have pulled the U. S. and Britain together at least on minor issues like the recognition of Transjordan. Also, after the conclusion of the second truce in Palestine on July 19, 1948 tension shifted from the Transjordanian to the Egyptian front, and the "disturbed state of mind" formula became ever less plausible as a ground for America non-recognition. On July 29 Dr. Philip C. Jessup, the US Representative at the UN, addressed a confidential memorandum to Secretary Marshall which analyzed the issue afresh. His points were: Transjordan was the "most realistic of Arab states in [the] present... Palestine situation"; this was recognized by all sides. This being so, Transjordan was the "principal factor" on the Arab side in peace negotiations; this was appreciated by the Provisional Government of Israel which had indicated that it would look "with favor" on the recognition of Transjordan by the US. And lastly, "recognition of Transjordan would be a sound first step in a program of mending our fences with the Arabs, involving no loss of credit with the Jews".

However, when President Truman and Secretary Marshall decided privately on August 30, 1948 that the former objections no longer obtained, they tied recognition to a policy decision not considered · by Dr. Jessup. It was to be coupled to the American *de jure* recognition of Israel, replacing the *de facto* recognition given on May 15. The American domestic scene suggests that the idea was the President's, and what mattered was not Transjordan, but Israel. The presidential elections of 1948 were approaching. Mr. Truman was too astute a politician to waste an electoral asset like the *de jure* recognition of Israel, which was due in any case. The coupling of this step with what was, after all, a "pro-Arab" move, also due and possibly suspect to a Jewish public unversed in the intricacies of Middle Eastern realities was an additional refinement. Accordingly, on October 24 and at the height of the elections campaign, President Truman publicy announced that once Israel had a permanent government, i. e., after the first general elections, the US would "promptly" give the state *de jure* recognition.

The recogniton of Transjordan, though resolved upon on principle, became thus in practice dependent on an extraneous development.

At about the end of December 1948 the British Minister in Amman, Sir Alec Kirkbride, told Prime Minister Abu'l Huda of the American decision to grant *de jure* recognition to Transjordan and Israel simul-

taneously, following upon the Israeli elections. Welcome as the news must have been, the circumstances were not pleasing to Abdallah's *amour propre*, and he tried to improve upon the conditions. He decided to send to Washington his confidant Samir Pasha al-Rifa'i with a message to the President. Rifa'i was a past and future prime minister, a pillar of the regime and he remains one of the few statesmen the country has so far produced. He proceeded to Washington. The Americans were friendly but non-commital, though he did meet Mr. Truman. Yet his host remained unconvinced.

However, after the Israeli election had taken place on January 25, on January 26 the State Department spokesman gave notice that the US was favorably considering the recognition of Transjordan. On January 31, 1949, the White House announced the *de jure* recognition, concurrently with that of Israel. It caused few ripples, in the US or Transjordan—not surprisingly after the interminable period of incubation. Minister of the Interior Sa'id al—Mufti on behalf of the sick prime minister, expressed his gratitude together with his regret over the long delay. There was "practically no editorial or other comment".

Soon duly accredited ministers moved into the legations in Amman and Washington, and during eight years relations between the two countries moved along a smooth path — friendly and not very consequential. Then, with dramatic suddenness, Jordan and the USA discovered their mutual dependence — the US for the sake of the West's survival in the Middle East, Jordan for its very existence as a political entity. The men of 1946 to 1949 had worked truer than they knew.

ISLAM AND NATIONALISM IN THE SUDAN

Gabriel Warburg

Two major phenomena had a lasting impact on Sudanese society and politics; these were the tribal divisions within this society and the nature of Sudanese Islam. Their influence can be easily traced from the emergence of the Sudan as a political community during the Turco-Egyptian rule in the years 1820-1885, until the military coup of Ja'afar al-Numayrī in May 1969.

The importance of the tribal divisions on the Sudan was due to three main reasons. Firstly, the large number of tribal groups, scattered over the Sudan, who in many cases differed in origin, language (or dialect), modes of social organization and sources of livelihood. Secondly, the vast areas of the Sudan combined with the lack of adequate communications, forced central government to delegate authority to tribal leaders. Thirdly, both during the Turco-Egyptian period and the Anglo-Egyptian regime, central government had a vested interest in strengthening tribal units and leadership as the most stable and conservative element in society.[1]

However, the decline of the tribes as a political force, especially during the period of the Condominium, derived from the mistaken assumption that a strengthening of the tribal heads' authority was possible even under a strong central administration. The viewing of the *shaykhs* as docile administrative clerks to be dismissed and appointed according to criteria of efficiency and obedience brought about their decline as an independent political power. Conversely, the preservation of the tribes as socio-economic units was due to their remoteness from the centers of government, poor communication, lack of economic incentives, and,

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[1] For details see my paper "Popular Islam and Tribal Leadership in the Socio-political Structure of North Sudan", in M. Milson (ed.) *Society and Political Structure in the Arab World*, (New York, 1974), pp. 231-280.

hence, a slow process of urbanization. If we add to this that, during the whole period, only very small budgets were allocated to expanding the educational system amongst the tribal population, it will be understood that undermining of the tribe from inside, by its own younger genera- tion, was largely prevented, since those tribal members who received a modern education generally left for the cities and integrated into the urban intelligentsia, though in many cases they upheld their links with their tribes.

Whereas the political importance of the tribes decreased despite the government's attempts to uphold it, the reverse can be said about the role of the popular Islamic leaders. The three regimes which ruled over the Sudan until independence, viewed Ṣūfī Islam in general with suspi- cion and tried their utmost to undermine its influence and to supplant it by a more "orthodox" school of Islam. The roots of popular Islam in the Sudan were, however, so deep that despite repeated attempts to weaken its leadership, it remained the central power in Sudanese socie- ty and politics until 1969.

Wherein lay its strength? The uniqueness of Islam in the Sudan is large- ly due to the tribal structure of Sudanese society and to the continuing process of Islamization, which began in the seventh century with the Arab conquest of Nubia, and continued with the southward thrust which gradually Islamicized the Christian kingdoms of Maqurra and 'Alwa. Of particular importance in understanding the so called 'popular' or 'non- orthodox' nature of Sudanese Islam is the period of the Funj Sultanate, which lasted from the early sixteenth century until the Turco-Egyptian conquest in 1820. It was in this period that holy families, both indige- nous and immigrant, established themselves in the northern Sudan and began to play a central role in Sudanese Islam. Some of these holy fami- lies founded their own schools of Islamic learning and their Ṣūfī orders (tarīqa) in the locality in which they had settled. Acting simultaneously as teachers of religion and Sufi leaders, many of these holy men or fakīs (a dialect form of faqih, jurist), claimed to be descended from the Proph- et (ashraf), and were regarded as possessors of holiness which granted them both spiritual and physical happiness and divinely-inspired power (baraka).[2] Thus, instead of a hierarchy of 'ulamā', teaching and ad- ministering Islamic law according to a so-called 'orthodox' Islamic code,

[2] For details see P. M. Holt, *Studies in the History of the Near East*, London 1973, pp. 121-34.

there developed in the Sudan a multitude of scattered Sufī orders whose leadership was vested in the local *fakī*. Even reputable orders such as the Qadiriyya or the Shadhiliyya "... were not centralized and all religious authority was canalized into the hands of the various teaching shaikhs ... So saint worship became the most powerful religious influence in the Sudan and a hagiography developed in which Sudanese saints eclipsed the most exalted figures in Islam ..."[3]

It is against this background of a diffused society, lacking both central political authority and a centralized religious hierarchy, that the Khatmiyya and the Mahdiyya made their appearance on the Sudanese scene. The Khatmiyya was first introduced into the Sudan by Muhammad 'Uthmān al-Mīrghanī in 1817-18 when he was sent by his teacher Ahmad b. Idrīs on a propaganda trip to Egypt and the Sudan. Travelling from Aswan through Dongola and Kordofan, and then to Sinnar, Shandi and the Red Sea hills, al-Mīrghanī clearly intended his *tarīqa* to embrace the whole Nilotic Sudan. This task was eventually undertaken by al-Hasan al-Mīrghanī, his son by a Sudanese wife, who settled in the Sudan after its conquest by Muhammad 'Alī. He built the Khatmiyya center near Kassala, and in close cooperation with the alien rulers, succeeded in establishing the new order in large areas of the northern Sudan. Moreover, except in one instance – the Isma 'Iliyya in Kordofan – al-Hasan and his followers successfully overcame the tendency of local *Khalīfas* to break away and found their own semi-independent orders. The Khatmiyya thus remained a highly centralized *tarīqa*, hated by many of the older local holy families whose authority it tried to supplant, but enjoying the full support and even the financial aid of their Turco-Egyptian overlords.

Since they had a vested interest in the established order, it is little wonder that the Mīrghanīs opposed the proclamation of Muhammad Ahmad as Mahdi in 1881 and his *jihād* against the Turco-Egyptians. In the Mahdist state there was no place for tribal or religious centers of power, since the authority of the Mahdi, and later of the *Khalīfa*, was absolute. Some of the Khatmiyya leaders therefore went into exile in Egypt, returning to the Sudan to rebuild their *tarīqa* and their authority only after the destruction in 1898 of the Mahdist state by Anglo-Egyptian forces.

While the Khatmiyya from the outset collaborated with the central

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[3] J. S. Trimingham, *Islam in the Sudan*, London 1949, p. 101.

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authority, assuming the traditional role of mediator between the people and their rulers, the Mahdists started as a revolutionary movement, seeking to supplant the alien rulers. Muḥammad Aḥmad's early years, before he declared himself 'Mahdi' — the heavenly guided one — differed little from those of other traditional Sudanese Ṣūfīs. He was initiated into the Idrīsiyya and Sammaniyya orders, and became a local shaykh of the latter. However, Turco-Egyptian rule and its oppression of indigenous tribal and religious orders, combined with economic hardships which were aggravated by the British-inspired-and conducted anti-slavery measures, created the ideal conditions for the appearance of a Mahdi and his acceptance by the people. His later success was due to three main factors: firstly, Egypt's military, political and economic weakness, which enabled the Mahdi to gather support without any real resistance; secondly, Britain's unwillingness to interfere in the Sudan or to allow Egypt, following its conquest in 1882, to invest either men or money in the Mahdi's defeat; and thirdly, the Mahdi's personality and leadership qualities as well as his belief in his divine mission. All these factors combined to allow the emergence of the Mahdist state, the first independent expression of a form of Sudanese nationalism. The Mahdiyya never intended to become another Ṣūfī order, or indeed to be limited to the Sudan. It regarded its mission as world-wide, heralding a new Islamic era, and its power as supreme, not to be shared with others. The Mahdi's followers and supporters, like those of the Prophet, were called *Anṣār*. They were to owe allegiance to the Mahdi alone and their organization was to supercede all existing organizations whether tribal or Ṣūfī. The Mahdi's death in June 1885, and the failure of his successor the *Khalīfa* 'Abdalla to extend the movement beyond the borders of the Sudan, primarily because of Anglo-Egyptian military supremacy, brought about the creation of a Mahdist-national Sudanese state rather than the realization of the Mahdist world-wide mission. Again, the destruction of this state in 1896-98 was not the result of disintegration, but of the military supremacy of the Anglo-Egyptian conquerors.[4]

The establishment of the Anglo-Egyptian condominium once again brought the Sudan under foreign domination and returned the exiled leader of the Khatmiyya, Sayyid 'Alī al-Mīrghanī, to the country as a protégé of the new rulers. On the other hand, the leading *Anṣār* and

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[4] For details see P. M. Holt, *The Mahdist State in the Sudan, 1881-98,* London, 1970.

especially the surviving members of the Mahdi's and the *Khalīfa's* families — were suspect, and remained under constant surveillance by the British-directed intelligence department until the First World War. Thus the twentieth century opened with a clear advantage for the Khatmiyya. Its leader, Sayyid 'Ali, was the first Sudanese to be honoured with a *C.M.G.* by Queen Victoria. Moreover, the Khatmiyya, despite the government's tendency to regard Ṣūfism and the local *fakīs* as superititious fanatics, received special treatment from the authorities, including financial aid.

The fortunes of the Khatmiyya were, however, soon to change as a result of the emergence of the *Anṣār*. The outbreak of the First World War changed the fortunes of Sayyid 'Abd al-Raḥmān and his followers. With Turkey joining the Central powers and the declaration of a Muslim holy war (*jihād*) against the Entente's infidels, Great Britain was concerned about the loyalty of its Muslim colonies. In broader terms this brought about a new orientation in Britain's policy towards Islam and the Arabs, culminating in the McMahon-Husayn correspondence and the Sykes-Picot agreement. The Sudan was a focal point in these deliberations, not because of its own importance but as a result of the considerable influence wielded over British policy-makers by Wingate and by certain members of his staff.[5] As far as the Sudan was concerned, a change in policy was clearly warranted. Firstly, in their effort to recruit support against pan-Islamic propaganda originating in Turkey, the British authorities tried to win the loyalty of Sudanese Muslims; and secondly, with Egypt becoming a British protectorate and likely to become independent in the not too distant future, it became imperative to eradicate or at least greatly reduce Egyptian influence in the Sudan. British propaganda was aimed primarily at Sudanese leaders, but was also directed at every sector of the Sudanese people. It was, however, abundantly clear that leaders of popular Islamic organizations of the *ṭarīqa* type enjoyed greater influence than tribal shaykhs or orthodox '*ulamā*.' Among the former Sayyid 'Alī al-Mīrghanī reigned supreme, but it was realized that ex-Mahdists, who were known to be both numerous and vehemently anti-Turkish and anti-Egyptian, could provide most welcome support for the new policy. Consequently Sayyid 'Abd

    [5] E. Kedourie, "Cairo and Khartoum on the Arab Question, 1915-1918" in *The Chatham House. Version and other Middle Eastern Studies,* London, 1970, pp. 13-32.

al-Rahmān was allowed to emerge from near-obscurity and to tour the strongholds of the *Ansār*, preaching to his followers that the Young Turks were infidels and that the future of the Sudan would be best secured through loyalty to Great Britain. The Sayyid was, however, shrewd enough to realize that religious and political strength required financial power. He therefore expanded his agricultural enterprises during the war, when both needs and prices ran high, and brought hundreds of *Ansār*, especially from the west, to cultivate his fields on Aba Island and on the banks of the Blue and White Niles.[6] He thus emerged from the war a leader in his own right, and by Sudanese standards a rich man.

By the end of World War I the two "Sayyids" as they came to be known, were the most influencial local leaders in the Sudan. Repeated attempts of the British administration to curtail their influence and to revive tribal leadership through so-called "Native administration", failed dismally.

But a younger, and potentially more dangerous force, was emerging in the Sudan and was beginning to challenge the supremacy of the popular Islamic leadership. This new generation, educated in Egyptian schools and at Gordon College, became an important element in central and provincial government between the two World Wars, as a result of the expulsion of Egyptian officials in the 1920's. However, despite their increasing weight within the administration, their attempts to become an independent political force, failed thoroughout the period. The "Graduates", as they defined themselves, succeeded to form their own organization on the eve of World War II.

The establishment of the Graduates' General Congress in February 1938 was facilitated by a number of factors.[7] First, central government authorities had realized that tribal organization in the Sudan was weakened beyond repair and therefore the ". . . possibility of evolving a system of genuine local self-government. . ." was unrealistic.[8] This did not mean a complete dismissal of tribal leadership, but rather an attempt to look for a possible alternative among the educated class. Second, the

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[6] Al-Ṣādiq al-Mahdī, *Jihād fī Sabīl al-Istiqlāl*, (Khartoum, n. d.), pp. 19-20.

[7] The following will deal in detail only with the penetration of sectarianism into Graduates' General Congress. For other details see K. D. D. Henderson, *The Making of the Modern Sudan*, London, 1953, pp. 536-53; Muddathir 'Abd al-Rahīm, *Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan*, London, 1969, pp. 124-32.

[8] Kelly to Oliphant, February 18, 1938, FO/371/22003.

threat of war created a situation in the Sudan in which the support of every segment of the population was important to the government, not least the intelligentsia, which was more open to hostile propaganda. Third, the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936 had stirred public opinion in the Sudan to such an extent that the politically-minded intelligentsia could no longer be relied upon to remain passive. Lastly, the appointment of Sir Douglas Newbold as Deputy Civil Secretary in 1938 and Civil Secretary in the following year was of great significance. For the first time since the establishment of the Condominium the man who stood at the helm of government was sympathetic to the educated class and tried to understand its aspirations. The government hoped that, by encouraging the intelligentsia, who constituted the Sudanese officials' class, to found their own organization, it would deal a death blow to sectarian politics which the authorities regarded as impairing the progress of the Sudan. Therefore, when the government recognized the Graduates' General Congress in May 1938, it was part of a well-devised plan initiated by the intelligentsia and with the full backing of the authorities. Even the details of the Congress Constitution were hammered out "... in friendly collaboration, between the future scourge of the 'imperialist oppressors", Isma'il al-Azhari, and J. C. Penney, who as Controller of Public Security was immediately responsible for the detection and surveillance of "subversive" political activity...[9]

To hope that the weak and politically immature educated class could challenge the authority of the two Sayyids and of their well-organized supporters, without succumbing to sectarianism in the process, was naive. In 1938 there were about 5,000 'graduates' in the Sudan who, in a total population of six million, accounted for less than one-tenth of one percent. Moreover, the term 'graduate' included both graduates of Gordon College, which was then the only secondary school in the Sudan, and graduates of intermediary schools. It is therefore no wonder that the government itself, despite its vested interest in the emergence of a non-sectarian intelligentsia, viewed it which certain misgivings. In explaining this new venture in Sudanese politics, the Civil Secretary wrote: "... It must not be inferred from the use of this rather grandiloquent title ('Graduates'), that we have already reached a stage in this country

[9] G. N. Sanderson, "Sudanese nationalism and the independence of the Sudan", paper presented to the Symposium on Islamic North Africa, London, September 14, 1971.

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at which the intelligentsia are beginning to agitate collectively for political rights and political representation. It is possible that the Graduates' Congress may emerge at some future date as a nationalist organization with a political programme ... Today ... it neither seeks formal recognition, nor does it claim to represent the views of any but its own members ..."[10] Once again the government's attitude was both ambivalent and unrealistic. It sponsored the intelligentsia as an antidote to sectarianism, but viewed it as too immature to play any significant role in the immediate future. Furthermore, by hoping, as the authorities did, that so-called 'self-imposed terms of reference', would stop the graduates from moving into the political arena, the government ignored both the aspirations of the intelligentsia and the political designs of the Sayyids, and especially of Sayyid 'Abd al-Rahmān. But even more important was the government's failure to come to grips with the time element. In 1938, just as ten or twenty years earlier, the authorities simply did not foresee a future Sudan which would be administered by its own people without British supervision. "...The welfare of the Sudanese people", wrote Symes, "is likely to be promoted neither by a spectacular process of development nor too rapid innovations. To the Sudan may truly be applied an Arab adage that 'haste is of the devil, slow deliberation is of God' ..."[11]

Instead of the emergence of a new political force, based on the intelligentsia, the new political parties which appeared towards the end of World War II, were a political extension of popular Islam. Throughout the period the British authorities had tried in vain to confine the leaders of popular Islam to religious issues, which they believed was their one and only role. While Sayyid 'Alī al-Mīrghanī, would probably have accepted this limitation, at least outwardly, it was totally unacceptable to the *Anṣār* as it was diametrically opposed to their very essence. The *Anṣār* of the twentieth century, as were their forerunners in the Mahdist state, were a Muslim movement in which religion and politics could not be separated from one another. And similarly Sayyid 'Abd al-Rahmān's religious ambitions could only be interpreted in political terms. Moreover, Mahdism had been the only force which had succeeded in bringing independence to the Sudan in the nineteenth century. Therefore, it was only natural that neo-Mahdism would identify itself with its fore-

[10] Gillan to Lampson, July 5, 1938, FO/371/21999.

[11] 'Monograph on some outstanding features and general purposes in the administration of the Sudan', by G. S. S. (Symes), May 1938, FO/371/22005.

runners, both ideologically and politically, and would assume a similar role against those who had crushed the Mahdist State. The fact that Sayyid ʿAbd al-Raḥmān discarded his father's militancy and chose the peaceful path toward independence was largely the result of his realistic appraisal of the political and military scene in the Sudan.

British misinterpretation of popular Islam in the Sudan was the result of a number of factors. First, their experience in Egypt since 1882 tended to suggest that it was possible to divorce Islam from politics. Second, during the first decade after the reconquest, British assessment of Sudanese popular Islam was largely based on their dealings with the Khatmiyya order and its leader Sayyid ʿAlī al-Mīrghanī. But historically the Khatmiyya, unlike the *Anṣār*, had always been a supporter of the *status quo* and hence a collaborator with the established order. Politically the Khatmiyya had seen its roles as an intermediary between its members and the rulers rather than as an active combatant for political power. Therefore the British view of popular Islam, based on their understanding of the Khatmiyya and other Ṣūfī orders, led to a misunderstanding of the *Anṣār*. Last but not least, the British governors sought to establish in the Sudan a social structure and a government of which they could be proud and which, in their view, would be capable of modernizing the country. Tribal administration, both in its early stages of indirect rule and especially after the founding of the rural and central advisory councils, was a crucial part of this scheme. It intended to associate the rural population with the type of government most suitable for them. Again, the attempt to associate the intelligentsia with the Sudan's education, culture and welfare was regarded as an essential step in the process of modernization. But there was no place for popular Islam, in its sectarian manifestations, within this scheme. The Sayyids were regarded as a hindrance to modernization, both socially and politically, and the separation of 'Church and State' was viewed as essential in the Sudan no less than in England. The British authorities never realized that the centers of popular Islam, though clinging to tradition, were assuming an important modernizing role. The achievements of Sayyid ʿAbd al-Raḥmān in the fields of agriculture, education and publishing, provide adequate proof that the *Anṣār* were striving to adjust their movement to the needs of modern society. An outstanding feature of this modernizing trend was the prominence of the intelligentsia in both the *Anṣār* and the Khatmiyya. Side by side with the traditional functions of a popular Islamic movement, which had in essence remained unchanged since the nineteenth century, the Khatmiyya and the *Anṣār*

evolved new forms of organization and allowed a certain flexibility in their ideologies, which had never really been well-defined in order to attract the 'new men' to their ranks.

It was therefore impossible to divorce the social and political development of the Sudan from its sectarian divisions. Since the 1920's there had always been individuals and groups who had tried to break out of the 'magic sectarian circle' but they were too weak and too divided to have any impact on the political scene. In Sudanese politics, during the pre-independence period, it mattered little whether one belonged to a tribe or to Graduates' Congress, or whether one advocated unity with Egypt or opposed it. Ultimately what counted was whether one supported the *Anṣār* or opposed them. Those who opposed them and wanted to maintain a political impact, had to seek shelter with the *Anṣār's* only rival – on the broad back of the Khatmiyya.

The founding of the *Umma* party, in 1945, indicated the general direction of Sudanese politics in the years to come. It was preceded, in 1943, by an attempt of the intelligentsia to form its own political force, the *Ashiqqā.'* And yet the intelligentsia could not maintain its political independence in face of strong opposition coming from two directions: the British authorities and the *Anṣār*. Hence, long before an unsigned agreement between the *Ashiqqā'* and the Khatmiyya was reached, whereby the political strife between opposing sections within the intelligentsia became part and parcel of sectarian politics.[12]

But whereas the *Umma* was openly identified with the *Anṣār* and led by the Mahdi's family and its religious adherents, the Khatmiyya maintained a more aloof role. Its relationship with the *Ashiqqā'* and its successors, the NUP (National Unionist Party), was rather ambivalent.[13] Its support for the NUP was largely due to its fear of Mahdist domination. Consequently after the NUP's victory in the Sudanese elections, in 1953, the support of the Khatmiyya began to dwindle. The Khatmiyya and its spiritual leader, Sayyid 'Alī al-Mīrghanī, had never really supported union with Egypt. However, the Khatmiyya leaders feared that through British support, Sayyid 'Abd al-Raḥmān would become

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[12] Henderson, *The Modern Sudan,* pp. 536-571.

[13] The NUP was the result of a merger of the *Ashiqqā'* and seven other political groups who favoured union with Egypt. It was formed during the Sudanese-Egyptian negotiations in 1952-53, largely as a result of the influence of General Najib and Major Ṣalāḥ Sālim. See M. 'Abd al-Rahīm, pp. 212-213.

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the supreme leader of the Sudan. In 1954 this danger seemed rather remote. The British were evacuating the Sudan, while the *Umma* party had only won 22 seats in the newly elected parliament, and the main danger therefore seemed to be in Egyptian domination. A complete change in Khatmi politics was called for and in October 1955 the "two Sayyids" reached a rather unexpected agreement which paved the way for Sudanense independence.[14]

In the years to follow, parliamentary government tried in vain to overcome sectarian divisions in the Sudan. This proved to be impossible as again and again the people of the Sudan proved their loyalty to the popular Islamic movements. An example of the power of the Sayyids was already given in the summer of 1956, when on June 26 the leaders of the Khatmiyya, meeting in the house of Sayyid 'Alī al-Mīrghanī, decided to abandon al-Azharī's National Unionist party and to create a party of their own under the leadership of Mīrghanī Hamza. This was the first occasion on which Sayyid 'Alī had come out from behind the scenes and onto the political stage, giving his support to the new People's Democratic party (PDP).[15] The fall of al-Azharī's government and the creation of an *Umma* – PDP coalition backed by the *Anṣār* and the Khatmiyya, split Sudanese society into two camps: all the branches of popular Islam on the one side and the other political parties on the other. The victory of the Sayyids at this stage was undoubted evidence of the weakness of the united camp of their opponents. It is possible that the attempt to split the *Anṣār* by means of creating a party of supporters of the late *Khalīfa* 'Abdallah, *ḥizb al-taḥrīr al-watanī*, was a desperate attempt by 'Abd al-Raḥmān's opponents to undermine his power.[16] However, the general elections of 1958 proved that, as long as unity prevailed between the Khatmiyya and the *Anṣār*, the opposition had no chance. The two religious sects divided the constituencies between them and, for the first time in the history of the Sudan, gave their support to candidates of the opposing sect in order to prevent the election of representatives of other parties. Thus, the representatives of

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[14] For details see my paper: "The Sudan's Struggle for Independence 1952-1956" in *Hamizrah Hehadash*, Vol. 25, pp. 38-51 (in Hebrew).

[15] *Ahrām*, June 27, 1956.

[16] *Al-Sūdān al-Jadīd*, January 16, 1957; *al-Jumhūriyya*, May 14, 1957.

popular Islam won 104 out of the total 170 seats in the Sudanese Parliament, and their control was beyond question. [17]

However, brotherly love did not prevail in the traditional camp and the signs of disintegration of the popular Islamic front appeared shortly after the 1958 elections. Disagreement broke out over the composition of the state's presidency. While the *Ansār* were in favor of a single president, the Khatmiyya preferred a Presidium of three — mostly because of its suspicions of the ambition of Sayyid 'Abd al-Rahmān al-Mahdī. There were further major differences of approach between the two sects regarding the foreign policy of the Sudan. The supporters of the Khatmiyya favored rapprochement with Egypt and the Arab world and were therefore prepared for compromise in the dispute with Egypt over the northern borders of the Sudan. The *Ansār*, on the other hand, preferred a policy of balance between the Arab world and the African continent. They objected to border concessions for Egypt and, according to their opponents, even damaged the policy of neutrality by requesting help from the United States during the cotton crisis of 1958.[18]

The result of the governmental crisis was 'Abbūd's coup of 17 November 1958 and the army's accession to power less than three years after the achievement of independence. According to 'Abbūd himself, this was the only possible "sound and blessed step", since the army alone could put an end to the "state of corruption, maladministration, instability, and individual and community fear" which parliamentary government had left behind in the Sudan.[19] Two years of so-called representative government had proven that no political party or coalition of parties could create stable government in the Sudan for as long as real power lay in the hands of the *Ansār* and Khatmiyya. However, 'Abbūd could also not free himself from this dependence, and it is doubtful whether the coup could have been carried out without the tacit agreement of the Sayyids. It appears that Sayyid 'Alī al-Mīrghanī saw in the army's accession to power an end to friction among the politicians and therefore gave his support to 'Abbūd. It must be added

[17] *Al-Sūdān al-jadīd,* September 8-14, 1957.

[18] *Ahrām,* June 2, 7, 9, 1958; *Weekly Review,* April 26, 1958; *The Middle East and North Africa 1970-71,* (London, 1971), p. 658.

[19] First statement following coup d'etat, November 17, 1958, quoted from English translation in Hisham B. Sharabi, *Nationalism and Revolution in the Arab World* (Princeton, 1966), p. 169.

that 'Abbūd himself and a great number of the officers who stood with him were loyal to the Khatmiyya. Sayyid 'Abd al-Raḥmān, on the other hand, did not rush to give his blessing to the plotters of the coup. When 'Abbūd and his deputy, 'Abd al-Wahhāb, came to get the Sayyid's blessing on his yacht on the Nile, 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Mahdī directed them to the heads of the *Umma* party in Khartoum, who duly complied with the officers' request. Relationships between Sayyid 'Abd al-Raḥmān and the heads of the coup remained tense up to his death on March 24, 1959.[20] The interesting fact in this is that the military regime – as had parliamentary government before it – needed the blessing of the Sayyids in order to achieve legitimacy for itself in the eyes of the Sudanese people.

The force of popular Islam expressed itself throughout the whole period of 'Abbūd's regime. The law for the dispersal of the parties and the confiscation of their property did in fact hit the *Umma* and the People's Democratic party, the political arms of the two sects. However, the *Ansār* and the Khatmiyya themselves were, not only unhurt by these measures, but in fact fulfilled some of the functions that had previously belonged to their parties. The *Ansār*, under their new leader Ṣiddīq al-Mahdī, reorganized and created a hierarchy of party-like institutions, both at the center and in the provinces. Ṣiddīq power and self-confidence rose to such an extent that in October 1959 he demanded of 'Abbūd that he end military government and revive democratic parliamentary institutions. The leaders of the *Ansār* did not even hesitate to attack 'Abbūd for, in their opinion, selling the rights of the Sudan by signing the Agreement for the Division of Nile waters with Egypt on November 8, 1959.[21] Ṣiddīq's declaration of the *Ansār*'s loyalty to 'Abbūd in May 1960, stressing that his activities and the activities of the *Ansār* were solely religious, was lip service only.[22] In November of the same year, Ṣiddīq's name appeared at the top of a list of twenty religious and political leaders on a petition to the military authorities, demanding that they return to their barracks.[23] In March 1961 Ṣiddīq

[20] K. D.D. Henderson, *Sudan Republic,* (London, 1965), p. 130.

[21] *Sudan Weekly,* April 4, 1958; May 9, 1958; BBC (Arabic), November 10, 1959.

[22] *Al-Ayām,* May 18, 1960, quoted in *Middle East Record 1960* (hereafter cited as *MER*), p. 415.

[23] *Reuter,* November 30, 1960. in *MER,* 1960, p. 417.

reiterated his demand, stating that the military regime had extracted the state from a crisis, but that its continuation in power was now doing more harm than good.[24] Despite his repeated demands for the cessation of military government, the authorities refrained from attacking Ṣiddīq or the *Anṣār* and, apart from attempts to restrict their economic power, left them alone to operate unhindered. Even in June 1961, following a railwaymen's strike, when a letter of protest from all the veteran political leadership including Ṣiddīq, was sent to 'Abbūd, the authorities still did not dare to harm the head of the *Anṣār*. All the other leaders were arrested and exiled to Juba, capital of Equatoria, while Ṣiddīq continued his activities unhindered.[25] Only in August of the same year, after a bloody clash at the Mahdi's tomb between young demonstrators of the *Anṣār* and the army, was Ṣiddīq placed under house arrest for a short period, and a number of leading *Anṣār* were imprisoned.[26]

Till mid-1961 cordial relations prevailed between the leaders of the Khatmiyya and the military junta. The majority of officers in the Revolutionary Council were supporters of the Khatmiyya and the army's policies, particularly regarding foreign relations, were in line with the view-points of the sect's leaders. However, the economic situation worsened in 1961, and pressure of Khatmiyya supporters, especially among the Railwaymen's Union, brought about a change in the line. In April Ṣiddīq and his son al-Ṣādiq al-Mahdī visited the leader of the Khatmiyya, Sayyid 'Ali, with the intention of reviving a unified front of the two orders against the military regime. Consequently, Muḥammad al-Mīrghanī, who had signed the June 1961 letter of protest to 'Abbūd in the name of the Khatmiyya, was among the Sudanese leaders who were exiled to Juba.[27]

Ṣiddīq died in October and the leadership of the *Anṣār* passed to his brother al-Imām al-Hādī al-Mahdī. Ṣiddīq's son, al-Ṣādiq, was designated to lead the *Umma* party and was ordered by his father, before his

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[24] *Daily Telegraph*, April 12, 1961, in *MER*, 1961, p. 469.

[25] *Al-Hayāt*, July 12, 1961, in *MER*, 1961, p. 473.

[26] *Al-Hayāt*, August 25, 1961, in *MER*, 1961, p. 470.

[27] *Al-Sūdān al-jadīd*, April 18, 1961; *MER*, 1961, pp. 408, 417.

death, to continue the struggle for the return of political freedom and democratic rule to the Sudan.[28]

The caretaker government, headed by Sirr al-Khatim al-Khalīfa, which took power after the deposition of ʿAbbūd in October 1964, was the first nonsectarian government in the history of the independent Sudan. Independent public personalities, as well as representatives of the Communists and of the Muslim Brothers, were prominent in it. This government also turned over a new leaf by attempting, for the first time, to solve the problem of the South with maximum consideration for the claims of the southerners themselves. It also began a campaign of purging the administration of officials who had shown too much loyalty to the military regime and of others who were described as lacking suitable qualifications. But even during the short period when this government ruled, the influence of the Anṣār and the Khatmiyya continued behind the scenes. Sadīq al-Mahdī and Dr. Aḥmad al-Sayyid Ḥamad, the representatives of the *Anṣār* and the Khatmiyya in the United National Front – which had been organized against ʿAbbud's regime – censured every activity of the caretaker government and sharply criticized all its failures. It was obviously anticipated that, at the first general elections to be held, power would return to the hands of the traditional forces who had not ceased to argue against the unrepresentative nature of Sirr al-Khatim's government. At the same time, the *Anṣār* feared that power would slip from their fingers as a result of changes in the electoral law and the widening of the constituencies. Indeed, the Trade Unions Federation and the Jazīra Tenants' Organization demanded (with Communist support) that half of the seats in the new Parliament be reserved for them. Similar claims were advanced by the students, who demanded the allocation of special constituencies. A National Front of the Free Professions also arose and declared its intention to stand for election with its own list. The caretaker government did not accede to most of these demands, but even the few that were accepted indicated to the leaders of the traditional parties that continuation of their supremacy was in danger. The students and the professionals were promised several additional special constituencies and, by granting the vote to eighteen year olds (instead of twenty-one), the electorate was increased by some 750,000 new voters of both sexes.

[28] *Middle East Mirror*, October 21, 1961; see also Yusuf Fadl Hasan, "The Sudanese Revolution of October 1964", *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 5, no. 4 (1967): 491-509.

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In this state of affairs, when tension between the United National Front of the traditional forces and the Left and its allies reached its peak, the caretaker government resigned in February 1965. The Communists, the People's Democratic party, and their supporters demanded that the office of prime minister be given to their candidate, Chief Justice Babikr 'Awaḍ Allah, who had actively participated in the antimilitary coup of October 1964. But the *Anṣār* were not prepared to take the risk of having a hostile government carry out the preparations for general elections. In opposition to the United National Front of the traditional forces, the Communists, the People's Democratic party, and their followers founded the Social-Democratic Rally, which declared a general strike against what was called "domineering by Islamic parties". This strike was a fiasco, since the Jazīra tenants and the railway workers continued their work — clearly indicating that they were not interested in political conflicts. Thus, it became clear that even in sectors which the Communists considered to be their bastions, their real political influence was minimal. The control of the traditional parties in the new government of Sirn al-Khatim al-Khalīfā was guaranteed, while the Communists had only one minister.[29] In May 1965, as the date of the elections drew near, the Communists and their supporters suggested a postponement. The representatives of the southern districts also opposed the elections since the situation in the South did not permit holding elections. Opposition also came from the People's Democratic party, which, under the influence of the Khatmiyya, decided to boycott the elections. This was probably due, among other reasons, to fear of *Anṣār* domination and the election of a member of the Mahdi's family to the presidency of the Sudan. The election results showed anew that only the *Umma* and the National Unionist party could win mass support. Out of the 170 seats in the new Parliament, the *Umma* won seventy-six and, together with the fifty-five representatives of al–Azharī's party, was able to rule as it pleased. Among the other parties, the Communists won eleven places — all of them in the special constituencies — and the Islamic Front, composed mainly of the Muslim Brothers, won only five places. For the first time in a long period tribal lists also participated in the elections. Thus, the Beja tribes succeeded in seating ten representatives in Parliament, while the independent list of the Nuba Mountains

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[29] S. R. Smirnov, ed., *A History of Africa 1918-1967* (Moscow, 1968), pp. 174-5; Henderson, *Sudan Republic,* pp. 213-16.

won nine places.[30] The reasons for the traditional parties' decisive majority are not clear-cut. Apparently, most voters had more faith in the old leadership, based on the religious-political tradition, than in modern parties whose ideology was for the most part alien, and who had proven themselves only as a revolutionary force, but not as capable of ensuring order and solving the problems of the people. Furthermore, the chances of the Communists and even of the Muslim Brothers among the tribal population were slim. Independent tribal lists, like those of the Beja and Nuba, were primarily at the expense of the *Anṣār* and should be regarded as part of the traditional conservative camp. In tribal districts par excellence, such as Darfur, the *Anṣār* succeeded in defeating all their opponents the independent Darfur list winning only one seat in Parliament. It appears, therefore, that the combination of Islamic leadership deeply rooted in the population and a mainly tribal and rural society, guaranteed supremacy of the traditional parties in any political confrontation. However, the Communists' achievements should not be regarded as a failure, since the winning of eleven out of the fifteen special graduates' constituencies and polling 17.3 per cent of the total electorate doubtless constituted considerable progress in comparison with the period before 'Abbūd. Communist success may be partly attributed to the People's Democratic party's boycott of the elections, which caused its supporters to split between the Communists and the National Unionist party (NUP) the latter probably receiving the bulk of Khatmiyya support.

The traditional coalition's regime continued for four additional years. However, after one year its stability had already been undermined, not because of the rise of new forces, but as a result of disagreement among the *Anṣār* themselves. The ascendancy of Ṣādiq al-Mahdī – an Oxford graduate and grandson of the sect's founder – to the rank of political leader of the *Umma* party met increasing opposition from his conservative uncle, al-Hādī al-Mahdī, the religious spiritual leader of the *Anṣār*. In July 1966. Sadiq exploited a vote of no-confidence in Parliament in order to overthrow the NUP – *Umma* coalition of al-Azharī and Maḥjūb and established a new government with himself and Mīrghanī Ḥamza at its center a kind of alliance between the more progressive wings of the *Anṣār* and the Khatmiyya. Al-Sadiq's government fell after one year, as a result of the struggle for the presidency, and the conservative wing of the *Anṣār* returned to power. The election campaign of March – April

[30] *Ibid*, p. 225.

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1968 brought the struggle between the two wings of the *Anṣār* to its peak. The Democratic Unionist party, which united the two Khatmiyya-supported parties (the People's Democratic party and the National Unionist party), for the first time since 1956 now took part in the campaign. Meanwhile, the two factions of the *Umma,* headed respectively by al-Ṣādiq and al-Hādī, competed with each other for support within the *Anṣār.* Matters reached the point of bloody clashes between members of the *Anṣār* on Aba Island, the sect's center. The result was an outstanding victory for Khatmiyya-supported representatives, who, for the first time since 1953, won the majority of seats in the general elections. The Democratic Unionist party won 101 places in the new Parliament while the two factions of the *Umma* took only 68. The other parties — which included the Communists, the Muslim Brothers, two tribal parties, and three representing the South — divided the remaining seats among themselves and did not have the power even to form a strong opposition. The new coalition government, headed by Muhammad Ahmad Mahjūb, was again, therefore, a government leaning on the traditional hierarchy of popular Islam, while one wing of the *Anṣār*, headed by al-Ṣādiq, joined the opposition. The 1968 elections were convincing proof that in the political struggle within a parliamentary framework, there was still no power in the Sudan which could undermine the supremacy of the conservative religious political leadership.

Numayrī's coup in May 1969 was, therefore, caused by the fact that the new political forces in the Sudan despaired of ever taking power by legitimate means and attempted, therefore, to break the power centers of popular Islam with the army's help. The revolt thus won the unrestrained support of the Communists and broke out after the *Ansar* reunited — thereby strengthening even more the power of Islamic leadership.

Seven years have passed since the military coup which brought Numayrī to power took place. During these years, numerous attempts to overthrow the regime have been reported from the Sudan. At least two of them were instigated by the *Anṣār* and their followers. The first, in March 1970, when revolt broke out in the *Anṣār's* bastion, on Aba Island, which ended with a reported massacre of some twenty-five thousand *Anṣār,* including their spiritual leader al-Hādī al-Mahdī\ The second, and more recent one, took place in July 1976, when according to Sudanese and Egyptian reports, the pro-*Anṣār* elements were trained and aided by Lybia and Ethiopia. A third, and by no means less important coup, took place in July 1971 and was backed, at least partly, by the Sudanese Communist Party. The coup's leader, Major Hāshim al-ʿAta succeeded to capture the presidential palace and to put Numayrī

and his colleagues under arrest. However, seventy-two hours later the coup came to an abrupt end and Numayrī was once again at the helm with the active support of Egypt and Lybia.[31]

It would, therefore, seem that the military have succeeded where the politicians had failed, namely, in destroying the political centers.

[31] For details see my forthcoming study: *Communism in a Traditional Society: The Rise and Decline of the Sudanese Communist Party.*

ARAB CULTURAL CONSOLIDATION:
A RESPONSE TO EUROPEAN COLONIALISM?

Ibrahim Abu-Lughod

One of the least discussed aspects of Frantz Fanon's analysis of Arab and African national response to European colonial occupation is that the Arabs responded in national-cultural terms whereas Africans responded in racial terms. Fanon has argued, somewhat successfully, that Africa's racial response was related to the fact that Europeans thought of Africans in racial terms. The conflict was thus perceived as one between a white necessarily superior culture and a black necessarily inferior culture. It made no difference to the European colonizer of Africa whether he was in Nigeria or Kenya; both were black, irrespective of geography, history, institutions, or cultural development. On the other hand, European occupation of the Arab world assumed a different emphasis: there, the European knew that he was colonizing an area with a particular and specific culture, a culture rooted, to a large extent, in its Arab-Islamic tradition. Therefore, the anticolonial drive of the Arab people assumed a cultural tone very specifically related to the Arab-Islamic cultural background of the Arab people.[1]

There is no question that Fanon's insight is fundamentally correct. The African nationalist movement was essentially a Pan-African movement in the broadest sense of the term; it was a movement that aimed at the liberation of the Black people of the world from white domination. African nationalists, while tactically struggling for the independence of a particular African territory under the domination of a specific European power, were fully aware that the European-African struggle revolved around the freedom and dignity of the Black person, irrespective of locale. The literature supporting the struggle of the African

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[1] Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, New York, 1968 edition, pp. 206-248.

people for freedom is essentially a non-territorial and a national literature; it is a racial literature which emphasized the unity and indivisibility of the Black people. It is not accidental for later African nationalists to stress Negritude as a philosophy. That is their response to white racialism.[2]

While Negritude can be viewed as a logical extension of an earlier genre of African cultural response to European colonialism, it will be readily observed that African literature in the sixties and seventies has departed significantly from its earlier orientation. The literature depicting the anxieties, struggles, and realities of independent African national communities is becoming increasingly more territorial in focus and specifically national in scope. While the entire literature of the colonial period utilized the colonial languages of Africa as its means for national and cultural expression, increasingly indigenous languages are being utilized, state-supported or contemplated.[3] As these national languages become more prevalent and are supported by the nation-states of Africa, they will have a much greater impact on the generation of very specific literary expression more concerned with the problems and reflective of the realities of particular African countries. When that process is finally consummated, it will put to final rest the earlier, more inclusive Pan-African yet racial response to the European colonial occupation of Africa.

The Arab response to European political domination was initially quite different from that of Africa, despite the many common features of European colonialism everywhere. While the Arab response might have resembled that of India, in that both were culturally based, the ultimate resolution and shape of that response in the years to come may turn out to resemble that of Africa rather than that of India. For what is apparent today is that the Arab national response that was rooted in a common cultural tradition deriving its inspiration from a common language, a common history, and a common religious value system is increasingly assuming a differentiated expression which derives much of its inspiration from the very specific circumstances of territorial "national" life. It is in this sense that the culmination of the

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[2] *Ibid.,* see also my "Nationalism in a New Perspective: The African Case" in H. Spiro, (ed.) *Patterns of African Development,* Prentice-Hall, 1967, pp. 35 ff.

[3] Ali Mazrui, *Cultural Engineering and Nation-Building in East Africa,* Evanston, 1972, especially pp. 85-98.

process of territorial-national political integration of the Arab states' system may turn out to have much in common with contemporary Africa.

II

We may not know the exact frontiers of what is commonly referred to as the Arab world and we may never know whether these frontiers in fact corresponded to those of the past. Yet it is known that, politically and administratively, there are at the moment twenty-one sovereign Arab States. In one way or another they either explicitly define themselves as Arab or refer in their constitutional documents to Arabic as the official language of the state and, by implication, it means that they are Arab. Some may even explicitly indicate that they are part of the Arab Nation. On the surface this may not raise any difficulties; yet students of Arab world and more specifically of Arab nationalism are fully aware of the degree to which the literature is replete with ambiguous answers to the questions: Who is an Arab? Whom does Arab nationalism include? The literature may reflect more accurately than the Arab national assertion, the variety of human mingling that has taken place in the Arab world, may in fact be more faithful to the variety of ethnic groups present in the Arab world and subjective identification of the inhabitants of the Arab world. Yet cutting across all definitions and problems surrounding the national identity of the people in the Arab world is the presence of a common language and a common culture. The frontiers of that language and culture may in fact have experienced serious shifts in history, but there is no question that, historically and temporally, an Arab region can be identified and separated from all other regions by the presence therein of a particular language and a culture which has been expressed through that language. It is not unusual to encounter the English expression "Arabic-speaking" people to denote the Arab people, an expression that essentially has no counterpart in Arabic.[4]

Regardless of the way these and similar problems of contemporary Arab national history are resolved, what is certain is that their resolution can be effected only against the background of the encounter of the Arab people with European colonial domination and occupation.

[4] I suspect that the Arabic expression "al-Natiqun Bi al-Dad" is borrowed from the English one.

For it is readily observable that the existing shape and reality of the Arab world is the direct consequence of its gradual occupation by one or another of the European powers. Excepting Palestine, which continues to endure occupation by a colonial-settler regime, the entire Arab world has been politically decolonized. But it is important to recall also that, just as the Arab world's occupation by Europe was effected at different points in history, its decolonization was effected at separate though related historical dates. Both the occupation and its termination at these differing periods had important consequences for its territorial integration and national fragmentation.

III

Excepting Morocco and some minor peripherial areas of the Arabian Peninsula, the Arab world was part and parcel of the multinational Islamic Ottoman Empire when Europe began its gradual occupation. Throughout the period of Ottoman sovereignty over the Arab world, the system of communication was essentially a bifurcated one, reflecting its political and cultural bifurcation. In the major portion of the Arab provinces of the Empire certainly until the mid-nineteenth century, the ruling elite was essentially a Turco-Circassian Turkish-speaking elite. Thus the actual political and administrative language of that portion of the Empire increasingly became Turkish; yet the language in common use as well as the language of education, culture, the arts, and law continued to be Arabic. At no point in the long history of Ottoman sovereignty was Turkish able to displace Arabic as a comprehensive language of communication. Second, while the population viewed itself as part of the universalistic Islamic *ummah*, there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate that everywhere in the Ottoman Empire ethnic identity maintained its viability within the social system.

Basic structural alterations in the systems in various Arab provinces toward the end of the eighteenth century, had led, by the mid-nineteenth century, to the assumption of power of political elites that had more effective organic links with the population. Along with other factors, this change had the consequence, eventually, of leading to the gradual displacement of Turkish as an effective language of political and administrative communication in some of the more important provinces of the Empire. Where this process was not consummated, it became an important issue of contention between the center in Istambul and the periphery in Jerusalem, Beirut, Damascus, and Baghdad. Certainly there

is no question that in Tunisia and Egypt, among others, Arabic successfully displaced Turkish by the mid-nineteenth century, thus signifying the assumption of power of an Arabic-speaking elite irrespective of its ethnic origin or diversity.[5]

Yet no sooner had this process been consolidated than European occupation began to set in. We need not be detained now with the motives, real or assumed, of the European colonial occupation of the Arab world. Whether European occupation would have been more effective in attaining its objectives by pursuing policies other than those it followed concretely is also a moot question for our purposes. What is important for our purposes is to note some of the general features of that policy and particularly those that relate to our primary concern, namely, the cultural response to those policies.

IV

Irrespective of the date of actual occupation of any portion of the Arab world, the European powers pursued the policy of national fragmentation and territorial consolidation. Thus when France successfully occupied Algeria, and, later on, Tunisia and Morocco and, still later, Syria and Lebanon, it treated each of these areas as a separate entity and severed it almost completely from its neighbors as well as from the rest of the Arab world. Britain pursued a similar policy with regard to South Arabia, the Gulf, Egypt, the Sudan, and eventually Iraq, Palestine, and Transjordan. The fact that these countries had a common Arab identity and that each set of countries had a common colonizer in no way interfered with the type of policy pursued by each of them. Thus each of these units was compelled by the occupying power to develop distinct territorial economic institutions, a distinct educational system, and distinct institutional structures to support a new political unit corresponding to the administrative frontiers of the occupied area. In due course each of these units forged a distinct territorial identity and political structure that was eventually to mature into its present form of statehood.

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[5] I have dealt with the significance of the language transformation in Egypt and Tunisia in "The Transformation of the Egyptian Elite" in *Middle East Journal*, XXI (1967) pp. 325-344 and "The Islamic Influence on Khyr al-Din of Tunis" in D. P. Little (ed.), *Essays on Islamic Civilization Presented to N. Berkes.* Leiden, 1976, pp. 18-21.

While the European powers were thus actively pursuing the policy of territorial consolidation of each of these administrative units, the same powers launched their major attack on those elements which had given the region its fundamental cohesion, national identity, and world view. The European powers understood too well, on the basis of their own previous historical encounters with the Arab people, and on the basis of the extensive knowledge that already existed in European capitals, which factors had given the region its distinct identity. Those factors did not necessarily relate to their actual political life or identity but, rather, to their cultural background, especially its language component.

The European attack on Arab culture and society was essentially three-dimensional. Internally and with regard to each of the occupied societies, by their action or by their policies, the European powers gave rise to a duality of institutions and structures that now can be discerned quite clearly as those institutions that are associated with "modernity" and all other associated with "traditionalism." Thus a modern educational system was established to train a small indigenous elite, disaffiliated from its traditions and background, to serve the needs of the colonizer; a modern urban system was developed to serve the needs of the colonial functionaries and settlers and those who functioned within their realms; a modern economic system was established, tied to the global economic system of European capital, and so forth. In due course this duality was to give rise to internal bifurcation and discontinuities that still plague the territorial integration of each of these societies. There was no question, then as now, that all superior values were associated with the "modern" sector and the drive of the Arab nationalists; even when they fought for liberation, was intended to facilitate the increasing modernization of their society, which, in their view, was not being successfully met by the colonizer.

This duality was to be served by the other dimensions of the European attack on Arab culture and society. The first of these was obviously the attack on the Islamic background of that society. Europeans, whether missionaries, soldiers, or colonial officials and their scholarly mentors, attributed the "backwardness," and thus justified the occupation, of the Arabs, their aggressiveness, authoritarianism, and whatever else they perceived as constituting the weakness of Arab society to the twin sins of Islam and Arabic; hence the major systematic assault on the integrity of Islamic beliefs and practices throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Irrespective of the motivation which underlied European attacks on Islam as a religious system and

irrespective of their understanding of what in fact constituted Islam, they understood quite correctly that Islam was an important foundation of what might be considered Arab culture. Thus any weakening of Islam as a social system or as a value system would have the effect of undermining the foundation of Arab society and correspondingly would weaken the cohesion of the Arab people. It is not accidental, therefore, that the European attack on Islam was launched with such ferocity almost up until our very days, when European colonialism had receded.

The last line of attack on the unity of culture was the European attack on Arabic: an attack, interesting to note, that persists today. It is obvious that Arab cultural creativity and contributions had been expressed and accomplished through Arabic. What unity of culture persisted in the Arab world, irrespective of who controlled it politically, was reflected in its common use of a literary language. It was the European understanding of the importance of Arabic as a unifying element that underlied their attack on its alleged unviability as a vehicle for the transmission of modern thought.

V

To render that attack successful, two strategies were pursued by European colonialism. With regard to Islam, a systematic policy of neglect of Islamic training and institutions and gradual encroachment on Islamic educational and economic institutions was coupled with a very vigorous attack on the authenticity of Islamic culture in general. On the other hand, individuals and institutions that promoted a break with Islamic traditions and seemingly passed into modernity were rewarded. Both the policies of penalties and rewards eventually had their impact. There was an effort on the part of the Muslim component of society to "reform" Islam and those who advocated reform were in general rewarded and approved of. On the other hand, when that "reform" still did not meet the anticipated results of the colonizer, systematic neglect continued. But in either case the intent was clear: to weaken the Islamic bond of Arab society and, thereby, to dilute the effectiveness of religion as a cementing factor in Arab cultural identity and in resisting colonial domination.

Just as the systematic attack on African culture by Europeans had its result in the affirmation of African cultural creativity by African nationalists, the same systematic attack on Islam by the European colonizers had the effect of generating a national response to some

extent rooted in the Islamic tradition. Thus the Arab nation liberation movement in the twentieth century, whether in North Africa or the Middle East proper exhibited an extraordinary attachment to Islam and identification with it even when its demands were secular. The attachment to Islam was essentially an attachment to one's identity which the European colonizer had demeaned and wished to disappear.[6]

This same attack served a very important purpose insofar as the nationalist response was concerned. Whereas the struggle for independence of any Arab country was waged to attain independence for that specific country, the more universal basis of national identification served the purpose of maintaining the bond of attraction and relationship across territorial frontiers. Whether individuals within each of these units of Arab society understood territorial independence as a means to an ultimate unification of all the territories is an empirical question yet to be tested. But the linkage between the specific territory and the cultural universe persisted throughout the period of colonialism and had its practical effect in generating transterritorial support for the "national" movements in each particular Arab country.

The second strategy pursued by European colonialism to break up the cultural unity of the Arab people was obviously the attack on Arabic. Europeans observed in the nineteenth century, and contemporary Europeans and American writers continue to note, that Arabs use at the minimum two Arabic languages. A language previously referred to as "classical" is used in writing, for literary expression, in law, and the like. It is an elite language that is mastered historically only by the educated. On the other hand, a common language conventionally referred to as "colloquial" is used by the people in ordinary discourse. While both are related, nevertheless the spoken common language is common, if at all, only within each particular Arab country or region. The literary language is, however, the common language of the Arab elite irrespective of locale and is the connecter between the past and present. If there is a common cultural heritage which is Arab in character, that heritage is embodied in the literary tradition with which all Arabs identify. That was and still is to some extent the case.

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[6] See inter alia, L. C. Brown, "The Role of Islam in Modern North Africa" in his *State and Society in Independent North Africa,* Washington, 1966 pp. 97-122. A. L. Tibawi, "The Three Religions in Concord and Conflict: The Cultural Aspect With Reference to Egypt and Syria," in J. Arberry (ed.), *Religion in the Middle East,* Cambridge, 1969, pp. 545-604 and my "Retreat from the Secular Path?", in *Review of Politics,* Notre Dame, 1966, pp. 447-476.

But Europeans passed value judgments as well. They and some of their Arab disciples alleged that Arabic is an unscientific language, incapable of expressing modern scientific concepts and thought and thus in some fashion is responsible for the observable backwardness and stultification of Arab culture and society.[7] More frequently than not, European diagnosis of the incapacity of Arabic to lend itself to scientific expression attributed this incapacity to the language rather than to the obvious fact that Arab society itself had not participated in scientific development for quite some time. The European attack on the unviability and unsuitability of Arabic as a means for the expression of modern science and thought in general was in fact a disguised attack on the Arab nation as such. For irrespective of how a nation is defined (and it is obvious that students of nationalism disagree fundamentally on what constitutes a national community) it is acknowledged the presence of a common language is necessary of not vital. The fact that a common history and a common culture may exist can be understood only in terms of their expression in a common language. This the European colonizers of the Arab world understood. They knew then as they do now that the Arabs, regardless of their differentiation, do constitute a community. Their political and administrative fragmentation, as a consequence of colonialism, can be permanently institutionalized if the underlying basis of their cohesion can be either substantially weakened or destroyed altogether; hence the attack on Arabic.

VI

The European "solutions" to both language "problems" — through which they expected to institutionalize national fragmentation — were essentially three-fold. Two of these solutions were promoted almost simultaneously, whereas the third was suggested somewhat later and was more confined to North Africa. The first solution was to promote the use of the colloquial language to the point where it would displace literary Arabic as the language of official and popular communication.

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[7] The most insidiously "scientific" attack on Arabic as an undeveloped language which is also incapable of development seems to have been initiated by the French scholar Ernest Renan who concluded on the basis that the Arabs are incapable of development. The most profound analysis of this aspect of the question is to be found in Edward Said, "Shattered Myths" in N. H. Aruri (ed.), *Middle East Crucible: Studies on the Arab Israeli War of October 1973*, Wilmette, 1975, pp. 408-447.

While proposals were advanced in this direction especially in Egypt at the beginning of the century, they were not confined to Egypt. Obviously the proponents of the use of colloquial Arabic offered considerable "scientific" justification for their proposal; while some Arabs supported the measure, it was eventually defeated. The Arab intelligentsia, expressing itself through the mass media and the "Language Academies," correctly perceived the real intent of the proposal, namely the territorial fragmentation of the Arab world and the severing of contemporary Arabs from their common cultural mooring. This should not lead us to think that advocates of the use of colloquial Arabic no longer press their suggestion nor that colloquial Arabic is not used in some restricted form of cultural expression. Students of contemporary Arabic theatre would readily observe that not infrequently writers do resort to the use of colloquial Arabic in these specific forms but, in general, literary Arabic has triumphed in the schools, in the courts, in literature in its broadest form, and throughout state institutions in the Arab world.

The second "solution" relates to the attempt to substitute the Latin script for that of Arabic while presumably keeping the same literary language as the language of communication and culture. The merit of this proposal is that while it would have maintained at least the uniformity of language expression throughout the Arab world, it had the obvious drawback of severing contemporary Arabs from their literary cultural background unless a massive transcription program was undertaken. The fact that other states in the world experimented with this type of "language reform," even in somewhat modified form, in no way helped in alleviating the anxieties of the Arabs over the potential consequences of incorporating such a policy. Furthermore, Arab nationalists did not view with any particular favor the language policy that was adopted by Ataturk's Turkey, which succeeded in substituting the Latin script for Arabic in the writing of the Turkish language. While this proposal met the same fate in the end as the preceeding one, it had an effect by simulating "writing" specialists to debate the concrete problems involved in Arabic orthography. While the "problems" are far from being solved, nevertheless, serious efforts are being expended in the attempt to simplify the system of writing.[8]

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[8] The most comprehensive treatment of the proposals for language displacement or "reform" is to be found in *Naffusah Zakariyya Sa'd, Ta'rikh al-Da'wah ila al-'Ammiyyah wa Atharieha fi Misr*, Cairo, 1964. Kamal Yusuf al-Hajj's *Falsafat al-Lughah*, Beirut, 1956 is a very important defense of the retention of Arabic as a

Both of these "solutions" to the alleged language problem were pursued essentially in areas that came under the control of Britain, although they had intellectual support from other European quarters. The third "solution" was more characteristic of the French and the French-controlled areas where they attempted, with somewhat mixed results, to substitute French for Arabic as the language of the arts, culture, and the modern economic sector. In implementing this policy, the French were pursuing a policy which they followed in other African areas to effect the policy of assimilation. For it will be recalled that, unlike Britain, France tried in its African colonies to hold the promise of equality to the colonized should he be willing to assimilate into French culture. One measure of assimilation, and thereby civilization, was the extent of language conversion and immersion in French culture. Whereas in the African case, it was possible for language conversion to occur, in part because many African languages were neither written nor did they have a great written literary tradition, in the French-controlled Arab areas the question was not that simple. A vigorous policy of active opposition to Arabic was pursued by French colonialism in Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco. Over the decades of French control of North Africa, France succeeded in giving rise to an isolated French-speaking North African elite which was denied equality with Frenchmen but differentially was cut off from the roots of its culture. Gradually, to be modern in North Africa society and to benefit socially, politically, and economically from the state's institutions and privileges meant to be a French-speaking indigene. Nowhere else in the colonized Arab world was the internal bifurcation in society as severe or as obviously linguistically determined as it became in North Africa. Partially in response to this successful effort of France, the North African nationalist movement was self-consciously both Islamic and linguistic. Thus when the Algerian nationalists waged their war of national liberation, they were conscious not only of wanting to create a socialist Algeria but also an Algeria which was decidedly Arabic-speaking and Islamic.

The seriousness of the language question varied from one society to another in the North African systems. Whereas it was most severe in Algeria, in part due to the duration and intensity of French cultural assault on the personality of Algeria and its systematic opposition and attempted eradication of manifestations of cultural identity, it was least

national language. See also Anwar G. Chejne, *The Arabic Language*, Minneapolis, 1969, pp. 145-168.

severe in Tunisia where the Arab tradition was most developed historically. Yet the problem seems to have been serious in Morocco where French colonialism was not as prolonged as it was in both cases. Irrespective of the severity of the language problems posited in the North African system, and whether they relate to the duality of French and Arabic or to the presence of other ethnic languages within each of the North African states which would have a bearing on societal integration, there seems now to be no question as to the future. All three North African States have committed themselves to Arabization while continuing the use of French as a second language. They have differentially adopted policies that are calculated to make that goal a reality in due course.[9] Neither they nor outside observers underestimate the problems – educational, social and political – of implementing that goal; yet there seems to be no doubt that the principle of Arabization is no longer in question. When this process is eventually consummated, the Arabs will have defeated the last of three "language" proposals initiated by European colonialism which would have.had the effect of breaking a bond that in part gave Arab culture its definition.

VII

These European efforts ultimately failed in the Arab world as they did in many other parts of the Third World, where they occurred. The Arab states, particularly after independence, adopted cultural policies that were intended to consolidate their cultural identity while modernizing those aspects of culture which they thought were in need of modernizing in accordance with their own views of history. No Arab state has broken with Islam as Turkey did at the time of the Kemalist movement. No Arab state seriously considered any of the language alternatives initially proposed by the European colonial scholars and agents.

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[9] *Al Lisan al-Arabi,* the Annual issued by the Arab League's Institute of Arabization in Rabat contains important essays on the entire question of language problems, reform and policies particularly in the three North African States of Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria. Annually the Institute surveys the progress of Arabization in the three North African states. Useful to consult in this connection are David Gordon, *North Africa's French Legacy,* Cambridge, 1962; and L. William Zartman, *Problems of New Power: Morocco,* New York, 1964, pp. 155-195; Charles Gallagher, "Language and Identity" in L. C. Brown (ed.), *op. cit.* and the very important survey done by Salih J. AlToma, "Language Education in Arab Countries and the Role of the Academies" in *Current Trends in Linguistics,* 6, Mouton, especially pp. 690ff.

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Their commitment to the retention and vitalization of their cultural tradition, and the policies they implemented, particularly in education, in translation and standardization, in publishing and broadcasting, and their commitment to universal literacy which they have been pursuing, effectively made these European alternatives a relic of a colonized era. Massive cultural assistance from one part of the Arab world to another tended to strengthen the common cultural identity of each of the Arab states which suffered the ravages of cultural colonialism. The cultural battles initiated by European colonialism against the integrity and unity of the Arab people, epitomized by their twin attack on Islam and Arabic, brought an affirmation of both. That affirmation was first reflected in the political program of the nationalist movements in North Africa and the Middle East which exhibited an unusual attachment to, and sometimes a commitment to, a revitalized Islam. It was equally reflected in the insistence on Arab unity predicated on the cultural identity of the people — an identity that was in large measure forged through centuries of cultural development expressed through Arabic. But in affirming both, the Arab nationalists were not insisting on either a stultified religious value system nor in as Arabic that was frozen in the Middle Ages. On the contrary, the nationalists recognized quite clearly the need for a modern understanding and implementation of Islamic doctrines and values as well as a modernized and hospitable Arabic that lent itself to use by the multitude.

It was in the light of this recognition that the cultural debates within the Arab world in its post-independence period must be placed. That comprehensive answers to the precise role of a revitalized Islam and its role in society have not been arrived at yet simply indicates that the problems posed by religion to society in general are neither as simple as colonialists assumed nor can they be simply legislated by the state. As Arab societies seriously come to grips with this kind of issue, it is inevitable that different types of answers are given. That Islam continues to play a role in Arab societies is a fact; but what kind of Islam and what kind of role will ultimately emerge will be determined by the existing dynamics in all Arab societies and their adjustment to the problems posed by a more technological era. The use of the two issues by the Arab national movement in the struggle against European colonialism was, as indicated earlier, a direct response to European attack. It may be suggested that the Arab nationalists were quite conscious of the mobilizational value of both issues even though they were at the same time affirming their national identity. In one sense, therefore, it

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may legitimately be said that Arab nationalism was the creation of European colonialism just as Negritude was the creation of white racism. With the serious recession of European colonialism in the Arab world, it is quite evident that different types of nationalism have grown. There is no question that territorial nationalism, more closely identified with the geographic configuration of each state, has emerged. That nationalism is drawing on spring of supports somewhat different from its earlier type. While its identity is more secure in terms of culture, it is preoccupied with different sets of questions and priorities. These priorities are increasingly being reflected in the literary and artistic works of each Arab state; and although such work is expressed through the medium of Arabic, it may turn out in fact to speak much more meaningfully to very specific populations comprehended within the frontiers of a specific state. While perhaps it is too early to make a final judgment on the outcome of this process, we can suggest that what we may be witnessing today in the Arab world is a new national-cum-territorial expression using Arabic as a vehicle. This new expression may have something in common with expressions stemming from neighboring areas but in due course the separate development of each Arab state may produce a region divided by a common language. Would it be too much to suggest that we are anticipating the growth of an Arab region similar to that of Latin America? If our reading of the data is correct, Arab cultural triumph over European colonialism may turn out to have been a pyrrhic victory.

versified number of para-military groups under the sway of the various Arab governments.

By far the largest component is Al Fatah, the "Front for the Liberation of Palestine." Its head is Yasir Arafat and it maintains close ties to most of the Arab states as well as Russia and China. It is estimated that Al Fatah had 20,000 members in 1970.[2]

Perhaps the most famous, or infamous, of the terrorist organizations is Black September, which is actually not a separate group but a sub-operative unit of Al Fatah. It was Black September which planned and executed the Munich Olympic massacre in 1972, killing eleven Israeli athletes. Black September is the most hated terrorist group in Israel. The most prominent of the Black September leaders is Ali Hassan Salameh; we shall deal with him momentarily.

The second largest independent terrorist group is As' Sa' iqa which is a Syrian group maintained, equipped, and trained by the Syrian army.[3] Sa' iqa was formed by the Ba'ath to serve Syrian interests in Lebanon and Jordan.[4] A full quarter of its members are Syrian army regulars.[5] It is a particular prominence now since it is the primary Syrian backed PLO organ operating in Lebanon.[6] It was Sa' iqa which was originally sent in to quell the Palestinian leftists fighting the Christians in Lebanon.[7]

There are several other groups backed by one or more of the Arab nations and each has its own goal or goals. On one hand stands the PDFLP, the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, which will allow (in theory) a Jewish autonomous region in an Arab Palestine (although the most "moderate" of the groups, they were responsible for the murder of twenty school children at Ma'alot in May, 1974). On the extreme left, lies the Front for the Palestinian Popular Struggle which wants to establish a Pan Arab state without first preparing an all Palestinian state as an intermediate stage. All of the groups

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 128.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 129.

[4] *Aspects of the Palestinian Problem* (Jerusalem: Israel Information Center), 1975, p. 9. Hereinafter referred to as *Aspects.*

[5] *Ibid.*

[6] *Israel and the Palestinian*, p. 129.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 128.

have one common bond. They are bound by the Palestinian National Covenant, Al-Mīthāq Al-Watanī Al-Filastīnī.[8] This functions as the constitution of the PLO.[9] It maintains that the Balfour Declaration is void (Article 20)[10] and that "armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine (Article 9).[11]

The Palestinian National Council at a meeting in Cairo, in June, 1974 agreed on a ten point resolution to the Covenant which contained a statement that liberation of all the soil of Palestine (including Israel) was to be a prelude to "comprehensive Arab unity", in other words to a Pan-Arab State.

What follows will focus on one chain of events and trace what may be illustrated as an evolution in the strategy of terror and counterterror in the Middle East.

Let us begin by stating that Arab terrorists know that through their acts alone they can not possibly put an end to the State of Israel. Their aim is to keep the Palestinian Question in the public's mind and to do this, outrage and terror are their most useful tools.

Sometime before the fall of 1971, a meeting was held in which the leaders of Al Fatah decided to create a new unit.[12] Its leaders and members were to be initially picked from the Intelligence department of Fatah. The three most prominent leaders being Abu Azad, Ghazi 'Abd al-Kadir al-Husseini, and Alı Hassen Salameh.[13] Later the rank and file (its members in fighting strength is estimated at between a hundred and several hundred) were recruited from the most promising members of the general body of Fatah and equally promising Arab students in Europe.[14]

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[8] *Aspects*, p. 30

[9] Y. Harkabi, "The Palestinian National Covenant: An Israeli Commentary," *Maariv* [Jerusalem], December 12, 1969.

[10] United Nations Security Council document S/11932 (January 14, 1976) *Letter Dated 14 January 1976 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council*, p. 13

[11] *Ibid. p. 7.*

[12] *Aspects*, p. 36.

[13] *Israel and the Palestinians*, p. 128.

[14] *Ibid.*

Black September was to be the elite unit. It would have the best resources and intelligence capabilities and its hand picked members were to be zealots. On the surface it seems very odd indeed that it was first used against fellow Arabs.

Even before the 1967 War, Jordan had been a moderating force in the Arab world as opposed to the Nasserites. The Jordanians had been duped into the war by the Israelis and in the process lost Jerusalem and the West bank of the Jordan River.[15] Jordan's King Hussein was and still is the best hope that the Israelis have in the Arab World.[16] Thus Black September began with a series of projects to destroy the moderating force which they viewed as a cancer in their camp. In 1970, in a PLO launched Civil War, Hussein drove out the PLO and fedayeen Palestinians and denied them a base of operations, thus securing Israel's long Eastern border.[17]

On November 28, 1971, Black September brought their own brand of terrorism to the world when the assassinated the Jordanian premier Wasfi Tal in the Cairo Sheraton Hilton. One of the assassins knelt by his victim as onlookers watched in amazement and horror, as he "lapped the blood streaming from his (victim's) mouth."[18] One of the members of the assassination team was Salemeh. Two days later a daily newspaper in Beirut, *An-Nahar* reported: "The Black September organization is, in fact, part of the Fatah movement, but its existence is not acknowledged officially."[19] For over a year this was officially kept secret. Thereafter followed a series of actions against Jordanian officials and interests in Europe.

Then in May, 1972, Black September began operations in earnest against Israel. Sabina Flight 571 enroute from Brussels to Tel Aviv was

[15] Anthony Pearson, "Mayday!, Mayday!" *Penthouse,* May, 1976, p. 54 ff.

[16] The Israelis consider Jordan to be the Palestinian Nation. Thus Hashemite rule in Jordan is imperative to Israeli policy.

[17] "Conversation with King Hussein", *Oui,* January, 1973, p. 107 ff. Hereinafter cited as *Conversation.*

[18] David B. Tinnin, "The Wrath of God", *Playboy,* August, 1976, p. 70 ff. Hereinafter cited as "Wrath of God". Tinnin's work is the only widely published material on the subject. However, it has been acknowledged as a legitimate rendering as with "Mayday!, Mayday!" above.

[19] *An – Nahar* Beirut Dec. 1, 1971.

skyjacked by four Black September terrorists, two men and two women.[20] They demanded the release of 319 Arab guerrillas. In an unprecedented move, the Israelis attacked the jet. Six passengers and two commandoes were wounded; all four terrorists were killed. Many nations condemned this type of retaliation but the Israelis have held to it to the present day with the most recent example being the commando raid on the Entebbe Airport in Uganda. A high Israeli official remarked shortly after the Sabina incident, "If the hyjackers had been allowed any kind of victory, we would be mortgaging the safety of all air travel to Israel. If we had allowed them to win this time, they would do it again and again, and take my word for it, it would cost us in blood no end."[21] The words of this gross underestimation ring hollow.

On September 5, 1972, Black September, with most of the world watching prime time coverage of the Munich Olympics took their revenge for the Israeli action in May. Seven terrorists commandeered the Israeli dormitory in the Olympic village and killed eleven Israeli athletes before it ended. Four of the terrorists were killed and three were arrested.[22] They were released in October of that year as ransom for a Lufthansa plane hijacked by the PFLP.[23]

King Hussein sent a message to German Chancellor Willy Brandt in which he stated: "I convey to you our affliction and anger at this act of violence perpetrated against the civilized world. This crime is the work of sick minds who are opposed to humanity, the Palestinian people and Jordan, and opposed to Arabism, its traditions, its values and cause."[24] He also sent "regardless of political and other considerations . . . condolences to the families of the victims."[25]

One of the planners of the Munich operation was Salameh and that

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[20] William Eggers, The Last Resort, Terrorism: *The Slaughter of Innocents* (Chatsworth, California: Major Books, 1975), p. 66. Information for this paragraph was used from this source.

[21] *Ibid.* p. 72.

[22] Acts of Terror Outside Israel (Embassy of Israel: Washington, D. C., 1976) p. 8. Hereinafter referred to as *Acts.*

[23] *Ibid.*

[24] "Conversation," p. 107.

[25] *Ibid.*

elevated him to a top position on a certain Israeli list.[26] Under the direction of Golda Meir, Major General Zvi Zamir, the chief of the Mossad, the Israeli version of the CIA, was allowed to organize a special unit.[27] "For nearly eleven months, Israeli hit teams, which were called The Wrath of God, waged war against the leaders of Black September; (sic) a war of kill and counterkill that embodied the most uncompromising tenet of both Jewish and Arab cultures: an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth. And the secret war had secret consequences, which contributed directly to the situation that prevails in the Middle East today."[28]

Both the Israelis and Black September tended to work principally in Europe since Black September's cells were formed, maintained, and supplied by Arab embassies there.[29] In the course of their actions and counteractions, it came to light on March 1, 1973, at the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Khartoum, in a raid in which two American and one Belgian diplomats were executed, that Black September was affiliated with the PLO.[30]

The Israelis eliminated 12 members of the Black September hierarchy and finally, in an attempt to kill a man whom they thought was Salameh, murdered an innocent Arab in a Norwegian village.[31] Salameh escaped and is still very active in Lebanon. But the greatest consequence comes from the fact that the Mossad lost its position of integrity. Two days before the Yom Kippur War, a Mossad agent in Europe succeeded in photographing the entire plans for the Syrian-Egyptian invasion. They were delivered in time to Israel but they were disregarded as fakes. The results are well known.[32]

Soon after Munich, Black September brought the art of letter bombing to its most efficient. This was from October, 1972, to March, 1973.

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[26] "Wrath of God" p. 72.

[27] *Ibid.*

[28] *Ibid.*

[29] *Ibid.*

[30] *Acts,* p. 10.

[31] "Wrath of God" p. 72.

[32] It took the Israelis two weeks to fight the Arabs to a standstill before being able to take the advantage.

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In October, 1974, a Black September team was arrested while in the final stages of planning the assassination of King Hussein, who was in Rabat, Morocco.[33]

Aside from the Hussein plans, the Arabs have feared that one or more of the PLO groups acting on its own would commit an act against a member in good standing of the Covenant. This occurred, much to the embarrassment of the Arabs and as a boost to the Israeli propaganda machine on September 21, 1975, when six terrorists of the PFLP and other units not directly named, kidnapped eleven OPEC ministers in Vienna.[34] The hostages were flown to Algeria, where they were released and the terrorists were allowed to go free.[35] Since then, the PLO has had major problems and not with the Israelis. They have had to tighten their hold on the extremist organizations and during this process their divisional involvement in the Lebanese crisis has caused them no end of worry.

When the Lebanese war reached a certain point, the Syrians sent its PLO regulars of Sa'iqa and other groups consisting of Fatah members into Lebanon to curb the Palestinians there, it was to prevent an Israeli invasion. It was feared that the Israelis would do this to protect their northern border.

What happened was of supreme embarrassment to the PLO. Here, one of its prime backers was openly abetting one of its contingents in the attempted control of one of its sympathizers, in fact, a group which represents its public reason for existence. When the PLO began to have trouble, the Syrian Army proper invaded Lebanon and this brought condemnation from most of the Arab States. Syria realized that it was on a tight rope and could only hope to fight a limited conflict like the U.S. had in Viet Nam. One of the great ironies in history is that now we can see a Christian army and an Arab army with the sympathy and moral support of a Jewish army, which it hates, fighting another Arab army which is backed by the Arab establishment.

It may be prudent to forecast that if the Palestinians accept with credulity the latest cease fire proposal in Lebanon, which is Syrian backed, the Israelis may have to change their Northern strategy to a con-

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[33] *Acts*, p. 12.

[34] *Ibid., p.* 14.

[35] *Ibid.*

tingency they have dreaded. The Palestinians arc on the defensive and will probably try to accept the best terms offered. To them this newest proposal is going to be the most advantageous one. It is basically a remake of a 1969 agreement. It allows (1) for no heavy weapons to be held by the Palestinians within the Palestinian refugee camps such as Tell Zatar. (2) It allows for no heavy weapons outside the camp in the countryside except in the *South* where the PLO will have a more important sway. (3) It also maintains that any raiding into Israel must be cleared by the Lebanese government.

It will be interesting to see whether or not Sa' iqa will continue to be regarded as a full operative member of the PLO in Lebanon, in which case it will more or less complete Syria's *de facto* power in Southern Lebanon, thus allowing for any future conventional military operations to be extended along Israel's Northern border to the sea. If Sa' iqa is considered to be a sub-unit of the Syrian army, its control will be in the north and eastern parts of Lebanon, if indeed the other Arab countries would allow Syrian presence at all.

The introduction of the Pan-Arab peace keeping force, which is to date so effectual as to be a farce, may, if the Syrians allow it, be the key to the question of the fate of Lebanon. The Israelis are wary of Syrian presence in Lebanon; indeed they are concerned for the safety of Hashemite Jordan. It is not unlikely that the Israelis would invade Jordan to help Hussein or invade Lebanon to help the Christians if the matter is not settled or if Jordan were attacked. This leads one to several points which must be considered:

1. As has been stated previously, individual terrorist acts will not bring about the demise of the state of Israel.
2. Even though this is true they keep the public's attention; thus they will continue.
3. Given past Israeli hard line reaction to terrorism, it is not improbable they will continue in their manner of retaliation.
4. Israel considers Jordan to be the Palestinian homeland and thus the Palestinian question is extraneous.
5. The Israelis will go to any length to prove their point e.g. the Entebbe commando raid, risking possible international retaliation.
6. If the PLO remains fragmented its individual components may commit acts which the general body cannot, thus opening the door to a form of Pan-Arab civil war.
7. Israeli-Egyptian and Israeli-Jordanian dètente along with positions taken by Iran and other states provides a division in Arab thought.

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8. Given this and the probability that intelligence reports that Israel has at least 20 assembled nuclear war heads are correct, the possibilities of tactical nuclear warfare in the Middle East are increasing geometrically.

The conclusions are not obvious. The PLO must gain some semblance of internal and external order. The Arabs must realize that the Israelis can at least fight them to a stalemate if not obliterate them. The Israelis must consider their policies and contingencies and be prepared to negotiate according to the circumstances allowed. If not, there may be nothing left to negotiate for.

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THE EMERGENCE OF CLASSES IN ALGERIA

Marnia Lazreg

Studies of imperialism have recently pointed out the importance of using the concept of class as a tool of analysis of social structure both in industrialized societies and in what is referred to as the Third World. This resurgence of class analysis constitutes a shift from an elite/mass model which proved its limited ability to explain such phenomena as "development" and "underdevelopment", to a more dynamic model which has the advantage of promoting an understanding of the structural roots of social and political events. However, a class analysis of Third World societies requires that the Marxism categories of class be reassessed in order to grasp a non-Western, historically specific reality in its complexity. This paper attempts to analyze the emergence of classes in Algeria using modified Marxist categories. In the first part, a discussion of theoretical and methodological questions will be presented. In the second part, the historical background of class formation will be briefly outlined. In the third part, the actual process of emergence of classes will be analyzed.

Before entering into the theoretical and historical analyses of classes in Algeria, it is necessary to refute certain assumptions which social scientists often make in their studies on Algeria. The first assumption is that Algerian society is in a state of transition towards socialism. The second assumption is that Algeria is engaged in the process of "nation-building" where the collective search for unity overrides class cleavages.[1]

Regarding the first notion, it is indeed true that Algeria is a transitional society in that it has passed from a colonial to an independent status and is in the process of moving from an almost exclusively agricultural to an industrial economy. However, it is difficult to determine

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[1] Jacques Berque, "L' Idee de Classe", *Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologie*, Vol. 38 (1968).

whether it is in transition toward socialism. For the time being, various forms of economic organization coexist and it is difficult to ascertain which one will be dominant in the future. The concept of transition has a limited explanatory value in that it tends to bypass and overshadow the specificity and duration of present phenomena by imputing to them a fleeting character.

The argument according to which new nations are better understood if studied in terms of nation-building and cultural revival, rather than classes, is misleading. First, it confuses the ideology of nationalism with its socio-economic foundations. It assumes that the construction of the national economy is the overriding interest of both leaders and led, without investigating the form and content of this economy and their differential effects on the social structure.

In Algeria, the desire to industrialize at a rapid pace has led to a special form of socio-economic organization which is capital rather than labor intensive and has therefore resulted in an increase in the gap between the employed and the unemployed and a subsequent increase in emigration to France. This points to the fact that nationalism may be viewed as a "class phenomenon instead of a supra-class mechanism."[2] The national *élan* ought to be analyzed in terms of the objective conditions under which leaders create new institutions and the interests that these institutions reflect.

Finally, the emphasis placed on post-colonial national unity betrays an elitist and an evolutionist bias. It is taken for granted that national "elites" are best equipped to deal with the task of economic reconstruction and that the "masses", stricken by some political inertia, cannot but wait for the elite to improve the conditions under which they live. Besides, it is also implicitly admitted that new nations exhibit a simple structure which will become more complex as their economies become more diversified. At the same time, this focus on nation-building as a factor of political unity assumes that the phenomenon of independence has the effect of merely restoring the pre-colonial order rather than transforming the structures inherited from the past. The pre-colonial order is somehow identified with cooperation, communal bonds, and community of faith. In reality, the Algerian pre-colonial era was characterized by a specific network of relations of property and appropria-

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[2]   Kalman Silvert, *Expectant Peoples: Nationalism and Development* (New York: Vintage Books, 1967); p. 28.

tion which, although cast in a seemingly communal framework was marked by some degree of inequality in the ownership of the means of production.[3] The evolution of these social relations under colonialism and after independence should be examined in order to provide an understanding of the transformations that affected the Algerian society as it moved from one form of socio-economic organization to another.

Before analyzing the nature of these transformations it is necessary to briefly define the concept of class as it is applied to the Algerian reality. The Marxian definition revolves around three criteria:

1. the relations of production;
2. consciousness of one's class position and interests;
3. political organization to promote class interests.

The ownership of the means of production gives rise to unequal social relations between those who own capital and those who merely own their labor power. This, however, is an objective division which may be necessary but not sufficient to qualify a group of people as members of a class. A class "in-itself" will become a class "for-itself" only if individuals engaged in the process of production develop a consciousness of their objective situation as members of a class with common interests. In the case of Algeria, this definition requires some specification. Algeria is marked by the coexistence of three modes of production: precapitalist, capitalist and "socialist". Under these conditions, the criterion of ownership is insufficient and needs to be supplemented with the factor of appropriation of labor power. This appropriation constitutes the common denominator of the existing modes of production. It represents the combined effects of the various modes more adequately than ownership and control.

Likewise, the concept of class consciousness is problematic insofar as it is difficult to ascertain the existence of this phenomenon under conditions where individuals' ability to organize independently and articulate their demands are somewhat limited. However, instead of dismissing this criterion as what Poulantzas calls a "Hegelian reminiscence", I will locate manifestations of this type of consciousness in areas other than political organization in daily practical activity.

This definitional problem being raised, how many classes do we have in Algeria? How have they evolved historically?

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[3] René Galissot, "Classification Sociale en Systeme Pre-Capitaliste: l' Exemple Algerien", *Cahiers du Centre d' Etudes et de Recherches Marxistes,* No. 60 (1968).

If class is defined according to the mode of appropriation of labor power and of the means of production, it is clear that Algerian society is composed of four main classes:

1. Those who appropriate labor power. Within this class three fractions emerge: a) the State administrators and controllers of the means of production; b) the new entrepreneurs who are encouraged by the State to create industries that would supplement the government's efforts made in this respect. The latter are theroretically controlled by the former. However, when they become partners as in the establishment of "mixed" corporations, the notion of control loses its meaning. Antagonism between the two fractions may occur as the new entrepreneurs' dynamic growth finds itself stunted by the restraints of a nationalistic economic policy; c) the large landowners, some of whom happen to be members of the state apparatus.

2. The urban and rural wage laborers;
3. Individuals in the liberal professions and small businessmen;
4. Peasants who own small plots of land.

Three periods must be distinguished in the evolution of classes in Algeria: the Turkish, the French and the post-independence period.

1 *The Turkish domination* of Algeria affected but did not destroy the social structure of Algeria. A Turkish aristocracy of administrators and military men held the monopoly of political and economic power. An Algerian aristocracy was comprised of two strata. One stratum (*Makhzen*) derived its power over a given territory by virtue of its allegiance to its Turkish counterpart; it helped the Turks levy taxes on the less subdued tribes in return for a partial exemption from taxes and/or a land allocation. The second stratum was made up of families tied to the religious institution They would occasionally lead rebellions against the Turks. The peasantry was made up of small land owners, who often hired their services out as sharecroppers of "khammes". In the cities, a mercantile bourgeoisie composed of Moors and Jews who escaped the Spanish Inquisition was active, but was kept under control by the Turkish government.

2 *The French colonization* which started in 1830 and ended in 1962 radically changed the form and evolution of the social structure prevalent under the Turkish domination.

First, a systematic policy of "land grab" carried out between 1844 and 1873 destroyed the individual's right to the usufruct of the land, and forcefully established alienable individual property of the European

type as *the* mode of property. Thus, the right to work which the Algerian community guaranteed its members was replaced by the abstract right to individual ownership which made easier the sale of the land so much coveted by the colonists. Labor lost its character as a direct productive activity for the development of the land and soon became divorced from the ownership or possession of the means of production. In other words, Algerian landowners became laborers on the land that was once their property. This transformation was precipitated by the replacement of Islamic law by French law, the sequestration of lands belonging to rebellious tribes, and frantic usury.

Second, a systematic administrative policy of breaking up the tribal structure resulted in relocating masses of people picked at random, thereby destroying the bonds that linked a poor farmer to his well-off counterpart.

Third, the establishment of a capitalist export economy ruined those among the Algerians who escaped expropiation but were not equipped for this new mode of production. They felt compelled to sell the surplus which was once used as a reserve to fall back on in time of drought. The most significant outcome of the French colonization was the relative impoverishment of all social categories now transformed into what a colonist called a "human dust".

These changes in the economic structure were also reflected on the level of social relations. The Algerian aristocracy was deliberately divested of its prestige since its functions were depreciated and replaced by new ones. The mercantile bourgeoise was transformed into a marginal category. As to the peasantry, it increasingly became proletarianized as wage labor replaced the "khammes" system.[4] By the same token, the new colonial laws enabled some indigenous farmers to buy up plots which they consolidated into fairly large estates of 100 hectares and more. A small "rural bourgeoisie" thus emerged. As colonialization progressed, this rural bourgeoisie would typically send its sons to French schools to acquire training mostly in the liberal professions. It is among this group that nationalism made inroads in the 1940's.

A small industrial bourgeoisie was able to make its debut but was not allowed to develop freely. It could not break through the political

[4] See Charles Robert Ageron, *Les Algérians Musulmans et la France (1871-1919)*, 2 vols (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1968), 2:817-836.

restrictions that the colonial regime placed upon it. Indeed, the contradiction of the colonial regime is that while it was engaged in the process of primitive accumulation of capital it held up to the Algerians the promise of being "assimilated" to the French nation, that is, subjected to regular rather than exceptional laws. Thus, a situation was created whereby the urban merchants and rural bourgeoisie held a position in the production process without playing the socio-political role that this position would normally entail. This fact had a tremendous historical importance for the class alliances that led to nationalism. It also has theoretical implications in that it points to a de-emphasis of the role that the ownership of the means of production plays under certain historically specific conditions.

Class Articulations Under French Colonization

During the colonial period in the 1920's and 1930's, the political expression of classes came under the form both of cultural revivalism and demands for equal rights with the French colonists. These latter demands are an instance of class thinking preceding national thinking. The group of Algerians that demanded French citizenship represented the urban and rural bourgeoisie. It must be noted that at the same time, the proletariat under the leadership of Messali Hadj called for the independence of Algeria. In the 1940's, the bourgeoisie moved towards a more nationalistic position while still operating within the existing legal framework, As colonialism became more and more rigid towards nationalist claims and as economic difficulties increased, a new and modest social category of the petty bourgeois type was brought into the arena in the 1950's. Being closer to the masses, it was able to see that political action within the colonial framework was doomed to failure. An independent Algeria, where full expression of class interests would no longer be hindered by a colonial superstructure was the goal that this class was able to impose upon the bourgeoisie. It was responsible for starting the armed struggle that led to independence in July, 1962.

The antagonism between the petty-bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie existed all throughout the war for independence, although it was strategically hidden behind the unifying façade of the F.L.N. (Front of National Liberation). However, the political skills of the bourgeoisie enabled it to play a crucial role during all phases of the war.

Classes Struggle After Independence

It was not until independence was achieved that class conflict unfolded. A few days after independence was declared, the government in exile (G.P.R.A.), which was dominated by the bourgeoisie, wanted to establish itself as the new government of independent Algeria. Petty-bourgeois and burgeois clashed over the issue. The petty-bourgoisie emerged from the struggle as the dominant class. However, the petty-bourgeoisie itself was split into two fractions: a radical led by Ben Bella, and a more conservative fraction led by Colonel Boumediene.

The Ben Bella fraction was able, in its three years of government, to expound an ideology of socialism, to endorse and codify a spontaneously evolved movement of workers' self-management, and nationalize part of the businesses owned either by nationals or foreigners.

The Boumediene fraction which came to power after a coup in June, 1965 started a process of containment of self-management and creation of state-owned and "mixed" corporations where the state enters into a partnership with private investors. [5] The new regime also made it possible for a technocratic bourgeoisie to assert itself, and for an industrial capitalist class of entrepreneurs to emerge by encouraging Algerian owners of capital to invest in light industry. This is a significant development both politically and theoretically:

1) On the political level, it permits the petty-bourgeoisie to claim that it is concerned with the welfare of the nation by actively seeking independence from *foreign* capital;
2) On the theoretical level, this development points to the state bureaucracy's role as not only reproducing the existing relations of production but also "producing" classes. Indeed, the rise of a class of industrial entrepreneurs is guaranteed by a government ordinance, the Code of Investments, which protects the private entrepreneur.

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[5]   A census of economic enterprises in 1968 indicates a high concentration of private businesses.

National Corporations	260 or 26.4 %
Other public enterprises	43 or 4.3
Private enterprises	516 or 52.4
Self-Managed enterprises	166 or 16.9

(Source: RADP, *Industrie*, vol. 3, p. 105)

Although it is the ascendant class, the petty-bourgeoisie is not hegemonic. Its fundamental weakness has been its inability to create a strong and organized party. This weakness must be seen as one of the consequences of Algeria's colonial background. Before independence, the F.L.N. was by necessity a "nation-party."[6] After independence, the F.L.N. could not promote the interests of one class over others since it "represented" all of them. The Ben Bella fraction of the petty-bourgeoisie devised a theory of the party which it felt was consistent with its socialist goals. Ben Bella wanted a vanguard party whose membership would be composed of all war veterans. The assumption was that the revolution had levelled out all class differences. Boumediene's use of the party is more in tune with the pre-independence conception of the party as a nation-party. He opened the F.L.N. to all Algerians who accepted his policies, just as the 1954 F.L.N. accepted in its ranks any Algerian who valued the goal of freedom.

Ben Bella's and Boumediene's desire to reconcile opposing class interests prevented them from setting forth a precise doctrine that would serve as a reference point to the incoming members. This resulted in alienating peasants and workers from a structure theoretically organized to promote their interests insofar as it was claimed to be the "avant garde organization of the Algerian people."[7] Contrary to the Chinese Communist Party, for example, the F.L.N. did not rely on the "masses", nor did it mobilize them. An illustration of this deficiency is provided by Boumediene's appeal, in 1968, to technocratic cadres to help reorganize the party. This move heightens the contradiction between theory and practice and reveals the confusion between economics and politics, expertise and revolution. The state administrative cadres are equated with the avant-garde of the party because they have, in Boumediene's words, "definite skills" that could be used in the Party's political positions, which require "a lot of conscience and culture."[8]

A second weakness of the petty-bourgeoisie has been the type of bureaucracy it has promoted. The efforts to meet the demands stemming from a new social order and the pressures to bend a foreign (e. g. colonial) bureaucratic structure to specific needs has placed heavier

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[6] See Mohammed Bedjaoui, *Law and the Algerian Revolution* (Brussels, 1961).

[7] See *La Charte d' Alger*, F.L.N. Commission Centrale d' Orientation, 1964.

[8] Houari Boumediene, *Discours*, Vol. 2, p. 245.

constraints on the bureaucrats. These contraints, combined with the role that the military plays as the ultimate arbiter, do not permit one to conclude that the Algerian dominant class is identical with the bureaucracy. Rather, the state apparatus appears to be the arena where different classes and fractions thereof meet. It is used by the technocrats and administrators along with the petty-bourgeoisie as a means to reproduce the conditions of their existence. By the same token, the state apparatus is also used to *produce* new classes or social categories. The emergence of a class of industrial entrepreneurs may be interpreted as a way for the technocratic bourgeoisie to build support outside the state apparatus. Likewise, the fact that these entrepreneurs' activity is ultimately controlled by the state enables the petty-bourgeoisie to perceive itself as being in command on the economy.[9]

To conclude, the evolution of the class structure of Algeria provides an example of the long-lasting effects of colonial domination. French colonialism determined the shape and direction of the Algerian social classes. It would be misleading to conceive of the present outlook of Algerian society as a distorted or peripheral one. Such a view would imply that Algerian society is anomic and that there is a norm toward which it should evolve. Rather, the specific type of colonial domination to which Algeria was subjected should be seen as having led to a specific type of society to be studied in its own right. Comparisons with other Third World societies that experienced similar colonial domination might very well bring our sociological consciousness to the realization that new ways of class formation and crystallization have already appeared, and challenge our traditional tools of analysis.

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[9] The role of these entrepreneurs is an important one and has not yet been investigated thoroughly. There is evidence that they do not perceive themselves as entities that supplement governmental efforts to combat unemployment but as capitalist actors. Indeed, capital investments are becoming more and more concentrated while the number of jobs created has been decreasing since 1970.

See *Industrie Privée*, AARDES, January 1975, p. 30.

OIL AND
THE FUTURE OF THE ARAB CIVILIZATION

Mourad Wahba

A definition of terms is essential at the beginning of any scientific re-
search. Thus two terms included in my paper have to be defined; that
is, oil and civilization.

Firstly, civilization is a techno-ideological system resulting from the
interaction between man and environment.

Any living system, by its nature, has to be consistent with itself; con-
sequently it tends to preserve its "identity". But this preservation is not
stable, it is dynamic due to the "evolution" which is immanent in civil-
ization as far as it resembles the living creature. Out of the interaction
between identity and evolution results a third feature which is the ten-
dency of the living system to be closed and open at the same time.

Secondly, oil is a means of production, but it turns into a productive
force to fulfill the purpose which is determined by the state of the civ-
ilizational system, that is, its being closed or open.

The relation between oil and civilization is a kind of challenge, signify-
ing a dialectical relation which implies contradiction that should be ex-
cluded.

Two questions are to be raised:

What is this contradiction?

How could it be excluded?

Contradiction is either in one system, or among many systems. This
first one is intrinsic, the second is extrinsic.

Concerning the topic of my paper, there is an extrinsic contradiction
between the Arab System and the Israeli-American System resulting
from the use of oil in the October War as a political weapon.

On the 17th of October 1973, Arab oil ministers held a meeting in
which they agreed to lessen the production of oil and to raise its price

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as a way to force Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories and recognize the legal rights of the Palestinians.

Economically, Western Europe was badly hurt by the Arab regulations, and the same occurred with America, but on a political basis. This was due to the contradictions aroused between America and Western Europe on the pretence that America handled the October war without consulting NATO. Moreover, some of the Arab countries under American influence began to revolt in a way that appeared to harm American interests, not only in the Arab World, but also in the Third World in its struggles for the development of an independent national economy.

These contradictions show that the use of oil as a political weapon reflects a world dimension in the Israeli-Arab conflict. On the other hand, the Arabs must understand and estimate the social content of this dimension, as far as America and Western Europe are considered as capitalist countries backing Israel, and as far as the Soviet Union and the socialist countries are supporting their just struggle.

A question is to be raised:

Where is the Arab civilization system?

Actually, between the national trend which seems to be *sui-generis*, surpassing the ideological conflict and preserving its authenticity, and a second trend that intends to be open towards modernization. Many seminars were held, in the Arab World, dealing with these two trends; that is, dealing with authenticity and modernization.

One of these seminars held in Kuwait (7-12 April, 1974) entitled "Crisis of civilizational development in the Arab World", issued a statement to the effect that the obstacles against the development of the Arab civilization could be surpassed through a radical change of the socio-economic structure and through modernization of the intellectual values. This means that the Arab culture of the past days *should be* modernized. This "should be" is in opposition to what is going on. And "what is going on" is included in either of the two mentioned contradictory trends, and both are wrong. The statement concludes that the right trend is that which synthesizes both trends without excluding either of them, and this synthesis could be realized through a surpassing outlook.

But, what is the nature of this surpassing outlook?

It is a scientific and rational outlook which is influenced by our techno-scientific epoch, so the statement says.

In my own view, this statement is, apparently, a modern one, but in fact it is not, because it is void of the social content that distinguishes our epoch, that is, the socio-technico-scientific revolution. In other words, we can't speak of science or technology *per se*, but of science or technology that has to realize a certain purpose, and that purpose is, definitely, the realization of the social revolution or the socialist revolution, as opposed to the capitalist regime. And this should be the main idea for what is termed "Authenticity and modernization".

One of the main obstacles to the realization of this main idea is the slogan which is raised by the Arab reactionary power and polarized in these words "The anathema of imported ideas". This is, indeed, a paradox which was absent in the past when the Islamic Civilization began to spread all over the world. The Arabs were open to the science of the Pagan Greek civilization. It happened that a few statements were raised against the use of logic, but it did not have any positive effect. On the contrary, Moslem theology was fruitful when it was open to the main principles of Aristotle's philosophy.

Here, a question is to be raised:

What is the justification of this openness of the Islamic system towards the pagan system?

It is the modernization of the Islamic system to prove its consistency with reason and science. That is why the great Moslem thinkers were involved in trying to conciliate faith with reason, in other words, religion with philosophy.

On the contrary, our Arab thinkers today commit a fatal mistake when they engage in discussing this issue, because the main issue in any epoch cannot be repeated. Otherwise, the movement of history would be circular, and this kind of movement is against evolution, while history is a living being in constant change. Moreover, the movement of history does not move in a straight line, for otherwise it would be mechanical and void of contradictions which are essential for any evolution. Therefore, the movement of history is spiral in a sense that it includes two processes: regression and progression. Thanks to this movement, we can solve the paradox of the conciliation between authenticity and modernization. It is not a matter of addition, but a matter of multiplication because the result differs, qualitatively and not quantitatively, from the two components, that is, authenticity and modernization.

In this sense, we could find out the main issue of our epoch, that is the social revolution, or to be accurate, the socialist revolution.

However, the socialist revolution is impossible without the spirit of "secularization".

What is secularization?

It is the defatalization of history, the discovery by man that he has been left with the world on his hands, that he can no longer blame fortune or juries for what he does with it. Secularization is man turning his attention away from worlds beyond and toward this world and this time (saeculum = this present age). It is what Dietrich Bonhoeffer, in 1944, called "man's coming of age". In other words, we can say that secularization is the separation between the absolute and the relative.

But, in my own point of view, secularization is the minimum of the modern age, while the social content is the maximum. That is why the modern city is not only a secular city, but secular either in a capitalist way or in a socialist way. In other words, it is techno-ideological city.

What about the Arab city?

It is not secular. Secular ideas were expounded beginning in the 1920's, but they did not form a social trend. We could mention two of the most famous Arab thinkers who tried to systematize secularization, I mean, Sheikh Ali-Abdel-Razik of Cairo (in his book *Islam and the origin of politics* published in 1925) and Bishop Haddad of Lebanon (in his articles published in 1974 in a Lebanese journal "AFAK").

Razik's main idea is the separation between religion and politics. He agrees that Al-Khilafa is not a religious post, and it does not replace the Prophet. He also agrees that to be against this statement is working for the benefit of the kings and against the interests of the Moslems. Owing to these secular ideas Razik was dismissed from his post.

Bishop Haddad's main idea is the separation between the absolute and the relative. Due to this daring idea Bishop Haddad was ordered by the religious authorities to stop preaching.

Thus, the civilizational challenge that faces the Arab city is this: if secular, then choose either secular capitalism or secular socialism.

Oil, as a political weapon, is a proof of this civilizational challenge, because it was not used — during the October War — against the socialist camp, in other words, against the secular socialist city, but against the capitalist camp, against the secular capitalist city. But America blackmailed this challenge by proclaiming that the countries producing oil are using it against the welfare of the people all over the world, and by threatening these countries with being occupied.

Consequently, oil is a means of proving the exploiting feature of the capitalist regime.

But, is oil able to surpass this function with a new one which tends to perform a radical change of the Arab World?

Of course, this is possible, on the condition that we should not separate oil and the socialist revolution. But this condition is not possible unless we isolate the Arab reactionary power, because this power is a great obstacle to changing oil from a means of production to a productive force, by exporting it as a raw material to the imperialist countries.

The decisive result is the progress of the West and the backwardness of the Arabs. Thus, there is a dialectical relation between progress and backwardness in a sense that backwardness is an outcome of its contradiction; progress. This contradiction lies between two systems: The Western system and the Arab system. Needless to say, this contradiction should be excluded, but not according to the laws of formal logic, that is by completely refusing the Western system. If formal logic is adopted, the Arabs will be left behind. Instead, dialectical logic should be used for the exclusion of the mentioned contradiction, by encountering a synthesis.

But, a condition is needed for finding a synthesis, and that condition is consciousness. This is the historic responsibility of the revolutionary intelligentsia in the Arab World. Its principal task is to convince the Arab peoples of this organic relation between oil and social revolution.

To what extent did the Arab intelligentsia succeed in fulfilling this task?

In a seminar held in 1974 in Kuwait three trends were expounded as ideal means of using the surplus-value, resulting from producing oil.

The first trend suggests using this surplus-value in the Western countries and not in Arab countries, in so far as they are underdeveloped.

The second trend suggests putting the surplus-value in the hands of the international organizations so as to avoid the dangers of being captured by the Western countries, and of the defects of the Arab backwardness in the process of economic development.

The third trend places emphasis on the natural development concerning the use of the surplus-value.

I am against the first two trends. The first trend deepens the exploitation by the capitalist camp, and thus preserves the contradiction that should be excluded. The second trend suggests that there is a congenital defect in the Arabs, and this is a non-scientific outlook.

As for the third trend, it is accepted to some extent because it faces the social problems and not the social revolution.

To conclude, oil will be a civilizational challenge unless it is related to the socialist revolution, the distinguishing feature of our epoch.