

EL COLEGIO DE MEXICO


915_9/In611/1976pe/CE



*3 905 0335683 *

Fecha de vencimiento

--



XXX INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF HUMAN SCIENCES
IN ASIA AND NORTH AFRICA

**Peasantry
and
National Integration**

Editor

Celma Agüero

El Colegio de México

CE
915.9
In 611
1976 PE

309115

Open access edition funded by the National Endowment for the Humanities/Andrew W. Mellon Foundation Humanities Open Book Program.



The text of this book is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License: <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/>

Primera edición 1981

D.R. © 1981

EL COLEGIO DE MEXICO

Camino al Ajusco 20

México 20. D.F.

Impreso y hecho en México.

Printed and made in Mexico.

ISBN 968-12-C111-6

1975
adm 1980

Contents

Preface 1

Introduction *Peter Worsley* 5

Part I On peasants and national integration

Perspectives for the Study of the Peasantry and national
integration *Celma Agüero, Susana B.C. Devalle, Michiko Tanaka* 45

The peasants and the Project for National integration in
Contemporary India *Bipan Chandra* 51

Ethnicity, peasantry and National Integration *Darcy Ribeiro* 83

The difficult pluralism: multiethnicity and national
revolution in Peru *Stefano Varese* 99

Part II Attempts at Integration

Integration and politicization (towards a radical redefinition
of integration) *Jorge R. Serrano* 115

National integration of the peasantry: the case of Japan
Harushige Yamasaki 139

1975 a. 67 90

Comments	<i>Ciro F. S. Cardoso</i>	153
Cooperativism and its role in the disintegration of the peasantry	<i>Ursula Oswald</i>	157
Philippine agrarian policy today: implementation and political impact	<i>David Wurfel</i>	171
Peasant mobilization in Java: conflict-model strategy in rural development	<i>Gerrit Huizer</i>	199
Peasants and national integration in the Maghreb: why does agrarian reform not mobilise the peasants of Maghreb?	<i>Abdelkader Zghal</i>	215
Sinarquismo or the revolutionary detour of the right-wing	<i>Jean Meyer</i>	237
The peasantry and the ethnic factor: the adivasis from Chota Nagpur (India)	<i>Susana B. C. Devalle</i>	247
The role of Egyptian peasants in the 1919 revolution	<i>Mohamed Ahmed Anis</i>	257
Economic conditions for broadening the geographical horizon of peasant awareness in the Edo era	<i>Tosbio Furushima</i>	271
Senegal-peasants and nation, prospects for horizontal integration	<i>Celma Agüero</i>	277
West Malaysia: a case of a late-developing peasant problem	<i>P. L. Burns</i>	297
Final debate		321

List of Participants

Mohamed Ahmed Anis, El Cairo University. Egypt.

Celma Agüero, El Colegio de México. Mexico City.

Roger Bartra, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México. Mexico City.

Simone Benckeikh, Institute of Social Research. Porto, Portugal.

Peter L. Burns, University of Adelaide. Australia.

Ciro F. Cardoso, Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia. México City.

Bipan Chandra, Jawaharlal Nehru University. New Delhi, India.

Anne Marie De la Vega, Centro de Investigaciones del Desarrollo Rural. Mexico City.

Susana B.C. Devalle, El Colegio de México. Mexico City.

Toshio Furushima, Sonshu University. Tokyo, Japan.

Gerrit Huizer, University of Nijmegen Netherlands.

Jean Meyer, Université de Perpignan. France.

Mokhzami, B.A.R., University of Malaya. Kuala Lumpur, Malaya.

Ursula Oswald, Centro de Investigaciones Superiores del Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia. Mexico City.

Susan Paine, Cambridge University, UK.

Darcy Ribeiro, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

Mr. Ruoner, Australian National University. Australia.

Jorge R. Serrano, Centro de Investigaciones Superiores del Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia and El Colegio de México. Mexico City.

Michiko Tanaka. El Colegio de México. Mexico City.

Stefano Varese, Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia. Mexico City.

Peter Worsley, Manchester University UK.

David Wurfel, University of Windsor, Ontario, Canada.

Harushige Yamasaki, Osaka City University. Japan.

Abdelkader Zghal, Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches sociales. Tunis, Tunisia.

Preface

Celma Agüero

This collection is the result of the papers presented at the Seminar on Peasantry and National Integration held under the auspices of the Thirtieth International Congress of Human Sciences in Asia and North Africa in Mexico City in August 1976.

The attempt to discuss the topic in Mexico during the gathering of specialists from Asia, Africa, Europe, the United States and Latin America proved to be a valuable experience. This was not only because the opportunity made an effective confrontation possible, permitting the juxtaposition of the results of innovative work and the presence of enriching hypotheses, but also because, after five intensive work sessions, we were able to establish an area for common discussion and propose directions for future research.

From among the difficulties and obstacles which occurred, we were able to salvage their importance as stimuli. Among the risks that could have endangered the gathering's success, the greatest was the possibility of moving among generalities: from those of the theoretical world to those informing the world of the empirical interview and the descriptive sample. But the participant's interests and preoccupation about joining theoretical elaboration to concrete studies in a different movement according to the case and people, set an example of scientific spirit that dominated the papers as a whole and dissipated those risks. On the contrary, it made for a discussion which was increasingly focused on their interests.

The commentaries and discussions which came up in each of the sessions uncovered the currents of reflection and interest in topics which were taken up several times: the characteristics of vertical and horizontal integration; peasant and agrarian reform; peasant changes in industrial societies; ethnicity and national integration policy; intellectuals in peasant societies; the peasant as a social class in the State and nation.

Starting from a characterization of *peasantry* as a human condition devalued by the advance of the industrial and technological revolution, but which nevertheless uses its ethnic power to resist, to the extent that the peasantry is recognized as a fundamental class in every revolutionary movement, the seminar offered a wide range of cases which went deep into the field of history and which reexamined recent experiences to illuminate the main topic. Cases of industrial development and peasant survival were given, as in the case of Japan, to examine the State's role. The importance of intellectuals in the alliance of rural and urban classes in order to achieve integration without respecting the peasants' interests, as in Algeria, was also discussed. The political language of the resistance, as in the case of Mexico, and the possibilities for peasant action in the anticolonial struggle, as in India, were examined.

The final discussion functioned as an active, creative workshop in which the vigorous participation of those present produced plans for future studies in a fertile field. Possibilities for analysis appeared which recognized the need for linking the peasantry with the worldwide system as a whole, demanding that historical specificity be present in the study at the same time.

The differences between the cultural areas in which the papers were set, the variety of disciplines brought to focus on the questions, and diversity of views on the problems provided objective sources of information and possibilities for interpreting theoretical domains and concrete experiences, instead of being reasons for dispersion, as might have been supposed.

In presenting the studies making up this volume, we attempted to reflect the dynamic validity of the work done. The seminar concentrated its efforts around an axis consisting of the position taken by P. Worsley, who opened up, with great lucidity, key propositions to be considered on this topic.

In the first part, we have grouped together papers discussing concepts inherent to the topic and their possible relationships in the light of the propositions of the peasant society. The second part, dedicated to attempts at integration, brings together papers which analyze the possibilities for the forces integrating the peasantry into national plans, from a perspective of concrete cases and situations. The third part, dedicated to the peasants' responses from a historical perspective –Egypt, Japan, Mexico– and from one of political action –Algiers, Malaysia– shows the peasants' capacity to form a front, not only to respond, but also to create a historical space in a nation's milieu. Unfortunately, the absence of two fundamental cases in a discussion on this topic –those

of China and Vietnam— limits the scope. However, these experiences were not foreign to the mind or spirit of the seminar's work.

This publication was made possible thanks to the generous support of Graciela de la Lama, President of the congress, to the collaboration of the participants, who made modifications in the first drafts and kept in touch despite the distances, to the care and precision with which Michiko Tanaka and Susana de Valle coordinated things from the Seminar

on Contemporary Asia at the Center for Asian and North African Studies, which provided all the support needed.

We are also thankful for the efforts of the translators María E. Vela for English, Ester Iglesia and Ana Magaldi for French, Vicente Hernandez for Japanese, and the help of the secretaries who worked enthusiastically during the pressure of the sessions and throughout the time we were editing: Pilar Camacho, Dalia Santiago, Acela Calderón and Mari Carmen Avila.

Here we express the participants' desire, repeated during the papers read in the last discussion, that this be the first volume in a series which shows the continuity of work so fervently begun in discussing a topic so important as the active role of the peasantry in Asian, African and Latin American societies from its diverse viewpoints.

Introduction

Peter Worsley

Let us begin by employing two now classic conceptualizations of the peasantry: those of Eric Wolf¹ and Teodor Shanin² respectively. Wolf firstly distinguishes “primary” from “secondary” peasantries. “Primary” peasantries are those which constitute the overwhelming mass of the population, i.e., these are *agrarian* societies, where agriculture is the heart of the economy and cities and towns only islands where tiny urban bourgeoisies are engaged in merchandising and small populations of craftsmen in processing in an elementary way the primary products of agriculture. Both are secondary to and dependent upon the dominant agricultural economy.

The rural population of the contemporary world, by contrast, constitutes only a *sector* within a wider economy and polity. Even if – as in the case of India or China today – peasants make up 85% of the population, the dominant centres of economic and political power lie in the towns. In contemporary China, well over three-quarters of the capital formation available to the State comes from the industrial sector: agricultural tax made up 29.6% of national budgetary receipts in 1950, and only 8% in 1958.

The growth of industry in the capitalist Third World is exemplified by Latin America, where, despite a less spectacular rate of growth and a much more unbalanced and dependent kind of industrialization, in all but a very few countries manufacturing now contributes more to GNP than agriculture.³

¹ Eric Wolf, *Peasants*, Prentice-Hall, New Jersey, 1966.

² Teodor Shanin, *Peasants and Peasant Societies*, Penguin Harmondsworth, 1971.

³ For an important debate on the scale and significance of industry in the Third World, see Bill Warren, “Imperialism and Capitalist Industrialization”,

Chinese agriculture, of course, is socialist agriculture, based on the collective ownership and collective working of the land in large units which are not just farms but also the basic social units of administration, education, health care, self-defence, justice, etc., in the countryside. They are also much more autonomous and participatory, in terms of decision-making and self-reliance, than either the Soviet *kolkhoz* or *sovkhoz*, which are rigidly structured within national planning machinery and administrative apparatuses, and more dependent, too, on external inputs, notably machinery.

This policy, first established during the period of industrialization in the 1920s–1930s, depended upon “milking” the peasantry dry in order to finance industrialization. The disastrous consequences are well-known. By contrast, today the Chinese countryside is a network of micro-industrial workshops and small factories. Large, technologically advanced plants in the cities are, of course, the other (and major) “leg” of industry.

The most productive agriculture of all however, not surprisingly, is not socialist agriculture at all, but the most highly mechanized and capital-intensive agriculture in the world, that of the USA and Canada, within whose economies agriculture still constitutes the biggest “industry”. Even in the most advanced capitalist economies, then, however “secondary”, agriculture has not simply been displaced by industry: indeed, its high performance depends upon inputs from the industrial sector (notably fertilizers and machinery).

Obviously Chinese or Soviet modes of agricultural production are entirely absent from the underdeveloped capitalist world. Large-scale, capital-intensive agriculture has existed for many decades in the form of plantations, estates and farms; today, modern “agribusiness” is developing rapidly. But peasant production still persists on a massive scale in the “world’s countryside”. As Palerm has reminded us for Mexico, despite the exodus to the urban areas (especially the massive explosion of Mexico City), the rural population has continued to grow in absolute numbers. And at the world level, peasants still constitute the majority of the world’s population. The peasant, then, is still much with us, and “awkwardly”, to use Shanin’s term⁴, refuses to disappear. (The econo-

New Left Review, 81, 1973, pp. 3-44; Arghiri Emmanuel, “Myths of Development versus Myths of Underdevelopment”, *New Left Review*, 85, 1974, pp. 61-82, and P. McMichael, J. Petras and R. Rhodes, “Imperialism and the Contradictions of Development”, *ibid.*, pp. 83-104.

⁴ Teodor Shanin, *The Awkward Class*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1971.

mic and social importance of the peasantry, too, is undervalued since 50% or more of what they produce may not reach the market at all, even though some part of any surplus they generate increasingly takes the form of cash-crops, and some peasantries are entirely, or increasingly, market-oriented, e.g. Nigeria, Ghana).

However in order to substantiate such assertions about the continuing importance of the peasantry, we need to specify our criteria of what constitutes a "peasant", as distinct, for instance, from a "tribesman" —to take one well-known debate⁵— or from an agricultural worker. To do so, we necessarily have to employ the concept of "mode of production", for it is only in terms of systems of social relations that "peasants" or "workers" can be defined at all. Further, a typology, however crude, of modes of production, is required. Thirdly, since modes of production co-exist within societies ("social formations", in neo-Marxist usage), the mechanisms that link people together are by no means limited to economic mechanisms, such as the market, financial institutions, etc., but involve a parallel *political* integration. Thus Anderson has shown how the growth of the internal markets of the feudal societies of medieval Western Europe was accompanied by the emergence of the Absolutist State —both essential institutional components, the one of the economic, the other of the political consolidation of a capitalist society— a dual process that requires analysis in terms neither of "economics" nor of "political science", but of political economy.⁶

The parallel, for the *dependent* capitalist societies established under colonialism, is the economic incorporation within the economy of the metropolitan colonial power (and thereby into the world market-system), and the establishment of the colonial State as the political analogue of the Absolutist State of nascent European capitalism.

The integration of societies, then, requires both economic and political consolidation. But it further requires *cultural* unification, for it is the *nation* that has typically been the central ideological identity, not the market or even the State.

⁵ Lloyd Fallers, "Are African cultivators to be called peasants?", *Current Anthropology*, 1961, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 108-110.

⁶ Perry Anderson, *Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism and Lineages of the Absolutist State*, New Left Books, London, 1974.

It is against the background of these considerations that the place and nature of the peasantry has to be discussed.

In this paper I shall concentrate on the "peasantry", defining them, stipulatively, as small-holders, and distinguishing them from agricultural labourers who work on large plantations (or as employees of small landowners), and from those workers who live under conditions of "feudal" dependence on estates or haciendas.⁷ To be sure, all three classes have common interests, insofar as they are all exploited by owners of capital—but in different ways, and by owners of different kinds of capital. Workers on haciendas, for example, though not formally enserfed, are bound to the estate by relations of clientage, and often by the employment or threat of force. Despite their formal status as free citizens and wage-workers, they are not free to gravitate to employment offering higher wages, as in a fully rationalized capitalist market-system. Hence the common use of labels like "feudal" or "semi-feudal" to describe this condition of unfreedom in which "extra-economic" sanctions are crucial. Thus they are commonly allotted a small plot of land on which to grow their basic subsistence needs, or are paid, at least partly, in kind. This also serves to tie them more firmly to a particular employer, as does their dependence upon shops and other services controlled by their employers.

Plantation-workers and workers on estates, then, have a different mode of existence from the formally independent micro-producer on his small-holding, even though the latter is also subject to external controls, whether the impersonal forces of the market or more direct forms of personal and institutional control by money-lenders, shopkeepers, State officials, etc.

At some point in history, both the labour-force on the haciendas and on the plantations had to be created: there had to be a production of labour. This was sometimes brought about by recourse to importing labour, including slave labour, from outside. But insofar as it was created within the society, it entailed the expropriation of the land worked by formerly independent small-holders and of users of communally-owned

⁷ David Lehmann has developed a more elaborated typology for Latin America, which adds to the widely-used distinction between "corporate" and "non-corporate" villages a further parallel distinction between "centralized" and "non-centralized" estates (*haciendas*). See his *A Theory of Agrarian Structure: typology and paths of development in Latin America*, Working Paper No. 25, Centre of Latin-American Studies, University of Cambridge, 1976.

land, and the conversion of those who lived in these ways into the landless, whose only possibility of making a living now became working for others.

In colonial regimes the State was usually the main instrument for the dispossession of the peasantry and their incorporation into a capitalist exchange-economy (e.g., via such institutions as the *repartimiento*, the levying of head-tax to be paid in cash, as in Kenya, or the simple imposition of forced labour, as in Angola). During the epoch of primitive accumulation of capital, an equally primitive accumulation of labour took place: *encomiendas* and the drafting of forced labour to the mines in no sense relied upon market-mechanisms and wage-labour, but upon extra-economic coercion and obligatory labour for a designated employer or for the State. From these "booty capitalist" beginnings, labour mobility, civic freedom, and the cash nexus only became established very much later and with great difficulty, entailing conflicts between new urban bourgeoisies and the older landowning class.

The agricultural systems that developed under the aegis of modern capitalism, however, introduced rationalized commercial management and a free labour-force, as well as capital-intensive and science-based agricultural techniques. In the more recently developed colonial and neocolonial economies, the process that took nearly half millennium in the New World was telescoped into a few decades in a country like Kenya, where, as Leys has shown a labour-force servicing the settler estates and plantations of Kenya was brought into existence in a very few years at the turn of the century (Kenya only became a colony "protectorate" in 1895), and has now given way to a rural economy where the large foreign-owned estates have largely been taken over by an indigenous landowning class who acquired the capital with which to purchase the land from the State. The proletarianization of the landless is still continuing apace (both in the countryside and in the towns), while land-redistribution programmes create tens of thousands of small-holders producing for the market.⁸

Many of those who become wage-labourers do not necessarily lose their lands altogether. Indeed, a "symbiotic" dual economy, combining wage-labour by the males of the family and the working of the land by women, children and old people back home, is widespread. Nor do those driven or pulled by inequality of living-standards as between town

⁸ Colin Leys, *Underdevelopment in Kenya*, Heinemann, London, 1975.

and country normally go to plantations or estates nowadays. They quit agriculture altogether. Either they emigrate abroad, like the 11.5 million migrant workers from the Mediterranean now working in Western Europe, or they go to the cities and towns within their own country. Many work in extractive industries: mines and petroleum.

But vast numbers still remain within agriculture, necessarily so in view of the underdevelopment of industry, working on plantations, estates and commercial farms (and in rural townships), or –like those we are concerned with here– working their own small-holdings, or working for others whose scale and mode of operation is not only small but only incipiently capitalist, e.g., where ties of kinship, clientage and other forms of direct interpersonal relationship link employer and worker, or where communitarian modes of sociation persist. For these reasons, both “employers” and “workers”, at this level and in this kind of agriculture (and many new townspeople), retain much of the ideology that they and their ancestors have been brought up with, often over centuries and generations. Their aspirations, for instance, are often oriented towards a return to a better past: at its most elaborate, expressed in the form of religious revivalism (or “nativism”), whether of a conservative and millenarian kind, or more secularly and concretely, in dreams of becoming a land-owner.

More dominant today, however, is the influence of modernizing forces generated in and radiating outwards from the more proletarianized sectors of society, with whom small-holding peasants are in close contact through migration-links. Just as the dominant bourgeoisie exercises a “hegemonic” influence over all other classes in society, so the urbanized and the proletarianized exercise dominant influence over those who are victims of capital. The typical ideologies of the underprivileged, then, are more likely to be Marxist than religious-millenarian today. Proletarian ideas and institutions: trade unionism, socialist and cooperative ideas and practice begin to penetrate the rural areas.

The increasing intrusion of the State, and of market-relations, into even the most physically remote corners of the work, also oblige the peasant to widen his intellectual horizons, since he now has to cope with new institutions and enemies as well as older ones: with land-reform agencies as well as tax-collectors; with State or parastatal marketing boards as well as traditional merchants; with credit unions as well as money-lenders, and with many other key denizens of the external world within which the village is ever more closely integrated.

To use terms like “land-owner”, then, to describe those who own or work the microscopic plots characteristic of peasant agriculture, or such apparently clear-cut and antinomic categories as “landlord” and “tenant”, “employer” and “hired hand”, conceals older and continuing dimensions of relationship (such as the hiring of kin) that complicate and render such relationships more ambiguous and doubly-contradictory. The transition to the ideal-type of capitalist relations—those based on the cash nexus—therefore remains incomplete. Tenants and hired labourers, moreover, are not so sharply distinguished as in situations where such roles have been established for decades, even centuries, generating different world-outlooks buttressed by the force of tradition: in a word, where distinctive class-cultures have not only emerged but become consolidated. In a commercial agriculture, the possibility of using land for ends other than those of traditional peasant society means that the landless person who acquires land as a result of land-reform programmes may, instead of working the land with family labour, rent it out to tenants or share-croppers while he decamps to the city and earns a much greater income as a wage-labourer or petty entrepreneur (e.g., shopkeeper), as in the Sudan.

The tiny scale of small-holder operations, moreover, makes for a considerable continuing community of ways of thinking and of vertical interpersonal connections and shared culture (e.g., religion) as between petty landowner (or “rich peasant”) and those he employs. Such community of culture is minimal on the estate or plantation (though there is commonly clientilistic, deferential or religious-fatalistic acceptance of one’s position even in a system of such patent and great inequality). But such passivity, even where longstanding, has been severely disrupted in recent decades, and the very recency of the newly-emerging relationships leads to both instability and challenge, to both backward-looking and forward-looking perspectives—and often to both at the same time.

A person’s occupational and class status, in such a mobile world, are by no means necessarily coherent and unambiguous: rather, they are, to use the sociological jargon, neither “congruent” nor “crystallized”, for in the struggle to survive, people have to piece together aggregations of ways of making a living. As a result, they quite commonly occupy, from one time or another—even at the same time—quite different statuses.⁹ A small-holder may work in the fields alongside those

⁹ Peter Worsley, “Frantz Fanon and the Lumpenproletariat”, *Socialist Register* 1972, Merlin Press, London, pp. 193-230.

he employs. He may employ others only seasonally. He, or members of his family, may themselves work at times for wages, or engage in trading-activities ancillary to agriculture. He may own one plot of land, and rent others, often on a share-cropping basis. Even those who lose their land and thereby become proletarians or share-croppers may, as in India, remain working on exactly the same piece of land, doing exactly the same kind of labour. Fundamental as the change has been in terms of ownership and non-ownership – for they have lost the land and its fruits to another – there has not been a total disruption of working life, even less of non-work social relations, ideology and culture.

All these categories of agricultural producer may, then, be analytically distinct as ideal-type constructs in the minds of theorists, but as existential historical and sociological categories they are categories-in-process. Real historical individuals may, over time, change their occupations and class-positions, and since the household is made up of several different persons, the coexistence of several mixed occupational and class positions is more marked than this model has suggested so far, for the occupation of each may vary, and each contributes differentially to a joint economy.

The recently-dispossessed small-holder is at one and the same time nostalgically attracted backwards to the lost land (including collectively-owned land, such as the corporate communities of the Andes) and on the other, propelled towards involvement, association, and identification with the already-proletarianized both in town and countryside.

Despite these complex, interwoven, uneven and contradictory processes of social change, however, certain basic tendencies assert themselves: the concentration of capital (and especially of land-ownership); the differentiation of classes; the domination of urban and especially foreign capital over the whole economy; the emergence of a proletariat owning only its own labour-power; the inability of such an economy to provide employment for the least-equipped; the spread of the ideological and institutional influence of the already-proletarianized among the newly-disinherited; and the attempts on the part of ruling classes to thrust the burdens of “development” upon the working class, the peasantry, and the sub-proletariat, while endeavouring to build up a mass support-base via religious, nationalist and populist political parties, clientilism, and by land-reform and cooperatives in the countryside – and by resort to force when all else fails.

The use of terms such as “peasant” or *campesino*, to refer to anyone working in agriculture, whether an agricultural wage-labourer or a small-

holding micro-proprietor, is ambiguous. On the one hand, it draws our attention, usefully, to important resemblances and continuities in the life experience of people caught up in these processes of transformation. On the other, it obscures, harmfully, the much more important differences between the social classes that emerge from these changes. Such usage, then, conflates together what needs to be kept distinct.

Mao Tse-Tung's classic analysis of the Hunan countryside in 1926/7, for instance, distinguishes large landlords from peasants and agricultural workers. *Peasants* he initially defined in terms of the principal means of production, the land, taking area of farming-land owned as the criterion for distinguishing between the various sub-classes—rich, middle and poor peasants—within the peasantry. With growing experience, the Chinese communists, whose leadership was by no means familiar with peasant life, came to appreciate that there were quite rich peasants who did not necessarily *own* a great deal of land, but rented plenty, and hired labour to work it. Further, non-farm economic activities (cotton-weaving, silk-manufacturing, etc.) were crucial in the total household economy of the peasant. Finally, access to capital—indebtedness to money-lenders—was a crucial cause of differences of wealth and poverty.¹⁰

It is perhaps also still necessary, too, to remind social scientists, officials, planners, and other city-folk with power over rural people that peasants do not engage in “agricultural production” in general, but grow particular kinds of crops on particular pieces of land in ways which involve various patterns of association with others. Many development schemes, for instance, have ignored these simple observations (and peasant knowledge), treating the problems of growing tea, for instance (a crop demanding detailed manual cultivation and harvesting), in exactly the same way as the problems of wheat-growing, a crop which lends itself to large-scale, extensive and capital-intensive cultivation. Such schemes have commonly ended in disaster. The British Groundnut Scheme in Tanganyika in 1947-49 will probably stand forever as the archetypal failure of this kind.

¹⁰ Mao Tse-Tung, “Report of an Investigation into the Peasant Movement in Hunan”, *Selected Works*, Vol. 1, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1954, pp. 21-59. See also the issue of *Modern China*: an international quarterly, Vol. 1, No. 2, Beverley Hills/London, devoted to “The Rural Revolution”, especially the articles by Philip C. Huang (“Analyzing the Twentieth-Century Countryside”), Angus McDonald (“The Hunan Peasant Movement”), and Yokoyama Sugwu (“The Peasant Movement in Hunan”).

Hence the first element Shanin directs our attention to, in his ideal-type definition of peasantry,¹¹ stresses the obvious: that peasants live off the land, in determinate kinds of agricultural production.

But in order to do so, they must engage in relations with others, both relations directly entailed by the productive process: planting, weeding, harvesting, etc.: and those entailed in the reproduction of the social groups of which the community is composed. Hence, to talk about peasant society as if the “mode of production” was to be conceived of simply in terms of the imperatives of agricultural work in the fields—as if the mode of production was simply a mode of *production*, and not also a mode of reproduction—is both naive and dangerous. No technical imperative of growing maize determines the organization of the village into systems of patrilineal descent, though patrilineages and sub-lineages are also units of land-holding and land-use.

Techniques and direct work-relationships define a mode of production in agriculture no more than they do in industry. Using a lathe, for instance, requires irreducible minimal and parallel levels of skill, technical knowledge, etc., whether in Soviet factories or in plants in the USA. But even the very organization of work itself is by no means technically determined, but will vary according to the norms and values of the social system within which the work takes place. Hours and conditions of work, the intensity of work, safety-levels, systems of remuneration (task—or time—related), incentives (material or normative), individual as against group or society-wide rewards (the “social wage”), welfare provision, the existence of exploitive profits, the utilization of the product—none of these is built into the machine. They are, rather, built into the social “machinery”. Hence the organization of labour is a function of social structure and of values held and operationalized by those who control that structure. We are dealing, that is, not with “pure” technological imperatives, nor with “economic” behaviour, but with political economy and with the varying cultural norms which inform human behaviour.

Tourning to agriculture, even a major work like Wolf's begins, technologically (and usefully), by distinguishing the major “ecosystems”: *swidden* cultivation, the “Palaeo-” and “Neotechnical” agricultural systems of Europe, and Asian rice-irrigation. But there is no necessary or demonstrated relationship between these technical systems of growing crops and the ways in which the surplus is appropriated. Hence

¹¹ Teodor Shanin, *Peasants and Peasant Societies*, Introduction.

when Wolf returns to discussion of the main historical types of surplus-extracting systems in the second half of the book, he has to abandon “ecosystems” (systems of “exploiting” land) and construct instead a political-systems typology: the main historical modes of exploiting *people*. Thus the reduction of the mode of production to what we might call the “mode-of-production-in-itself” (conceived of simply in terms of work-organization) does not even explain the very modes of work: why people work in particular ways with particular others. Even less does it explain why the product gets distributed the way it does.

To explain those things we have to look at the political economy and the culture of the society under study. Classical political economy was predicated upon the analytical primacy of the individual as the typical economic actor: producer, entrepreneur, consumer, owner, etc. But in late capitalist and state socialist societies, corporate institutions dominate decision-making. In peasant societies, too, as Shanin’s second definitional element observes, the peasant *household* is the basic unit, and the household is not simply a unit of production, but also of consumption, as well as the key unit of residence and a unit for many other social purposes. Hence, though it possesses, as we shall see, a high degree of autonomy, it is involved in relations with other like units that go far beyond the direct field of production, and hence are expressed in terms of a general, supra-economic master-idiom – that of kinship. Because of the dual economic nature of the household, and its multiple other functions, neither the individual members of the household nor the household as a collective are simply oriented to profit maximization and infinite accumulation as their main ends. Rather, the welfare of coming generations and to take care of the older generation, are the ultimate rationale. The farm, that is, is a *corporation*, managed by the present incumbent of the position of head of the kinship unit (normally the eldest male), but inalienable by him. He is not a private owner, only a custodian on behalf of the other members of the corporation, and custodian, too, on behalf of both the dead and of generations yet unborn.

Hence to treat the working of such household economies in terms of the interplay of the “factors” of capital, land and labour on the market is analysis “by fiat”, to use Cicourel’s term. Peasant economies, rather, operate according to a quite different economic rationale, articulated to cultural logics and values quite different from those underpinning Western capitalism, no matter how much they have been increasingly sucked into the orbit of the world capitalist economy.

These non-capitalist dimensions of peasant life are best understood by turning to the anthropological literature of pre-capitalist cultures. There one finds a close parallel between the “domestic” mode of production described by Sahlins for tribal societies, and the “closed corporate” economy and social world described by Wolf for the villages of the Andes, or the village of Eastern Europe described by Chayanov and Shanin.

Despite obvious cultural and historical differences, certain common elements stand out. The utilization of labour, land and capital are not dictated by the “laws” of the market. However much these communities are involved in commodity-production and the cash-crop economy, labour rather than capital is the key resource. Since there is no alternative to which they might devote their labour-power, labour has no opportunity-cost, for people can, if necessary, simply work harder and longer if market-prices swing against them. Reserves of labour can be mobilized so as to produce vastly increased output as, for example, in the rice-irrigation of Java described by Geerts, where fantastic productivity – up to ten times that obtainable by hoe-cultivation – can be achieved by greater inputs of labour.

But people are also the end as well as the key resource; and cultural norms rather than simply ecological possibilities dictate the uses to which production is put. Moreover, whether these ecological possibilities are realized at all depends upon social constraints and cultural stimuli. Motivation, for instance, is low, where the lion’s share accrues to others. In other cultures, greater production and greater productivity may be devoted to supporting more people rather than enabling a select elite to live at higher standards than others. Far from any inherent Malthusian degeneration of the people/resources relationship, more people may be enabled to live, not at ever higher standards, but at exactly the same standards, as a result of technical innovation: better strains of seeds, methods of planting, etc.: in Geertz’s terms, agricultural *involution*. One of the likely effects of such growth without social transformation is exemplified by the growth of China’s population from 60M in 1290 to 179M by 1750 – largely owing to improved varieties of rice and other new crops – without any basic change of social structure or culture.¹² This inability to convert surpluses into other forms of wealth

¹² Ho, Ping-ti, *Studies on the Population of China, 1368-1953*, Cambridge, Mass., 1959.

is not, therefore, a technical problem (as Elvin suggests in his discussion of the "high-level energy trap"¹³), but a function of a conservative social structure.

People-centred tribal economies, Sahlins suggests, are based upon use-values, not exchange-values. Exchange exists in tribal society, but even this is based upon exchange-for-use, not exchange for speculative profit. An economy governed by human wants differs fundamentally from a capitalist economy, which is driven by a "system-logic" towards infinite accumulation. But human wants, in tribal society, are customary and inflexible, and once satisfied, constitute barriers to further production. (One can only eat so much.) In some cultures, however, there are other ends to which production can be dedicated, and exchange can have other rationales than the needs of material consumption or variety. People near the boundary-line of physical survival, for instance, still often devote scarce resources to ritual and religious ends.

The notion of "the primitive" as always near to starvation, and therefore preoccupied with subsistence-needs, in part derives from the experience of the breakdown of agricultural (and hunting-and-collecting) economies under the impact of capitalism. (In the last few years alone, there have been famines affecting tens of millions in Bengal (1974), Bangla Desh (1974/5), Afghanistan (1972/3), Bihar (1974), Ethiopia and the Sahel. Some 500-600 million people are *chronically* near starvation-level in South-East Asia.

Tribal horticulturalists (to use the term anthropologists often use to describe the scale of primitive agriculture) also live commonly close to the margin of survival, as Wolf has emphasised. But where they are working good soil and are assured of water, they do not necessarily lead precarious existences. Nor, even, do pre-agriculturalists. It is certainly favoured hunters-and-collectors, not agriculturalists, that Sahlins describes as the "original affluent societies". True, there are marginal survivors, like the Siriono, who came back from the hunt with nothing one time in four¹⁴ or the nomads of the Australian deserts. But the Australian aborigines I studied¹⁵, like the hunters living in similarly well-

¹³ Mark Elvin, *The Pattern of the Chinese Past*, Eyre Methuen, London, 1973.

¹⁴ Allan R. Holmberg, *Nomads of the Long Bow*, Smithsonian Institution, Institute of Social Anthropology, Publication No. 10, Washington D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950.

¹⁵ Peter Worsley, "The Utilization of Food Reserves by an Australian Abo-

endowed areas described by Sahlins¹⁶ satisfy their needs at times by working only three or four hours a day. Indeed, they might be said to have had a "problem of leisure" analogous to those anxious discussions about the use of non-working time which became a subject of concern in the 'sixties (though no longer) in advanced capitalist societies. The nomadic Hadza of Tanzania, for instance, used to spend up to six months of the year gambling. "Why", the Bushmen asked, "should we keep on working? If God intended it, why did he provide so many *mongongo* nuts?" Sahlins labels this a "Zen" economy. Other such lucky peoples use their seasonal surpluses to sustain them while they engage in months of ritual activity.

Having met their customary levels of everyday wants, some tribal societies have found themselves with an *embarras de richesses*. Yet they often continue producing more and more because the ends they pursue are quite different from the satisfaction of material needs, whether these be the quotidian requirements of basal metabolism or those of gourmet tastes. Nor are surpluses produced only where producers are driven to produce them by ruling classes seeking to maximize their wealth, or to convert it into other forms of wealth via trade. Often there are no such available alternative forms of wealth or they are limited in kind and volume. Where there are, the levels of demand for these, too, are static.

If agricultural surplus cannot be converted into other kinds of wealth, however, it can always be converted into immaterial prestige, secular or religious, often involving sustained collective work, organised by kings, chiefs, or 'Big Men', and the subsequent ostentatious and competitive destruction or lavish consumption of the wealth so painfully accumulated in feasts. Personal and collective, inter-communal and intra-communal prestige are generated in the process.

"Structural levelling" is another way of dealing with inconvertible surpluses, and provides a rationale for producing and accumulating them. Instead of emphasizing his superiority by grandiose conspicuous consumption and display, the chief may reinforce his position by acting as a redistribution-centre. The tribute coming in is then distributed to

original Tribe", *Acta Ethnographica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae*, 1961, Vol. 10, Nos. 1-2, pp. 153-190.

¹⁶ Marshall Sahlins, *Stone Age Economics*, Aldine-Atherton, Chicago, 1972, "The Original Affluent Society", pp. 1-39.

the needy and to other clients, thereby building up ties of gratitude, obligation and dependence.¹⁷

The social hierarchies created are thus stamped by an "achievement-orientation" every bit as competitive and obsessional as that which drives on the ambitious entrepreneur under capitalism. (Not for nothing have commentators compared Margaret Mead's Manus with the denizens of Wall Street.)¹⁸ But the high social status achieved is personal, not "structured social inequality". The sons of the Big Men are not necessarily Big Men themselves, unless they carve out this status for themselves once more.

Accumulation was thus not an end in itself. It was part of a cultural logic which harnessed production and distribution to the maximization of status, whether through conspicuous consumption or destruction, or via redistribution. The chief in Africa, or the Bedouin sheikh, might also be materially poor. Wealth flowed through the chief, rather than ending at him. These obligations to his inferiors were often symbolically expressed in "rituals of degradation" such as those accompanying a king's installation.¹⁹

The functions of capital in a capitalist economy could not be more different. "Capital" as aggregated labour "locked up" or "congealed" in commodities that can be exchanged against other goods exists in all economies, but not that capital which is used to generate yet more capital via a chain of investment, profit, reinvestment and further profit in a cycle which *demands* perpetual accumulation if the productive enterprise is to compete successfully with its market rivals. By contrast, prices are inelastic in primitive exchange, and increased demand for products in short supply does not result in higher prices but is met by increased output from the supplier, who is obliged to satisfy his customer at customary prices, or by diversifying to other suppliers, still at customary prices.²⁰ Objects valued for their immaterial prestige or

¹⁷ See, for instance, Max Gluckman, *Essays on Lozi Land and Royal Property*, Rhodes-Livingstone Paper No. 10, 1943, Livingstone, and Sahlins, *op. cit.*, "The Spirit of the Gift" (chapter 4) and "On the Sociology of Primitive Exchange" (chapter 5).

¹⁸ Margaret Mead, *Growing Up in New Guinea*, Morrow, New York, 1930.

¹⁹ Max Gluckman, "Rituals of Rebellion in South East Africa", in *Order and Rebellion in Tribal Africa*, Cohen and West, 1963, pp. 110-136.

²⁰ Sahlins, *op. cit.*, "On the Sociology of Primitive Exchange", pp. 185-275.

ritual value are not susceptible to, even this limited market flexibility: an elaborate ritual, etiquette and protocol regulates the exchange of such "valuables", which only pass between culturally-defined exchange-partners in a system of ranked statuses.²¹

In the "domestic" mode of production, then, the producer is not an Economic Man, let alone a capitalist. Hence his behaviour cannot be understood in terms of trans-cultural or non-historical categories of economic action, but only in the context of the totality of social relations entailed, not only in the process of producing, but in terms, too, of the relations the members of the household enter into with other culturally-defined groups and networks in the spheres of consumption and of social reproduction. Economic relations cannot be separated out from wider social relations.

It may be legitimately objected at this point, that resemblance between domestic producers in tribal societies and peasants are not as important as the differences between their respective economies. The peasant resembles the tribal producer insofar as one component of his production is dedicated to subsistence, and another to social reproduction. But the peasant, normally, is also involved not simply in a cash economy, but forms part of a wider society, in which the outside world dominates the village and exploits its members. Rent is extracted from the peasant, whether directly by feudal lords or by the State, indigenous or colonial, and whether forcibly imposed or customarily rendered. In capitalist society, he is exploited, impersonally, by the working of the market which transfers the value he produces to those who market his products. Exploitation of this kind also requires an apparatus of social control, which the State provides; and the State readily becomes a rent-extracting agency of its own.

Hence Shanin's third and fourth criteria lead us away from the ideal-typical model of the domestic mode of production, in which the household is a relatively self-sufficient entity, and society simply an aggregation of such entities: "Society without a sovereign", in Sahlins' terms: the very prototype of anarchy. The peasant household is always part of a succession of ranges and levels of encompassing social structure.

The immediate higher-level entity is the village or the more diffuse "social field" of the hamlet. These entities provide for both non-econo-

²¹ Sahlins, *op. cit.*, "Exchange-Value and the Diplomacy of Primitive Trade", pp. 277-314.

mic as well as economic interchange. At the economic level, the peasant economy requires markets for its surpluses or ancillary products, the sale of which is usually quite integral to its survival, as well as tools and other goods which are not available within the village. Trade, then, is an integral aspect of peasant economy, and a major theme in anthropological literature. In these exchanges, the peasant household, far from engaging in *reciprocal* or balanced exchange, however, is at the mercy of the more powerful: the money-lenders, merchants, shopkeepers, etc.

Skinner's work on the marketing-areas of Imperial China is perhaps the most sustained attempt to chart the persistence and change of such areas over time, using "central place" theory.²² He distinguishes three levels of market: the lowest linking a number of villages brought into relationship indirectly through the marketing of their specialized products at a central market town. Side-by-side with these exchanges, mediated via money, cash-crops are also marketed, but go to the towns and cities, not to other villages. The market is also the source of specialized goods needed both for production purposes by the peasants (e.g., agricultural implements, fuel), for household purposes (lamp oil, etc.), and for personal use (clothing, etc.). Such transactions commonly take place between long-established partners. The relationship between peasant and shopkeeper, for instance, is consolidated by debt and is rarely totally discharged. But arrangements based on preferential treatment ("most-favoured" partners) are also commonly reinforced by extra-economic ties of marriage or reciprocal loaning. Credit facilities are also available from money-lenders and bankers, normally to finance agricultural production, but these are impersonal and nakedly exploitative. Itinerant traders also circulate from one market to another, supplementing the services available from local suppliers of goods and services. Typically, such markets can be reached in a day's walk, and the peasant can return home the same day. The size of such market-areas is therefore strikingly similar, as is their period persistence over long periods of historical time.

Over and above these economic changes, other social activities, collective and individual, go on at the market-town, from religious festivals

²² See G. W. Skinner, "Marketing and Social Structure in China", *Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. XXIV, Nos. 1-3, November 1964 - May 1965, and Geoffrey Shillinglaw, "Traditional Rural Cooperation and Social Structure": the communist Chinese collectivization of agriculture", in *Two Blades of Grass: rural cooperatives in agricultural modernization* (ed. P. Worsley), Manchester University Press, 1971, pp. 137157.

and pilgrimages to entertainments and recreation: story-telling, performances of popular dances, music and opera, and drinking, especially on fair-days.

Shillinglaw has argued that there is a striking correspondence between the number of standard market-areas identified by Skinner (around 80,000), and the number of People's Communes finally established in 1961/2, to wit, 74,000. They roughly corresponded, that is, to the traditional standard market-areas which were also the lowest level administrative units, the *hsiang*. It is interesting to note that initially only 24,000 communes were created. These had to be altered, not simply because they proved too big, but because they "bore no relation to any possible trading system at whatever level".²³

Several such "standard" market-areas make up an "intermediate" market-area, serviced by a larger town or even a city. This links several "standard" market-areas together, transferring agricultural produce to urban centres or other grain-deficit provinces. Here, too, are to be found goods and services unavailable at standard market-area level: agricultural machinery and durable consumer goods such as sewing-machines, transistor radios or bicycles. In Imperial China, these "intermediate" zones usually had as their centre the county (*hsien*) town, and were thus administrative as well as economic centres.

The highest level, Skinner's "central" market-areas, mediated between the provinces and the central economy, with even more diversified economic activities, usually centred upon a provincial capital, and possessing a high degree of "autarky". They were also distinctive cultural zones, with their own dialects, their heartland often being a natural geographical zone: river-basins, watersheds, etc., and their boundaries commonly following natural features such as mountains. Hence, in times of weak central political authority they tended to become independent statelets. The territory between these zones also tended to be an agriculturally marginal "no man's land" or "badlands", in which neither adjoining provincial authority had much interest or control. Such zones —e.g., the Chingkangshan mountains of Kiangsi— were therefore ideal bases for traditional bandits and modern guerrillas alike.

All of this is a far cry from nineteenth century conceptions of the village as a non-antagonistic, closed *Gemeinschaft*, later refurbished in

²³ loc. cit., p. 152. Note also Shillinglaw's observation that the *first* communes "cut across all traditional marketing patterns with disastrous results" (p. 154).

the form of twentieth-century notions of the "little community" and the "folk society". Even the progenitor of this latter concept, Redfield, came to acknowledge that the cultural heritage of the village included not only the "little tradition" of village-level ritual and belief, but also the "great traditions" (Christianity, Buddhism, Taoism, Confucianism, Islam and Hinduism) from the influence of one or the other of which few villages in the world have been free for much of recorded history.

The forces which have transformed rural society in the twentieth century, however, have not been those emanating from the major world-religions (even if, in the past, peasants have expressed themselves largely through the idiom of religion, whether conservatively or in heretical ways). Rather, it has been the growing penetration of the world-market and of the State that has brought to an end the autonomy of the village. Labour, now, whatever its status under the traditional small-holding domestic economy, has become a commodity. So has land. Hundreds of thousands of small producers, caught between the "scissors" of low world-prices for their crops and higher prices for the manufactured goods they consume, have had to sell their primordial means of subsistence. Hence Tawney could write of the Chinese peasant in the inter-War period that he was like a man standing in a lake with water up to his mouth. One ripple and he would be drowned. Wolf, again, emphasized that the peasant economy is inherently precarious.

A sizeable number of those who went under, died in famines. Others became labourers in the countryside or emigrated to towns. In a world that was fast becoming a "global village" millions emigrated abroad. To the great emigration from agrarian Europe to America in the nineteenth century, the parallel emigration of millions of Chinese southwards to the Nanyang, and to California, South Africa, Australia, Hawaii and elsewhere, we have to add today the massive migration of eleven-and-a-half million migrant workers from the underdeveloped Mediterranean area to the factories of Western Europe.²⁴

These movements have had significant consequences for those who stayed in the countryside, for they, too, found their traditional pattern of life disrupted, and for the first time, were brought into touch with ideas and movements previously confined to the towns.

²⁴ Stephen Castles and Godula Kosack, *Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe*, Oxford University Press, 1973.

Both closed corporate communities and individual small-holders could try to resist the growing intrusion of the outside world. This did not necessarily mean a struggle between classes: of poor versus rich peasants, tenants and landlords. As Shanin has shown for Russia between the abolition of serfdom and World War I, peasants readily protested in innumerable outbreaks of an often violent kind, but they protested mainly against the *State*, in the form of its agents: tax-collectors, inspectors, Army recruiters, officials of all kinds. The rural anarchists of Andalusia attempted to express their hatred of the enviroing society by declaring themselves independent of it.²⁵

“Conservative” resistance also took the form of demanding a return to traditional levels of rent. Pre-capitalist rent (e.g., feudal dues) was always lavish in accordance with customary norms, which were often highly formalized, even ritualized. Levels and forms of exploitation were thus normative and institutionalized, and deviation from them was always liable to engender a peasant resistance all the more powerful because it was also *righteous*: custom had been breached, ancient rights removed or infringed upon. Rights and norms would not stop rapacious landlords, feudal lords, monarchs, tax-collectors, or other extractors of peasant surpluses from stepping up their demands. But to do so beyond customary limits always invited resistance. Such resistance usually took the form of “voting with their feet”, of failing to do what was asked — a dumb, cunning peasant obstinacy usually interpreted as “stupidity”. Perhaps the last major historic expression of this response was the passive resistance to forced collectivization in the USSR. Lacking any centralized organization or alternative programme, peasants in tens of thousands of villages acted in parallel. They slaughtered 18 million horses, 30 million cattle (nearly half the total), and nearly 100 million sheep and goats (two-thirds of the total).²⁶

The continuing chronic weakness of Soviet agriculture, the Achilles’ heel of that economy, derives from the low levels of motivation and inferior living-standards that still characterize the Soviet peasantry. On their private plots, by contrast — a mere 3⁰/₁₀ of the land area — they produce a high proportion of several major agricultural products. When

²⁵ Eric Hobsbawm, *Primitive Rebels*, Manchester University Press, 1959, chapter 5, “The Andalusian Anarchists”, pp. 74-92.

²⁶ Isaac Deutscher, *Stalin: a Political Biography*, Oxford University Press, 1949, p. 325.

peasants made the transition from negative resistance to positive action, it often took strange forms. Tolstoy, in *War and Peace*, classically describes both. With the collapse of the estate-economies and the dissolution of normal social controls as the French army advanced, the peasants on the Bolkonski estate confronted Princess Mary, quite inarticulate as to what they wanted, but clearly threatening and demanding. Later, whole families “suddenly began selling their cattle and moving. . . . as birds migrate to somewhere beyond the sea . . . to parts where none of them had ever been before”.²⁷ Such peasant *movements* – usually taking the form of religious outbreaks – would only give way to more violent counter-attacks upon their masters when not only customary norms of exploitation, but absolute living-standards were threatened, and hunger and impoverishment became real. Then peasants were driven to their ultimate form of protest: the *Jacqueries*. Terrifying as these riots and the wholesale destruction of landlord property and symbols of authority might be, the spontaneous nature of the outbreaks and their lack of sustained organization or of any coherent strategy or programme, rendered them vulnerable to disillusion and to the inevitable counter-attack.²⁸

Hence Marx, writer of the French peasantry in the late nineteenth century, saw them as essentially isolated, atomized and parochial, as intrinsically susceptible to take-over bids by populist demagogues like Louis Bonaparte as their sub-proletarian urban successors have been in the twentieth century:

The small-holding peasants form a vast mass, the members of which live in similar conditions but without entering into manifold relations with each other. Their mode of production isolates them from one another instead of bringing them into mutual intercourse. The isolation is increased by bad means of communication and by the poverty of the peasants. Their field of production, the small-holding, admits of no division of labour its cultivation, application of science and therefore, no wealth of social relationships. Each individual peasant family is almost self-sufficient; itself it directly produces the major part of its consump-

²⁷ Leo Tolstoy, *War and Peace*, Book X, chapters IX and XI.

²⁸ See Hobsbawm, *op. cit.*, pp. 89-91, on the apocalyptic expectations of the Spanish village anarchists, their failure to develop any effective organization or program, and the inevitable repression.

tion and thus acquires its means of life more through exchange with nature than in intercourse with society. A small-holding, a peasant and his family; alongside them another small-holding, another peasant and his family. A few score of these make up a village, and a few score of villages make up a Department. In this way, the great mass of the French nation is formed by simple additions of homologous magnitudes, much as potatoes in a sack form a sack of potatoes. In so far as millions of families live under economic conditions of existence that separate their cultures from those of other classes, they form a class. In so far as there is merely a local interconnection among these small-holding peasants, and the identity of their interests begets no community, they do not form a class. They are consequently incapable of enforcing their class interest.

... They cannot represent themselves, they must be represented, their representatives must at the same time appear as their master, ... an unlimited governmental power that protects them against the other classes and sends them rain and sunshine from above.²⁹

Peasant misery and frustration predisposed them to respond to dreams of a new life held out to them, again and again, and their emotional readiness to follow those who promised them a way out made them a singularly volatile and powerful "available" or "disposable" political force: in Shanin's expressive phrase, one of "low class-ness" but "high mass-ness".³⁰

But their aspirations, self-image, strategies and modalities of action, like those of any other class, change with their changing position in a system of forces. Peasants have been thought of, stereotypically, for millennia, as conservative, primitive, passive, irrational, fatalistic, traditionalistic, deferential, other-worldly, parochial, incompetent, familistic, amoral, uncultured, possessive, individualists pursuing the "limited good". Insofar as this has been true, it has been because they have been the sector of society with the most unchanging pattern of social relations, and the maximum of social control and exploitation, and the least equipment for understanding, let alone changing the world.

²⁹ Karl Marx, "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon", *Marx Engels, Selected Works*, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1968, pp. 171-2.

³⁰ Teodor Shanin, "The Peasantry as a Political Factor", *Sociological Review*, 1966, Vol. 14, No. 1, pp. 5-27.

This structural isolation and stasis has to come to an end. Emigration from Europe to America, or from China to Indonesia, might be irrevocable. But much modern migration is *organized* so as to return the migrants to their homeland, from the South African mines back to the "Bantustans", from the mines of the Andes to the villages, or from Cologne and Gothenburg back to Turkey and Morocco. When they go home they take new ideas with them. And they find those at home faced with massive change in the villages, and looking for ways of coming to terms with it.

For this reason, peasants no longer find their choice of ideological alternatives limited to the conservative, religious, monarchist parties that have traditionally mobilized and dominated them. A whole range of modern influences, from consumerism to populist, even revolutionary parties, compete for their allegiance. And the most impressive victory in this century has been the defeat of the greatest power in world-history, the USA, by the revolutionized peasantry of a small country, Viet Nam.

The peasantry, then, constitute an arena of competition, a political "resource-potential" courted by rival suitors. This competition for their souls is viewed by them with historically-founded suspicion. Today, they find themselves confronted with four major rival forms of development-strategy, each of which is represented as assuring them the best hope for the future.

The first of these is at once the most technically efficient and the most ignored, largely because it means the elimination of the small-holder. In the USA, food, not steel, electronics, or even armaments is the crucial item of export. In 1973, agricultural exports of \$17.7 billion overcame a trade deficit of \$7.6 billion in other areas of the economy.. The smallest unit of land-measurement used in the prairies and plains of North America is the "section" of 640 acres. Usually, three or four sections constitute a small farm. But a man with his sons and female kin, and possibly one or two (often seasonal) hired workers, can farm areas of this size readily, since they have at their command (owned or rented) massive combine-harvesters, and electronic machinery which tells them when the moisture-content in the grain is just right for harvesting.

Since the household is still the unit of organization on these massive small farms, relies upon family labour, and the land and equipment are privately-owned, some have described these farmers as "technologically advanced peasants". It is true that they are the smallest agriculturalists in a system of agriculture that includes ranches larger than many in-

dependent countries, owned by large corporation. But even the smallest farm differs from the peasants we have described, in that they are oriented to marketing a cash-crop, retain no subsistence element, and are managed on entirely capitalist lines. They are vertically integrated into a chain of export-oriented institutions (banks, railroads, grain-exchanges) dominated by large financial corporations.

Whatever the legal "private" title to land and machinery, farms of this kind constitute appendages to the large corporations. Vegetable farmers in East Anglia, for example, plant seeds, cultivate in specified ways at specified times, and harvest when told to by the factories owned by giant food-corporations which freeze the vegetables in their factories. North American farming has long been dominated by capital-intensive, State-aided, and scientifically-based agriculture of this kind. True, on "the frontier", the homesteading family was the typical unit during the pioneering days of the opening up of the West (and in earlier times). But even this myth neglects the removal of the existing users of the land (the Indians) by the State (the Army), and its sale to pioneers for virtually nothing; the State's role in developing the railroads; and the scientific research-work underpinning frontier agriculture conducted in State-funded institutions ("cow colleges") where new strains of seeds were developed and machinery was developed, and where whole generations of young farmers were educated in their use.

Farming of this kind is capital-intensive, then, and clearly inimitable in the Third World, which has plenty of human capital, but little of the conventional kind. The horse-power available per worker in India is .02; in US agriculture, 63.35. Not all even of advanced capitalist agriculture relies on exactly these kinds of technical inputs. Japanese agriculture, for instance, depends on vast inputs of fertilizer, whereas the use of machinery is quite limited. Thus, Japanese agriculture uses .021 (and India's .003). The yield per hectare in the USA (in wheat units) is therefore only .87; the yield *per worker*, however, is exceptionally high: 123.5. The corresponding figures for Japan are 7.54 units per hectare (over eight times the US figure), but only 13.1 per worker (less than a tenth of the US figure). Despite these technical differences, both are capital-intensive forms of agriculture: the capital is, however expended on different inputs.

It is this demand for capital that has been the source of the constant tendency towards differentiation and polarization into social classes in the countryside. The involvement of the producer in systems of vertical integration brings with it an intensification of these strains, the principal

contradiction being not that between large and small farmers, but that between the small farmer and the large corporations which control his farming operations, sell him machines, lend him credit, and purchase his crop. Hence agrarian populism has been a consistently radical tradition in US and Canadian history. As Lipset has remarked:

Agrarian radicalism, though it is rarely socialist, has directed its attack against big-business domination. In certain economic areas farmers have openly challenged private ownership and control of industry, either through governmental or cooperative ownership, to eliminate private control of banking, insurance, transport, natural resources, public utilities, manufacture of farm implements, wholesale and retail distribution of consumers' goods and food commodity exchanges. The large measure of socialism without doctrines that can be found in the programs of agrarian political and economic organizations is in many respects more socialistic than the nationalization policies of some explicitly socialist parties.³¹

Agrarian radicalism has by no means been limited to advanced capitalist agriculture, however. In virtually every country today, the demand for land, or protest and resistance on the part of farmers to deteriorating living-standards, has induced governments to look for ways of heading off discontent. Land-reform programmes have been the major strategy for so doing.

It is often assumed that land-redistribution is somehow inherently socialistic. It is, of course, nothing of the sort. Insofar as socialist governments have undertaken land reform in order to break the power of the large landowners, win the support of the peasantry, and to expand the productive forces of agriculture, land-reform can have a socialist content, above all where the distribution of land is seen simply as a stage in the reorientation of the masses of individual rural petty producers towards, firstly, a cooperative, and then a collective form of agriculture, as in China. But under capitalist conditions, the implications are usually quite different. Indeed, the most notable proponent and pioneer of this kind of strategy in this century was Stolypin, the Tsar's Minister, who in 1910-1916 decided that the gulf between the great estate-owners and the poor and landless peasantry had become too

³¹ S.M. Lipset, *Agrarian Socialism: the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation in Saskatchewan*, Anchor Books, 1968, pp. 33-4.

great and was socially explosive. A way had to be found, then, of satisfying this land-hunger, for some at least, but in ways that would *strengthen* capitalism. His strategy was to bring into existence a prosperous small peasantry who would then constitute a mass base for capitalism in the countryside. Whereas the common lands and commonly-owned strip-fields in Britain's eighteenth-century capitalist revolution in agriculture had been enclosed and had become the property of large landowners, the lands owned by the Russian village communities, the *mir*, were parcelled out, precisely in order to bring thousands of *small* farms into existence in Stolypin's reform. The same basic objectives have underlain land-reforms in Iran, Egypt, Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, and elsewhere in this century, with in some cases (Morocco, Philippines) the bulk of the land going in ever larger parcels.

Such policies, then, have generally been adopted in order to forestall mass discontent, and to do so in a way that both strengthen capitalism and avoid socialist solutions. The most modern manifestation of this strategy has been the Green Revolution, which depends on heavy inputs of fertilizer, machinery and irrigation works, and therefore requires capital investment beyond the means of the small peasant (who often sells out to richer men in order to cash in on rising land values).

Neither are cooperatives inherently socialist, as often assumed.

If inserted within a general socialist strategy of development, they can be literally progressive, i.e., they involve a *movement* from petty private ownership and production towards *joint* working of the land on a large scale. As we shall see, in China this involved no less than four distinct phases: following the enactment of the Agrarian Reform Law of 1950 (already in operation in the zones liberated earlier), the peasantry were then encouraged to join mutual aid teams. Then followed the formation of actual cooperatives, then the "higher state" of cooperative organization, and only then the final establishment of the communes during the Great Leap Forward of 1958 — a process that took nearly a decade.

The cooperative under capitalism has a different logic and trajectory. To be more accurate, it does not transform social relations of production at all (though it generally leads to improvements in productive *techniques*, and also brings into existence a larger and more important new kind of social organization). It lacks this transformatory dynamic because the cooperative is still based upon private ownership of land. Some of the farms, however, are larger than others. Since the cooperative, by virtue of its sheer size, makes possible wholesale economies of

scale, through the bulk purchase of commodities needed both in agriculture and in the household (consumer coops), and by securing better prices, through its collective bargaining power, for the members' collectively-marketed crops (producer coops), and can also secure better credit facilities for its members (credit coops), the cooperative benefits all its members by passing on to each and every one of them a share in these economies. It may also institutionalize the lending and sharing of key resources, notably tools and implements, draught animals and machines.

Though it could be said to be redistributing to its members profits which formerly went to middlemen, it does not, however, redistribute the basic means of production. Land and agricultural equipment remain the private property of their owners. The small-holding remains the unit of production, and continues to yield a private profit, and the use of equipment naturally involves payment to the owner. In the sphere of consumption, again, the economies of operation are passed on *pro rata*, i.e., the richer farmer saves more than the smaller farmer, since the former does a greater volume of business with the cooperative. Further, it is the richer members who benefit disproportionately from the utilization of any resources owned by the cooperative as an organization, e.g., cotton-ginning plants, and particularly tractors, in Tanzania.³²

In addition to this economic dominance, the larger farmers usually dominate the cooperative administratively and politically, since they are usually better educated and possess at least the elementary skills of literacy and numeracy, and may even be familiar with more advanced managerial techniques (book-keeping, etc.) which they use in managing their own farms, but can equally use in the service of the cooperative. The service of the cooperative, therefore, can soon become the domination of the cooperative. This political power is usually used to keep the cooperative on a conservative course. Occasionally, peasant cooperativism may generate a "peasantist" political lobby independent of other parties. More rarely, the leadership—even some of the larger farmers—can become radicalized and use their leadership positions to steer the cooperative in socialist directions.

All these forms of agricultural production and of agrarian social reproduction reflect the increasing hold exercised by the external world over the village: i.e., the transformation of primary peasantries into sec-

³² John S. Saul, "Marketing cooperatives in a developing country: the Tanzanian case", in P. Worsley (ed.), *Two Blades of Grass*, pp. 347-370.

ondary ones: in particular, the growing drive towards cash-crop production, the incorporation of the individual petty producer within new organizations of peasant producers, and the articulation of these to national economic and political structures, and thereby to the world-market. In the process, the autonomy and insulation of the small-holder is reduced to vanishing point: in the extreme, the subsistence component in his "dual" economy becomes reduced to zero, and the market takes over. At best he has a "kitchen garden" attached to his homestead, but his family depends basically on food now purchased in the market with the money it earns from selling what they produce. The *collective* autonomy of the "corporate" villages is also eroded away as these, too, are incorporated within provincial, national, and world frameworks, and linked thereby to thousands of other villages through structures that transcend and differ from traditional markets, cultural affiliations and contacts, and which are penetrated and controlled by superior and external authority. At this point, the traditional "parcellized" sovereignty of the village comes to an end.³³ Estates, too, whether centralized or non-centralized, to use Lehmann's distinction, are similarly pushed away from "feudal" self-sufficiency in the direction of capitalist rationality, and cease to be characterized by relations of serf-like dependence.

In place of these traditional autonomies, new institutions exercise sway over the producer. Producer-controlled cooperatives arise precisely in order to protect their members against the power of outside forces, mainly those of the market: to maximize their parallel interests by obtaining higher prices for their crops and pressing for lower prices for the goods they buy. But institutions have their own logic, and centralized organizations generate new bureaucracies. It would be a mistake, however, to see these simply in terms of a "New Class" maximizing its sectional interests, for although they do have their own interests³⁴ they are always subject to the far more powerful pressures of governments, as well as the pressures of organizations which purchase agricultural

³³ On "parcellized sovereignty", see Anderson, *Lineages of the Absolutist State*.

³⁴ See Colin Leys, *op. cit.*, on the emergence of an indigenous landowning bourgeoisie financed by the State, especially chapter 3 "Continuity and Change in Agriculture", chapter 5 "Agrarian Capitalism", and chapter 6 "Neo-Colonial Society".

commodities.³⁵ Hence “peasant” organizations increasingly come under the direct control of central governments, or are even brought into being in the first place by governments, rather than by peasants, both as wings of political parties and as a “sector” within a corporatized national economic framework of planing, social control and resource-allocation, itself inserted into a world capitalist market. The “allocation”, however, like the “planning”, remains largely rhetorical. The reality is the appropriation of surplus value from the peasantry, and capital-accumulation for the State.

The low prices which the State and world commodity-exchanges can impose on the peasant, by means of their organizational power, mean that the sector of petty rural production becomes vital in providing cheap food for the swelling populations of the cities. It also brings in foreign exchange on a more or less significant scale. Finally, those who give up or are driven out of agriculture become a crucial source of cheap labor for the urban economy. If they retain land in the villages, they can always be decanted back there when life in the city becomes unbearable. These functions within the wider economy therefore constitute them as a “reserve army of labour”, as a source of primitive capital accumulation, and a major source of foreign earnings. Politically, similar and parallel controls convert them into a “disposable” and “available” mass.

Given such untrammelled powers, the State is commonly tempted to intervene directly in production itself, either by taking over or establishing its own cooperative *producer* organization, thus moving from the *marketing* of the end product of agricultural production (and its appropriation) to direct intervention in production, either by seeking to coordinate and improve peasant small-holder farming, or by establishing State farms of one kind or another. In the latter case, the State now becomes a landowner and employer of its own wage-labor-force.

Not infrequently what ensues is disaster —at best, a dismal shortfall of expected output-targets. My own involvement in this kind of enterprise was the British Government’s Groundnut Scheme of 1947-49, which cost 36 million in that short time before being practically totally

³⁵ Ernest Feder, *Strawberry Imperialism*: an inquiry into the mechanisms of dependency in Mexican agriculture, Institute of Social Studies, The Hague, 1976, gives a pithy account of one development of “US agriculture in Mexico”. Even the agreement signed in Mexico between the US brokers and the Mexican Government was written in English!

abandoned. The bigger the scale of the productive venture, of course, the bigger the scale of the disaster. Logically, on the other hand, the greater should be the success where there is success.

But there rarely is. The reason for this are twofold: the one deriving from the predominance of the bureaucrat (and all the forces he represents) over the peasant; the other from the correlative absence of countervailing power among the peasantry –and therefore the low levels of rewards they obtain– and the absence, too, of any commitment amongst the employees of these public enterprises.

One of the typical syndromes of this kind of forced cooperativization is what is usually termed inefficiency or corruption. What underlies these phenomena, however, is the disruption of the peasantry and their subjection to those who “know better”. Yet no one, in reality, knows more about growing certain kinds of crops in certain types of soil, the patterns of rainfall, etc., than peasants living in cultures which have accumulated such knowledge over millennia rather than centuries. Yet today, they are suddenly uprooted, put into new and unfamiliar physical and social surroundings, as part, often, of large-scale organizations, and asked to grow crops they have never tackled before alongside people they have never seen before (even hereditary enemies). Little wonder they fail, technologically, as farmers, under these conditions.

This state of affairs is brought into being by a new powerful stratum of urban-based officials and technical experts, often political appointees, who are quite often unfamiliar with agriculture altogether, and more usually concerned with keeping themselves in office and gaining promotion, power and wealth, than with producing agricultural goods and thereby raising the living-standards either of the people they are supposed to “represent” or the population who consume the products of the countryside. But the basic constraint on their behavior is that they have to respond to the demands of government by ensuring that capital accumulation takes place; hence, by exploiting the peasantry. The commonest way is the return to the producer of often less than half what his crop fetches on the world-market. Under these conditions, peasant motivation is low, and resistance begins.

The debate between proponents of large-scale agribusiness or collectivized State or para estatal organizations, on the one hand, and advocates of small-scale peasant farming on the other, fails to connect up, however, to the most relevant, the largest and the most successful of contemporary strategies of agricultural transformation, that of China (I leave aside the other major “success” story, that of US agriculture,

because it is quite inimitable in the impoverished Third World). In China, small-holder production, cooperatives and collectivized farming were neither discrete and unchanging absolutes nor “functional alternatives” co-existing as parts of an overall system, but *phases* in a general *process* of transforming the individualistic producer into a member of a large-scale collective entity, the commune. In this way the perpetuation of a myriad of small peasants was avoided, and the dangers of premature and over-centralized collectives averted (since the latter requires both high capital investment and a highly-developed “proletarian” consciousness and psychology amongst the work-force). The Chinese experience, therefore, gives no comfort either to the proponents of cooperatives or to *étatiste* collectivists. Nor, as many technocrats, impressed by Chinese success, are beginning to suggest, can the Chinese commune be simply borrowed, for it has grown out of a very specific historical experience that cannot be omitted or imitated or produced overnight. One cannot “borrow” the commune as if it were some kind of morphological building-block, because its content requires (a) the revolutionary dispossessions of the ruling, and especially in the countryside the land-owning classes;³⁶ (b) mass mobilization for that revolutionary struggle, and for subsequent “socialist construction”; (c) the *sine qua non* for achieving both of these, the revolutionary party.³⁷

The first step was to boldly satisfy the immemorial peasant desire for land –and thereby raise the volume of production and the level of productivity. The Agrarian Reform Law of 1950 was based on the expropriation of land owned by collaborators and by large landlords, plus temple, lineage, and other land, and redistributing it to the poor and landless. But the Chinese had no intention of creating hundreds of thousands of micro-capitalist farmers. Hence they built upon that other major strain in rural life – mutual aid (and thereby raised the level of development of productive forces). In all too many land-reform schemes, otherwise, land-distribution has resulted in lowered production and productivity.

³⁶ William Hinton, *Fan Shen*: a documentary of revolution in a Chinese village, Pelican, 1966.

³⁷ Peter Worsley, “The revolutionary party as an agent of social change, or The Politics of Mah jong”, in *Social Science and the New Societies* (ed. Nancy Hammond), Social Science Research Bureau, Michigan State University, East Lansing, 1973, pp. 217-245.

In inter-war North China, village associations have always carried out large joint projects, such as flood-control works, at times of natural disasters and in the “dead” winter season. They had also taken care of the cattle of the village cooperatively. Again, young men went out from the villages as “gangs”, hiring out their labor in the towns and farms. In South China, the lineages corporately owned land which they could disburse to the poor, or which was managed on behalf of the lineage, the income being used for charitable purposes. Water-projects and religious enterprises were also undertaken and financed in this way. Village-members also cooperated in building and maintaining schools, roads, bridges, in cropwatching, in self-defense against marauding soldiers, etc.

These existing forms of mutual aid were the basis of the first phase of Communist formal organizations: the “Mutual Aid Teams”, which were formed during the period of reconstruction from 1949 to 1953. The second stage was the formation of cooperatives, in which each household contributed whatever forces of production it possessed. Some had water-buffaloes, others implements; most only their labor-power. These forces of production were now pooled and made available for general use, but the owner received compensation for that use. Thus marked inequalities of ownership –and therefore income– remained. But the resources were no longer monopolized by a limited few, and the practice of working together as a collectivity grew. By the time of the transition to the third phase –the higher level cooperatives– the lands of many cooperatives were already effectively being farmed by the community as a whole, even if still privately-owned. Eventually, people were rewarded for work done, in the form of work-points, not for their ownership of this or that means of production. By this point, production had effectively become socialized. Hence private ownership became increasingly irrelevant and out of harmony with the pattern of production-relations. The making of private profit from sale of produce had also been brought under control by the creation of a State market for grain at stable prices, together with the stabilization of the price of key consumer goods.

The stage was set, therefore, for the final move in 1958, with the Great Leap Forward, from the advanced cooperatives to joint ownership of land and other property, and the collective working of that land, but now in much larger and quite novel units³⁸ – the People’s Communes.

³⁸ Peter Worsley, *Inside China*, Allen Lane/Penguin, 1975.

As a result, with enormous difficulties, mistakes, and backsliding, agricultural production has now reached levels that make starvation simply an historical memory —hand-in-hand with balanced industrial development. For the period 1950-1975, growth-rates of 3.2% in food-grain production and 12.1% in industrial production were achieved. Combined with the progressive reduction of the birth-rate to not all that much higher than 1% over the last two years, per capita total consumption increased by 3.3¹/₂% per annum for the period 1952-74.³⁹

Since the scale of operation of the commune is so large —up to 50,000 people and more in a large commune— large-scale water control and irrigation works become possible: a network of purely locally constructed hydraulic works which utilizes under-employed labor during the winter, has come into being, complementing national and provincial hydraulic projects. In addition to concentrating labor, capital can be accumulated on a large scale. In enterprises of this size, even tiny savings per head aggregate to large capital accumulations. This capital can be expanded either in the expansion of production (increasing inputs of fertilizer, the use of electricity and small machinery) or on social purposes such as hospitals, schools and housing. Chinese agriculture is still only 10% mechanized, and has a long way to go. But it is now complemented by a network of tiny workshops where agricultural machinery and implements are serviced, electrical generators made, fertilizers produced (now approaching half the input into agriculture), and silk and other raw materials processed for sale on the market, etc., so that, for many important requirements, the commune has become independent of the city and its factories and makes important earnings for non-agricultural activities.

The crucial mobilization was that of labor, not capital, though the availability of fertilizers and small machines was a crucial capital input from outside. But the mobilization of the latent initiatives, the energies and the knowledge of a formerly depressed and seasonally under-employed rural population was also crucial and central in this process.⁴⁰ So has the regime's capacity to mobilize people ideologically.

³⁹ Suzanne Paine, "Development with Growth: a quarter century of socialist transformation in China", *Economic and Political Weekly*, Bombay, 1976, Vol. XI, Nos. 31-33, pp. 1349-1382.

⁴⁰ Jack Gray, "Mao Tse-Tung's Strategy for the Collectivization of Chinese

These political messages, however, would have fallen upon deaf ears, as in innumerable other peasant countries, had they not been accompanied by an improving standard of living. Living-standards have risen, undramatically but steadily, for over a quarter of a century now. Today, the bicycle, the transistor radio and the sewing-machine are the big consumer durables, even if cash income is still low. But the countryside has not been "milked" dry, and some half of the food produced is consumed by the peasants. Prices have been remarkably stable over two decades, too: from a base-line of 100 in 1952 to 160⁺ by 1973. Over the same period, the price index for industrial products sold in the rural areas increased from 100 to only 114 (in 1971), and agricultural tax was cut from 12⁰/o of the gross value of agricultural production in 1953 to only 5⁰/o in January 1975.⁴¹

None of this has been accomplished simply by sending in experts or political officials. The leadership of the Communist Party has been quite central, but it has not been simply an external phenomenon. The participation of the peasants, and the high degree of self-management by the commune are real. They have been derived from the lengthy historical experiences of a rural-based revolution. The Bolsheviks, by contrast, had virtually no rural cadres, and their revolution was, initially at least, a swift seizure of power in the two key cities.

By these means, the Chinese have broken with the policy of building up industry at the expense of the peasantry, replacing this with a policy of "walking on *two legs*" (agriculture *and* industry), and of removing the "Three Great Differences": those between agriculture and industry, between town and country, and between mental and manual labor.

This kind of strategy is opposed at virtually every point to current development-strategies throughout the capitalist Third World. There, capital-intensive agricultural projects, typified by the Green Revolution and by agribusiness, are the principal techniques. Since they are capital-intensive, not labor-intensive they produce a surplus labor-force, which then emigrates to the city where it encounters urbanization without industrialization. As a recipe for disaster, this could scarcely be improved upon. (The crowning touch, Galtung has suggested, is to build a huge university system, and then arrange matters so that there is no

Agriculture", in E. de Kadt and G. Williams (eds.), *Sociology and Development*, Tavistock, London, 1974, pp. 39-65.

⁴¹ Paine, *op. cit.*, Table 4, p. 1374.

employment for this new “proletarian intelligentsia”.⁴² Further consequences are the dependence, for survival, of the mass of subproletarians upon their kin (what the French call *parasitage familiale*), often as part of a huge army of servants, or upon the minority of wage-employment, or upon “informal income-opportunities” in all their variety which “redistribute” income: crime, above all, and for women, prostitution. Analogous to the involution of agriculture described by Geerts, a new *urban involution* of the informal economy arises: the interposition of thousands of middlemen between the producer and the customer; the multiplication of innumerable “penny capitalists”⁴³ or other “urban peasants” such as the “subsistence transport sector” made up of truck-owners who drive their own vehicles and rely on inordinate inputs of family labor,⁴⁴ just like rural peasants, but who only manage to scrape up enough food to feed their families, despite their formal status as urban “entrepreneurs”.⁴⁵

In the development of European capitalism, poverty, unemployment, and slumps were equally chronic, but these were the beginnings of economic systems that came to spread out over the entire world. Today, it is the stranglehold they successfully established that precisely prevents the underdeveloped countries from following the path of the capitalist pioneer countries. The twin phenomena, then, of urban, involution and rural backwardness are functions of economies incapable of providing balanced growth because they are oriented to the demands of a world capitalist market dominated by the “over-developed” powers and local bourgeoisies, rather than by the requirements of production related to the human needs of the majority. Under such conditions, social imbalance and conflict is endemic. Hence the marginalization—economic and political, cultural and social—of important segments of the urban and rural populations rather than their “integration”—may be expected

⁴² Gareth Stedman-Jones, “The Meaning of the Student Revolt”, in *Student Power* (eds. A. Cockburn and R. Blackburn), Penguin, 1969, especially pp. 26-29 on “Students as the New Proletariat”.

⁴³ Sol Tax, *Penny Capitalism: a Guatemalan Indian Economy*, Smithsonian Institution, Institute of Social Anthropology, Publication No. 16, Washington D.C., 1953.

⁴⁴ Colin Leys, *op. cit.*, p. 161.

⁴⁵ T.G. McGee, “Peasants in the Cities: a paradox, a most ingenious paradox”, *Human Organization*, Vol. 32, No. 2, Summer 1973, pp. 135-142.

to continue. In a world economy which as a whole is also dominated by multi-national corporations, and with ever more effective communication-systems, the populations of the Third World (and usually the more skilled and educated rather than the peasantry) constitute an enormous reservoir of labor, now contributing more than 11¹/₂ million workers to the factories of Western Europe alone.⁴⁶

The common factor in all of this is unequal (and therefore contradictory) development, generating both class and national struggles. To comprehend the place of any particular class or society within this world-system requires relating it to the system as a whole. But it also calls for historical specificity, and the analysis, in depth, of culturally-institutionalized ways of behavior and thought, rather than the abstracted, idealistic and formalistic categories of French structuralist political economy, which, for some reason that eludes me, even appeals to those who think of themselves as "historical" materialists.

In the words of the historian who has produced the single most impressive attempt to analyze the dynamics of the formation of one such class in an emergent capitalist country, the English proletariat at the turn of the eighteenth century, "class is a social *and cultural* formation arising from processes which can only be studied as they work themselves out *over a considerable historical period*" (my italics, P.W.), and always, too, entails a *relationship* to other classes in a *system* of classes engendering loyalties, solidarities and identifications on the one hand, and antagonisms, discriminations, and resistances, on the other. All of these, Thompson writes, are "embodied in tradition, value-systems, ideas and institutional forms" which have meaning for the actors themselves and inform their actions.⁴⁷

A final note. In concentrating on the emergence and transformation of society in the countryside, I have concentrated on classes and modes of production. But these are not the only analytical entities, or the only foci of people's attention. Indeed, they may not be the principal objects of their attention at all, however analytically and objectively important. Hence we need to pay particular attention to other historical-

⁴⁶ Castles and Kosack, *op. cit.* See also Suzanne Paine, *Exporting Workers: The Turkish Case*, Cambridge University Press, 1974, and Peter Worsley, "Proletarians, Sub-proletarians, Lumpenproletarians, Marginal, Migrants, Urban Peasants and Urban Poor", *Sociology*, Vol. 10, No. 1, January 1976, pp. 133-142.

⁴⁷ E.P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class*, Pelican, 1968, pp. 10, 12.

ly-shaped cultural outcomes of unequal development, of which *ethnicity* and *nationalism* are the most modern manifestations.

The implementation by external conquest of the colonial State clearly makes for quite different relations between those who govern that State and those they rule, as contrasted to societies where the State emerged as an “organic” and internal growth (with whatever passages of violence and continuing “monopoly of the means of violence”). The modes of ideological control, and possibilities of appeal to “traditional” and “common” values, will also differ profoundly in the respective cases. For people do not live simply in *economies*, but in *societies* and *cultures* with distinctive histories. Hence there is all the difference in the world between the reactions to social change of peasants living in ancient Andean “closed-corporate” communities owning their own land, or fighting to get it back, and, say, the immigrant populations of Brazil or Argentina, whose cultural identity is disconnected from any such material and historically-rooted base, and where, therefore, despite cultural diversity, they have been more readily incorporated into new national synthesizing identities, as in the USA. This important dimension has, however, been discussed in Professor Darcy Ribeiro’s paper elsewhere in this volume, so I shall not develop it here.

My thanks are due to Suzanne Paine and Bipan Chandra for their critical comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

PART I

On Peasants and
National Integration

Perspectives for the Study of the Peasantry and National Integration

Celma Agüero
Susana B.C. Devalle
Michiko Tanaka

I

The present paper is an account of the research experience of a group of researchers at El Colegio de México that began work under the guidance of Dr. Prodyot Mukherjee.¹ Its members came originally from different disciplines and this constituted their first experience in research related to Asia. The goal of the team's work has been the analysis of the process of the formation of nations based on agrarian societies via a study of the relations of the groups which compose them, taking the peasantry as the determining group in this process.

Establishing this field of research in Mexico creates a two-fold opportunity for discussion and reflection. First, becoming conscious of belonging to a society which has a peasant base that is an active participant in historical development, sensitizes and challenges the researcher, and secondly, creates the need to place oneself within this reality in order to study the agrarian societies of Asia and Africa in a concerned manner and within the total historical context.

This type of research situation: 1) stimulates the development of critical work which, from different perspectives and areas of interest permits the achievement of a more adequate identification of the problems and a more correct characterization of the realities which the researcher faces; 2) permits the development of enriching encounters as paths to a valid approach to these societies and their dynamics; 3) in this effort to confront two societies, a continuous dialogue is also

¹ Mukherjee et. al., *Movimientos agrarios y cambio social en Asia, Africa y América Latina*, El Colegio de México, México, 1974.

opened between the world view of the researcher and the reality he is trying to understand. This dialogue causes adaptations in the researcher's views which permit him to discover new meanings for the same reality. Reflection obliges one to maintain a continuous reference to specific historical experience without forgetting the total historical context for each of the periods chosen as a focus of study.

The desire to study the emerging national realities of Asia and Africa in their postcolonial form implies the knowledge of a preliminary process; that of the national formation of agrarian societies under colonial rule. Among the social groups which take part in this process, the peasantry appears as a pivotal socioeconomic component with a potential for autonomous thought and action in opposition to the groups which control the State. The studies try to discover how peasant action manifests itself: those actions which are backed up by previous experience and resist the pressure of the colonial system, and those actions which attempt to participate in the formation of the national system, presenting or not alternatives to this project.

II

The studies have begun with the selection of concrete cases in Japan, India and West Africa, marking off small areas of study. The inclusion of Japan might at first seem out of place since it has not suffered direct colonial domination nor was the existence of the Japanese nation ever in doubt. Nonetheless, examining more closely its historical development at the time of the establishment of the modern state, under foreign pressure in the middle of the 19th century, it is seen that the peasantry is subject to oppression, although in this case exercised from the center of national power. In the discussion of the studies it has been possible to count on the collaboration and comments of specialists interested in different societies, and working in many distinct disciplines. This style of work, although it originates in the study of small social units (tribal societies, village communities), allows them to be seen in the socio-economic context within which they exist, and in permanent interaction with the rest of society as a whole.

Discussions which have analyzed the way the peasantry has behaved in different areas have aided in the understanding of a complex peasant reality, making it necessary to take into consideration aspects which had been originally ignored. This type of analysis assumes constant attention to the historical development of the total society within

which the peasantry is included, and within this development, of the specific historical conditions to which the peasant responds. Our goal has been to understand and observe the process of the formation of a peasant political consciousness via a study of different styles of response which can be detected in his actions: support, demands, legal appeals, non-collaboration, resistance, flight, open confrontation, etc. The peasant's choice of one of these responses indicates that he is very conscious of the specific structural conditions and of the possibilities for acting under these conditions as he perceives them at the immediate local level, at the level of the total society, and even at the level of foreign relations, whether with the colonial metropolis, or later with the centers of hegemonic super-national power.

Until now, our attention has been centered on the study of peasant movements, which, although they constitute exceptional moments in the life of the rural masses, are moments in which their political consciousness is revealed in a clearer and more immediate manner. Our studies have shown that repercussions of these movements are observed in their geographic extension at the time they are occurring, as well as in terms of an accumulation of experience, a tradition of protest, which allows them to make modifications and changes in the formulation of the political consciousness and even to create new methods of response. Those elements of social organization and of the daily life of the peasants which condition, limit, or favor rebellious actions still remain to be analyzed; for example, forms of association, types of natural authority, popular beliefs, social norms and sanctions, forms of relation with other sectors of society, etc.

III

The movements which we analyze correspond to a key period in the expansion of European industrial capitalism in the world. In this period all local economies reorganized themselves in relation to the world market, a process which profoundly affected their societies, weakening the autonomy of local power and propagating the ideology of the hegemonic center.

At this point the dislocation of the social order which controls peasant life is perceived, yet none of the means of adaptation which had existed previously under former conditions of domination exist. The peasants, trying to halt the advance of this process, call for a reaffirmation of already known mechanisms in order to create new ties of solidarity and a new order that will permit resistance.

In these first manifestations are found the seeds of national consciousness in which anti-colonial aspirations are wrapped. Meanwhile, the colonial apparatus produces a dominant group of bureaucrats and intellectuals who accept the colonial project.

Using similar traditional values, the displaced, formerly dominant groups arise, attempting to recuperate their position in the face of a new situation.

These are the factors which participate in nation-building; and the character of the national state depends on the relative position of each of them and on the way they are joined.

Our discussions are directed at examining the role of the peasants both in the process and in the results of these national movements. The form which peasant participation adopts in critical moments of resistance will determine the characteristics of the development of contemporary political regimes in these agrarian societies and will condition the model of integration which these nations follow.

In this sense it is useful to take into account at least two currents which work towards integration: firstly, that which is developed by the initiative of the native group whose influence has grown under colonial rule, and which proposes a new system in the image of the metropolis in order to consolidate their hegemony over their fellow countrymen and achieve vertical integration which responds better to the world-system. Secondly, that of horizontal integration, which principally proposes a close cooperation among the dominated groups by means of which they can demonstrate their opposition to both the colonial regime and to vertical integration. The characteristics which the national states assume, and their political orientation, will depend on the complementariness or confrontation existing between these two currents.

IV

We have always been conscious that, in undertaking the study of peasant problems, it is necessary to discover a vision of the history of agrarian groups which will bring us closer to the peasant reality and to their way of looking at their problems.

In this attempt we have encountered difficulties. In the first place, the existence of numerous perceptions of this reality, deformed by the viewpoints of the observers even though this deformation is not necessarily intentional. Faced with this situation it has been necessary to try

to find another angle from which to approach the problem, and to try to visualize it in its totality.

In the second place, the form in which documents coming directly from the participants in peasant movements should be interpreted, since, although they may not present a true picture of the occurrences, help us to understand the ideologies of these movements so as to be able to share them both with the group which gave rise to them and with other groups which may be interested in this type of problem.

Another task would be that of recuperating the experiences of self-resource of these groups for action and resistance, with the aim of restoring them to their collective memory.

Thirdly, in view of the difficulty of access to documents, especially those coming from the peasants in connection with these movements, it would be important to examine the collection existing in various places, which has not received adequate attention. On the other hand, it would be essential to evaluate in a detailed fashion the material provided by oral tradition. A task which in this respect demands most urgent attention is that of creating an oral history record of peasants groups, although in some areas the peasant himself has already begun to carry out this work together with the social scientist.

In many cases, the researcher has provided us with an analysis of peasant movements that only meets the demands of colonial administration or the dominating national center, for merely intellectual satisfaction, or else this work has been primarily aimed at the collection of material to prove theories.

At the same time as we reject this type of approach backed by interests that are alien to the reality under study, we as researchers make an attempt to create a consciousness of the need to study the societies that are to be found outside the geocultural boundaries they belong behind. This is in order to develop a method that would be more in keeping with the researcher's own knowledge of this reality. It is also to achieve a global vision that embraces both realities, always on the lookout for a critical consciousness capable of clarifying the experience we try to transmit.

The Peasants and the Project for National Integration in Contemporary India

Bipan Chandra

I. Agricultural class structure in the colonial period

Colonialism brought about momentous social and economic transformation during which centuries old social and economic relationships and institutions were dissolved and replaced by new relationships and institutions. In the realm of agriculture too, new agrarian relations and class structures made their appearance. New classes, absentee landlords and money lenders at the top and tenants-at-will, share croppers, and agricultural laborers at the bottom, came into being. A new agrarian structure was born that was neither traditional, nor feudal, nor capitalist. There occurred a growth of tenancy and a hierarchy of intermediaries between the state and the actual cultivator on a scale unprecedented in Indian history. By 1931, one-third of the rural population was landless and most of the remaining two-thirds were tenants-at-will, share-croppers and petty peasant-proprietors. Not that exploitative elements were introduced afresh. Economic inequality, political and economic oppression by zamindars, maliks, etc., status differences, and caste domination had prevailed in ample measure earlier. But the pattern of such domination and exploitation was now transformed. Moreover, old institutions and relationships were not consciously overthrown, rather attempts were made to superimpose on them. Consequently, they disintegrated and along with them disappeared some of the social protection of the lower castes and classes provided by mutual help and enforcement of custom, though within the limits of the old structure.

New relationships were evolved by the interaction of the old with the new; but what occurred was change without social revolution. Consequently, the new social basis of agriculture was not more conducive either to economic development or to economic welfare. The point

here is not whether the new structure was better or worse, nor that the old society disintegrated, but that what came in its place was as, if not more, regressive and as much of a strait-jacket on the development of agriculture. The new structure or relationships of forms of surplus extraction and utilization (a) did not provide incentives or opportunities to any class or stratum engaged in agriculture in any position to make modern improvements and (b) led to the siphoning off of resources from agriculture and the agriculturist.

Broadly speaking these changes came as a result of the introduction of new land systems, the heavy land revenue demand, legal and political changes, the destruction of indigenous industries, the disintegration of the age - old union between agriculture and industry, the integration with the world capitalist economy in a subordinate position, and above all the fact that the Indian economy and agriculture underwent a commercial revolution which was unaccompanied by an industrial revolution. More specifically, Indian agriculture was commercialized without any change occurring in its technical base or productive organization.

One major consequence of the colonialization of Indian economy and agriculture was stagnation in agricultural output, decline in productivity, fall in the per capita availability of food and, in general, the increasing impoverishment of the cultivator. However, here we are not interested mainly in the poverty and misery of the peasant but in changes in the agrarian class structure in the recent colonial and then the post-colonial period.

We have discussed these changes in very broad outline, often ignoring regional differences. It is rather awkward to generalize about the entire country when wide differences in pattern came into being because of the varied and prolonged colonial historical process. However, we have done so because the general elements of colonial agriculture and class structure came to be similar all over the country. At the same time, statistical data and other evidence from particular parts of the country have often been given because of the paucity of much necessary data and evidence for all parts, or at least the difficulty of access to this for reference purposes.

A) At the top of the agrarian class structure came the zamindars and landlords who owned and controlled most of the land. By the 1920's, landlordism had become the main feature in both the zamindari and ryotwari tenure areas. Moreover, through sub-infeudations, the number of intermediaries had increased. Large numbers of zamindars and landlords were new both in functions and personnel. High land revenue de-

mand, its rigidity, and the new legal and administrative system led to the expropriation of the older upper classes as well as the peasant proprietors. Merchants, moneylenders, speculators, officials, professionals, and other urban groups bought up zamindaris, or the peasant-owned lands, in order to become landlords. Most of the new zamindars and landlords were absentee and had little link with land. They, along with the older zamindars, were not interested even in organizing the machinery for rent collection, and therefore, readily took to subinfeudation, thus increasing the number of rent receivers and hence the rent-demand. The middlemen invariably had recourse to every conceivable legal or illegal mechanism to collect more from the actual tiller of the soil. In ryotwari areas too, land was gradually passing under the control of landlords and moneylenders. It is to be noted that the alienation of land by an owner-cultivator did not mean transfer of cultivation but interposition of a middleman between the previous owner, the new tenant and the state. By 1947, nearly 70 per cent of the total cultivated land was owned by zamindars and landlords. In ryotwari areas about 50 per cent of the land was in landlords' hands and the rest was heavily under debt.

The zamindars and landlords were not only recruited from moneylenders but many of them increasingly took to moneylending. The Uttar Pradesh Banking Enquiry Committee reported in 1931 that landlords were the largest source of rural loans in Uttar Pradesh, contributing nearly 40 per cent of all loans.

The stagnant colonial economy with its lack of economic opportunities in a period of increase in the number of proprietor-landlords produced sharp differentiation within the class of zamindars and landlords. Thus, in Uttar Pradesh in the 1930's 0.4% or 804 zamindars owned 25% of the land while 1.5% held 58% of the land. In the Agra part of the province, 85.5% of the proprietors paid less than Rs. 25 per year as revenue, while another 13.2% paid between Rs. 25 and Rs. 250 per year. In Bengal, in 1893, 85.4% of the estates controlled 9.8% of the area, with an average per estate of 49 acres of land, net rental of Rs. 29, number of 4 shares, and net rental income of Rs. 7 per share. The next 13.8% of the estates controlling 39.3% of the area had an average per estate of 1228 acres of land, net rental of Rs. 1711, number of 6 shares, and net rental income of Rs. 235 per share. This extreme differentiation among the landlords was to have a very significant impact on the Indian national movement. The majority of rent receivers were, in their incomes and even life styles, not distinguishable from the rich or even middle peasants. They were impoverished and

were getting further impoverished. They were becoming quite hostile to colonialist areas, men born to education and status and used to political and administrative leadership, they could and did begin to play an active role in the anti-imperialist struggle and to provide the latter with elements of mass support, especially in elections under a restricted franchise after 1919. They played an important rôle in the 'massization' of the national movement. Yet, with all their impoverishment, they were rent receivers. This could not but leave an impression on the social program of the National Congress and its pattern of national integration.

Similarly, they also began to play a certain role in the emerging peasant movement, especially in the 1920's. Apart from direct impact, the pull they exercised on the rich and middle peasants and through them on the peasant movement and its programs was significant.

The commercial bourgeoisie in India, first destroyed but later developed as the linkage of Indian economy with the world economy, gave a lift to internal trade. Growth of export of agricultural raw materials and foodstuffs and growth of internal trade in agricultural products as the result of the growing unification of Indian economy and the pressure on the peasant to compulsorily sell his products in order to meet his payments to the state, landlord, and moneylender provided ample opportunity for the commercial bourgeoisie to grow. The village market structure and the compulsive need of the peasant to sell immediately after the harvest and later to buy for consumption made the merchant a major appropriator of agricultural surplus. Commercialization of agriculture, which often led to crops being grown with merchant's advances and marketed through this monopolistic channel, further strengthened his position, as did the fact that he often combined the usurer's function with that of the trader's. He also increasingly began to control the land as an absentee landlord.

Colonialization of the economy, administrative and legal structure, the land revenue system, and increasing commercialization of rural life created a favorable economic and political climate for the village moneylender who began to occupy a dominating position in the rural economy and to expropriate both the peasant proprietors, the occupancy tenants and the zamindars. This led to major tensions in the countryside and produced two interesting consequences. In many parts of the country, the cultivators could be rallied by the small and even big landlords against the common enemy, the moneylender. Secondly, the rural tensions generated by the intrusion of the non-cultivating

usurer often threatened the social and political peace and led the colonial administrators to heap abuse on him. Yet the usurer was a crucial cog in the mechanism of colonial surplus extraction. He kept the revenue machinery working and other agricultural processes going. He enabled both the production of export crops and their eventual export. He was responsible for the maintenance of the minimum agricultural functions including the production of the peasant. He was the ultimate and the only safety valve in the countryside. In fact, he was as much an intermediary between the colonial state and the peasant as the zamindar or the earlier revenue farmer. So the colonial administrators abused and cursed him as an evil—but also declared him to be a necessary evil.

If moneylenders became landlords, many landlords and superior ryots—rich and middle peasants—became moneylenders. In particular, they lent to petty tenants, share croppers, and agricultural laborers who had no security to offer and therefore could not become clients of the regular moneylenders. The landlords and superior ryots could, however, use their social and caste position and kinship connections to collect. In 1951-52, nearly 25 per cent of all rural debt was held by agricultural moneylenders. Their competitive position as moneylenders was another point of friction between landlords and rich peasants and the traditional moneylenders. This enabled the former to generate a spurious radicalism that opposed usurers without opposing usury in any meaningful sense.

In conclusion to this sub-section, it may be said that the most important change in agrarian relations during the colonial period was the growth in the relative strength of the landlord, the trader, and the moneylender. Moreover, whatever increase of income occurred in agriculture due to certain commercialization of agriculture also went to them.

B) The actual cultivator increasingly became a rack-rented tenant-at-will or share cropper, whose terms of tenancy were constantly deteriorating. In 1951, 29 per cent of the rural population consisted of peasant proprietors, while tenants and laborers made up 71% or rest of the rural population. By the end of the colonial period, the rent and interest burden on the peasant amounted to 14,000 million rupees per year.

A major feature of the agrarian class structure in the recent colonial period was the high degree of internal differentiation and stratification within the peasantry.

At the top emerged a distinct stratum of rich peasants, both owners as well as protected tenants, who succeeded in benefitting from the com-

mercialization of agriculture because of their control over land, the protection provided by tenancy legislation to occupancy ryots and legislation against transfer of land to non-agriculturists, the opportunity to buy the expropriated land of the peasants, and the scope of money-lending and trade. In some regions, many of these rich peasants – owners or occupancy ryots – became, because of the opportunity to obtain high rents, landlords in effect while retaining their status as peasants. In others, they strove towards capitalist or semi-capitalist farming.

An important aspect of the rural differentiation was the emergence of the rich peasant moneylenders. Not only was nearly 25% of the rural debt held by agricultural moneylenders in 1951-52 but *in addition* 14.4% of the debt was held by the relatives of the debtors.

The rich peasant as a rent and revenue payer was opposed to imperialism as well as to the zamindar. But, as an actual intermediary, whose legal position was still that of peasant-proprietor or occupancy ryot, or as a potential intermediary, his agrarian and political outlook was deeply conservative, and this apart from the fact that, even as a man of property and employer of labor, he was no radical on the socio-economic plane. This conservative character of the rich peasant was a major factor responsible for the conservative agrarian program of the National Congress and the failure of the radical and left nationalist to go, except in a few cases, beyond the programmatic stage in defense of the interests of the tenants-at-will, share croppers, and agricultural laborers.

Below the rich peasants came a stratum of middle peasants who were very close in social and economic position as also in political and agrarian outlook to the rich peasants, having survived the colonial process of disintegration and expropriation.

The vast mass of peasantry was gradually getting reduced to the statum of landless agricultural laborers and petty landholders, described by Surendra J. Patel as dwarf holding laborers, some of whom were petty proprietors and other tenants-at-will and share croppers, who had either no rights to land or were in the grip of indebtedness. Now the important point regarding these dwarf holders was that they were a transitional class; they were peasants who were on the way to becoming proletarians. They could be seen as small peasants, for their outlook and hopes and fears those of peasants; or as semi-proletarians whose social interests already converged towards those of the landless. But we will have more to say on this aspect in the section on the agrarian class structure in post-colonial India.

The ranks of landless agricultural laborers were swelled by disinherited peasants, ruined artisans, and the growth in population which was not absorbed by a modern industrial or service sector. It is to be noted that the agricultural laborers constituted a new social class of rural proletarians which was increasingly becoming distinct from the land-holding peasantry. The dwarf holder and the landless laborer constituted more than half of the rural population. They were not only the poorest and the most exploited, but objectively their problems could not be solved by any reform of the agrarian system. In fact, their problems could not be solved at all *within* the agrarian system.

The numerical distribution of the agricultural population into different rural classes is a difficult task and has not been fully attempted. Ultimately, with all the economic and sociological arguments against it, the pattern of land holdings or operational holdings is the only one statistically available and serviceable. But even here one has to impose rather arbitrary dividing lines. Surendra J. Patel believes that those holding or cultivating (as opposed to owning: the extremes of ownership may not be reflected in cultivation since landlords rented out their land to many tenants; consequently land holding, whether in ownership or tenancy, gives a better idea of rural class structure and stratification within the peasantry) less than 5 acres should be classified as dwarf holders and landless agricultural laborers. These, according to him, constituted 71.1% of the total agricultural working population in 1931, with 37.8% constituting the category of landless agricultural laborers. I believe that in general those holding less than 2.5 acres can certainly be classified as proletarians and semi-proletarians or dwarf holders. In any case this shows that *differentiation within the peasantry had reached a very advanced stage in the late colonial period*. According to the Agricultural Labour Enquiry of 1951 19% of the rural families had no land. Of the land-holding families, 38.1% had less than 2.5 acres of land, controlling in all 5.6% of the land (16.8% under 1 acre and 21.3% between 1 and 2.5 acres). These may be seen as semi-proletarians or as dwarf holders. 21% of the rural families held 2.5 to 5 acres of land, constituting 9.9% of the area. These may be seen as the small peasants. 19.1% of the families held 5 to 10 acres of land constituting 17.6 per cent of the area. These may be regarded as the small and middle peasants. 16.2% of the families held 10 to 25 acres of land constituting 32.5 per cent of the area. These may be seen as middle and rich peasants. 4.2% of the families held 25 to 50 acres of land constituting 19 per cent of the area. These were clearly the rich peasants.

1.4⁰/_o of the families held 50 or more acres and controlled 15.4 per cent of the area. These were the big landowners who merged with the zamindars.

Differentiation within the peasantry was, moreover, occurring all over the country. For example in the Punjab, in 1939, 48.8⁰/_o of the total holdings were in the category of up to 3 acres and constituted 6⁰/_o of the entire agricultural area, while 6.3⁰/_o of the holdings above 25 acres constituted 52.8 per cent of the area. In Uttar Pradesh, in 1946, 55.8⁰/_o of the total holdings were in the category of under 2 acres and constituted 13.1⁰/_o of the land, while 19⁰/_o of the holdings in the category of over 25 acres controlled 12.9 per cent of the area. In the ryotwari area of Madras, 22.8⁰/_o of the land owners owned less than 1 acre of land and 3.4⁰/_o of the total land, while 0.8⁰/_o of the land owners owned more than 18 acres and 13.1⁰/_o of the total land.

II. Agrarian class structure in the post-colonial period

The nationalist leadership was committed at the moment of freedom to changes in the agrarian structure. At the same time it had to evolve a new institutional structure that would serve the needs of economic development in the long run. From the beginning it recognized a few constraints: (i:) Industrialization, however rapid, would not absorb the vast numbers of rural unemployed and underemployed who must therefore remain in the villages and live off the land. Capitalist farming could not absorb this labor force either; rather the opposite. (ii) Agricultural production must grow and agricultural surpluses must flow into the cities. The petty peasant producers could not perform this task. Only capitalist farmers could do so. (iii) In a relatively overpopulated country like India, capitalist farmers could not be permitted to dispossess peasant proprietors, since a large and undisguisedly unemployed proletariat would pose immense social and political problems. Hence the need for a new institutional structure which would be neither feudal, nor semi-feudal, nor wholly capitalist; and which would, on the one hand, produce marketable agricultural surpluses and on the other keep the vast rural population engaged in agriculture by preserving the small and dwarf holder till, after decades of industrialization, it began to be sucked into the non-agricultural sector. This structure had to have as its base small and dwarf peasant property and at its top rich peasant-cum-capitalist farming. This policy had in fact been laid down during the last quarter of the 19th century by Justice Ranade, much of whose thinking

percolated down to the Indian planners through the political as well as the intellectual traditions. Arguing against the zamindari system, which he described as semi-feudalism, Ranade pleaded for a policy of land to the tiller accompanied by the transformation of the old zamindars into capitalist-farmers. And, then, he wrote: "A complete divorce from land of those who cultivate it is a national evil, and no less an evil is it to find one dead level of small farmers all over the land. High and petty farming . . . this mixed constitution of rural society is necessary to secure the stability and progress of the country." This policy of replacing landlordism by rich and middle peasants while keeping the small, subsistence farmer-cum-commodity-producer intact so that there was no proletarianization and disintegration of the peasantry was accepted by the Congress Party and the Government of India after 1947. This policy has sometimes been attacked from the 'right' by those who want greater leeway for the capitalist farmer, and sometimes from the left by those who want more equitable distribution of land. The attack from the right has been easily met, since there has been scope for the growth of capitalism, and the dangers of untrammelled concentration of land are there for all to see. The technocratic critique that the vast mass of small holders are economically non-viable has been met with two types of answer. In the 1950's the promotion of agricultural cooperatives was stressed. This policy foundered on the twin reality that no pooling of the resourceless and the landless would be viable and cooperativization of the rich and middle peasants' land was beyond the limits set by the existing class and political structure of the country. The other answer has been to use state-supported credit and marketing structures and modern technology and inputs to make the small peasant viable.

The left criticism of the agrarian strategy was also ineffective, for it was based on illusory economic and political assumptions. Firstly, it accused the ruling classes of preserving semi-feudalism, while what they were doing was changing the agrarian structure, not by giving land to the tiller but by gradually transforming the landlords into rich peasants and capitalist farmers. Then the left argued for land ceilings which were easily evaded by the big landowners by dividing land among relatives and children. Land ceilings thus did not generate land for distribution but it did generate a large number of rich peasant holdings. The left now demanded lower land ceilings. But this step could produce a significant amount of distributable land only if the rich peasant was divested of land. This was politically not feasible for a regime which

depends upon the rich and middle peasants politically as well as economically. In fact, even the left dared not attack the rich peasant but either tilted at the windmills of feudalism or wanted to attack the rich peasant by calling him a semi-feudal landlord. The fact is that the agrarian class structure of India has been now so sharply stratified that the rich peasant confronts the proletarian and semi-proletarian elements, and he does so with the support of the middle and even small peasant.

What has been the impact of land reforms and other policies on the agrarian class structure? (i) The zamindars and the semi-feudal agrarian structure have disappeared or are disappearing. But the abolition of the major intermediaries released little land for distribution to the landless; in fact initially some of the landholding tenants were ejected by the landlords from the land which they were permitted to resume for self-cultivation as rich peasants and capitalist farmers. But many of the previous tenants now became owner-cultivators. (ii) The land reform was pro-landlord in the sense that the landlords were permitted to remain at the top of the agrarian class structure, though they were forced gradually to change their class status. (iii) With the growth of owner-cultivation the rural political and social domination passed to the rich peasant. Many of the agrarian policies, for example regarding ceilings which are described as reactionary by the left and are ascribed to feudalism and landlords are in fact the product of the deference paid to rich peasant interests or ideology. (iv) Land ceilings succeeded in reducing big landed property but released no land for distribution to the landless. Their main impact has been to discourage the purchase of land by the rich peasants who therefore now use their economic surplus to improve the land and not to buy it. Thus capitalism in agriculture has been strengthened without dispossession of the small cultivator and without further concentration of land. If anything, it is the rich, middle and small peasants who have gained at the cost of the very big landowners. Indeed, the deepening of capitalism has created wider employment opportunities. (v) The form that growth of capitalism takes is the promotion of rich peasant farming. (vi) Tenancy is very much reduced, though its extent is less known than before since it is driven underground. Tenancy is also for that reason more difficult to fight. Moreover, the areas of advancing agriculture, which so to speak hold up the mirror of the future to the backward areas, are virtually free of semi-feudal tenancy. (vii) At the same time, there has been a constant increase in the number and proportion of agricultural laborers so that they constitute the largest social group in the countryside today. But

Table I

<i> Holding size</i>	<i> Percentage of population</i>	<i> Percentage of area</i>
0 - 2.5	48.23	6.71
2.5 - 5.0	17.43	12.17
5.0 - 10.0	16.59	19.95
10.0 - 15.0	7.29	13.85
15.0 - 20.0	3.46	9.42
20.0 - 25.0	2.09	7.20
25.0 - 30.0	1.37	5.53
30.0 - 50.0	2.35	12.99
50.0 and over	1.18	12.19

this increase has not come from the dispossession of the small peasantry, as is sometimes believed. In fact, after the initial process of evictions in the 1950's, no dispossession of the small peasant seems to have been occurring.

Let us take a look at the agrarian class structure as it has evolved as a result of the land reforms and other agrarian changes. Table I gives the percentage of population in different sizes of operational holdings and the area commanded by each size of holdings. Table II is derived from

Table II

<i> Land operated in acres</i>	<i> Percentage of households</i>	
00.0	27.750)	
00.01 - 00.50	7.553)	42.192)
00.50 - 01.00	6.889)) 60.854
01.00 - 01.25	4.342)	18.662)
01.25 - 02.25	14.320)	
02.50 - 05.00	16.330	
05.00 - 07.50	8.614	
07.50 - 10.00	4.239	
10.00 - 15.00	4.626	
15.00 - 20.00	2.062	
20.00 - 25.00	1.239	
25.00 - 30.00	.688	
30.00 - 50.00	1.043	
50.00 and above	.384	

the latest survey undertaken by the Reserve Bank of India. It provides, however, only the percentage of households in each size of holding and is given here only for comparative purposes.

Tables I and II are not strictly comparable since the population in a household goes with the size of operated holding. We have, therefore, based our discussion on Table I only.

Land control is thus highly unequal if the entire rural population is taken to constitute peasantry. However, if we take out the 48 per cent who really constitute not small peasants but, in Lenin's phraseology, proletarians and semi-proletarians (similarly, the rich peasants are best described as rural bourgeoisie and the middle peasant as the rural petty bourgeoisie), the differentiation on the basis of rich medium, and small still implies that they are part of the same class. We get, as Table III shows, a picture of viable landowning classes which resembles in almost all important aspects, except the extent of land owned, the European peasantry including that of France and Germany at the turn of the 19th century or even today in fact.

Among the landowners the inequality is not very weighted on one side; and this is particularly true if the landholders above 5 acres are taken into account. The ruling groups have been and are making every

Table III

<i>Holding size</i>	<i>Percentage of landowning population (which is 51.77% of total rural population)</i>	<i>Percentage of area controlled by the landowning population (which controls 93.29% of total operated area.</i>
2.5 to 5.0	33.67	13.05
5.0 to 10.0	32.04	22.38
10.0 to 15.0	14.08	14.85
15.0 to 20.0	6.68	10.10
20.0 to 25.0	4.036	7.73
25.0 to 30.0	2.65	5.93
30.0 to 50.0	4.54	13.93
50.0 and over	2.23	13.07

attempt to keep these groups stable and viable both through legislation and economic policies. Moreover these groups play an important part in local and regional politics and have, therefore, the ability to protect their interests. Any policy of land ceilings, to be effective, must propose the extreme egalitarian step of family holding being limited to a single family size holding. Politically, this step would be no less radical than the proposal to collectivize land. This is especially so because of the relative equality and therefore solidarity between the 'effective' peasants.

The real problem for the ruling classes is posed by the 48 per cent who have no land or virtually none, who cannot be provided with adequate employment or living standard, and who can never again be reintegrated into the 'peasantry'. Yet, if they become conscious of their changed social position, their politics will turn against the capitalist system itself. To prevent this class awareness from emerging, to keep these people satisfied when the existing social structure is incapable of satisfying them, is the task of politics and ideology. Part of this burden is taken care of by the belief of their being a part of the peasantry, and to keep this illusion going, the El Dorado of land distribution is held up before them. The dwarf holders are given just enough land to keep their notions and hopes of being owner-peasants going. Moreover, this also prevents unity among all those who are really and historically permanently landless. The rest of the burden is assumed by the idea of social uplift and national integration, which does have a great deal of basis in real life. The question here is: are those 48% proletarians and semi-proletarians along with the 34% small and medium peasants or rural petty bourgeoisie to constitute the nation or are they, in the name of national integration, to wait for decades outside the pale of society till capitalism develops sufficiently to reintegrate them into the 'nation'?

III Peasantry and national integration before 1947

The leaders of the Indian national movement desired the peasantry's integration with the nation and the national movement in order to strengthen the striking capacity of the anti-imperialist struggle. Stung by the taunt that they represented merely the 'microscopic minority' of the educated few –the *babus*– and more or less ignored by colonial authorities, it embarked on the course of wider social mobilization, including that of the peasantry, to be able to put greater pressure on the colonial rule to meet its constantly rising demands. This change in

nationalist policy coincided with the period when the full consequences of colonialism for the Indian peasant were coming to the surface, moving him into an era of spreading discontent and economic and political struggle.

A) To integrate the peasantry into the national movement, the nationalist leadership promoted two integrative principles: (i) The notion of the peasantry or *kisan* as a single cohesive social group or one happy family. One purpose was to overcome the peasantry's division on caste, communal, or local bases. The notion of the *kisan* or peasantry had within it certain elements of class cohesion and even consciousness. These elements were later asserted and utilized by radical peasant leadership. But the notion was not promoted by the nationalist leadership with a view to promoting or accentuating the class struggle against the zamindars and landlords. Rather, it was seen as an instrument for overcoming the internally divisive tendencies which weakened the united national struggle against imperialism. Consequently, despite the large scale propagation of the 'ideology' of a single peasantry or of the *kisan*, peasant 'class' consciousness remained on the whole at a very low level and did not, in fact, exist at all in several parts of the country. Peasant consciousness spread very slowly *and only when* zamindars and landlords were gradually politically isolated.

The notion of the peasantry as a social group was also used to paper over the rapidly emerging differentiation within it. In fact it was even used to integrate the small and ruined landlords with the peasantry.

(ii) The second integrative principle was aimed at making the peasants feel part of the nation. This was achieved by stressing not only that peasant interests must predominate in the national movement, but that, further, the peasantry *was* the nation, or at least its basic constituent. It is on these grounds that the dominant National Congress leadership frowned upon the separate organization of *kisans*. As a resolution passed at the Haripura Session of the Congress in 1938 stated: "The Congress has already fully recognized the right of *kisans* to organize themselves in peasant unions. Nevertheless it must be remembered that the *Congress itself is in the main a kisan organization.*" (My italics).

B) The objective justification for the Indian nationalist leadership's efforts to integrate the peasantry within itself and with the rest of the nation lay, firstly, in the fact, so well brought out in the works of R. Palme Dutt and A.R. Desai, that the peasantry's primary contradiction during this period lay with imperialism. Hence, the anti-imperialism movement did not merely 'exploit' the peasants' mass strength or place

its interests at the command of the bourgeoisie or 'middle classes'. It represented to a certain extent the anti-colonial interests of the peasantry. Starting with Dadabhai Naoroji and Justice Ranade and ending with Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, the national leadership's effort to grasp and explain rural poverty with reference to colonialism and in the context of the anti-imperialist struggle was certainly more advanced than the efforts of the colonial authorities and imperialist writers to explain it outside the colonial framework or even than the understanding of the leaders of the spontaneous militant peasant movements of the 19th century.

Secondly, with the unification and integration of India, including its agriculture, economically and politically during the 19th and 20th centuries, it became essential that the peasants should learn to think and act to protect their interests on an all-India plane. For that they had to feel and know that they were part of larger national entities —the peasantry and the nation. Both these aspects came to be fully recognized by the peasant movement when it developed autonomously during the 1930's and 1940's. The peasant movement stressed the importance of the anti-imperialist struggle for the social development of the peasantry and its own role in it. In fact, it constantly fought after 1936 to acquire greater weight in the nationalist leadership and the national struggle.

Moreover it was not as if the peasantry or its movement were 'utilized' by the national leadership or were 'sacrificed' at the altar of nationalism —ironically this charge was to be made with a vengeance later by certain conservative 'peasantists' against the entire left, socialist and Communist leadership the world over. Nationalism helped arouse the peasant and awaken him to his own needs, demands and, above all, the possibility of an active role in social and political development. Nationalism helped the peasant movement to 'stand on its feet', to spread and take roots in the 1920's and 1930's. It gave cohesion to the peasants, created a sense of solidarity among them, and taught them elements of modern organization, overcoming the utterly disjointed and local character of the peasant movements of the 19th century, when the only widespread movements had been held together by religion or by the top zamindar leadership. Even later, in the 1930's and 1940's, the Kisan Sabha leadership, growing away from the national leadership through its sectarianism, failed to build a genuine all-India peasant movement or to organize large countryside agitations. In fact, the peasant movement, like the national movement, was able to overcome and transcend the weakness of the nationalism leadership and its pattern of national

integration not by counterposing peasant interests and bourgeois nationalism, but by better integration of the peasantry with the national movement, by more vigorous anti-imperialism, and by trying to establish a different pattern of class leadership over the movement.

The link between the national and the peasant movements has been brought out with great clarity by two recent scholars, Majid Siddiqi and K.N. Panikkar. At the end of his study of the peasant movements in Uttar Pradesh from 1920 to 1922, Siddiqi concludes: "The association of the *kisans* with national politics helped both the peasant movements as well as the political movements for they drew sustenance from and gave strength to each other at different stages The movement from below was thus given an initial boost by the cohesion that politics lent it." Similarly, K.N. Panikkar concludes his paper on the peasant revolts in Malabar during the 19th and 20th centuries by referring to the merger of the peasant and national movements in 1921: "This coalition created a sense of cohesion and solidarity among the peasantry. It also provided them with an effective organization."

C) The negative aspects of the Indian nationalist pattern of the peasantry's integration into the national movement lay in three of its important features;

(i) Ignoring the basic features of colonial agrarian structure, the national leadership on the whole curbed the anti-landlord struggle. Its dominant sections were opposed to anti-landlord ideologies, policies, and agitations. They opposed all anti-landlord actions of the peasantry in the name of non-violence and the unity of the anti-imperialist struggle. Separate class organizations of the peasantry, it was said, divided and weakened the national movement. Opposing the independent mobilization of the peasantry, they favored peasant mobilization only when it was a part of the broader national mobilization against imperialism. Thus Gandhi advised the agitating peasants of Uttar Pradesh in February 1921: "You should bear a little if the zamindar torments you. We do not want to fight with the zamindars Zamindars are also slaves and we do not want to trouble them." In May 1921, he again wrote:

. . . . it is not contemplated that at any stage of non-cooperation we would seek to deprive the zamindars of their rent. The *kisan* movement must be confined to the improvements of the status of the *kisans* and the betterment of the relations between the zamindars and them. The *kisans* must be advised scrupulously to abide by the terms of their agreement with the zamindars, whether such is written or inferred from custom.

Similarly, in the Congress Working Committee resolution suspending the non-cooperation movement in 1922, three out of eleven clauses concentrated on the 'legal' rights of the zamindar: In the early 1930's, the Congress Working Committee repeatedly assured the zamindars that it was not opposed to them and that it opposed 'the confiscation of property' and 'class war'. Even the leaders of the Uttar Pradesh Congress, which was much more to the left on the agrarian question and was supporting and organizing peasant agitation against high rent, felt it necessary, in order to ensure the all-India leadership, to state publicly that it worked for "harmony between zamindars and tenants" and did not preach class war.

In the 1920's and 1930-2, Congress leadership concentrated, (with the exception of Uttar Pradesh almost exclusively) on mobilizing the peasants around the anti-imperialist demand for the easing of the crushing burden of land revenue and other taxes such as salt tax. Gandhi's peasant campaigns dealt almost exclusively with issues of opposition to the British administration or, in one case, British planters. The famous Eleven Points of Gandhi in 1930 included two peasant demands: a 50 per cent reduction of land tax and the abolition of salt tax; and at the height of the world depression, when the Indian peasantry was sinking under the burden of rent, usury, and land revenue, he sought to mobilize the peasants on the question of salt tax because this alone could unite the peasants from ryotwari as well as zamindari areas without simultaneously affecting the zamindars.

It may be suggested that the basic criticism here should not be that the national leadership did not promote the anti-feudal revolution with the slogan of land to the tiller. That would have thrown the landlords, big as well as small, into the 'lap' of imperialism. Not only was it not possible for an all-class nationalist front to do so, but in view of the strength of British imperialism before 1939 would perhaps have been bad short-term tactics and therefore politically short-sighted, for the aim of any effective anti-imperialist movement had to be the complete isolation of the enemy. The large number of small and medium landlords in the country need not have been handed over to imperialism as allies. The need to unite and mobilize varied interests and diverse classes and social strata into a wide national front and to neutralize those who could not be so united might indicate a policy of compromise between internally antagonistic classes, the underplaying of their mutual contradictions and the balancing of their conflicting interests.

But the balancing of conflicting interests precisely means both sides making sacrifices and making accommodation. If there was to be a class

compromise, on what terms was it to be? Whose interests would the compromise serve? Was the compromise genuine or did it mask a surrender on the part of some classes and groups? Granted that abolition of landlordism was not to be demanded, how far were the other demands of the peasants against rack-rent, evictions, forced labor, illegal exactions, and the debt burden and for security of tenure and fair wages for labor fought for and secured? Even the peasant organization showed enough political realism to distinguish between their long-term and short-term demands. If it was not possible to go as far as the Communists, why not at least go as far as Jawaharlal Nehru? Even in 1930-32, Nehru and other left Congressmen fought not for no-rent but for fair and just rent. Certainly, it should have been possible for any genuine social compromise to accommodate most of the immediate demands of the peasants.

Yet, this is precisely what was not done. In the name of national unity against imperialism, the peasants' interests were more or less completely sacrificed. *National integration was promoted at the peasants' unilateral cost.*

For years the National Congress failed to evolve a broadbased agrarian program. All the three major movements launched by Gandhi, namely, those of 1920, 1930 and 1942, started without any such program. Gandhi and the national leadership offered to the peasant at most a few "mildly ameliorative, 'self-help' measures" in the name of the constructive program. They placed almost their entire emphasis on Swaraj and the vague talk of agrarian change. *The landlords were to be kept in the national movement by guaranteeing protection of their basic interests, the peasants were to be mobilized through the ideology of nationalism.*

In the 1930's, some of the anti-landlord peasant demands were taken up and in one case, that of Uttar Pradesh, a genuine compromise between the landlords and tenants was put forward when the Uttar Pradesh Congress and Gandhi demanded in 1930 that occupancy tenants should be given a relief of 50 per cent and the non-occupancy ryots a relief of 60 per cent in their rent payments. Gandhi later in 1931 reduced the demand to a relief of 25 and 50 per cent respectively. But despite peasants' militancy these demands were not pressed by Gandhi and the all-India national leadership. As S. Gopal has noted, Gandhi in the end "roundly condemned pressure being brought on landlords, direct appeals not to pay, the proposal of a general 50 per cent reduction of rent and any refusal to pay less than what was within

the individual's capacity." It is also to be noted that in Bihar, where Gandhians held stricter control over the Congress leadership, the nationalists did not take up any of the major peasant demands against the landlords. Not only were *kisans* to be restrained, the leadership was also to restrain itself.

Preparing for the elections of 1937 and trying to contain the challenge of the left within the Congress ranks, the dominant Congress leadership took up with varying degrees of clarity some of the immediate demands for reduction and land revenue, rent and debt burden, moratorium on debt payments, exemption of uneconomic holdings from revenue and rent, cancellation of rent arrears, ban on evictions, fixity of tenure, provision of cheap credit, abolition of beggar and illegal exactions, and recognition of peasant unions. But the Congress organized hardly any agitations, struggles, or even educational campaigns around these demands. The record of the Congress ministries from 1937 to 1939 was in this respect quite dismal. Their agrarian legislation was weak and meager, the only significant relief being given vis-a-vis moneylenders. Above all, their attitude towards the peasantry was not favorable. While the landlords were consulted and accommodated at every stage, the efforts of the peasant unions to exert pressure through mass mobilization were condemned and suppressed both at the party and administrative levels. In anger, Nehru wrote to G.B. Pant, the Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh: ". . . the Congress Ministries are tending to become counter-revolutionary. This is of course not a conscious development but when a choice has to be made, the inclination is in this direction. Apart from this, the general attitude is static."

There are some indications that Gandhi's attitude towards the agrarian question was beginning to change in his last phase. In June 1942, he told Louis Fischer in answer to his question, "What is your program for the improvement of the lot of the peasantry?" that "the peasants would take the land, we would not have to tell them to take it. They would take it." When Fischer asked, "Should the landlords be compensated?", he replied: "No, that would be fiscally impossible". In another interview two days later, Fischer asked, "Well, how do you actually see your impending Civil Disobedience Movement?" Gandhi replied: "In the villages, the peasants will stop paying taxes. They will make salt despite official prohibition . . . Their next step will be to seize land." "With violence?" asked Fischer. Gandhi replied: "there may be violence, but then again the landlord may cooperate . . . They might cooperate by fleeing." Similarly, he told Mirabehn in jail that after independence,

zamindars' land would be taken by the state either through their voluntary surrender or through legislation and then distributed to the cultivators. By 1946, he even acknowledged that there had always been class struggle in history and that it could be ended if the capitalists voluntarily renounced their social role and became workers. After all, he said, capital is really created by labor and not by the capitalists. But this intellectual and ideological development came too late to affect the national leadership and Indian bourgeoisie which were by now ready to 'ditch' him with all his idiosyncracies. For Gandhi himself, the understanding was too hazy, too much outside the framework of his overall thought to lead to meaningful political activity. It was more an expression of his integrity and constant search to grasp the reality and, in the end, of the profound personal and political tragedy that was beginning to surround him in his last years. For what could be more tragic than that this great and moral man had created a framework of bourgeois politics and set a pattern of leadership which had no place for his own honest doubts.

Anyway, to resume our analysis, it is to be noted that in 1945-6, the Congress did accept the objective of abolition of all intermediaries, an objective which was actually accomplished in the post-war years but in an anti-peasant way so that semi-feudalism or landlordism was attacked and partially abolished but without benefitting the mass of lower peasantry. It is to be noted that neither the pre-independence nor the post-independence program of the National Congress contained even simple ameliorative measures for the ordinary tenant-at-will or share cropper or the agricultural laborer. Moreover in its various agitations, the demands and interests of these classes and strata were more or less completely bypassed.

Why was all this so? It may be suggested that this extremely weak and compromising policy towards the landlords was not adopted in the main because of deference to the interests and wishes of big landlords (i.e. jagirdars, talukdars, and big zamindars), against whom the post-independence land reforms were to be aimed. This policy was much more the result of deference to the interests and outlook of the following five strata:

a) The property-owning conservative instincts of the emerging stratum of rich peasants who were increasingly taking to landlordism and moneylending and who tended to dominate both the mass national movement in the countryside and the emerging peasant organizations and movements. In the zamindari areas their main interest lay in the security of tenure and transfer of land ownership to the occupancy ten-

ant, and in the ryotwari areas in lower land revenue and in curbing the all-pervading moneylender-merchant who was both their oppressor and their competitor.

b) The small and ruined landlords, whose deteriorating economic condition led them to participate on a large scale in the national movement and even the peasant movements in the 1920's and 1930's and whose established social position in the village and relatively higher standards of education enabled them to soon acquire leadership positions in these movements. It is interesting that when in 1935-6, the Bihar peasant leader Swami Sahajanand Saraswati did accept the program of zamindari abolition, he simultaneously declared that only big zamindars were zamindars while petty zamindars were peasants. Earlier he had resigned in protest against a socialist majority resolution of the Bihar Kisan Sabha executive demanding zamindari abolition on the grounds that this would alienate those Kisan Sabha supporters who were *small zamindars and large tenants*.

c) The professional and other members of the middle classes and intelligentsia, who lived and worked in small towns around the villages, who often took to petty landlordism and had moneylending connections, and who also formed the backbone of the national movement in these semi-rural areas.

d) Merchants and moneylenders with their direct links with the commercial, usurious and rental exploitation of the peasantry.

e) The class instincts of the bourgeoisie as a propertied group. These instincts are never even radical, far less revolutionary.

The fact that the Indian national movement relied so heavily on electoral politics, specifically on the narrow electoral base of the top 10 to 15 per cent of the population, made it heavily dependent on these classes and strata. In the rural areas, in particular, the rich peasants and small landlords constituted the bulk of voters. On the other hand, the mass of poor peasants and agricultural laborers had no votes.

(ii) A second major weakness of the national movement lay in the fact that even at the level of purely anti-government demands the peasant movement was not permitted to acquire a wide scope. Efforts were made to limit the agitations to the specific demands of very specific groups, and were often designed to secure immediate relief. No wide mobilization of the peasantry occurred even around Congress-led peasant movements outside Uttar Pradesh, where the movement was also designed to get relief to sections of peasantry really hard hit by the depression. The Champaran and Kaira movements were rather narrow in scope and Gandhi made it clear that they were not a part of the po-

litical national movement. The Guntur no-tax campaign of 1921 was quickly curbed. The Bardoli Satyagraha of 1928 was declared by its leader, Sardar Patel, to be non-political. After 1937, the Congress ministries frowned upon any effort to organize peasant demonstration even in support of the Congress agrarian program. It is, moreover, not accidental that Gandhi and the Congress did not organize a single general no-tax campaign.

(iii) Thirdly, the politics and the political and class consciousness of the agricultural laborers and poor peasants were completely dominated by the politics and the political and class consciousness of the rich peasants and small landlords. Thus, from the point of view of the rural poor, both aspects of national integration were flawed. The concept of the nation subordinated their interests and politics to those of the urban bourgeoisie and the concept of the peasantry to those of the landlords and the emerging rural bourgeoisie.

D) The Indian nationalist pattern of national integration showed major weakness even at the level of nationalism or the anti-imperialist struggle:

(i) Because the class demands of the mass of peasants were not taken up, and reliance was placed almost entirely on the anti-imperialist appeal, the level of peasant participation in the struggle remained rather low, except in a few areas for a short time and in a few Communist-led movements. The propertied peasants had too much to lose to be willing or able to sustain a movement for long in the face of severe governmental repression. The result was that the largely urban based nationalist movement could not be sustained beyond a short period of one to two years.

Consequently, without large scale, effective mass peasant participation, the nationalist movement could at no stage go beyond the strategy of Pressure-Compromise-Pressure or P-C-P and often found it difficult to implement even this strategy by bringing enough pressure to bear upon the Government.

(ii) In several areas, the peasant-landlord and the peasant-merchant-moneylender contradictions coincided with religious or caste divisions. This enabled the communal and casteist forces to augment their appeal with class and economic appeal, just as the class appeal tended to take on religious or casteist coloring. Thus in the Punjab, the landlords, rich peasants and the colonial authorities first used casteist politics around the concept of agriculturist castes for years and later, after 1973, turned to Muslim Communalism. The merchant-moneylenders too tried to

protect their interests by appealing to Hindu communalism. In Bengal, the Muslim peasantry struggled hard to generate a secular peasant movement against primarily Hindu landlords and moneylenders, but succumbed in the end to Muslim communalism when faced with the pro-landlord or very weak anti-landlord nationalism of the Bengal Congress and the Hindu tinge of much of the national leadership. In Kerala, the militant tenant movement of 1920-1921 had ended up with elements of communal passion. In Maharashtra, Andhra, and Tamilnadu the cultivators and landlords had ranged on the opposite scales of the caste hierarchy.

In all such situations, the nationalist pattern of peasant and national integration could not succeed without incorporating some elements of class struggle. The refusal of the dominant national leadership to do so resulted in the failure of national integration in the Punjab and Bengal where the communal forces ultimately prevailed. The reverse was the case in Kerala, Andhra, North Western Frontier Province and to a certain extent in Uttar Pradesh where nationalism based on agrarian radicalism overcame communal and caste identities. The failure in the Punjab and Bengal was a major factor in the eventual partition of the country.

In all these cases, it becomes clear that national integration could have come only through class consciousness and that, contrary to the dominant nationalist view, not only did the peasant 'class' consciousness not divide Indian society in the face of imperialism, it was in fact the only effective means of opposing the disintegrative communal and caste ideologies and movements which objectively aided imperialism. National unity and integration had to be based on a conscious political program of *uniting different social classes and not of ignoring class differences or of subordinating the interests of the rural poor to the interests of the rural rich*. In India, a program of amorphous, non-class integration failed to check the growth of social integration based on varieties of modern false consciousness using elements of traditional culture, values, and institutions.

E) It is of course to be noted that the peasantry and the peasant movement also failed to produce better principles of integration for itself or for the nation. The peasantry did not produce its own ideologies or organic intellectuals or its own thought or even its own organizers. It is interesting that a peasant party did not emerge in any part of the country. The politics of the politically aroused peasants tended to be guided by the left nationalists who used the glamour surrounding the notion of peasantry to integrate the radical urban youth and small town

intelligentsia into the national movement and around a vague pro-peasant program that did not go beyond ameliorative measures or a purely anti-imperialist program.

F) The Communist and other left groups showed a better awareness of the anti-feudal demands of the peasantry but they too failed in the two directions in which the nationalist leadership had failed.

To a certain extent the left did not place sufficient emphasis on political work among the peasants. They failed to raise the anti-feudal consciousness and the awareness of their own class position among the peasants. Though they showed a certain awareness of the emerging class differentiation and divisions within the peasantry, they failed to make a serious study of the phenomenon or to create its awareness among the peasants, especially among the dwarf holders and agricultural laborers. Though they succeeded in creating a certain peasant 'class' cohesion against the landlord wherever the peasant movement was under their guidance they failed to guard the peasant movements against the rich peasant or even small landlord domination. As Swami Sahajanand Saraswati recognized in 1944 in his most radical phase, it was "really the middle and big cultivators (who were) . . . for the most part with the Kisan Sabha" and that "they are using the Kisan Sabha for their benefit and gain . . ." The Swami now pleaded for basing the Kisan Sabha exclusively on the agricultural laborers and poor peasants.

Moreover, with some exceptions as in Bengal during the Tebhaga agitation, even when the class position of the tenants-at-will, share-croppers and agricultural laborers was recognized in theory and in the programs, in practice few agitations and little struggle was organized around their demands and interests. Quite often, just as the Congress leadership sacrificed the interests of the peasants to those of the landlords in the name of national unity, the left tended to sacrifice the interests of the rural proletarians and semi-proletarians to those of the rural bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie in the name of peasant unity.

A very important failure of the left lay in the fact that, while emphasizing the independent class mobilization of the peasants as peasants outside the framework of the national movement, *it failed to establish a strong link between the anti-feudal and 'economic' consciousness of the peasant and anti-imperialism.* Its tendency to place much greater emphasis on purely economic demands resulted in the lesser political role of the peasantry as well as in a lower development level of the peasant movement in extent and depth. The historical task was to simultaneously take up the peasants' class demands and to make them more militant

anti-imperialists. Merely to make the criticism, which is made by many contemporary and later left-wing writers, that the national movement subordinated peasant demands to nationalism is inadequate and does not explain why the left, which followed the advice of being more thoroughly and militantly anti-feudal, made little headway among the peasants, except in Kerala and to a certain extent in Andhra where *it combined both*. Any effort to keep the peasant movement away from the anti-imperialist stream weakened the peasant movement itself. For example, in U.P. in 1921, the liberal dominated U.P. Kisan Sabha's efforts to keep peasant agitation separate from the nationalist non-cooperation movement failed and resulted in its own disintegration even though its demands were more militant than the pro-Congress Kisan Sabha's. Similarly, when the Bihar Kisan Sabha and its popular leader Swami Sahajanand Sarawati took a stand opposed to the national movement in 1942, their influence declined sharply among the Bihar peasants. The Communists also went into a virtual retreat during 1930-1934 because of the failure to establish a correct relationship with the contemporary national movement. The fact was that while the nationalist leadership failed to mobilize peasantry because of their neglect of the peasants' class demands, the left, too, failed because of the failure to establish a correct linkage with the peasantry's anti-imperialist feelings. Here, obviously, the correct policy would have been to 'walk on two legs'.

IV. Peasantry and national integration after 1947

The post-1947 period marked a major change insofar as the country won political independence and state power was no longer exercised by alien rulers interested in accentuating forces of national disintegration. But the process of the peasantry's integration into the nation had not been completed, and therefore continued. The forces of national disintegration have made repeated appearance, sometimes involving sections of the peasantry. Objectively too, agriculture has been becoming more and more national. The dominant political leadership has been making efforts to mobilize the peasantry for national capitalist development which now performs the unifying role played earlier by anti-imperialism. The all-India parties, the electoral process, the spread of education, the modern mass media, and to a lesser extent the all-India peasant organizations have been major instruments of national integration.

A) The task of national integration still had a few positive and un-

finished aspects and has been, therefore, supported by most of the political parties and politically conscious Indians:

(i) India had to struggle constantly for economic independence and against the constant threat of neo-colonialism. National unity is a basic aspect of the defense and growth of political and economic independence.

(ii) National and economic reconstruction could occur only on a national plane. The notion of the development of society still exercised a great pull over the minds of the people.

(iii) In view of the political, economic, administrative, and constitutional unification of India, political power could be used, as well as captured, in the end, only on a national plane.

(iv) More specifically, the interests of the rural masses in land reforms, higher wages, agricultural prices vis-a-vis industrial prices, allocation of state funds, and even social and cultural development – inheritance laws, social position of women, education, radio, films, etc. could only be best and successfully fought for on a national scale.

(v) Socially divisive forces such as caste, communalism and linguism, which affected national integration, also impinged upon and disrupted the economic and political struggles, that is, the class struggles, of the different sections of the rural masses. These forces have retained a strong hold over the Indian people, including the rural masses. These still had to be overcome. For example, caste was and still is used by the dominant rural strata, earlier headed by the landlords and now mostly by the rich peasants, to keep the lower class down and to unite around themselves the middle and small peasants of the same caste. These divisive forces have remained quite strong, partially because of the fact that little was done before 1947 or after to spread modern ideas among the peasantry and to actively uproot the old obscurantist ideas.

B) While the goal of national unity and national development was certainly positive in the historical situation, it could not be achieved in the old way. Gradually, after 1947, the negative aspects of the traditional pattern of peasantry's integration into the nation acquired greater weight. The further unification of the nation could be carried out not under the slogans of a nation and a peasantry without classes, for there no longer existed a common, alien enemy, but only by identifying the new national but internal enemy or enemies within both the nation and the village. National integration had now to proceed through democracy, class struggle, far-reaching socio-economic transformation, and socialism.

(i) It is now widely recognized that the benefits of agricultural development since 1951 have in the main gone to the rich and middle peasants. Apart from the class configuration, a major factor in this has been the notion of the peasantry forming a homogenous class, "an integrated rural society", and a *single village or rural community*. Thus the Indian planning process was initiated under the slogan of "community development" for the "rural sector". Rural cooperatives and the Panchayati Raj have also been built on the some assumption of "class fusion." Moreover, the concept of village community was consciously put forward and advanced as an *alternative* to the notions of class cleavage in the countryside. The Community Development Programme, Panchayati Raj, and rural cooperatives were to become instruments of aggrandizement in the hands of the rich peasant and landlord-turned-farmer who emerged politically very powerful, partly as a result of the adult franchise.

(ii) Above all the ideology of a single peasantry or *kisans* has prevented the fuller emergence of class struggle in the countryside.

This ideology increasingly became after 1947 – as even before 1947 – an instrument of the rich peasant-small landlord domination of the by now distinctly emerging social strata or even classes of the small, impoverished peasant – the dwarf holder – and the landless agricultural laborer. The notion of the peasantry has hidden the fact, brought out in section II above, that the emerging and even dominating tendency in the Indian countryside is the division of the peasantry into the rural bourgeoisie, rural petty bourgeoisie, rural semi-proletarians, and rural proletarians. Of course, sometimes the rural upper strata use the divisive ideologies of caste and communalism in the same manner.

An important point of difference with the pre-independence period needs to be noted in this respect. During that period, the entire peasantry was objectively anti-imperialist, even though different peasant strata had different interests; after 1947 the different agrarian classes and strata have hardly anything in common.

The powerful position of the rich peasant in the countryside, in the state legislatures and governments and even in the Centre, aided by the notion of peasantry, explains both the slow pace of agrarian reform and the failure of the left-wing parties to organize the agricultural laborers and dwarf holders except in Kerala and a few other small pockets.

This ideology of being a peasantry – even if formally divided into rich, middle, and poor peasantry – formed the basis of much of left-wing peasant activity, including that of the CPI, CPM, and CP(ML)

groups. This was the basis of their view held in common, whatever their other differences, that the chief political task in rural India (or even in India as a whole) was the making and completion of the anti-feudal revolution. Consequently, in an effort to organize peasants on an all-class basis (barring the semi-mythical feudal lord) the organization of the rural proletarians and semi-proletarians was neglected if not completely ignored.

One political and social consequence was the continuing hold of conservative political forces on the agricultural laborer.

In contrast to the left, the peasant radicals have instinctively responded to the changes in rural class structure and advanced the slogan of equality in place of class struggle, change of social system, etc. The ruling political leadership has also increasingly adopted this objective of equality, thus confining agrarian radicalism within the ambit of peasant outlook. This slogan of course makes a powerful appeal to the small and middle peasant, the low caste agricultural laborer, and even the rich peasant who sees it in the context of the marked difference between his style of life and that of the urban bourgeoisie or even middle classes.

(iii) The notion of the peasantry as a class has also led the left to ignore the historically specific problems of the lower caste rural poor, whose caste has been and is being used to keep them down. Today this aspect cannot be seen as a 'feudal' survival. This is a specific historical form through which the rich peasants and small landlords keep down the agricultural workers and the dwarf-holding share croppers and tenants-at-will. This neglect has enabled the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeois elements belonging to these castes to mobilize the rural poor behind their own politics and interests. Of course, as pointed out earlier, the higher castes also use caste to keep the small and middle peasants behind them. Struggle against the caste system is needed to break up both these artificial unities.

(iv) The notions of the peasantry as part of a single nation and as a single class have also prevented the unity of the exploited rural poor with the exploited of the urban areas and the radical intelligentsia. Consequently, as before 1947, certain parties such as the Bhartiya Lok Dal (or BLD) and the Akalis have been trying to raise the false urban-rural dichotomy.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Agricultural Labour Enquiry, 1951.

All-India Debt and Investment Survey, 1971-72. Vol. I, Published by Reserve Bank of India, 1975.

P. S. Appu, *Note on Land Policy and Note on Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings*, Planning Commission, Govt. of India, 1972, Mimeo.

P. S. Appu, "Tenancy Reform in India", *Economic and Political Weekly*, Special No. August, 1975, Nos. 33-35.

Amiya Kumar Bagchi, *Reflections on Patterns of Regional Growth in India During the Period of British Rule*; Centre for Studies in Social Sciences, Calcutta, Mimeo.

G. S. Bhalla, *Changing Structure of Agriculture in Haryana* Chandigarh, 1975.

Sheila Bhalla, *New Relations of Production in Haryana Agriculture*, Working Paper, Centre for Economic Studies and Planning, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, Mimeo.

Krishna Bhardwaj, *Production Conditions in Indian Agriculture*, Cambridge, 1974.

V. M. Dandekar, "Economic Theory and Agrarian Reform, in A.M. Khusro, *Readings in Agricultural Development*, Bombay, 1968.

M. L. Dantawala, "Small Farmers, Not Small Farms", in A.M. Khusro, *op. cit.*

A. R. Desai, *Social Background of Indian Nationalism*, Bombay.

A. R. Desai, *Rural Sociology in India*, Bombay.

R. Palme Dutt, *India Today*.

Francine R. Frankel, *India's Green Revolution*, Princeton, New Jersey, 1971.

B. N. Ganguli, "The Indian Peasant as an Analytical Category", *Sociological Bulletin*, September, 1974, Vol. 23, no. 2.

- The Indian Central Banking Enquiry Committee Report*, Govt. of India, 1971.
- P. C. Joshi, "Community Development Programme, A Reappraisal", *Enquiry*, No. 3. 1960, Delhi. Also in A.M. Khusro, *op.cit.*
- P.C. Joshi, "Agrarian Social Structure and Social Change", *Sankhya: The Indian Journal of Statistics*, Series B, Vol. XXXI, Parts 3 & 4, 1969.
- P. C. Joshi, *Land Reforms in India*, New Delhi, 1975.
- G. Kotovsky, *Agrarian Reforms in India*, New Delhi, 1964.
- Wolf Ladeginsky, "Teneurial Conditions and the Package Programme", in A.M. Khusro, *op. cit.*
- E. M. S. Namboodripad, *Economics and Politics of India's Socialist Pattern*, New Delhi, 1966.
- Nanvati and Anjaria, *The Indian Rural Problem*, Bombay.
- S. J. Patel, *Agriculture Labourers in Modern India and Pakistan*, Bombay, 1952.
- Utsa Patnaik, "Capitalism in Agriculture", *Social Scientist*, Nos. 2 and 3, September & October, 1972.
- K. N. Raj, "Ownership and Distribution of Land", *Indian Economic Review*, April 1, 1970, Vol. V (New Series), No. 1.
- C. H. Hanumantha Rao, "Socio-Political in Agricultural Policies", *Economic and Political Weekly*, Special No. 1974, Vol. IX, Nos. 32-34.
- Bhawani Sen, *Evolution of Agrarian Relations in India*, New Delhi, 1969.
- Eric Stokes, "The Structure of Land Holding in Uttar Pradesh 1860-1948", *The Indian Economic and Social History Review*, April-June 1975, Vol. XII, No. 2.
- Taiib and Majid, *The Small Farmers of Punjab*, Agricultural Research Centre, Delhi School of Economics, Mimeo., 1976.

- V. S. Vyas, "Structural Change in Agriculture and the Small Farm Sector", *Economic and Political Weekly*, 10 Jan. 1976, Vol. XI, Nos. 1 and 2.
- Hamza Alavi, "Peasants and Revolution", *Socialist Register*, 1965 ed. by Ralph Miliband and John Saville, London, 1965.
- All India Congress Committee, *Indian National Congress: Resolutions on Economic Policy, Programme and Allied Matters 1924-1969*, New Delhi, 1969.
- Balabushevich and Dyakov, *A Contemporary History of India*, New Delhi, 1964.
- Robert Crane, *The Indian National Congress, and the Indian Agrarian Problem, 1919-1939. A Historical Study*, Unpublished Ph. D Thesis, Yale University, 1951, Microfilm.
- D. N. Dhanagre, "The Politics of Survival: Peasant Organizations and the Left-Wing in India, 1925-46", *Sociological Bulletin*, Vol. 24, No. 1, March, 1975.
- D. N. Dhanagre, *Agrarian Movements and Gandhian Politics*, Institute of Social Studies, Agra University, Agra, 1975.
- S. Gopal, *Jawaharlal Nehru. A Biography*, Vol. 1, London, 1975.
- Walter Hauser, *The Bihar Provincial Kisan Sabha, 1929-1942*, Unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, University of Chicago, 1961. Microfilm.
- K. B. Krishna, *Problem of Minorities*, 1939.
- H. D. Malaviya, *Land Reforms in India*, New Delhi, 1954.
- E. M. S. Namboodripad, *The National Question in Kerala*.
- Jawaharlal Nehru, *Autobiography*.
- S. M. Pandey, "The Emergence of Peasant Movement in India: An Area Study", *Indian Journal of Industrial Relations*, Vol. 7, No. 1, July 1971.
- K. N. Panikkar, "Peasant Revolts in Malabar in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries", 1971, Mimeo.

T. Ramakrishna, "Kisan Movement in India", Mimeograph in Nehru Museum and Library, New Delhi.

M. A. Rasul, *A History of the All India Kisan Sabha*, Calcutta, 1974.

Majad Hayat Siddiqui, *Peasant in the United Provinces, 1918-1922*, Unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, 1974.

Pattabhi Sitaramayya, *History of the Indian National Congress*, Vol. I, 1936.

Ethnicity, Peasantry and National Integration

Darcy Ribeiro

For someone like myself, who is, in principle, opposed to any type of integration, it is difficult to deal with the problem of the integration of the peasantry. To speak of *ethnicity and national integration* is even more difficult in that it involves still more serious problems.

Firstly, what do we understand by peasantry? To be a peasant is a human condition. In general this condition is seen as deficient. Peasants are those that do not exist, those that do not know, those that do not wear shoes, the illiterate i.e. they are deficient. However, some years ago, when anthropologists began to concentrate their attention on peasants, many new aspects began to be discovered about them. Amongst other things, 'that they are not only made up of deficiencies but that they also have presence', especially human presence which is undeniable in them, and which has been lost to others. Seen from this perspective, it is the city dweller and not the peasant who can be considered deficient, a type of generic man, lacking permanent distinguishing characteristics.

We now know that it is the peasant who has something in common, dating back six thousand years to the birth of civilization where the first human society was stratified into two components: the *peasant* and the *city dweller*. It is in this way that the recently founded city gives birth to civilization, isolating the peasantry from the condition which had always been common to all human beings and converting itself into an urban minority. This urban minority originally accounted for only a very small percentage of global society (two or three percent at most). It was composed of warriors, traders, artisans and priests. They, however, possessed immense potential.

This urban cell, isolated and differentiated from those who produced food, principally offered the peasantry physical security (with its warriors) and psychological security (through its priests), establishing an

increasingly unequal form of exchange. Since then the urban areas have obliged the peasants to exchange concrete subsistence goods for promises of security. On this basis, a parallel development has taken place over the ages of a peasant and a citizen condition which form the substrata of all those civilizations which concentrated traditional and folkloric aspects in the one and erudition and technique in the other.

From the point of view of integration one can show that it is the peasant condition, in allowing man to maintain a far greater number of his traditions, which conserves the original human character. In the city, the succession of conquerors, the rapid diffusion of fashions, changes everything. However, this is not of importance. The city dwellers were able to change because the peasants continued to maintain standards of living, their nature, which were fundamental for all. Moreover, the city dwellers could even fail (as occurred very frequently in the burnt and sacked cities) because food producers continued as the life supporters and the wombs from which new cities would be born.

Despite technological revolutions, and ever more complex civilizing processes which shook civilizations, the peasants continued to exist in much the same way as previously, until the *Industrial Revolution*. Among the disasters this revolution provoked throughout the world, one of the most important has been the obsolescence of the peasantry. Since then, the peasant has declined from his historic and ancient position to become obsolete. Civilization can exist without peasants. In England, where the process was unleashed precociously, peasants began to decrease both in absolute numbers and in relative terms such that today they account for only 4⁰/_o of the total population. Moreover, in addition to being reduced drastically in numbers they were also radically changed, so that today the English rural worker has very little of the peasant in him. The same has happened with the agricultural workers in the U.S.A., whom make up 8 percent of the total population. Both those in England and the U.S.A., in terms of their nature and the way they think or act, are more similar to the city dwellers of their countries than to any historical peasantry. In reality, those two countries, along with others in the vanguard of industrial civilization, do not now have a peasantry.

During the 19th century, when this process was scarcely apparent Marx, who witnessed the disappearance of the peasantry, predicted the disappearance of other strata of society through a general process of proletarianization which would convert all into salaried workers.

What is the significance of this proletarianization? In ideological terms, as regards peasants, it represents the loss of an individual self identity which itself signifies their deculturization. It is the loss of ones' 'self', an old process which is now becoming generalized. The peasant taken to the Roman city as a slave, or the African peasant taken to America as a slave, are converted into 'things', dispossessed of their particular characteristics. Both lose their identity. Their descendents do not know the name of the land they tread, of the trees they see, of the birds that frighten them. For a long time they will be uprooted and alien, not only because they are from elsewhere but also because now they are from nowhere.

On the other hand, those who are still peasants can still read signs in the phases of the moon and in the color of the grass, with a deep and ancient wisdom, full of detail and comparable only to the knowledge possessed by the wisest of the wise. Through this very slow and arduous process, the uprooted are being whitewashed, disinherited of their greatest possession i.e. intelligence of themselves, their knowledge of the world. In the end, they even lose confidence in the capacity of their own intelligence to comprehend reality.

During my experience an anthropologist working with indigenous groups, I have often heard questions such as: Who is the lord of the iron? Who is the master of the salt? Who makes matches? Are there better metals than iron? The indigenous forester, still full of curiosity, has confidence in his own mind because he has not been degraded and dehumanized through social stratification. He wants to know because his curiosity is still alive. The worker never asks anything. He knows that science is a thing of doctors and behaves as if he knows that he does not know and is satisfied, even content not to know.

Although the isolated peasant who modernizes an ancient tradition, always in the same place, forms part of a social stratification, he is closer to the indigenous type to which I referred, than to the common worker. A reserve of what is essentially human exists in this obsolete person. This is a reserve lost to those of us immersed in the streams of civilization.

Integration: to what?

In view of these considerations, perhaps we are now in a position to talk of peasant integration. One of the best approaches to understanding integration is to consider it as a process unleashed by the Industrial Revolution which spreads as a sequel throughout the world, always

giving rise to the same effects. That is to say, as the peasant becomes obsolete, 'depeasantified', he will be converted into a generic urban being, a person without a past, a characterless individual; a person who is not the product of himself, of his will, or of his aspirations because he is only the residual product of his own dehumanization, which takes place randomly as a result of an exogenous movement of civilization.

Integration, understood in this way, would be a natural, fatal, unavoidable process; at least this is the way it has been commonly seen up until the present. Perhaps this is how it should be. However, for some time we have begun to suspect that this homogenization does not take place everywhere or affect everybody at the same rate or equally radical. Apparently, in England and in other countries, the process was particularly violent as those countries exploited other peoples and countries in order to sustain this process intensively. Elsewhere, it is unlikely to occur in that way. Even in England there were exceptions. It is evident that the success of the process was much greater in areas where it was transplanted, as, for example, in North America and Australia, than in the British Isles themselves, where we have the Welsh affirming their individuality. The Welsh point to a way back, ethnic reconstruction, which is possible for the very same detribalized English, and far more so for peoples throughout the world who still maintain their own identity, thus confronting the transforming forces of the Industrial Revolution.

Of importance during the last few years is the discovery that the Industrial Revolution does not necessarily imply a compulsive westernization of man, as was thought previously. The products of that civilization —such as steam engines and motors— are human potentialities, and not Western and Christian creatures which, if they had not developed in Europe, would have arisen in another context. Moreover, they can be reconciled with other contexts. Due to their socialist revolution, the Chinese were able to incorporate gasoline and electricity into their ancient civilization whilst affirming ever more their quality as Chinese. They were able to do this because the socialist revolution allowed them to take these instruments of imperialist and class domination and convert them into forces for the reconstruction of China, seen as a project of the Chinese themselves, and for their own benefit.

Up until now we have considered peasantry and integration from a traditional perspective. However, there are other possible approaches which lead us to reconsider these problems and perhaps understand them better. Amongst these is the now generalized notion that the

urban proletariat has also begun to become obsolete, as occurred previously with the peasantry. At least, factory workers do not now increase in numbers to the same extent as previously and they now comprise a minority component of the economically active population when compared to the legions of tertiary sector workers. Thus, it can be demonstrated that the Industrial Revolution, which began by making the peasantry obsolete (reducing its participation in the economically active population from 80⁰/o - 10⁰/o), terminated by displacing the factory proletariat which now accounts for scarcely 40⁰/o of the basic sector of the work force.

What will occur during the new technological revolution now under way (the thermonuclear revolution), with its yet greater power to destroy and remake societies and cultures? One of its already apparent tendencies is that of an even greater homogenization of men in that it leads to the use of the same form of productive technology, the same forms of social organization and similar explanations of the world in all human societies, spreading them universally. This is apparently creating the basis for an inevitably uniform human civilization throughout the globe. However, apart from these powerful unifying forces one begins to observe the emergence of individual positions or points of view, proud in themselves, and which were impossible to observe a few decades ago.

Another perception, increasingly generalized these days, is that referring to the obsolescence of national *cadres*. It is true that they still appear to be extremely positive and vigorous. Nevertheless, it is also apparent that they do not now possess the compulsive force that they showed in the past. The recognition of this tendency towards the weakening of the state, as a compulsive national *cadre* within a particular national ethnic group exercises control over others, sheds considerable light on what could happen in the future.

Nevertheless, prior to commenting on this tendency, it is necessary to remember that during the course of the mercantile and industrial revolution, the majority of different human groups was dominated by alien peoples, and the number of ethnic groups was reduced from some ten thousand to fewer than two thousand. The most serious aspect is that scarcely a dozen of these groups increased in numbers or in terms of lands controlled (in the form of macroethnic groups and in national, or imperialist dominated territories); these account for almost the whole of humanity, all forced into a compulsive Europeanization. Never before was humanity so severely impoverished and degraded.

Faced with this situation, the fear of the more brilliant anthropologists was to see the surviving faces of humanity even more dramatically reduced. The considerably greater power of the present technological revolution threatened a homogenization which would dominate and intensify in the next few decades more than in any past epoch. The terrible result would be to place the hopes and potential of man in an ever more reduced number of human types with the evident risk of disaster. In the distant past, if a hundred or a thousand of the ten thousand human modes failed, thousands and thousands would always survive guaranteeing the survival of the human race. Today we are all in the same boat. We are a nutshell on the ocean and if we sink, all will sink. It is as if we were gambling with human destiny on one throw of the dice, a situation which is, to say the least, gambling to much. In fact we are reducing the possibilities of human survival to a random and increasingly improbable chance occurrence.

Ethnic revolts

In reality, the situation is not as tragic as this because there are also reasons to believe that perhaps these homogenizing forces are not as fatal or as dramatically compulsive as would appear. This is apparent when we observe the revitalization of ethnic minorities and the increasing obsolescence of nation states.

Peoples who have maintained their ethnic identity begin to have ever greater opportunities to express themselves. For example, the Flemish were never so fanatically Flemish as they have been during the last few decades. In the University of Louvain, for example, the students, after many decades of being francophile, which seemed to be a natural and unquestionable situation, began to demand that their classes be given in Flemish. Everyone knows that the students are going to study and to write their exams in French, but the students demand that the most important classes be given in Flemish. What does this signify? This abrupt demand can only be explained as a late and bitter reaction to the humiliation and violence suffered over a long period but which now has no power to support it. On the other hand, the Basques have never been so energetically Basque as in the recent past. Previously, being Basque was a precarious state; today it is something to be proud of. The Bretons, similarly, were never before as conscious of their own value and of how good it is to be Breton. These and many other similar events which fill the newspapers indicate a rebellion of oppressed ethnic

minorities in nation states constructed by bourgeois society. This is a rebellion which will permit those peoples who escaped extermination and homogenization, and who for a long time seemed condemned to disappear, to survive, strengthened in their individuality in the future.

Those peasants who continued to live with past traditions, also maintaining their individuality, were those that lived for themselves with the passing of civilizations. However, other classes of rural workers also exist, such as the Brazilians, or the Caribbeans, who were never peasants. They were, and continue to be, only a rural work force stripped of their particular ethnic characteristics. The Brazilian lived to produce. first sugar, then gold, and finally coffee. That is to say, they existed to produce other than for their own consumption with the aim of providing profits for their masters. They could never live for themselves, organized as a human community whose objective was to multiply and perpetuate itself. They represented human fuel burnt in sugar mills and in the mines for the benefit of the world market.

As regards the archaic peasants, they lived their own lives, according to a millenarian tradition, remaining the same or little changed through the generations. The Brazilian, the Cuban, or the Colombian were abruptly changed from tribal African Negroes or from indigenous foresters into a *tablua rasa*. That is to say, into men stripped of their own ethnicity and homogenized into the first rudimentary forms of their future being, a *New People*. Their existence was, and continues to be that of people who have been cast aside, stripped of themselves, culturally poorer today than any of their European, African or indigenous ancestors. They are people having no past, that can only, in the best of worlds, await a future in which they will fulfill themselves, not as a result of their history, but in a voluntary Utopia of their own construction.

The creation of these *New Peoples* implied a ferocious, uprooting violence which never occurred in Europe. England conquered the world but was unable, or was not required to defeat the Welsh who resisted, and continue to resist the dismantling and destruction of their ethnicity. Spain, which brought all the Hispanic American regions into uniformity, giving them a language without dialect and an extensive common set of cultural values, did not manage to hispanize the Catalans, the Galicians and particularly the Basques. These groups, existing and resisting, serve to demonstrate the future tendency for hundreds of other oppressed peoples throughout the world.

Ethnic reconstruction

In the extensive extra-European world, peoples who were principally remnants of ancient civilizations with which Europe clashed during its expansion, survived, maintaining their identity and self image; all of them infamously sacrificed, exploited, degraded and rotted by the violence, greed, intolerance and diseases of the white man. However, they were so numerous that despite the destruction many survived in large demographic concentrations and with their own ethnic identities, as in the cases, for example, of the Chinese, Arabs and Indians. Others survived in smaller groups, but also preserved something of themselves. That is to say, people who, with what they conserve of themselves, testify to their past when they were advanced civilizations. In the future, over the next few decades, their destiny is to remake themselves, beginning with what they are and constructing according to their own self image.

One day, not far in the future, they will offer the alternatives to the European, which will be the realization of the potential of the civilization to come. In the Americas very few people have conserved features of their original identity. The few that have see in those features stigmas of their decadence rather than signs of their past grandeur. They see in their own racial form the image of ugliness because they had to learn to see through European eyes. Their cultural heritage is a protective cover against Europeanization rather than the survival of their days of glory as people belonging to an original and autonomous civilization. Their social condition is that of peasants immersed as oppressed elements in the body of Latin American national societies. In some countries, such as Guatemala and Bolivia, they comprise the majority of the population; in others, such as Peru, Ecuador and Mexico they number in the millions, some of whom are dominated and exploited to extremes.

Out of this submission, this alienation, this *despoliation* imposed by the dominators over centuries, the *Testimonial Peoples* of the Americas will emerge and reform themselves. As the drama of their survival was more prolonged and more brutal than that of the Flemish or the Basques, one would presume that the energy released by their eventual uprising will also be even greater.

The most apparent of these *Emergent Peoples* are the representatives of a dozen of the five hundred indigenous ethnic groups that survive in America, the great majority of which are formed by small groups of

dozens of people, some of hundreds and a few numbering in the thousands. These twelve indigenous groups, each having more than a hundred thousand members, account for 90⁰/o of the indigenous population of the Americas. As a whole, their total number today is not above 15 million. As one can appreciate, this is a very small number when compared to the 500 million new Americans. But these groups are those that correspond in our continent to the ethnic enclaves which are rising throughout the world in search of the energies which will allow them to rediscover their freedom and dignity in the civilization of the future.

In terms of this picture, what does ethnic integration with the peoples of America mean? Destroying their ethnic identity? Liquidating them? No. Let us not forget that it is they who in one way or another have resisted the authority and force of civilizations over the centuries. All the weapons of extermination, of uprooting and of degradation, the most cruel war of extermination and the most frightening genocide recorded in history were used against them. Personal slavery existed which consumed millions and millions as human fuel in mining activities and on plantations. Their erudite *stratas*, artists, and technicians who molded and voiced their civilization were eliminated. Catechism, brutally or subtly imposed (whichever resulted most effective) consistently sought to *break* the windows of their spirit, darkening it. European diseases rotted their bodies, often as the result of deliberate infection campaigns; and, finally, there has existed an indigenism which, in declaring all to be Indians, incited the true Indian to abandon his stubbornness in wishing to be more indigenous than the others.

If, with the ability to use, or the use, of these powerful weapons of Europeanization, the conqueror could not completely subjugate and annihilate the ethnic identity of the Quechua, Aymara, Maya, Mapuches, Zapotecs, and Otomie, how can one expect that without them it can be achieved? History has probably proscribed forever these crude forms of extermination and repression. It would be necessary to have recourse to others. Many wish to see their societies finally homogenized, as much by means of subtle procedures of a protective nature as by general processes that appear to promise the same result. Amongst these the most impressive homogenizing force that one can foresee is the process of industrialization and the consequent urbanization and modernization of society which together would achieve an efficient 'de-indianization'.

Nevertheless, it is doubtful that complete success would be achieved. Proof of this exists in the case of the Welsh, Flemish, and Basques, all

of them urbanized and modernized but masters of the ethnic self identity which makes them content with themselves and distinct from the rest. The same would happen, I believe, with the ethnic groups in America, especially those with high indices of population. Once liberated from the oppression that weighs on them and, perhaps, principally from the oppression represented by the expectancy of being assimilated and the forms of repression (educational, paternalist, etc.) placed at their disposal, they will surge forth to the tasks of self reconstruction as peoples existing for themselves.

These observations, which would appear obvious, no one knew and none of us would have been able to pronounce until recently. In this case, we are faced with an evident widening of the possible conscience which from one moment to another should increase our perceptive horizons, allowing us to see perspectives clearly which previously were hazy or invisible. In effect, we all presumed that although the process of integration of indigenous populations into the economy of the dominant society, accompanied by their intensive acculturation, would not lead to their complete assimilation (thus making them indistinguishable from the other members of national society), neither would it lead to successful efforts and resistance in terms of self identity and ethnic reconstruction. Moreover, many students of the problem even affirmed that as the indians were in essence a peasantry oppressed by landlords, once liberated by an agrarian revolution they would, *ipso facto*, also disappear as archaic indigenes.

Today it is evident that those indigenous masses which comprise the peasantry of the nations in which they live --or a great part of it-- are not even that. In addition to their peasant condition, they also exhibit an ethnic condition which pre-dates their stratification and which is not reducible by even the most deep-rooted social reforms. It is even probable that any reform, to the extent that it be effectively liberating, would strengthen rather than weaken the ethnic identity, offering conditions in which it could express itself.

The serious problem for nations such as Guatemala, Bolivia, Peru and Mexico --the Testimonial Peoples of America-- is that as multi-ethnic societies they are structured as uni-national states. This signifies that the socio-political order of these countries is based on the ethnic oppression by the Hispanic groups of the indigenous masses which, in certain cases, comprise the majority of the population. Such a situation leads to conflicts which are disguised at present in thousands of types of resistance but which could explode tomorrow in ethnic wars. These

would be true racial wars, more obscene than ever, a result of the terrible violence that would be unleashed.

A few years ago these risks were scarcely apparent. Today they are evident. I hope that this is sufficient for the *Testimonial Peoples* to recognize, finally, the nature of their multi-ethnic societies and the oppressive character of their national organizational forms. With this recognition the violence hidden in their present institutional structure, based on the Hispanic model, will be evident. Given that this structure has caused so much damage in Spain, provoking and maintaining inter-ethnic tensions, at times of a terrible magnitude, in the Americas they could assume an even more violent character.

The institutional model that the *Testimonial Peoples* must consider is not the present one. Rather it is that of the Swiss or Russians, which allows the coexistence of distinct peoples in a multi-ethnic society within a sufficiently open nation-state. The efforts to maintain the present historic states of the American nations could lead to exactly the opposite effect: not only to perpetuate present oppression but also add new forms of violence that could become more generalized to the extent that inter-ethnic tensions would begin to erupt more vigorously. The result would be the breakup of the nation-states that is desired so much and so erroneously to perpetuate.

As a result of these considerations one also concludes that in some Latin American countries the nation-state, organized by the dominant classes, is reaching its limits of survival, after independence, as the project of its own prosperity. Effectively, in the same way as occurred during the colonial period, and likewise in the autonomous stage, *creole* ownership is based on the super exploitation of the development of these antagonisms based on class exploitation exacerbated by an ethnic domination, which both disguises and aggravates it.

One hundred and fifty years later, so great are the accumulated internal social tensions (of the type it was hoped, in vain, to resolve through agrarian reform) that, although they reflect, and have also affected the native, have led to the emergence of new indigenous leaders who are ever more demanding and whose historical role will be to struggle until they impose a reordering of the national state. This reorganization would permit the real society, which is multi-ethnic, to achieve the only possible integration of its diverse components i.e. to achieve an institutional structure which is openly multi-ethnic. Only in this way will the way be opened towards a common project of solid societal construction in which the energies wasted for centuries in inter-

ethnic tensions, are channelled towards beneficial ends. Unfortunately, it is very improbable that the dominant classes in those countries would peacefully accept the reorganization proposed by the oppressed classes. The solution to conflict of this nature, if it occurs, lies in the fire of social revolution.

A commentary
Simone Bencheikh

Darcy Ribeiro has just stressed the importance of a specific relationship between the “campesino” and the “citadino”. It is possible to understand and analyze this relationship only by taking into account the development of the Industrial Revolution, originating in the West and catering to the needs of Western expansion.

This development does not necessarily imply absolute and universal Westernization, and, in this sense, it cannot compel all the “campesinos” who still live on this earth to “descampesinar”. For they continue to exist, despite the fact that “someone or other” predicts their disappearance every day (presumably in order to add fuel to certain ideologies, such as the indigenist ideology), insisting on the anachronism of their presence (and, to keep on the Western-humanist ground which is the institutional home of many amongst us, the anachronism of their very presence as human beings).

When I say “someone or other” it is because I deem it necessary and extremely important to ask several questions of you (and of myself), such as these: who is who in this case? Who or what are we studying? and why? and who are we studying? and for whom? what do we really know about the hidden, perhaps dormant facets of the “campesino”, who has withered away, who has been ridiculed, humiliated or destroyed in us—in each and every one of us—why is there no peasant here amongst us, or representatives of groups of unions, leagues and peasant confederations? . . . to whom are we listening? to whom are we speaking? Would not the “campesinos” feel a trifle worried by what we are doing, what we are saying here, or what we are trying to say and explain? Who can these “campesinos” really be? where do they come from? (from what continent, what country, what region?) . . . to what *nations* do they belong *organically*—to what *spaces* do they belong?

When, following Darcy, I repeat the words ‘human presence’, I am not forgetting that it was in the name of humanity that the Industrial Revolution was carried through, and that this was the beginning of the

'proletarianization' and (so called) national integration (disintegration?) of the rebellious peasant (or race), which has sadly caused the loss of his identity.

Moreover, at this stage in the commentary, one wonders if we are all in agreement (and it would be interesting if we did agree) on the meaning of the term "nation" in relation to historical or other links existing between the emergence of the nation and that of the State (or of the workings of the State). Since people nowadays speak of the Nation States, one wonders whether the nation came before the State or if the State creates the nation –at what level (s) does the universality of the phenomenon lie? At what level (s) does this universal nature give way to a more specific phenomenon? How and where can one find the distinct parts that make up the processes known as national integration, the ethnic groups, the 'campesinos'? How can we find the key moments when these same processes come apart? In what cultural area, in what area of civilization? How does this movement towards a proletariat work, at a time when the state is becoming worldwide? What are the specific traits of this movement – its failures, its weaknesses? At what level(s), and in what space(s) does the presence of the absolute or relative failures not computed in this process help to bring out the "real", living presence of this movement of resistance, set in motion perhaps some centuries ago?

It seems to me that we must reflect a great deal on the concept of *time*. The nature and content of time for the ethnic groups (or peasants) fighting for survival (a life's work in itself) does not necessarily coincide –and in many cases it does not coincide at all– with the official values of the institutions which have fashioned those of us present here today.

For the "campesino que está desapareciendo" (n.b. "que está desapareciendo" and not "que ha desaparecido"); for "el indio que está desapareciendo" (and not "que ha desaparecido") time –its nature, its content (its color, its smell, its many languages) . . . time doubtless means the time for revenge against the effects of a certain project of civilization which simply implied their total disappearance. And it's possibly only because we realize today –and only today– that the times do not coincide, that we are saying: "the oppressed", who have resisted and who are still resisting so-called national integration, are finally showing themselves. (But national integration, from a certain stage onwards, means absorption by the State which is in the process of

becoming worldwide, causing the emergence of those unstable national forces of which Darcy was speaking.

I think that these "island people" have never stopped showing their faces, as the history of their resistance began at the exact moment of the imposition of "la pauta europea, barroca, capitalista, industrial" (that is to say at the moment when the mask was imposed). And it's possibly because the faces were so battered that *we didn't want* to see them.

All the creative power, all the profound and authentic knowledge of these "island people" comes to the surface for those who can see, listen to and decipher the enormous amount of things that bear witness to this permanent resistance and which, just in order to be permanent, has had constantly to be brought up to date and has also understood how to profit from objective conditions in order to bring itself up to date. This requirement (the organization of resistance over a very long period of time) comes, undoubtedly, from the oppression, the violence and the humiliations that they have lived through for so long (several centuries). Personally, I believe most sincerely in the role of contempt, as well as hate and resentment, when it comes to the extraordinary staying power of these island people, apparently swallowed up in History. I think that the "campesinos" and the ethnic groups who still resist the threefold civilization process of pasteurization, homogenization and sterilization, which forms part of the institutions of most of the Nation States that we know, have never, in reality, stopped living in a sort of *counterpoint* with national races outside the formation process of the latter. The term counterpoint is here used in the sense of a certain horizontality. You know that there exist, grosso modo, two ways of composing music. In the first case one works through a succession of melodic formulae that one can or cannot superimpose. If they are superimposed one creates a meeting of sounds, but it is above all the horizontal movement of the melodies which takes the lead, as well as certain of these meeting points. When the sounds meet, chords are created and these are the moments of harmony. In the second case one proceeds above all through a programmed and systematic succession of chords. This procedure was developed mainly in the West (in the urban West) where it was called harmony. It is, moreover, linked to scholastic thought and is remarkably similar to the principle behind the construction of cathedrals. Horizontal music, on the other hand, is a part of the East, along with vegetation, the water trapped during droughts and desert oases, with terraced cultivation and with paddy fields. It is multidimensional music

because it gives priority to the vibrations of water and not to those of the earth.

It was the willful application of the principle behind the verticality of cathedrals (that of scholastic thought) that provoked the "four plagues" of Mexico. In this country the project for the conservation of the principle of horizontality of the "defeated" who knew how to resist the four calamities and then did so, has been played down. A few years ago, if my memory serves me well, they were selling milk in a shop in Mexico that was "pasteurizada, homogeinizada, esterilizada, blanqueada y sin sabor". Has integrated milk then really reached its peak? (and in what? and why?).

Since the four calamities were so terrible and the traps were, and still are, so great, one must not forget that in Mexico "those who know" continue to live in and for the moment, and they live in a multi-dimensional labyrinth which is in no way anachronistic since it bears witness to a formidable resistance and since it rightly remains, even to this day, the mainspring of life. Why is it that most anthropologists work mainly in the field of the anthropology of death? Why are they not motivated (or a little motivated) to break new ground in the anthropology of life?

* Allusion to the work of Carlos Fuentes, *Tiempo Mexicano*.

* Allusion to the work of Octavio Paz, *El Laberinto de la Soledad*.

The Difficult Pluralism: Multiethnicity and National Revolution in Peru

Stefano Varese

The multiethnicity of Peru and its history are ancient; the consciousness of this, on the contrary, has scarcely to emerge. Peruvian society is pluricultural and plurilingual, however the nation and its State obey a historically recent design which is unidimensional, absolute and antipluralist. Here we will attempt to demonstrate that a national revolution such as the Peruvian one, initiated by a progressive segment of the army, faces the ideological and ethnical challenge of multiethnicity with great difficulty. Confronted with a plural social reality, the Peruvian political project tends to fall back on unicultural, vertical, and authoritarian policies, a political style formed through the translation of the immediate historical experience by a specific class and ethnic frame of knowledge. The military leadership of Peru today, by its origin and formation, is in fact solidary with the interests and ideology of the modernizing sector of the national bourgeoisie. This is in spite of the fact that a relatively high percentage of the officer ranks of the Peruvian army are derived from the rural and urban petit bourgeoisie and, in many cases, from its most proletarianized segments.

The redimensioning of previous group affiliations and identifications has been the objective result of military preparation in Peru. However, there were and still are important individual exceptions which help to a great extent in understanding the progressive, if not decidedly revolutionary nature of the economic and political actions taken during the initial period of the revolution. In this respect the 'memoirs' of the Press Secretary of the Presidency during the period under Juan Velasco Alvarado are revealing. In these memoirs, through the anecdotes and details of palace policy, it is possible to ascertain the serious contradictions which existed between a small group of radically revolutionary high ranking officers and the majority who were indifferent, conservative or clearly reactionary.

In the introduction to his book *El asalto a la razón*, George Lukacs affirmed that "there is no innocent ideology"; a legitimate paraphrasing would be that there cannot be innocence or naiveté without ideology. The Peruvian national revolution, beyond its "*Voluntarisme*" came face to face with the objective conditions of the nation's plurality. This plurality seems to require much more political imagination than what its ideological conditioning and innocence had foreseen.

At this point it is useful to consider further the concept of pluralism as understood by the leaders of the Peruvian revolution, especially in the period between the beginning of the process in 1968 until approximately the time when President Juan Velasco was overthrown by General Francisco Morales Bermudez, that is to say up until the initiation of what has been referred to as the "second stage" of the revolution. During this second period the pedagogic nature of the initial ideological declarations is reduced and at the same time an evident halt is brought to the program of structural reforms. The formerly abundant references made by President Velasco to the pluralistic political project become scarcer and more prudent, and this silence begins to acquire the undeniable category of a political declaration. Furthermore, the socialization of the newspaper which had recently established a dialectic between the government and the mass media, owned and managed by the most important economic sectors of the population, is terminated with the replacement of previous directors and management by new, more controllable and politically dependent personnel.¹ The recent closing of more than a dozen left and right wing journals, i.e. all of the political periodicals in the country, brings to a close this period of the Peruvian process and allows us to reach some conclusions about the limits to objectives faced by the military leadership.

In his 1971 '*Message to the Nation*' Velasco defined the humanistic, libertarian, and socialist aspirations of the Peruvian revolution. The objective stated was the intentional construction of a new society based on the cohesiveness of the population, politically structured so as to

¹ The expropriation and nationalization of the newspapers dictated by the Peruvian revolution while still directed by Velasco was, fundamentally, an attempt to socialize these mass means of communication. The government maintained one paper for itself while all the others with a national circulation of over 20,000 were granted to the different sectors of the organized population or those in the process of organization: peasants, workers and employees of co-managed and self-managed factories and enterprises, the public education sector, professionals, intellectuals and artists.

result in a 'fully participative social democracy'. The means to this end revolved around the concept of economic pluralism: the new Peru would be organized by establishing a balance between labor and capital. Progressive participation in the management and ownership of private companies by workers and employees up to a limit of 50⁰%, with the other half reserved for the capitalistic owner, became the most concrete and synthetic expression of the new concepts of pluralism introduced by the revolutionary government. Further complimentary structural reforms confirmed the pluralist intention of the revolution, or in other words of a "third way" compromise that equally rejected the supremacy of capital over labor or, viceversa, labor over capital. Of course, the deep social and economic changes implied by a commitment of this nature were expressed by general doubt, skepticism and dissatisfaction, fundamentally by the two antagonistic classes. For the capitalists the measures were an unpleasant foretaste of what was to come; the accusation that it was the beginning of a communist plan was not long in coming. For the working class, the government measures represented only a momentary panacea, a clever distracting maneuver equivalent to the modernization of the obsolete and inefficient economic structures of an underdeveloped capitalism. The workers in industry, in mines, and in urban areas could resort to their experiences, knowledge and union organization in order to attempt to interpret the new terms of reference of the political game and to design an appropriate strategy. In the case of the very large majority peasant sector, the reaction was twofold. The wage earners and workers of the large coastal sugar *haciendas*, which had been expropriated and then transformed into integral production cooperatives, maintained for a certain period their political loyalties to the party and to the populist type union organizations which for years had skillfully mediated and negotiated their rights. After the first years of direct and democratic management of the cooperatives and of profit sharing which resulted in incomes far greater than those received by the rest of the nation's workers, this sector of the rural population began to break away from the rest of their class companions. In a short period of agrarian reform a class of privileged peasants and workers was created: a rural petty bourgeoisie without private ownership of the land, but organized in cooperatives and equally damaging for a socialist project. The other part of the Peruvian peasantry, the majority sector, or the dependent peasants of the highland *haciendas*, where as yet colonial type production and work conditions remained or still remain untouched, responded to the agrarian

reform measures with the scepticism of those suffering from centuries-old marginalization and exploitation. They were, in the end, once more dealing with an affair of *'viracochas'*, of the white man, of Spanish speakers, of city dwellers or at least of *'mistis'* intermediary mestizos. For the vast majority of the indigenous Quechua and Aymara speaking peasants of the Andes region, the concepts of "agrarian reform, economic pluralism, full participation, Peruvian revolution, etc." were simply a new way of presenting the old system of exploitation.

The mistrust of the indigenous peasants when faced with an economic and social reorganization that directly affected them and was fostered by socially and ethnically different people, was reinforced by the bureaucratic authoritarianism and the directness with which the changes were imposed. The various indigenous peasant sectors did not participate at all in decisions related to the mode of expropriation of the latifundios, nor the awarding of these to beneficiaries. They had to accept as good a series of decisions formulated by technicians. Participation in the management of peasant enterprises came as a later and very important step, but this participation operates according to a social, economic, and administrative model of organization in whose formulation the peasant did not participate. For example, the geographic-spatial structuring of the new social enterprises does not necessarily respond to the Peruvian peasant reality; it is, rather, the final historical consolidation of the long process of fragmentation and reconstruction of agrarian spaces under the colonial and *latifundio* system. The lands awarded the peasant are *ex-hacienda* spaces; but these were apportioned with a social and ecological irrationality that destroyed the previously existing rationality. These decisions are taken according to economic criteria exclusively, without critical historical vision, and without the participation of the local population. It is here that we can observe side by side the declared pluralist intentions of the government as regards the direct and democratic participation by the population in the design and administration of communal enterprises and its social life in general, and the concrete reality: the class-based, uniethnic, non-democratic nature of the state organization responsible for the undertaking of government policy.

It is apparent that the same contradiction exists in the other social areas of the Peruvian political process. However, in the context of interethnic relations it is very clear and can be easily observed in all its severity. Our hypothesis therefore, is that not only are interethnic relations in the modern world always relations of class, but that in these

relations it is easier to see the antagonistic interests of the various interacting social groups clearly and unmistakably.

The strength of the synthetic indicativeness shown in interethnic relations as regards class contradictions is due to the fact that the complex symbolic character of each ethnic group and its language and culture can only with great difficulty be used for ideological manipulation by the members of the dominant classes of the other ethnic group. Of course, intentional ideological falsification aimed at achieving the political demobilization of a dominated ethnic group can, and does, occur. However, this presupposes at least two minimum conditions: a) the existence of an indigenous bourgeoisie whose interests coincide with the interests of the bourgeoisie of the dominant ethnic group; and b) an effective control of the semantic-cultural universe of the dominated ethnic group by the elite of the dominant group. This is not the occasion to deal with the historical reasons why in Peru's case neither of these two conditions exist, but it is important to note that their absence can clarify why interethnic relations can maintain their open and revealing character in terms of underlying class interests.

When we affirm that interethnic relations are also class relations, and that in and through these relations the existing antagonistic class interests are unmasked, we are indicating that the matter being dealt with is the revelation of objective conditions which do not necessarily imply the miraculous installation or the spontaneous arising of a clarified class consciousness within the dominated ethnic group. It is a question of a first step, which we refer to as the appearance of the ethnic consciousness, consciousness of a particular ethnicity or a form of 'consciousness for itself', which is the result of the clear contraposition of the interests of the two related groups. Following the perception, in the widest sense, of this contraposition of interests, where occurs, concomitantly, a reconsideration of the group's particular situation, a rethinking of this situation as compared to that of the other group, or a self definition via a dialectic of the opposition which if "historically unblocked" (A. Gramsci) would benefit both the dominator and the dominated.

However, let us return to the consideration of the pluralist conceptions of the Peruvian revolution. During the revolutionary government's eight years of power there have been very few official declarations that could lead us to affirm that the military leadership possesses a concept of pluralism wide enough to cover the multiethnic, multilingual, and culturally diverse position of the country. Consequently we can assume that the political and administrative capacity required for the

democratic expression of this social reality is lacking. However, as regards the legislative measures and structural reforms enacted and undertaken by the Peruvian government there are some indications that the application of pluralist concepts; exclusively limited to economic aspects, in a multiethnic and complex social reality such as that found in Peru, is evidently insufficient, and finally leads to the accentuation rather than the moderation of conflicts. The social model proposed by the military national revolution during its first years of government contemplated the exclusive existence or coexistence of five sectors in the national economy: 1) the state sector with control of basic strategic resources: energy, a large part of transportation and of communications; 2) the reformed private sector; for example, all the production enterprises employing more than six workers which, during a period of a few years, would progressively be transformed into co-administered companies in which up to 50% of the management and profits would pass to worker control; 3) the cooperative sector especially in the countryside, with its different formulas of social management; 4) the 'social ownership' or full self management sector applied to all those new production and/or commercial enterprises created with state financial support; to retail commerce, small and medium sized rural properties, small scale transport, etc. As can be seen from this summary list, the Peruvian model sought to establish a dialect of powers and counterpowers in which, according to the statements of President Velasco, "each economic and social organization, system or subsystem, would have the opportunity to demonstrate its virtues, defects and capacity for adapting and surviving." The unions were presented with an unexpected and provocative challenge, especially as regards the new social administration organizations represented by the self managed, co-managed and cooperative enterprises. The past tense is consciously used because since the displacement of President Velasco in 1975 the process has slowed down drastically and there are now clear signs that the gains achieved may be totally eliminated. The rights of co-management have been reduced, leaving a wide margin for the existence of private enterprises which can now include factories employing more than 50 workers; state credits to the self management sector have suffered important reductions. Fishing, one of the principal sectors of the national economy, which had been totally nationalized during the first period of the revolution, has now been almost completely reopened to national and foreign private investment. The radical military who were the initial promoters of the revolution along with Velasco and

who still occupied high positions in the government have been removed from their posts, retired prematurely or exiled. Today it can be affirmed that the Peruvian revolution is being betrayed by the same military institution which instigated it over eight years ago. We have yet to see to what extent the conservative and reactionary military, which has momentarily gained control, can reverse a historical process already in motion and what effect their actions will have on worker and population organizations that during a short period had a taste of a possible future.

Previously we commented that even a limited economic vision of pluralism, as conceived in the initial revolutionary project, was forced by the complex multiethnic, linguistic, cultural, and historically plural reality to make concessions and to rethink the national project in wider terms, in which a political margin had to exist for the expression of this diversity.

When a multiethnic country questions the capitalist system of economic and political organization and opens itself to different and plural experiences, these inevitably cannot be limited to the economic area; rather, they transcend it and create a crisis for the entire political, organizational, and administrative structure of the state and nation. This statement does not pretend to be new, far from it; one simply attempts to recognize, along with Marx in the Prologue (1972), the necessary relations that exist between the different components of a social structure; between the economic bases of society and the group of institutions which make up its superstructure and which assure its maintenance and reproduction.

When the nationalist revolutionary process began to alter some of the components of Peruvian society's economic base, specifically in the rural areas, the elements of the old system of political power were menaced and did not delay in reacting to reinforce the mechanism of the superstructure in order to assure the reproduction of the system. While the structural reforms enacted at the highest government levels required a self managed organization of peasant enterprises, and a direct decentralized democracy with minimum possible intervention by the state apparatus, the old political structures of power inside the state remained untouched. The result was that conditions were created in which self management, established by decree, met with its first concrete obstacles, not now the landholding oligarchy displaced by expropriation, but the state apparatus which for many years functioned as its watch dog. The same mechanism was repeated in the other sectors

of the reformed structure. To simplify, with a certain amount of risk, one could affirm that there was no corresponding alteration at the superstructural level accompanying the revolutionary action as regards the economic base: voluntarism of the revolutionary military leadership sinned in ingenuousness, 'ideological innocence'. An attempt was made to give production units economic power and autonomy in management terms without supporting them with the political power which would protect them from a state apparatus which for years had produced and reproduced the capitalist conditions of production. The repressive apparatus of the state was left intact, its links with the bourgeoisie, which began to be affected by the reforms, were not severed. The attempt to create an element of counter-power within the state, such as the System of Support for Social Mobilization (SINAMOS), which intended to function as a buffer between the revolutionary government and those sectors affected by the reforms, demonstrates once more that for the military leaders it was inconceivable that it should be indispensable to remove the previous state apparatus in order to be able to make the reforms it promulgated viable. To create the SINAMOS without dismantling the "Guardia Civil" (Police), and the Ministry of the Interior with its prefects and subprefects, both of which derive from, and are at the service of, the local bourgeoisie, was not only politically naive but also a short road to suicide. The workers and peasants were given the 'power' (granted by decree from the highest levels of government) to organize social production enterprises and, later, representative organizations for direct democracy; but their class enemies were present in every corner of the enterprises, in each state office, in each police station, in each Prefecture, and in each tribunal, with all their old power untouched.

To recapitulate: the pluralist concept of the initial Peruvian revolution was essentially an economic one inasmuch as it aspired to create a complex and modernized economic system in which underdeveloped capitalism would be a substitute for a type of 'ecological equilibrium' between capital and labor; between the small capitalist firm, co-management and self management enterprises, and the large state enterprises. Obviously, this economic structure should be accompanied by a corresponding political and organizational structure. However, from the outset, and exactly in agreement with the premises of a diffuse pluralism, the revolution rejected the idea of a single party. A vaguely formulated alternative to this solution was preferred. This consisted of creating graduated federal structures which included the different production units at a first base level, (agricultural cooperatives, co-managed companies,

self managed companies, etc.) and in which direct democratic management mechanisms existed, finally terminating with a national confederational system in which participation would be necessarily representative. The system of support for social mobilization (SINAMOS) was made responsible for the viability of the project in its organizational and political aspects. However, as just observed, a task of this nature implied if not the dismantling, at least the neutralization of the obstacles presented by the reactionary public administration and by the nucleus of a still sufficiently powerful and articulate bourgeoisie.

Up to this point we have presented a brief and necessarily superficial description of the limitations within which the economic pluralism was conceived and put into action during the first period of the Peruvian revolution. As regards the areas which fall outside a strict economic definition, the revolution perceived the necessity to offer some concessions in terms of a broad pluralism which can be defined as cultural or ethnic. Fundamentally, these concessions consisted of a reduced number of legislative measures linked with the multilingual and multi-ethnic nature of Peru.

However, prior to enumerating these measures, it will be useful to put forward some concrete data on the Peruvian situation. Peru still has a very marked multiethnic character: of the 14 million inhabitants, almost 3 million are monolingual Quechua speakers, while 4 million speak both Quechua and Spanish, but to a great extent share an indigenous-peasant culture which is clearly differentiated from the urban Europeanized culture. In the southern zone, on the frontier with Bolivia, there are more than 100,000 speakers of Aymara, a language also found in an Andean valley near Lima. In the eastern zone of the country there exist more than 55 ethnic groups, making a total of more than a quarter of a million people. The picture is complex linguistically and ethnically, but this complexity is not reflected in the nation's administrative organization. The Spanish speaking urban sectors and the *criollos*, politically dominant since the Republican Constitution of 1821, continue to see and consider the country as an entity with a uniform and monocultural European filiation and vocation. The country is thought of neither as a multiethnic society nor, much less, as a possible national project with its own plurinational state.

As far as the dominant liberally derived bourgeois ideology is concerned, the state and nation coincide: a determined class and ethnic group of Peru created its own state on becoming independent from Spain, and consequently considers this to be coincident with the nation,

even though in that nation one finds different ethnic groups or nationalities which, to a greater or lesser extent, are submitted to or integrated with the central power. There is an important historical element here that should be mentioned; for many Third World countries which began the process of decolonization and national liberation in the last few decades, the concepts of *nation*, *state*, *ethnic communities*, *nationalities*, *multinational state*, *multiethnic society*, etc. constituted a central political concern. In the case of Peru the process of independence and formal decolonization began at the beginning of the XIX century. This was the time when the concept of nation and nationality suffered grave conditioning, from the bourgeois ideologies emanating from the French Revolution, from the centralist and homogenizing Napoleonic conceptions and, finally, from the romantic ideological movements. Nationality necessarily implied linguistic unity, cultural unidimensionality and administrative centralization. For the recently decolonized nations, the Soviet experience and the Leninist statements on the problem of nationalities have, in some way, provided a wider and a more fruitful frame of reference. On the contrary, for collective representation in history, and even in the political and social sciences, in Peru the community of ethnic peoples that constitute the country is conceptualized as a nation-state whose unity will be as great as is the cultural and linguistic homogeneity.

From this point of view, the unity and integration of the nation is, in the end the same as the unity of the state. All the inhabitants of the state, whatever their ethnic affiliations, are included within the nation—the nation being conceived as the cultural and organizational expression of the dominant *criollo* sector. In this sense it is accepted as an absolute truth that there is a total coincidence between citizenship and nationality. But, even in its least elaborate and explicit form, this vision in political practice is at best naïve or at worst produces ethnic aggression. Even at the margin of any ethnical consideration, this political position is a serious matter in that it leads to an ignorance of the objective content of ethnic development processes, and to misunderstanding of the development of Peruvian society as a whole.

It is within this context that the few initial political actions taken by the revolutionary government with respect to the problems of ethnic pluralism must be understood. In 1972 the Educational Reform was promulgated. Among other things it established the definitive institutionalization of bilingual education in those regions of the country in which a local language is spoken. In 1975, days before the replacement of Velasco, this measure was extended with the passing of a decree rais-

ing Quechua to the status of an official language, along with Spanish. Its use will be obligatory in courts judging Quechua speakers; furthermore it will be used in official matters which affect Quechuas; and, finally, the teaching of Quechua will be obligatory in the national educational system. The third legislative measure, the amplification of the Agrarian Reform Law, was promulgated in 1974 and deals with the Peruvian Amazon region which covers almost 60% of the national territory. This law for native communities of the Peruvian jungle aims to guarantee the territorial rights of ethnic tribal minorities by providing state support for their demands for recuperation, amplification, and possession of those territories which were lost to them as a result of the internal colonial and marginalization process. At the same time, the law grants a certain amount of administrative autonomy to ethnic minorities and establishes mechanisms for state administrative and financial stimulus and support for ethnic and multiethnic federative organizations. Finally, a political decision was taken by the government during the last few months of 1976 the exact significance and nature of which are difficult to establish at the moment. This concerns the nationalization of the Summer Institute of Linguistics (S.I.L.) a powerful North American missionary organization which has been extremely active in Peru during the last 30 years working among the ethnic groups of the Amazon and Andean region.*

The same questions can be raised about these measures as were raised concerning the economic measures taken by the government: to what extent are initiatives of this nature viable when the whole structure of political and bureaucratic power is unaltered? To what extent can these initiatives begin to activate minimal measures aimed at establishing an ethnic and linguistic democratic pluralism within the unaltered context of a bourgeois and capitalist state? As in the case of self management, we can affirm that multiethnicity or democratic ethnic and linguistic pluralism is impossible within the political, administrative and economic framework where the traditional power still exists with all its strength and energy.

These are disturbing questions which pose the old dilemma of the progressive bourgeois consciousness: is it possible to maintain and even increase the democratic gains achieved by the working classes during the relatively peaceful periods of capitalist development, or are these

* In February 1977 the government of General Morales Bermudez renewed the agreement with the S.I.L. for the next five years.

destined to be eliminated in the short or medium run if the people do not totally and definitively assume the complete control of the state? In 1926, Antonio Gramsci (1973, III: 21 222) predicted, as Marx had previously in the *18th Brumaire of Luis Bonaparte*, that the general tactic of the threatened bourgeoisie can be no other than what became known later as fascism. The presence of socialist elements, such as unions, cooperatives, co-management, etc., which can coexist in a capitalist regime does not appear to be sufficient to guarantee that through their diffusion and penetration, the whole structure of a regime would be modified until the peaceful triumph of socialism and the forms of direct and decentralized democratic self-management which are concomitant and indispensable conditions for any true pluralist and multi-ethnic solution.

Moreover, it seems that the mere presence of socialist elements within the structure of an underdeveloped and dependent capitalism would accelerate the appearance of the contradictions, and would produce an extreme reaction from the threatened bourgeoisie. Along with Gramsci, we are forced to admit that as with the Workers Councils of Italy in 1920, where in the absence of a corresponding workers' control of state power, the growth of fascism took place as the extreme response of the threatened bourgeoisie, so, in the same way, the introduction of co-management and self-management by decree in the capitalist regime of Peru necessarily leads to a radicalization of the reactionary response.

Thus, the dilemma is a false one and the statement has a certain sound of rhetoric as it represents an already well known Marxist view but, as the Peruvian experience demonstrates, it is a rhetoric which cannot be ignored politically. It does not seem possible to begin a socialist transformation of the economy, or to install self-management by the people (the initial formulae for direct and decentralized democracy, ethnic pluralism or democracy for ethnic groups or nationalities) if the entire state apparatus, as well as existing power relations, are not suppressed and replaced. The Peruvian state is the consolidated political manifestation of the power of one class and one ethnic group; power which is exerted in order to maintain the remaining classes and the national ethnic groups in a dependent and oppressed situation. The aspirations of the progressive military, during the first state, to activate a plural dialectic which would result in the structuring of a self-management and socialist, multiethnic and democratic society, had taken for granted and underestimated the strength of the desperation of the affected social sector. The Peruvian revolution was asking, by decree, that

the oligarchy and Spanish speaking bourgeoisie commit social, cultural, and political suicide in the name of a national project in which its power would be shared along with its land, factories, newspapers, and schools. This was too great a demand to make, even by a military government.

Bibliography

GRAMSCI, Antonio, *Scritti Politici*, Editori Riuniti, Roma, 1973.

MARX, Karl, *Introducción general a la Economía Política y Prólogo a Contribución a la crítica de la economía política*, Cuadernos del pasado y presente, Córdoba, Argentina, 1972.

PART II
Attempts at Integration

Integration and Politicization (Towards a Radical Redefinition of Integration)

Jorge R. Serrano

Introductory note

This paper is theoretical-positional in the sense that it discusses, from a theoretical point of view, a new approach or position regarding integration. Let us outline (as an entry to our theme) the *general point which motivated it*.

In saying this, we do not refer to a precise logical point but, rather, to a more general idea which has oriented the search for, and the selectivity of, the political concepts and problems explored here. Given that later in this paper the presence of this general intuition will be continually sensed, though not immediately apparent, we will devote this introductory note to comment on it directly. We allude to two passages in the *Analects of Confucius* which, in its laconic brevity, still stimulates the modern reader. The passages, in Waley's¹ translation, are the following: "Someone, when talking to Master K'ung, said, 'How is it that you are not in the public service?' The Master said, 'The Book says: 'Be filial, only be filial and friendly towards your brothers, and you will be contributing to government.' There are other sorts of service quite different from what you mean by 'service'" (II, 21).

And, "Tzu-kung asked about government. The Master said, "Sufficient food, sufficient weapons, and the confidence of the common people'. Tzu-kung said, 'Suppose you had no choice but to dispense with one of these three, which would you forgo?' The Master said, 'Weapons.' Tzu-kung said, 'Suppose you were forced to dispense with one of the two that were left, which would you forgo?' The Master

¹ CONFUCIUS (Tr. Waley A.), *The Analects of Confucius*, Allen and Unwin, London, 1964.

said, 'Food. For from of old death has been the lot of all men; but a people that no longer trusts its rulers is lost indeed' " (XII, 7).

We leave aside problems of textual criticism (for example, the problems of the Shu-ching's quotation of the first passage), in that this does not affect the principal point which interests us. Rather, we only present Pound's ² translation of the last part of the second passage as it is more stimulating and no less exact than that given by Waley: i.e. "All must die, but if the people be without confidence nothing stands."

The starting point which interests us in the first passage is the idea that one is already in public service as the result of one's conduct in the family sphere. That is, the public sphere goes so far beyond the official into the home itself that there is no break between these two, they really form a continuum. This is true to the extent that one can invert the terms saying that the model of the governmental system is, in essence, a family model (kings, princes or rulers are the authorities in a family which is the nation). *This continuum as regards public life and the possibility of participation --through one's behavior-- from one's social position are the aspects which are of interest to us.*

Furthermore, this contrasts in an extremely important way with the manner in which the public sphere was perceived in Greece where the 'Western tradition' commenced. The division between the 'polis', the public area, and the 'oikia' or house, the private area, was absolute, inviolable. Whilst the former was the stage of liberty, the latter was that of need. This gives origin to the tragic idea that politics, in being the particular activity of the *polis*, is only concerned with "lexis", (the word), and "praxis", (the action) which deals only with those human affairs that severely exclude what is solely necessary or useful. This idea gave rise to the Western tradition which conceives of politics as being concerned with something other than the basic needs of man, whether it be referred to as 'politeia' or 'super-structure'.

Moreover, this separation between the private and the public, between the home and the 'polis', between politics and 'oikonomia', also gives rise to *another idea which is no less questionable: the notion of citizenship*. Only the citizen (the member of the polis), the free man, has the possibility of participation and of political decision making. The rest (remembering that in Greece the slaves greatly outnumbered the free-

² CONFUCIUS (Tr. Pound E.), *The Unwobbling Pivot, The Great Digest, The Analects*, N.D.P. 285, N.Y., 1969.

men and formed the backbone of the economy) cannot even think of participating. It is a world from which they are excluded because they are not citizens. Neither their opinion, their confidence nor their support is needed. They have no place in such a world (something only apparently different occurs in many countries today as regards peasants, women, marginal groups, etc.).

Faced with this situation let us consider the second passage. Here Confucius affirms that in extreme cases it is more important to do without food than to lack the confidence of the people, as without this confidence "nothing stands". (Here it is well to remember the tradition of the "Mandate of Heaven" which was expressed through the people or, at a different and more recent level, the contemporary victory of the people of Viet Nam). However, it is not necessary to prolong our discussion of these passages at present. When the reader finishes this paper we suggest that he reconsiders the two passages. Then it will be understood why we regard these passages as the germ and orientation of our whole discussion. Let us now terminate this introduction, focussed on history, and pass on to a brief summary and identification of the principal concepts we use in this paper.

Part I: A different perspective on political integration

Section 1: Preliminary³ identification and framing of concepts

Our discussion falls directly within the political area. It is concerned with a political vision of the problem of integration.⁴ We wish to take

³ This first section is in a strict sense preliminary. If any reader feels that it does not coincide with his interests, we suggest he go straight to the next section ("A Political Vision of the Political"). It is here that we shall start our theme properly. The reader can eventually go back quickly to the first section, should he need clarification of some aspect.

⁴ We begin by commenting at the outset that the very concept of integration is not new in social thought. In one way or another the concept is to be found in the works of jurists, social philosophers and historians, such as Montesquieu and Herder, Rousseau and Vico, De Maistre and Dilthey, Spengler and Jaeger; it also appears prominently in the writings of anthropologists, sociologists and sociopsychologists such as Benedict, Kroeber, Riesman and Festinger. Nevertheless, we must note that in spite of being a concept which has been the subject of reflection by distinguished thinkers and despite the fact that even today it is a concept which is still actively discussed by scientists, it has not yet achieved a satisfactory level of clarity and intelligibility. Thus, the conclusion arrived at by Angell

advantage of this occasion to present for academic discussion *a different perspective on integration from a political angle: the perspective which contemplates integration from the viewpoint of political demand.* Thus, the axis of our discussion will be the relationship between the concepts of Integration (I) and Political Demand (PD), or, more precisely, the discussion of political demand,⁵ within its general theoretical context, prior to relating it, in a particular and determinant manner, to the concept of integration.

We will begin by locating the concept of Political Demand (PD) within the framework of the central concepts of political study. We touch on these latter in the following order: I) public goals; II) the model of political life; III) the inputs of political life. Public goals will be our starting point to define the political as such. The model of political life will give us a general scheme and outlook of the political; it is here that we shall define political life, and here also that we shall call the attention of the reader to a remarkable fact: that out of the four parts which make up the model (a-b-c-d) the second and third (b-c) have been much more studied than the first and fourth (a-d). Therefore, we shall insist on the latter two since they will enable us to observe—in the following sections—political life in its totality, and hence, to redefine the notion of integration and to look at it—at the end of the paper—in relation to politicization. Finally, the inputs of political life will introduce two other central notions we require, that of Political Supports (PS) and that of Political Demands (PD). In this way we shall have the notion of Political Demands (PD) located in its proper setting and we will be able to go on to the second section.

I. The development of political studies, due in no small way to the great influence of Max Weber, has been characterized by the persistent concentration of political analyses on problems related to the acquisition and use of power. In this way the notion of political power has

when dealing with the theme should not be considered strange: “one must conclude that the states of conceptualization, of operationalization and of research-validated theory on integration are all unsatisfactory.” (Angell R., in *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*; Vol. VI; 1968, p. 385).

⁵ In contrast to the concept of integration, which has for a long time been of concern to academics, the concept of political demand has been ignored as an analytical and theoretical concept to the extent that only recently has it begun to command the attention of a few academics (Weiner, Easton, Swartz). Nevertheless, we suggest that *it may be of great relevance, particularly in third world countries.* Bearing this in mind we will deal with the concept itself.

been converted into the essential and, with lamentable frequency, the only focus of analysis. More recently, political anthropologists⁶ involved in the analysis of processes, have suggested the need to stress the notion of *public goals* (PG), putting the study of power on a second level in the sense that it be taken into account to the extent that it has empirical importance in each case. Although we adhere to the anthropological, viewpoint on public goals, for our discussion of integration and political demands it is not necessary to put aside completely the traditional viewpoint of political studies on power.

II. *The other central concepts* and their relationship with Public Goals. *Because of the need for methodological clarity we will frame them by making use of a scheme or model*⁷ *of a highly generalized nature. I refer to the model which conceives of political life as a system of dynamics.*⁸ Adopting this as our point of departure we can acknowledge political life as consisting of one or more⁹ systems which function in a dissipative manner, i.e. systems which "require a regular input and give a regular output".¹⁰ For analytical reasons we will for the present

⁶ SWARTZ M., (Ed.), *Local Level Politics*, Aldine, Chicago, 1968.


⁷ As regards the use of models it is an opportune moment to recall Landau's conclusion when studying this type of problem: "Political science has always had recourse to metaphors, it advanced from the known to the unknown. Those that criticize the use of 'models' should understand that they need to use them also. Consequently, a good part of the controversy over the use of models has no reason to exist. The option is not between models or no models, but rather between critical and acritical consciousness in their use. The open and 'hygienic' use of models may or may not help us to develop an empirically solid political theory, but it ~~will~~ help us to avoid taking many of the risks associated with the cunning, implicit and numbed metaphors which one commonly finds in works of political science." M. LANDAU, "On the Use of Metaphor in Political Analysis", *Social Research*, 28, 1961, p. 353.

⁸ This model, already used in several cases of social analysis is used here at a greater level of generalization. Here we approximate the use made of the model by Easton. However, as will be seen, with the exception of some approaches of the model, we follow a different line to Easton. Thus, a mentioned, previously, we only use the model in order to achieve methodological clarity but with very different aims.


⁹ In using the plural form we are trying to leave open the possibility of including, either as independent or partial systems, the various levels (local, regional, national, etc.) of political life, or to embrace ample time limits. In order to simplify the exposition we will maintain the use of the singular form.

¹⁰ Adams, R.N., *Energy and Structure*, Un. of Texas Pr., Austin, 1975, p. 127

divide our system into two sections or subsystems which we will refer to as the Transformer (T) and the Circuit (CR) of our system. The circuit refers to the passage or circulation of the inputs and outputs, whilst the transformer is the mechanism which converts inputs into outputs. For the moment the scheme can be represented as follows:



Now let us complete the model. The outputs, in their turn, will revert (the lower part of the scheme) to the different societal systems (economic, family, work, educational, demographic, and socio-psychological, etc.) which, in their turn, will introduce new inputs into our political system and thus maintain this in an active state, avoiding its “dissipation”, i.e. they will make political life possible. Here is a suitable point at which to note that the outputs revert to those different societal systems precisely in the form of public goals which are implemented in the economic, family, working spheres, etc., i.e. the outputs of our political system *are* the public goals. Thus, we are now able to understand that the whole process or system of *political life is in reality no more than the determination, implementation or manipulation –i.e. the formation and handling– of public goals* (in that the inputs, the transforming system –as well as power itself, according to the traditional conception of political studies– are orientated to and constitute a part of that formation and handling). We now have a model which is as follows:



where PG are the public goals or outputs (PG = c) and where “d” represents the different societal systems in which political life terminates and is generated or started anew.

Now, given that “b” represents the transformation subsystem T where decisions on goals and means of implementation are made, that it is also in “b” where the decision makers concerned with the conversion of inputs into outputs¹¹ are located and, finally, given also that Weberian influence is very marked in the political sciences, it is not surprising that a considerable number of the analyses and studies of political problems concentrate on the study of the transformation subsystem “b”,¹² and moreover, that there are several studies that branch out also to the results, namely, the outputs (“c”) of that subsystem “b”.

Counter to the emphasis accorded these studies to date, I wish to suggest the general hypothesis that *a change of interest in favor of “a”*

¹¹ Which thus transforms the decision makers into ‘executives’, in other words, those that have the political power to effect the transformation.

¹² As regards the transforming subsystem, it should be noted that throughout our work we only refer to it where it is relevant to our argument. As we do not deal with it here, it can be taken as a ‘black box’, but only in a methodological sense (an area where the processes internal to it remain in the shade, unanalyzed, and where only the inputs and outputs of the box are registered and analyzed). But, this only represents a methodological resource which allows us to go directly to the point which interests us. In reality the transforming subsystem cannot be considered in a static way (as frequently occurs with the ‘black box’) since we are dealing with an important and intensely dynamic area. From this point of view it could be more fruitful to consider it as a ‘field’.

and "d" could lead to promising surprises in revealing hidden spheres of reality which previously appeared only in a vague way in the observer's conscience.

III. Let us now consider the inputs, i.e. "a". Continuing at a high level of generalization it is legitimate to consider the inputs to be reducible to two aspects, valid for any type of political system.¹³ The first of these aspects is included within the term Political Supports (PS). These are the resources introduced into, or held by, the transforming subsystem in order to select, decide and implement the public goals to be reached, or, more concisely, they comprise the determining and implementing energies of the system.¹⁴

The second aspect of the inputs brings us to the central notion which we particularly wish to relate to the concept of integration i.e. Political Demand (PD). Political Demand is understood to be the desires of the different members, systems or subsystems of society that are or can be directed to the transforming agents (i.e. T) of the political system for those desires to be converted into public goals; or, expressed more concisely, they are the components and the aspect itself of the construction of *directionality* for the energies of the system. Easton, however,¹⁵ defines the PD as "an expression of opinion that an authori-

¹³ The suggestion as to the reduction of the inputs to two aspects, as expressed in note number eight, is taken from Easton D., *A Framework for Political Analysis*, Prentice Hall, 1965, N.Y. In the way we understand and handle these two aspects we diverge strongly from Easton and follow different paths.

¹⁴ A study of it would cover not only the direct supports accorded the different parts of the transforming subsystem (and easily detectable) but also the indirect supports which are probably of far greater interest for the analysis. These are more difficult to discover and very frequently more decisive in the system. The study of the supports would also include their diverse foundations: coercion, legitimacy, consensus, persuasion, etc. The study of problems related to the supports has been partially dealt with in political analyses, especially when these are closely concerned with aspects of power.

¹⁵ It has already been noted that PD has only recently attracted the attention of a limited number of academics. Lasswell and Kaplan (*Power and Society*, Yale, Un. Pr., New Haven, 1950, p. 17), have the honor of being the first to give Demands a certain specific role in their political considerations when referring to the "demand statement"; Swartz M., Turner V.W., Tuden A., (Eds.), (*Political Anthropology*, Aldine, Chicago, 1966), attempting to offer a general processual approach to the study of politics, define the concept PD in an interesting way but do not explore it further.

To our knowledge, only Easton has devoted a little more time and work on the study of political demand, having dedicated one of the six parts of one of

tative allocation with regard to a particular subject matter should or should not be made by those responsible for doing so".¹⁶

Thus, for Easton the PD has to be an "expression of opinion". We do not consider this to be necessary; even less necessary is the idea that the demand should be made by those that 'fulfill' the requirements. It is sufficient that it be a desire. Easton also requires that the content be an "authoritative allocation" whilst for us it is neither necessary that it be an allocation nor "authoritative" (in the sense in which he understands the term, i.e. that it depends on those who control the allocation – the executives of the system). Of importance for us is that the content be a possible public goal – allocated or not, authoritative or not. Moreover, he requires that the PD should be "with regard to a particular subject matter", whilst our formulation allows it to be particular or general, precise or diffuse. When Easton says "should or should not be made" he underlines the imperative or proscriptive character of the demand. We are entirely in agreement with this although, as just commented, the subject does not have to fulfill certain requisites in order to be able to proscribe; it is sufficient that he be a member of a society. Finally, when speaking of "those responsible for doing so" he circumscribes the obligation to those officially or formally accepted by the system. We, on the other hand, are very much interested in maintaining that obligation open to those of a non-official nature and even to those that have been officially rejected i.e. we are particularly interested in focusing also on those that form part of the "opposition", legal or not, accepted or not, clandestine or open.

Section 2: A political vision of the political

As can be observed from previous comments, *we particularly wish to put an emphasis on focusing on the most neglected and vague of the areas 'a' and 'd' of the model presented and, thus, establish a greater global unity.*

his books to the concept. (Easton D., *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*, Wiley, N.Y., 1965). In recognizing his inspiration in some of the points we now consider we must, nevertheless, say that his notion of PD (as well as his notion of the 'political' on which his notion of PD depends) is, for our purposes, so reduced and reductive and oriented solely towards the institutional or formal aspect of "the political" that it is of no use to us.

¹⁶ Easton D., *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*, John Wiley and Sons, N.Y., 1965, p. 38.

This means that *we now wish in particular to focus more precisely on those areas where the very beginnings or generation itself – the gestation– of political life takes place starting from the other systems of society, namely, starting from the social at large, –“d” in our proposed scheme. This has only been dealt with, until now, in a very partial and fragmented manner under, for example, the heading of political socialization. But this and similar approaches may represent a socio-psychological, anthropological or sociological point of view, but not a political one, and this is precisely our purpose: to look from a political standpoint at the gestation of politics. This is the first key point we wish to make.*¹⁷

We wish then to focus on the generation of the ‘political’, starting from the social and, what interests us is to examine the gestation of politics from a political point of view. Thus, we wish to deal with two things; firstly, the generation of political life and, secondly, the angle from which we observe it. Let us note that in view of this latter point (amongst other things), we have chosen to adopt the concept of public goals as our central notion of “the political”, in order to gain greater clarity in terms of the angle from which we observe matters. Thus, whilst we are working with this concept we will be sure of observing the gestation of politics from a political viewpoint. Having noted this let us pass on to the point which particularly interests us at the moment.

*Generating the ‘political’ from the social –keeping to our definition of politics– means that we refer to a process whereby any social aspect or problem*¹⁸ *becomes a public goal. It is obvious that the conversion of a social aspect into a public goal involves a lengthy trajectory. Now, if we conceive of social needs in general being located at one extreme of that trajectory (i.e. the take off point) and the pursuits of political life at the other extreme (the end point) we will understand that it is precisely the notion of political demand which takes us from social needs to*

¹⁷ We will attempt to go into this cautiously and in more detail since, on the one hand, we consider it of great importance and, on the other hand, we will not count here on the help of watchful explorers nor of intrepid pioneers. With the simple and honest wish to interchange ideas on aspects we consider of transcendental importance and whose multiple implications are not at all well known, we offer the following points more as an invitation to general reflection than anything else.

¹⁸ Social aspect or problem is here understood in a wide sense: it could be economic, ecological, religious, familial, institutional, associational, etc.

public goals; this means that the PD notion constitutes the nexus of the two extremes and the justification of the dialectical relationship that exists between these. However, this last point (the dialectical relationship) will not be dealt with a present. If we remain with the idea of the nexus we understand that the typical area¹⁹ of the political demand is that of the long trajectory between one extreme and another i.e. that of all the dynamism inherent in the gestation of "the political", or precisely the trajectory of the processes in which the transformation of social needs into public goals to be implemented²⁰ operates.

This long and complex trajectory is what we call the conversion or evolution of the "social" into the "political".²¹ At present it is important for us to rescue the idea of the gestation of the "political" seen as the transformation of the "social" into the "political" through the Political Demand notion.

This consideration of the gestation of politics as already a function of 'the political', seen from the viewpoint of a definition based on the concept of public goals, presents us with the possibility of considering political life within, and with our model or scheme as a much wider unity than is usually considered but, nevertheless, always remaining a unity. In order to be able to understand the character of this global unity and its dialectical nature better²² it is necessary for us to consider it

¹⁹ In referring to a "typical area" we do not wish to say that it is exclusive in that, as has been seen, the demands and supports are aspects of a single notion of input. In reality the relation between PD and PS, as included within the notion of input, is also a dialectical relationship. This relationship will be analyzed later.

²⁰ The step between public goals which *need* to be implemented and those *to be* implemented (i.e. between choosable and chosen) is the first typical field of the supports; in the same way the step between the Public Goals to be implemented and those implemented relates to the implementation resources or supports (second field) i.e. the output resources, (as opposed to the input resources which are those most frequently referred to as supports).

²¹ As we make a detailed analysis of the process of 'becoming' or the conversion process in another study in which we consider its multiple stages and transformation mechanisms, we refer the interested reader to that study. To contemplate these aspects here would involve dealing with a large variety of aspects which, although interesting, are not necessary for the present discussion.

²² The concept 'dialectic' is apt to be widely used and imprecisely understood. In view of this, it is useful to comment briefly on the way in which it is used in this paper. The concept is used in this study as a hypothetical instrument for the analysis of concepts and realities and, as a result, we are able to postulate a peculiar relationship between their constituents. Such a relationship is characterized by the following three aspects: negation, preservation, and elevation. Ne-

in its two principal phases or moments. Then *the whole process of conversion or evolution, seen globally as the political demand process emerges as the subjective moment of "the political" (subjective moment equals Political Demand), whilst, at the other extreme, the process of the implementation of public goals will be manifested as the objective moment (objective moment equals Public Goal). In this way the whole framework appears as more fully-fledged and one gains a vision of the total cycle of political life (from its genesis in the social to its return to the social), always from the peculiar perspective of the 'political'. In this sense one can say that it is a political vision of the "political".*

*Within the framework thus outlined it is of the highest importance to emphasize that the subjective and the objective moments are nothing more than phases of the same reality i.e. the two moments are indispensable, essential for understanding the particular reality in question. Without one it is impossible to understand the other, and vice versa.*²³

We mention this in order that the unity required conceptually²⁴ between the subjective and the objective moment should be seen more clearly. Thus, whilst the objective moment can be considered the "in-

gation, not in the sense of a contradictory but of a contrary opposition; preservation as regards the affirmation of any of the related constituents or elements: even though such affirmation maintains an opposition contrary to the other element (due to the negation aspect), nevertheless, the opposition is of such a nature that the opponent is conserved not eliminated. Moreover, it demands and requires this kind of opposition in order to explain the affirmation better. Finally, elevation is used in the sense that the very opposition relationship gives rise to a dynamic by means of which a higher level is sought and reached where those opposed are reconciled in a single unit –being incorporated in such a unit–, thus leaving the previous opposition justified.

²³ Moreover, given the very notion of PD, it can also be said that in general, whilst PD defines the essence of the political phenomenon through its finality PG, on the other hand, constitutes the existence of the political phenomenon. Also, whilst PD determines the essence of each specific political phenomenon, PG gives it actuality, creating the existence of that essence. Thus, it can be seen that one cannot have existence without essence since this would consist of pure and limitless indetermination (what actually exists are all concrete realities), whilst essence without existence would consist only of an "idea", pure abstraction, no present reality.

²⁴ Although this does not occur in each concrete case since it is obvious that not all the demands must necessarily be converted into public goals (not all the essences will of necessity exist). However, it is also obvious that (and this is what is of importance at this point in our argument) each public goal is no more than a fulfilled political demand.

strument” through which the subjective moment is achieved, the subjective moment, in its turn, must be considered to be the means by which the objective moment is determined. Only in this way can it become something concrete. In synthesis, to conclude this idea, one can apply the expression used by Fichte in another context to the political phenomenon as a whole: “Ich bin Subjekt-Objekt und in der Identität und Untrennbarkeit von beiden besteht mein wirkliches Sein”.²⁵

Part II: A different notion of political integration

Section 3: Absolute and relative definitions

*We have insisted on emphasizing that the “political” as such is made up of two moments because arising from them we will start building what we hold to be a more complete and valid notion of political integration. For the moment we will only present the first step in the process. This is fundamental, although as yet incomplete, as its level of generality gives it an indeterminate character: later it will need to be determined more precisely. In view of what we have already said about the moments, this first step seems almost obvious. It can be stated in the following way: in general, political integration is the identity between Political Demands and Public Goals i.e. if the subjective and objective moments are identical then there is perfect integration. This is clear if one takes into account that Political Demands are exactly what all the members (whether individuals, groups or institutions) of the political system expect the system to offer them and, in the last instance, the reason for which the system exists and for which they form part of it. In other words, if the system provides for the conversion of all the demands of its members into public goals, then, as a result of the very definition of the terms, integration would be consummated, the system would be undivided, whole and integral.*²⁶

²⁵ Fichte J.G., *Sämtliche Werke*, ed. I.H. Fichte, Berlin, 1845-6, vol. IV, p. 13 (“I am subject-object, and in the identity and inseparability of both consists my true being”).

²⁶ From the Latin, *in*, a prefix with privative or negative force, and *teg*, a variation of *tag*, the root of *tangere*, to touch: i.e. something untouched and therefore undisturbed, undivided, complete.

This first fundamental step obliges us to recognize that the notion of integration is totally dependent on the notion of Political Demand: the greater the fulfillment of the Political Demands of the system, the greater the level of integration, and vice versa. *Thus, this makes the notion of integration a function of the notion of Political Demand.*

We pointed out previously that we were taking the first fundamental step towards the notion of integration, but that after taking this first step it would still remain incomplete. Let us see why. We have just seen that the notion of integration depends on the notion of Political Demand. Now, if we delve further into the concept of PD (Political Demand) a very important feature can be discovered which should be considered. That is to say, the antagonistic character of PD. This aspect clearly emerges when PD refers to a macrosystem (to a political system which operates at relatively high levels of resolution —regional, national, etc.). This antagonistic character appears in PD (i.e. in the demands existing within the system) when these are seen as a whole. Let us explain a little. It is clear that these demands as a whole want an enormous range of public goals to be implemented which will respond to the desires of the large number of units (individuals, groups or institutions) of the system. Now, as the wishes of these units will not always be the same (to the extent that their needs or interests are different or frequently opposed) there will be cases in which what is desired by some will not yet be desired by others or they will desire it in a different way. Extreme situations are found in those cases where what is desired by some is not desired by others. In other words, *the sum of the demands in a system involves levels of indetermination, ambiguity and contradiction, which it is necessary to specify or resolve in some way. As was seen previously, integration depends on PD, thus, it is obvious that, concomitantly, when speaking of integration the same indeterminations, ambiguities and contradictions will appear as will the same need to specify and resolve them.* Thus, the terms 'specify' and 'resolve' present the two important problems that we now have to face. Let us take the first of these. *How do we specify the indeterminations or ambiguities in order to specify integration also?*

When we took the fundamental step in terms of understanding the notion of integration we talked in absolute terms, given its level of generality. (Having advanced a little in our considerations, we saw that this generality involved ambiguities and contradictions). Thus, the first thing to do (even before going into the particularities), if we wish to escape from the undefined generality, is to transpose the level of con-

ceptualization in such a way that instead of conceptualizing in absolute terms we do so in relative terms. In this way we can transform our previous Political Demands and Public Goals etc., into the following: *in relative terms, political integration is the degree of coincidence between Political Demands and Public Goals: the more coincidence, the more integration; i.e., when there is a greater approximation between the subjective and objective moments there will be a greater level of integration and when the approximation is less, the level of integration will be less.*²⁷ This now leads us to a dynamic concept of integration, as it depends on the dynamics of the relationship between the moments: this can tend towards increasing approximation or towards increasing distance between the moments, conditions which can be characterized respectively by the use of the terms 'integration' or 'disintegration' (as an integrating policy, disintegrating policy, etc.) i.e. the notion of integration reflects the very dynamic of a society or, more particularly, that of its political system.

Section 4: The principles of inclusivity and efficiency and their relationships

Thus, given the antagonistic character of PD, it has been seen that in order to deal with integration it is necessary to speak in relative terms i.e. in terms of degree (greater... lesser... etc.). This immediately raises a serious problem: what is the criterion for determining the levels of the scale, or more correctly, what is the criterion used in the gradation of the scale. In order to answer this, what will be referred to as the *principle of inclusivity* is of use; this derives from our definition of the 'political' as public goals. The principle of inclusivity, used as a criterion for the gradation of the scale, can be formulated as follows: *all other things being equal, the greater the level of inclusion of the 'public' the greater the level in the scale.* This means to say that the determining factor is the levels of the 'public', which in its turn is determined by

²⁷ This statement is made at such a level of generalization that it is unnecessary to define whether this relationship is simply lineal or more complex. The nature of the relationship would be determined by empirical investigation in each particular case studied. The only thing that could invalidate our formulation would be the possibility of substituting the word 'approximation' for 'distance'; this is not possible.

inclusivity itself (the capacity to incorporate the greatest possible number of members of the system.)²⁸

With the help of this criterion we may now take a further step, re-considering and also specifying PD. *From here it follows that as the demands in the whole system are ambiguous or contradictory (because they represent the needs or interests of the different units or members of the system), then higher level demands will be Popular Political Demands (PPD) as, according to the very definition of terms, they will be the most inclusive. Thus, from the point of view of political integration the unspecified notion of PD becomes specified as PPD.* It is the Popular Political Demand, then, by definition of terms, which, in a specific way, obtains the highest levels in the criterion scale of integration i.e. it is the Popular Political Demand which more cogently requires the greatest degree of approximation between itself and Public Goals in order for us to be able to speak of greater integration.

Now, this idea at first sight demands a radical *volte face* (through 180 degrees) in terms of this conception of integration and that used by those who base integration on the exercise of power. This turn presents us with the opportunity to deal with the *second important problem which remained to be solved.* The notion we adopted of integration specified, at the level now of importance to us, the ambiguity and indetermination, but did not indicate *the solution to the contradictions that originate in the antagonistic character of PD.* In order to achieve this a new step forward will be necessary.

²⁸ This notion of inclusivity would seem to be quantitative only; this is only apparently so, in that every member possesses a particular quality. Evidently, this quality can differ, but the difference, from a social point of view, is only detectable to the extent that it has social repercussions. This is the same as saying to the extent that it influences other members of society, i.e. to the extent that it is inclusive. The same criterion operates when we are dealing with a group and not an individual: i.e. quantity in terms of the number of members, quality in terms of its effects or social repercussions. In this sense it is quite possible to assert a particular dialectical relationship (not generalized) between quantity and quality: this is detected through quantity. Deep down the underlying supposition which maintains the inclusivity principle is that which states that the basic unit of the system is the individual as a person. Therefore, it is a unit which is the subject and not the object of the system; the system exists for the subject, not the reverse. It presumes, thus, that in principle all men are equal. Not that they are all naturally the same (a child isn't the same as an adult, etc.) but rather that they have equality of opportunity to fulfill themselves as persons. This is the equality contemplated in the inclusivity principle and which allows the satisfaction of the needs of all the members of society.

Let us commence by observing that the resolution of the contradictions at an ideal level falls within the area of meta-empirics and this will not be dealt with now (it is an utopian world: a classless society, the millennium, paradise, etc.). But if we move from the ideal to the real we find ourselves at the center of a new dialectical relationship, that of Demands-Supports. It will be remembered that the political supports (PS) are “the resources which are introduced into, or held by, the transforming subsystem to select, decide and implement the public goals to be carried out”, i.e. they are “the determining and implementing *energies* of the system”. This idea that the supports are the energies to determine and implement Public Goals gives rise to the fact that in order for every Political Demand to be converted into Public Goal such determining and implementing energies are required.²⁹ On the other hand, as the Political Demands are introduced into the system by the various units composing it, it is those units which are interested that their Political Demands be implemented. Thus, it will also be those units which will struggle to accompany the Political Demands with energies, in the form of resources, in order to achieve their acceptance and implementation in the system. In general terms, this suggests the need to introduce the notion of an index or *efficiency principle* which characterizes the Demand-Support relationship. This principle can be formulated as follows: *the level of effectiveness of Political Demand depends on the level of agreement between Political Demand and Political Support*. It is in this agreement, or more generally, in this efficiency principle that the resolution of the dialectical opposition between Demands and Supports is to be found.

The previous comments indicate the way in which the units, each one separately, attempt to resolve the problem of the contradictions of PD in the whole system i.e. by simply attempting to reinforce, to adequately ‘underpin’ its demands with important and valuable supports. These supports may, of course, arise amongst the demanders themselves, who then attempt “to inject them” into the transforming subsystem (T); or, they may also arise from within the transforming subsystem (on the one hand thanks to the resources that this system has already accumulated, and on the other hand, thanks to the fact that the member of T are, in addition to being members of T, also members of CR, –the circuit– i.e. they are also demanders). This takes place when

²⁹ As will be remembered, we refer to the determining energies as input-resources and to the implementing energies as output-resources.

the transforming subsystem allots some of the resources available to it to one Political Demand or another. Thus, it is the capacity of the units for mobilizing resources, both within and without the transforming sub-system, which determines whether there is greater or lesser agreement between their Political Demands and Political Supports.³⁰ However, *up until present, we have seen only the way each unit attempts to resolve its own particular contradiction clearly but not the general contradictions of the system. We now have to deal with this last problem; this we will do by beginning with a very serious point which emerges when we relate these last reflections to previous ideas.*

We refer to the marked discrepancy which arises when we relate the efficiency principle to the inclusivity principle or, more particularly, to what this last principle revealed to us. Alternatively, we could say that the problem arises in relating what has been discovered through our discussion of the specification, with what has been hitherto discovered in our discussion of the contradiction. *It will be remembered that as regards integration, the non-specified notion of Political Demand was specified as Popular Political Demand, with the help of the inclusivity principle. This means to say that it is the Popular Political Demand which obtains the highest grades on the scale of integration and which, therefore, requires most strongly a greater effort in order to be brought closer to Public Goals so that an increase in integration can be spoken of. Now, if we consider this in relationship with the efficiency principle the result will be that so as to be brought closer (PPD and PG) it is necessary for the PPD to be those with the best level of agreement with the PS (Political Supports) i.e. it should be those that have the greatest capacity to mobilize resources both within and without the transforming subsystem.* At least this is what can be derived from the concepts themselves, despite the fact that the realities in the majority of the countries of the first, second and third worlds show dramatically that it does not yet occur in this way. It is precisely here that the marked discrepancy to which we alluded appears.³¹

³⁰ We must not forget that there are mechanisms that obstacularize, deviate and decrease the supports, and also the demands; we will not analyze these mechanisms now because it is not necessary for our argument. For our argument, what remains as a result after those decreases etc. is sufficient.

³¹ In passing, a theoretical observation could be pertinent: while the theory of 'the political' centers on the analysis of power and its centers of concentration, problems such as those we are dealing with now will pass completely unperceived.

Nevertheless, despite the fact that an analysis of the majority of countries may show that this does not yet take place in them, it is decisive that the logical strength of the concepts impose themselves and consequently impose on us the disturbing consequences which arise not only through the theory but also through political praxis (this is even more disturbing!). *In order for integration to be a reality and not a benign name cloaking the evil reality of structural domination, the first task for integration is to close the gap between Popular Political Demands and Political Supports or, more generally, between the inclusivity and the efficiency principles.* Moreover it is important to note here that although we are dealing with political integration (but understanding the 'political' as public goals), *it is impossible to make a radical separation between political integration and other types of integration, such as economic, social, etc. To the extent (which is great) that these last types of integration are, or incorporate, public goals they will, to that extent, fall within the same definitional criteria of political integration and must also be judged through them.* Our reflections on some of the aforementioned consequences, however, will be included in the final part of this work. Nevertheless, prior to this it is necessary for us to reconsider an unsettled point, using the elements already at our disposal. That is to say, the problem of how to proceed from the solution of the particular contradictions existing in the system to the general contradictions of that system.

Given what has already been said it is obvious that there is a need for the Popular Political Demands to construct its own Supports. However, we have closely analyzed the first aspect of the Popular Political Demand, i.e. Political Demand, but not the second aspect, Popular (PPD). If we begin to reflect on the 'popular' aspect of the PPD we see, on the one hand, that the popular sector, as a demanding unit and in the context of previous considerations, still relates to particular units (frequently many and still divided). Nevertheless, when delving deeper it can be seen that *logically the same concept incorporates already within itself the 'general', in that a deeper consideration of the concept reveals the interchangeability between the 'popular' and the 'inclusive'. Precisely as regards the incorporation of the greatest possible number of members of the system and even of the 'public' used in our definition of the 'po-*

Moreover, a place for them does not even exist as, deep down, one is dealing here with a point where an enormous and constant in the pathological sense of the en-
demical vacuum of power exists.

litical', —on which these concepts are based. Thus, by definition, these concepts are, in certain respects, substitutes, one for the other. *At the conceptual level this means to say that it is the 'popular' (the unit P, the subject P) which is the only factor truly capable of resolving the general contradictions of the system. (Consider the very important consequences that this would have for the unity of third world countries, and of these countries with the 'popular' levels of the first and second worlds.)*

The acceptance of the logical strength of this conceptual level could, in itself, *lead to priority being given in political theory as well as political praxis, to the relationship between the inclusivity and the efficiency principles. It could, thus, inaugurate a new political phase for human society, a phase that would see the Popular Political Demands playing the principal role in the totality due to an original construction of its Political Supports. The general contradiction would then also be resolved at a real level.*

Epilogue: integration and politicization

However, let us note that we have said “the acceptance. . . of this conceptual level”, and acceptance does not depend on science, but on man. Science, once accepted at its conceptual level can, based on its conceptual conclusions, still offer *the hypothetical construction of a program, a strategy*. By way of an epilogue, *this final part of the paper will be dedicated to outlining the starting point for some of the possible guidelines of this strategy.*

At the outset it should be noted that this part of the paper, on the one hand, subsumes various of the points made in the course of our work and, on the other hand, is grounded —in addition to other central notions managed— in the very notion of the ‘political’ as public goals. Moreover, it is organized and offered in terms of heuristic science, i.e. science organized as a body of hypothetical-stimulative search propositions, the only proof or validation of which is demonstrated in the results obtained and whose method is the logically controlled exploration impulse.

In concrete terms, *this part of the work is developed from and around an extreme and bipolar hypothesis*. The first and principal part of the hypothesis is as follows: that all social life constantly exists with a *panpoliticization dynamic* (a pervasive tendency to politicize all social aspects —understanding politicize to mean the determination and im-

plementation of public goals) which responds to the need to conserve and perpetuate social life; thus, that dynamic is the vital principle of the social as such. It is a source of inclusivity in the sense that it manifests a constant tendency towards the formulation of *ever more public* goals (those which respond to needs which include a greater number of "beneficiaries"). That is to say, it is a dynamic which is in itself universalizing, a dynamic favoring universalization. In the sense that this inclusion dynamic itself represents a trend which favors all that is beneficial it can, in the last instance, also be referred to as a 'cosmicizing' principle.

However, in the second part or pole of the hypothesis, a social dynamic of counter-politicization also exists which finds its support in the limitation inherent in reality; this is a panfragmenting dynamic that can be referred to as an *exclusivity principle* and, consequently, is the basis itself of the obstacles faced by the first principle; therefore, it would be equivalent to a 'chaoticizing principle'.

So, in order to respond to the question of why the first principle is not fully realized if the panpoliticization dynamic is the origin and source of the very existence of the society, it is necessary to formulate a reply, making use of the second principle in the following way: the atoms or components of the society are individuals or particular groups which, through being conscious of being particular individual beings (i.e. limited in their capabilities) set the second principle in motion as a result of that consciousness. Now, what is of crucial importance to note here is that deep down this setting in motion is a dynamic destined to fail in that it destroys the process tending towards the overcoming of the limitation (source of social life), towards 'cosmicization'. Such a dynamic attempts to give permanence only to the limited aspects, thus producing the illusion of favoring the individual; in reality, however, it only favors the individual to the extent that he still maintains a social link. That is to say, to the extent that he conserves a partial link with and acceptance of the first principle. Thus, the exploitation relationship as such occurs: in order to favor an individual (or particular group) a social relationship situation is created in which the individual (although based on the exclusivity principle, on limitation) depends radically on an external vital principle, the inclusivity principle, the overcoming of limitation. This means to say, a parasitic existence is created. *Thus, it takes advantage of the efficiency of the first principle (the need for the existence of the society) in order to make the survival of the parasitic relationship of the second principle possible.*

Only when one recognizes this fact as a whole will one be in a position to destroy the parasite. Then, doubtlessly one will enter a new and different world; new and different only because there will be no place for fragmentary dynamics; that is to say when, because of a kind of a conservation instinct, there is a “spontaneous” rejection of all particularist dynamics which divide the breadth and realistic extension of the public aspect of any goal. The limitations of reality, in the development stage in which it is found, in any epoch and circumstance would be the only factor authorized to place limits (its own limits) on ‘the public’ of the goals. All the rest which limits them represents an unacceptable regression since it favors the fallen parasite.

Thus, by means of this extreme, radical, bipolar hypothesis all the deviations and obstacles put in the way of the political becoming social life can be seen as strategies of the second principle, *and only as such*. But, in this case *our hypothesis could also be seen as a strategy (to face a strategy, another no less important is required) for detecting all the individualizing, particularizing, parasitic and exploitative tactics. Then the ultimate strength of our bipolar hypothesis would rest in maintaining it firm and intransigent in the following sense: while one can not demonstrate otherwise, all obstacles to panpoliticization favor the parasite, they represent a destruction of, and treachery against, the preservation and perpetuation of society.*

To conclude: a) From the strategic point of view this hypothesis arises not only as a species of ‘panpolitometer’ (i.e. as a register of the panpoliticization dynamic) but, more importantly, as an ‘antipolitometer’, as a gauge of the antipoliticization particularistic dynamic. Or, even more correctly, and including the two aspects in a single term, it can be seen as a ‘politoscope’,³² as a powerful lens useful for observing, even in infinitesimal measures, the tendency favoring or obstacularizing efficient politicization (that of the inclusive, universalizing, ‘cosmicizing’ dynamic).

b) From the notional point of view it will now be unnecessary to insist that it is not difficult to see that *panpoliticization is the effective, practical road towards a powerful integration.*³³ *To the same degree,*

³² Excuse the abuse of so many neologisms and use the model in them.

³³ It is almost obvious, although we will not go into detail now, that a panpoliticizing method, *par excellence*, is the theoretical and practical handling of Popular Political Demands.

panpoliticization would offer a clear criterion of the level of integration achieved. Lastly, in view of all that has been commented on until now, when speaking of integration we are able justly to include all types of integration and not only political integration. In this sense we can conclude with the following formula which offers us a new synthesis: *panpoliticization = panintegration*.

National Integration of the Peasantry: the Case of Japan

Harushige Yamasaki

The national integration of the peasantry may be defined as a process in which the peasants, while more or less preserving their subsistence economy, their traditional way of life and the limited relations with the outside world which these imply, and who thus constitute a relatively isolated microcosm of rural society, are involved in and subordinated to the dynamics of a broader social system formulated as a nation state. It is necessary to distinguish economic, political, social, and cultural aspects of the integration process, and to examine the interrelations among these aspects. This process implies, naturally, the transformation of the peasants themselves, since they are now exposed economically, politically, socially, and culturally, to various influences from the broader system in which they are being involved. The differentiation of the peasant into those who are able to adapt themselves to new circumstances and those who are not able to do so is inevitably promoted by these influences.

Throughout the process of national integration of the peasantry, we must distinguish two opposing factors: the integrating forces or the integrators, and the subject of the integration, i.e. peasantry. The main integrator is the nation state, or to specify more concretely, the government of a nation state striving for national integration under its hegemony. The mechanism of the capitalist economy is one of the most powerful integrating forces not only in the economic aspect of the process, but also in the others. Nonetheless, in so far as this mechanism is affected by governmental policies and is integrated as a subsystem into a more comprehensive social system formulated as a nation state, we should assume the nation state as the main integrator.¹

¹ In my scheme, the political forces striving for mobilization of the peasantry in order to oppose the governmental policies of the time and to seize the

In so far as a nation state implies class antagonism within it, the policies of the government for national integration are led by particular interests of the ruling class or group. The ruling elite and their government monopolize the symbol of the nation, and impose the policies and institutions for national integration on the peasantry.

The peasants are the fundamentally passive factor in the process of national integration, because of their intrinsic character. Nonetheless, the peasantry have to respond to the imposed integration policy in some manner, since national integration means for the peasants the destruction of their way of life maintained for a long time. Whatever way they respond to the integration policy is one of the decisive factors in the integration process. The attitude of the peasantry towards the national integration policy may be classified roughly as (1) evasion, (2) resistance, (3) passive adaptation, (4) positive adaptation. These types of attitude are not exclusive to each other. It is likely that the attitudes of the peasantry differ in each of the above mentioned aspects of the integration process. For instance, the peasants may stubbornly resist the cultural integration, while they try to adapt themselves to the new economic circumstances. Moreover, we have to take into consideration that the growing economic and social differentiation of the peasantry may result in different responses according to their differing status, and this may in turn accelerate the differentiation. The type of the response of the peasantry to the integration policy depends not only on the historically determined social character of the peasantry in a country, but also depends on the character of the integration policy, including the form of its execution by the government, and its degree of fitness to the real social situation in the country. And if the applied policy does not fit reality, the government, in turn, has to respond to the response of the peasantry. Whether this response appears as suppressive or concessive depends once again on the character of the government and on the ability of the peasantry to adapt or to resist.

In this way, the state and the peasantry are two main variables in the process of the national integration of the peasantry. The peculiar course of the national integration of the peasantry in each country is determined by the characters of these two variables and by their interaction.

state power are excluded from the integrating forces. These forces should be qualified as the potential integrator. In an advanced stage of national integration, a struggle between the real integrator and the potential integrator challenging the course pursued by the former may take place.

In Japan, the process of national integration of the peasantry took place intensely, in all of the above mentioned aspects, during a short period of approximately forty years, from the Meiji Restoration in 1868 until the beginning of the twentieth century, though the conditions for this rapid accomplishment had been provided in a socio-economic development during the preceding period, i.e. the Tokugawa period. This rapid advance in the national integration of the peasantry after the Meiji Restoration is closely related to the fact that among the Asian countries of the time, Japan alone was able to proceed towards industrialization and new military power in the imperialist world.

The national integration process of the peasantry in Japan represents an exceptional case, because of its rapidity and thoroughness. Japan was fortunate to have exceptionally favorable conditions for national integration, as will be discussed below, when she was confronted with a task of national integration in the second half of the nineteenth century. However, the case of Japan may serve as a model of an extreme form of the national integration of the peasantry, and thus as a point of reference in studying the process of the national integration of peasantry in the other countries.

In this paper I will briefly examine first, how thoroughly national integration of the peasantry was carried out in Japan in the early stage of her development as a nation state, and second, the factors which enabled Japan to accomplish such rapid and through national integration of the peasantry.

I. The process of national integration of the peasantry

1) At the starting point of the conscious endeavor towards national integration in Japan, there was a serious sense of national crisis among some members of various social groups. This sense, which played a decisive role in determining the course and the outcome of the political turmoil in the final stage of the Tokugawa period, had been brought about by the pressure from the Western powers and by Japan's self-cognizance of her, technological and military backwardness. Therefore, the most urgent task for the new leaders of the Meiji government which emerged as victor if this political upheaval, was to defend the political and economic independence of Japan against expanding Western powers. In order to achieve this, many radical reforms were necessary. Driven by the sense of national crisis, they could not hesitate in carrying out radical reforms, though many of them originated from the lower strata of the *Samurai* class.

The leaders of the Meiji government recognized clearly that not only the concentration of all power in the hands of the government, but also the establishment of a well-organized administrative system, reaching down to the village level, were reforming measures necessary to overcome their backwardness. After the Restoration, i.e. the transfer of state power from the Tokugawa shogunate to the new government under the authority of *Tenno*, the new government began to strive for the establishment of a highly centralized local administrative system, and were able to achieve this by the end of 1880's, immediately before the promulgation of the Imperial Constitution in 1890.

Two hundred sixty-one *Hans* (feudal domains) which had constituted practically independent political bodies under the Tokugawa regime were replaced by forty-six prefectures forming local administrative districts of the centralized system of government. The governor of each prefecture was nominated by the government from amongst its bureaucrats, and the administration of the prefectures was put under the complete control of the government.

The *Mura* (village) was reorganized as the smallest unit of administrative organization, entrusted with many administrative functions and strictly superintended in their precise execution by the government and the prefecture. In an effort to improve administration efficiency at the local level, the government enforced the merger of several Muras into enlarged new ones. The mergers were conducted so thoroughly all over the country that the number of Muras was reduced from 74,479 in 1883 to 15,820 in 1889. This fact illustrates how positively the government exercised its power in order to establish its administrative organization at village level.

At the same time the government was striving to construct a national infrastructure, such as railway, postal and telegraph systems, and this infrastructure played a significant role not only in general economic growth and in the involvement of the peasantry into the market economy, but also in establishing the physical basis of the centralized administrative organizations.

In this way, even the peasants in mountain villages and on small islands were brought under the control of the highly centralized administrative organization. The village offices were the fundamental footholds for the government in executing various measures which aimed at the national integration of the peasantry.

2) Giving high priority to education, the Meiji government introduced the compulsory education system in 1872. The rate of attend-

ance was no more than thirty percent of the total number of children of school age at the beginning of the system, but exceeded ninety percent by 1906, a level as high as that of the most advanced European countries of the day. Such a rapid popularization of primary education owed a great deal to the established local administrative organization.

The compulsory primary education system served as a powerful weapon in implanting a common national consciousness in the people, because primary education in pre-war Japan was characterized by powerful government control and thoroughgoing indoctrination in Tenno worship and other authorized morals formulated in the Imperial Rescript on Education in 1890. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, school children all over the country were taught with identical texts compiled by the Ministry of Education, by qualified teachers indoctrinated in official ideology in the Normal schools established by the prefectures.

At the same time, the spread of education among the peasantry assisted their adaptation to the market economy and enhanced their social mobility.

3) The conscription system, introduced in 1873, also functioned as a powerful weapon for national integration.²

The Conscription Act of 1873 contained, however, many exemption clauses, including redemption, because the needs of the standing army were not at that point so large for it to be necessary to conscript a large proportion of the eligible youth. Thus, the principle of universal obligatory military service remained nominal for a time. Nonetheless, by 1889 in order to correspond to rapidly expanding military needs, the exemption clauses were abolished completely and obligatory military service was imposed universally. During the two wars against China and Russia, 1894-95 and 1904-05 respectively, most of the enlisted men were conscripts. Given the militaristic social climate of modern Japan, particularly as intensified by these wars, the fulfilment of one's obligatory military service was considered as a kind of rite of passage before becoming an adult.

The military served as an institution for reinforcing a common national consciousness, Tenno worship and other morals indoctrinated in the schools. Especially for soldiers from the countryside, the military offered an opportunity for close contact with those who came from

² See Herbert E. Norman, *Soldier and Peasant in Japan: The Origin of Conscription*, New York, 1943.

towns and cities, with different occupations and different experiences, and thus served as a factor in enhancing social mobility.

It encouraged and sponsored the organizations of veterans which were eventually united in the Imperial Veterans' Association in 1910. The village branch of the Association, embracing most adult men, was an important social organization in the village and served to propagate and reinforce militaristic ideas at the village level.

4) Concerning the peasant economy, the most important institutional reform was the land tax reform carried out from 1873 to 1880. This reform aimed at completely revising the land tax system, inherited from the previous regime, because the actual rate of land tax had varied from one Han to another, and because the payment of taxes in kind was incompatible with a modern fiscal system.

The reform consisted of transforming the ambiguous usufruct rights of the peasantry under the feudal regime into exclusive private property, and commuting the land tax in kind formerly paid to the Han into a land tax in cash paid to the new central government at a uniform rate based on the evaluated worth of each parcel.

The land tax reform was a long and complicated effort, because in order to accomplish it every parcel in the country had to be measured, evaluated, and a document which certified landownership and settled the amount of tax to be paid by the owner had to be issued for each one. Because of the extreme subdivision of land into very small parcels, the number of documents issued exceeded 110 million. In addition, this work encountered the vigorous resistance of peasants seeking a lower tax on their land.³ The fact that this huge and complicated job was accomplished within seven years may serve as an indication of the degree of capability of the administrative organization.

The land tax reform was concerned only with settling the amount of tax for each parcel and identifying the owner who was responsible for payment of the tax, and did not touch upon tenancy relations. These had expanded gradually since the end of the seventeenth century, promoted mainly by rising productivity in agriculture and the intrusion of a money economy into the traditional peasant economy. The land tax reform had the effect of expanding tenancy even more rapidly than before. In the first place, the commutation of the land tax from pay-

³ Confronted by many peasant uprisings opposing the land tax reform, the government was forced to reduce the projected tax rate of 30% to 2.5% in 1877.

ment in kind to cash payments brought new economic difficulties for the peasants, particularly those in economically less developed areas, since it exposed them to fluctuations in the price of rice and to exploitation by merchants. Secondly, with the establishment of private land-ownership, the land fulfilled the necessary and sufficient conditions to be treated as a commodity, since the complete removal of feudal restriction of the transactions and mortgage of land encouraged the entry of commercial and usury capital into land transactions.

A sharp turn in the economic situation took place in 1881, converting the galloping inflation of the 1870's into serious deflation by a drastic reduction in the amount of inconvertible paper money in circulation. This economic depression profoundly affected the peasant economy which was being drawn into the market economy. Thus, many peasants fell into debt and eventually were wholly or partially deprived of their land by official auction resulting from their neglect to pay the land tax, or by foreclosure.

5) The decades immediately following the 1860's were a painful transitional period for the peasant economy, because its involvement in the market economy was rapidly accelerated during this time by several successive factors.

The first factor was the expanding foreign trade which did fatal damage to some of the important commercial crops such as cotton, sugar cane, and indigo, while on the other hand, opening up a vast overseas market for raw silk and tea. The second was the effects of the land tax reform referred to above. The third was the construction of modern transportation facilities, particularly the railway, and the fourth was the start of industrialization.

The government had to make various efforts to assist the peasantry in their difficult task of adapting to a market economy, because the failure of the peasant to adapt might cause political and social unrest in the countryside, and also might create obstacles to economic development.

The most significant of the government's efforts was the promotion of the agricultural association (*Nokai*) as an organization for the improvement of farming methods. Beginning at the end of the 1880's the government tried to mobilize the village leaders who were striving spontaneously for the propagation of advanced farming methods, and to encourage them to organize the villagers into agricultural associations. Under the powerful sponsorship of the government and the prefectures, the organization of the associations spread so rapidly that by 1910 one

had been organized in every village, and this grew into a huge pyramidal organization with prefectural federations and the Imperial Agricultural Association at its top. Being subsidized by the government and the prefectures, this organization played the role of organizer for the agricultural cooperatives which began to develop after 1910 also under powerful sponsorship from the government. Although biased towards the interests of the landowners and the upper layer of owner-cultivators, this organization began to function as a pressure group for agricultural interests, as it expanded to constitute a huge national organization. In this way, the organization contributed to the national integration of the peasantry not only economically, but also politically.

The strategy of the government to give high priority to the establishment of an institutional infrastructure, such as the agricultural associations,⁴ and to utilize it as a channel for propagating advanced farming methods among the peasant masses, turned out to be successful.

Estimation of the growth rate of Japanese agriculture in its early stage caused a prolonged debate.⁵ However, according to the latest and most reliable estimation,⁶ the annual real growth rates of agricultural production were 1.8% and 2.0% for 1880-1900 and 1900-1920 respectively. This considerably high growth rate of agricultural production indicates the increasing productivity on small family farms, since Japanese agriculture lacked completely big capitalist farms. Moreover, production of commercial agricultural products such as cocoons, tea, fruit, and vegetables⁷ increased at a rate higher than the average, while many rural, small-scale industries such as silk reeling, silk and cotton

⁴ Besides the agricultural association, the government strove for the establishment of institutions for agricultural education and technological extension service.

⁵ Kazushi Ohkawa and Henry Rosovsky, "The Role of the Agriculture in Modern Japanese Economic Development," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, Vol. IX, No. 2, 1960; James I. Nakamura, *Agricultural Production and the Economic Development of Japan 1873-1922*, Princeton, 1966. See also Kazushi Ohkawa, Bruce Johnston, and Hiromitsu Kaneda (eds.), *Agriculture and Economic Growth: Japan's Experience*, Tokyo, 1969.

⁶ Kazushi Ohkawa, Moyohei Shinohara, and Mataji Umemura (eds.), *Estimates of Long-Term Economic Statistics of Japan Since 1868, Vol. 9, Agriculture and Forestry*, Tokyo, 1966.

⁷ Some sorts of fruit and vegetables, for instance apples and cabbages were introduced after the Meiji Restoration.

weaving,⁸ and manufacturing of many miscellaneous goods, a certain part of which was exported, were developing steadily, offering a supplementary source of cash income for peasant families. On the other hand, migration of poor peasants and their family members as wage laborers or domestic servants was increasing, as the other pole of the differentiation of the peasantry. They provided an inexhaustible source of cheap labor for developing modern industries. Nonetheless, the development of commercial agriculture and rural indigenous industries indicate that a certain part of the peasantry proceeded along the painful road of adaptation to the rapidly developing capitalist economy.

This adaptation of the peasantry had its historical premise. Commercial agriculture had already begun to develop spontaneously from within the peasantry since the second half of the Tokugawa period. Nonetheless, we cannot deny the effects of the government policy which gave high priority to the establishment of the institutional infrastructure.

However, the success of peasants' adaptation meant that the peasantry were put institutionally under the control of the government and were made to depend constantly upon its tutelage.

II. The favorable conditions for national integration of the peasantry

What kind of factors enabled Japan to achieve such a rapid and thorough national integration of the peasantry?

1) The most decisive factors in the process of national integration is the role of the nation state as integrator. The rapid achievement of national integration may be impossible to attain without correctly oriented, systematic efforts on the part of a state apparatus which recognize properly both the importance and the difficulties of its task.

Nevertheless, there are a certain number of prerequisites in achieving the national integration of the peasantry, for instance the development to some degree of the means of transportation and communication, an increase in agricultural productivity to an extent which provides the peasant economy with a certain amount of marketable surplus and so on. If these prerequisites are not present in sufficient numbers even the

⁸ Cotton-spinning, which had been an important rural industry in the Tokugawa period, was 'gradually ousted' first by imported cotton yarn and later by the domestic cotton yarn manufactured in big factories. However, cotton weaving did continue mainly as a small rural industry.

most enthusiastic efforts of the state may fail, encountering too many obstacles, or cause serious social tension between the state, as the integrator, and the peasantry as the subject of integration.

In the case of Japan, there is no doubt that the new Meiji government played its role as integrator powerfully and skillfully. It recognized clearly the strategic importance of achieving national integration at the critical moment of its involvement in the world arena and pursued this goal consistently. It was able to choose appropriate policies for national integration, and to develop a comprehensive and systematic program for it. Furthermore, it was able to set up a centralized administrative organization which extended down to the remotest and smallest villages, and also was able to secure, by means of this organization, the strict execution of its policies to such an extent that it has been charged with too rigid centralism, conformism, and authoritarianism until today.

However, such a good performance by the government in its role as integrator would have been impossible if the prerequisites for national integration had not been prepared before the conscious efforts towards integration began. The marked ability of the government and its administrative organization was itself the result of processes taking place during the preceding period, i.e. the Tokugawa period.

2) The socio-economic developments of the Tokugawa period cannot be here discussed in detail,⁹ and only brief remarks will be made regarding some significant points closely related to the topic.

a) The social regime of the Tokugawa period was composed of some two hundred and sixty feudal domains (*Han*), and the Tokugawa shogunate, as the largest feudal lord, exerted institutionally strict, though not perfect, control over them. This system can be characterized as centralized feudalism.¹⁰ Corresponding to this political structure, nationwide network of commerce, finance, transportation, and communication were developing.

b) While remaining the basic political unit, the feudal domains were undergoing a high degree of regional integration. At the beginning of the Tokugawa period the *Samurai*, who had been direct rulers of the

⁹ See John W. Hall and Marius B. Jansen (eds.), *Studies in the Institutional History of Early Modern Japan*, Princeton, 1968. Concerning the social and economic change of the countryside in the Tokugawa period, see Thomas C. Smith, *The Agrarian Origins of Modern Japan*, Stanford, 1959.

¹⁰ Sakae Tsunoyama, *A Concise Economic History of Modern Japan*, Colombo, 1965.

peasants, were forced to leave their fiefs and to live around the castle of their patrol-lord. Thus a castle-town, with a considerable population composed of Samurai and their servants, merchants, and artisans, was formed in each Han. The formation of these regional urban centers stimulated the commercialization of agriculture, the development of various rural industries, and both the permanent and temporary urban migration by members of peasant families. The fact that population density in the Japanese countryside had already reached a considerably high level, sustained by the intensive cultivation of rice, facilitated close economic and social intercourse between the castle-town as regional centers and the surrounding villages.

On the other hand, the foundation of effective administrative organization was needed in order to secure the control of the peasantry by the castle-town where the feudal ruling class was living. Thus the Samurai, the former warriors, were transformed into the bureaucrats of the Han administration, while some representatives of the village communities were institutionalized as agents of the Han administration and made responsible for the execution of various instructions from above. In this way, Samurai administrators and village officials were accumulating the administrative experience and knowledge without which the rapid establishment of centralized administrative organization after the Meiji Restoration would have been more difficult.

In short, regional integration on the scale of the Hans, which were small neither in area nor population, occurred as an important step towards integration on a broader, national scale.

c) The two hundred and sixty years of the Tokugawa period had been relatively peaceful. Until the last stages of the period, which began with the arrival of Admiral Perry's fleet in 1853, there had been neither alien threat nor civil war. The political stability of this period contributed favorably not only to economic development, but also to the accumulation of intellectual ability among the people.

The development of educational and cultural facilities in the castle-town was not irrelevant to the peasantry. Although the spread of education to the peasant masses was not to be achieved until after the Meiji Restoration, Japanese villages in the last stage of the Tokugawa period had already provided themselves with some well-educated leaders from the upper strata of villagers. They were to play an important role as mediators between the state as integrator and the peasant mass as the subject of integration.

d) One of the factors contributing to the political stability of the

Tokugawa period was the seclusion policy adopted shortly after the establishment of the Tokugawa shogunate. While on the one hand the seclusion retarded the development of Japanese society in various aspects, by its retreat into isolation from the world, on the other hand it enabled Japan to pursue spontaneous development without being disturbed by alien influence.

Japan is an archipelago located at the eastern most extremity of the Eurasian continent. Separated from the continent by sea, Japan was able to avoid military invasion from the great empires on the continent, yet she was able at the same time to absorb the high civilization of the continent if she wished. Thus Japan was able to develop as a uni-racial country, and did not suffer from deep cultural or religious divisions among her people. This racial, cultural, and religious homogeneity was maintained and intensified by the seclusion, and served as a very favorable condition for political and economic integration when the need to shape that integration emerged as an urgent task.

3) A significant factor which enabled the government to pursue its policies for the national integration of the peasantry successfully was that the government was able to find a group receptive to its policies inside the village. Most of those who played the role of the intermediate receivers of governmental policies oriented to the peasantry, of mediators between the government and the peasant mass, belonged to the stratum of wealthy peasants known as Gono, which means literally "big peasant." The term Gono was employed to signify those peasants who held more land, of which a part was being rented out, while the remainder was still being cultivated by their families, sometimes supplemented by a few hired workers. As such, the Gono was an intermediate and transitional stratum between the ordinary owner-cultivators and the large landowners renting out their land wholly or in a large part.

The Gono represented one pole in the differentiation of the peasantry under the penetration of the market economy. They were being differentiated from the ordinary peasants not only economically, but also intellectually. As Thomas C. Smith pointed out, the Gono in the last century of the Tokugawa period "read widely, and took a lively and intelligent interest in affairs far removed from events in the village. Such men occupied an intellectual world very different from that of the ordinary peasant."¹¹ The fact that Japanese rural society had come to

¹¹ Smith, *op.cit.* p. 178.

differentiate such a social group, which was able to respond sensitively to various stimuli from the outside world prior to the beginning of the political and economic turbulence that led eventually to the Meiji Restoration, has a decisive meaning for the process of national integration on the peasantry.

The Gono's growing positivity and their endeavors to adapt themselves to the changing outside world were stimulated intensely by the overall social changes after the Meiji Restoration. Their intellectual interest was expanding rapidly, and their active energy was being emitted in various directions. Utilizing their interest in and ability to understand affairs far removed from the village, the government was able in general to secure their sympathy and faith in its political program for national integration. Nonetheless, some of them participated actively in the "Liberty and People's Rights Movement", the first popular political movement in Japan, which demanded a Constitution and Diet as protection against authoritarian government, and had been inspired by the newly introduced Western political ideas of liberty and democracy.

However, the most common activity of the Gono in the early Meiji period was economic. They labored, for example, to introduce new varieties of rice, new commercial crops such as tea, advanced farming methods such as ploughing by horse and drainage of paddy fields; to promote sericulture and the silk reeling industry; to improve indigenous industries; to promote saving, and so on. The remarkable feature of their economic activity was that it aimed to promote the adaptation of the village community as a whole to the changing economic circumstance rather than constituting a personal endeavor for wealth, and thus their activity can be considered to have been characterized by community-oriented leadership.

The reason why this type of leadership emerged should be sought in the social character of the Gono. Although among the Gono there were many who "occupied an intellectual world very different from that of the ordinary peasant," the Gono as cultivating landowners were different from the commercial and usury capitalists who acquired land but related to the village from outside, and still preserved close ties with the village community in which they were living. They were still the acknowledged leaders of the village community and did not separate themselves from it. Although the accelerating differentiation of the peasantry was gradually bringing about an explicit opposition of the poor to the rich, and the tenant to the landowner, a fierce and pervasive sense of solidarity was still the most important characteristic of the

Japanese village and had not yet broken down. Thus, when the changing economic and social circumstances made it necessary for the village community to adapt, the Gono, as the acknowledged leader of the village community and with a sense of solidarity towards it, undertook the role of organizer and promoter in modernizing the village toward the adaptation.

Without these community-oriented activities of the Gono, the rapid propagation of the agricultural associations, for instance, would have been difficult. Yet in effect the most active Gono had already begun a spontaneous movement to organize meetings and associations for studying advanced farming methods before the government began its effort to promote the agricultural associations. The effort of the government to mobilize its administrative organization for an overall propagation of the agricultural associations proved effective precisely because the goal of improved farming methods was widely held among the Gono. In addition, the thorough indoctrination of the peasantry with the official ideology became more feasible via the indoctrination of the village leaders as the primary receivers of this ideology, charged with the subsequent indoctrination of their followers.

The successful national integration of the peasantry thus became possible when the government, pursuing consistently that goal via a well-organized administrative system, was able to find active and influential community leaders and succeeded in integrating them as effective mediators between the government and the peasant mass in pursuit of its program of national integration.

4) Nevertheless, the Gono was by nature a transitional social stratum. Involved more and more closely and firmly with the social mechanism of rapidly developing capitalism, the Gono themselves were differentiating; some of them because parasite landowners or rural bourgeoisie, while others sank to being small owner-cultivators or even tenants. Through this differentiation, the community-oriented leadership of Gono was retreating, while tenants, affected by the rising trade union movement and other social changes, began to awaken to class consciousness and to organize themselves in tenant-unions which articulated their economic demands for lower rent and their social and political demands for human rights, universal suffrage, etc. The political mobilization by the tenants against the established order of the village, and the government which backed this order, began immediately after the First World War, and signified the beginning of a new phase in Japanese rural society.

Comment
Ciro F.S. Cardoso

Professor Yamasaki's paper on the national integration of Japanese peasantry between the Meiji Restoration and the first years of the 20th century provides a broad and adequate survey of the mechanism and factors of such a process. I quite agree with the definition he gives of this national integration, as a process of involvement in and subordination to "the dynamics of a broader social system formulated as a nation state". We could perhaps add: to an industrial capitalist nation state.

On other hand, I have two main points of disagreement to put forward. The first one is related to the concept of "peasantry". Although the paper does not provide a formal definition of peasantry, in my opinion the concept suggested by the text is insufficient. The elements given as characteristic of the peasantry are too loose and, as I think, secondary:

- 1) a subsistence economy;
- 2) a traditional way of life;
- 3) a limited intercourse with the outside world, "thus constituting a relatively isolated 'world' of rural society".

These three elements may well disappear and yet a peasantry, recognizable as such, still exists.

It is, of course, extremely difficult to give a definition of "peasantry" applicable to the very different periods and societies in which some type of "peasant" is supposed to have existed. Anyway, I think that one of the purposes of this seminar is to try and approach this problem. So I shall hazard, not exactly to define, but merely to mention the factors or elements that, in my opinion, *all* peasantries share:

- 1) a certain amount of structural autonomy concerning the process of production; very high in the case of peasants-landowners, very low under a feudal system, but never absent: I do not think it is useful to call "peasants" people who are really rural employees or rural workers, as some Latin American authors do (Anibal Quijano, Giorgio Alberti, etc.);

- 2) stable access to the continual use of land, through property —private or communal—, or though several possible forms of arrangement between landlords and peasants;

- 3) family labor as a central feature, even if, in certain cases, other laborers may be employed in supplement.

A great amount of structural variation is still possible, naturally, even if these elements are accepted as common to all "peasantries".

The second point of disagreement concerns the form in which the role of the state as integrator is presented as "the most decisive factor in the process of national integration".

The state appears then as an entity in itself, related to Japanese society from the outside, as if situated above the class structure of the country. I do believe in a very important degree of autonomy of the political-institutional sphere, but not in its total independence from the society. The author himself points out, very justly, that: "The marked ability of the government and its administrative organization was itself the result of processes taking place during the preceding period, that is the Tokugawa period". But in the text it is not at all clear what classes, class fractions or class alliance brought about, according to the author, the reforms of the last decades of the 19th century, giving sense to the new organization of the state and assuring a social base to the new project of an almost totally reshaped society.

The first part of the paper deals with the process of national integration of the peasantry, its mechanisms of several sorts (political, institutional, ideological, economic, etc.). The second part seeks to explain the success and rapidity of this process by presenting the factors or conditions which enabled Japan to carry out such a thorough transformation. All that is very convincing and interesting, the second part in particular.

The two aspects which I find most interesting are: 1) the effects of the urbanization which took place under the Tokugawa regime; 2) the importance of the wealthy peasants or *gônô* for the spread of changes in the countryside during the early Meiji period.

The rapid growth of Japanese cities began at the end of the 16th century, under the Oda, Toyotomi and then under the early Tokugawa period. This process is now better known, and it is certainly a very striking one: in less than a century, more than one hundred cities of several kinds, with very different types of population and class structures, grew from former villages, completely changing the economic and social structures of the country: military and administrative cities like Edo, peopled mostly by *samurai*; commercial cities like Osaka; while the ancient imperial city of Kyoto maintained its traditional cultural and religious importance and developed also commercially.

It could be interesting to compare the potentialities of change of a feudal structure, with the peasant family plot as a base over which a class of landowners exploiters can establish itself, with those of a rural structure such as that of colonial and early 19th century Spanish Amer-

ica, based on big estates worked by slaves or by dependent laborers without any stable access to land use. Even in those countries where the Indian or *ladino* communities and their communal lands did legally exist, it was as a secondary or residual feature. In these conditions, the spread of commercial relations could never lead to the emergence of a dynamic group similar to the Japanese *gônô*; and village solidarity was not really a social factor of paramount importance. So, even if countries like Mexico, Guatemala or El Salvador, roughly at the same time as Meiji Japan, knew quite radical processes of capitalist change, called the "liberal reforms", which destroyed the structural remainders of the colonial period, the project of society which gave sense to these changes reflected a very different social structure. Under the leadership of mostly rural and commercial bourgeoisies, without the possibility of a process of rapid and thorough industrialization comparable to Japan's, what the Latin American liberal reforms did was not to integrate the peasantry to the national community, but to destroy or weaken it as a peasantry, keeping the popular masses in general from participating in the benefits of what is called "modernization".

Cooperativism and its Role in the Disintegration of the Peasantry

Ursula Oswald

The present paper discusses cooperativism in the agricultural sector, taking into account the integration-disintegration dynamic. This leads us to pose the following question: integration-disintegration, for whom and for what reason? From the outset this question leads to a fundamental dichotomy, specifically expressed in this work as the opposition between the popular and the elitist sectors.

In the particular case dealt with in this paper we include within the term "popular" those peasant workers who lack specialization apart from the traditional cultivation of maize. These for both the basis of the cooperative and the base of the village itself as they include independent agriculturalists (individual "ejidatarios"¹) who continue to produce individually in order to satisfy their own subsistence needs, marketing only the surplus. In other words, we are concerned with worker peasants (and their families) whose output is directed towards their very survival, that is to say, to satisfy basic needs and vital demands.² The

¹ "Ejido" refers to a collective system of land distribution by the state to a group of peasants. This allotment does not grant ownership but only the right of cultivation. Normally, the assigned land is divided and each peasant receives an individual portion and title. The ejidal land can not be sold or rented but ordinarily it is inherited to the descendants. This pulverizes it with a certain frequency. The person (the ejidatario) loses his right of cultivation and therefore his title when he does not work the land.

² Chombart de Lauwe, Paul-Henry, 1970, "Convergences et controverses sur la genèse des besoins", *Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologie*, 49, pp. 25-36.

1975 a) "Les intérêts contre les besoins: la double nécessité", *La Pensée*, No. 180, Avril, pp. 122-139.

1975 b) "Les sociétés en proie au désir", *Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologie*, Mai, pp. 5-22.

Laswell, H.D. y Kaplan, A., *Power and Society*, Yale, U.P., New Haven, 1950, p. 17.

term *elite* as used in this paper includes those ejidatarios and private livestock owners who have either partially or completely abandoned traditional cultivation practices in order to undertake commercial export production. In numerical terms these groups account for approximately 14% of the total peasant population, while the remaining 86% are included within the popular sector. In addition to the rural livestock bourgeoisie, the leaders of the cooperativist organization are included within this same elitist group. These are locally referred to as the "board of directors". In reality, however, because of its composition this group transcends the local limit as, in addition to local leaders, it also includes regional representatives of the national bank which, in their turn, administer World Bank funds for the cooperatives. We note this point because it signifies that our approach has had forcibly to transcend the local framework and take into account a double perspective: that of the popular base, on the one hand, and that of the local, regional, national and international elite on the other.³

However, prior to examining this elitist-popular dynamic more closely, we must clarify the sense in which we use the concept of integration, a concept which is understood in a multitude of ways in the social sciences (not to mention the legal, architectural and philosophical approaches, etc. towards the same concept). For purposes of this paper a definition of the concept is employed which allows a conceptualization and operationalization appropriate for dealing with and explaining the empirical data and, thus, for corroborating the utility of such a defini-

Swartz, Turner, Tuden (eds.), *Political Anthropology*, Aldine, Chicago, 1966.
 Easton, D.A., *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*, John Wiley and Sons, N.Y., 1965, p. 38:

³ In this work the local leadership is considered to belong to the elite, although one has to be conscious of the fact that we are dealing with an elite which is, in reality, manipulated by the extralocal (regional, national and international) elites. This means that one is dealing with people in a transitional phase, i.e. that no longer totally reflects what can be called the non capitalist worker peasant given that he has modernized his system of production, taken on the role of a leader, has often worked outside of the village, etc.; and, because of this particular behaviour, which differs from that of the rest of the peasants, was designated to the directorate of the cooperative. However, although he is no longer a traditional peasant it is still not possible to consider him to be totally different, given that the external promoters took advantage of his non capitalistic components (the particular sense of commitment) in order to use him for the achievement of their own goals. Although a study of the elite would thus have to differentiate clearly between different levels (local, regional, etc.), for our purpose it is sufficient to mention all these levels in order to include them.

tion.⁴ Prior to discussing the concept itself, it is also opportune to clarify that when using this term no allusion at all is made to a “normal” state of a social system which opposes any social change or conflict and which, therefore, can be considered to be static. On the contrary, the process dealt with here is both dynamic and contradictory. Thus, it seems appropriate, given such goals, to adopt the approach of Jorge R. Serrano who postulates that “political integration is the identity between Political Demands and Public Goals”.⁵

In order to apply this definition to our case-study we will modify it or, more correctly, adapt it in the following way: in place of “political integration” we will here refer to integration as *socioeconomic and political integration* and, in place of “political demand” in general, we will refer directly to the *popular demand*, given that this work deals with the base, i.e. the popular sector as defined previously.⁶ Thus, the definition used in our approach is that: *integration is the identity between Popular Demands and Public Goals*.⁷

It should be made clear that first, popular demand includes all those wishes —economic, social or political, etc.— which tend to be transformed into public goals and which are, therefore, “political”, i.e. they tend to integrate, and not to marginalize the people politically (as is sought, for example, with the consumer society in a developed world country); and, secondly, that a consideration of the popular sector implies a dialectical consideration distinguishing between the popular and the nonpopular; this consideration, in its turn relativizes our approach which previously has only been considered in absolute terms. That is to say, in our case-study popular and elite sectors are found at opposite poles; the latter is totally opposed to the achievement of popular public goals and attempts to impose its own public goals. These are the result of elitist

⁴ These data are based on field work conducted in southern Mexico (State of Guerrero).

⁵ Serrano M., Jorge R., “Integration and politization — Towards a radical redefinition of integration”, *CIHAAN*, 1976, p. 15.

⁶ This differentiation of concepts is of a terminological type and should serve to clarify their use in this paper. Both of the modifications not only perfectly adjust to the concepts used by J. Serrano but are already suggested and legitimized in his study.

⁷ The term “public goal” signifies the aim or objective sought by an entity, society, group, etc., in order to obtain a common benefit.

demands which are, in their turn, the product of class interests that are in conflict with popular interests. Therefore, in this dynamic we postulate that the greater the satisfaction of popular demands, the lesser the satisfaction of elitist demands, and vice versa.

However, the antagonistic relationship is not as simplistic as this postulate would seem to suggest; on the contrary, transformation mechanisms or, more accurately, mechanisms for the manipulation of popular demand intervene in such a way that elitist demand apparently coincides with popular demand, given that the latter is manipulated and/or transformed in accordance with elitist requirements. Here, both the relativization of our approach and the complexity of the problem can now clearly be appreciated.

The considerations mentioned above provide us with the conceptual elements necessary for formulating the central hypothesis of this work and for focussing subsequently on field data directly related to the cooperativism problematic.

The central hypothesis is the following: *the cooperativist movement acts as a disintegrator of the peasantry, given that it transforms and/or manipulates the socioeconomic and political demands of the popular base, in the service of the elite (which, in the specific case studied, must also include the State itself⁸). In this way the elite uses cooperativism as a means of popular legitimization; the analysis shows, however, that cooperativism is but a manipulation of the popular base and of its demands.*

Thus, cooperativism would only promote the integration of the elite, which, at the same time, provokes the disintegration of the peasantry. In the extreme case we would have a total integration of the elites and a complete popular disintegration, i.e. a total negation of popular needs in terms of their conversion into public goals. The present study, however, will show that this process is more complex and multifaceted. Therefore, it is not possible to talk of direct negation but, rather, of a manipulation or transformation of popular demand as a function of

⁸ In Mexico, cooperativism under the name of the "collective ejido" has a political function in attempting to resolve the problems of low productivity and land tenancy. It obtained initial support during the presidency of L. Cárdenas (1934-40) being abandoned partially by later presidents of the country and receiving a new impetus with the present government. Thus, it can be noted that interested governments, when they have so wished, have promoted cooperativism (usually with the support of the World Bank or similar agencies) and, therefore, they also are directly responsible for the immediate effects of cooperativism i.e. the separation of popular demands from public goals.

elitist demand in such a way that, as mentioned previously, the elite does not lose its popular legitimization (on the contrary, it always obtains or increases it).

Let us now test this hypothesis with the data available. First, we will analyze the proposed aims of cooperativism, as formally and officially established by the supra-local national elite⁹.

Proposed aims:

The aims of the ejidal firm or collective ejido (the cooperative) are the following:

- An increase in existing agricultural and livestock exploitation, through the use of new techniques;
- promotion of livestock exploitation in the ejidal sector in order to supply urban, national and international markets;
- the creation of new sources of work;
- the increased participation of the peasantry in official credit programs;
- the standardization of community life through the use of legal codes aimed at reducing local and regional violence;
- regularization of land ownership problems among *ejidatarios*;
- the better use of technical assistance.

To sum up, one is concerned with the socioeconomic development of the village, aimed at diminishing political tensions and violence at the same time as increasing export livestock production.

Discovered realities

The analysis of our data shows that the socioeconomic aspects and political repercussions of the process are not as lineal and clear as anticipated. On the contrary, the process is far more contradictory. This is manifested socio-economically in the following observed realities: the insufficient wage received by the members or worker cooperativists, which is clearly inferior to the earnings obtained from the simple culti-

⁹ Direct information from the Bank of Mexico, the organization responsible for granting credits to collective agricultural companies, and because of this, representative of governmental policy. Moreover, it is the official organization that redistributes credits granted by the World Bank and is, therefore, the executive arm of this organization.

vation of maize; dependency in terms of the credit and new technology introduced by the promoting bank; the separation of the cultivator from his means of production; the destruction of subsistence cultivation in favor of purely export or commercial crops; the scarcity of basic food-stuffs with the result that the majority of the daily expenses now have to be provided for by the women and children; a change in consumption patterns is witnessed in general; migration of the younger work-force takes place, which itself leads to the destruction of family and ritual organization; and, finally, an accentuation of social stratification occurs. These socioeconomic contradictions are also repeated in the political area where the peasants, as well as being marginalized, also find themselves represented by leaders who, although in popular disguise, in reality defend the interests of the regional, national and international elite.

The strong antagonisms that arise within the peasant base, as a result of these socioeconomic and political contradictions have resulted in the necessary formation of opposition groups; this has led to the formation of factions¹⁰ and subfactions which, in their turn, divide the ejidal base (cooperativists and poor independent peasants). In this way the elite has the facility to implement the system of "divide and rule".

As can be seen, the contradictions found show at their core the manipulation and, almost invariably the nullification of the popular demands. But the divergence between proposed aims and discovered realities also focuses our attention on the legitimization of elitist interests at the cost of popular interests.

Let us now analyze the field data in detail, at the same time confronting popular demands with public goals and their transformation. We will begin with the *economic* data. The annual wage of the cooperativists, \$7,500 Mexican pesos (\$300 U.S.), is only 59.6%¹¹ of the annual

¹⁰ Nicholas, Ralph W., 1963, "Village faction and political parties in rural West Bengal", *Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies*, 2, 17-32.

1966, "Segmentary Factional Political Systems" in : Swartz et. al. (eds.), *Political Anthropology*, Aldine, Chicago, pp. 49-59.

1968, "Rules, Resources and Political Activity" in : SWARTZ (ed.), *Local Level Politics*, Aldine, Chicago, pp. 295-322.

¹¹ This percentage is still reduced by 17% if we take into account (as we must in order to have a common basis for comparison) the production of maize by individual ejidatarios for subsistence use owing to the fact that the cooperativists are obliged to spend 5,350 pesos annually in the purchase of such basic foodstuff, (i.e., they have to spend 71.3% of their salary of the cooperative, equivalent to 13.5% of the total annual income of the cooperativist and of his family).

agricultural income earned by individual *ejidatarios*¹² who chose not to enter the cooperative, (not taking into account what they obtain from peonage labors or from cattle earning). This disproportion is not only relative, i.e. in comparison with the individual *ejidatarios*, but also absolute: the total income coming from the cooperative is sufficient to satisfy something less than half of the necessary annual expenditures of each cooperativist. Thus, wives are obliged to complement the insufficient wage (by washing clothes, making bread or cultivating flowers for the market, as maids, working in small food shops, etc.). In the cooperative studied, wives contribute 50.6% of the necessary income, as compared to 17.6% among the individual *ejidatarios*. In the majority of cases, even where one includes this contribution, income does not cover the basic needs of the family with the result that children, from school age onwards, have to contribute their labor as well to the support of the family. Moreover, in that the establishment of a livestock cooperative only requires an abundant labor force in its initial phase, young people are now obliged to emigrate towards tourist and industrial centers throughout the republic.

A further problem is faced as regards the income of the cooperative; this demonstrates elitist goals even more clearly. The income that a member receives for his labors is, in reality, nothing more than a loan. This means to say that the members are obliged to return this money after the first three years of the functioning of the state company (used as a synonym for the cooperative or collective *ejido*). This leads us to the second point of interest, *credit*.

The type, amount and conditions under which credit is granted (see table 1), along with the analysis of the source of credit (directly from the World Bank to the Bank of Mexico and then successively to the general headquarters of the state *Ejidal* Bank, the regional office of this bank and finally the local board of directors of the cooperative) clearly demonstrate the inequality of the policy for granting credits to individual and collective *ejidatarios* by strongly favoring the latter. Moreover, it also demonstrates the vertical interaction and the dependency implied in this granting of credit. Not only is the cooperative 'obliged' to produce an export product and to forgo subsistence cul-

¹² The term 'individual *ejidatarios*' only includes the group forming the *ejidal* base, i.e. we exclude the rich individual livestock raisers (*ejidal* and small ownership) in order to thus obtain a common basis for comparison.

tivation¹³, but the implementation of modern technology, which is economically and technically beyond the reach of the ejidatario, also serves the objectives of the national bureaucracy (which provides technicians and administrators) as well as the objectives of the central countries who provide the credit.¹⁴ This vertical interaction disguises the true objectives of the central countries behind a mask of humanitarian aid¹⁵ and, in its turn, also prevents this structure of exploitation and dependency from being perceived by the peasants. The member of the cooperative will only be conscious of the deficient administration and the corruption and the failures in the granting of credit by the regional branch of the bank.¹⁶ This is a typical obstacle to the person involved being able to delve further into the structure exploitation, an awareness of which would permit him to detect the underlying national and international goals which provoke these failings at a local level as a result of the manipulation of peasant needs and demands (more credit, increase in incomes, diversification of production, stable base for the survival of the family, covering of basic necessities, etc.) in function of elitist demands (to sell advanced technology, to assure the supply of a world tourist center with cheap meat and to monopolize export production in such a way that at the same time a need is created to import basic foodstuffs¹⁷). All this, in its turn, pressures the peasant and

¹³ Previously, between 30% and 50% of the basic production was destined to self consumption by the popular sector, whilst now with regard to meat – which is the only thing the cooperative produces – the comparative figures are only 9% for the total population and 2.5% for the ejidal base, the remainder being all exported.

¹⁴ Several studies exist which demonstrate that the credit granted by the central countries always confers direct benefits to them. See for example BUTHER, F. (ed.), *Sozialer Fortschritt durch Entwicklungshilfe*, München, 1972; SCHARRER, H. (ed.), *Förderung privater Direktinvestitionen*, Hamburg, 1972; FEDER, E., 1973, "McNamara, The Pied Piper of Washington: The World Re-orient's its Development Policy", (in press).

¹⁵ McNamara, R., "Address to the Board of Governors of the World Bank", Sep. 24, 1973, Nairobi.

¹⁶ See the complete study: Oswald, Ursula, Serrano Jorge R., Luna Laurentino, 1976, *Cooperativos ejidales y capitalismo estatal dependiente* (in press).

¹⁷ The land surface dedicated to the cultivation of maize was reduced by 57.5% with the introduction of the cooperative. This resulted in the increased scarcity of this basic crop.

obliges him to work in livestock exploitation¹⁸ in order to be able to repay the credit and the respective interest payments. Thus, the granting of credit, the implementation of new technology and the destruction of self dependency in favor of a commercial product has resulted in what can be summarized as "economic and social dependency" (because of being a member of a cooperative organization), at a time when popular demand was the exact opposite, i.e. for greater liberty in both the economic and social areas.

A further economic aspect remains to be considered (which, as already noted, has repercussions of a social nature). One must indicate that the necessary condition for the granting of credit was the *supply of cultivable land* by the members. This permitted the concentration of 2,700 hectares, a necessary condition for profitable capitalist exploitation. All of this land is now used for grazing, in place of maize. This has not only had repercussions in terms of production and mechanization (using new technology), on alimentation itself and on the work but it has also created a political problem of prime importance. Supported by the strength of the cooperativist organization (52.60/o of local ejidatarios are organized in the ejidal company) these ejidatarios took over communal lands that theoretically had previously served as community pasture areas and which, in concrete terms, were specially useful for a few rich ejidal and private livestock raisers. Thus, these livestock raisers, in order to acquire greater political force, united with opposition individual *ejidatarios* against the idea of the cooperative and together presented their complaint before the Ministry of Agrarian Reform and before the federal Ministry of the President itself. Moreover, only with the direct intervention of the armed forces and of a powerful senator (now governor of a state) in favor of the cooperative was it possible to avoid a greater bloodbath.¹⁹ The military forces still contin-

¹⁸ This obligation is not as absolute in the contract as in reality, owing to the fact that in order to be able to return the land parcel to the member he is obliged to pay the cost of all the investments made on it. The results of the investments are of no use to him as, for example, those made to change cleared into grazing land. This sum, in itself greatly increased owing to the application of modern technology, (15.20/o of the annual salary for a single hectare) is impossible for the member to accumulate given that his income is not even sufficient, as we have already seen, to cover his basic necessities.

¹⁹ Even thus, amongst other things, the local deputy was murdered, several members of the board of directors were injured, five horses were stolen in a period of six months and the fences of cooperative lands were destroyed more than 80 times.

ue to protect the production areas, whilst tensions continue at the local level.

These tensions are now so accentuated that they transcend both blood ties and, to an even greater extent, traditional *compadrazgo*²⁰ relationships. Thus, the first negative effects are now also felt within the *traditional family organization*, at a time when the cooperative has still not terminated its initial take off phase and still requires a fairly large work force for the construction of infrastructural works such as warehouses, corrals and irrigation canals, and for the preparation of grazing pastures, etc. In any case an excess supply of labor has already begun to be experienced. Although *migration* has been concentrated, up until present, amongst the younger sector of the population, who previously helped on the family parcel and who now only partially find work within the ejidal company, within a few years the very members of the cooperative will be obliged to search for new sources of work given that livestock exploitation will only require limited amounts of labor (a few semi-specialized workers). This means that within a short time the traditional peasant of the area, who learned cultivation practices from his father, will not even possess his own land (this now belongs to the company), neither a place of work, nor a trade which will permit him to change employer.

Finally, as regards the social aspect, we will mention the phenomenon of *social stratification*. In order to develop the cooperative, the promoting bank took advantage of the influence of a group of local leaders. This was achieved principally by offers of economic rewards (double salary for the directors, complete indemnization for the land given by them, purchase of their livestock, etc.) but also with the increase in status and prestige accorded them (frequent journeys to the capital of the state and of the country, the right to sign all letters and documents, representation of the co-ejidatarios before the authorities, etc.). This, in its turn, strengthened their position within the local bourgeoisie, while the co-members (the workers or "fools" as they refer to themselves) found themselves indebted and even deprived of their land, their basic means of production. This not only led to their rapid impoverishment and to an increase in their dependency, but also to the perpetuation of

²⁰ One part of the family joins the cooperative whilst the other defends its interests as individual ejidatarios. Even more extreme is the situation of ritual kinship where, for instance a case occurs in which the leader of the cooperative and that of the opposing group are *compadres* (ritual kinship between the child's father and godfather).

that same dependency given that at present it acts not only at the individual, but also at the social level: the traditional small free peasants who produced for their own consumption and marketed their excess production now find themselves swelling the ranks of the agricultural proletariat. They have no basis on which to support themselves, other than an insufficient salary, they lack subsistence foodstuffs and the means to produce them (the land) and, as if this wasn't enough, have a debt to the bank which is impossible to pay. In other words, differences between opposing strata developed and accentuated, with the result that the *ejidatarios* that form the 'base' of the ejido presently form part of a proletariat in their own company, while only a small group of leaders are installing themselves at the opposite pole, i.e. that of the rural bourgeoisie.

However, there can be no doubt that the deviated demands, both economic and social, have their political repercussions: the conflict over communal land is only one although the most sanguinary expression of them.

In searching for the supports and factors involved in the conflict over land, and in the transformation of the demand for land, we have to distinguish clearly between two antagonistic groups. On the one hand the cooperativists, who are supported at the local level by the richest livestock raiser of the region and his family, at the state level by the present governor, at the national level by the official party – the PRI – and the present presidential policy and, finally, at the international level by the directors, i.e. the directorate of the World Bank. On the other hand, the group which is opposed to the cooperative is supported at the local level by the leader of the opposing group which is united with the private livestock raisers (excluding the richest) and with the members of the opposition party – the PPS –, at the state level by the governor at that time, at the national level by the agencies and elected deputies of the opposition party, and at the international level by private capital, in as much as it is opposed to the nation's Third World policy with the restrictions it poses in terms of investment, payments of taxes, syndicate control, etc.

But of course, the really concrete violent conflict is localized in the village itself. Here the struggle between the base of the cooperative and that of the individual *ejidatarios* demonstrates, with its bleeding violence, the manipulation to which both groups have been subjected, in having been divided into two antagonistic factions. Thus, the majority of the previously mentioned negative effects of cooperativism are subsumed in

a pseudo conflict²¹ with the opposing faction, principally made up of the ejidal base itself. This permits, in addition to the efficient protection of production by the armed forces (under the pretext of maintaining order between contending factions), the total control of the population by state capitalism, which takes advantage of the Roman principle "divide and rule"²². The second important aspect of this manipulatory policy has still to be mentioned: this we refer to in this paper as the "escape valve" role of the factions. This means that in order that the peasant base should not confront the real problem, in this case the cooperative or, more generally, the exploitation of the popular groups by those above, the public goal is diverted and the elite creates a pseudo factional enemy in the manner mentioned. This takes place in such a way that the revolutionary and discontented forces spend their time on insignificant and easily controlled clashes (given the presence of the military) in place of developing a true class struggle. Thus, the division into two factions fulfills the function of a valve through which discontented and revolutionary energies escape.

In addition, however, the formal policy, with its adequate credit promotion, technical assistance, mobilization of mass media and armed intervention, all of which favor cooperativism, becomes a witness to, and an explicit promoter of, the manipulation of popular demands; all of these mechanisms and the way in which they are manipulated favor the transformation of popular demands into demands which completely restructure the goals of the local peasants in favor of the few powerful ones. These, in a third world country such as Mexico, are to a fairly large extent those functionaries that lead the country. Therefore,

²¹ We use the term 'pseudo' because one is dealing with an artificial conflict within the same social stratum (without benefit for it); i.e. cunning alliances now exist between socioeconomic strata which are in themselves opposed (large scale livestock owners and poor ejidatarios) which create renting conflicts between the latter and others of the same stratum (poor coejidatarios both within and without the cooperative).

²² This control, by means of the fostering of two antagonistic factions and their subfactions, has special significance in this case given that we are concerned with the most violent area of the republic and one of the most conflictive in the world. A very high crime level exists there: between a quarter and one fifth of crimes are homicides and 63.20% personal attacks (these data are averages for the last five years) which signifies that there are between two and three murders monthly in a population of 5,102 inhabitants.

the deviation of the popular demands also leads to political authoritarianism, a typical sign of dependent state capitalism.²³

Thus, when relating our empirical data with the hypothesis and the theoretical framework mentioned at the beginning of this paper, we can conclude by asking ourselves: at the cost of what and in favor of whom did the increase in livestock production and export production take place.²⁴ Given, that 79.20/o of all the members of the cooperative did not receive a wage which even allowed them to live poorly, it clearly shows that even the basic popular demand of "being able to at least subsist" is not satisfied. The same occurs with the social demands where both the family and the ritual organization disintegrates (through migration, specific interests of a few leaders, etc.). Delving further into the political field we can see that contrary to what was previously postulated, local conflicts increase and surpass supportable limits in such a way that the armed forces have to intervene.

Thus, as a whole, one clearly notes that none of the demands or expectations of the village, with respect to cooperativism, were fulfilled.

Why does this collective ejido continue to function? In analyzing the supports for the collective ejido and the means used to promote it we discover the tremendous socio-political manipulation to which the members are subjected, and in such a way that although they now realize that it is not to their advantage (560/o explicitly prefer now individual exploitation) they can not but continue struggling for it. This can be explained only by the transformation of the basic popular demand into an elitist demand.

Thus, analysis of a cooperativist movement sheds light on the gradual process of disintegration of the peasant base by the separation, through manipulation, of the popular demands from the public goals being in fact implemented which are those of the elite. To the same extent it sheds light on the integration of the elite and the satisfaction of its demands. The elite, in order to achieve goals, has manipulated the traditional peasant conscience at the same time as promoting individual competition between local leaders. The result is a total transformation

²³ See note 15 for more detail.

²⁴ It is a fact that even though there has been an increase in livestock production this has not even been sufficient to cover the repayment quota corresponding to the credit, not to mention of course any profit for the members. Moreover, as we have already seen, this increase was based on an enormous decrease in the production of the basic foodstuff, maize.

of the original demands, which not only questions the method with which it is achieved (manipulation, corruption, conflict murder) but also the goal itself of the human being.

Table I: Credits

<i>Credit receivers</i>	<i>Cooperative members</i>		<i>Individual ejidatarios</i>	
	<i>Implemented</i>	<i>Projected</i>	<i>Implemented</i>	<i>Projected</i>
<i>Type of credit</i>	<i>\$</i>	<i>\$</i>	<i>\$</i>	<i>\$</i>
long term	3,366,266	26,909,350	—	—
short term	340,902	7,394,500	283,391	—
total	3,707,168	34,303,850	283,391	
long term: %o interest	7.6	7.6	—	—
term in: years	18	18	—	—
short term: %o interest	7.6	7.6	12	—
term in: months	12	12	7	—
long term by member (average)	18,295	146,247	—	—
short term by member (average)	1,853	40,188	3,456	—
number of members	184	184	82	82

\$: Mexican Pesos

Philippine Agrarian Policy Today: Implementation and Political Impact

David Wurfel

Friends have often expressed surprise that a student of agriculture should be, by training, a political scientist.¹ But the focus of this study is government policy, a clearly appropriate domain for the political science discipline. The policies to be studied are those which affect the legal and economic control of land, and thus also—in a still dominantly agricultural society—the national distribution of wealth and power. Relative equality of wealth and power among the citizenry—and continuing government efforts to reduce gross inequalities—is a requisite of stable democratic government. The reduction of inequality also happens to be consistent with basic principles of justice to which I personally subscribe.

The purpose here is primarily to describe the nature of Philippine agrarian policy today, the degree of its implementation, and the problems associated therewith, before assessing the likely political consequences of that policy in light of some of the literature on agrarian

¹ This assessment, based on nine months of field research, is grounded in respect for the expressed intention of President Marcos to free the tenant farmer from the bondage of landlordism. Insofar as this analysis offers expressed or implied criticism of government programs affecting the intended goals of policy, it is to be hoped that it may, where appropriate, help to stimulate improvements in policy formulation and implementation.

In no sense does any criticism of policy denigrate the contribution of that dedicated band of civil servants, to be found in greater or lesser numbers in every agency, who are expending great effort to carry out their respective programs in the best manner possible. These officials, as well as private citizens in all walks of life, have been extremely helpful to me as I carried my research from air-conditioned office to remote barrio, and back. In fact, without the cooperation of so many Filipinos—including the loyal service of research assistants—this inquiry simply would not have been possible. To them I am deeply grateful.

Field research in the Philippines has been supported, since 1974, by a grant from the Canada Council.

change and peasant unrest. But first we must make some references to the context out of which the present policy emerged.

All the elements of present agrarian policy —land transfer, rent control, government credit, organization of cooperatives, land settlement, and agrarian courts— were to be found in earlier eras, but with differences in emphasis and scope. Previous upsurges of interest in agrarian reform were notable in 1954-56, 1963-64, and 1971. The political motivation for policy in each period differed. In the Magsaysay Administration, when the suppression of the Huk rebellion was so fresh in the memory of the landed elite, policy-makers were determined to destroy the mass support base of revolutionary counter-elites. Though the President and the Congress in the early 1960's, both aware of the increasing evidence of Huk revival, were impelled by similar concerns, building a mass base for the prominent elite decision-makers themselves was certainly an important consideration as well. An election was upcoming. Since 1972 Mr. Marcos seems to have been most interested in destroying the mass support —feudal in character— of his elite competitors, though the other two types of motivation have also been present. Only in 1971, which saw the enactment of the most progressive legislation before martial law, was there effective mass pressure for reform. In fact, without such pressure there probably would not have been substantial progress in reform at that time.²

Agrarian reform in the “new society”

Though the reforms of 1972-73 were the product of the most restricted decision-making process in the history of Philippine agrarian policy —consisting of the President and few advisors— the mass pressures of 1969-71 certainly impinged on presidential thinking. In fact, the urgency which Mr. Marcos attached to agrarian reform can be seen from the fact that within one month of the declaration of Martial Law he had issued Presidential Decree No. 27 for “the emancipation of the tiller of the soil from bondage.” The President, who had shown slight interest in land reform during his first 7-1/2 years in office, decreed that all ten-

² Thus Professor Huntington's dictum that there is “a basic incompatibility . . . between parliaments and land reform” (S.P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (Yale University Press, 1968), p. 388 ff) needs amendment. As Huntington himself later admits this does not apply when there are effective peasant organizations, which were active in the Philippines in 1971.

ants on rice and corn land were "deemed owners" of a family-size farm. Hours before he penned the decree in his own land —before TV cameras— he had succumbed to pressure, especially from his native region of Ilocos,³ to exempt landowners from less than 7 hectares. There were, in fact, several other limitations of the sweeping transfer of rights to the land.

Since October 1972 President Marcos, Secretary of Agrarian Reform Conrado Estrella, and others, have often repeated such phrases as "agrarian reform is the cornerstone of the New Society," adding, "On this reform, the foundation of this country is being built," "The entire machinery of government has been committed to fulfill the promise of this program." On the first anniversary of P.D. 27 the President went so far as to say: "The land reform is the only gauge for the success or failure of the New Society. If land reform fails, there is no New Society." It is within the context of these bold statements of priority that Philippine agrarian reform deserves to be examined.

Scope. In November 1972 the Department of Agrarian Reform, the agency responsible for implementing P.D. 27, announced that there were 1,437,956 hectares of rice and corn lands tilled by 1,078,817 tenants. These figures, however, were taken from the 1960 census and failed to account for changes in the intervening 12 years. The Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources reported 5.678 million has. planted with rice and corn in 1972. Extrapolating earlier trends, this would have meant more than 3 million has. cultivated by tenants. In the first instance, therefore, it appears that about 1 million tenants were deprived of the benefits of land reform merely by manipulation of the data defining the scope of the program. (Interestingly enough the Bureau of the Census has not until now published the results of the 1971 agricultural census. Did it show an even larger number of rice and corn tenants?)

By 1975 research had established that 57 percent of tenants were farming land owned by persons with less than 7 has., and thus would not benefit from reform under the terms of P.D. 27. In June 1976 figures posted outside the office of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform reported a total of only 644,199 tenants tillers on 1,058,214 has. of rice and corn lands, with more than *two-thirds* of those on landholdings

³ There are no large landholdings in the Ilocos region and almost all landlords there would come within the 7 hectare retention.

below 7 has. Thus only about 10 percent of the tenant tillers on rice and corn land, according to the best unofficial estimates, are now supposed to be beneficiaries of land reform.

What happened to all the other tenants? Essentially DAR seems to have decided that if tenants cannot be found by their fieldmen, they must not be there. The "totals" are now the number of tenants interviewed by DAR teams. It is much to the credit of the DAR, however, that in 1976 they decided to launch a new, more thorough identification process, linked to "carpet parcellary map sketching" for the whole barangay, thus providing a much more reliable data base for administrators. In some barangays where the carpet PMS is already complete, nearly 50 percent more tenants have been identified than during 1973-74, foretelling perhaps as *expansion* in the "scope" this time. Unfortunately, there were reports before that DAR fieldmen were sometimes too easily persuaded by landlords that the cultivators seen on the land were not really tenants, and thus should be ignored.

Accomplishments. Given the varying definitions of "scope," measurements of accomplishments will vary also. There are three steps in the land transfer process on which there is data. The first is the issuance of the Certificate of Land Transfer, which is essentially the same as the "allocation" of a lot under R.A. 3844, the 1963 legislation. CLTs can be cancelled or withdrawn without notice or hearing; they are only a preliminary indicator of right to the land.

As of June 30, 1976 DAR reported the "issuance" of CLTs to 197,973 tenants. (One CLT is issued for each plot; nearly half of all tenants receive two or more CLTs.) The term "issuance," however, refers only to the spewing forth by the computer, not to receipt by the tiller. Public reports in 1975 on the wide discrepancy between CLTs "issued" and "received" led to a revision of the data collection system at the regional level. A national compilation was made in February, revealing that of 281,000 CLTs "issued," only 127,000 had been actually received by the farmer. Even though the ratio of received to issued has probably improved somewhat since February, there are undoubtedly not more than 100,000 tenant-recipients by now. While this is more than 50 percent of accomplishment according to the most recent, and most restricted, scope, this is less than 25 percent of the goal announced in 1972. At the rate of 9,000 new tenant recipients in the first half of 1976, it will take nearly 18 years to distribute the certificates to all tenant beneficiaries as defined in 1972. DAR spokesmen have nevertheless talked frequently in recent months of "finishing" land reform by the end of this year.

The second step in land transfer, a much more meaningful one for both tenant and landlord, is the compensation to the owner by the Land Bank and the commencement of amortization payments by the tenant-becoming-owner. At this point the landlord-tenant relationship ceases.

As of June 30, 1976 the Land Bank had paid in cash and bonds over 331 million to landlords with 26,100 tenants, or 8 percent of the supposed beneficiaries of 1972. Though this three-year accomplishment is nearly three times that of the Land Bank in the 1969-71 period, the pace is not entirely satisfying. During 1974, the first year of LIP operations after the Bank's reorganization, there were only 3,472 tenant beneficiaries on paid-up land, compared with 5,746 in 1971. The following year, 1975, payments benefited nearly 400 percent more. And in the first six months of 1976 accomplishments were 57 percent of the previous year's level. At the 1976 rate, it will take the Land Bank more than 6 years just to compensate the landlords whose tenants have already received CLTs, and nearly 25 years to complete the task for the 1972 defined scope.

In order to become full owners the amortizing tenant must meet payments for 15 years. At the end of that period, land reform could be said to be completed.

Problems. If accomplishments have been far below expectations in the first two stages of Operation Land Transfer, there must be some explanations. Perhaps expectations were unrealistically high; we may have been infected with the PR man's syndrome.

One of the obstacles to faster implementation is a classic one, budget. DAR field personnel are the lowest paid of any government agency in the agricultural field. Lawyers attached to DAR teams receive no more, for instance, than junior research assistants at U.P. or Ateneo. Perdiems for the additional expense of moving officialdom from the team or district office to the barrio are practically non-existent. Thus morale is low and performance suffers. Particularly in the legal staff, inadequate salaries make it impossible to fill all the positions actually approved. While DAR's "actual expenditures" for operations rose appropriately from 45 million to 79 million between 1973 and 1974, the increase in FY 1975 of only 2.5 percent was only a small fraction of inflation, lower than the increase in the government budget generally. The intention to complete land reform must be reflected first in a substantial increase in budget.

An encouraging sign was the release of an additional 13 million in April 1976 for the Bureau of Lands to accelerate parcellary map sketch-

ing; the funds for this special project had heretofore been squeezed out of its own modest budget. As of the end of 1975 little more than half of the OLT target coverage had been mapped and sketched, and the lack of surveys—especially accurate ones—had become a major obstacle to the issuance of CLTs or payment by the Land Bank. In April the Bureau of Lands had requested 26 million to finish the job, but the remaining 13 million had not even been promised.

While budget is a problem which must be solved outside of DAR, the second major obstacle to more rapid implementation is, in large part, an internal one: confusion over policy and inordinate delays in decision-making. In the beginning it appeared as if this confusion might be avoided. A few weeks after the issuance of P.D. 27 a draft of the “Implementating Rules and Regulations” had been completed. The draft resolved most of the many ambiguities in the decree in favor of the tenant. However, the President ordered that promulgation of the rules be deferred pending experience to be gained in pilot land reform areas. Neither the November 1973 draft of the rules and regulations, or any modification thereof, have been promulgated to this day. The resulting confusions have been myriad.

In 1974 work was begun on another document which, it was explained, might obviate the necessity for the implementing rules and regulations, i.e., a draft Code of Agrarian Reform. DAR staff were aided in this task by lawyers from the U.P. Law Center and consultants from the private sector. Two different versions of the Draft Code have been completed, one in 1975 and another in 1976, but the most recent one is under “further study” and the promulgation of the Code seems as distant as it was in 1974. In any case, it would not clarify most of the issues which were treated with some precision in the draft rules and regulations.

Perhaps the greatest progress so far toward clarification of the issues was Secretary Estrella’s unnumbered circular of May 3, 1976. The most important provision of the memorandum is that which authorizes the distribution of CLTs to tenants even on lands where the owner has filed some kind of complaint with the DAR, or where the land is under court litigation. If the courts or DAR lawyers make a subsequent ruling which invalidates the CLTs, then they may be withdrawn. In January 1976 there were 50-60,000 CLTs being withheld in such cases, often with the landowner having made no more than a verbal protest. According to the May 3rd circular CLTs were also to be delivered to the tenant, even when the owners claimed that the land had been conveyed to other persons before P.D. 27. After the CLTs are distributed the owner

can present his documentary evidence to the DAR. In practice, such claims were often unsupportable, but the landowner, by promising to present documentation at a future date, would succeed in holding up the CLT.

The silence of P.D. 27 —unlike previous legislation— on what to do with areas within landed estates not directly cultivated by a tenant, especially roads, irrigation systems and homelots, is an increasing cause of difficulty in OLT. Both tenants and many landlords are urging the Land Bank to acquire such areas. Some unscrupulous landowners however are using continued ownership of irrigation systems or homelots to maintain control over their tenants. Even some “voluntary surrenders” of CLTs can be traced to such pressures. Fortunately the May 3rd memo provided, for the first time, some guidance on irrigation systems, instructing DAR fieldmen to organize irrigators associations and assist them in purchasing the existing systems with Land Bank financing.

However, the same memo was entirely silent on the homelot issue, even though it had been discussed at length within DAR over a period of more than 2 years. The cause of this non-decision is not known, but the prolonged paralysis on this question is a crucial measure of the administrative malaise in DAR. The legislative authorization for Land Bank acquisition of homelots, in R.A. 3844, is undoubtedly still valid. Conflicts over homelot possession, rental and/or purchase price will surely become one of DAR's major headaches in years to come. It is possible that DAR's failure to clarify administrative policy on so many points reflects an ambivalence on the part of the President himself as to how far he wants to push the land reform. Certainly Secretary Estrella consults very closely with the President on many matters.

Landowner opposition. Vague and inconsistent administrative guidelines, or total lack thereof, are clearly, as in the case of homelots, weapons in the hands of landlords determined to fight land transfer at every turn. No one knows how many owners are of this bent, but it is certainly true of most smaller ones. The larger owners were hardly more philanthropic in their outlook, but were more effective in the first few months after P.D. 27 in taking evasive measures. In any case, the large owners have other economic interests and are not so dependent on land rent; thus they are less tenacious in their opposition than smaller landholders.

It is clear that a very large number of owners have resisted reform at every stage of the administrative process. The first step was to avoid detection at all, which tactic was surprisingly successful, given the fact that land is a terribly obvious commodity. If the land was identified,

tenants were simply ejected, or given a modest sum to declare that they were merely laborers, again avoiding coverage by OLT. Others quickly mortgaged their land to lending institutions, perhaps investing elsewhere. Conversion to sugar, tobacco, bananas, or urban subdivisions was a somewhat later step undertaken by those who had not avoided identification, as well as by those who had. Conversion to urban land received DAR approval, under certain conditions; conversion of tenanted rice and corn land to other crops proceeded without benefit of official sanction and contrary to law. When an owner was unfortunate enough to be faced with the issuance of CLTs on his land, he could protest that the land had been sold to another or distributed to heirs, or insist that the occupants were not his tenants. Until very recently (see above) this led to indefinite delay.

When it came time for small owners to file for the right of 7 has. retention, only about 10 percent of those likely to be eligible submitted their petitions, on the principle that the less information obtained by DAR—and much was required of these petitioners—the greater the chances of avoiding OLT.

The land valuation process has also provided ample opportunity for foot-dragging. Until December negotiations were being used to set the price of the land, outside the framework of P.D. 27. Landlords, despite repeated invitations from the DAR, regularly failed to appear, thus delaying indefinitely the completion of land reform. The Barrio Committee on Land Productivity, authorized in 1973, was activated in 1975 as an alternative mechanism. It now sets the average normal harvest for different classes of land in the barrio, 2.5 times of which becomes the land price under the P.D. 27 formula. The 11 members of the BCLP include 4 tenant representatives, 2 owner-cultivators, 2 landlords, the barrio captain, and the *Samahang Nasyon* president, plus the non-voting DAR technician. Since in a land reform area at least one of the two mentioned barrio officials is usually a tenant, tenants are likely to command a majority. Fearing to be outvoted, landlords most often do not show up. (Ironically, the influence of the landlord—even in the process of being expropriated—is still so great in many areas that when they do appear they are often able to determine an outcome favorable to their interests.) Their non-participation in the decision, though made with a proper quorum, is then used as a basis for protest against that decision to the DAR. As of June 30, 1976, while 8,106 BCLPs had been organized, and 3,644 had forwarded to the DAR central office the decision made about productivity, only 1,861 of

those had been approved. The remainder were classified as lacking complete data or "with protest." So far, *no* BCLP decision has become the basis of Land Bank payment. Landowners are simply not presenting to the Bank the voluminous documentation required. And as long as the Land Bank has not entered the picture, the landlord may still receive rent for his land. A recommendation now being considered to halt rent payment by CLT holders would provide a significant stimulus to speedier implementation.

Curiously enough it is the tenant who is said to be providing the main delay at the last stage of the compensation process. After the land price is agreed, the Land Bank comes to each CLT holder and asks him to sign a "farmer's undertaking" which fixes the amortization schedule and extracts a promise to pay. Hundreds of farmers—perhaps thousands—are refusing to sign. In some instances cultivators had been persuaded to sign blank forms after verbal agreement on the terms of the LTPA with the DAR technician, only to find later that the price had been hiked, apparently in private discussions between technicians and landlord. Other times they were promised that they would get their home—as well as farm—lots for the price agreed, then to discover that there was no such promise in writing. Or the landlord may have agreed to condone past debts, then at the last minute added the amount to the purchase price. Sometimes the tenant is simply a shrewd bargainer. He sees that the price to be derived from the BCLP will be much lower than that in the LTPA, and simply wants to reopen the negotiations. Or he may even be the object of manipulation by unscrupulous "tenant leaders," encouraged from the landlord. On still other occasions the farmer is reportedly "reluctant to become an owner." If true, this is most likely to be the result of threats and/or enticements from the landlord, so that most fundamentally it constitutes another type of landlord opposition tactic.

That the landlord would be attached to his land, and want to retain ownership, is hardly surprising. That he should take advantage of every loophole, every ambiguity, is consistent with his own best interests. What is less easily understandable, however, is that DAR has never taken steps to penalize landlords for their many evasive, and sometimes illegal, tactics. In effect, it is the honest landlord, who complies with all regulations and does not ask for special favors, who is being penalized. This does not encourage further compliance.

The distributive effect. We have noted previously some of the inherent advantages for large landowners. Not only is the wealthier and

more powerful owner better able to evade coverage, pay for legal maneuvers or invest in crop conversion, but he has also been benefited by the vagaries of the compensation scheme. The negotiated agreement, or LTPA, which has been the basis of Land Bank compensation so far, has produced average production figures for irrigated land of 146.7 cavans per hectare, and for unirrigated land of 71 cavans, as of June 30, 1976. Though entirely comparable data for the BCLP are not yet available, production figures for irrigated land range most often around 85 cavans, and for unirrigated land around 45 cavans, or less than two-thirds the LTPA levels. Thus, in spite of the fact that President Marcos in May 1975 tried to make payment more attractive to those owning less than 24 has. by increasing cash payment from 10 percent to 20 percent, very few of those landlords have yet been compensated at all, and thus will eventually come under the BCLP scheme at much lower prices.

Some very careful assessments of the distributive impact of OLT, as between landlords and tenants, have already been done.⁴ But economic analyses assume the full implementation of existing decrees and regulations. In fact, the true distributive effect is going to be determined in large part by the degree to which implementations are "by the book." Because of the slow start of business activity by the Land Bank, the cash market value of the Land Bank bond is now little more than 50 percent of face value. Thus landlords in most urgent need of cash, usually the smaller ones, will suffer more from the compensation scheme than those who can afford to hold on to their bonds and get productive loans at 85 percent of the face value. For the cultivator, failure to pay amortization payments—which is so far typical of more than two-thirds of all amortizing owners—certainly "softens the burden." It remains to be seen whether the Samahang Nasyon can be an effective instrument to police amortizers in arrears. The Land Bank staff will never be large enough to allow them to take direct responsibility.

In any case, inflation will also be a major determinant of the reform's distributive impact. Whether fast or slow, it is likely to be a persistent advantage for the tiller. Hardly any landlord has chosen the option of

⁴ See Duncan Harkin, "Agrarian Change and the Filipino Response," *Solidarity*, X:1 (January-February, 1976), pp. 13-32.

See Benedict Kerkvliet, "Land Reform in the Philippines since the Marcos Coup," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 47, No. 3 (Fall, 1974), p. 287 ff. Also Dennis Shoesmith, "Land Reform in the Philippines: Emancipating or Emaciating the Tenant Farmer?," *Australian Outlook*, Vol. 28, No. 3 (December, 1974), pp. 274-89.

receiving direct payment from his former tenant *in kind*, which, despite its other disadvantages, would protect the owner against inflation. Even though Philippine inflation may not be as bad as that in Japan immediately after land reform there, it is certainly on a steady upward curve. It will fall most heavily on bondholders without business acumen who merely keep their bonds and collect a modest 6 percent interest. Because of inflation, the fears expressed by some critics of Operation Land Transfer that most tenants would be economically incapable of meeting their amortization are not likely to be well-founded in the long run. It will be necessary, however, to create an enforcement mechanism that encourages the *will* to pay.

Even with the benefit of a rising *palay* price, there will, of course, be many amortization owners who fall into economic difficulty and face the acute danger of losing their land. There are already many instances of transfer of CLTs from one cultivator to another, although it is strictly prohibited. The subterfuge used is that of "abandonment." A CLT-holder who "abandons" his land loses his rights too, and thus the CLT is reissued to a deserving farmer, in almost every case the one who is found to be farming the "abandoned" land. The new CLT holder is not just lucky, however. He paid a consideration to the one who "abandoned" the land. This is a standard practice on leasehold land, where the right of leasehold—in Central Luzon, at least—fetches as much as 3-4,000 per hectare for good riceland. And since the transfer of leasehold rights is not illegal, it can be freely mentioned to an outsider.

The prospect for a widespread practice of subterranean transfer of rights can also be extrapolated from the experience of the landed estates, some of them under government administration for 20 or 30 years. In certain estates most lots appear to have changed hands two or more times, despite restrictions imposed. Some of those transfers were from cultivators to non-cultivators, i.e., the reestablishment of landlordism. The pressure of population on the land and the unequal capacities of men make this process to some extent inevitable. But through the institutionalization of low-interest credit and cooperative marketing schemes government could prevent such a process from becoming the dominant and pervasive one, wiping out the benefit of land reform in one generation, as happened on such a large portion of the friar lands.

Government credit and cooperative marketing

Recent studies have told us that the main source of private, high-interest credit—ranging from 20-200 percent—for the rice and corn farmer

today is the *suki*, the grain buyer, who has preempted the role of the landlord, in part as a result of agrarian reform. Thus government efforts to extend low-interest credit through Masagana 99 and Masagana Maisan, as well as the attempt to build a cooperative credit and marketing system based on the Samahang Nayon, are timely and necessary corollaries to Operation Land Transfer and should be included in any study of agrarian reform, even though their purpose was primarily to increase production.

Masagana 99. This constitutes the most massive government scheme for agricultural credit in Philippine history. Since it began in May 1973 until the completion of Phase VI releases in March, more than 2.5 billion had been channeled through the Philippine National Bank and the Rural Banking System to more than a half million farmers—in the peak year of 1974. This financial outdoing is several times that provided for land reform.

The loans were given to tenants and owners alike, with the only collateral being the standing crop. Each applicant for a loan was supposed to fill out a “farm plan” with the assistance of an agricultural technician from the Bureau of Agricultural Extension or the Bureau of Plant Industry, in order to know the fertilizer and chemicals needed on his land. Chits were given for fertilizer and chemicals purchase, while cash was released in order to allow the farmer to pay for planting, weeding and harvesting. During the first year of the program there was such pressure to “get the money out,” that the farm plan was, at best, a formality, and hundreds of persons who were not farmers at all actually received loans. The manner of implementation was determined by the fact that the only measure of success was the amount that each bank was able to loan, or the number of loans which each technician was able to approve. Since rice farmers were given fertilizers at a subsidized price, and sugar planters were not, a lively trade quickly developed out of the eagerness of the rice farmer for cash. Whole barges of Masagana 99 fertilizers were shipped from Luzon to Negros, until a stop was put to the practice. But such sales to sugar planters within the same province, e.g., Pampanga or Iloilo, were on a smaller scale and were much more difficult to detect or halt. They have continued to plague the program until today, reducing the productivity of rice and thus the rice farmer’s ability to repay his loan.

Repayment percentages, over 90 percent, were remarkably good for a government credit scheme during Phases I and II. By Phase III, however, the PNB’s repayment had already dipped to below 70 percent.

The Rural Banks, still claiming 91 percent repayment into Phase III, were attempting to fool the Central Bank by extending loans out of which old loans could be repayed. Bad weather helped bring the repayment percentage in Phase IV (November 1974 to April 1975) down to 62 percent for the PNB and 72 percent for the Rural Banks, according to official figures. As the Central Bank and the PNB became more and more alarmed about rising arrearages—which have now reached nearly 1 billion—more drastic measures were taken. The help of the PC was asked, some of the more obvious delinquents were taken to court, and a few officials were removed for having been caught in “fake farmer” rackets, i.e., taking loans given to agricultural technicians, and even barangay captions, to encourage them to assist more effectively in the collection process. Still into Phase V the collection percentage continued to drop. The farmer’s perception of Masagana 99 as a “government loan” —having more the character of dole than credit— was an underlying factor which new policies could hardly touch.

In addition to intensifying the collection process, it became more and more difficult for delinquent borrowers to borrow again—until in the current Phase VII it became absolutely impossible. Thus the amount of funds loaned, and even more sharply the number of borrowers, began to drop. Borrowers in Phases V and VI were little more than two-thirds of those during Phases III and IV. Thus the number of borrowers—who are both owners and tenants—is now less than the total number of CLTs issued. And scores of thousands of rice and corn farmers are disenchanted with RB or PNB credit, whether the fault lies with themselves or the system.

Even though the interest rate of 12 percent is far lower than that for alternative sources of credit, the farmer also has other criteria by which he judges the desirability of a credit source. From usurers he has come to expect prompt service, without restrictions on use, free of forms and other paper work—all at which is the antithesis of bank loans. Furthermore he values very highly a lenient approach to delinquency, often forgetting that he loses more than he gains from postponement of a usurious loan. Such values are deeply ingrained, and are not changed easily. For the vast majority of Masagana 99 loan recipients, this was their first brush with institutionalized credit. Now they are threatened with the stockade if they do not pay an overdue loan. Some are sufficiently frightened to sell their carabao in order to allow early repayment. Thus whether it is from psychological preference or economic necessity, a large portion of former Masagana 99 farmers are again

propelled toward the usurer for credit needs. It is probably a much smaller group that benefited sufficiently or budgeted carefully enough that they are now no longer in need of borrowing.

Thus the long-term benefits to land transfer which Masagana 99 might have provided are likely to be rather minimal. The increased production achieved by many farmers was based on fertilizer input, but without loans most farmers cannot afford to put on the prescribed amount, so that yields will fall again. Fertilizer usage in rice farming already dropped 20 percent from 1974 to 1975, and is still on the decline.

The economics of the program itself were hardly redistributive. The Rural Banking system nearly doubled gross income from 1972, before Masagana 99, to 1974, the first full year of operation. And by 1975 the net income for the system rose to an all time high of 28 percent of gross income. Yet even these figures probably conceal the rural bankers' true gain. For instance, privately owned rural banks—which are often slower in paying the Central Bank than farmer borrowers are in paying them—sometimes establish “money shops” in the town market. Though advertising interest rates of 14 percent per annum, a closer analysis of *real* interest rates reveals figures above 100 percent, and this with Central Bank money borrowed at 1 percent per annum. The rural banking business became so profitable that 1974 saw the largest number of new banks opened in the system's history, 76 in all. These were often owned by the very same families that were supposed to be “victims” of land reform. Probably the greatest beneficiaries of the program are distributors of agricultural inputs, who, at the local level are often the rural bankers as well, if not local politicians. In sum, the profits to lenders and distributors was probably greater than actual interest savings of farmers, though a precise measurement is very difficult indeed.

Samahang Nayan. The SN is the barrio unit of a national cooperative structure conceived by Dr. Orlando Sacay which is eventually supposed to include 40 Cooperative Rural Banks and 60 Area Marketing Cooperatives, as well as central cooperative institutions, of which the Cooperative Insurance System of the Philippines was the first to operate. By the end of 1975 there were 15 registered AMCs, not all of which were yet operative, and 2 registered CRBs, only one of which was functioning. At the base of the system there were 14,329 registered SN with nearly 100,000 members. In terms of membership this is one of the largest organizational structures in the Philippines—and it grew 25 percent during 1975. Total savings, composed of the general fund, the

barrio savings fund, and the barrio guarantee fund, amounted to the impressive figure in January 1976 of 42.7 million. Total savings had nearly doubled in 1975. It is hardly accurate to say, therefore, as some critics have, that the Samahang Nasyon program is dead. What is true, however, is that totals and averages hide a wide variety of health among the numerous associations.

Dr. Sacay himself has admitted that less than 20 percent of SN are really healthy.⁵ This is apparently measured in terms of approximate adherence to the schedule of collections from members —5 per month for the BSF and one cavan per hectare per harvest for the BGF— and fairly regular meetings of the various SN committees. There is essentially no place in the evaluation forms used for successful innovation, i.e., new projects, new types of activities.

Perhaps a majority of the SN are moribund: they are not collecting savings or holding meetings, and their members would resign if they could. But the Bureau of Cooperative Development will not allow any SN member who resigns to withdraw his savings, so even the most disgruntled still continue to appear on the membership roles.

The causes for this disgruntlement are many, and can be traced back to the origins of the program. SNs began to be formed in 1973 under great pressure from the top. Though they are officially “voluntary organizations,” threats which held some potency in the early days of Martial Law were often used to bring in the new members to the time-consuming training programs. There were also false promises, e.g., “only those who join the SN will receive Masagana 99 loans.”

As training continued it was explained, quite correctly, that the goal of the SN was to accumulate capital so as to create a cooperative rural bank and an ACM which could service the farmers. But the SN itself was not supposed to be engaged in either cooperative marketing or credit —though some of the healthy ones have done so extra-legally. The vast majority of SN members are not serviced to this day by either CRB or AMC, so understandably they have lost interest. One particularly acute DLGCD officer observed that if it had not been for the launching of the CISP program in late 1974 and early 1975 the whole co-

⁵ The statistics on which Dr. Sacay, Undersecretary for Cooperative Development, DLGCD, bases this admission are to be found in reports of the Agricultural Credit and Cooperatives Institute, financed by the International Development Research Centre, Ottawa; they are carefully guarded from the quizzical eye of the researcher.

operative structure in his province would have collapsed. Life insurance was well sold by DLGCD field men and the payment of death benefits seems to have been quite prompt in the few instances where it has so far been necessary. But in time even the insured began to examine this rather minimal group policy more closely, and the enthusiasm has waned. In those municipalities where SN are not yet serviced by a co-operative marketing or credit structure it will probably be difficult to revive the disillusioned membership. They will be more skeptical than ever about new promises associated with the cooperative structure.

The creation of additional CRBs has been faced with some special obstacles created, in effect, by another agrarian program, Masagana 99. Upon release of Masagana loans the PNB, or the Rural Bank, was supposed to deduct 5 percent for deposit in the savings account of the SN, credit to the individual farmer. Many RBs failed to do this, but probably most did. When it came time to organize a CRB the capitalization was to be derived from the BSF of the Samahang Nayon. But the Rural Banks refused to release the savings, even on formal request of the board of directors of the SN, and produced a letter from the Central Bank to justify their stand. Their contention was that as long as SN members were overdue in repayment of their loans, the bank "had no funds" to pay out savings withdrawals. The Central Bank and the Department of Local Government and Cooperative Development may soon be resolved, but the formation of Cooperative Rural Banks has already been delayed for more than a year, thus contributing to further demoralization among Samahang Nayon members.

The moribund state of so many SNs is a threat to the success of the land reform program. (The reverse is also true. Nothing more effectively destroys an SN than the failure of its members to receive the CLTs which they think they deserve; and many have been so destroyed.) The SN is given the responsibility of guaranteeing the prompt payment of amortization by its members who are land reform beneficiaries. All CLT recipients are, in turn, supposed to join a Samahang Nayon. In case of complete default, the SN must find another landless farmer to cultivate the lot in question and assume amortization payment himself. In the interim the SN may have to take direct responsibility for the operation of the farm. This mechanism has not yet functioned, though it may soon be put to the test. It is a challenge even to a healthy SN with strong leadership. It is hard to be optimistic about what will happen in other types of SN, which are more numerous.

In sum, the government credit and cooperative programs designed to

bolster land reform have operated quite imperfectly. It is yet too early to tell whether the major problems can be corrected fast enough to reinvigorate these programs. The cooperative mechanism is a delicate one, in which mutual trust and the nature of leadership are overwhelmingly important. It is not susceptible to rapid qualitative change at central direction, particularly when that direction is not responsive to local differences. The Masagana 99 program, on the other hand, depends much more heavily on a centrally administered bureaucracy. Bureaucratic leadership has reacted rather well so far to feedback, and may yet be able to alter policies and procedures so as to revive the Masagana 99 and put it on a stable footing.

Inevitably, however, a successful credit program, built on the proven ability to repay and designed to increase production, will conflict with a policy of agrarian reform dedicated to strengthening the position of the disadvantaged. In the past, production oriented considerations have always been given priority over those emphasizing equity. The conflict between the Rural Banks and the cooperatives is a case in point, and must be resolved at the highest levels. If the resolution is to be made in the spirit of agrarian reform, the cooperatives must be freed from unnecessary restraints. They could become the institutions most truly representative of the tiller of the soil.

Despite the public focus on land reform in recent years, there are a variety of other government policies which greatly affect the distribution of land. Those of longer standing have to do with disposition of public land, today centered in the Bureau of Lands and the Resettlement Division of DAR. The more recent developments are primarily focused on promoting agricultural production, but nevertheless have a very direct impact on patterns of land ownership and control.

Disposition of public land

Organized land settlement in sparsely populated provinces and municipalities was a major emphasis in the agrarian reform program under Magsaysay. It has continued to be popular among landlords, who see it as an alternative to land transfer in heavily populated areas. Today land settlement programs are handicapped by Muslim unrest in many parts of Mindanao. But perhaps the most basic reason for the relative lack of emphasis on resettlement today is that the Philippines is running out of vacant cultivable land. In 1974 the Bureau of Lands reported that there were only 346,129 has. of disposable public agricultural land on which

there were as yet no applications —compared to 1,469,517 has. on which there were applications pending. Organized land settlement may well be de-emphasized also simply because it is a very expensive way to open up public land. The record of settler repayment on government advances designed to facilitate the resettlement process is very poor.

The argument used to be made that organized land settlements was preferable to the free-for-all so poorly supervised by the Bureau of Lands because it avoided land conflict and was able to enforce the rules against tenancy on homesteaded land. But the experience over the last two decades even cast those contentions in doubt. Tenancy is rife within the settlements and has been for years. Even settlement officers often have their own *kasama*, or share tenants. Thus figures on families resettled cannot be equated with cultivator ownership. There are now over 50,000 officially recognized settler families on nearly 700,000 has. of DAR land.

Though settlement areas are not without land conflicts, the situation on other public land is probably worse. The compilation and organization of statistics in the Bureau of Lands is so poor that it is quite impossible to tell how many disputed claims there actually are. But the problem was recognized as serious enough in 1973 that Secretary Tanco of the DANR drafted a decree to provide for the cancellation of illegally acquired public land, even without the lengthy, cumbersome court procedures which are now required. Unfortunately the decree has never been signed and the cancellation of what are certainly vast areas of illegal acquisition proceeds at a snail's pace.

Because the Bureau of Lands has no data on patents issued by land size, or information on the number of patentees who have tenants, it is impossible to know how many cultivator owners are created by its program.⁶ Even though the great majority of patents are in the homestead and free patent category, limited to 24 has., the courts have invariably upheld the right of public land applicants to use tenants in the occupation and cultivation of lands for which they apply. This fact came to the attention of the President in 1973, causing him to issue P.D. 152, "Prohibiting the Employment or use of Share Tenants in Complying with Requirements of Law Regarding Entry, Occupation, Improvement

⁶ A 1972 study by J. Steward in Hagonoy, Davao del Sur, which had been originally settled by homesteaders, revealed tenancy rates of *over* 80 percent. Quoted in Gelia Castillo, *All in a Grain of Rice* (Los Baños: SARC, 1975), p. 270.

and Cultivation of Public Lands” However, even though the decree authorized the denial of application or cancellation of grant on the grounds of the use of tenants, there is no evidence available that any such denials or cancellation actually took place. From 1973 through 1975 more than 313,000 public land patents were issued, probably less than 1/5 of which established actual tillers as owners. Even so, 62,000 constitute three times the number of owner-cultivators tentatively created by DAR and the Land Bank in the same period.

Corporate farming

Since Martial Law there has been a remarkable increase in the area planted to export crops, primarily because of the influence of world prices, but partially also to avoid land reform, at least in certain areas. Nearly 94,000 more hectares were planted to sugar in the crop year 1974-75 than just three years earlier. Based on field inspections in some of the areas where such crop conversion is taking place, but without the benefit of adequate statistics, it seems likely that at least half of that was formerly planted to rice or corn. And of that 47,000 has., at least half again was either purchased from cultivators or planted to sugar after ejecting or buying out the tenants.

Bananas began their most rapid growth before Martial Law, with production jumping from less than 2 million boxes in 1969 to more than 28 million in 1972. But since then an additional 5,800 has. has been planted. While some of this land was in old abaca plantations or uncultivated, the great majority of it was converted from rice or corn.

In almost all cases the conversions from rice or corn involved the displacement of either owner-cultivator or tenant. Tenants, of course, were thereby deprived of benefits of land reform. Owners were given rent for their land, and some were hired as laborers on plantations. The lease agreement seemed favorable to most owner-cultivators when they were first told about it —though they were seldom allowed to read it. Banana companies offered 400 or 500 per hectare and promised five years payment in advance. For the man with six hectares and a large family 30,000 in cash was a *tremendous* amount of money! Some were able to invest this money in another piece of land, a small business, or at least a new house. Other were more profligate. For most the cash was gone within a year or so and alternate income sources were meager indeed. Within two years of the advance, some plantation managers came back to the owner-lessor to tell him a very new piece of news, that the advance was subject to interest and that a substantial interest

payment was now due. As a result several former owner-cultivators have had to sell their land to the plantation in order to pay their debts. This process will undoubtedly accelerate over the years. In any case, renewal of the lease is at the option of the plantation, so that the owner could be permanently reduced to the status of laborer or tenant without actually losing rights to the land.

The plantation should be pleased indeed to get access to land for such a ridiculously low cost. For the net profit per hectare on banana land, according to the industry's own figures, was 11,000 last year! The landowner is getting a handsome 4 percent of the profit! Pineapple land is being leased by Philippine Packing Corporation for 200 per year, if level, and 2.00 per year, if rolling. As in the case of some banana plantations, PPC has leased certain areas from absentees whose right to the land is disputed by the actual cultivator. But in the process the cultivator is being driven off.⁷

The physical ejection of the actual cultivator is often the consequence of corporate cultivation under G.O. 47, enunciated by President Marcos in 1974 to boost the country's rice production. All corporations with more than 500 employees are required either to import rice at their own expense or to produce it; 158 corporations as of May 1976 have chosen to cultivate 28,460 has., about 19,000 of which is leased. Victorias Milling Co., for example, leased from the Mindoro Agricultural School, then proceeded to bulldoze the occupants who had been trying for years to get legal title to the public land they had so long cultivated. In rice and corn areas of Mindanao it is common for the corporation to enter into a lease with a small owner, similar to that of the banana plantation. In one instance in Davao the G.O. 47 corporate farmer was clever enough to tie up the desired area in leases only months before the public announcement of an NIA irrigation project—in direct violation, by the way, of G.O. 47. It is estimated that more than 15,000 has. have been lost to farming by tenants, owners or claimant-occupants as a result of G.O. 47.

Also in 1974 President Marcos issued a decree opening up another type of corporate farming. P.D. 472 required all holders of timber licenses and pasture leases on public land “to develop areas within their con-

⁷ Vincent G. Cullen, S.J., “Sour Pineapples: Priest Exposes Landgrabbing Activities of Philippine Packing Corporation in Bukidnon,” *Signs of the Times*, Manila, June 12, 1976, pp. 17-24.

cessions for the production of rice, corn and other basic staples to take care of the consumption requirements of their workers and the people within their areas." But previously most of the easily cultivable hectareage within timber and pasture concessions had already been planted by land-hungry farmers, who were nevertheless unable to acquire any right to the land they tilled because the Bureau of Forestry refused to classify it as suitable for agricultural purposes, and thus "alienable and disposable." Many such farmers had petitioned the Bureau vainly for years, only to find that the interests of more powerful people were attended to first. Therefore, on the nearly 26,000 hectares already being farmed under the provisions of this decree, thousands of cultivators are being driven off the land to which they first set the plow. Only a small portion are being hired back as laborers.

Thus it seems fair to say that since 1972 about 70,000 hectares of agricultural land tilled by more than 20,000 families have slipped out of the control of the cultivator due to government policies encouraging agricultural production —or more than the area gained by 26,000 tenants through land reform. Since we have not yet entered into the balance sheet on the one side, cultivators who receive homesteads and free patents or, on the other, the seizing of ancestral lands from tribal groups, both Muslim and non-Muslim, or the loss of land through indebtedness — the most important and least researched process of them all— one must conclude that on balance, the trend on the land is *away* from the ownership and control of the cultivator and toward the expansion of the absentee landlord. This is a trend which has been uninterrupted for centuries. It is only a pity that with all the resources at the command of the government today, it cannot be halted.

A consequence of the continuing loss of land by the cultivator is the growth of the landless labor class, a category that has not benefited in any way from government credit or cooperative programs, or from land reform itself. Though its growth has been speeded by the recent efforts to evade land reform and by the emphasis on corporate farming, the ranks of landless laborers were being augmented already in the late 1960's by government credit programs to facilitate the purchase of tractors, financed by the World Bank,⁸ programs which continue until the present. Such loans made it easier for landlords to eject their tenants

⁸ Bart Duff, "Output, Employment and Mechanization in Philippine Agriculture," International Rice Research Institute, Los Baños, Paper No. 75-01, December, 1974.

and shift to farming with wage labor. Though one recent estimate suggests that there are 8 million landless laborers, 80 percent of the rural working force,⁹ this includes all tenants, not just those without any tenure rights on the land, a more useful definition. In any case, landless laborers are of increasing importance, not just on sugar plantations, but in rice-growing areas, as well, and for the newer export crops that are expanding so rapidly. The government recently recognized their plight by the creation of the Rural Workers' Office in the Department of Labor.

Political consequences

Since the political purpose of land reform and its ancillary policies was to create mass support for the New Society and its leader, and to undermine support for alternative leadership on both the right and left, it is well to take a closer look at the actual political impact, as policy-makers themselves may also be doing. Agrarian policies are perceived differently by different groups, of course. Those whose perceptions and attitude we must attempt to understand are rice and corn landlords, their tenants, cultivator-owners and claimants dislocated by various types of corporate farming, and the corporate farmers themselves.

We have already described the way in which landlords have attempted to evade the impact of land reform. This is associated with various tactics designed to maintain the influence of a patron over his clients. Such landowners, who are undoubtedly in a majority, are often embittered against the government. A large portion have the attitude of "sitting out the duration," hoping that somehow land reform will "go away". Only a halt to land reform, and a more generous compensation for those who have already had their land taken, will mollify this group. They are now so suspicious of the government's intentions that they assume that land reform will be extended to other crops and pushed down to zero retention on rice and corn. Their preparations to meet such an eventuality, e.g., harrassment or quiet dispossession of tenants, are creating further agrarian conflict. In this group there is a strong disposition to welcome a change in top governmental leadership.

⁹ Alfredo M. de la Rosa (Executive Director, Office of Manpower Planning and Development, National Manpower and Youth Council), "Training Policies, Programs and Institutions for Employment in the Rural Areas," Paper delivered at Asian Conference on Landless Rural Workers, Manila, March, 1976.

Among the landlords there is a sizable minority, however, who are either more philosophical, more urban oriented, or simply have a wider array of economic interests outside land, who are not opposed to land reform in principle, but are unhappy about the method of acquisition and the amount of payment. It is this group which might be turned from neutral to supportive of government through an increase in the cash payment by the Land Bank. This group will probably share the displeasure of their diehard compadres with the BCLP evaluation, but would be less likely to try to block its implementation.

On balance, then, landlords are hostile toward and apprehensive of the land reform program, and these attitudes will be intensified if the program is implemented further. Negative attitudes will also tend to become more generalized toward central government leadership over time. And as the reform is pushed down to smaller holdings, the hostility of smaller landowners will increase most rapidly. Such findings would seem to counsel a slowing down, or even halting, of the land reform program.

But the attitudes of tenants must also be accounted for. There is a segment of the tenantry which is also uneasy about land reform. They usually have a close, warm relationship with their landlords and are afraid of a future that might break that tie, forcing them to take greater risks. Thus when landlords suggest that they will no longer be able to give emergency loans or *rasyon* after land reform, such tenants might easily be persuaded to surrender their CLTs. Or they might be susceptible to landlord advice not to join a Samahang Nayon. In any case, this group does not constitute more than 10 to 25 percent of the tenant class, and are to be found most often in isolated towns. Their attitude toward central government is vague, but being easily influenced by landlords, could turn hostile.

The great majority of tenants, on the other hand, would seem to welcome land reform. Those who have been demanding reform over a period of years will tend to regard it as a matter of right, and thus be particularly critical of any shortcoming in implementation. Lachica reports that in Central Luzon most tenants believed that earlier land reform efforts were a response to the Huk insurgency.¹⁰ The larger number who have not been part of an organized peasantry will be

¹⁰ Eduardo Lachica, *HUK: Philippine Agrarian Society in Revolt* (Manila: Solidaridad Publishing House, 1971), p. 33.

“grateful for the privilege given to us by President Marcos.” Both subtypes are supportive of the national government today. The former category could turn against the government, however, if they decide that this reform is another “palabas,” or sham. The latter’s support will erode more slowly since their expectations were not so high in the first place. In any case, the failure to receive a CLT—even for a reason which may seem “good” to an administrator— or inordinate delay in the opportunity to stop paying rent to the landlord could turn positive political attitudes toward central government into negative ones. To hold the support of the tenants, it would seem to follow that effective implementation of agrarian reform must be speeded up, including cooperative marketing and credit as well as land transfer.

And what of those unaffected by agrarian reform, but whose livelihood and status is profoundly altered by the intrusion of corporate farming? This is a large category composed of several subtypes only a few of which can be mentioned. If the displaced tenant had no expectation of land reform and is able to become a tenant elsewhere, despite the inconvenience of the move, his basic status has not changed. It is much more common, however, that those displaced are either owners or public land claimants. The former was probably able to sign a lease, often disguised as a “growers contract,” with the farm corporation and in the first few years is basking in the luxury of his advanced cash payment. For most, however, that period ends all too quickly. They are forced into a search for wage labor or a tenant holding, a significant status deflation. In the meantime they are becoming aware of the tremendous profits being made from their land, especially in the case of bananas or pineapple. Insofar as they recognize the role which government played in their dispossession, their understandable frustrations will be turned against government as well as corporate farms. At that point they are ripe for dissident recruitment.

The most immediately explosive case, however, is that of the cultivator-claimant who has been trying for years to get legal rights to his land, but who is physically forced to stand aside upon the entrance of a corporate farm. There have already been armed clashes with such people, but those with superior wealth usually have command of superior force, and the cultivator is effectively dislodged. A generation ago when this happened—and it happened often then too—the loser trekked to new unoccupied land and started again the tiresome process of making ideal land productive. Today, however, it is seldom possible to find cultivable unoccupied land, so the displaced cultivator is most

often reduced to sporadic wage labor. His bitterness is deep and his propensity to violence, great. All that is needed is leadership to turn that violence to political purposes. Thus increased rice, banana or pineapple production today may have been bought at the price of a widening rebellion within the next few years.

The corporate farmers themselves are not as pleased with the situation as one might imagine of an entrepreneur embarking on a new venture. They were forced into rice farming by G.O. 47 and P.D. 472 and some claim it will not be profitable. In any case, it requires new capital outlays and involves new kinds of management headaches. Some of the corporations involved are owned by landlords dispossessed by land reform, so that their political attitudes are colored by both policies. But for the most part corporation executives and board members are affected by such a wide array of government programs that the agrarian dimension is a minor element in their thinking. Market prices and profitability are more relevant to their mood.

If there were an uninhibited flow of information to the President from all sectors of the Filipino populace affected by agrarian policy, we could see that he would receive strong signals both to speed up the reform, and to slow it down. Since it is his style to try to please everyone, just as if he were soon to face an election, his apparent inaction is, therefore, understandable.

But the feedback process is far from perfect. With an end to electoral competition, and the muzzling of the once free press, the upward flow of information outside the bureaucracy has been substantially restricted. Patterns of personal connections reminiscent of the "Old Society" determine who reaches the President's ear. Thus it is those with economic power and political influence who get their message across most often, i.e., the landlords. The one organized landlord group, with the acronym ALARM, feels dissatisfied with the President's response to its advice. But, as of old, the messages most persistently and effectively transmitted are particularistic ones, not suggestions for alteration of policy.

The peasant voice is undoubtedly weaker than it was before Martial Law. Though certain peasant leaders are occasionally allowed to speak to the President, and Samahang Nasyon officials send telegrams or letters to Malacañang Palace from time to time, the channels have narrowed. Other peasant leaders are in jail or coerced into silence. A Presidential Action Committee on Land Problems had been created in 1970, with provincial committees reporting to it. However, its function of investi-

gating and resolving expeditiously "disputes over land between small settlers and big landowners and between Christians and cultural minorities" was effectively limited to Mindanao. And by 1974 it had become inactive. It was reinvigorated by Presidential Decree in 1975, but continues to focus its attention on Mindanao, where, to be sure, land problems are the most acute. But only the most serious conflicts reach the provincial committee, and not a few erstwhile complainants are inhibited by the fact that the committee is chaired by the Provincial Commander of the Philippine Constabulary. Elsewhere the farmer's only appeal is to the very bureaucracy which is the cause of his problem. A caveat distilled by Samuel Huntington from the experience of many countries is indeed relevant; "Peasant participation may not be necessary to pass (land reform) legislation, (but) it *is* necessary to implement (it)."¹¹ However, this may be an inevitable limitation on land reform under Martial Law.

Given the predominance of communication from the landed class, it is not surprising that appropriations are inadequate and administrative clarifications infrequent. The President and his advisors, as is true of so many political leaders, are making decisions on the basis of short-term calculations. They are probably unaware of the fact that this is not a case of half-a-loaf being better than none.

A land reform which is primarily a public relations effort is harmless enough, since the wily peasant expects nothing of it anyway. A fully implemented reform, on the other hand, can create a newly satisfied and conservative peasantry, as it did in Japan. But a half-completed job has explosive potential. Those who have suffered from landlord evasion tactics are the most disillusioned. And while landlords themselves are unhappy, a large percentage of the peasantry, given a promise which seemed in the process of fulfillment, also feel cheated when fulfillment repeatedly slips into the future. This is hardly the basis for legitimacy and stability, especially when the traditional source of legitimacy, elections, has been discarded.

Philippine agrarian reform has already produced an increase in rural conflict since 1973. That conflict will spread most rapidly if the reform slows to a halt less than halfway to its original goal.

This does not mean, however, that peasant rebellion is imminent, despite some of the warnings in the literature. "Decentralized sharecrop-

¹¹ *op. cit.*, p. 394.

ping systems in general and irrigated rice production in particular are likely to create a homogenous landless peasantry with strong incentives for collective action. . . These economic characteristics should in turn lead to political radicalism," says Jeffrey Paige, adding even more emphatically, "Rice sharecropping. . . (is) most likely to lead to agrarian revolution."¹² Despite later qualifications, it is clear that the Vietnam example weighs too heavily in his thinking. In any case, for a country like the Philippines where, despite legislation, a majority of rice farmers are tenants and majority of tenants are sharecroppers, such a prediction of tendency cannot be dismissed lightly.

Nor is the warning from Keith Griffin to be disregarded, in light of the rapid proliferation of wage laborers in Philippine agriculture. Says he: "Technical change in agriculture. . . tends to increase relative inequality and in some cases even reduce absolutely the standard of living of large sections of the rural population . . . Eventually . . . the tenant will have been converted into an agricultural laborer. . . The Philippines case study illustrates (a tendency toward) a polarization of classes. . . If. . . inequality is rising while employment and output are relatively stagnant, the stage will be set for a violent confrontation."¹³

Barrington Moore touches a different dimension when he discounts the likelihood of agrarian rebellion when patron-client relations are strong.¹⁴ But precisely as a result of land reform policy, patron-client ties in the Philippines are eroding more rapidly than ever before.

Yet neither social nor economic conditions, per se, produce successful radical peasant political activity. Even if there is a critical "sense of deprivation" among cultivators, they must also have effective leadership and, as several writers have concluded from recent studies, be provided with the opportunities inherent in a breakdown of governmental authority.¹⁵ Since authority is now being all too effectively exercised by the

¹² Jeffrey M. Paige, *Agrarian Revolution: Social Movements and Export Agriculture in the Underdeveloped World* (New York: Free Press, 1975), pp. 62-63, 369.

¹³ Keith Griffin, *The Political Economy of Agrarian Change: An Essay on the Green Revolution* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), pp. 73-76.

¹⁴ Barrington Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), p. 470.

¹⁵ See Donald Zagoria, ed., Special Issue of Peasants and Revolution, *Comparative Politics*, VIII: 3 (April, 1976), passim.

Martial Law regime, it is apparent that under present conditions agrarian rebellion could hardly be the cause of its downfall. The groundwork is being laid, however, for a situation in which peasant revolution might succeed, if President Marcos had already been overthrown. But, of course, since we are attempting to project several years into the future, variables could appear which are not now on the horizon.

Peasant Mobilization in Java: Conflict-Model Strategy in Rural Development

Gerrit Huizer

In recent years considerable attention has been given to the "conflict-model", as opposed to the "harmony-model", as a strategy through which dynamic changes can be introduced in developed as well as developing countries. The effectiveness of the "harmony-model", implying gradual adaptations in the overall existing social system so that it can continue to function, is more and more debated. One example is the strategy of "planned change"¹ which has been advocated for years as a means to solve the problems which people in the developed and developing countries are facing. The failure of this strategy to cope with such issues as radical integration or poverty particularly in the developing countries has become so blatantly visible that even institutions such as the United Nations speak about it and propose the "conflict-model" as an alternative strategy. This e.g. in relation with community development.

Community development has for many years taken as a frame of reference the idea of the harmonious traditional community where people have a natural inclination towards cooperation. The official United Nations statement regarding community development a decade ago indicated:

"These programs are usually concerned with local commu-

¹ Warren C. Bennis, Kenneth D. Benne and Robert Chin, editors, *The Planning of Change*, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966; in the school of "andragogy" (including community development, adult education, social work, etc.) in the Netherlands the debate about "conflict-model" versus "harmony-model" has recently started. In USA Saul Alinsky has been a protagonist of the "conflict-model" for years. See e.g. M.V. Beugen, "Pleidooi voor Kritische agogïe", *Vrij Nederland*, February 21, 1970.

nities because of the fact that the people living together in a locality have many and varied interests in common”².

In a recent United Nations evaluation of accomplishments and drafting of a future policy it was emphasized that the idea of harmonious communities are ridden by factional or other forms of internal struggle and conflict of interests. It was suggested these conflicts should be evaluated realistically and these forces utilized constructively.³

The U.N. document pointed out that over-emphasis on traditional consensus may block the development of innovation. In a traditional society the dominant groups in the community have means to control these individuals who threaten the existing order. Therefore:

“A more effective strategy than that of community consensus could take the form of identifying creatively deviant individuals, helping them to cultivate leadership qualities, and creating new groups and organizations around them”⁴.

In cases where the social structure and climate are adverse to dynamic development, conflict may thus have a more positive quality as an innovating force than consensus based on tradition or adaptations in the *status quo*. The forces operating in the conflict situation which exists in rigidly traditional rural areas, may be channelled constructively.

Thus, solidarity of peasants, shown in distrust and resistance can be a positive force, facilitating their mobilization, rather than being an impediment to it.

Until today few experiments have been carried out, and even fewer have been described, where the utilization of dissent and conflict has been applied systematically in a constructive way, and radical enough to create an atmosphere of enthusiasm amongst formerly underprivileged peasants⁵.

² This statement followed the generally accepted United Nations definition of community development in *Community Development and Related Services*, E/2931 Annex III, United Nations, 1960, par. 3.

³ *Popular Participation in Development: Emerging Trends in Community Development*, United Nations, New York 1971, p. 6 ff.

⁴ Ibid. p. 26.

⁵ For some interesting cases see Gerrit Huizer, *The Revolutionary Potential of Peasants in Latin America*, Lexington Books, Heath: Lexington Mass., 1972, particularly chapter 2.

One example where the "harmony-model" strategy of community development failed to mobilize the peasantry but where the carefully introduced "conflict-model" strategy around the peasantry to active participation in agrarian reform occurred between 1953 and 1965 in Java, Indonesia.

In Java the way of solving problems, or of living with them, has traditionally been dominated by the "harmony-model", *rukun*. In this context, established leaders have generally monopolized community and other development facilities. Programs such as the *Lomboka Social Desa* (LSD, literally Village Social Institution) have, understandably, not found an enthusiastic response among the peasantry⁶. The better-off, particularly the village-heads, the *lurahs*, generally determined the kinds of programs to be implemented, benefitting their own circles, rather than the poor peasantry. Some scholars have emphasized that the harmony, supposed to exist in Javanese villages was a fiction as it is in most of the developing countries⁷.

The Indonesian peasant front

The "conflict-model" strategy was systematically applied from 1953 onward when the General-Secretary of the Indonesian Communist Party Aidit initiated a peasant organization campaign which brought over 8 million peasants into the ranks of the *Barisan Tani Indonesia* (BTI, Indonesian Peasant Front) in the following ten years. This organization became also militant enough to be able to undertake such radical actions as the occupation of land belonging rich landowners by poor and landless peasants.

According to the instructions given by Aidit to the BTI organizers, the strategy which can be defined as the "conflict-model" was introduced gradually and carefully⁸.

⁶ H. ten Dam, *Cooperation and Social Structure in the Village of Chibodas*, in Indonesian Economics: *The Concept of Dualism in Theory and Policy*, van Hoeve, The Hague, 1961.

⁷ For some examples see J. Helmer and E. Weitering, *Kommunitatipatrenen in een West-Javaanse Desa*, Doctoraalscriptie, Tilburg, 1970, mimeo.

⁸ Quotations are from C.P.I., *National Peasants Conference, Documents*, Djakarta, April 1959, Supplement to *Review of Indonesia*, no. 6-7, June/July, p. 6 and 7.

1) As one of the first and most important steps the “going down” development was indicated. Party-leaders and activists of different levels went to the villages and tried, through the method of “Three Togethers” (eat together, work together and live together with the peasants) to win the confidence of the peasants in order to find out exactly what the agrarian relationships at the village level were and to investigate the social and economic conditions of the peasants, or, in party terminology: “to assess the strength of the classes in the villages.” It was emphasized that special attention should be given to the number of persons and the size of landlord’s holdings, rich peasants, middle poor peasants, agricultural laborers and other “classes”.

2) After winning the confidence of the peasants and becoming profoundly acquainted with the specific problems of the various kinds of peasants and farmers in the village, actions had to be taken which would lead to the improvements in a gradual way. Such actions were to be “small but successful”. As was noted: “The peasants and especially the peasants directly concerned, must be convinced of the justice and advantages of every demand raised and the demand must be in conformity with the strength of the peasant’s organization”.

It was recommended that the activists must “strive to draw in and arouse 90 per cent of the inhabitants of the village and must genuinely base themselves upon the poor peasants and the agricultural laborers and unite with the middle peasants.”

Whenever a small but successful action of the community development type was undertaken, the cadres emphasized that this was only a preliminary solution as long as more important structural causes of poverty and lack of facilities remained, such as the exploitation by landowners and merchants.

First success: land reform legislation

As a result of the organization drive the numerical strength of the Communist Party and the organizations guided by it, particularly the BTI, had become so impressive by 1959 that elections (which probably would have given this party a majority or the first rank), were postponed under pressure from the army⁹. The influence of the BTI was, however,

⁹ Donald Hindley, *The Communist Party of Indonesia, 1951-1963*, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1964, gives a good description of the strategy and growth of the PKI.

strong enough to get the first Indonesian land reform law promulgated in 1960, as demanded.

The BTI leader Asmu had declared that land reform was the ultimate goal of the peasant struggle, but that a gradual approach would be accepted. While it was demanded that lands of landlords belonging to the Darul Islam (an Islamic terrorist organization harassing the rural areas) be confiscated, because they had been involved in efforts to overthrow the government, the "patriotic" landlords would not be affected and it was only demanded that they share the yield with their tenants on a 60-40 basis. BTI also demanded that the maximum amount of land that a landlord would be allowed to have should be 5 hectares of irrigated land or 10 hectares of dry land¹⁰. The new law included these points more or less clearly.

Since in Java there were only relatively few landlords with more than 5 hectares the ceiling of 5 hectares did not leave much land to be distributed to those who had no land or not enough for subsistence.

The "ceiling" was relatively high for Javanese conditions where the average plot is about half a hectare.

The law, however, was seen as a good starting point and the BTI launched a campaign to make the peasants acquainted with the new law and demand its implementation. This implementation came about very slowly.

The activities of the land reform committees legally in charge of the distribution procedure started only on September 24, 1962, the second anniversary of the promulgation of the basic agrarian law.¹¹

Compared with similar efforts in other countries the publicity given in Indonesia to the land reform legislation by the authorities and even the Communist Party demonstrated little aggressiveness.

The first stage of the land reform program would be executed in Java and the Lesser Sunda Islands. In the course of 1963 the land reform committees in this area came out with the figure of 377, 445

¹⁰ Asmu, "The Question of Land Reform" *Review of Indonesia*, VII, no. 7, July 1960, p. 30-32., republished from the organ of the BTI, *Suara-Tani*.

¹¹ E. Utrecht, "Land Reform in Indonesia" *Bulletin of Indonesia Economic Studies*, V, no. 3 Canberra, Nov. 1969, p. 77; a highly interesting account of the various laws and the reform procedure can also be found in the Indonesian language in Boedi Harsono SH, *Undang-Undang Pekok Agraria*, Djambatan, Djakarta, third printing 1970.

hectares of land (including national domain) available for distribution. It was noted that the high "ceiling" and particularly the leniency towards the absentee landowners in this program area was a reason for the small amount of land available.

Much *sawah* land was in the hands of absentee landowners who lived in the towns in Central Java¹².

The chances for conflict between owners and potential beneficiaries were enhanced by the reaction of the landlords to the first steps of the implementation of the land reform law, the determination of the quantity or surplus land available. As a World Bank Report observed¹³:

Observations in the Javanese countryside in 1964 pointed to many evasions of the permissible retention. There was no clearly stated provision that to escape redistribution, ownership of a parcel of land to antedate the reform by a specified date. Lacking this, normal subdivision of a holding became as standard in Indonesia as it is elsewhere ceilings or ownership are introduced.

In addition to the fact that the land reform committees were often dominated by the representatives of the local elite, and was biased in favor of the larger landowners, they were also liable to certain forms of corruption¹⁴. Both factors interfered with the effective implementation of the reform program.

Radicalization of peasant pressure: "unilateral actions"

As a reaction to the slow and defective implementation of the land reform, and the determination of which surplus lands were to be expropriated, the BTI and PKI (Communist Party) stepped up their activities and became more militant, risking the more or less harmonious collaboration which existed at the national level between them and the various other political currents.

¹² E. Utrecht, op. cit., p. 78.

¹³ International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International Development Association, *Economic Development of Indonesia*, Vol III Annex 1, Agriculture, Report No. AS-1328. P. 37.

¹⁴ For a recent study see: J. Helmer and E. Weitering, op. cit. p. 43.

At a December 1963 meeting of the Central Committee of the PKI the slowness of implementation of the land reform was vigorously denounced. Figures were presented indicating that of over 200,000 hectares of surplus land that had been registered, less than 20,000 hectares had actually been distributed in the country as a whole.

In order to pressure for the speeding up of the reform program, Aidit endorsed and encouraged in a party report the so-called "unilateral action movement" (Gerakan Aksi Sefihak) of the peasant¹⁵. It is difficult to assess if the "unilateral action movement" was instigated by the BTI of PKI leadership or was a spontaneous reaction of the peasants themselves to doubtful practices and "unilateral actions" by land owners¹⁶ such as eviction. The "unilateral actions" were initiated somewhere in 1963 by peasants as well as landlords and generally implied not awaiting the decision of the Land Reform Committee, but taking the law in one's own hand.

Utrecht gave the following examples:

a. A landowner learns that one of his laborers has on his own initiative or at the instigation of the BTI, requested the local land reform committee to assign to him the property rights over the stretch of land that he tills. Without waiting for the decision of the committee, the landowner tries to oust his dangerous laborer. The latter seeks help from the BTI if it was not behind him already.

Then the landowner reports what is going on to the Petani advises him to issue an ultimatum as to the date on which the laborer has to leave his field. But one morning, some days before the ultimatum runs out, the landlord discovers on his field a crowd of 100 or more BTI members armed with stocks, hoes and sickles and working together. Off he hurries to the local board of Petani and after some time he returns accompanied by a band of Petani members as big or bigger than the BTI crowd on his field and provided with all sorts of weapons as well. A battle is fought and victims fall under the knives and the hoes or by the bullets of army or police units who have meanwhile intervened.

¹⁵ The report was later published as: Aidit, *Set Afire the Benteng Spirit*, Foreign Language Press, Peking 1964.

¹⁶ Wertheim suggested that in relation with the crucial land tenure issue the BTI may have followed a somewhat more radical line than the PKI; see B Gunawan, *Kudeta, Boom, Meppel*, Netherlands, p. 207, note 4.

b. A laborer, thinking that as a sharecropper he has a right to the local land reform committee, without awaiting the decision of the committee, refuses to hand in a part of the harvest to the landowner. (Not infrequently this happened on the advice of the BTI). The landowner, supported by Petani, then tries to get rid of his laborer by intimidating him. A mass of BTI members comes to the laborer's assistance and a fight develops.

c. A landowner does not await the decision of the land reform committee concerning a dispute on a stretch of his land, either because he is convinced that he will win the affair on objective, factual and legal grounds or because he feels assured of the support of some influential committee members who may have a party or a family relationship with him.

Here again, the laborers, encouraged and supported by the BTI, frequently take matters into their own hands by mass occupation of the disputed field¹⁷.

Then he drew the conclusion: "If one takes failure to await the decision of the committee as the criterion, *direct action was liable to be resorted to by either side, and not, as was often said, only by the landless peasant.*

The organization that sided with the party who had taken the initiative without awaiting the decision of the committee accused the opponent of having acted provocatively. This was often true, which clouded the issue still more"¹⁸.

While "unilateral actions" of the landowners tried to avoid the land distribution or the peasant claiming their new rights, the "unilateral actions" of the peasants were directed towards the initiation and acceleration of the land distribution process.

The tactic mostly used by peasants was occupation of the lands to which landless peasants were entitled according to the law. By occupying certain plots of land the peasants involved tried to indicate which lands were to be distributed, and to whom they were to be distributed, thus forcing the land reform committee in charge to speed up its decision. A complication that arose was that the BTI members who occupied a certain plot to be distributed, were not always those peasants who had a right to the land according to the legally established list of priorities

¹⁷ E. Utrecht, op. cit. p. 81-82.

¹⁸ Ibid., underlining by G.H.

(tenants tilling the land in question first, workers cultivating the land second, etc.). In several cases the BTI favored its own members in such actions in preference to members of the other smaller peasant organizations, even if these had priority according to the regulations. This gave reason for strife and conflict in some cases.¹⁹

Another issue to which the "unilateral actions" of peasants were directed was related to the sharecropping regulations. When the first three years after the promulgation of the law regarding this topic were over, and the contracts made between sharecroppers and owners terminated (contracts had to be made for three years!) sharecroppers did not want to give back the land they had been cultivating to the owner when he desired so, and simply refused *en bloc* to leave it. This happened in 1964 and 1965 on a rather large scale according to informants. Legally the owners had the right to take back their land to cultivate it themselves, but in many cases, BTI action prevented them from doing so.

One immediate effect of "unilateral actions" demanding fulfillment of the sharecropping agreements was probably that on March 2, 1964, the Regulation of the Minister of Agrarian Affairs No. 4 was promulgated to take measures against landowners who did not follow the stipulations of the local authorities regarding sharecropping. They could be denounced to the village land reform committee. As punishment for the landowners who were found guilty of violating the legal arrangements for division of the proceeds (mostly on a 50:50 basis) it was stipulated that 60 per cent of the harvest would be for the tiller, 20 per cent for the landowner and 20 per cent to be delivered to the Land Reform Committee. This regulation was made retroactive to Jan. 1, 1964.

In the application of the "conflict-model" strategy in each case the question arose of against whom exactly to direct the peasants' actions. Because of the complicated land tenure situation, the distinction between landlords and peasants was generally not easy to make. At the 1959 PKI Peasants' Conference the main target of the reform efforts was seen to be those "landlords" who were foreign or who actively supported or sympathized with the Darul Islam, the bands terrorizing some areas up to 1962 in a fight for the establishment of an Islamic state.

The peasants were divided into:

1. 'rich peasants' who are by nature 'semifeudal', lease out ex-

¹⁹ See for one case J. Helmer and E. Weitering, *op. cit.* p. 43.

cess land that they have and lend out money, although they may also work some of their own land;

2. 'middle peasants', who usually, but not always have enough land for their own needs and are as a rule 'independent economically', although they too may be exploited by moneylenders or landlords; and

3. 'poor peasants and agricultural laborers', with little or no land, and who, as tenants or sharecroppers, are wholly at the mercy of their landlords²⁰

In 1959 'rich peasants' were seen as neutral in the peasant struggle against 'landlords'. After the introduction of agrarian legislation, however, all owners of more than 5 hectares of irrigated land in densely populated areas or the equivalent in other kinds of land, were officially considered as landlords.

During the implementation of the reform a more precise knowledge of the land tenure situation was needed and in early 1964 the PKI leader Aidit launched a campaign that he personally headed, to investigate the rural situation in Central and East-Java. About 200 research workers and 2,500 assistants collaborated in this effort.²¹

It was noted: "As part of its intensive campaign to win adherents among the peasantry, the PKI under Aidit has carried on extensive research in land-tenure patterns in Indonesia; this has revealed very high concentrations of landownership in the hands of a few peasants and landlords in many areas. These data confirm the analyses made by non-communist investigators at least in Java"²²

The research of 1964 also tried to identify the "7 village devils": "wicked landlords, the blood-sucking money lenders, the *idjon* dealers, wicked middleman, the bureaucrat capitalists, wicked authorities and the village bandits"²³.

Through the research, awareness of new rights and willingness to

²⁰ Justus M. v. d. Kroef, *Agrarian Reform and the Communist Party, Far Eastern Survey*, 19, no. 1, jan. 1960, p. 6.

²¹ "Aidit completes research into conditions of peasants and peasants' movement *Review of Indonesia*, VII, no. 5-6-7, Djakarta May/June 1964.

²² Justus M. v. d. Kroef, *The Communist Party of Indonesia. Its History, Program and Tactics*. University of British Columbia, Vancouver 1965, p. 147.

²³ "Aidit completes research etc." op. cit. p. 28; *Idjon* is a type of usurious pawning of land and harvest.

overcome traditional domination was stimulated among the peasants, which expressed itself in the "unilateral actions" that took place particularly in Central and East Java.

The peasants were classified more or less according to the criteria worked out in 1959, and the "conflict-model" strategy of the local peasant organizations of the BTI was designed in accordance with the findings. Landless agricultural laborers and tenants were the favorites of the BTI's action, but the small owner-farmers who had not enough land for subsistence were also included in the base of the organization. The family-farmowners who had enough land for subsistence were seen as a group to collaborate with. The rich farmers who worked at least part of their land were not considered enemies. The struggle was directed mainly against the landlords, those who lived off the land and off the tenants or sharecroppers who cultivated it.

It was this group which had the surplus land as defined by the land reform law. Because of their wealth they were often also moneylenders and controlled many small farmers through indebtedness.

To introduce the "conflict-model" in a society strongly dominated by a tradition of *rukun* (harmony) by bringing peasants into action against the "landlords", generally the influential people of their village was apparently not too difficult. The land tenure situation contained so many —often deeply hidden— grievances and resentment that united action among peasants against their "enemies" could be stimulated.

A complication was that wherever cases of strife occurred, they were often related to the factional splits and political divisions existing already in the villages. This was in some areas between poor PKI and the Nationalist Party, PNI (which often meant between poor peasants and better-off farmers or even landlords) and elsewhere between PKI and the Orthodox Islamic Party, the NU (between poor peasants and *hadji* landlords).

The religious issue particularly may have provoked difficulties, since land belonging to religious institutions (*wakap*) was not considered affectable for distribution. It often seems to have happened that *hadji* landlords donated their land nominally as *wakap* land.²⁴ Whenever accusations were made that peasants acted "unilaterally" by taking religious lands, it may well have been in such cases.

At times serious clashes occurred between Islamic groups and BTI

²⁴ E. Utrecht, op. cit. p. 84.

peasants. Thus at the village level often things have happened which upset the village solidarity beyond the point of what was bearable.

The fact that in addition to the purely economic and legal aspects of the struggle for implementation of the land reform such religio-ideological (*aliran*) factors and local political factional strife entered, probably increased the bitterness of the struggle²⁵.

For the PNI and its peasant organization Petani the struggle was particularly painful, since Petani had in its rank many better-off farmers who had much to lose from the land reform. The PNI peasant organization members were instructed not to choose the side of the landowners, but rather the poor peasants, but the peasants' "unilateral actions" were condemned.

Probably under pressure from the PNI, and while President Sukarno was absent, by mid 1964 the government ordered settlement of agrarian disputes through mutual consultations to be started. The PKI and a National Conference in July 1964 requested the establishment of land reform courts which would include representatives of the peasant organizations.

President Sukarno, in the August 17, 1964 (Independence Day) speech expressed understanding for the "unilateral action movement" and the establishment of the reform courts was announced. The actions continued, though mostly non-violent, in the meantime. On some occasions they led to violent clashes such as in October 1964 involving 2,000 peasants, where several policemen were injured²⁶. It was probably this kind of "impulsive" action of the BTI which made Aidit remark in a party report in May 1965 that, "the peasant movement must proceed in a framework of strict discipline"²⁷.

Some authors suggest that the movement was getting "out of hand"²⁸

²⁵ W.F. Wertheim, *From aliran towards class struggle in the countryside of Java*, Paper for the International Conference on Asian History at Kuala Lumpur, August 1968, mimeo, p. 17; see also E. Utrecht, op. cit. p. 83.

²⁶ Guy J. Paker, *The Rise and Fall of the Communist Party of Indonesia*, Memorandum RM-5735-PR, prepared for United States Air Force Project Rand, The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. Febr. 1969, p. 43.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ E. Utrecht, op. cit. p. 83.

The Land Reform Courts were created on October 31, 1964. This made it possible for almost all the available land, about 300,000 hectares, to be distributed in Java, Madura, Bali, Lombok and Sumbawa by the end of the year, according to a report by the Agrarian Minister²⁹.

Effects and after-effects

The overall frequency and size of the "unilateral actions" is difficult to estimate. The fact that President Sukarno in August 1964 more or less endorsed the movement, and that during the second half of 1964 measures were taken to accelerate the stagnant land reform program dramatically, may indicate that the "unilateral action movement" acquired considerable proportions. This would indicate how effectively the BTI and PKI had organized the peasants by slowly introducing this "conflict-model". Militancy is generally not considered a characteristic of the Javanese peasants and the traditional approach at the village level has always been the search for compromise and harmony. The fact that in a good many instances this pattern was abolished seems to show how far the process of "de-traditionalisation" had gone in Java. On the whole it seems that local people took the new course of events for granted and about half a million peasants were able to benefit from land reform in a relatively short time (the second half of 1964). Later, this "unilateral action movement" apparently lost some of its impulse.³⁰ It seems that during the rapid land distribution in the second half of 1964 little violence occurred.

It should be emphasized that the strategy of occupying and effectively (or symbolically) cultivating land, the legal property of which is debated, as often happened in the "unilateral actions", cannot be defined as violence, if under "civil violence" is understood: "All collective, non-governmental attacks on persons or property, resulting in intentional damage to them, that occur within the boundaries of an autonomous of colonial political unit"³¹ -

²⁹ E. Utrecht, op. cit. p. 85.

³⁰ W. F. Wertheim, *Indonesia before and after the Untung Coup*, *Pacific Affairs*, XXXIX, No. 1 & 2, Spring and Summer 1966, reprint mimeo, p. 7.

³¹ Tedd Robert Gurr, *Psychological factors in civil violence*, *World Politics*, Vol. XX, no. 2, 1968, p. 247; for a discussion of land invasions see Gerrit Huizer *Land invasions as a non-violent strategy of peasant rebellion: some cases of Latin America* *Journal of Peace Research*, 1972, no. 3.

Violence occurred mainly in the reaction of the rural elites after the political climate in the country changed in 1965.

If the "populist" government of Sukarno had remained solidly in power it might have been possible for the BTI to mobilize the peasantry even more after the initial success. A further step could have been a demand for lowering the "ceiling" of maximally allowed land property from 5 hectares to 2, or even 1 (as happened in equally densely populated Japan in 1946). In that case much more land would have been available for distribution to landless or semi-landless peasants. As such further legislation and its implementation could have been achieved by gradually increasing pressures opposing the vested interests by peaceful and non-violent "conflict-model" strategy, including the occupation of lands, which could have been claimed legally.

However, the BTI suffered a definitive setback in October 1965, when several hundreds of thousands of its members were assassinated particularly in Central and East Java and Bali³²

This massacre was organized mainly by the para-commando troops of the army after, on September 30, 1965, a *coup d'état* by dissident leftist army officers, headed by Col. Untung, had failed³³. During the coup, five notoriously anti-communist generals had been assassinated. Although it is difficult to disentangle the role of the PKI, or some of its top-leaders in the *coup*, the army directed its revenge against the peasants.

The peasants were, through the BTI "conflict-model" strategy, militant enough to no longer fear a confrontation with the local elite on agrarian issues. They were, however, completely unprepared for a confrontation with violent repression.

A Pulitzer Prize winning report described as follows what has been called "one of history's worst orgies of slashing, shooting, chopping violence":

Thousands of Indonesians who were members of the Communist Party, or who supported it, or who were suspected of supporting it, or who were said by somebody to have supported it, were put

³² Guy J. Pauker, *The Rise and Fall of the Communist Party of Indonesia*, Memorandum RM-5735-PR (see note 26).

³³ There is an extensive and confusing literature about the details of the *coup* and about the degree of involvement of the central leadership of the PKI.

ruthlessly to death. In the mayhem, people innocent of Communist affiliations were killed too, sometimes by mistake, sometimes because their old enemies were paying off grudges in the guise of an anti-Communist campaign³⁴.

Some authors seem to suggest that the massacre was carried out by the villagers themselves against elements which they considered as the cause of "disruption of village solidarity" and its replacement by "class conflict"³⁵. In some areas, such as Bali, where BTI and PKI activists seem to have neglected to integrate their action into the local cultural and religious traditions³⁶ this may have been the case. On the whole, however, and particularly in East and Central Java—as many sources indicate—the assassination campaign was initiated outside the village and carried out mostly by non-villagers or young members of the village elite.

The para-commandos of the army played the initiating role and the members of the orthodox Islamic youth organization ANSOR were trained by the army to carry through the campaign. Many of these youngsters were sons of relatives of the traditional local leaders and landowners (*hadjis*)³⁷.

Conclusion

From the experience of the BTI in Java one can conclude that the systematic application of the "conflict-model" strategy at the village level can be very effective in mobilizing the peasants. Such militant approaches as non-violent land occupations can be an essential part of this strategy if

³⁴ John Hughes, *Indonesian Upheaval*, David McKay Company, Inc. New York, 1967, p. 153.

³⁵ Guy J. Paukor, *Political Consequences of Rural Development Programmes in Indonesia*, *Pacific Affairs*, XLI, No. 3, Fall 1968, pp. 389-390.

³⁶ John Hughes, op. cit. pp. 175-183; Philippe Gavi, *Konterrevolution in Indonesien*, Europäische Verlagsanstalt, Frankfurt, 1968, p. 40 indicated that only in Bali and Madura did more civilians than military men participate in the assassination.

³⁷ Data from a study by Lance Castles quoted in W.F. Wertheim, *Indonesia before and after the Untung coup*, *Pacific Affairs*, XXXIX, 1 & 2, 1966, reprint mimeo, p. 6.

justified demands are not attended to otherwise. The violence which at times occurs as a reaction to the application of the "conflict-model" strategy is not necessarily a result of this strategy. It seems to occur if the government is not willing to keep in check the elites which have to lose from the reform processes and privileges, not to speak of foreign interests. If a government is prepared to check and control such a reaction, considerable social change in the rural areas can be brought about, bringing the peasants into effective participation in the national development effort ³⁸

³⁸ Another case where the "conflict-model" strategy was carefully applied but became frustrated through this intervention through factors not directly related to rural mobilization as such was the land reform and peasant mobilization undertaken by the Unidad Popular government of president Salvador Allende in Chile (1970-73). In the case of Chile it was even clearer than in Indonesia that foreign economic and political interests had a great deal to do with the destruction of the peaceful application of the conflict model strategy. It is indicative that in Santiago 1973 the words "Djakarta, Djakarta" were written on the walls here and there.

Peasants and National Integration in the Maghreb: Why Does Agrarian Reform not Mobilize the Peasants of Maghreb?

Abdelkader Zghal

Why does agrarian reform not mobilize the peasants of the Maghreb?

The starting point of this paper is an empirical observation that is baffling at first sight. It concerns the phenomenon of the "abstention" of the landless peasants of Algeria when summoned to 'profit' from the agrarian reform decided on by the state, after ten years of independence and without the pressure of a peasant movement for agrarian reform.

In fact, the greater part of the Algerian peasantry which mobilized for the war of national liberation has not expressed what might be called the "thirst for land" through attempts to occupy the land of the large national property owners, or even through simple demonstration with agrarian reform as the order of the day. The occupation, at the moment of independence, of the farms of French colonials which were declared vacant property, is a phenomenon limited merely to the permanent workers of the farms. The poor landless peasants who lived around these farms did not attempt to profit from the French colonials' 'holiday' to invade and occupy their farms.

It took ten years for the Algerian state, in power after a long armed struggle by the peasants, to decide, finally, to issue an official decree concerning the limitation of the private property of natives of the country. Neither the government of Ben Bella, nor that of Boumedién had to undergo the pressure of a peasant movement through the limitation of the large private property in the country. The promulgation by the Algerian state of the decree of November 8, 1971, entitled "Agrarian Reform", reflects much more the evolution, at a given moment, of the balance of forces at the heart of the Algerian ruling classes, than a positive reply to demands clearly expressed by the poor peasantry. Nor was this decision a judicial regulation brought about by a spontaneous movement of society as was, for example, the phenom-

enon of autogestation in the former colonial farm. The poor peasantry which should have been, in principle, the main beneficiary, showed little enthusiasm after the promulgation of this decree. Five years after the launching of the first phase of the agrarian reform the peasant union, created by the state to facilitate peasant participation in the application of this reform, gives the impression of being much more a new and high institutional body dominated by bureaucracy than a peasant organization. The most serious aspect is that several poor peasants preferred to "abstain" rather than take part in this so-called agrarian "revolution". The scale of this phenomenon of abstention seems to have attained disquieting proportions in certain regions. An inquiry in the commune of Wilaya de Tlemcen revealed that a quarter of the beneficiaries of the first phase abstained. The author of this inquiry concluded his study with the statement that "the phenomenon of abstention well and truly exists and it is no use hiding it from oneself or from others. Sometimes it attains disquieting proportions: 50⁰/o at Cheraga and 75⁰/o at Mahelma."¹ In order to discourage this phenomenon of abstention, it seems there has been no hesitation in "the use of constraint to maintain the interested parties in their place."²

Comparison with the situation in the Moroccan and Tunisian countryside gives the impression that this lack of enthusiasm shown by the Algerian peasantry for agrarian reform is a specific trait of the peasantry of the Maghreb in general, and not only of the Algerian peasantry. In Tunisia, in 1969, after the failure of the project for the generalization of the cooperative system in the countryside, the peasants celebrated this failure with the same relief as the large property owners.³ In Morocco, where the concentration of land in the hands of national property owners is greater than in Algeria and Tunisia, the battle cry of agrarian reform seems to mobilize much more certain radical city elements than the poor peasantry.⁴

¹ Abdelkarim EL AIDI: "A propos du désistement dans le secteur de la révolution agraire. Le cas de la commune de Maghnia; Wilaya de Tlemcen", *Bulletin du Centre de recherche et de documentation*, Université d'Oran (4), 1974, p. 94

² Nourredine ABDI: La réforme agraire en Algérie. *Maghreb-Machrek*, (69), July-August-September 1975, p. 33-41

³ Later on, many former cooperators regretted this failure but that is another story.

⁴ This is not intended to mean that the peasantry accepts its living condi-

This phenomenon poses two questions directly linked to the general problem of the conditions of national integration:

1. The first question concerns the possibilities and the limits of a system of alliance between the poor peasants and the "élite property-holding citizens at the center of power."
2. The second question raises the controversial problem of the nature of the political behaviour of the peasantry.

These two questions are obviously linked and it is impossible to avoid cross checking and repetitions in treating them separately. But I prefer, for the sake of clarity in this account, and for the progression of my argument, to separate them on the analytical level. It is only after having developed the first and second questions (which will form the first and second parts of this paper) that I will attempt (in the third part) to present the organic relationship between these two questions, using the gramscian notions of the historical block and civil society, and evaluating the strategic position of ideological formations and the role of the intellectual in the development and expression of current ideologies.

I. National integration and systems of alliance

The idea of national integration (or construction) does not escape the usual ambiguity of concepts designed to define the complex social phenomena which include traits of a structural order and others of a cultural order. But we shall retain the concept because it has, at least, the merit of clarifying the idealistic and statistical interpretation of the concept of 'nation' developed by the first European nationalist ideologists at the beginning of the nineteenth century. For these ideologists the nation is a natural, unchangeable entity fixed once and for all as the embodiment of a 'spiritual principle' (Fichte), or of a 'soul' (Renan). The idea of national integration has the advantage of stressing the fact that national reality is not only an historical phenomenon, determined by precise socio-economic conditions, but also a dynamic reality, a process that evolves and changes within itself. This process is the result of the interaction of two sets of facts, one of a structural order, and the other of a cultural order. The first is the development, during the first phase

tions in a passive way. We shall discuss this question in the second part of this paper.

of industrialization, of an economic market going beyond the traditional frontiers (tribal, feudal and others) that characterize the precapitalist means of production. Parallel to the establishment of this national economic market a cultural base is formed which tends to dominate the local traditions bound to the precapitalist means of production. In each social development the traits which characterize the process of national integration (national economic market and common cultural base) are conditioned largely by the kind of relationship that exists between the center and the periphery of social development in the precapitalist phase.⁵

The object of this paper is to study these post-colonial conditions in the Maghreb, with regard to social development. But perhaps it would be useful, before expounding the facts relative to these relationships, to put forward a preliminary statement of a theoretical nature. We have, in the preceding lines, used the concept of means of production which is one of the classical notions of Marxist theory, and we have, also, adopted the Marxist interpretation of the national entity, which links the development of nations in the process of domination by capitalist means of production. Nevertheless, we have to admit, with Rey,⁶ that if Marx effectively expounded the theory of capitalism means of production, that of the enumeration of means of production was only half developed. We are also in agreement with that other man who said that "the historical studies of Marx, on France in particular, whether written before or after 'Das Capital', do not constitute a scientific theory of class struggle in a concrete social structure. The concepts which are used there, for example, 'the sack of potatoes' of the divided peasantry or, in a more serious vein, that of 'Bonapartism' are very approximate and unworkable.⁷ The interpretation by Rey of this lapse by the author of 'Das Kapital' personally seems both plausible and acceptable. According to Rey the cause of his inability to create a theory on the enumeration of means of production is Marx's lack of any real contact with the peasantry.⁸ In view of these conditions it is hardly surprising that it is

⁵ Abdelkader Zghal: "L'édification nationale au Maghreb". *Revue Internationale des Sciences Sociales*, Vol. XXIII. 1971, (3).

⁶ Pierre-Philippe REY: *Les alliances de classes*, François Maspéro, Paris, 1976, p. 117.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 173.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 212.

finally in the minority tendency of American sociology, in opposition to the dominant functionalist theory, that we find the greatest effort to study the different types of alliance between the urban elite and the peasantry, in concrete social developments and well defined social situations. We are thinking in particular of the stimulating work of Barrington Moore on "the social origins of dictatorship and democracy".⁹ In this study Moore has attempted to show the direct benefit caused by the different conditions of the town-dwelling bourgeoisie and the land-owning aristocracy at the beginning of industrialization, and the forms of national integration expressed by the particular structures of the states (democracy, fascism, communism). Yet our course will not be completely similar to that of Moore, for two reasons: the first is of a theoretical nature: Barrington Moore, despite the few pertinent comments of his conclusion, did not give to ideology (above all to that of the city-dwelling elite) the place which it deserves in the selection and practice of alliances. The second reason is of an historical nature: Moore studied the interaction of the commercial and manufacturing bourgeoisie and the land owning aristocracy during the first phase of industrialization. We are studying, on the other hand, the relationship between the new governing class (in which bureaucracy plays a fundamental role) and the poor peasants. In the third world the countries are becoming more and more scarce where the bourgeoisie still plays the role of privileged partner of the new governing class. Moreover, socialism and agrarian reform are the order of the day in the great majority of the countries of the third world, even if actions often contradict the words of those who stand up for socialism and agrarian reform.

It is obviously in Algeria where the poor peasantry is officially portrayed as being the privileged ally of the new ruling class. "We have made our own choice", affirmed the Boumedién President, "Algeria should, above all, heed the fate of the landless. The land owners, for their part, uphold us only in order to safeguard their considerable privileges... Our natural allies are the hard working and deprived masses. And as for those who earn twenty times, and even fifty times the wage of an agricultural laborer you can imagine that they are far from satisfied with our politics".¹⁰

⁹ Barrington Moore: *Les origines sociales de la dictature et de la démocratie*, François Maspéro. Paris 1969.

¹⁰ Speech April 13, 1971.

This declaration of policy brings us to the following question: how, in practice, has the new governing class of Algeria acted in order to make concrete this clear choice of alliance with the landless who, in the case of Algerian society, are, for the most part, the poor peasants? As the 'agrarian revolution' of Algeria is still in its initial stages and empirical enquiries are few and far between, one should start with the study of a more stable experiment: that of the use of the inherited land left by the colonists as an available resource in the hands of the ruling class as a means of consolidating its system of alliance with the poor peasantry. The study of Algerian self-management realized by the same ruling class that brought about the 'agrarian revolution', will help to throw light on the meaning of the 'abstentions' of the poor peasants, called to 'profit' from this 'agrarian reform'. The comparison of the actions of the Algerian ruling class in its relations with the poor peasantry with that of Tunisia and Morocco will bring out the meaning and significance of the likenesses and differences of the three experiments.

1. The new Algerian ruling class and the landless peasants¹¹

Algeria's declaration of independence and the hasty departure of a part of the French colony deprived the Algerian ruling class, in its crisis, of the initiative in the achievement of the first phase of the agrarian reform. The principles of this reform were accepted by the F.L.N. at the Souman Congress (August 20, 1956): "The conquest of national independence means at the same time agrarian reform". The Tripoli program (June 1962) confirmed these principles, but the conditions of its application remained ambiguous. This program in fact anticipates a limitation of private property and "a free assignment of recovered land to landless peasants or those insufficiently provided for." The expression 'free assignment' is to be understood as a distribution of land to the poor peasant. But, without explicitly rejecting the idea of distribution, the authors of the program proposed that, in the case of the well mechanized lands of the colonists and the large Algerian land owners, the land should be shared without being divided into pieces, and that these

¹¹ On self-management in Algeria we have three studies: Gregori Lazarev: "Autogestion agricole en Algérie", *Tiers-monde*, P.U.F., Paris, 1965.

Claudine Chaulet: *La Mitidja autogérée*, S.N.E.D., Algiers, 1971.

Ian Clagg: "Selfmanagement in Algeria", *Monthly Review-Press*, 1972, New York.

properties should be exploited collectively. The ambiguity of the project comes to light in the formulation and in the coexistence of the notion of sharing out and that of collective exploitation. In any case, one finds the idea of self-management in neither the Souman Congress, nor in those held at Tripoli. It was the permanent workers of the colonial farms, who were the least affected by the war of national liberation, who decided to occupy the 'vacant' farms. By this act the permanent workers of these farms demonstrated their opposition to all attempts at the recuperation of these farms, as much by the Algerian bourgeoisie as by the great mass of landless peasants and those without permanent employment. The idea of self-management was first tried out in the farms near Algiers, probably under the influence of trade unionists with knowledge of Yugoslavian practice.

The reaction of the first Algerian government to these occupations was positive. It made legal the accomplished fact and set in motion its new-born bureaucracy to consolidate the functioning of these farms. A new institution, the National Office for Agrarian Reform, was created to take charge, in some ways, of the technical, financial and administrative problems of the self governing farms. Faced with this 'aid' the farm workers had but one prerogative:

The administration of daily tasks by a committee and a president elected by all the permanent workers. All the rest, such as for example, the regrouping of farms in one single unit of a good size, cultivation plans, the number of workers and the criteria for payment, were decided without the institutional participation of the workers. But, in reality, the new-born bureaucracy of the Algerian state did not have the means to see through its policy. The technical and administrative personnel qualified for the centralized management of the colonial farms simply does not exist. The solution that was found to bypass these objective (limits of the bureaucracy was an increase in centralization) by two 'technical' means:

- The regrouping of farms of an average 130 ha. in the colonial farms; 12.000 ha. for the self governing units.
- Priority given to mechanization, simplification of tasks and the reduction of initiative by peasants.

On the level of exploitation the workers find themselves practically in their former position as wage earners, but this time with the inconvenience of having as employer a distant bureaucracy which pays their salaries irregularly (sometimes a few months late). The representative of this bureaucracy in the heart of the enterprise, the Director, appointed and paid by the national office for agrarian reform, is often a young

city dweller without any technical or administrative education, incapable of assuming the role of the former manager. In practice the role of this bureaucrat is limited to that of link-man between the peasants and the central bureaucracy.

The conclusion to be drawn from all these facts is that the workers on self-governing farms, who are basically the natural allies of the Algerian ruling class, often find themselves, in their daily lives in situations which put them in conflict with this class. Nevertheless, reality may be distorted if one focuses on nothing but the conflicting aspects of their relationship. The experiment with agricultural self government, with all its limits due, in the main part, to bureaucratic hyper-centralization, is an experiment just as much for the Algerian ruling class as for the workers on the self-governing farms. This experiment has its own dynamics which, while suffering the often hostile actions of its environment, act at the same time on this environment. Several critics of this experiment have not realized the importance of these dynamics.¹² The loosening, in 1969, of the bureaucracy's troublesome and ineffective control is an indication of these internal dynamics which self-government possesses. The agrarian reform undertaken in 1971 follows logically the maintenance of the self-governing sector. In 1964 this sector, which monopolized a quarter of agricultural land and 60% of agricultural products, contributed only 10% to the effective agricultural total of the national economic market. It was necessary, sooner or later, either to generalize agrarian reform over all the country, or to break up the self-governing sector. In 1971 the Algerian ruling class opted for the first hypothesis by proclaiming its desire to make concrete the principle of "the land for he who work it".¹³ On the level of the intentions affirmed in the charter of the agrarian revolution, the property of absentee landlords should be wholly nationalized and the greater part of peasant property should be returned to individual family exploitation, the excess being entrusted to the National Fund for Agrarian Reform. But the most significant point is that private property, even

¹² Christian Leucate: "Révolution agraire en Algérie?", *Critique de l'Economie politique*, No. 15, January-March 1974, p. 67-88.

¹³ On the above special issue of *Revue Algérienne des Sciences Juridiques, Economiques et Politiques*, Volumen X, (1), March 1973, one can consult Ait Amara "La réforme agraire en Algérie", CERES, F.A.O. agency, July-Agustus 1974, cf. ABDI, art. cit., 1975.

when reduced to the lowest possible level, no longer has all its former prerogatives. Private property owners are asked to respect the system of culture of each zone, worked out by the technicians of the state. Without saying so explicitly, the state is attempting to act as the principal owner of all the national inherited land, in the traditional Islamic way.¹⁴

In practice, absentee landlords (often living in the city) who should have been totally eliminated have been able to keep a part of their inheritance by naming a member of their family as direct exploiter. The greater part of peasant property seems to have been affected in a more radical way.

The final result of the operation is that "the state sector, along with the self-governing sector, which cover over half the agricultural and pastoral lands—and the best—will employ a total of only one fifth of the active male population".¹⁵

In view of these facts, how can the battle cry of agrarian reform be expected to mobilize the landless Algerian peasants?

The comparison of these facts with the Tunisian and Moroccan experiments shows that beyond the differences between the three experiments, it is the constant factors that could help us to understand better the lack of motivation of the Maghreb peasants when it comes to agrarian reform.

2. Traits common to the three reforms

The differences between projects of agrarian reform in the three countries are quite well known.¹⁶ They have to do, primarily, with the

¹⁴ Nourredine Abdi: "Perspective d'évolution de la propriété privative des terres agricoles ou la vocation agricole en Algérie dans le cadre de la Révolution Agraire", *Revue Algérienne des Sciences Juridiques Economiques et Politiques*, Volume X, March 1973, p. 223-238.

¹⁵ ABDI: art. cit., 1975.

¹⁶ For the Tunisian experiment consult the publication of CERES Université d'Tunis and more particularly the Studies of:

H. Attia, "L'évolution des structures agraires en Tunisie depuis 1972", *Revue Tunisienne de Sciences Sociales* (7), November 1966, p. 33-58.

L.B. Salem, "L'encadrement des unités de production agricoles", *R.T.S.S.* (26), September 1971, p. 115-162.

M.Makhlouf, "Structures agraires et modernisation de l'agriculture dans les plaines du Kef", *Cahiers du C.E.R.E.S., Série géographie* (1), 1968, p. 261.

importance of areas mobilized to the profits of the poor peasantry. In Morocco, out of a million hectares of colonial lands, a little more than half has been handed over to the funds of agrarian reform, due to purchases effected by the rural and town-dwelling bourgeoisie. In Tunisia, the transfer of colonial lands to the bourgeoisie has been much more limited. Since 1961 the Tunisian State has decided to use the former colonial farms as the nuclei around which to form the small peasant exploitations, in cooperative units of production. This project was, in one sense, more favorable to the poor peasantry than Algerian self government, in that it did not limit the advantages of private property to the former workers of the colonial farms, integrating in the agricultural cooperatives not only these former workers, but also a part of the small exploiters and the landless peasants.

Basically this project did not compromise the status of the average large private property. Nevertheless, the very dynamics of this reform, combined with political instability, presented the Tunisian state, in 1969, with the same alternative as that of self government in 1971: either to compromise the first achievements of the reform, or to rely solely upon the private inheritance of land.¹⁷ On August 28, 1969, an article of law was submitted for authorization to the President of the Republic which stipulated that: "agricultural exploitation . . . can be expressed only by the cooperative units of production (Article 1), and that the landowners who do not wish to comply with the cooperative units of production are to sell their lands and the means of production appertaining to them . . . according to prices that will be set by decree" (Article 5). It was, in a sense, a project of nationalization of the whole of private property much more radical than that contained in the Algerian "Charter of Agrarian Revolution" of 1971. But the balance of

M. Makhlouf, "Les coopératives agricoles en Tunisie: structure et difficultés", *R.T.S.S.*, (26), September 1971, p. 79-114.

A. Zghal, "Changements de système politique et réforme des structures agraires en Tunisie", *R.T.S.S.*, (12), June 1968, p. 9-32.

A. Zghal, "L'élite administrative et la paysannerie", *R.T.S.S.* (16), March 1969, p. 41-52. (Not included in CERES' publication).

Y. Alouane, "Coopération et développement. L'expérience tunisienne", *Verlag für Literatur und Zeitgeschehen*, Hanover, 1971, p. 159.

About the limited Moroccan experience see:

N. Bouderbala, M. Charaïbi, P. Pascon: "La question agraire au Maroc", *Publication du Bulletin Economique et Social du Maroc*, (123-124-125), August 1974.

¹⁷ L. Rudebeek, "Development pressure and political limits: a Tunisian example", *The Journal of Modern African studies*, (8-2), 1970, p. 173-98.

forces at the heart of the ruling class made sure, finally, that it was the option that compromised the first cooperatives that were adopted.¹⁸

It remains to say that beyond the political failure of Tunisian agrarian reform one can find points common to both in the very limited experiment of Moroccan agrarian reform, the more important one in Tunisia between 1961 and 1969 and finally in that of Algeria. What they have in common is often underestimated.

Nevertheless, if one puts oneself in the place of those affected by these reforms, one can ascertain that these projects are prompted by two complementary principles:

1. The refusal by the ruling class and its central bureaucracy to leave the initiative in the hands of the peasantry as regards the effective management of the lands given to the peasants.
2. And the recourse, consequently, to excessive mechanization for carrying out the most important tasks, in place of peasants.

The result of this option is two-pronged:

1. The devaluation in the process of production of the private land owning factor with respect to imported agricultural machinery.
2. The transformation of the beneficiaries of the agrarian reform into semi wage-earners without the regularity of salaries and the job security of the former permanent workers on the colonial farms.

In these conditions it is not surprising that, despite certain differences due to local traditions and the political conjuncture of the three countries of the Maghreb, the reactions of the poor peasantry called to 'profit' from these agrarian reforms are quite similar. Their reactions can be summed up in the formula: "sure, but....!"

II. The poor peasants and agrarian reform in Maghreb

To grasp the significance of the reactions of the landless peasants of Maghreb to the projects for agrarian reform it is necessary for us, first of all, to clarify our position on two theoretical questions which continue to be a subject of debate between specialists in rural studies. The first is the definition of the idea of the peasant and the categories of

¹⁸ J.L. Simmons, "The political economy of land use: Tunisian private farms", *Rural politics and Social change in the Middle East*. Edited by R. Antoun and I. Harik, India University Press, 1972, p. 432-452. A. Zghal: "The reactivation of tradition in a post traditional society", *DAEDALUS*, winter 1973, p. 225-252.

peasants. The second poses the question of the revolutionary possibilities of the peasantry.

To tell the truth these two questions are basically perverted by the ethnocentrist (occidental) heritage of the social sciences and by the quite frequent tendency of occidental specialists in just the same way, moreover, as many of those brought up in their schools, to question non-European societies from the point of view of the historical experience of Europe. This tendency risks the creation of definitions which seem to be universal propositions but which, in reality, are nothing but systematic interpretation of certain empirical facts in European society. Thus the definition of the peasantry most often quoted (that of Wolf) is merely the systematic interpretation of the European agricultural condition in the nineteenth century, which fits in nicely with the four criteria selected by Wolf as being the characteristic traits of the peasantry.¹⁹

These four criteria are: 1) to be a rural cultivator, 2) to manage one's exploitation not only for the market but also for family consumption, 3) to belong to a local community which goes beyond the framework of the family, even when enlarged, 4) and to have an inferior economic and political position and to have to give away a part of one's production in the form of rent or taxes.

This picture of the peasantry is established essentially to be contrasted with that of primitive and tribal societies which escape the domination of a central power: It makes 'analytically marginal' every peasant category that does not correspond to its criteria.²⁰ This definition of the peasantry is thus inoperable for the type of problems which concern us in this paper. We should, however, refuse 'to pin the peasants down to one single definition'²¹ and affirm with Mintz that for the study of the present problems of the rural world in non-occidental societies it is more important to develop the typologies of rural socio-economic groupings than to work out some abstract definition of the peas-

¹⁹ E.R. Wolf, *Peasants*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J. Prentice-Hall, 1966, p. 3-4.

²⁰ T. Shanin, in *Peasants and peasant societies*, Penguin Books, 1971, p. 15.

²¹ S. Ortiz, "Reflexions on the concept of Peasant culture", in T. Shanin, *op. cit.*, p. 322-335.

G. Dalton, "Peasants in Anthropology and History", *Current Anthropology*, Vol. 13, (3-4), June-October 1972, p. 385-407.

antry.²² We retain Post's hypothesis for whom "African reality reveals two types of closely interwoven processes.

The first is a process in which the model changes from 'communal cultivator' to that of 'peasant'. The second is the process of incorporation of communal and peasant societies into the worldwide capitalist system".²³ We also consider as worthy the proposition of Hobsbawn who states "that beyond a certain point in the socio-economic differentiation of the agrarian population, the term 'peasantry' is no longer applicable".²⁴

The debate on the revolutionary possibilities of the peasantry is also often perverted by the 'fixation' of specialists on the political behaviour of the European peasantry in the nineteenth century, and the reactions of European intellectuals to this behaviour. Mao Tse Tung needed a great deal of courage and willpower in his thought not to be contaminated by the prejudices of the founding father of the maxims and of his second-rate European followers against the peasantry. Marx's famous definition of the peasantry, more insulting than scientific, is well known – the barbarity at the heart of civilization – and the one in the same style concerning the French peasants – the sack of potatoes.²⁵ These prejudices, coming from one of the most lucid thinkers of the modern world, are the expression of the positivist ideology that dominated the Europe of the nineteenth century, with its illusions on the idea of civilization and progress linked to the development of technology. By some kind of primary reaction to these prejudices, Fanon thought he had to defend the opposite hypothesis by affirming that "in the colonies only the peasantry is revolutionary."²⁶ But science is not built up by playing one prejudice against another. The debate of this

²² S. W. Mintz, "A note on the definition of peasantries", *The journal of peasant studies*, Vol. I, (1), October 1973, p. 92-106.

²³ K. Post, Peasantization and rural political movement in Western Africa" *European journal of Sociology*, XIII, 1972, (2), p. 223-254.

²⁴ F. Hobsbawn, "Peasants and politics", *The journal of peasant studies* Vol. I, (1), Oct. 1973, p. 3-22.

²⁵ On the evolution of Marx's thought about the peasantry see:
M. Duggett, "Marx on Peasants", *The Journal of peasant studies*, Vol. II (2), January 1975, p. 159-182.

²⁶ F. Fanon, *Les damnés de la terre*, Maspéro, 1975, p. 25.

question is, therefore, far from being closed. To tell the truth, in the way that it is often presented –“is the peasantry revolutionary?”– the question is badly phrased and consequently inoperative.

The thesis of Fanon has been taken up once more in a subtle fashion by Stavenhagen, who states that in Latin America, “in exchange for certain advantages, many organized workers’ movements saw themselves as strictly associated with the governmental structure or with some party in power”. On the other hand, “the peasant movements, for their part, have always shown themselves to be more radical than the worker’s organizations, apart from a few exceptions”. Given the rigid and oppressive political and social structure which is that of the rural sector, *every peasant demand, however modest it might be, is a full scale frontal attack on the hegemony of the property owning oligarchy.* (It is I who underline this passage). After this statement Stavenhagen goes on to assert that: “according to all probability, peasant agitation in the next few years will become more frequent and intense in the countries which do not put into operation a massive and accelerated program for the redistribution of land”.²⁷ But this optimistic expectation (for a revolutionary) does not reply in a satisfactory manner to the question posed by Barrington Moore in the conclusion to his book where he wondered “if the great period of peasant revolutions which have missed the twentieth century up till now, is not now coming to an end”. His reply is that “to know whether this is true or not it would be necessary to examine very closely the situation in Africa and Latin America”.²⁸ This is indisputably one of the tasks that must be given priority by the specialists of the two continents.

From these remarks one can say that every proposal about the political behaviour of the peasantry in general (Wolf) or even about the peasants of the third world (Fanon), is a premature and unfounded proposal. In the same way the proposals relative to the political behavior of the socio-professional rural category like, for example, the middle peasants²⁹ or the rural proletariat³⁰ can only have some relevance if they

²⁷ R. Stavenhagen, *Sept thèses erronées sur l’Amérique latine ou comment décoloniser les sciences humaines*, Ediciones Anthropos, 1973, p. 73-74.

²⁸ B. Moore, *op. cit.*, p. 383.

²⁹ H. Alavi, “Peasants and revolution”, *The socialist Register*, 1965, p. 241-277.

³⁰ S. W. Mintz, “The rural proletariat and the problem of rural proletarian con-

are limited to a social structure and to a well specified historical period or, in the best of cases, if they rely on comparative studies of peasant types having opposite behavior patterns.³¹ There is consequently no typology of the peasantry relevant to all the study projects of the rural world.

The pertinence of each typology depends on how one envisages the problem. In this paper we have time and again used the classification of peasants into three categories: poor, middle and large private property owners. This is a useful classification but it obscures the diversity of the concrete situations which proceed from the different conditions of integration in the countryside in the international capitalist market.

In order to understand the reaction to the agrarian reforms of the peasants of the Maghreb placed in the category of poor or landless peasant this category should be broken up into relatively homogenous groups: 1) the permanent worker on former colonial farms, 2) the small farmers (Khammes) who are not integrated into local communities, as on the oases, 3) the landless peasants without permanent employment, 4) the little landowners clinging to their exploitations. The separation of the two latter categories is often arbitrary due to the system of undivided property and matters of kinship between these two categories.

Politically it is absurd to give one of these categories the title revolutionary or conservative. The behavior of each group depends not only on the stakes but also on the circumstances and prospects offered. The permanent workers on colonial farms in Algeria have often been reproached for not having played an active part in the movement of national liberation and in the armed struggle, like the peasants of the disinherited regions. In his study on agricultural self-government in Algeria, Chaulet clearly shows that the rather weak efforts at fighting of the permanent workers on the colonial farms can be explained mostly by the very harsh system of police control around these farms, and by the type of environment that these workers live in, which makes clandestine action very difficult. But the independence, the political sense and the contention of this rural proletariat were clearly expressed when they had the chance of speaking up during the first congress of

sciousness", *The journal of peasant studies*, Vol. I, (3), April 1974, p. 291-325.

³¹ On B. Moore's book, see the article of N. Mouzelis: "Greek and Bulgarian peasants: aspects of their sociopolitical situation during the interwar period", *Comparative studies in society and history*, (1), January 1976, p. 85-105.

the Fellahs (October 1963), and during that of the Federation of Landworkers (December 1964).

Confronted with the projects of agrarian reform proper, that is to say the limitation of private property, only the small farmers (the Khammes) tend to express unreservedly their total support of these projects. This is explained not only by the nature of the antagonistic relationship between small farmers and landed property owners, but also by a lack of blood relationships between these two categories.³² But the dominant trend of the reactions of the majority of poor peasants is well described by Pascon when considering the experiment of Moroccan agrarian reform which, like that of Algeria and Tunisia, is "marked from the point of view of technocracy. The peasantry, absent at the beginning, nevertheless expressed its wishes . . . negatively, through massive surrender. The landless peasants, the tenants, the benefit claimers wanted land and the means to cultivate it, as personal property and with no strings attached . . . the state wanted beneficiaries, wise and modest pupils, who would respect the advice and cultural recommendations of the state and who would be always under their guidance . . . the most fearless and aggressive gave in".³³ In Algeria, over and above the phenomenon of 'absenteeism' which was officially recognized, on the spot enquiries revealed that the beneficiaries of the agrarian reform were not behaving in a passive way, and were measuring their reactions according to the possibilities of local and national conjuncture. The forms of resistance taken by the beneficiaries of the agrarian reform to their semi-salaried status were highly varied. Once called to vote for the management of the cooperative, some used this occasion to demonstrate their discontent, either by a huge proportion handing in blank voting cards, or by entirely eliminating the former management. According to Ait Amara, "the self manager protests in his own way, by reducing his production in proportion to the reduction in his real income (drop in productivity, negligence and waste)".³⁴ The same phenomenon was found in Tunisia and Morocco.

³² M. Ruissi makes a remark on this phenomenon in his thesis about the oasis in South Tunis, p. 4.

³³ P. Pascon, Ph D Thesis (manuscript) on Haouez of Marrakech. p. 251.

³⁴ H. Ait Amara, "Quelques aspects de la restructuration agraire", *Revue algérienne des sciences juridiques économiques et Politiques*, Vol. X, March 1972, p. 161-176.

From these observations we gather the following two conclusions:

1. In the case of agrarian reforms as they are practiced by the ruling classes of the three countries of Maghreb, the occasions of conflict between landless peasants and the local representatives of these ruling classes are more frequent than those which put the poor peasants up against the large landed owners: which explains why protest movements in a rural setting often take the form of a coalition directed by the middle peasant and manipulated by the landed owners,³⁵ and that peasant violence against landed owners is exceptional.³⁶

2. Contrary to the tradition of revolt of the precolonial peasantry of the Maghreb, the rural world at present gives the impression of being calm in comparison with the towns periodically troubled by the demands of workers and students. Two factors could explain this relative calm in the countryside.³⁷

a) The accelerating depopulation of rural areas caused by the generalization of mechanization and the fixing of a permanent agricultural work force which has a certain job security and some social advantages. For Algeria the process of the depopulation of this rural proletariat is so advanced that one wonders if, really, the term peasant is still adequate to describe this rural population. Enquiries in Morocco give the impression on the other hand that depopulation has not yet reached Algerian proportions. Tunisia is in an intermediary stage.

b) For the rest of the poor peasantry: absence of perspective for a normal life in the countryside and the search for the possibility of employment in the towns or abroad. The relative calm of the rural population in Algeria can be explained, among other things, by the fact that

³⁵ In Tunis, between 1961 and 1969, this type of coalition emerged violently at least on two occasions; in January of 1965 in Msaken and in 1969 in Ouerdanine, two villages of Sahel.

³⁶ Even in Morocco, the violence of the Glaoui against the tenants are phenomena quite exceptional in the Maghreb and they rather call to mind certain forms of violence against the Indian peasants in Latin America. On the other hand, the counter violence of the tenants after the death of Glaoui is also an exceptional phenomena in the Maghreb. See the description based on his own experience of this counter violence in Gavin Maxwell, Lord, of the Atlas. *The rise and the fall of the House of Glaoua, 1893-1956*, E. P. Dutton Inc, New York 1966, p. 267-68.

³⁷ This calm is only relative. Notwithstanding the total silence of mass communication media, from time to time we learn about violent movements without great significance, especially in Morocco.

20% of the active population lives in France. The same phenomenon is seen in Morocco and Tunisia, but on a smaller scale.

III. Historical block and civil society

We have, in the first part of this paper, discussed our problems in terms of class alliances, following more or less the path of Barrington Moore, but nevertheless stating a certain reserve on his theoretical leanings, which underestimate the role of ideologies and of ideologies in the fulfilling of projects of alliance. It is well understood that in stressing, in this last part, the weight of ideologies and value systems, we do not deny the fact that the alliances revolve around objective class interests. But we think, at the same time, the certain structures inherited from the past often have a considerable effect on the decisions of politicians –even the most revolutionary. The interest of the Gramscian notion of Historical Block³⁸ is that it is not “simply conceived of as an alliance between social classes”, but rather as “an entire historical situation . . . with, on the one hand, a social structure – the classes, and, on the other hand, an ideological and political superstructure”. *Civil Society*, or ideological *management* and *political society* or *domination* (State Apparatus) intellectuals, in the widest sense and not only the great intellectuals, are the managers of the superstructure. In a system of alliance the function of the intellectuals of the ruling class is to impregnate, socialize and integrate the allied forces and above all to integrate their intellectuals with the ruling class. Uncontrollable enemy groups will be neutralized by means of political society (violence) when the action of civil society (ideology) proves ineffective. Which means that “the thoughts of the ruling class are also, trumps at times, the dominant thoughts.”³⁹

In these conditions, given the relative autonomy of the two elements of the superstructure –civil and political society– one should not expect a radical and instant change at the level of political society (revolution or independence) to provoke an immediate and total collapse at the level of civil society. Even when excluded from political society, the intellectuals of the Old Regime continue to act on the new growing society, even after their death. To tell the truth, if one accepts the pro-

³⁸ We follow in this part, the interpretation of H. Portelli *Gramsci et le bloc historique*, P.U.F. Paris, 1972.

³⁹ K.Marx, *L'idéologie allemande*, Editions sociales, 1966, p. 74.

position of Marx on the link between ruling class and dominant thoughts, one has consequently to accept that the organic intellectuals of the new historical block cannot escape contamination by the ideology of traditional intellectuals (those of the old regime). It is therefore not enough for people to decide on a system of alliance, on the level of the new political society, in order to reinforce the social base of the new regime, for an ideology favorable to the allied social categories to develop and diffuse immediately at the very beginning of the new political system. The example of the Russian Revolution in its relations with the peasantry confirms the hypothesis of the existence of a relative autonomy in civil society with respect to political society. The ghost of past ideologies is not easily buried with the political disgrace, or even death, of their authors.

This is the meaning of Mao Tse Tung's 'thought' and his evaluation of ideology in the class struggle and, consequently, in class alliance. And it is not pure chance that his split from a part of the positivist inheritance of occidental Marxists has, as starting point, his idea of the role of the peasantry in a revolutionary alliance system. Whilst Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin totally accepted the prejudices of Marx against the peasants, Mao did not hesitate to wholly immerse himself in a peasant movement which is not his own creation or that of townspeople. At one of the difficult moments during the Bolshevik Revolution Lenin proposed 'linking' all urban cells to all rural cells so that each worker cell 'linked' to a rural cell would keep a constant eye out for all possible occasions to sacrifice such and such a culture need of a co-cell.⁴⁰ After the death of Lenin, Stalin resolved the peasant problem through sheer brute force.⁴¹ But it can be said that it was Trotsky who, in 1905, even before the Bolshevik victory, gave the best definition of the standpoint of the Russian Marxists on the role of the peasants: "It is only once the avant-garde of the revolution and the urban proletariat are at the helm of the state that numerous sections of the working masses, notably in the countryside, will be dragged into the revolution and organize themselves politically. After this conquest of power by the urban proletariat the Russian bourgeoisie will abandon their position of

⁴⁰ Lenin, *Oeuvres complètes*, T. 33, p. 478, cited by Robert Linhart, *Lénine, les paysans*, Taylor, Seuil, 1976, p. 65.

⁴¹ M. Lewin, *Russian peasants and soviet power*, the Norton Library, New York, 1975.

revolutionary hegemony over the peasants".⁴² More than half a century later, after the victory of the Bolshevik Revolution, Russia continues to pay the price of the heritage of the occidental Marxist prejudices against the peasantry for its food.

In China, on the contrary, twenty years after his rise to power, Mao was stating "that it cannot be doubted that the struggle of the peasants is developing to such a point as to make them stronger than the workers".⁴³ In 1959, commenting on a work by Stalin, 'Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.', Mao wrote: "the basic mistake (of Stalin) is due to his lack of confidence in the peasantry".⁴⁴ In 1960, on the subject of a sentence from the Manual of Political Economics of the Soviet Union "the lands of the rich peasants are given to the poor and middle peasants" Mao noted that this sentence 'means that the government confiscates the land to give it to the peasants. Here it is a case of feelings of mercy . . . this idea is, in reality, a right wing concept'.⁴⁵

This notion is, however, that of the three ruling classes of the Maghreb with, obviously, differences in the intensity and continuity of the action. To take the case of the most advanced ruling class in this field, that of Algeria, we declare that, at the moment when it initiates a radical agrarian reform, it makes a speech to the peasants of the most patronizing kind: "torn away from ignorance and exploitation the peasants nevertheless put to use and to their own profit *a land that the revolution has given them*, (underlined by me).⁴⁶ As a string attached to this gift of the revolution the Algerian peasants have to *change their mentality and integrate themselves*. "If the Revolution *has given the peasants land* and the material means to work it, it should now help them to increase their social awareness and to place their action in a

⁴² L. Trotsky, *Bilan et Perspectives*, 1905, p. 426-28, cited by G. Arting, "Le problème de la Paysannerie", in "Bilan et perspectives", *Critique de l'Economie politique*, (15), January-March 1974, p. 83-104.

⁴³ Report to the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, April 5, 1929, quoted in Mao's letter to Lin-Piao, January 5, 1930. Text quoted by M.A. Macciocchi, *Pour Gramsci*, Seuil, 1974, p. 183.

⁴⁴ *Mao-Tsé-Toung et la construction du socialisme*, text Seuil, 1975, p. 40.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 73.

⁴⁶ *Avant-project the charte Nationale*, April 1976, p. 16.

PEASANTS AND NATIONAL INTEGRATION

situation which goes beyond the narrow horizons of the unit of production". In this exercise the peasants are seen as the object of the action of the *Revolution* (that is to say the ruling class). Let us take as an example this battle cry of the predecessor of the National Charter which could have been printed in any Tunisian or Algerian newspaper: "the Agrarian Revolution would not move forward if it did not manage to change the mentality of the peasant and destroy in him all archaic patterns of thought and action, and also his vision of the world".⁴⁷

The question that remains to be answered is the following: has the process of "depeasantization" of the rural peasantry of the Maghreb really reached such a point that, finally, it is they themselves who ask for the destruction of their vision of the world? This would on the one hand explain, for the most part, the scarcity of violence in the Maghreb-ian countryside, and, on the other hand, the ambiguous reply of the peasants of the Maghreb to the projects for agrarian reform: their "sure, but . . . !".

We must draw the conclusion that the violent reaction on the part of the British authorities in their crushing of the peasant movement concealed the fear of these authorities of the probability that the movement might change from a national liberation revolution to a social revolution. This fear was shared by the bourgeoisie, the big landowners and even the Wafd leadership.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

Sinarquismo or the Revolutionary Detour of the Right -Wing*

Jean Meyer

I. Circumstances

The circumstances surrounding *Sinarquismo* are the archaisms and the imbalances that existed in Mexico under Cardenas, disorders prevalent in rural areas for the preceding 25 years; countrywide economic problems, above all agrarian; socio-political problems, in particular the consequences of the religious conflict and, finally, the 'fascistization' of the middle classes. All this took place during the presidential succession of 1940 which reveals a fantastic increase in right-wing forces.

In Mexico, 70% rural and deeply affected by the conflict between the Church and the State, a unique encounter took place between the peasant masses and the townspeople, between the young people of the 'new strata' (to avoid using the term 'middle class'), the craftsmen, and the workers belonging to the old trades, all of whom were susceptible to the ideology of the U.N.S. (Unión Nacional Sinarquista).

The Mexican Government, characterized by its authoritarian democracy, is a strong one which recognizes in the U.N.S. a potentially subversive and revolutionary organization, employing nationalist, organic and unitary ideas, which the official party sought to monopolize (the R.M.). The U.N.S. is idealistic, populist, anti-bourgeois and anti-capitalist like the homologous movements in Hungary and in Rumania during the thirties. The *Legion of the Archangel Michael* in Rumania combines social Christianity, agrarianism and traditionalism with hatred of the democratic, communist and Jewish 'foreigners'. The legionary's oath says: "We want to live a hard and strict life, rejecting all luxury

* This deals with the conclusions of book published by Hachette in 1977, *Le Sinarquisme: Un fascisme mexicain? 1937-1947.*

and dissolute living. We want to suppress any attempt by man to exploit man. We want to devote ourselves to the fatherland for always'. The U.N.S. can also be compared to the agrarian parties of Eastern Europe from 1919 to 1949, to the Brazilian *Integralismo*, to Salazarism, to the Italian *Uomo Qualunque* of 1944-1946 and to Argentinian Peronism with which it kept up a correspondence. The U.N.S. was relatively free to play an extremist role, free to make untenable promises, free to attract the public from the 'leftwing' movements, made possible by the absence of a revolutionary Left, by the fact that, under Cardenas, the Left was integrated and committed to the Government. The revolutionary opposition thus was monopolized by the U.N.S.

II. Strategy and tactics

Three possible strategies can be noted: 1) suspicious isolationism, withdrawal on a village and rural basis; 2) revolutionary combat, preferred by Abascal¹, but impossible without the support of the army at least; or 3) compromise, the search for the government's support for effective pressure.

The U.N.S. broke down due to its inability to choose between the 2nd. and 3rd. strategies, an inability that was manifest in the conflict between the "Base"² and the U.N.S. It took refuge in strategy No. 1, from where it could one day eventually be rescued. *Tactics*: The legal steps corresponding to the institution list and legalistic spirit of the movement; these are accompanied by the infiltration and the lobbying in the Ministries of Agriculture, Interior, and in the military. The doors were never closed and the national leaders, from Zermeño to Torres Bueno, were received by President Cardenas and by President Avila Camacho.

Agitation and propaganda belong to the field of direct action which is basically non-violent. This non-violence, in which numerous millenar-

¹ Salvador Abascal, national leader from 1940-1941, removed from the leadership following Pearl Harbor because his radicalism worried the Americans. He embodied the hard wing of the movement with his millenarian and Apocalyptic inclinations and real fascist potentiality.

² The "Base": secret organization which manipulated the UNS until 1944. In close contact with the Mexican Government, the American Embassy and the Catholic Hierarchy. Dreams of a Mexican *Opus Dei*.

ian elements can be found, is not synonymous with inactivity. It includes and canalizes disciplined aggression, which always makes a strong impression on observers. Tactically, this non-violence corresponds to a dialectic of waiting and of action which is essential for the movement; it is also revealing, it proclaims the essence of the movement, a movement of the poorest of Mexicans who transfer the role of the pariah to the level of national politics. The U.N.S., a political pariah, identifies itself with Mexico, a pariah nation, that has to free itself from the United States. All the strategies of civic resistance (going to prison, not paying fines, etc. . .) are deeply rooted in these pariah ethics, which at the same time were characterized by a reverence towards power – there is a desire to ‘kiss the ground beneath it’, and as long as the opportunity is given, this is done with haste and with joy.

The result is a political style which combines steadfastness with respect. In 1941, at the time of greatest severity, the U.N.S. gave the following instructions to its leaders:

Suppress anything that may be offensive from our vocabulary . . . do not attack the authorities. We support the authorities who make it a rule to seek the common good. We desire harmony between the people and the Government, we are not a blind and narrow-minded opposition.

But, the U.N.S. continues by proclaiming that “we do not want fine speeches, Mr. President, we want justice” and fills the streets with its demonstrators. This type of action is essential in order to mobilize, recruit (‘sinarquize’), train and maintain the troops in good order, in order to be noticed by the Government.

Before 1946, the U.N.S. did not once stand in an electoral campaign. Its reasoning was well-founded on the uselessness of the vote; the attempt of the *Fuerza Popular* in the autumn of 1946 merely shows that times had changed and that the U.N.S. was on the decline. As the possibilities of lobbying were limited (the U.N.S. had only a few allies in the system; people were too afraid of it), direct action and the mobilization of the crowd constituted the essential part of the *Sinarquist* political game that the Government accepted and manipulated with its police and militia. Who tackled the Sinarquists? Who took the bottom out of their movement? The agrarian sector and the police, never the army, the only political sector in the government system which sympathized with the U.N.S.

Failure or success depends on the strategical context.

III. Strategic context

The forms of attack and the intensity of the *Sinarquist* movement –the use of non-violence, the elimination of the radicals, its decline– were conditioned and practically determined by the strategic context, that is to say, the constellation formed by the institutions, groups, and individuals, whose interests were at stake, their strength, their alliances and opposition, the political and legal rules which governed the conflict and its solution in Mexico: the United States, the war in Europe, and then after Pearl Harbour, World War II, all belong to the strategic context. In view of the configuration of forces, it is evident that:

The *Sinarquists* had very little economic and political power; they never received serious financial help from the Mexican landed classes nor from abroad, in contrast to the P.A.N., for example, which is financed by Mexican industrialists and bankers. Socially, the *Sinarquists* recruited from the middle classes, the craftsmen and especially from the peasant classes. The peasant, within the context of agrarian reform, was an ideal subject for Government manipulation, likewise by the U.N.S. As a result, the U.N.S. itself was manipulated and on a threefold basis at that –

1) by the “Base”, a secret organization, representing the interests of the conservative Catholic sector who wanted to convert the U.N.S. into a pressure group on the Government (in short, strategically the same as the P.A.N.).

2) by President Avila Camacho’s Government that used the U.N.S., while controlling it, in order to destroy the Left and to dismantle the positions of Cardenas’ followers.

3) by the United States, who thus continued with the consolidation of Avila Camacho’s regime in order to prevent a return to Cardenist practices, and with the struggle against the implantation of a fifth column in Mexico. Its intervention in 1941 in the elimination of Abascal is decisive.

At all three levels of manipulation, the ‘Base’ was represented by Antonio Santa Cruz, a rich Catholic businessman. The U.N.S. was fighting for reforms, and for power, although it did not say so. For tactical reasons, the U.N.S. declared that it did not want to become involved in politics, but the permanent conflict between the ‘Base’, that did not want a takeover, but nevertheless wanted to exercise its influence, and the successive leaders of the U.N.S., from Zermeño to Torres Bueno, is proof of his ambition. At local level, this is evident, and at national

level, it can be seen in the foundation of the *Fuerza Popular*, a short-lived party.

The success of the U.N.S. was certain. To be able to exist within the Mexican political system, especially during the period of domestic crisis (1937-1941) and international crisis (after 1940) to be able to demonstrate in the streets, in itself constituted an exploit. This success was due to the capacity of the U.N.S. (and that of the 'Base') to check and to control its radical groups and its troops, to bring about a compromise between the Government and the United States. This explains why the Government sold paper to the newspaper "El Sinarquista" and combined tolerance at national level with a bloody repression at local level up until 1941. After the elimination of Abascal, and after achieving the consolidation of the Government in regard to Cardenism, the repression of *Sinarquism* did not involve any more martyrs. But, each time that the *Sinarquists* raised their voices or marched too quickly, they got their knuckles rapped (1944).

So they had to find a compromise between the political interests of the movement, those of the Government and those of the United States, which could not be threatened. This explains the internal crisis in the U.N.S. which had a vast audience among the people because it spoke out against the Government and the United States; it also explains the contradiction that existed between the U.N.S.'s daily activism and its long-term inactivity. 'Floating in too great a myth, they fly ahead of it, hurrying into action, marching, singing, and getting agitated just for the sake of it, their words and gestures often masking the powerlessness or abandonment of their ideal, but at the same time used as rites capable of producing powerful symbols, sources of energy and renewal'.³

Once Abascal, who would have undoubtedly led the movement to a take-over and thus clarified the position (by the probable destruction of the U.N.S. or by its alliance with other rightwing forces, mainly military), had been eliminated, there was nothing left other than untenable promises. For the time being, they could economize on action, and content themselves with waiting patiently, in the exaltation of individual purity, and in adventism, consoling themselves with local activity (moralizing, cleanliness and literacy campaigns. . .). Then, the leaders of

³ Eugen Weber, "Fascisme et national-socialisme", in *Annales ESC* 1969 I, p. 200.

the U.N.S. split up, relations with the 'Base' were broken off and the masses grew weary. A handful of unshakeables is all that remained

The U.N.S. worked in international and national political circles. The rise of fascism in the world, and especially the nationalist triumph in Spain gave it a boost, but this only lasted until Pearl Harbor; afterwards, it needed to make a stand against Italy and Germany to protect itself from the fatal accusation of fascism. Within Mexico, the U.N.S. participated in the general rise of emotions and anti-Cardenist forces before 1940; then it became the ally of Avila Camacho in the flight against Cardenism, and after the defeat of the latter, with the coming of Miguel Aleman as President, the U.N.S. loses its "raison d'être".

IV. Nature of the U.N.S.

The easy tag of fascism has been attached to very different movements. This does not mean to say, and it is what sometimes makes it difficult to understand *Sinarquism*, that the U.N.S. was not affected by fascism. The methods and the outward signs of fascism are not everything, and the Mexico of 1940 was very far from the capitalist societies of the period of monopolist concentration and imperialism; the Mexican 'bourgeoisie', if there is such a thing, was more on the side of President Avila Camacho than on that of the U.N.S. If fascism is supposed to stem from the democratic bourgeoisie, in an atmosphere of serious economic crisis and against a powerful proletariat, there is nothing of this kind in Mexico. All the same, the political system is not undergoing a crisis; the crisis of the presidential succession in the summer of 1940 did not affect the system, even if it was advantageous to *Sinarquism*. There is no revolutionary threat from the Left and the State has become the central economic and political agent in Mexico to such an extent that no one even talks of a take-over.

Neither the economy (the situation has been bad for years, but not catastrophic), nor the State, nor capitalism is undergoing a crisis. This is why there is no one to finance the U.N.S., a movement of the poor, the remains of the incorruptible sort, why it is not a matter of the U.N.S. taking over the State, but of the State using the U.N.S. Things might have been different had Múgica succeeded Cardenas in 1940; then money would have flowed in to the treasury. The U.N.S. was there to help make the famous but "inexplicable" swing of the Mexican Revolution in 1940.

The support of Santacruz or that of a few other rich men is not the cause of the striking growth of the U.N.S. The members of the P.R.U.N., of the Dorados, of the P.A.N., etc. . . have far more money. The reason is to be found in the logic of a situation which, in a society frightened by Cardenism, seemed to have to reinforce right-wing radicalism, more especially as leftwing radicalism had begun to lose its hold among the masses, while at the same time knowing how to give the impression that it was above the other parties. The U.N.S.'s awareness of this situation undoubtedly explains in part its extraordinary activity which had no equal⁴. This still does not, however, indicate the type of combat and the type of simplification that should be chosen by this activist and still pliable right-wing radicalism. Abascal was eliminated because he was a terrible simplifier, and he might have led the U.N.S. to a truly conflictive type of fascism. The U.N.S. reached its peak under his leadership, then began its decline. At that precise moment, what it needed was to take power or to be asked to rule. It did not find a partner, because neither the State nor the propertied classes were threatened. As for the numerical strength, a Bergery said to La Rocque, who was so proud of the large numbers in his "Croix de Feu"⁵, 'you still do not equal the number of gas subscribers'.

Today, in 1976, in the Third World, there are movements that seek to combine nationalism, socialism and populism, using a mystic-mystifying language. Their ideology usually corresponds to a national-populist, opportunist and progressive dictatorship that aims for economic growth and promises national independence and social justice. For a long time the Mexican political system was familiar with this type of language, used simultaneously by the Government and by an opposition movement, the U.N.S., whose brilliant and rapid trajectory showed the richness and fragility of certain social movements.

In the U.N.S, as was somewhat the case with Italian fascism, the forces at play were the conservatives and the national-populists, both from the political Catholic circle. They spoke different languages and were from two different institutions:

⁴ 400,000 members, a million sympathizers and daily presence in the streets.

⁵ French nationalist right-wing movement of the thirties.

- 1) The conservative “base”, which played a double game with the peasants, with the *Sinarquists*, and with the United States, and
- 2) The U.N.S., which strictly speaking embodied a peculiar type of revolutionary reaction. The “Base” was looking for the key to the masses. The U.N.S. had already found it, but thanks to the “Base”.

So, until 1944, paternalistic and authoritarian leaders of the old style (Santa Cruz) and leaders of contemporary movements, who violently attack liberalism, democracy and an unjust economic system co-existed. The difference between the conservatives and the rebels was social, the former often belonging to the ancient oligarchy, sometimes to the new, the latter belonging to the middle classes. The difference is also biological – a whole generation existed between the two. The young leaders angrily and violently attacked the historical (Cardenist) Left and its class war, but not its social aims. They managed to recruit members from the so-called leftist groups – students, workers, industrialists, poor peasants and Indians. The ideological salmagundi, made up of a glorious past, present action and future advantages, was successful because of its very confusion. On the other hand, the Salazarian Catholicism of the “Base” did not leave room for the authoritarianism of the anti-traditional masses. The Sinarquist leaders were the leaders of a great movement of the poor, who are always the losers in socio-economic changes. Their ideology was suited to a time when any kind of change was better than none, when feverish activity acted as a substitute for efficiency.

The U.N.S. proved that peasants and workers could accept such an ideology. Stemming from university circles (young lawyers from Guanajuato), it was spread by the young nationalists who could not see anything in the litanies of so conformist a Left, and who could not find a place in the system. This ideology first took root in the historical heart of Mexico, in the highly-populated agrarian areas of the *Bajío*, and in the Indian communities overwhelmed by extreme poverty, and then among the workers.

This is how this vast movement appeared. It was the bearer of radical claims, dreaded as such, even by some of its members, and considered as such by the Government, in a country where nationalism is equivalent to anti-communism.

In its biggest statistical dimension, the U.N.S. was agrarian, but it also worked as a “revolution” of the middle classes, as a reappearance of that which history had repressed (Catholics excluded from political life) or lacked (agrarian reform). It is a movement of all classes.

V. Failure or success?

The U.N.S. is a fine example of the power and of the stability of the Mexican political system, a fine example of the control of the peasants by means of manipulation and by means of an opposition organization that is “loyal” in its own way. The U.N.S. was the first to assert its role as demobilizer during mobilization. It rightly affirmed that it had prevented many bloody riots and more than one uprising. It boasted of having quelled the last seeds of the Cristero uprising, notably in the Acámbaro region (Guanajuato), where it forced the remaining dissidents to lay down their arms, from 1940-1941. It channelled the discontent of the peasants, allowing them to express themselves and to make themselves understood by the Government.

The U.N.S. rendered an excellent service to the Mexican authoritarian democracy by integrating the rural masses, deprived of their traditional restraints (the landowners and the clergy) by the agrarian reform and anti-clericalism (since 1914, the Church has formed part of the opposition), into the system. The U.N.S. wanted to be, and in fact was, the first “democratic” movement of the masses (demos) in Mexico, a factor of modernization and integration in a political life dominated by an extremely limited ruling class. The U.N.S. was thus a political feat proper to the century of the masses, that of the passing from carlo-populism to contemporary right-wing national populism during which time the radical potential had been diffused. The U.N.S. did not take power, but it did fulfill its historical mission of controlling the peasant masses, of representing the “fascist” psychodrama, and finally of facilitating the slide to the right of the Mexican Revolution. As Padre Heriberto Navarreta said, quoting some lines from *El Cid*:

“Sinarquism? Goodness, what a good servant, had it had a good master!”

“El Sinarquismo? ¡Dios que buen vasallo si hubiese tenido buen señor!”

The Peasantry and the Ethnic Factor: the Adivasis from Chota Nagpur (India)

Susana B.C. Devallé

The problem to be discussed in this paper came to light while observing the history of peasants of tribal origin (*adivasis*) in Chota Nagpur. They have been a permanent presence in the agrarian history of the area and a politically active force.

The history of agrarian groups has been frequently kept on the margin of official history. This has been due in part to the persistence of approaches that consider peasant groups as entities isolated from the social context of which they are a part, and as having their own dynamics, instead of viewing their role in the context of the larger society and as active participants in historical processes. In this respect it is important to observe the process of formation of a political consciousness among the peasantry and, in relation to it, the existence of organized participation in the struggle against dominant native elements, colonial domination, and the obstacles that they encounter against their participation in the political life of independent nations.

Under British rule in India, the first signs of protest on the part of the *adivasi* peasants of Chota Nagpur rose from the need to solve agrarian conflicts involving the economic relations centering around the character of rights to land use, agricultural work and production, and appropriation of the latter by local sectors or by elements coming from other parts of India. The first elements of the *tradition of protest* of the *adivasis* from the area ¹, dating from the end of the XVIII century and

¹ The present paper has been based on the study of cases of traditional peasant protest among the Mundas, the Santals and the Bhumijis, mainly those in the course of the XIX century. The following movement and actions of protest have been analyzed in more detail: Ganga Narain's Rebellion of 1832, among the Bhumijis; the Santal Rebellion of 1855, among the Santals, and the Birsaité

continuing during the XIX century, were formulated around these issues and evidenced by the uprisings, the activities of social banditry and non-cooperation. Here a dual analytical problem is encountered. On the one hand, these are traditional communal cultivators that were transformed into peasants. On the other hand, the ethnic element is present. Thus, the predominantly agrarian nature of their protest movements during the XIX century and those that have occurred in the present ought to be kept in view. At the same time it should not be forgotten that these people were also defending their identity and integrity from pressures of dominant economic, political and cultural forces, a struggle that still continues.

The British colonial system began to reinforce itself through special legislation, armed force and the use of the local elements who controlled land and peasants. The appropriation of agricultural production, and of the very peasants as a captive labor force, was achieved thoroughly and systematically by way of a system of rents and taxes which used this income to feed the colonial administration's treasury. This appropriation not only affected the peasant and his produce, but sometimes the government also became the direct owner of the land, as in the case of the Damin-i-koh.² In order to unite and organize themselves, sometimes in broadbased movements founded in multi-tribal alliances, the *adivasis* that participated in protest actions had first to define themselves as peasants in opposition to the immediately domi-

Movement of 1895 among the Mundas. (Devalle, S.B.C., "El movimiento Birsaita. Un movimiento milenario en una sociedad tribal", in P.C. Mukherjee, *et. al. Movimientos agrarios y Cambio Social en Asia y Africa*, México, 1974; y Devalle, S.B.C., *La Palabra de la Tierra (Protesta campesina en India S. XIX)*, México, 1977.)

For the present situation opinions are based on published sources and interviews.

²An area around the Rajmahal Hills was delimited in 1832, encompassing 1351 sq. miles (the Census of 1901 mentions 1,422 sq. miles), 60 per cent of them high lands. It was declared government property. The creation of this sector was due to the ideal of using its strategic situation for the defense of Bengal and of commerce, and to increase the rent income with the progressive colonization of the area. The Government strongly sponsored the migration of Santals to the Damin so as to open it up for cultivation. In 1851, 82, 795 tribal and non-tribal migrants lived in this area, settled in 1,473 villages. Only the 1,164 Santal villages were to pay rent. (cf. W.W. Hunter, *The Annals of Rural Bengal*, New York, 1868, p. 234; V. Raghavaiah, *Tribal Revolts*, Nellore, 1971, p. 148, and Roy Chaudhur, "Santal Parganas" *Bengal District Bazeteers*, 1905, Patna, p. 74-75).

nant sectors: the *zamindars*, the *thikadars*, the *jagirdars*, the money-lenders and the merchants (when these last two also came to control *adivasi* lands).³ Aware of their condition as peasants, the *adivasis* defended their rights to the land they had tilled for generations against sectors that, while not participating in agricultural work, appropriated the produce and even exerted control over the peasants as a labor force.

The economically powerful local sectors were used by the colonial system of economic exploitation to consolidate its political power over territories with a tribal population and, among other things, to ensure that rents and taxes coming from agricultural activities continued constant, even in periods of famine. At the same time, these locally dominant sectors benefited by British imposed legislation which introduced the idea of private land ownership and considered land as a marketable good. The deprivation of the peasants of their lands was legalized by the new laws, which were careful to regulate, but not eliminate, the system of peasant labor force exploitation, as in the case of the *kamioti* system.⁴

The *adivasi* peasants perceived the character of the colonial system and the new economic relationships in which they were involved through their experiences in legal protest and failed uprisings (aimed at attracting the Government's attention so it would grant justice) and, as well, through contacts with the agents of the administration and the bearers of the colonial ideology. This perception developed gradually. First, they became familiar with the strength of the army, then the increasing demands of the tax collectors, the injustice of the courts' employees, the corruption of the police, the ambiguous work of the missionaries,

³ The term *zamindar* in Bihar, Bengala and Orissa designates a type of hereditary landlord; *thikadar* a contractor of farmers, and *jagirdar*, a person to whom a conditional or unconditional assignment of land or its renewe is given.

⁴ According to this system, known by names in different regions of India, the indebted peasant was to pay his debt with labor and personal services to the lender while not receiving any payment. Usually the debtor passed in to the condition of a life-time serf. The situation of peasant indebtedness did not improve with the enactment of laws like the *Ammended Act of Land Tenancy in Bengal* of 1918, or *The Bihar and Orissa Kamioti Agreements Act, 1920*. These laws did not eliminate the *kamioti* system; they just regulated it. In the thirties the system still existed in Bihar, especially in areas with *adivasi* population. (Cf.: E. G., Man, *Sonthalia and the Sonthals*, Calcutta, s.f., p. 111; R. Mukerjee, *Land Problems of India*, London, 1933, p. 229; W. W. Hunter, *A Statistical Account of Bengal*, vol. XIV, London, 1877, p. 303; A.G. Roy et. al. *The Bihar Local Acts, 1793-1963*, Allahabad, 1964, vol. III).

and the ideas coming from the colonizer's tradition spread through education and missions.⁵

The agrarian base, a constant element in the long history of protest of the *adivasis* of Chota Nagpur, was later on encompassed in another kind of offensive and defensive action that developed into a struggle against the agents of the colonial administration and for liberation. The political strategy was based then on the establishment of bonds of solidarity backed by an ethnic consciousness that encouraged action in defense of the cultural and social integrity of the *adivasi*. The perception of their own ethnicity became a vehicle for the expression of the struggle for economic and political independence, and an instrument for organizing actions and alliances in the face of the colonial representatives. On this basis common interests and aims were detected and projects were formulated, as in the case of the Birsaite Movement.⁶ The ethnic banner was thus transformed, within the framework of the colonial system and in the context of peasant *adivasi* protest of the traditional kind, into a means effective for cementing the unity required in organizing a collective, though locally limited, action

⁵ Christian missionaries of different denominations began to arrive in Chota Nagpur in the XIXth century. Their influence was especially important in education. The missionaries offered help to the peasants against the demands of *thikadars* and *jagirdars*. The condition for obtaining their support, not explicit but present in practice, was conversion to Christianity. The converted Mundas began to protest openly against the landlords by means of non-cooperation. For example, in 1874, Christian *bhuinhars* denied their service to the landlords. It seems that the help of the missionaries was effective in the Courts when a converted peasant defended himself against a landlord. *Thinkadars* and *jagirdars* then turned violently against the missionaries and the converted peasants. Together with this conditional help a conflict developed in relation to lands. The *adivasi* peasants realized that there was "no difference between the white man at the Calcutta court and the white man at the mission bungalow" (Zide and Munda, "Revolutionary Brisa and the Songs related to him", *Jour. of Soc. Res.*, 1969, XII, 2 p. 38). It began with the attempt of the missionaries to get hold of *pahanai* lands for the use of the mission in the Munda area. The reaction of the Mundas was to abandon the new faith. The missionaries then pressured the colonial authorities for more strict laws concerning land. The Sardari Larai movement arose due to these conflicts over land. Conversion followed the ups and downs of peasant protest in the area. After repression, conversion was accepted as a way to avoid punishment and to remain on good terms with the Government (as the Christian faith was the religion of the colonizer).

⁶ The Birsaite Movement (1895-1900) was a millenarian messianic movement in its form and agrarian in its content. It had a political program where, together with the agrarian problem, the issue of political independence was also considered, conditioned to the elimination of British domination.

against the British. Ethnicity was not only a banner. The need to defend their ethnic identity appeared as a reality. The *adivasis* sought to legitimize their struggle for rights and for a total economic and political, as well as cultural and religious independence, with their own traditions and their own history. The strengthening of their ethnic consciousness and the reinforcement of their identity sprang from a awareness of the existence of processes of penetration of ideas held by the different groups that tried to establish dominion over the tribal areas. This penetration was observable in the persistent tendencies towards Hinduization, in the ideas introduced through legislation, Christianization and education.

The role that ethnic consciousness plays poses a series of fundamental problems. One aspect to be considered is that of the formation of this consciousness and its projection in terms of impairing or favoring the formation of a class consciousness. Another aspect is the detection of definitive patterns of domination as reflected in the character of interethnic relations, in the colonial situations as well as during the process of formation of the nation-state in the independent nations. Lastly, the projects for national integration should be analyzed in terms of the social groups that put them forward, and the aims of these projects.

The so-called ethnic problem has been an intellectual construct used to explain characteristics of societies under colonial domination or of societies that are in the process of nation-building. It has also been an invention of the dominant national sectors that propose historical projects with the aim of imposing them on the pluriethnic society of which they are a part. The colonial administrations skillfully used the ethnic question to impair the crystallization of alliances that could endanger the colonial system. In this situation, the reinforcement of particular ethnic attachments was generally encouraged. In the course of the process of nation-building in pluriethnic societies, the elements that monopolized the elaboration of a national project could sometimes manipulate the ethnic groups with the aim of *solving* the assumed problem, supporting a certain integration (disintegration) of these groups in order to subordinate them. This attitude goes together with a concept of the nation-state that denies the pluriethnic nature of its society and, consequently, denies full participation to its plural elements in the elaboration of its project. The question arises then as to whether the ethnic problem has been created by the ethnic groups themselves or rather by the dominant national groups in order to impair the development of formulations, independent of the *national* ideological current that the

latter want to prevail. Aside from this intellectual and ideological construct, how do ethnic groups perceive the relationships in which they are involved, and how do they view their participation in society?

The ethnic factor can operate in many ways. A reinforcement of ethnic identity can be used as a defensive weapon in the face of pressures external to the society (as with colonial domination), or it can be manipulated to support external domination. Also, an introversive, defensive attitude can make tendencies towards conformism prevail inside the ethnic groups which might accept terms imposed by the dominant sectors without question.

Manifestations of ethnic consciousness, especially when expressed as collective political actions, are not an example of stubbornness in defending cultural traits (sometimes seen as anachronistic). Neither are they just a mechanism for cataloguing different groups in society, as some scholars would like to present them. Rather they evidence the desire of these social sectors to defend and express themselves, and to participate in the framework of the pluriethnic society in the face of the sectors that impose, dominate and manipulate the destiny of the various components of society in favor of their own *national* project.

In general terms, in the policies towards ethnic groups, the tendencies are towards absorption, forced integration, elimination, changes produced and imposed from the summit, cooptation, etc. It is interesting to observe the cases where after independence from colonial domination, some of the old policies of the metropolis are again being revived, and the dominant sectors that propose the *national project* appropriate for themselves the *mission civilatrice*, formerly the monopoly of the colonizers. These they apply to the national ethnic groups, to educate them, to impose a *national language* to the detriment of other languages, thereby making these groups *less indigenous, less tribal and less different*, but not to the degree that recognizing them becomes difficult, and that the social system could continue to reproduce itself.

A criticism is necessary of the types of analyses that manipulate ethnicity to cover something vaguely defined as the ethnic problem: class situations, conflicts in the struggle for power, for superseding economic exploitation, for the avoidance of cultural destruction, for the avoidance of the destruction of the historical past of these peoples. Unfortunately, when integration is talked about in pluriethnic societies, it is generally a partial integration with a concrete aim: a better form of control and, sometimes, a better form of exploitation, as is the case of the indigenous or autochthonous peasantry. Also, unfortunately, the

development of a new and heightened national consciousness (fed with elements coming from the different sectors of the society) is not sought. Thus the possible contributions of various cultures are rejected and the forging of a more complete national history that could embrace elements generally ignored or made marginal to it is made impossible.

In the case of the tribal population in India after independence, the "special" characteristics of the *adivasis* have been stressed, especially the cultural aspects. It is necessary to change this view and see the *adivasis* that work on settled agriculture in their essential condition as peasants, as is the case of the majority that live in Chota Nagpur. This condition should be understood in the context of the economic relationships at a national level. This done, one can start to understand and explain what has occurred and is occurring to the *adivasis*, and how they have acted and now act in specific situations. Thus, one avoids deriving the explanations of the expressions of collective and organized protest of the *adivasis* from the effects of "cultural clashes" or the "inability" of the *adivasis* to "adapt" themselves to the new situations. The inclusion of these protests among the so-called communal conflicts is rejected, because it masks the true nature of conflicts from which the protests derive. The fundamental problem is that of the relationships in which peasants are involved. These are unequal relationships of economic exploitation and of social, political and cultural domination. An awareness of this situation can favor the emergence of a peasant consciousness as to their condition and their interests with regard to other sectors of society. This had led the *adivasi* peasantry to face concrete situations with collective actions in defense of their basic interests: their land, the product of their land and their work. At another level, this refers to the defense of their land, their language, their culture, their history, as defining their identity, and the awareness of this identity. In independent India, the *adivasi* peasantry has been involved in political actions where confrontations have been defined in the frame of class struggle, at the level of the economic structure and also in the political front.

Adivasi peasants, together with other sectors of tribal origin, have been officially catalogued as sectors with "special" problems that deserve "special" treatment (what is called *protective discrimination*). They are named *Scheduled Tribes* or *Backward Tribes*.⁷ From the mo-

7 Cf. Articles 46, 339 and 340 of the *Constitution of India*.

ment they are so qualified, the objective condition as peasants of a majority of the *adivasis* is ignored, a condition that they share with other peasant sectors. The privileges and protection given to the *adivasis* show a paternalistic discriminatory attitude that justifies the introduction of changes from above. The ideas of "weakness" and "backwardness" have been promoted in different ways through official action and the activities of working groups organized by social scientists. By defining them as a "special", separate sector, protecting them in an oppressive fashion, and by giving them the characteristics of "backwardness" and "weakness", obstacles are set up which prevent the emergence of a consciousness among the *adivasi* peasants as to the real nature of their situation before other sectors of society, as well as the common interests they share with other peasant sectors, *adivasi* or not.

If one considers objective reality in independent India and observes the situation of these peasants in the framework of specific socio-economic relationships, this situation cannot be described simply as the product of a process of acculturation or as a product of communal relations and conflicts with sectors identified by their caste attachments. It is necessary to concentrate the analysis on the existing class structure and the conflicts that develop from it. After independence, the confrontations of *adivasi* peasants with landlords, money-lenders and other dominant rural elements were defined in the field of class struggle. For the peasantry the main issues continued to center around the privation of lands, indebtedness and extortion, and the appropriation of the product of their work in terms of exploitation which affected the *adivasi* peasant as a agricultural labor force. The acceleration of this process increased the number of landless peasants among the *adivasis*. It is not only the local elements with economic and political power that have been responsible for this process, but also the enactment of development plans that included the establishment of large industrial complexes, such as occurred in the rich mineral belt of Chota Nagpur.

The existence of a *tradition of protest* which brings together more than a century and a half of experiences of struggle on agrarian questions tends to make actions on the political front possible, with the consequent development of a "consciousness for itself" among the peasants. The development of this consciousness, based on ethnic identity and on the acknowledgement of their peasant condition in the face of others, confronts serious problems. The hegemonic groups set obstacles to this development not only through the crude methods

of direct repression but also through the more subtle method of the diffusion and imposition of an ideology. This ideology attempts to convince the *adivasi* peasant that he is incapable of surviving without their protection, that his "inherent" weakness will not allow him to struggle or defend himself from the powerful rural sectors, and that he will only succeed if he accepts the kind of help they offer. A commonly used method for diffusing protest is that of cooptation. An example, is the fusion of the Jharkhand Party with the Congress Party in September 1963.⁸ Other common tactics include the oversimplification of the issues of national politics at the time of elections. The aim is not to make people politically conscious but to mobilize the votes of peasant masses for parties that represent other social classes.

An old ideal, the formation of a separate *adivasi* state in Chota Nagpur, is still alive. Young *adivasi* intellectuals are forging plans to make it real. This project starts from an ethnic perspective but considers the context of national economic, political and social relationships in India. While the hegemonic groups have not recognized the pluri-ethnic character of the nation, the *adivasi* have, and so are attempting to change the character of the nation-state. These ideas have been able to emerge because there is an awareness among the *adivasi* of Chota Nagpur of their own historical experience. This history in which people see themselves as members of ethnic groups in the face of the other sectors with different historical and cultural traditions and as peasants, has been painfully built up on the basis of a double experience of oppression: one derived from being treated as tribal and considered "primitive" and "backward", and the other that comes from the position of subordination and exploitation as a peasant. The old and the new forms of subordination that the *adivasi* peasants remember do not lead them to accept the imposed ideologies. The *adivasi* of Chota Nagpur have shown that they reject being subjected to a global colonial or capitalist socioeconomic system of control and exploitation. This happened generally by means of "passive" protest and, at exceptional times, with desperate frontal struggle culminating in rebellion.

8 The group of Christian *adivasis* has oriented the Jharkhand Party since its beginnings. The *adivasis* of Chota Nagpur acknowledge that cooptation has touched the Party and have doubted the moral integrity of its most important leader, Jaipal Singh. Non-Christian *adivasis* consider the converted as people that look towards the dominant national groups. The ethnic issue has been manipulated by the Jharkhand Party to attract the non-Christian sector.

These are the ones who are aware of their own history. There are others who have forgotten it and built an imaginary history of replacement, paving the way for their assimilation by the dominant social system on its terms. This latter is the case of the sectors of the *adivasi* population that make efforts towards Hinduization and, in an ambiguous way, the case of the Christian *adivasis*.

Those who are aware rely upon their history or resistance, and also upon the strength coming from the feeling of belonging to the land. Land is understood as the territory that defines the people and their *nationality*, and it also refers more directly to the work and *raison d'être* of the peasantry.

The *adivasi* peasants of Chota Nagpur have been constantly present in the agrarian history of India. However, the peasant movement in the area is still weak. Nevertheless, with the consciousness that they have developed throughout their historical experiences, they have been able to defend their interests in the economic field with actions that gradually passed to a political level. The *adivasis* have the possibility of strategically utilizing yet another resource: the strength of their ethnic identity. It allows them to define themselves, to unite for action and to look for their own ideological formulations.

The Role of Egyptian Peasants in the 1919 Revolution

Mohamed Ahmed Anis

To study this subject the following considerations will have to be taken into account.

Firstly: in an underdeveloped country like Egypt the peasant class is the oldest social class in comparison with the working class or the intelligentsia or even the bourgeoisie with its various levels. These latter classes were formed during the XIXc., whereas the peasants have been there for centuries. This means that the peasants are the most original Egyptians. They are a class with customs, traditions and a distinctive life-style and qualities accumulated through generations. Hence, no true revolutionary movement can arise in Egypt without peasant participation. This also means that Egyptian peasants have more influence in Egyptian life than other classes, not only because of their large numbers but also because of their traditions which are rooted in the consciousness of Egyptian society. Consequently any revolutionary movement in Egypt which does not enjoy peasant participation lacks strength and genuineness. It is on account of this that we can describe the Orabi Movement (1881-1882) and the 1919 revolution as genuine because peasants participated in them, whereas we cannot describe the Nationalist Party's movement, which occurred between the Orabi Revolution and the 1919 revolution, as such.

This latter movement was initiated by the intelligentsia in cooperation with the workers.

Secondly: In spite of the above mentioned fact, it can be noticed that the peasants are always late in joining any revolution. This may be due to the slow pattern of rural life.

Thirdly: The researcher meets with difficulty in trying to formulate a fixed definition of peasants, particularly those who own land. If it is proper to define peasants, this definition can only be effected according to two standards: the size of ownership and the type of use made of the

land. Where there is no need for work by others and the owner with his family work alone on their land, which can only happen on smallholdings, we find the pure peasantry. Egyptian sources are agreed in defining smallholdings as pieces of land the area of which is less than five feddans.

Owners of this type of holding can be considered peasants if they are able to exploit it alone, if they have no other land and if they have no other source of work except agriculture. However, within this group we can distinguish between agricultural laborers and smallholders. In this way the peasant class can be defined as the social group which has no other work but agriculture and which does not need the efforts of others. In this, holders and non-holders are the same. According to Ya'kub Artin,¹ Mohamed Ali distributed land to peasants in 1813 by giving an area of between 3 and 5 feddans to each family. Yet, at the end of Ismail's rule there were peasants owning less than 1/24 of a feddan. The discrepancy in distribution of land in every village became apparent. Now, what were the reasons that led to a continual impoverishment of the peasants?

The most important of these can be summarized as follows:

1. Legislation since the appearance of the First Regulations (1846) was not in the favor of small peasants.

2. The establishment of big ownerships on title lands (lands of big farms on which taxes were only lately imposed in 1854) was done¹ at the expense of peasant lands. It is not true that the big farms were on un-reclaimed lands. They were on the cultivated lands of the peasants. The Orabi Memoirs prove this. He says: "Even those who were given lands of the Abadien (big farm) soon exchanged them for lands from the cultivated areas. This happened under Said, who issued two orders, in 1854 and 1855, allowing owners of low productivity big farms to exchange them for cultivated lands abandoned by peasants."² Thus the rise of big ownerships on title lands both of Gafaleks of Abadiech was and completed at the expense of peasant ownership.

The system of taxation

3. It is probable that the system of taxation was the decisive factor in

¹ Ya'kub Artin, *Rules Regulating Egyptian Lands*. Bulaq, Cairo 1889, pp 173-4.

² Documents House, Mahfeza 42. Daftar 185, Mehia Turki 172.

impoverishing Egyptian peasants. This process can be explained in the following terms: the increasing taxes under Mohamed Ali and the means forced on the peasants resulted in whole villages being unable to pay taxes.

To face this difficulty, Mohammed Ali founded a new system known as Trusteeship in 1840. According to this system high officials and officers were compelled to pay the current and overdue taxes owed by insolvent villages in return for a part of the lands of these villages for them to cultivate. Peasants were to work on these lands as laborers to be paid either daily or by being given part of the crop. The law stipulated that the lands should be gradually returned to the peasants when they were capable of cultivating them and paying all due taxes.³ But by 1844 an area 1,205,599 feddans had become a trust of Mohammed Ali and his family and his high ranking officials and officers. The trusteeship lands were not returned to their owners. Ya'Kub Artin fails to explain this, though he emphasized that these lands were converted to private ownership. This fact is stressed by the decision of Consultant House of Representatives in 1866 which abolished the system of trusteeships, saying that "the trustees have possession of the requisitioned land according to the Regulations".⁴ Land ownership records kept at the National Archives indicate that the larger part of trusteeship lands was converted to the private ownership of trustees.⁵ Thus when the trusteeship system was abolished in Ismail's reign, a great part of the taxed lands was owned by the trustees.

4. The increased taxes and their consequences led to the peasants losing their lands in the period between the end of Mohammed Ali's rule and the end of Ismail's. In this period taxes increased greatly, and under Ismail, additional taxes were enforced. It is unnecessary to list all these taxes but it is enough to mention that Ismail El Mofatesh, the minister of finance of the Khedive Ismail, used to be proud of himself because he collected 15 million pounds of tax money in one year.⁶

³ Rivlin, *The Economy and Administration in Egypt in the early Nineteenth Century*, (translated into Arabic), Cairo, 1967. p. 97

⁴ *Egyptian Actualities*, December 31, 1866.

⁵ National Archives, Ownership Records of Araba Al Madfuna Girga District, 1269 (A.M)

⁶ Grouchley, *The economic development of Modern Egypt*, Bristol, 1930. p. 127.

The weight of taxation was further doubled by an extremely strange system which came into force with Mohammed Ali. Under this system the peasants of a village were jointly responsible for paying the taxes due. The whole village was also responsible for the taxes of neighboring villages. This system laid the door open to injustice by village chiefs and local authorities and their manipulation of the peasants' affairs. In addition to this system, which was kept in use up to the beginning of Said's rule, there was a discrimination in taxation between peasants and big-owners. From the very first moment, the owners of Abeadieh and Gafaleks were exempted from taxes until Said, when a small tax was imposed on them. On the other hand we find some peasants continuing to pay taxes on lands destroyed by the Nile or needed for public works.

Under these circumstances tax methods were very cruel and brutal. Abdallah al Nadim, the writer who supported the Orabi Revolution, points out this dramatic fact: "The methods of levying taxes were enough to set people trembling. They were based on humiliation, insults and bodily harm. When the ma'amur came to a village to supervise the collection he called for its inhabitants one by one. Those who paid did not escape a few lashes to satisfy the ma'amurs thirst for torture. Those who were unable to pay were thrown to the ground by a soldier and whipped severely. If they escaped death they were put in jail".

There were two factors which contributed to injuring the peasants to the extent that they abandoned their lands. In addition to the increase of taxes and the corvées, two new factors emerged:

1. The appearance of a market economy and the predominance of cash dealings. This led to the collection of taxes in money. These changes took place at the end of Ismail's rule and they enabled the peasants to borrow from foreign moneylenders, especially Greeks, against the security of their lands. These foreigners penetrated the Egyptian countryside, backed by the Capitulations and the authority of Mixed Courts. At the first sight this may seem on the side of the peasant and, in fact, they were welcomed. But the case soon proved otherwise: Mixed Courts stipulated that those who gave loans to the peasants had the right to take the peasant's land if the borrower failed to pay back the loan at maturity.

2. The other factor was the boom resulting from the American Civil War. The price of cotton rose and therefore farmers began to grow more cotton, borrowing from the Greek moneylenders for this. As soon as the war ended, cotton prices suddenly fell and the moneylenders hastened to foreclose their mortgages. Thus a large area of the culti-

vated lands was lost to the hands of foreigners, mainly Greek money-lenders.⁷

This fact was clearly and dramatically depicted by Blunt who was a friend of Egypt and the Orabi Revolution. About the last years of Ismail's rule he says, "the peasants were in a state of great distress during this first year of the three formidable last years of Ismail's rule. The well-known Ismail Seddih El-Mofatish was at the height of his power and authority. The foreigners who held the debts were pressing for and claiming the payment of installments while the farmer was on the verge of starvation. In those days of crisis, one rarely saw a farmer in the fields who had a turban on his head or a shirt on his body.

On market days women flocked into the towns, coming from their villages in order to sell their clothes or gold ornaments to Greek usurers so that the peasants might pay taxes to the tax collectors, who used to come into the villages with whips in their hands."⁸

The situation became worse when in the fall of 1877 the Nile flood was lower than usual. As a result, the crops of 1878 were far below the expected. Egypt was on the eve of a famine. In his book entitled *The History of Egypt before and after the Occupation*⁹, Theodore Razesh-tein most dramatically describes the conditions of farmers in 1879, as also did Albert Farman, the U.S.A. Consul at that time.¹⁰ The articles written by Abdallah Al-Nadim in *Al Taif*¹¹ during 1882 contained many incidents of Ismail's rule. One of these articles recounts that a woman was whipped to death because she refused to reveal where her husband kept his money; he owed the Government 45 piastres.

Such was the background of the Orabi Revolution. In connection with this L. Baer, in his *Social Studies in Modern Egypt*¹² mentions

⁷ Baer, *A History of Landownership in Modern Egypt, 1800-1950* London, 1963.

⁸ Blunt, *The Secret History of the British Occupation of Egypt* (translated into Arabic) Cairo, 1927, pp. 238.

⁹ Translated in Cairo in 1927, p. 238.

¹⁰ *The Betrayal of Egypt*, (translated into Arabic), 1964, p. 238.

¹¹ Se-Taik, Ahmed Abdel Rehim *Egypt and the Egyptian Question (1878-1882)*, Cairo 1965, p. 83.

¹² 1969 edition, pp. 100, 19.

that in 1874 the farmers staged an armed resistance movement in the area between Sohag and Girga against the collectors. Considerable groups left their villages for the hills and formed armed bands that engaged in various activities including warfare against tax collectors.

The farmer element was, therefore, effective and prominent in the Orabi Revolution and assumed many forms of helping:

1. Donations by farmers. At that time the State Treasury was quite empty after the English financial controller took all the funds available in the Treasury and fled to the British fleet just a few days before the war. These donations were given by farmers or small landowners, the Omdehsand, the Sheikhs of the villages.¹³

Included in such donations are the crops which the farmers obtained by attacking the lands of rich people, such as happened in Gharbieh and Kalubieh.¹⁴

2. A serious social change came into existence when the farmers took the land by force and distributed it among themselves, as in Mirieh Behera and Assiut.

3. In some regions the farmers rose against the Greek moneylenders, especially at Benha.

4. Farmers volunteered for the ranks of the Orabi Army. They armed themselves and gathered along the shores of Manzala lake.¹⁵

Generally speaking, it can be said that the Egyptian farmers saw in the Orabi Revolution an opportunity to free themselves from injustice under which they had labored for so many generations. Their participation in the Revolution took the form of a popular movement in the countryside where big landowners dominated. The social phase of this movement was clear in the fact that the farmers tried to take the land for themselves since they felt that it was their own: they were its real lord. However, it is still true that although the farmers' role in the revolution was strongly felt, Orabi failed to invest their movement. Had he acted otherwise, the result of the Revolution might have been quite different. We shall see a similar gross failure on the part of the 1919 Revolutionary leaders and even among the leaders of the 1952 Revolution.

¹³ Documents House, "The Orabi Revolution Papers", Mahfeza 1-4.

¹⁴ Documents House, "The Arabic Revolution Papers", Mahfeza 1-4.

¹⁵ *Ibid*, Mahfeza 8.

The countryside under the British occupation and protection (1882-1919)

A widespread misunderstanding among most historians is the belief that the British Occupation was friendly to farmers, who wore the blue Galabiehs. Such was the allegation of Cromer, the first British Commissioner of the occupation. In his book entitled *Modern Egypt* Cromer put forth this false statement which most English officials in Egypt propagated. The reason for this misunderstanding, perhaps, was that the occupation authorities tried to attract the Egyptian farmers by decreasing taxes, eliminating the corrupt Turkish officials, making fair in the distribution of irrigation water and abolishing corvée (corvée was abolished in 1882 and taxes reformed in 1894). However, these arrangements did not radically affect the problems of the farmers, because the most serious problem of Egyptian peasants was misdistribution of land ownership.

The British occupation period saw the increase of foreign landholdings as a result of the peasants' inability to pay their debts to foreign usurers. There are many instances of this. It is enough, however, to cite only one. In the Mudiria of Assiat alone, in the period from 1885 to 1895, there were 126 cases of selling small peasants' lands because of overdue taxes. These lands went to the big owners.¹⁶

In the period between 1893 and 1903, the number of seizures of peasants' lands on account of overdue taxes reached 23,154 on an area of 190,638 feddans against a sum of E.E. 295,886. In 26,400 cases the land was actually sold, the area totalling 53,880 feddans, most of which was in Gharbieh and Sharkieh.¹⁷

At the same time the number of landless peasants reached more than a million.¹⁸ Land banks did not offer any help to alleviate the peasants' burden (neither the Land Bank, which is the oldest bank to be established in Egypt, nor the Egyptian Agricultural Bank, founded in 1902 to lend to farmers and to protect their ownership).

¹⁶ National Archives. "A research of the Sale of the Lands and Palmtrees of the Assiut Madrich in the year 1885", Filinegna 1620. Turkish Department.

¹⁷ Girgis Minen, *Lands and Taxes in Egypt*, Cairo, 1904, p. 627.

¹⁸ Rahed Al Barami and Hamza Eleish, *Economic development in Egypt in the Modern Age*, Cairo, 1954 pp. 144-146.

A new phenomenon appeared during this period: the emergence of a new class of middlemen benefitting from agriculture. These accumulated fortunes at the expense of the farmlands and they included farm labor contractors and other middlemen who controlled the market of agricultural labor.

The peasants' position during the First World War

1. During the First World War new burdens were put on the Egyptian peasants as the price of cotton dropped from 20 rials before the war to about 10 rials.

2. Credit banks stopped lending money, whereas land banks pressed demands for the recovery of their loans.

3. The Government pressed for collection of taxes and ordered the tax collectors and European governors to take the collection of Government dues very seriously. All these factors forced many peasants to sell their cotton at the lowest prices. The government also compelled most peasants to sell any ornaments, jewelry, cattle and poultry to pay the rest of the dues.

4. An increase in prices of basic commodities accompanied the decrease in cotton prices. There were, however, some prominent features in the persecution of peasants represented by the recruitment of Egyptian peasants to work for the British authorities during the war, in Egyptian Labourers' Corps. Egyptian folklore records this in a sad song with the famous opening lines "My Country, O My Country, the authority took my son. . . O my dearest I want to return home".

Similar expressions were current among peasants in particular to show the injustice to which the Egyptian peasants were subjected by being forced to participate in the war through the E.L.C.

This compulsion is considered to be the main reason behind the peasants' great participation in the 1919 Revolution. There are a number of points to be made about the peasants joining the British Army. Of these:

I. The Egyptian peasants joining the British army did not do so as volunteers, as is often stated. There were all kinds of compulsion and coercion.

II. The Egyptian Administration's policy of intervening to capture peasants and send them away to the laborers' corps was, in its turn, a voluntary action on the part of Egyptian Officials, as British writers pictured it. It is a black spot in the history of British domination in

Egypt, that *corvée* has become an official policy directed to hundreds of thousands of Egyptians.

III. The claim of voluntary participation, which British documents attempted to circulate, is due to the British Authorities' attempt to reconcile what the British commander said on November 7, 1914 ("Britain will not ask Egyptian people to give any aid in the current war") and their actual practices in Egypt during the war. The most prominent of these practices was to recruit peasants in the service of the British military effort. British documents indicate that the number of Egyptian laborers working with the British army gradually increased as the theatres of operation widened. (Iraq, France, Salonica, Rhodes and Palestine). This number reached 24,700 laborers in 1917 and in 1918 it reached 320,714. The British Authorities called this 'recruitment of peasants' in official press.

What is to be regretted is that many village heads and other officials used their powers to settle personal scores between them and certain village families, or to attain personal ends.¹⁹

An example of these officials was Ibrahim Pasha Malim who was Moudir of Girga during the year 1916 and the first half of 1917.²⁰

There were also many others. Government officials used to enter villages and wait for the peasants to return at sunset. Then they would treat them like animals, choosing the fittest for service. If anyone rejected this "compulsory volunteering" he would be whipped until he accepted. In this way even children of 14 and old men of 70 were taken by force.

The Egyptian laborers worked under very severe conditions, particularly in Gallipoli and Palestine. British documents estimate their number at 500,000 peasants, whereas Arab historians put them at more than a million (1,170,000).

In addition to recruiting the peasants in laborers' corps, the military authorities resorted to confiscating agricultural crops, animals and cattle. They took these commodities at the lowest prices, far below market. Every district was ordered to deliver a certain amount of cereals to the army at these low prices. Sometimes the farmers were asked

¹⁹ *Al-Ahram*, July 23, 1972. *The Corvée of Egyptian Workers by the British Authorities During the first World War*, Dr. Yunan Labib Rizq.

²⁰ National Archives, The Service Record of Ibrahim Malim Pacha, the Madir of Behira, No. 28293, Rach 64.

to give more than they had. This was the background of the 1919 Revolution. Historians used to place the start of this Revolution on November 13th, when Salad Zaghul and his two colleagues went to the British High Commissioner Reynold Wingate, to discuss with him Egypt's independence. This is a false start because the 1919 Revolution had already started before that.

The 1919 revolution and the peasant

In a letter sent by the British High Commissioner to the British Foreign Ministry on September 15, 1918, we find clear indications that several incidents had occurred in the moudriehs during May of the same year. There were many casualties as a result of the peasants' resistance to the orders of the local authorities. This resistance, however, did not change into widespread disturbances, but it indicated what could happen in 1919. In fact, the march of events in 1919 gave the Revolution its violent aspect and introduced the republican and social dimensions. No sooner had a demonstration taken place in Cairo than the Egyptian countryside boiled over with a revolutionary movement which was based on 1) the disruption of communications, and 2) the taking over of police stations and grain stores.

On March 14, 1919 the peasants in Menoufieh attacked the police station at Menauf where a number of peasants, gathered by the authorities to join the ELC, were still held. These peasants were released by the outraged masses and the station was burned down.²¹

The next day the Revolution reached dangerous dimensions when there were organized attacks on means of communication in all regions.²²

The Upper Egypt modirieh started these attacks in the period from the 13th to the 15th and from the 17th to the 18th of March.

²¹ *50 years Since the 1919 Revolution*, Shetham's Report to Curzon 25 March, p. 221

²² For more details see:

1. Abdel Rahman Al Rafc, *The Egyptian Revolution*.
2. Mohamed Sabry, *The Egyptian Revolution* (in French)
3. Valentine Chiral, *The Egyptian Problem*.
4. Abdel Azim Ramadan, *The Development of the Nationalist Movement in Egypt, from 1919 to 1952*.
5. *50 years since the 1919 Revolution*

They were followed in a no less violent way by the Gharbieh, Menoufieh, and Dakahlieh.

In Lower Egypt the Revolution took the same form as in Upper Egypt, that is, disruption of communications to Cairo and the districts, and the taking over of police stations. There were republican tendencies in Zifta which was completely under the control of the revolutionary masses and a revolutionary committee was formed. It declared Zifta independent, lowered the flag and raised a nationalist flag. In Minia, the revolutionary committee did the same and declared a republic.

There is controversy about this historical phenomenon. In its final evaluation it is a revolutionary event but its revolutionary nature is limited. The revolutionary aspect is seen in the declaration of independence, whereas the limited aspect is represented by the setting up of a government to safeguard land ownership in Zifta, if not in the whole Madria. The most important and glaring event in the present revolution is the battle which took place between revolutionaries and British soldiers at Al-Emdan in the Garbia modirieh. This village soon fell, while at Atai Al-Baroud British soldiers surrounded the revolutionaries.

The revolutionary masses attacked the property of Ibrahim Halim Pacha, the Madier of Behira at Damanhur. It is a fact that the Turkish flag was raised in some villages. There were clashes between peasants and Greek shop owners. Kafr Al-Sheikh was one place where violent battles took place. The fighting between the British and the peasants was heaviest in the Delta. On the other hand, the peasants at Bulag Al-Dakrouir Badrshein, Hamamdia and Beni Suif attacked railway stations on March 15th.

British documents indicate that heavy fighting took place in the Wasteh district. Wasteh was one of the districts that witnessed the most violent battles in Upper Egypt, which raged between Wasteh itself and the city of Beni Swif. However, the most bloody incident in the revolution happened in the Assiut Modirieh and in particular at Dairot and Deri Mawass. The train attacked by peasants in that area was full of British officers and men, a large number of whom were killed. These districts only fell when the British authorities sent military reinforcements from Cairo down the Nile to Assiut. Yet violent clashes occurred between these reinforcements and the peasants at Dairot and Assiut. One of the revolutionary hot spots in Upper Egypt was the village of Shalosh, where a battle took place between the Nile-born reinforcements and the revolutionaries. Documents point out another attack south of the Nizaly Ganoub station where fighting occurred between the peasants and the British forces travelling on the Nile. The Gizen

modirieh was the scene of many outrages. Battles took place at Karf Al-Showam, Imbaba district. British airplanes flew over the villages of Ayat and Matania and bombed the villagers.

Egyptians still remember the British storming on March 25, of the two villages of Azizeia and Badrsheim where they pillaged and set fire to the houses. The same happened at Nazlat Al-Shobak on March 30, and at Sharkia, particularly at the village of Shabanat. Zagazig district witnessed similar incidents. Again, the same acts were repeated in three other villages at the town of Etai Al-Baroud, (there are many details to be found in "Two years after the 1919 Revolution", published by the Cairo daily newspaper Al-Ahram, and based on British documents.)

We must draw the conclusion that the violent reaction on the part of the British authorities in their crushing of the peasant movement concealed the fear of these authorities of the probability that the movement might change from a national liberation revolution to a social revolution. This fear was shared by the bourgeoisie, the big landowners and even the Wafd leadership.

In fact, the apprehensions of British authorities were justified: for British documents indicate that in some modiriehs the peasants revolted against big landowners and pillaged large farms. Such incidents occurred at Kafr Al-Sheikh and in Assiut. Those who deny 'the social dimension of the peasants' revolt in 1919 are gravely mistaken. The elements of social unrest and friction between peasants and big landowners had existed since the Orabi Revolution and continued during the occupation. There are proofs to this in Dr. Ali Barakat's Ph.D. thesis dealing with "The development of landownership in Egypt and its influence on political life". Fikry Abaza mentions an episode in his book (*The Laughing and the Crying*) concerning the 1919 revolution which indicates this social dimension. He recalls that he and some other educated people belonging to the bourgeoisie tried to stop peasants who were attempting to take over the property of Mohammed Mahmud Pacha in Assiut. Mr. Abaza says that "the angry masses tried to burn Mohammed Soliman's palace in Assiut. When some people tried to stop them saying that his son was one of those exiled to Malta, one of the attackers replied, 'Did Mahmud Pacha distribute loans to the hungry? We want food'."²³

²³ Fikry Abaza, *The Laughing and the Crying*, Cairo; 1958. pp. 53-4.

This social dimension led some writers such as Valentine Chirol in his book *The Egyptian Problem* to think that it was due to the influence of the Soviet revolution in 1917. In fact, this claim is totally unfounded. The 1919 revolution in Egypt was far from being influenced by the Soviet revolution for several reasons, most important of which are the following: One: The geographic distance between Egypt and the Soviet Union. The Egyptian revolution is not like that of Kemal Atatürk in Turkey, which is near enough to the Soviet Union to be financed and supplied with weapons. Neither is it like the revolution in Iraq in the twenties which was supplied by the Soviet Consul in Karmen Shah in Iran. Egypt was far from the Soviet Union, which did not at the time have a naval force in the Mediterranean.

Two: The Egyptian leadership belonged to middle and big landowners. It is true that the peasants' move to seize lands has resulted in dividing the Egyptian bourgeois leadership into two parts: the liberal Constitutional group which represents big landowners left the Wafd while the remaining leadership retained medium landowners under the command of Sa'ad Zaglul. Strangely enough, when the same man came to power in 1924, he immediately got himself into a quarrel with the Communist party which was based in Alexandria. As a result of this clash the Communist party was dealt with and its leaders fled or were brought to trial. Evidence for this attitude is to be found also in an episode recorded by Mr. Ali Selim, Sa'ad Zaglul's secretary. He says that he heard that a commintern delegation visited Sa'ad Zaglul during his exile in Malta to establish cordial relations between him and the commintern. Sa'ad Zaglul, however, categorically rejected this saying that it was not good for Egyptian society to turn to communism.²⁴

There is no doubt that the Wafd leadership drew its strength in all conflicts from 1919 and after from the peasant masses. But it is also certain that it never forwarded the idea of land distribution. Consequently the program of the nationalist movement was incapable of exploiting the strength of Egyptian peasants fully. It can be said that Egyptian peasants, in the period from 1919 to 1952, were depended upon to support uprisings but were not allowed, even by the nationalist leadership, to organize themselves politically or professionally in a way to enable any leadership during that period to use them against antinationalist

²⁴ Al-Ehnnin (Monday) Newspaper, August 23, 1948, Ali Selim was the head of Sa'ad Zaglul's personal secretarial body.

forces whether Egyptian or foreign. This is the most prominent error of Egyptian revolutions. The Orabi Revolution committed this error to a certain extent, so did the Mostapha Kamel movement but to a worse degree. The 1919 revolution also committed it. It can be said that although the 1952 revolution distributed lands to peasants, no action was taken by earlier revolutions to invest the peasantry, it refused to organize the masses of Egyptian peasants so as to use them against its external or internal enemies. These masses remained to a large extent idle and were spectators without participation in the country's affairs.

Even when the Egyptian army attacked Barlif in 1973, peasants in the villages around were not organized or armed to participate, even as rear lines, in this battle. This largely explains the ease of the Israeli penetration into the West Arm of the Red Sea extending from the south of Ismailia through Deversoir to the outskirts of Suez. I visited this area immediately after the war and came to the conclusion that had the various villages in the area been armed, however modestly, they would have stopped or at least delayed this penetration.

In conclusion, it can be said that in the important Egyptian revolutions, particularly those of 1882 and 1919, the peasants played a fundamental role, though more the role of spectators than of participants. Nevertheless, they actually joined in the revolution's events. This is due to the nature of the leadership of Egyptian revolutions, including that of 1919.

In view of this it is not strange to find Sa'ad Zaglul saying in his memoirs that he was surprised when he was in Malta, to hear of the Egyptian peasant movement. Mohamed Farid expresses the same surprise in his unpublished memoirs.

The surprise of these two leaders reveals the type of mentality which refuses to believe in, or totally rejects, the Egyptian peasants' potential for revolutionary action.

The conclusion which the present writer wished to stress is that in an undeveloped country like Egypt, depending principally on agriculture and where the percentage of peasants in the population reaches about 90%, no genuine revolution can be successful unless it takes into consideration the capacity of peasants for revolutionary action if their abilities are organized and accepted as such.

Economic Conditions for Broadening the Geographical Horizon of Peasant Awareness in the Edo Era

Toshio Furushima

With the exception of Ryukyu and Ezo (present-day Hokkaido), the Japan of the Edo era (1603-1867) had neither colonies nor the experience of having been colonized. Moreover, among the ancient inhabitants, political leaders and their subjects belonged to one and the same stock, and there were no differences in language and religion. They did not have the complex problems which can be seen in many Asian and American countries, which arose from the struggle for liberation from colonial rulers or from the fact that the people had different languages or religions. Therefore, as far as Japan is concerned, there is a clear and mutual relationship between economic development and the establishment of an awareness of the country as a whole in the process of formation of a national State.

It is frequently said that in the Edo era, the peasants' awareness was limited to the village in which they lived or, at most, to the lands of the feudal lord who governed them. During the seventeenth century, peasant life and production was self-sufficient, with the village as a basic unit, since they were stripped of almost all the surplus produced through land taxes (*nengu*, a land rental paid to the feudal lord which was based on the plot's average yield). Therefore, there was no contact with regions far away from the village, either through trade for everyday articles or articles for sale. It was through the uniform land taxes that peasants from a feudal lord's lands were able to form a sense of community. Even if there were regional differences from the eighteenth century on, changes in this situation began to appear. Such changes can be considered to be due to variations in the amount collected as land taxes as well as to the appearance and subsequent sale of agricultural surpluses.

In this study, we use the term *peasant* for those individuals working in small-scale agriculture who use farm implements and their own land, and who use a family labor force consisting of a married couple and

their children. From the second half of the fifteenth century on, the number of such peasants began to grow and, toward the end of the Edo era, they constituted the basic agrarian structure of Japan. After having established a village, the farmers used the forests and meadows as communal lands, and communally administered water to irrigate rice fields. The feudal lord took almost half of the natural products of their crops as land taxes, which resulted in the peasants being forced to live and produce at a level of self-sufficiency. Under such circumstances, the laborers' daily activities were habitually restricted to the village and, only once in a while, were relations extended to the inhabitants of neighboring villages: when there were disputes over the boundaries of communal lands or over sources of water, especially in years of drought. Not even the privileged minority in the settlements did much more than do business with representatives of the feudal lord and only when they paid taxes did they go to the place where the lord's warehouses were, to present petitions. For the villagers, therefore, the village was a small universe, and if there were no regions larger than this to be considered, there was even less need to be aware of Japan as a nation.

From an economic point of view, the fact that village inhabitants could become aware of other regions has its origins in the commercial relations established when selling the surpluses they produced and acquiring elsewhere the goods for work and subsistence which they did not have. In general, the appearance of this surplus would have been impossible without a decrease in the land tax rate, which had impeded any type of surplus. Such changes were first seen in the Edo era after 1680. This reduction in the tax rate continued until around 1715.

The land tax laws of the Edo era established the typical yield per unit area, which was multiplied by the quantity of land each individual possessed. The amount to be paid was calculated in this way. In the first half of the era in question, each village took the fluctuations in its annual income into account, so that the taxes paid were reduced during hard times. After 1680, the decrease in taxes had its origin in the indulgent estimate of the decrease in its annual income. In 1713, the feudal government took this leniency in collections into account, based on the fact that the intendants (local magistrates during the Tokugawa shogunate) of the feudal lords accepted bribes from representatives of the peasants, and sent severe warnings to the intendants. After 1718, the shogunate proposed reforming the land tax laws, and began preparations for adopting the *jomen* system (the establishment of a fixed tax rate for several years). These preparations were interrupted by the 1732

famine in the western region, which forced a decrease in the tax rate. From 1744 on, the shogunate succeeded in implanting the law of *arigekemi*, according to which the total land tax was increased to up to 50 percent of each year's net income, without taking fluctuations in the plot's yield into account. After 1750, the *jomen* system was generally adopted everywhere. The period which continued until 1770, in the middle part of the Edo era, is the one in which the greatest amount of contributions were levied. Nevertheless, from this moment on, what the Tokugawa shogunate collected showed a continued tendency toward decline. For the present, the data examined refers only to the territories under the Bakufu government's direct control. However, if one compares variations in the price of rice on the Osaka market, where the major part of it was received by the feudal lords as land taxes, with the amount of annual tributes collected by the shogunate, one can see that they are almost in an inverse proportion. Therefore, one can say that a similar tendency toward a decrease is also observed in the amount of land taxes from the feudal lord's lands.

Peasant uprisings can be considered the social phenomenon having the closest relationship to the tax reductions following 1770. Comparing the tax trends already identified, one could say that they went up in years in which unusual contributions were imposed. It can also be seen that, in the period after 1750, there is a propensity toward numerous uprisings with large numbers of participants, even in a zone with few problems, such as the area around Osaka. The year following the great levying of additional taxes in 1744, there was an insurrection in which more than 20,000 people are said to have participated. Until well into 1760, measures taken by the feudal lords against those movements were harsh, even so far as volleys of fire against groups of villagers, who did not hesitate to use farm tools as arms. When there were changes in administrations, the shogunate attempted, on several occasions, to raise land taxes, but it was no longer possible to repeat another period similar to that of 1750, in which the increase was successful.

Historical research on peasant turmoil in Japan has concentrated on individual cases of struggle. The majority of the researchers have reached the conclusion that such movements were defeated. There can be no doubt that many leaders were executed and the villages pacified. But, if tax trends are studied on a long-term basis, one can conclude that these insurrections were a great success in resisting the feudal lords.

The fact that all the peasants' surplus production was taken away from them through land taxes put their standard of living at the level of

self-sufficiency and limited their regional awareness. Nevertheless, on two occasions the tax decrease produced changes in this situation. There were no effects at a national level the first time, as far as agricultural production was concerned. Essentially, the productivity of agricultural villages from the area surrounding Osaka to the coast of Setonaikai was raised. Of course, at the beginning, the surplus which remained in the hands of the peasants was applied mainly to raising the standard of living. But within a short time, this encouraged the introduction of new techniques to raise the production of goods to satisfy social needs. Cotton, the raw material for clothes, and colza, the raw material for lamp oil, became the goals of progress and techniques and of the increase in production. Even dried sardines and the chaff of oleaginous seeds acquired in foreign countries came to be used as fertilizer in their cultivation. Thread manufacture and oil extraction operated in the small peasant towns as cottage industries and their products were commercialized. In this way, the peasants became traders in these manufactured goods and in their agricultural products, as well as buyers of the necessary manufactured goods. Because of this the workers' awareness of the region was broadened until it included the villages in which their co-participants in commercial transactions lived. Individuals dedicated to business began to appear among the peasants and their children, who became urban merchants when they moved to the city. People who had come into contact with urban tastes and culture also appeared among the upper strata of those remaining in the villages. The fact that rich merchants of peasant origins frequently appear in Ihara Saikaku's novels, and that there were disciples of Matsuo Basho even in small towns, shows the high point in the tendencies of an era such as this.

The influence of the second period of tax reduction was even more general and profound. It extended from the central region of Japan to the area to the north of Edo, while in the area around Osaka, it reached even the poor workers in the lower strata of the villages. In the regions mentioned, sericulture became the main livelihood, as did trading silk worm cocoons. Their products, raw silk as well as cloth, were processed by peasant hands. Even paper with silkworm eggs was widely sold as merchandise.

As surplus increased, it gave rise to the introduction of new means of production and subsistence goods. Moreover, the peasants' radius of action, which had been restricted to within the village, was expanded to include neighboring regions, and expanding the radius of action also broadened their views on marriage.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the industries manufacturing agricultural products such as cotton thread and extracted oils, located in small towns around Osaka, became independent, and the peasants became food purchasers. In the village markets, speculation began with the agricultural products sold there, including rice and wheat. If we start with this fact, which became widespread, there is evidence that, when the moment to pay annual taxes in rice arrived, the prices from neighboring markets were taken as the basis for determining its amount.

There is also evidence that promotion samples were sent to remote markets and that the quality of the merchandise was becoming stable. Cotton from the regions of Osaka and Nagoya was sold in the central and northeast regions which did not have it, and there it was spun and finished to satisfy local needs. Raw silk from the center and northeast became the raw material for the entire country's silk industry, and silk paper was even sold in the southwest, which gave rise to new sericultural regions. Therefore, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the agricultural production and industrial goods in the peasant villages, which had been under the feudal lords' control before, gradually became goods for the entire country.

This expansion of the sphere of economic activities started an outflow from the villages and broadened marriage prospects. Near commercial centers, the urban population rose and the merchant population was concentrated in the old, small, workers' towns. In their everyday life, the peasants even became aware of regions outside the town they lived in, and one can imagine that they even came to conceive of Japan as their total sphere of economic activities. It is often said that, given the isolation of the feudal lords' territories, it was not possible to acquire a sense of nationality in Edo Japan. However, as can be seen from the data on economic relations, it was not like that. In any case, one must realize that members of the military caste were the ones who made the formation of a sense of nationality from the feudal one difficult. But the peasants adapted themselves much more easily to the realities of life and the economy, reaching the point where they considered the regions with which they had relations as part of their own vital sphere, such that their regional awareness was broadened.

The essence of the aforementioned is the following: the economic basis for the peasants' sense of nationality is a phenomenon which is linked to the transformation of agricultural products into merchandise which stayed directly in the farmers' hands, as well as to the fact that

different regions formed a single nation politically. In order to explain the transformation of the state of the isolated economy, which restricted the life of the workers to their own villages, the following conditions were necessary: 1) the producers depended on family labor: they themselves possessed the means of production, led an independent life, and their products stayed primarily in their hands. These producers are the peasants; 2) the feudal lords' and political leaders' exaction reduced what reached the farmers' hands, the surplus which they could sell; 3) therefore, and with such premises, one has to consider that one decisive factor was the peasants' resistance to the feudal lord's plundering their surplus, that is, peasant uprisings.

Senegal-Peasants and Nation, Prospects for Horizontal Integration

Celma Agüero

This essay attempts to put forward some considerations on the horizontal integration of the nation, based on the experience of the two Senegalese peasant groups (the Sever and the Wolof) that, because of their position in the peanut basin, have played a more intensive part in the colony's history¹. It is therefore a matter of trying to detect the intervention of the peasants as the society's main producing group in the formation and integration processes of the nation within the sphere of the states (either independent or colonial), that chose a system of one-crop farming as the country's main resource. The very nature of the product and the form of production have led the peasants to constant and progressive economic deterioration². In spite of this, however, and in spite of their inability to control the critical situations that affect them (ecology, demographic pressure, market economy), and the fact that they are the victims of exploitation and super-imposed marginalization, the Senegalese peasants have generated a form of action that expresses their awareness of belonging to the nation³. They

¹ The study based on bibliographic material forms part of a hypothesis, the control of which we propose to undertake shortly during field work in Senegal.

² The deterioration undergone in terms of the income of the rural producer can be seen in the fact that the Senegalese peasant earns one seventh of what he earned fifty years ago in terms of the exchange value. Samir Amir *Neocolonialism in West Africa*, London, 1973, page 10.

³ See J. Saul and R. Woods "African Peasantries" in G. Arrighi's and J. Saul's *Essays on the Political Economy of Africa*. Monthly Review Press, New York, 1973. K. Post "Peasantization and Rural Political Movements in Western Africa". *European Journal of Sociology XIII* 2, Paris, 1972; L. Cliffe "Rural Political Economy of Africa" in P. Gutkind's and I. Wallerstein's *The Political Economy of Contemporary Africa*, London, 1976.

have proposed limits to the integrating force of the post-colonial state⁴ and have established horizontal lines of cohesion that offer other angles to the process of national integration.

To be able to study the peasants as an active group within the generating components of this process implies, in the first place, seeing them within the complexity of a society that has undergone successive transformations in its historical communities both pre-colonial and colonial. In the second place, it implies discovering the forms and the history of their relationship with the different state structures in which they participated or which were imposed upon them.

This prospect is valid if it is recognized that the nation in a large part of African countries arises within the framework of the state, and that the colonial experience of insertion into a capitalist system has deeply marked the process of the structuring of the society and the formation of the national consciousness. These circumstances become more real when they are applied to societies composed of ethnic groups whose experiences have given them the characteristics of national historic groups; groups that have been broken up or reunited in colonial and geographical areas that the new states inherited with all their political and economic significance.

This gave rise to the fact that the construction of the nation and that of the state have constituted, and continue to constitute, two complementary aims for the liberation movements. These call for the gradual mobilization of the different groups and classes of the dominated people in whose midst a national consciousness has already begun to appear. Thus, the states have had to submit themselves permanently to the controls imposed by a society that demands political and multi-ethnic participation, which is the basis of the liberation movements, throughout the different stages of its configuration. Such dynamics showed that victory over the occupier did not mean that the process of the construction of national consciousness or the construction of the state were concluded, but rather that there was still a lot more to do.

Indeed, as time has passed, experiences have multiplied. From the

⁴ On the post-colonial state, see H. Alavi's "The State in Post-Colonial Societies". *New Left Review* 74 July, August 1972 pages 59-81; J. Saul's "The State Post-Colonial Societies, Tanzania" *The Socialist Register*, 1974, London 1974, pages 349-372, and C. Lays' controversial article "The Over-Developed Post-Colonial State: a re-evaluation. *Review of African Political Economy*, 5, pages 39-68.

more or less profound mobilization of the groups in the society, states dominated by a class⁵ trying to achieve a consensus to legitimize its power and vertically integrate the nation by different means while at the same time trying to use the national consciousness to support its project, have arisen. But in many cases, the administration has had to face growing resistance from majority groups of peasants who are aware of their capacity for production and who have recognized certain submission to former colonial proposals in the national project. Then, the vertical integrating force of the nation, if it had existed at all, begins to lose force. In its place, the retraction of these groups – which in no way can be called passive – has reinforced the horizontal links that give another meaning to the idea of belonging to the nation. At the same time, these links force a reconsideration of the relationship with the state, establishing other areas and proposing other ways for the construction of the nation. These in time adopt a different rhythm, that of the recovery of forces with regard to the conditions of transformation. In fact, when the horizontal dimensions that define the different peasant groups appear, they determine the intervention of the peasants in the historical process.

This mobilizing and integrating action of the ruling class can be clearly seen in the changes, suffered by the ideology of independence. These have varied from the call for unity in securing justice against foreign powers, (calling more on the urban sectors than on the peasant ones), to the denial of effective political participation. The masses have argued the need for order and unanimity rather than for liberty in the periods following independence.⁶

In this essay dedicated to Senegal, while keeping in mind the dual generating process of the nation, we shall attempt to detect the forces that unite the peasants in their search for horizontal integration. This

⁵ For our essay, whose center of interest is the peasants, the Senegalese ruling class is considered as a relatively homogeneous group. It is clearly distinguished from the peasants by its income brackets, its lifestyle and its access to the institutional sources of power. See B. Magabane's "The evolution of the class structure in Africa" in P. Gutkind's and I. Wallerstein's *The Political Economy of Contemporary Africa*, London, 1976; R. Cohen's "Classes in Africa": Analytical Problems and Perspectives" *The Socialist Register*, 1972, London, 1972. M. Diop, *Histoire des classes sociales dans l'Afrique de l'Ouest. Le Senegal*, Maspéro, Paris 1972; S. Amin "La bourgeoisie d'Affaires Sénégalaise" *L'Homme et la Société*, 12. Pages 29-41.

⁶ C. Ake "The Congruence of Political Economies and Ideologies in Africa" in P. Gutkind and I. Wallerstein *op. cit.*, 198-211.

study is three-dimensional, the historical coordinate being the main axis for the understanding of the dynamism of the village communities. This dynamism is a result of the accumulation of experience and the constant production of values that allow them to renew their resistance to the foreign leading power, while at the same time preserving the community's essential features. In this historical line it is important to keep in mind the political and economic dimension, seen as a close relationship between the village and the metropolis, because of the imposition of production for the colonial market. (Later on, during the periods of independence, this relationship was to be established between the village and the transnational companies through the new local state in the same way). The contact, operated with the aim of extracting the product at a low price, has encouraged the village society, in its ability to unite, to find an answer to the rationality of the slave economy that it still has. It has done this by converting everything into new resources in order to save its own systems, at the cost of some adaptations that guarantee certain autonomy and an important amount of mobility in the insertion into the new structure.

In this effort to form a permanent relationship with the state, the Senegalese peasants have transformed their past and present experiences in the region into a fruitful field of action for the creation of horizontal relationships. These exist not only between groups subjected to the same system of production, but also between ethnic groups that have adopted the colonial proposals only on a very marginal basis, and have otherwise preserved their traditional forms of contact with the land.

The history of profound re-structuring of the society also shows the history of the language that the peasants have used to express their awareness of belonging to a vital group within it. It also shows the terms that have been used in the establishment of their relationship with the state, that in the case of Senegal, possesses all the characteristics of a post-colonial one.

The Senegalese state was established in 1960 after independence, conceded by metropolitan France and achieved without the aid of a liberation movement. Such a movement, would have, as in other cases, mobilized society and tended to form a class alliance against the ruling power. The country inherited the role of economic administrator that it had had as a colonial state. Only one group in society was to have access to state politics, with limited participation in the planning of the economy and the export deals, that group being the developed urban group.

At that time, the Senegalese administration was, in the first place, trying to dominate the peanut producers and the transformation and marketing companies. Although in fact the control of the market eluded the grasp of the new state, it organized production by renewing institutions of exploitation. Multi-national firms such as UNILEVER have partly replaced the French companies, and their decision-making centers are now no longer to be found in Paris, Bordeaux or Marseilles, but scattered in other countries, such as the United States, where these firms operate from. Moreover, peanut prices have been falling continuously and the producing countries are losing more and more their ability to negotiate. The Senegalese government had to choose between bringing the almost exclusively one-crop farming system to an end or conserving it.⁷ On opting to continue with the one-crop system, all it did was to modify the organization of the slave economy at the level of production and marketing. This not only explains the increase in government agencies and personnel, but also the imperative need on the part of the growing groups of state bureaucrats and political leaders to exercise control by different means and legalize their demands by including all groups in society in their project.⁸ Different social transformation strategies were at the base of the government's action, that also launched an active campaign making use of African Socialism and nationalism as instruments of the struggle, or as the frameworks in which to carry out this transformation.⁹

The State had chosen its role as the intermediary between the representatives of international capitalism and the local growers who depend-

⁷ The economic option of Mamadu Dia and his group during the first few years of his independent government tended to diversify agrarian production in order to neutralize the danger of the prevalence of the peanut crop as the exclusive source of foreign exchange. By means of a plan of rural animation, he aimed at forming a new awareness among the peasants capable of weakening the newly-born rural bourgeoisie. But, his economic policy implied social restructuring that the classes in power were not willing to accept. This tendency was weakened with the fall of the leader in 1962.

⁸ The government once more adopted the system of marketing cooperatives which, together with the agricultural export production system, reinforced the economic inequalities already existing in the rural society.

⁹ T. Hodgkin, *Nationalism in Colonial Africa*, London, 1965; page 117; and *African Political Parties*, Penguin London, 1961, page 165; W.J. Foltz "Senegal" in J. Coleman's and C. Rosberh's *Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1966. Pages 16-64.

ed on the same productive force as in colonial times. The Senegalese peasants, who represent 83% of the active population and who supply 85% of the agricultural produce exported¹⁰, are concentrated in the peanut zone, where two of the country's largest ethnic masses, the Serer and the Wolof, dominate the agricultural economy¹¹. In this essay, which is an attempt to detect, in the differences of the reactions and the similarity of the expression of these two ethnic groups, the bases for the generalizations outlined, the facts given will be taken mainly from the experiences of the Serer and the Wolof.

Both groups share a precolonial history of economic equilibrium and complementarity. Both groups also have the political experience of having belonged to active and organized states like the Baol Kingdom¹². In this they shared territory in a different way. The Serer society, known for the sophistication of its crop systems and close association between cattle-breeding and agriculture, was settled in the Wolof area and was considered as the minority group, but tolerated because of

¹⁰ M. Diop, *op. Cit.*, page 92.

¹¹ The following table illustrates the numerical importance of the two groups. . . Source: United States Army, *Area Handbook Senegal*, Washington, 1963, page 62. Quoted in D.B.C. O'Brien, *Saints and Politicians*, Cambridge University Press, 1975, page 155.

		% of the total
Wolof	1.116.000	36.
Serer	431.000	13.9
Falani	356.000	11.5
Tukolor	310.000	10.0
Diola	214.000	6.9
Mandinka	146.000	4.7
Bambara	127.000	4.1
Lebu	56.000	1.8
Others	300.000	(11.1)*
	3.056.000	100

*Includes non-Africans

¹² There are historical documents dating back to the fifteenth century on the political organization of the Baol kingdom that apparently conserved its fundamental characteristics up until the time of the treaty signed with Feidherbe in 1859. The Serer population that prevailed up until then surrendered to a Wolof dynasty that was the expression of the continuous invasion of that ethnic group in the area.

being an already integrated society. The Wolof group predominated in an area whose resources lay in semi-nomad pasturage, slave trading and looting after war. Greatly affected by the domination of the colonial economy and peanut production, they nevertheless maintained control of the territory, since the product was extracted out indirectly, by making the most of the local production systems. Thanks to this situation, a type of relationship was established with the market which allowed them to participate only partially in capitalist practices and principles, and to conserve a certain amount of freedom of action, to the advantage of the group's survival.

When, in 1964, a government decree brought an end to the taxes that the peasants paid to the leaders of the land, the property passed into the hands of the State, which delegated it to the communities set up as modern production organizations. But, in the interval between the passing of the law and the promulgation of the decree, a de facto situation arose among the peasants in one of the Serer zones. They understood that the land freed from their masters "would belong to the cultivators". Nonetheless, the purpose of the suppression of these taxes was not so much to reduce the existing economic inequalities as to convert the land into a free factor of production in order to reduce peanut costs¹³. It was the time of the "productivity operation" launched in the peanut basin, that had to ensure a 250/o increase in three years as from 1968 in order to compensate for the loss of the increase in price that the European Common Market had guaranteed.

The state then proposed a change in the organization of production by circulating technical reports and favoring the sale of modern equipment. Climatic inconveniences and the memory of difficult experiences at a time of continuous deterioration of the peasant income resulted in the contracts remaining unfulfilled. But, in regard to the technical reports, more importance was given to those concerning the cultivation of sorghum and millet than to those dedicated to oleaginous crops. Nearly 500/o of the peasants returned to subsistence farming¹⁴ under unfavorable circumstances and made a real selection of the propaganda reports with the instinct to preserve a society that can live in semi-anar-

¹³ The facts are taken from J.M. Gastellu's study "L'autonomie locale des serer du Mbayar" in J.L. Balans', C. Coulon's, J.M. Gastellu's *Autonomie locale et integration nationale au Sénégal*, Pedone, Paris, 1975.

¹⁴ R. Dumont *op. cit.*, page 198.

chy and keep some power of response in the control of production. This power can be used at different levels – either by allowing a true dialogue with the state when the peasants acquire the advantages of a functional literacy and rural animation – checking scales, recognizing different types of manure, doing accounts and reading in their own language – or else by challenging the state at the time of a fall in peanut prices, by refusing to harvest the crop which is worth hardly anything to the producer. In both instances, the government has put a stop to the possible development of a more open expression. In the first place, it curbed the possibility of emancipation that would have allowed the control committees, composed of young villagers, and not necessarily of the great families, to function efficiently. At the same time, it stopped the circulation of professional reports reconsidered by the peasants that is to say freed of vertical tendencies. In the second case, the state started the brutal repression and persecution of the peasants in order to get the product at a low price, but with very relative success.

1968 to 1971 were years of crisis in the rural economy and continuous discontent among the peasants, accompanied by a tendency to reject commercial agriculture, which caused both official and international concern with regard to the power of the Senegalese peasants. The decision of the Serer to fall back on the cultivation of products for self-consumption was supported on the one hand by the group's attitude towards the peanut economy, and on the other hand, by its history of village autonomy that has preserved its vitality since pre-colonial times. As opposed to what happened in other groups, the introduction of the peanut crop into rural production did not lead to the individual accumulation of resources, except in a very small way, since in the last resort the surplus of the peanut harvest was used to enrich the "Mother's till",¹⁵ that is to say, maintain the group's economy. This allowed them to continue the traditional practice of allotting two thirds of the cultivated area to products for self-consumption (sorghum and millet) and one

¹⁵ The inexistence of economic individualism in spite of fifty years of infiltration of the peanut (and therefore monetary) economy may explain the difficulties of action in the Serer medium. In this way, in Ngobe Mbayar for example, the wealth of the mother till would be a suitable idea for arousing the solidarity of the farmers as regards the circulation of techniques and the oleaginous crops. And moreover, how can one fail to admire the wisdom of this peasant society that puts the subsistence of the group before personal gain? J.M. Gastellu, "L'organisation du travail agricole en milieu Serer OP" in J.M. Gastellu's and B. Delpech's *Maintenance sociale et changement économique au Sénégal, II Pratique du travail et rééquilibres sociaux en milieu serer*, ORSTOM, Paris, 1974, Page 59.

third to peanuts. In this way, the Serer have managed to integrate the new crop into their traditional system of production, while at the same time integrating it into their cultural system. So, when the peasants refused to produce for a low price, for the Serer the reversion only implied intensifying an already known practice.¹⁶ The organization of agricultural labor, supported by organized collective labor, the structure of the society and the economic options of the group all made possible the decision, which became a form of resistance to the pressures of the state.

Maintaining an attitude of creative response, of retraction and of resistance, means not only keeping alive the traditions of local autonomy, but also making an effort of continuous construction, so that this resistance is always up-to-date.

For the Serer, who formed part of the Baol kingdom, one of the most important ones in the area, the history of village autonomy dates back to the time when, together with the Wolof leaders, they had to establish dual action. This was expressed in an institution that brought the agents of the central power face to face with the representatives of the local communities who made sure that their rights were respected, even if this meant resorting to arms.

This autonomy had its roots in the integration of the group and in the power of the villages' animism, respected because of the Islam of the governors and the geographic isolation that disappeared at the time of deforestation¹⁷. When the foreign power replaced the monarchies of Senegambia, the aforementioned village organizations persisted at the side of the colonial authorities. This helped to reinforce the people's autonomy. After the Second World War, when the model of total colonial rule underwent a crisis, this autonomy was expressed as a conflict between the Serer groups that turned violent in 1950 when three problems, separate at the beginning — the land dispute, the administrative dispute and the political dispute — became one.

The solutions at the village level consisted of new proposals, parallel to those already known of the withdrawal and rejection of the innovations that did not agree with the aims of the local community. Two factions were then born — the traditionalists and the progressives—

¹⁶ J.M. Gastellu, *ibid.*, page 45.

¹⁷ B. Delpech, "A Sim: Un Modèle traditionnel de coopération agricole chez les paysans Serer du Sine", in J.M. Gastellu and B. Delpech, *op. cit.*

that deeply divided the society and used national political trends as instruments in order to ensure local victory and show their adherence to a national group. This attitude revealed that the political problems of common interest could be resolved by political means and not only by religious means as had happened in the past. At the same time, it pointed to an awakening of the Serer as far as their awareness of belonging to the nation.¹⁸

The force of the solidarity of the ethnic group was present however, which meant respecting one of the foundations of village autonomy – the Serer religious system that completely sanctified the expressions of daily life. On the one hand, this made it easier to resist conversion to Islam, but on the other hand, it did not prevent the recent and superficial adherence to Mouridism or Catholicism without cults being established or the basis being upset (apparently, no Muslim religious leader has been able to establish himself in the area).

This conversion to Islam appears to be more of a first step towards the preservation of their possibilities of resistance on the one hand, and the acquisition of communication channels in the power system on the other, a practice already familiar to the Wolof group, and exercised in answer to colonial pressures.¹⁹

In fact the Wolof group, that represents 80 per cent of the Senegalese peasants, seemed to incorporate itself into the capitalist economy quite easily through the early adoption of the cultivation of oleaginous crops. However, the massive conversion to Islam and the adherence to the Mourid brotherhood that acted as production organizer and extractor offered the peasants the means of establishing an original relationship with the ruling power. In the daily practice²⁰ of giving their labor and production in exchange for a blessing and promise of salvation, the force of the personal relationship of dependence of the Taalibe with the marabut religious leaders broke one of the principles that holds up

¹⁸ Here we refer to the case studied by J.M. Gastellu, *op. cit.*

¹⁹ M. Klein, *Islam and Imperialism in Senegal*, Sine Saloun (1874-1914) Stanford University Press, 1968, page 226.

²⁰ Preached by Ahmadu Bamba, pioneer of the brotherhood and persecuted by the colonial administration. See P.L. Couty "La doctrine du travail chez les Mourides" in J. Copans' P.L. Couty's, J. Roch's and G. Rocheteau's *Maintenance Sociale et changement économique au Sénégal. I. Doctrine économique et pratique du travail chez les Mourides*, ORSTOM, Paris, 1972, pages 67-83

capitalist economy: labor is bought and sold at the market price. This was the principle that threatened to upset the equilibrium of local societies, especially if together with their labor, the land could also be considered a commodity. But Mouridism, which during its first stage (1886-1915) had shown significant resistance to colonial intervention, accomplished a synthesis between the rejection of the colonial power (against the capitulation tax, for example), and their aspirations for survival by creating a coherent social and ideological system that established a transition within the Senegalese society.²¹ If it is true that the modifications of the productive forces and the production relationships are the result of the introduction of the peanut crop, Mouridism has given an original form to that economy, by managing, as County States,²² to absorb the market economy and its categories, while at the same time neutralizing it.

So, it can be said that Mourid Islam favors a restoration of the traditional society that under the impact of colonial penetration was on the way to destruction. But this is achieved in a system of dependence the peasants depend on the state (and therefore on the world market) for the marketing of their harvest and for the supply of modern tools, seeds, etc.

The role of the brotherhood evolves from recovery and resistance to the preservation of the social order. In fact, since the 1920's, the Mourid Marabouts first collaborated with the French administration and then, after independence, with the Senegalese administration.²³ In spite of this, the Mourid Movement appears as the answer of the peasant economy to the market economy, by taking advantage of ways of agriculture labor organization that are the result of the combination of traditional practices and the modern needs of the brotherhood. This dual attitude that both secures and guarantees dependence, in the event of a crisis, allows them to reverse the situation in favor of the village. In the critical years from 1968 to 1970, the Wolof peasants escaped the con-

²¹ J. Copans' "La notion de dynamisme différentiel dans l'analyse sociologique. Société traditionnelle, système Mouride, société sénégalaise en J. Copans, et. al., *Ibid*, 1972, pages 19-33.

²² Ph. Couty "L'Economie sénégalaise et la notion de dynamisme différentiel" in J. Copans et. al., *ibid*, page 75.

²³ D.B. Cruise O'Brien, *Saints and Politicians*, Cambridge University Press, 1975, No. 106.

trol of the government by selling their harvest as contraband on the Gambian frontier for cash, and for three francs more per kilo, which proved to be a considerable advantage compared with the price and payment system of the cooperative.²⁴ This form of marketing the product goes back a long way, but in 1970 it reached the figure of 50,000 tons, representing a loss to the state of one and a half million pounds, which made it consider the problem as one of the most serious as regards the peasants response to the economic situation. Other forms of peasant action made the crisis more acute, for example simply abandoning the cultivation of the peanut crop and replacing it with that of the food products such as sorghum and millet used exclusively for self-consumption.

How did the peasants manage to find ways of escaping the double network for the extraction of the product for export, that of the brotherhood, by means of the marabut, and that of the state, by means of the cooperative? Precisely by employing the traditional practices of relationship and cultivation that up until then were considered essential for production.

In order to change the type of cultivation, the peasants took advantage of the relationship existing at the village level with the marabut (responsible for the distribution of costs and the organization of the farming), by offering only 10 percent of their labor to the "Wednesday field", administrated by the religious leader, and thus fulfilling their part of the vertical relationship with the Murid organization. But, at the same time, they developed networks of horizontal relationships founded in the neighborhood, relationships of mutual aid, that allowed the peasants to establish permanent cohesion and decide on the action to be taken with regard to agencies of state control such as the cooperatives.

The Santaana and the Dimboli which are mutual aid organizations, are truly traditional institutions that help towards social integration within the Murid Wolof society, thus showing the importance of social

²⁴ The cooperative does not pay for the product until its debts in the bank have been met, thanks to the first payments given by the peasants destined on principle to the payment of their own debts. But the individual accounts of the peasants are nearly always very imprecise. From 1968 to 1970, the world price of oleaginous products increased, but nationally remained the same. So, the peasants near the Gambian frontier sold their product abroad, especially when faced with the prospect of having to give it in to the cooperative in return for late and reduced payment and at the same time fall into the hands of profiteers and have to pay up to 70% monthly for their loans. R. Dumont, *op. cit.*, pg. 203.

relations very much apart from those that are specifically Murid.²⁵ If it is true that the Santaana, in the practice of the cultivation of the marabut field, at a national level can be considered to be promoting the exploitation of the peasants by the religious leaders, at a village level, in the family lots, this practice takes on different proportions. In the first place, it materializes the mutual aid whereby the peasant acts freely with regard to the brotherhood's rules, and secondly it is so widespread that in many areas, more than 50 per cent of the time is employed in neighbors' fields. In spite of the cost incurred by the gathering of those concerned (the occupant of the lot buys the rice that he distributes as food on credit), the Santaana is the most accepted form of framework, although there are other less expensive ways, such as employing laborers. It would seem that its integrating role within the village, although it is used as an instrument of modern exploitation, (administered by the brotherhood) guarantees peasant actions in times of crisis. For example, in 1968, when the peasants refused to harvest the crop because of the difference in the prices of the domestic market and the world market; or in 1970, when they decided to replace peanuts with crops for self-consumption; or in 1973, when the Senegalese countryside was hit by a drought. All these actions, that showed resistance to the exploitation agencies, were the expression of a growing awareness of the dynamism with which the peasants were reconsidering their relationships of dependence. These became reciprocal relationships, capable of demanding solutions, in the case of the Marabut, and in the case of the state bureaucracy, they became relationships of resistance, thanks to the cohesive force of the already existing horizontal relationships, that as time went by, had become stronger and had acquired new functions.

In the present political system, the situation of rural society, especially that of the peasants, who produce the majority of the country's wealth, is one of weakness, internal division and dependence. Nevertheless, their marginality and political irrelevance, with regard to the state, does not prevent them from making use of the channels that the system has provided in order to ensure their own subsistence. In this

²⁵ It seems that the status of the peasants in the traditional Wolof hierarchy, whereby they are considered to be free men (jambur) with a relatively stable social position even though they may have been the victims of exortions by the ruling elite, has been kept alive. The traditional hierarchic society has offered many of its characteristics to the Mourid system. Ser D.B. Cruise O'Brien, *The Mourides of Senegal*, Clarendon Press, 1971, page 18.

way, in the boss-client relationship, where the system of political factions exists, the peasants have made their voice heard and have achieved some good by supporting the local leaders who have influence in the towns. In the case of the Mourid Wolof, those religious leaders with a large number of followers among the rural masses are the ones recognized as popular authorities with access to the advantages offered by the national administration. So, leaving politics in the hands of the Marabouts has become a national decision.

But, while there exists a relationship of dependence of the Taalibe with regard to the Marabut, the latter is still considered as a peasant by the state. And, in spite of such a situation of political dependence, critical times have proved the peasants' ability to act against the state by making their opposition known and, if necessary, taking well determined action.

When the call to political participation tried to mobilize the peasant masses during the Independence, the parties that summoned the rural voters, like that of Senghor, had recognized the need to count on that force. At that time, the rural masses responded as a homogenous group, expressing their expectations as regards the decolonization procedure, that was mainly concerned with economic improvements. It was a matter of meeting the demands for an increase in prices for the producers (both big and small landowners), for the increase in salaries (for farm laborers) and for the opening of possibilities to the African merchants. At the same time, the nationalist call evoked the revolutionary leaders of the nineteenth century, (Abdel Kader, Al Hajj Omar, Dan Fodio, among others, who resisted colonization with arms) not as popular heroes but as the ancestors of the present nationalists. The summons could be more efficient and lead to massive political response when it incorporated these two aspects. Senghor had his first success when he referred to himself as the leader of the peasant masses during his speeches in the 1950's.

The agenda of the nationalists, whose ideology was centered on self-respect, self-determination and the doctrine of liberal democracy, was substantially modified when government action intensified the contradictions existing in society. These were contradictions between the governors and the masses that forced the groups in power to withdraw all demands for the re-distribution of wealth and political participation that had been encouraged before. Faced with the inability to solve those two problems, the leading Senegalese classes came across difficul-

ties in trying to solve other problems – those concerning authority and integration.

The result was that the masses were deprived of effective political participation, although at times they have been called to the polls purely as a matter of form. Any dissidence was dealt with by intimidation or prison.

But, the peasant society, still penetrated by government agents, exploited by money-lenders and merchants, manipulated by religious or traditional leaders with government contacts, decided to express its desires not only with actions but also in direct political language. Since 1969, complaints from the peasants concerning the lack of solutions to the problems of the cooperative system, and the lack of technical aid, as well as comments about their social situation have been heard on rural radio. To this can be added the protests about government action vis-a-vis the peasants. By 1970, the situation had become so serious that, according to Dumont, some considered that all that was needed to start an agrarian revolt was a spark and a determined leader²⁶. The government was at the time ready to prevent such a happening, and the order given at that moment for the collection of all firearms throughout the country, with the pretext of protecting some animal species, was symptomatic of this.

The subjects of the peasants' complaints have been listed by Copans in an interesting essay²⁷ on the explanations and ideological reactions provoked by the drought in the Sahel.

One of the issues that most clearly indicates the degree of the peasants' awareness of the situation with regard to the state and civil servants is that of political dependence. Below, we quote some of the documents transcribed from radio bulletins. "The authorities should help the peasants instead of taking them for asses on whom they can load all kinds of burdens" (April 1969). "We didn't even have the right to speak when the authorities came here. Only the political representatives had the right to do so. Instead of letting us speak in order to defend our interests we were pushed to the back" (Diohine, December 1971). Added to this are concrete remarks about the advantages enjoyed by different

²⁶ R. Dumont *op. cit.*, page 212.

²⁷ J. Copans, "La Secheresse en pays Mouride Sénégal. Explications et réactions idéologiques paysannes", en J. Copans, *Secheresses et famines du Sahel*, Maspero, Paris, 1975.

social groups. "The rural group with its labor is the one that feeds everybody - both the rural group and the bureaucrats". (Casamance, August 1972). "There are more or less ten thousand civil servants in the government, and nothing has ever been deducted from their salaries to pay for the amounts misused by their colleagues. Let it be known that if the government remains in power, it is thanks to the peasants" (Diourbel, May 1969). Further on, there is another complaint: "We are young people from the rural areas who are obliged to go and look for work in the towns, to protect our minimum annual budget. But, unfortunately, we are often badly received by the government. (There follows a description of police persecutions). How do you expect us to improve our standard of living? Why do you accumulate all the goods of the state in the towns?" (Niakhene, April 1971)²⁸. On other occasions, the accusations are directed against the political authority that subordinates the peasants to the state: "Sometimes we hear on the radio that the government is going to do something to help the peasants, but we never see anything being done. When we ask about this, we're sent to see the village leader who sends us to see the district leader who in turn sends us to see the prefect. Can't we do anything else?". (Sine Saloun, April 1969). Their awareness of being an oppressed economic group is expressed as follows: "The BNOS (National Bank of Senegal) exploits us and doesn't leave us anything. The ONCAD²⁹ also exploits us, pays its employees and gets profits; the BNOS is rich, the ONCAD is rich and we're poor." (Amene, August 1969). Evidence of their awareness of still belonging to a marginalized social and political group of rural society is indicated in the following way: "The representatives who go to the jungle shouldn't just listen to the rich people. They should take the word of the badly-dressed people, who contrary to what they think, aren't stupid". (Sine Saloun, April 1970).

This is the peasants' point of view about something that flows like an underground torrent, the continuous creation of a response that on becoming a conscious search for solutions to the conditions of their

²⁸ Salaries in the public sector during the independence were seven times more than the equivalent of the average peasant's salary. Ten years later, in 1970, official statistics show that 52.5% of the government's annual expenditure was allocated to the salaries of the bureaucracy. D.C. O'Brien, *op. cit.*, 1975, page 130.

²⁹ The National office of Cooperation and Assistance for Development, This agency depends on the marketing office that establishes the contacts with the cooperatives.

group, proposes alternatives of greater importance. These are alternatives that recognize the horizontal links of national integration in favor of other projects. The considerations put forward in this essay have arisen as a result of the attempt to try to detect the validity of these links.

Even though this study has been carried out in the closed (artificial) framework of a state, in following the norms of the formation of the nation imposed by colonization, we have kept in mind the fact that this process is very closely linked to the international context, and especially foreign domination, on the one hand, and on the other to the local social systems, whose persistence and power of transformation reveal the dynamic and innovating ability of the peasants. Taking the artificial character of the states born out of decolonization as a starting point, the studies on national integration have been centered on an interest in horizontal integration and especially in the conflicts caused by the cultural and ethnic pluralism of the societies in question, rather than in the obstacles encountered by the central power in the diffusion of values and decisions. The integration that could be called vertical belongs to the privileged field of recent studies, as it can be considered to be more operative for the knowledge of possibilities and obstacles.

In such cases, the analyses have been centered on the study of the formal elements of the African political system, as if the ruling group had the power to model African societies for its own aims.³⁰ Or else in the attempt to draw attention to the links existing between the power of the new governments and the local points of power, they propose a relationship between the central and the peripheral systems. The channels that communicate the two systems reveal the weakness of the peripheral system's participation, which is its selective attitude in admitting political intermediaries like the Marabouts, merchants or traditional leaders, who enjoy the legitimacy of the two levels of power.

These selective exchanges between the systems are what appear to stimulate an integration within the global political society, and which in the case of Senegal, may point to the slow emergence of a national political culture, whenever this is not opposed to the values of the local

³⁰ E. Klaus, "La communauté traditionnelle et le progrès social en Afrique subsaharienne" en A. Abdel Malek's *Sociologie de L'impérialisme*, Anthropos, Paris, 1971, page 387.

culture. The result is that the elements of national political culture are situated at a symbolic and emotional level and hardly at all at the level of real knowledge about the administrative and political institutions and machinery, and still less at the level of participation. History has shown how President Senghor, in fifteen years of government, has had to compromise with the leaders of local elites, Muslim brotherhoods, and the great families in order to maintain the power of the national political elite and assure his stability. It is clear, however, that this precarious equilibrium is threatened — the numerous crises within the two systems that the country has had to face since its independence is proof of this. Various solutions have been proposed, such as a change in the economic system and a massive social mobilization, such as in 1962 with Mamadu Dia, or else as in 1972, a two-part political reform — decentralization and deconcentration.³¹ In ten years, these crises led to precarious solutions that only managed to mitigate the speed of a process that can be analyzed by having a closer look at the other factors involved.

Our subject of study arises above all from the fact that the process of national integration in Africa is occurring during one of the periods of the incorporation of the continent to the world system of capitalist economy,³² the main implications of which are the extraction of raw materials and the exploitation of cheap labor. Consequently, this process is carried out wholly within the framework of a system of dependence that will undoubtedly impose its own characteristics on the integration of the nation. Another starting point involves keeping in mind the fact that in the case of Senegal, a definite break between the colonial economy and the post-colonial economy does not exist, because, in spite of the nationalist leaders' different plans and proposals, the new state chose to dedicate its efforts to a one-crop farming system, with the same crop that had supported the colonial state. This was to lead to

³¹ The reforms tends in fact, to reinforce the local authorities, to organize the country in rural communities as a moral entity and with financial autonomy, administered by boards, elected mainly by the votes of its members. The main aim of this is to encourage the government in its own promotion among the villages. But, the reason for its failure lies in the very origin of the reform as proposed by the office of Organization and Method, in yet another act of over-evaluation of the central system in imposing norms of the peripheral sectors without getting to know their opinions on the matter.

³² I. Wallerstein "The Three Stages of African Involvement in the World Economy" in P.C.W. Gutkind's and I. Wallerstein's *The Political Economy of Contemporary Africa*, page, London, 1976.

complete dependence on the limits of price fluctuations on the international market, together with an increasing need to import food.³³

This situation has been maintained thanks to the creation of a state that runs this type of economy through a ruling class whose stability is largely based on international finance, together with the efficiency of its management in ensuring the production of oleaginous crops by the rural masses at a low cost. This, in turn, gives rise to the need to establish control through the manipulation and political subordination of the peasants³⁴. It also results in attempts to involve the peasants in a project for the integration of the nation by means of institutions of exploitation and plans for rural animation. In short, it is in this way that the state fulfills its role as the vehicle that subordinates the peasants to the world economy.

Such a policy coincides with the ideology of the new rulers who agreed to inherit an economic reality that was the same as the previous one. Consequently, they had to eliminate the possibilities of the participation of masses, curb the demands for the distribution of wealth and announce the end of the ideological debate within the country in the name of order and especially, unity. During the time of the nationalist struggle, unity was associated with justice. Afterwards, it was used to try to hide the contradictions existing between the leaders and the masses, contradictions that the Senegalese peasants were fully aware of. The perspectives resulting from the nationalist speeches on radical changes in the general economic condition attributed to the colonial economy are proof of a deterioration of the system. All that remain are the calls for dignity and national unity, that have another meaning and that coincide neither with the politics in practice nor with the economic plans put forward. The peasants are looking for, and sometimes find, ways to resist this ideology of the imposition of a national plan.

Moreover, the Senegalese peasants, like many others in Africa, have a

³³ The country imports approximately 200,000 tons of rice. According to Pellisier, in 1972 the deficit of basic food totalled 500,000 tons of millet. The country also imports an enormous amount of tinned food such as milk, as well as fruit and vegetable extracts that it could produce itself.

³⁴ The relationships with external forces, such as the capital or the state, are often useful in the uniting of the poor and the rich peasants in their demands for increases in prices, tax reductions and improvement in public services. But, at the same time, these relationships are a source of differences and class formation. The rich peasants have access to the state bureaucracy and to commercial capital by means of which they can exercise political control over the communities.

long tradition of organization and resistance to colonialism³⁵, based on the dynamic survival of their practices of social cohesion, of political autonomy in religious conflicts, of the distribution of authority or economic machinery that allow them to save essential features of their tradition at the cost of some adaptations.

This force of a group that is aware of being the protagonist of a production that alienates the country's economy at all levels, explains the artificial character of the administrative and political structures of both the colonial and the independent period. Moreover, it is indicative of the ruling group's inability to obtain a "national response" from the rural masses. There are other responses, however. On the one hand, there is a repeated refusal to accept the effects of the economic subordination to the world market by changing to the cultivation of basic food crops or by refusing to harvest at the risk of severe punishment, thus minimizing the value of their relations with the state institutions. However, on the other hand, their action tends to find new ways, that reinforce the efficiency of cohesion between the different villages, that put ethnic or community differences on one side in order to come to a horizontal dialogue of a force that many analyses have neglected.

The active and organized resistance to the state appropriation, the exploitation of a raw material with insecure prices, the awareness of being the producing mass and of belonging to a nation, all seem to constitute essential factors in the origin of a process of the horizontal integration of the nation. Such a process offers an alternative of independence in ways that the peasants can choose in order to achieve acknowledgement of their vital presence, participation in national government and a rupture in the blockade of foreign forces.

³⁵ See for example B. Barry's *Le royaume de Waalo, le Sénégal avant la conquête*, Maspéro, 1972, as well as "Le royaume du Waalo du traité de N. Gio en 1919 à la conquête en 1855" by the same author, *Bulletin de L'IFAN*, Serie B. XXXI (2) 1969, pages 339-444.

West Malaysia: a Case of Late-Developing Peasant Problem*

P.L. Burns

Of the five major countries in South-East Asia which have experienced colonial rule only West Malaysia¹ has been relatively free of peasant unrest. By contrast the Philippines, Vietnam, Burma and Indonesia have had major peasant disturbances, many of them well before World War II.² In a country better known for its 'plural society' – an ethnic plurality consisting of Malays (approximately 52 per cent of the population) Chinese (35) and Indian (10)³ – the Malay peasantry has usually been thought of as supportive of their traditional aristocratic leaders. However inaccurate this view may have been, it was shattered in 1974 when peasant and student demonstrations occurred in widely separated parts of the country. This paper seeks to explore two questions which arise from these events: first, why after years of relative quiescence and much government attention has the Malay peasantry become so clearly discontented; and second why does this discontent constitute a threat

* This paper was given at the 30th International Congress of Human Sciences in Asia and North Africa held in Mexico, August 1976.

¹ Malaysia is generally thought of as comprising two regions: East Malaysia consisting of two states, Sabah and Sarawak and West Malaysia, sometimes referred to as Peninsular Malaysia, consisting of Penang and Malacca, which with Singapore before World War II made up the crown colony of the Straits Settlements, and nine sultanates.

² Of the better known movements and disturbances there were the Colorums and Sakdals in the Philippines, the Nghe-Tinh Soviets in Vietnam, the Saya San rebellion in Burma and the communist-led revolts of 1926-7 in Indonesia.

³ There has not been a census for some years, but a recent official estimate gives the following percentages: Malays 53, Chinese 35.5, Indians 10.6, and others 0.7 for a total population of 8,809,557. (*Mid-Term Review of the Second Malaysia Plan, 1971-1975*, Kuala Lumpur, 1973, p. 25).

to national politics? The answers revolve partly round the way in which the colonial economy developed and partly round the dynamics of communal politics in West Malaysia since *Merdeka* or independence.

The peasantry in the colonial economy

The most striking feature of the economic history of the Malay States is that, unlike the other South-East Asian countries which experienced alien rule, the appropriation of peasant surpluses was never critical to the maintenance of the colonial economy. In Java, for instance, the requirement that the peasantry devote a portion of its land to the cultivation of cash crops for the export market was an essential feature of the 'culture' or cultivation system. In Vietnam the appropriation of peasant surpluses took several forms: taxation, state monopolies on staples, and *corvée* labor, all of which were important to the maintenance of the French colonial system. In the Philippines and Burma the peasantry formed the cornerstone of the commercialized rice and sugar industries of central Luzon and the Burmese Delta. In the Malay States the peasantry for a long time played only a minor role in the economic changes which took place under British rule. The explanation for this may be found in the way a capitalist mode of production developed in Malaya.

It had its origin in the growth of the tin industry during the latter half of the nineteenth century.⁴ With the demand for tin plate in Europe and America from about the 1850s the operation of the centuries old tin mines in the states of Perak, Selangor and Sungai Ujong was transformed. Very quickly the Malay chiefs who controlled the tin mines were faced with the classic problem of finding sufficient labor to work the mines throughout the year. The Malay peasant was an agriculturist, or fisherman and spread too thinly along the major river systems to provide the necessary labor force. Although the Malay chiefs attempted to mobilize work forces within Peninsular Malaya and adjacent Sumatra, they soon turned to the Chinese merchants of the Straits Settlements for Chinese laborers and thereby established a pattern of labor importation for the capitalist sector of the economy which was to continue into the twentieth century. With the imposition of British

⁴ For an account of the development of this industry see Wong, Lin-Ken, *The Malayan Tin Industry to 1914 with special reference to Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan and Pahang*, Tucson 1965.

rule in these three tin-producing states in 1874-5 came the introduction of modern forms of government and the expansion of the infrastructure which insured the survival and eventual dominance of the capitalist mode of production. Twenty-five years later when the plantation industry was launched in earnest with the introduction of rubber, the labor force was again drawn from overseas. The numbers of Chinese were now augmented by Indians, mostly Tamils. Again, as with the development of the tin industry, the peasantry was not required to play a part.⁵

To say that the peasant surpluses were not critical to the colonial economy does not mean that the peasantry was unaffected by the new mode of production and the process of British rule. Land was transformed into a commodity as modern forms of land tenure, registration and taxation were established. The alienation of land for mining and planting gave it a new, added value. The decline of the local handicraft industry, the penetration of the village world by manufactured goods and the replacement of the exchange of goods and services in kind by cash, brought the peasantry increasingly into intimate contact with the market economy. The growth of towns to service the mines and later the plantations brought the village closer to the modern sector of the economy.

British policy helped shape these changes too. Driven by the belief that the Malay peasantry could not provide a suitable labor force for the extraction and planting industries, and mindful of the social and political consequences which might follow the disruption of the 'Malay peasant-yoeman' society, the colonial authorities took steps to insure its preservation. In 1913 the Malay Reservation Enactment was brought into force to prevent the peasantry from selling land to non-Malays, such as Indian money-lenders and the European rubber companies.⁶ While the legislation was generally successful in preventing non-Malay ownership, it laid the basis for the concentration of land ownership in the hands of a new Malay rentier class. Colonial authorities also attempted to steer the peasantry away from rubber, the one lucrative

⁵ Accounts of the growth of the planting industry may be found in J.H. Drabble, *Rubber in Malaya 1876-1922*: (Kuala Lumpur, 1973) and J.C. Jackson, *Planters and Speculators* (Kuala Lumpur, 1968).

⁶ The only comprehensive examination of British policy in this area is by Lim Teck Ghee, *Peasant Agriculture in Colonial Malaya: its development in Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan and Pahang, 1874-1941* (unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, Australian National University, 1971).

cash-crop of the interwar period, and towards the cultivation of rice, in which the country was always deficient, and of coconuts. This prohibition was eventually abandoned as the peasants ignored it or went outside the reservation to grow this new lucrative crop, one which offered a monetary palliative to the new pressures at work in their world. Thus by World War II, new crops had been added to long-established ones; rice growing prominent in the four northern states of Perlis, Kedah, Trengganu and Kelantan, and fishing on the East Coast were old industries. In the five southern states of Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan and Pahang (which were combined in 1895 as the Federated Malay States) and Johore some peasants came to depend exclusively upon rubber growing while others mixed rubber cultivation with rice and fruit crops and still others cultivated bananas, coconuts and areca (betel) nuts as cash crops.⁷

Some general points need to be made about the uneven diffusion of these types of peasant responses to the spread of the colonial economy throughout the Malay States. In the heartland of the colonial economy—Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan—, the mixed and rubber-growing types were widespread. This was a region where peasant surpluses were not of importance to the state revenues. In these states and in Pahang it should also be noted that Britain destroyed the power of the aristocracy to govern, although it retained the sultanate as means of legalizing their right to rule. The aristocracy only became significant within the colonial system later as an English educated administrative elite. By contrast in Johore the peasant population was small and its surpluses a negligible portion of the ruler's wealth, which depended on the export crops first of gambier and later rubber. Unlike the position in the federated Malay States, Britain allowed the Sultan and his civil service to continue to govern the state. With the transformation in the relations of production the landed aristocracy of the nineteenth century became an administrative elite in the twentieth. Where this aristocratic elite chose to invest in land, they did so in areas of commercialized agriculture.

As in Johore, Britain only established its control over the four northern Malay states in the first decade of this century. Here too, Malays continued to govern the state under the direction of a British

⁷ M.G. Swift, 'Capital, Saving and Credit in a Malay Peasant Economy' in R. Firth and B.S. Yamey (eds.) *Capital, Saving and Credit in Peasant Societies* (London, 1964) p. 133.

officer. But the similarities ended there, for unlike in Johore the ruling classes of these states were almost entirely maintained by the extraction of surpluses from the peasantry. With the exception of Kedah where some rubber estates developed, the failure to commercialize agriculture left these states dependent upon whatever revenue could be derived from the peasantry. This may explain, at least in part, why the peasants of this area failed before World War II to devote more of their land to the cultivation cash crops; it would appear they were never able to retain sufficient surpluses to do so. This also explains why the aristocracy remained a landed ruling class.

The growth of the colonial economy in the Malay States before World War II was therefore not dependent upon the surplus labor of the peasantry. Labor for the extraction and planting industries was recruited from overseas. This was reflected in the ethnic composition of the Federal Malay States, where by 1930 Malays made up only 34.7 per cent of the population while in the four northern states less than 18 per cent were non-Malays.⁸ Although peasant surpluses were not critical to the colonial economy, the peasantry was deeply affected by its workings; in the five southern states, where they became increasingly drawn into the market economy, and in the four northern states, the expanding cash economy was added to the burden of traditional exactions.

The peasantry after World War II

The Japanese occupation caused new pressures in the countryside. The collapse of the colonial economy disrupted the rural production Estates and rubber producers on small holding's were hit; indeed all those who depended on cash crops as their sole source of income suffered. Mixed production peasants could retreat to subsistence production. Food shortages in the towns drove many non-Malays, especially Chinese, into the countryside as 'squatters'. Japanese policy of exploiting ethnic differences between the Chinese and Malays led to communal clashes at the end of the war. Widespread opposition to the British constitutional proposals for a Malayan Union led to a further politicization of the countryside during 1945-47. From 1948, when the

⁸ C.A. Vlieland (comp.), *British Malaya: A Report on the 1931 Census* (London, 1932) p. 36.

Federation of Malaya was established, and until independence in 1957 the country's life was dominated by the long 'Emergency' against the communists and the politics of the transfer of power. The elections which were held in 1955 to choose a government to negotiate independence, brought the Alliance to power and saw the first development plan introduced to assist the rural producer.⁹ This was the first of four national schemes –the fifth (the third Malaysia Plan) has just been announced– which, among other objectives, has attempted to improve the production and prosperity of the peasantry. While there is not enough space here to examine these schemes in detail, it is important to assess the impact they have had upon the Malay peasantry. This is best done by examining the results in three areas which have received much attention: rice, rubber and land.

The Malay States before World War II were net importers of rice. This situation continues today though the levels of imports have been much reduced to about 10-15 percent. It is hardly surprising that achieving self-sufficiency in rice production (in addition to it being a traditional staple crop for the Malay peasant) should have become the goal of the first five year plan.¹⁰ The recession of 1958 and the setback the government party received in the 1959 elections saw the government shift the emphasis of the second plan towards increasing peasant incomes.¹¹ This and the third plan saw the introduction of the "green revolution", genetic-chemical technology, the expansion of irrigation, the opening of new land. The incidence of double-cropping rose sharply. The goal of increased production was met by a

⁹ These were:
 First Malaya Plan (1956-60)
 Second Five Year Plan (1961-65)
 First Malaysia Plan (1966-70)
 Second Malaysia Plan (1971-75)
 Third Malaysia Plan (1976-79)

¹⁰ For critical assessments of these plans see: E.K. Fisk, 'Rural Development Policy' in T.H. Silcock and E.K. Fisk, *The Political Economy of Independent Malaya* (London, 1963); G.D. Ness, *Bureaucracy and Rural Development in Malaysia* (Berkeley, 1967) ch. IV; M. Rudner, 'Malayan Quandry: Rural Development Policy under the First and Second Five-Year Plans', *Contributions to Asian Studies* (Jan. 1971), pp. 190-204.

¹¹ M. Rudner, 'Malayan Quandry: Rural Development Policy under the First and Second Five-Year Plans', *Contributions to Asian Studies* (Jan. 1971) p. 195.

rise of between 30-35 per cent between 1956-1970¹². But the other goal of increasing of incomes was not fulfilled. Indeed, household incomes remained close to the poverty level. The reasons for this are complex, but would be familiar to any student of peasant production in Third World countries. For instance where double-cropping took place rents rose to meet the increased production.¹³ Most important, given this type of agricultural strategy, the crop chosen to increase peasant incomes had the lowest return value in the market place. The amounts available for sale tended to be small after quantities for personal consumption were taken out of the total harvest. The failure to improve the credit institutions left the peasant *padi* producer still dependent upon the money lender (*chettiar*), Chinese shopkeeper middle man and kinfolk for the wherewithall to purchase the necessities of production, household necessities and meet other expenses. In this respect the *padi* producer had less bargaining power than the rubber grower prices were to his advantage. The rice producer had to move his crop immediately after harvesting it. In many cases credit arrangements frequently depended on settlement after the harvest. Moreover the price support schemes on imported rice were balanced against the government's desire to hold down the cost of rice to the consumers. There were other problems of a more general kind which are discussed below.

In respect to rubber, it has already been noted that many Malays cultivated it before World War II. It is difficult on the basis of statistics to separate out peasants operating on three or four acres from small capitalist farmers (usually Chinese) on fifty acres. Nevertheless, taken together they were producing over a third of all rubber in Malaya by 1930. The collapse of the colonial economy during the Japanese occupation

¹² J.T. Purcal, *Rice Economy* (Honolulu, 1972) Chapt. 4; J.T. Purcal 'Rural Economic Development and its Impact on Economic and Social Integration in West Malaysia'. *Contributions to Asian Studies* Vol. 7 (1975); R. Ho, 'Rice Production in Malaya: A Review of Problems and Prospects', *Journal of Tropical Geography*, Vol. 29 (Dec. 1969).

¹³ R. Ho, 'Rice Production in Malaya: A Review of Problems and Prospects', *Journal of Tropical Geography*, Vol. 29 (Dec. 1969). Although legislation exists (*Padi Cultivators Act, 1967*) to limit rent, it is widely ignored as tenants decline to register their lease for one reason or another. (Lim Teck Ghee *et al. Land Tenure Survey, Farm Locality D-II Muda Irrigation Scheme: Final Report* (Universiti Sains Malaysia, 1974).

turned most peasants to the cultivation of cash crops. After the war the government encouraged rice production and attempted to reach greater self sufficiency in the First Malaya Plan. In an attempt to increase income, rubber was once again encouraged in the Second Five Year Plan (1961-65). More land was made available for its production. Financial inducements were given to encourage the planting of high yielding varieties of trees.¹⁴ These schemes tended to benefit the non-Malay capitalist smallholder producer as well as the Malay peasant. But it has been the better off Malay peasant with sufficient land to give over to rubber and still cultivate other crops, especially paid, who has benefited. One authority has concluded that these developments increased the disparity between 'levels within the Malay (peasant) community'.¹⁵

There are other difficulties as well. Although the rubber producer in times of good prices earns a relatively higher annual income he is in an industry of long-term declining value. The rise of oil prices has adversely affected the synthetic rubber industry and given the natural product a longer life, but an increase in the price of natural rubber will make production of the synthetic product once again profitable.¹⁶ Finally, where the producer cultivates only rubber he is, as the spectacular drop of prices in 1974 demonstrated, open to all the unfortunate consequences of market fluctuations.

A very heavy outlay of capital has gone into the development and settlements of new land in West Malaysia. Of several schemes, two have had the widest national impact: the 'fringe alienation scheme' and the programs of the Federal Land Development Authority.¹⁷ The first was launched by the Federal government after the 1959

¹⁴ M. Rudner, 'The State and Peasant Innovation in Rural Development: The Case of Malaysian Rubber' in D. Lim (ed.) *Readings of Malaysian Economic Development* (Kuala Lumpur, 1975) pp. 328-9

¹⁵ J.T. Purcal, 'Rural Economic Development and its Impact on Economic and Social Integration in West Malaysia' *Contributions to Asian Studies* Vol. 7 (1975) p. 71.

¹⁶ *Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER)* 30 July 1976 pp. 95-101.

¹⁷ See Tunku Shamsul Bahrin, 'A Preliminary Study of the Fringe Alienation Schemes in West Malaysia' *Journal of Tropical Geography*, Vol. 28 (June, 1969) pp. 75-83; and R. Wikkramatileke, 'Federal Land Development in West Malaysia, 1957-71' in D. Lim (ed.) *Reading of Malaysian Economic Development*.

elections was intended to help the poor, but land-holding peasant not the landless, and aimed at opening land adjacent to, or at least within three miles of existing settlements. As this scheme was administered through the State governments it strained the resources of local authorities, and in time the shape of the program was much altered. In most areas land went to the landless, who were otherwise employed, as well as to poor peasants. Often where the new land holder had other employment or was double-cropping *padi* they found it difficult to maintain the rubber they were encouraged to cultivate in fringe scheme areas. A more serious abuse appears to have been the way in which some politicians manipulated the development sites and the selection of participants to their personal advantage.¹⁸

The fringe alienation scheme was a short-term program intended to meet the social and political problems suggested to the government by the adverse election results in 1959. The larger land settlement programs were undertaken by the Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA). The FELDA program sought to clear land and distribute it in ten acre lots planted with rubber or oil palm and supported by a wide range of community services. Since 1957 only about 27,000 families have been settled – a small portion of the total landless or poor peasantry. The cost of locating each settler has been in the order of M\$15,000 and up. More over, the cost of the scheme became the small holder's debt to FELDA. The industrious young settler with a small family and few other liabilities benefited as long as prices remained stable. For others, especially older settlers 'the accumulation of near insurmountable financial and allied obligations with tradesmen or loan sharks in nearby townships and impositions by relatives. . . has led to another set of stresses and to the growth of class apathetic settlers'.¹⁹ Indeed, others have argued that the system whereby the settler must sell his produce through FELDA instead of independent dealers, has turned the settler into a laborer without benefits associated with the labor contract of state workers.²⁰

¹⁸ D. Guyot, 'The Politics of Land: Comparative Development in Two States of Malaysia' *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. XLIV, 3 (Fall, 1971) pp. 368-389.

¹⁹ R. Wikkramatileke, 'Federal Land Development in West Malaysia, 1957-71', in D. Lim (ed.) *Readings on Malaysian Economic Development*, p. 122.

²⁰ 'The Plight of Federal Land Development Authority Settlers in Malaya', *Journal of Contemporary Asia* Vol. 3. No. 3. (1973), pp. 367-370.

It is the fortunate few that gain access to land under these settlement schemes. Land may also be purchased of course, but only the better-off peasants or salaried persons in the village can afford to acquire it in this way; most peasants acquire it through inheritance. Under Islamic partible inheritance this is a mixed blessing as it has greatly encouraged fragmentation of holdings. This, combined with a rapid growth in the rural population— in spite of migration to towns, an increase of 26 per cent between 1957-1970— has led to the reduction in the size of already small holdings. Although the government has tried to place limits upon fragmentation, the problem remains for those who hold small parcels of land.²¹ Peasants holding smaller plots of land and unable to purchase land have adopted a strategy for survival which Geertz has characterized as 'shared poverty'.²² Owners of land have taken on kinfolk as tenants. For instance, in one area which has been the recipient of considerable government assistance, it was found in 1973 that 52 per cent of all tenancies were of this type.²³

A general pattern emerges. In the area of land tenure, there is on the one hand increasing landlordism and on the other widespread 'kinship'. As observed above, tenants who have gone into double-cropping have found their rents doubled, or rent taken on both crops. The form that rent has taken has also changed. Rents in kind have given way to rents in cash. The evidence in one area suggests that whereas in 1955 only 16 per cent of rent was collected in cash, by 1973 it had risen to 77 per cent.²⁴ Indebtedness remains endemic to peasant production. In the past twenty years credit institutions have not developed sufficiently to meet the peasants' chronic need for capital as they have become more thoroughly integrated into the market economy. Furthermore, religious tithes (*zakat fitrah*) which normally fall on the pro-

²¹ R. Ho. 'Rice Production in Malaya: A Review of Problems and Prospects' *Journal of Tropical Geography*, Vol. 29 (Dec. 1969) pp. 27-8; R. Ho 'Land Ownership and Economic Prospects of Malayan Peasants' *Modern Asian Studies* Vol. 4, (Jan. 1970) pp. 83-92; and S. Husin Ali, 'Land Concentration and Poverty Among The Rural Malays' *Nusantara* Vol. 1 (Jan. 1972).

²² C. Geertz, *Agricultural Involution* (Berkeley, 1969).

²³ Lim Teck Ghee *et al.*, *Land Tenure Survey* p.xvii. See also K. Horii, 'The Land Tenure System of Malay Padi Farmers', *The Developing Economies* Vol. X, No. 1 (Mar. 1972) pp. 45-73.

²⁴ Lim Teck Ghee *et al.*, *Land Tenure Survey*, p. 55.

ducer are paid by the tenant instead of the landowner.²⁵ Although some peasants have been turned into farmers, most remain locked into a system of production where the demands of the market place have been added to the traditional exactions of landlords and creditors. Accumulation above subsistence needs is not possible. Although 25 per cent of all development funds have gone into the rural sector there has been no improvement in the peasant's standard of living.²⁶ Indeed, things appear to have gotten worse. The statistical evidence suggests that the richest 20 per cent have increased their share of income between 1957-70 from 50 to 56 per cent while the poorest 60 per cent – in other words rural laborers, *padi* planters, fishermen, mostly Malays, as well as urban unskilled laborers – saw its share drop from 30 to 24 per cent. To put it another way, for this period, one part of the population was marked by considerable prosperity and high investment of development funds, while the bottom 42 percent of the population got much poorer.²⁷

Finally, a word must be said about another area of importance to the peasantry, the rural elite. As Eric Wolf has observed, ecological and demographic crisis have usually been accompanied by a crisis of authority at the village level.²⁸ This, of course, has been an uneven process shaped in part by the type of colonial administration experienced in the nine Malay States and in part by the transformation of the political superstructure that has occurred since World War II.

Under colonial rule rural government has gradually changed. This began first in the tin-producing States where the district chiefs were swept aside and replaced by British officers. The lowest unit of administration in the 'old order' was retained in the *mukim*, consisting of one or more villages with a *penghulu* in charge. At the village level there were the older, the headman (*ketua kampung*) and the religious functionaries, Islamic *imam* and spirit mediums, *homoh* and *pawang*. As the centralized system of colonial government reached out to the village,

²⁵ J.T. Purcal, *Rice Economy*, p. 128.

²⁶ R. Thillainathan, 'Planning for Economic Equality and the Role of the Public Sector: The West Malaysian Case' in D. Lim (ed.) *Readings on Malaysian Economic Development*, p. 311-2.

²⁷ D.R. Snodgrass, 'Trends and Patterns in Malaysian Income Distribution, 1957-70' in D. Lim, *Readings on Malaysian Economic Development*, pp.261-2.

²⁸ Eric Wolf, *Peasant Wars of the 20th Century* (New York, 1969).

the position of *penghulu* was gradually transformed. Whereas in pre-British Malaysia the *penghulu* may have inherited his title—he was drawn from among the wealthier founder families and was related to many of the villagers—under British rule the post became that of salaried official. The holder of the position—still formally appointed by the Sultan—was chosen more for his ability as an administrator, rather than his attachments. He was often drawn from outside the *mukim*. Power shifted away from the district to the center. The District Officer unlike the *datuk*, or Malay district chief, did not have a monopoly of the distribution of the resources of the district and its several *mukims*. The *penghulu* therefore became the administrator of a host of regulations and enactments, registrar of births and deaths, the assistant of the land revenue officer, and the judicial officer responsible for settling petty civil and criminal cases. After World War II this process of integrating the *penghulu* and other traditional leaders into the administrative system continued more rapidly as the new state and federal governments, their statutory bodies and political parties reached into the villages to mobilize support for electoral politics or development programs. In areas where once the *penghulus* were elected, they were now chosen by the District Officer and *Mentri Besar* (the chief minister) of each state. The same process was extended to the village headman who, though not a salaried official, was the recipient of an honorarium. The result tended to not only ensure the recruitment of able officers, but also ensured the political loyalty of these minor officials.

The differentiation of the peasantry, the growth of the modern state and the creation of political parties have given rise to a new rural elite. S. Husin Ali sees it as a triad composed of the landlords, party functionary and government official.²⁹ These positions often overlap but are most frequently located in the office of *penghulu* and party functionary. The older leaders, the elder, religious functionary and village headman have seen their power and influence dwindle away. Their access to the resources of the state have been greatly diminished. Where once they played an important role in the cooperative activities of the village in such things as the construction of public works, now this responsibility has been taken over by a government department or agency. To become effective brokers they had to go beyond the village, but this role has

²⁹ S. Husin Ali, *Malay Peasant Society and Leadership* (Kuala Lumpur, 1975) Chapt. V.

been taken over by the *penghulu* and party functionary. The new rural elite, in order to become effective 'leader-brokers', have had to become more closely bound to the world beyond the village and *mukim*. Indeed, the very investment and development schemes introduced into their *mukims* benefit them directly and remove them further from the peasantry whose interests they are supposed to promote. The poor are therefore driven inwards on themselves and isolated still further from channels of power. As one writer remarked recently 'no new leaders have emerged and the villagers have been left without authoritative leadership precisely at the moment when the government is calling upon the rural populace to accept national and rural development goals which threaten to upset traditional patterns of rural life'.³⁰

The peasantry and national politics

In 1955 the federal elections brought the Alliance—a combination of three 'communal' parties, the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA), the Malayan Indian Congress—to power. All three had their origins in the manoeuvrings for political and ethnic representation following abandonment of the Malayan Union and the establishment of the Federation of Malaya in 1948. Electoral expediency had brought the three parties together and when they triumphed in the 1955 elections they formed the government which eventually negotiated the transfer of power in 1957.

Not only did these negotiations take place with the British, but also between the three constituent parties of the Alliance. The final formula, to which each agreed, has frequently been characterized as allowing the Malays to dominate the political arena while the non-Malays were to continue to control the economy. More precisely it involved an explicit commitment in the constitution to preserve the 'special position of the Malays' especially with respect to Malay reserved land, quotas on places in the public service, access to licenses and permits for certain businesses, and public scholarships and educational grants. Islam was to be the national religion and Malay the national language. The non-Malays were given access to citizenship and thereby the right to participate in the political life of the new

³⁰ C. Bailey, *Broker, Mediator, Patron and Kinsman* (Papers in International Studies: Southeast Asia; Series No. 38) p. 72.

state. Implicit in these arrangements was the suggestion that their cultural traditions would be tolerated and their role in the economy unfettered.³¹

Not all the parties outside the Alliance, for the most part communal parties, were pleased by these arrangements, but the new constitution provided the basis for the Alliance which has succeeded in retaining power since *merdeka* in 1957. This description of the 'communal contract' between the three parties of the Alliance does not explain why it has held together or what has been the basis of its power. Two points are of importance. First the Alliance is an alliance of class interests, a combination of wealthy Chinese and Indian businessmen and English-educated aristocratic Malays. Second, the Alliance has retained power by the skillful manipulation of the divisive communal forces within Malaysian society. With considerable ability the Alliance has retained a sizeable portion of non-Malay support. This has been due to their party organization, to the concern of non-Malays that some less moderate Malay group than UMNO might come to power and to the working of the electoral system which, if the electorate votes along communal lines, insures that only alliances of communal parties can gain power. The disaffected non-Malays have lost themselves in small communal and class parties, or have been contained by the judicious use of the Internal Security Act.³² Among the Malays, the Alliance's most secure bases have rested in their ability to gain the seemingly undivided support from the Malay peasantry. It has been argued above that there was a crisis of authority developing between the peasantry and the rural and urban elites. While this is largely true, the links have tended to hold well enough for electoral success, partly because of the skill of the leadership, and partly because in the five southern states the presence of large numbers of non-Malays encouraged communal solidarity.

If this was the general basis of the Alliance's power, the elections of 1959 suggested that a gradual loss of support was developing among the

³¹ K.J. Ratnam, *Communalism and the Political Process in Malaya* (Kuala Lumpur, 1965) and G.P. Means, *Malaysian Politics* (London, 1970).

³² The Internal Security Act (1960) came into force at the end of the Emergency and incorporated powers originally enacted under the Emergency Regulations. It enables the authorities to imprison persons without trial for two year renewable terms.

Malay peasantry.³³ A party which had been long in the making, the Pan Malayan Islamic Party (*Partai Islam Se Malaysia* usually referred to as Partai Islam or PAS), displaced the Alliance in two states, Kelantan and Trengganu and increased their presence in the federal Parliament from two to thirteen seats, making it the largest opposition party. Two years later Trengganu was lost to the Alliance, but the PAS continued to hold Kelantan.

Three points must be made about this loss of Alliance and especially UMNO support. First, as noted earlier, the forces of production in these two states were slow to be modified by the operation of the colonial economy. Before World War II there was little commercialization of agriculture, either of peasant production or through the introduction of rubber estates. In these northern states, and none exemplified this better than Kelantan, the appropriation of peasant surpluses was essential to the maintenance of the state. The ruling elite was a landed elite which, by its control of the state apparatus, was able to control the distribution of these surpluses. Thus in a region of few non-Malays, or widespread peasant production and of harsh social conditions, the class polarization if not class consciousness, was clearly established as these States entered *merdeka*. Second, the PAS appears to be inaccurately portrayed as a 'reactionary' 'conservative' party which was foisted by 'obscurantist religious' teachers on a backward, isolated peasantry.³⁴ In their work on the PAS Clive Kessler and John Funston have argued persuasively that the party combined radical populist nationalism with reformist Islam.³⁵ The leaders of the PAS have been drawn from two groups which have run counter to the politically dominant elite among Malays, the English-educated aristocratic administrator or politician. The last of these was Arabic-educated and strongly influenced by reformist Islamic ideas for the creation of dynamic Islamic societies. The ideas of this group made more head-

³³ G.P. Means, *Malaysian Politics*, pp. 252-3.

³⁴ For examination of this literature see C.J. Kessler, 'Islam, society and political behavior: some comparative complications of the Malay case', *British Journal of Sociology* Vol. XXIII, (Mar. 1972).

³⁵ The interpretation of the PAS which follows is based on very important research of these two writers: C.J. Kessler, 'Muslim Identity and Political Behaviour in Kelantan' in W.R. Roff (ed.), *Kelantan* (Kuala Lumpur, 1974) and N.J. Funston, 'The Origins of Partai Se Malaysia' *Journal of South-East Asian Studies*, Vol. VII, No. 1. (Mar. 1976).

way in the ports of Singapore and Penang than in the Malay States before World War II, but thereafter gained a wider currency. The other major group, which Roff has termed the 'autochthonous intelligentsia', are village Malays educated in their own language who often became school teachers and journalists.³⁶ They were inclined toward secular and radical nationalist views and were influenced by these traditions in Indonesia. Before World War II many joined the *Kesatuan Melayu Muda* (the Young Malays' Association of KMM), and later found places in the PAS and *Partai Rakyat* (People's Party) when they were established in the 1950s.³⁷ Thus the PAS combined two important Malay political traditions. In the 1955 elections the party had only recently been formed. In 1959, with the support of traditional village leaders, the PAS swept into power in Kelantan and Trengganu. Leaving aside Trengganu, where the PAS split and allowed the Alliance into office, the PAS succeeded in Kelantan in mobilizing the discontented peasantry through the elements of the traditional but powerless village leaders and removed the landed elite just when it was trying to consolidate its position within the UMNO and the Alliance. In the ten years that followed this election the struggle for control of the State between the PAS and the federally backed UMNO only sharpened the class lines between parties. The PAS became more the party of the poorer peasantry, the tenant and sharecropper gaining support from the *imams*; the UMNO, the party of the wealthy, sought to mobilize support through the *hajis* (those who have made the pilgrimage to Mecca) who were often the local traders, richer peasants, and larger landowners.³⁸

Third, it is important to see how Islam in this setting has a considerable mobilizing capacity. Both parties, the UMNO and the PAS, sought to establish their legitimacy by reference to Islam. Kessler has argued that in Kelantan, however confused, the debate between the two parties was over the appropriateness of Islamic social-theory to present-day society. For the UMNO, solutions to the problems of Kelantan society

³⁶ W.R. Roff, *The Origins of Malay Nationalism* (New Haven, 1967).

³⁷ Now called Partai Sosialis Rakyat Malaysia, the party of largely Malay Marxists and Social Democrats who have until recently struggled to gain support of Malay peasants. Until 1965 they formed, with Labor Party, the Socialist Front. (R.K. Vasil, *Politics in a Plural Society*, Kuala Lumpur, 1969) Chapt. IV.

³⁸ C.J. Kessler 'Muslim Identity and Political Behaviour in Kelantan' in W.R. Roff (ed.), *Kelantan*, pp. 296-7.

had to go beyond Islamic rules for a properly ordered society. The Islamic reformists in the PAS took the opposite view. A 'just society' could only emerge from a program based on Islamic notions of the nature of man and society. Kessler argues most convincingly that although Islam, alone among the great religions, claimed to possess 'an adequate and comprehensive social theory' it was 'overwhelming, ethical and individualist'. It failed to recognize social divisions and the contradictory interests of groups in action. Nevertheless, the presence of this idealized Islamic social theory and the objective reality of the human condition of Muslims creates a 'tension' which produced a movement of special intensity.³⁹ As Kessler observes,

'Popular Kelantanese Islam, in other words, is not only an idiom for the perception and discussion of grievances. It is also a way of apprehending the world which carries with it ways of acting in the world. Popular Islam provided the Kelantanese with an implied grammar of motives and a rhetoric of political action. It provides them with a repertoire of techniques for fashioning the world and themselves in it.'⁴⁰

These features are most strongly seen in the PAS' oppositional role at the state level before 1959 and subsequently in resistance to the UMNO's ambitions at the federal level.

At the next election in 1969 and the riots which followed, two lines of discontent crossed, one manageable, the other deepseated with serious long-term implications for the non-Malay urban 'middle class', prominent among whose leaders was the new generation of lawyers, doctors and academics. Their concern with the trend of Alliance policies towards the rapid promotion of the interests of the Malays or *bumiputra* ('sons of the soil', the more popular expression by this time) —drove a number of them to form a new political party in 1968, the *Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia*.⁴¹ In doing so they joined three other parties which drew their support largely from non-Malays, workers, small merchants, clerks and other members of the petit bourgeoisie. They appealed

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid. pp. 309-10.

⁴¹ R.K. Vasil, *The Malaysian General Election of 1969* (Singapore, 1972) pp. 42-3.

to the implacable opponents of the Alliance on either ideological or 'communal' grounds. One party, the Democratic Action Party (DAP) was a child of the Singapore period in Malaysia and had inherited Lee Kuan Yew's policy for a 'Malaysian Malaysia' which challenged the 'communal contract' implicit in the 1957 and 1963 constitutions. Gerakan was less clear where it stood on this issue, some taking a line which amounted to agreement with it, others arguing for a stricter rendering of the communal contract, a view which would not see the interests of the non-Malays sacrificed for the *bumiputra* program.

In the elections of May 10, the Alliance suffered what amounted to a serious loss of support when compared with previous results, winning only 66 of 103 Parliamentary seats compared to 89 of 104 in the 1964 election.⁴² Their share of the total vote fell by 10 per cent. In the Perak and Selangor the Alliance lost their absolute majorities. In Penang they were turned out of office by Gerakan. In Kelantan, in spite of a massive campaign, the Alliance failed to dislodge the PAS, but more of this below. Although the result left the Alliance firmly in control of the federal parliament, the defection of non-Malay support was especially humiliating for the MCA which lost most of the seats. The MCA responded by declining to participate in forming new cabinets. At the same time jubilant supporters of the opposition parties took to the streets to celebrate. On May 13, communal rioting broke out in Kuala Lumpur. Parliament was suspended and the country was governed by the National Operations Council until February 1971.⁴³

What consequences did these events have for national politics? First, the movement of the non-Malay urban middle class away from the Alliance to parties with class links among non-Malay workers weakened the Alliance's base. Second, the riots and the role the police and military (manned largely by Malays) played in restoring order, demonstrated to this non-Malay middle class that they had no option but to work

⁴² For election results see *Ibid.* and K.J. Ratnam and R.S. Milne, 'The 1969 Parliamentary Election in West Malaysia' *Pacific Affairs*, XLIII, ii (Summer, 1970).

⁴³ There are several studies of these events, but the following are the most useful: G.F.V. Galiano, *Communal Violence in Malaysia, 1969: The Political Aftermath* (Ohio University Papers on International Studies, Southeast Asia Series, No. 13); Goh Cheng Teik *The May Thirteenth Incident and Democracy in Malaysia* (Kuala Lumpur, 1971) and A.J.S. Reid 'The Kuala Lumpur riots and the Malaysian Political System' *Australian Outlook* Vol. 23 (Dec. 1969) pp. 258-78.

within the existing political framework. That they understood this was suggested by the speed with which the MCA offered to participate in the government.

The other area of discontent was amongst the Malays. The 1969 elections revealed a further loss of Malay peasant support away from the UMNO. At the federal level the PAS increased its number of seats from 9 in 1964 to 12 and more importantly improved their share of the total votes polled from 14 to 23 per cent. These results could be interpreted as a return to the 1959 election pattern since the PAS setback in the 1969 elections can be explained by the Alliance's appeal for unity during the nation's confrontation with Indonesia. But the 1969 results indicate that it was more than a return to the 1959 position. The PAS, in direct confrontation with the UMNO fared better. In terms of total votes cast by Malays, the UMNO received 41.4 per cent to the PAS' 40.2. But it was at the State level that evidence emerged of a broadening of PAS support. It retained its hold on Kelantan in spite of the Alliance's vigorous campaign and its promise to the state of a special grant of 546 million dollars if it rejected the PAS.⁴⁴ More significant was the PAS' improved share of the total vote in each of the eleven states, especially in the other northern states of Kedah (the then prime minister's state), Perlis, Trengganu and Perak. These were of course areas of widespread Malay peasant production. It has been argued that the results reflect Malay hostility to UMNO concessions to non-Malays at the national level, but while this has been a factor, it is worth noting that where the PAS won seats at the federal level it was in constituencies where Malays made up more than 90 per cent of the electorate. The result may therefore be interpreted the other way, as Kessler has demonstrated in his study of Kelantan: the absence of a large non-Malay element in the constituency sharpened the class issues within one ethnic community. Hostility towards non-Malays is subordinated to the conflict between classes within the Malay community.

If the election results suggested widespread discontent among the Malay peasantry towards the UMNO leadership, the riots in Kuala Lumpur which followed tragically demonstrated the depth of Malay feeling. It is unnecessary to go into the details of riots here, or to speculate on the extent to which the participants were manipulated by powerful

⁴⁴ C.J. Kessler, 'Muslim Identity and Political Behaviour in Kelantan', W. R. Roff (ed.) *Kelantan* p. 297.

local leaders. Although the published evidence is not very helpful on this question, these riots can be interpreted as outbursts of the deprived against those —mainly Chinese— who appear to possess and hold the wealth of the country. In its direct and awful way the rural problem could be said to have been brought to the streets of Kuala Lumpur through the recently arrived inhabitants of the squatter villages which surrounded the capital. Taken together with the election results, the riots revealed a polarization in Malay politics which threatened the electoral base of the UMNO and weakened the authority of the Alliance.

Conclusion

The government's response to the events of 1969 reveals the extent to which the Malay peasantry has become and will continue to be a major political problem. This is most clearly seen in the creation of the National Front (*Barisan Nasional*) and the declaration of the New Economic Policy.

Shortly after the riots and the setting up of the National Operations Council, leading members of the government party approached the opposition parties with a view to broadening the membership of the Alliance. These talks eventually led to the formation of the National Front in January 1973.⁴⁵ Of the parties to join, Gerakan and the PAS were the most important. Both defended their decision to join the National Front as a way of assisting the restoration of national unity. Doubtless both saw it as a way of gaining support for their state programs and as an opportunity of promoting their policies at the national level. The inclusion of Gerakan was an attempt to win back the non-Malay vote especially among the Chinese who had deserted the MCA and the Alliance. Likewise it was hoped that the PAS would bring to the Alliance the electoral support of the Malay peasant, the village leaders and religious teachers of the northern states. While the UMNO —nominally the Alliance— got a place in the Kelantan state government, the PAS secured seats in the Kedah and Trengganu cabinets as well as a ministry in the federal government. Similar arrangements were made with Gerakan.⁴⁶ Characterized as 'accommodating ethnic

⁴⁵ *FEER*, 15 Jan, 1973.

⁴⁶ *FEER*, 16 Sept. 1972.

elites' the National Front strategy may be seen as one of consolidating class interests. It also had the advantage of converting party conflicts to class faction fights to be settled in the party room.

Electorally, the National Front was a great success. At its formation it commanded 118 seats to the opposition's 26 in the federal parliament. In the 1974 general election they improved this share to 135 out of 154 seats. Nevertheless, the creation of the Front precipitated a crisis within the Malay based parties, UMNO and PAS (and Gerakan as well). Not all their members could agree with the new alliance and many left their respective parties. In the case of the PAS, the contradictions between the party's ideology and its class basis became apparent. There is little evidence to go on, but the resignations of local leaders and also voting patterns appear to indicate that the peasant support and village leaders were thrown into confusion by the PAS participation in the National Front. For instance many of the 222 independent candidates in the 1974 general elections were former UMNO and PAS members.⁴⁷ The evidence points to the conclusion that with PAS entry into the National Front the peasantry has lost an effective channel for voicing its grievances.

This is illustrated in three by-elections, two held before the 1974 general elections and the third a year later. The first two by-elections occurred within a month of the Front being formed. Each seat had been vacated by a leading member of the UMNO and the PAS. In Kuala Kedah the UMNO secretary-general and former information minister held a seat vacated by the retiring former prime minister, Tunki Abdul Rahman. He was opposed by a 29 year old former bank clerk, Siti Nor. Although a last minute candidate, she surprised even her supporters by securing 40 per cent of the votes. Her success was due partly to the support she won from disaffected local PAS leaders and partly to the fact that her father was the celebrated leader of the squatters' movement for 'land-for-the-landless', Hamid Tuah.⁴⁸ The other by-election was for the seat vacated by the PAS chief minister of Kelantan who joined the federal government. The National Front candidate, a PAS member, won

⁴⁷ Chandrasekaran Pillay, *The 1974 General Elections in Malaysia* (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore; Occasional Paper No. 25; 1974) and R.S. Milne 'Malaysia and Singapore in 1974' *Asian Survey*, XV, ii (Feb. 1975).

⁴⁸ *FEER*, 5 and 26 Feb. 1973. For an account of Hamid Tuah's activities see S. Husin Ali, *Malay Peasant Society and Leadership*, (Kuala Lumpur, 1975).

with ease, more easily because unlike previous elections there was no UMNO candidate. Yet there was a very low turn out. PAS supporters, instead of voting against 'their' candidate, chose not to vote at all. The third by-election occurred again in Kedah in August 1975. In the general election the previous year the National Front defeated the Partai Sosialis Rakyat Malaya (PSRM) by a majority of 4,775 out of a total of 11,000 votes. In the by-election the PSRM candidate reduced this margin to 136 votes.⁴⁹ This by-election, it will be noted, occurred after the peasant demonstrations late in 1974.

Turning to that other area of government endeavor, the New Economic Policy, one finds a more direct attack upon the basis of discontent in Malay society. The 1969 riots galvanized growing opinion in several quarters into the realization that, if the Malays were to be helped, more of them would have to share in the more prosperous sectors of the economy. Therefore, the policy declared in 1970 that the new priorities would be directed first towards, 'eradicating poverty' among all races, and second, to 'restructuring' Malaysian society 'to correct economic imbalances' and eventually to 'eliminate the identification of race with economic function'. With specific reference to Malays, the New Economic Policy proposed 'the modernization of rural life' and 'the creation of a Malay commercial and individual community...'.⁵⁰ These goals were to be achieved over a twenty year period. To this end Malay ownership of the private sector would rise from 2 per cent in 1970 to at least 30 per cent by 1990. Increasing numbers of Malays would be recruited to professional, technical and management positions and to the urban labor force. In the rural sector the strategy remained one of transforming peasants into farmers. As expressed in the Second Malaysian Plan (1971-75) this meant an emphasis on 'extensive' land development and the creation of new institutions to improve the 'credit, marketing services and research results' provided for small agricultural producers. In the words of the *Mid-Term Review of the Second Malaysian Plan* not only would this make the peasant more productive, but also 'more commercially oriented'.⁵¹

⁴⁹ R.S. Milne, 'Malaysia and Singapore, 1975' *Asian Survey* XVI, ii (Feb. 1976).

⁵⁰ *Mid-Term Review of the Second Malaysia Plan, 1971-1975* (Kuala Lumpur, 1973) p. 1.

⁵¹ *Ibid.* p. 125.

Most important in the long term plans was the belief that the industrialization of the economy with a greater participation of Malays in all areas of this development and the creation of 'new growth centers' in densely settled rural areas would draw Malays away from the land and thereby ease the pressures which hitherto had encouraged land scarcity, unemployment and poverty among the peasantry.

Admirable as the intentions of the New Economic Policy were, the Malaysian economy is still dominated by foreign capital and it lives by its exports of raw materials: tin, rubber, palm oil, timber and petroleum. It is of course intimately bound to the world economy and when the world recession and inflation got underway in earnest in 1974, Malaysia did not escape its impact. The price of rubber dropped sharply in the last quarter of 1974 and consumer prices rose steeply, those of food by more than 24 per cent.⁵² The immediate effect was to trigger off a number of protest demonstrations especially in the northern states, the largest occurring at Baling where some twelve thousand peasants took to the streets. Two months earlier the demolition of a squatter village in Johore under police supervision had led to demonstrations which were supported by university and college students.⁵³ The November marches brought the students out again, many of whom were Malays from villages themselves. The riot police were used to put down these protests and many students and members of staff were arrested.

The demonstrations, and the debate over the conditions in the villages which followed, appear to have brought about a change in the emphasis of the Third Malaysia Plan (1976-9) which has just been announced. Development spending on the commercial and industrial sector has been reduced from 16.5 to 9.5 per cent. The government evidently hopes to make up the difference through foreign and local private investment in this area which is central to the New Economic Policy. In the rural sector—a designation which includes more than the peasant producer—there is a return to the commitment of earlier five year plans to devote a quarter of the development budget to agriculture, an increase from 21.7 to 25.5 per cent in the Second and Third Malaysian Plans. The emphasis is to be less on land development (as in the previous plan), than on increasing the productivity of the small

⁵² *FEER*, 10 Jan. 1975.

⁵³ *FEER*, 4 Oct. 1974.

producer. Although the government hopes that production increases will lead to the eradication of rural poverty, it reveals its frustration over earlier efforts to transform peasant production when it states in the Third Plan that 'It is not agriculture which hampers upward mobility . . . but the lack of ability to turn it from a subsistence occupation into a business-oriented enterprise. The Government can only provide the facilities. The entrepreneurial spirit must come from the farmers.'⁵⁴

The peasant problem in Malaysia has been long in the making. The government has thus far failed to improve the living conditions of the peasants substantially or to turn them into prosperous capitalist farmers. Yet, the Malay peasantry remains a critical element in the strategy of 'ethnic politics' of the ruling class. The changes in national politics, the co-opting of the PAS to the National Front, has left the peasantry without effective leadership or channel through which to air their grievances. Their continuing discontent and their inability to share in the wealth of the country will make them unreliable followers of those who seek to manipulate them.

⁵⁴ *FEER*, 30 July, 1976, p.95, gives the only account available to this writer before the Conference.

Final Debate

This text is a summary of the most important parts of the final debate and conclusions of the seminar. These were put forward during the last session by the participants, whose contributions included admirable points and suggestions. At the same time, they also posed questions or proposed plans for the future. The points considered as fundamental and deserving greater study were, a) peasants and national integration from the point of view of the integrator or the integrated, b) the role of peasant intellectuals in the integration process, and c) the problems in the analysis of the relationship between classes and ethnic groups. The dynamic spontaneity of the debate has been limited for reasons of space, but an attempt has been made, nevertheless, to preserve its colloquial form and liveliness in this summary.

The arguments are gathered together and consider points of view from different standpoints, examining the debate and suggesting hypotheses to be studied in the next stages, such as the peasant-state relationship in countries with an agrarian economy. The common area of discussion was opened with the points that tended to clarify concepts and establish their relationships.

On nation, integration and peasants

H. Yamasaki: National integration has become an urgent and serious matter and the current problem of many developing countries.

The peasantry has appeared as a serious case of political and social tensions because of its very nature in developing countries and has tended to be a serious obstacle to national integration.

Prof. Zghal pointed out that the problem of national integration of the peasantry is not a problem which exists in every historical stage but appears only in particular periods. I completely agree with this, except that he identifies this limited period with the transitional period from

precapitalistic to capitalistic societies. I think the problem of the national integration of the peasantry also emerged with vital importance in the socialist countries such as the Soviet Union and China, which still have huge peasant masses. The peasant, in the sense defined by Wolf or Shanin, exists throughout the various stages of the history of human society, but a program of national integration of peasants only exists in particular situations.

There is a need for rapid nation building, which in a sense is enforced by the structure of world politics and world economics.

After the Second World War many countries of Asia and Africa acquired their political independence from colonial status; they then had to face a program of nation building to survive as viable units in the world arena. The leaders of the ruling classes of the new states have to achieve a more firm national integration. But, to achieve any success with national integration there are several prerequisites.

In short, interaction between state power as an integrator and the peasant as the subject of integration, must be analyzed: both poles of the integration process, their goals, choices of strategy, etc.

For instance the response of the peasantry towards any immersion of national control and response, or flexibility of state power towards various forms of peasant resistance, and so on, constitute topics to be studied. The paper of a study group of El Colegio de Mexico pointed out two types of national integration, vertical and horizontal. It is interesting to me but I cannot understand clearly the implication of horizontal integration. Until now the theory has been put forward that the integration process has appeared as vertical, and horizontal integration still remains an idea to be held up against vertical integration. And, lastly, I would like to distinguish several aspects of national integration such as political, economical, social and cultural.

Integration between these aspects must be analyzed and synthesized. It is my impression that speakers in these seminars did not clearly distinguish these aspects and deal with interrelations between them. The first thing to do is to break down the problem of national integration into some aspects and then to integrate these. Such a methodology may be very useful.

What is the defining factor of such various forms of national integration? The interrelation between the integrator and the integrated must be the most important problem.

P. Worsley: The very word nation is a new phenomenon, a novel innovation in history. It arises certainly in Western Europe as a concept

in the era of the growth of capitalism. Before that people didn't talk about nationality. The aristocracy of France had more in common with the aristocracy of England than they had with their own people. There was no suggestion that the population need speak the same language or have the same culture. For example, the domination of English dialects spoken around London over those in the rest of the country accompanied the emergence of the national market. So, it seems to me that the phenomenon which you call nation building is the phenomenon of mobilization and is what we are referring to when we speak about the growth of a national identity. It is usually the ruling class which is interested in developing, mobilizing the population to follow the path of development that they set as targets. I think that there is a very great danger for sociologists, anthropologists and social scientists in assuming that the predicament of the ruling classes is analytical or one that raises ethical problems.

You say that the self-expression of the autonomy of the peasants is an obstacle to national integration. But from the point of view of the peasants it is the defense of their interests. Why should the peasants not defend their own interests against those who wish to mobilize them, exploit them, extract surplus from them, use them as hired troops in the army, etc.? It seems to be utterly rational, not irrational, traditionalistic or pre-modern, for the peasants to defend their own interests collectively.

The phenomenon of nationalism, the construction of national identity and the mobilization of people, the attempt to make them feel that they are Mexican or French or English or Japanese and that they have common interests, is part of a process of persuasion, of legitimization, and, therefore, it is manipulation to persuade them that the interests that they have in common are greater than the interests that divide them.

We must resist any temptation to assume that nation building is, *per se*, some inherent and necessarily morally correct settlement. The nation is not a natural phenomenon. It is a process, it emerges, it appears quite easily. We need to distinguish, therefore, between ethnicity and nationality, because multi-ethnic societies are very frequently incompatible with the national identity. In Mexico, the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Austria and Hungary, innumerable societies are formally multinational, but the problems that create tension, friction, are those of unequal development. They refer basically to the economic differentiation of the different sectors of the economy, as for example, between underdeveloped, the back woods of Yugoslavia, the case of Montene-

gro, rural, mountainous, backward, underdeveloped, and the highly developed, semi-industrialized parts of Slovenia. Nationalism or multinational identity persists when there is some material interest, such as differentiation of occupations, functions or economic activity, as between agriculture and industry, or when people feel threatened. When there is a dynamic expanding economy which sucks in masses of labor, it does not matter what nationality or ethnic identity they have, as in the American melting-pot situation in the late 19th century and early 20th century, it is really not important what national language they speak for the purposes of the economy. But there are not dynamic expanding economies with expanding industrial sectors in most of the third world countries. There is a highly unequal development or to put it into more theoretical sociological terms, rather than in economic terms, there is a sense of relative deprivation.

People know that they are living at lower standards than the people in the city.

There is no need of a direct experience to have an idea of unequal consumption, one can know it indirectly through mass media or communication. This is a revolutionary force in itself, a radical force. So, in order to explain the persistence, the emergence, the disappearance, and sometimes reemergence of ethnic identities and especially national identities, it has to be related to inequalities of a material kind, in terms of political economy. For example, the emergence of Scottish nationalism in the last few years is very directly a result of the discovery of oil and the potentiality of vast wealth in Scotland that the people do not want to see go to England.

B. Chandra: No doubt nations and nation building appear in particular historical contexts and in a process, but it is not a conclusion of only this. We need to examine to what extent the process of national integration is really attached to it. To what extent does it affect the objective process, and to what extent it does not and instead represents a certain type of manipulation.

The European experience of how nations came into being and how national integration came to exist has a lot in common with how national integration came to existence in the colonial countries and post-colonial societies. But, also it is true that the bourgeois national leadership mobilized the peasantry and suppressed sections in the name of nation and national integration, and they promoted national integration so that then societies might be unified against colonialism. But it is not just manipulation, it also represents a certain objective phenomenon.

Colonialism does have a contradiction with the society of the colony. Not only with the bourgeoisie, but also with the peasant class and with the working class. Consequently, this provided the objective basis for national integration during the course of their anti-colonialist struggle. The second important aspect of this is that unless the society of the colony gets integrated, it will not be able to defeat colonialism, because colonialism has massive forces behind it and, consequently, to defeat it there is a real need for a nationally integrated society.

This is the really important historical question, and the same should be applied to post-colonial society, but there the difference becomes sharper because the post-colonial society finds that if social development is to occur then the society, all the people, must help together. They should not get split up. Of course, the split will not occur only along class lines. If it were that simple then one might say that national integration has no role in post-colonial society. But the tendency is not only to spread along class lines, but also to spread regionally, linguistically, tribally and so on. Then, again, not only is there the danger of a new colonialism, of colonialism reasserting itself continually, but also the problem that the forces and the planning process, whether capitalist or socialist, cannot take place properly unless it takes place in a unified, coherent society.

The danger becomes greater. Let me give an example of manipulation. To me an example of a manipulative government would be what happened at the end of the 19th century around the slogan of independence from the British Empire, or, "we want our place in the sun of a civilizing nation".

National integration is thought to cover up the class situation; instead society is thought to be unified and the promise of independence with which everybody was enamored, including Karl Marx in the middle of the 19th century, is falsified by efforts of integration. Therefore, once given the objective basis for national integration, a question to be asked is the one that has been asked in the paper of the group from El Colegio de México. Using their language, one should ask about vertical and horizontal integration. The main question is: society has to be integrated, under whose hegemony? Which class is to dominate in it? Society must be united against colonialism. If this is not done the struggle will not be successful. But if a unified movement emerges, should it be under the domination of the bourgeoisie? In China there was also national integration but under the hegemony of one type of political force. There are different cases, like Indonesia and India.

The more the peasantry or the working class tries to model the city coalition, the more it hands over the unified and imperialist struggle to the bourgeoisie. The way out is to struggle for hegemony and the same process must continue afterwards. You have a much deeper experience of Africa, P. Worsley, and your example is very interesting in regard to the struggle against colonialism. Tribal people have struggled together and, they have also fought for a certain national integration and against those tendencies which are divisive. But, as soon as the colonial struggle is over, the problem remains.

One must consider also the danger of the historian, economist, sociologist, falling prey to ruling class ideologies. The entire society starts taking on the colors that divide the society. It is in the best interests to locate those sectors which somehow divide the society.

Sometimes, it may be take the form of the struggle of the pure black people against half black people, as in the Portuguese case. Sometimes, it may be even the question of pure Indians, as in Mexico or in some other Latin American country; their interests must be looked after as against the interests of those who are no longer pure Indians. It is a fact that there is real need for national integration in these societies.

Capitalist societies require national integration because division will not serve the purpose of their social change or social revolution. Therefore, the real question is that national integration does become of value, but the real struggle occurs over the question: National integration means under whose hegemony? In this one must not avoid the class question under any circumstances.

Under what kind of hegemony has national integration to be achieved?. The problem of nation building is totally connected with the problem of class struggle within the country. Nationalism and the overlapping of the problem of nationalism and class struggle is one very important characteristic of the developing countries. Then, we must at first analyze the problem objectively.

In dealing with this problem we must separate the ideological or variable point of view by analyzing the objective process of national integration.

On integration, ethnicity and classes

S. Varese: We should be clear about the major difference between national integration and change. If we look at the origin of the so-called modern states, it is connected with the expansion and growth of capitalism.

The question is: Supposing that national integration is a necessity, what does national integration really mean? Does it mean homogenization under one ruling class which can be the bourgeoisie or the proletariat?

It is possible to carry on, to construct a national project which includes pluralism and self-management on the base of the people. But let us think about a multi-ethnic society. A multi-ethnic society like Mexico does not have a multiethnic state. This has to be made clear.

The people that belong to, work and exist in the state and in the government do not belong to an ethnic group. They only belong to the other bourgeoisie: speaking Spanish, coming out of a class, a very clear class, the upper bourgeoisie, the bourgeoisie itself or the petit bourgeoisie.

In a limited number of cases, few members of the ethnic groups reach a very low position in the state organization, which is not the government.

We should differentiate between government and state. In Mexico, for example, it is clear that what changes is the government, every six years. The state itself, at a certain level, remains the same. This state organization is homogenous, highly integrated.

In the case of Mexico there is the party, the PRI, which is extremely integrated. But society itself is not integrated. The question is, how can a multiethnic national project be organized which, is multiple because it happens to be in a multiethnic society; it needs a multiethnic state organization. There are few badly carried out examples in the cases of Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, and the example of Switzerland.

The question is whether integration really means the destruction of all possibilities for the minority groups. Minorities in terms of ethnic groups. Minorities having every right to decide together in a solidarious political system with the rest of the nation. The other observation I had in mind concerns the Scottish case cited by Prof. Worsley: the fact that when sometimes the bourgeoisie of an ethnic group discovers that their interests are in contradiction to the bourgeois interest of the dominant ethnic group, at that point there is a real reemergence of the ethnic identity which has to be differentiated from the emergence of an ethnic and class interest and conscience of the peasant and workers of the ethnic group. Ethnicity can be so for reactionary or revolutionary reasons; ethnicity does not guarantee that there is always revolution. Ethnicity can be used by the local bourgeoisie in order to acquire more independence from the dominating ethnic group which has different interests.

The case of the United States, the melting-pot, mentioned by Prof. Worsley, it is true as long as the economy is expanding, but as soon as the economy is stabilized the chicanos say we have rights, and the Indians and the Blacks do too. As soon as the economy is not expanding any more, this will happen in multiethnic societies whenever the interests of the dominant group start to be in conflict with interests of the local bourgeoisie. This is why it is important to investigate whether there is really a bourgeoisie in the local ethnic group. In Mexico, there are some local indigenous groups that already have a bourgeoisie, a bourgeoisie which is already starting to understand that maybe their interests are not the same as those of the dominating bourgeoisie. This may originate a reemergence of ethnic identity.

A. Zghal; The nation must be thought not as a natural phenomenon, unchanging, but as a historically specific phenomenon, emerging under particular conditions in times of history. A nation can thus appear and disappear. The nation is either inherently progressive or reactionary.

It can be used for different ends and for different functions. It is generally associated with the emergence of capitalism and the construction of a national market. This market which therefore means that the cultural integration is desirable, that is necessary to integrate the population served by this market.

In what we might call a sort of late capitalism contemporary Europe, with the phenomenon of the transcendence of national markets, above the level of the limits of the nation-state, like multinational he who manages, manipulates the symbols of nationalism. But in his own interests or in those of other people?

This is a very inadequate way of formulating the question because no bourgeoisie ever rules on its own. It always has to have alliances with other social strata and build up a system of alliances. The urban, industrial, mercantile, commercial, bourgeoisie, for example, based in cities, always needs to ally with some faction of the rural classes, even the peasantry.

The way in which these alliances are made differs from country to country.

This leads to different national developments in terms of nation-building considering the case of the Japanese miracle, the high degree of cultural integration achieved in Japan depended on the elimination of resistance, or on the passivity of the Japanese peasantry. The Japanese peasantry was incorporated successfully, and the nation was built, but the consequence was fascism. So, different types of systems of al-

liances lead in different directions. Some to bourgeois democracy, others to fascism, and yet others to various other types of political formations. There is no general phenomenon of national integration, there is a variety of forms of national integration.

D. Wurfel: We need to come back to a point made earlier, that national integration has certain similarities with mobilization and that it is a process.

It is a process of both; on some occasions under the control of the leading elite and on other occasions an uncontrolled socio-economic process. The colonial situation is a rather interesting case where the ruling elite certainly did not intend national integration and nationalism to be consequences of the socioeconomic processes the colonial powers introduced in the colonial areas. This is a clear example of a socioeconomic process that was not a deliberate plan of the part of the ruling elite.

It is not correct to say that national integration took place before independence, that it was a necessary basis for the success of the independence movement. That is true in some countries, but the very fact that there is a question of national integration problems of peasantry, and of national integration today, in a postindependence era, is precisely because it did not take place before independence in a number of countries. Perhaps Malaysia is the most glaring example of this.

We should recognize that certain types of integration are a threat to the peasant's status and other types of integration may actually be desired by the peasantry. We should try to look at the question of integration and the types of policies that are called integration from the peasant viewpoint. In the Philippines in the 1930's under Kazan there was a declared policy of national integration in Mindanao, a deliberate international government policy of putting Christian settlers into Moslem land and taking the land away from Moslems.

This is a clear case of the ruling elite directing a policy of national integration which was a very serious threat to a particular element within the peasantry, the Moslem group, which is the cause of the difficulties in Mindanao today.

When integration is a result of the expansion of a market economy, we cannot deny the fact that the peasants, on the edge of the market economy, in most cases want to become part of that market economy.

These are two very different kinds of processes that are lumped together under the term of national integration.

P. Burns: We seem to be flowing from peasants to national integration, as if they are going to be integrated in some way. I wonder if we

could put it this way: peasants and the peasantry and national integration relate to the appropriation of peasant surplus and getting it into urban areas.

The whole discussion is, in the end, economic determinist in character. This impinges on the way in which we look at ethnicity, on the way in which we look at peasant resistance and on a whole range of problems which anthropologists and sociologists have been looking at over the past year or two. In fact, we ended up in some sort of anthropological *cul-de-sac* in the last few days. Partly because of the way that we conceive the peasantry, partly in the way that we have focussed on ethnicity. Very real problems, most important in terms of understanding the variety of social and political response, have been aired, but all about the question of the appropriation of peasant surpluses. If we continue along this line one can see how this is critical both to communist and non-communist countries. In the cases of China and Vietnam, there is a stage in which peasants are given access to land to increase agricultural production. In these two cases the surpluses removed from those areas flow back into the countryside in a critical way which enables the peasantry – peasantry that has been transformed – to take yet another step in its own transformation, because it is integrated in the state.

In the non-communist countries the appropriation of surpluses from the countryside into an economy which is still one in which a capitalist mode of production dominates, surpluses either go into the development of industry or perhaps go outside the country. This happens in the case of Southeast Asian countries, where it goes streaming out of the country, it does not come back into the countryside, it does not return to the peasantry. In other words, all the contradictions created by that situation are reflected in a variety of social, political and religious responses that happen at the base in peasant society.

The role of peasants in national integration is linked to the appropriation of services. National integration means producing a nice roundness with no differentiation.

On peasant intellectuals

B. Chandra: The question of the peasantry's own intellectuals cannot be separated from the prior question of differentiation in the peasantry. Just as the previous discussion has shown that the concept of nation and national integration can be used, and is quite often used, to reinforce the particular hegemony of the bourgeoisie, and in some cases

even of the landlords. Similarly, one aspect of nation and national integration is the concept of peasantry itself. In modern times it cannot be used without it becoming a way of imposing class domination on the agricultural laborers and poor peasants by the rich peasants. These rich peasants should not be described any more as peasants but part of the bourgeoisie.

The bourgeoisie plays the role of villain as a whole. This is repeated at the level of the village with the rural bourgeoisie playing this role.

From this point of view, how can the question of the peasantry in modern times producing its own intelligentsia be answered. In modern times the peasantry is depreciated in every part of the world.

In such situation what does it mean that the peasants have their own intellectuals? Does it mean the peasant's sons? And what is a peasant's son? A peasant's son when he gets educated either tries to become an urban bourgeois intellectual, a part of the state apparatus or an urban petit-bourgeois intellectual.

Even if he stays in the village he is bound to represent an interest; he is a rich peasant's son or a poor peasant's son; he is bound to represent the interests of the rich peasants or the village leaders and poor peasants. And if the rich peasant's son can play the role of representing the interests of the poor peasants and the village leaders, so can an urban petit bourgeois intellectual's son play that same role -vis-à-vis- the peasantry equally well.

The emphasis should be on what his outlook and his political are, what his ideology is, what they represent.

He will no longer be just representing the peasantry, he will have to be either the rich peasantry, or perhaps the transitory class of the rural petit bourgeoisie, the middle peasant.

Mokhsani: About the manipulation of the peasantry by their leaders, by the national leaders or other outside intellectuals, I think there is also counter-manipulation. For example, the Malaysian population is 55⁰/o indigenus Malay, 35⁰/o Chinese immigrant and 10⁰/o Indian. The peasantry is basically Malay with a strong Chinese group as well. The political system is lead by a Malay middle class with bourgeois orientation. But to get votes they have to enlist the Chinese rural peasantry.

These people are asking for industrialization, which means the Malay elite will get jobs at the top, but every five years they have to refer back to the peasantry. This means that they must reassert Malayness, that is being Muslim and different from Indians. This is the time when the

peasantry at the local level begins to assert itself asking, for example, for more irrigation projects.

There is something that the peasantry can get every five years although not very much. But, at the same time, they still can get something because the elite needs their support and therefore must put something down the line for the peasantry. I would like to give an example of peasants in action as a way of peasant manipulation of the elite. Within the last three years in the Philippines, nearly three billion pesos have been poured into the agricultural credit scheme by the government. Nearly one billion has not been repaid on time. That is a rather massive case of the peasantry in action manipulating the government for its own interests.

A. Zghal: There is a point of distinction between two different situations, one in which you get countries composed of a plurality of orientations in religious terms: Firstly, the *ulama* of the cities, the traditional intellectuals, and on the other hand, the *marabut* sectarian movements which were essentially peasant-based. These two different religious orientations or sectarian movements were reflected in competition for popular support, that took a religious form. Lying behind is a crucial problem of who would control the peasantry. Would it be the city-based owning classes or, on the other hand, would the interests of the peasants be asserted? In the 19th. and 20th centuries the urban intelligentsia won and succeeded in surprising the autonomous petit *ulama* dominating the *marabut* movement. After independence a second polarization took place with the emergence of a state technocratic bourgeoisie, controlling access to the national resources by means of its control of the state. This older nationalist elite, city-based, succeeded in becoming victorious over the peasant community, itself in turn displaced by the new technocrats. The debate takes on terms: who controls the state and the supply of the state access to control of the resources available to the state, which in the case of Algeria is petroleum and other basis resources?

J. Gerling: Prof. Bipan's contention is that the existence of sociocultural factors runs parallel or even at cross current to economic factors. Indonesia is very much a case in point where these sociocultural groupings are more important in many ways than the economic ones.

In the Java countryside there are two major conditions of the village: one which is based on Javanese cultural tradition, which would be associated clearly with the old Javanese empires. The empires had difficulties when a new ideology appeared in the form of Islam. The village was in turn divided along two lines: one a Javanese tradition, a cultural

tradition, and the other a Islamic tradition. Islam was a kind of subversive ideology for a period of time, and it continued to be through the colonial period. It is still seen by the state today as a subversive ideology. But, Islam was greatly strengthened during the colonial period. In a way, the pressures that operate within the village through the demands made on the peasantry tend to reinforce the two cultural traditions that divided the village ideologically. One could go on looking particularly at the period of the 1960's, with the coup. It seems that some interesting things developed, particularly on the Islamic side, where the traditional *ulama* or *shi'a*, the religious school, took up the leadership in the village to deal with a crisis created through the Community Party's efforts to distribute land, land frequently held by the Islamic group.

If that is the intellectual, the religious, the teacher, perhaps that is the closest you can get to the peasant intellectual.

B. Chandra. In India, the village was being drained of its surplus by the city. A situation emerged in the 60's and 70's when the village surplus was going neither outside the country nor to the city. Rather, the capitalist development of the country is hampered by the fact that the amount of surplus created in the village for industrial development is less in India than in China. But this is not, to appraise what is happening in India. Of course, social development is total and is impossible to have, as Mr. Bipan pointed out, a spiralling development unless some such process goes on.

But here is an example with the capitalist class itself, precisely in a situation where it depended upon the village political support that is controlled by the rich peasant. Now we come to the question of the peasant intellectual. By intellectual we mean the political leadership of the peasant. Most of the leadership of the peasant at a moment like this in India comes from the village. The state level leaders are from the village, the district level, the level on which people are all active, especially peasants who were cultivating land. In fact a large number of them in the legislature at the central level are functioning peasants, as the phrase goes.

This then brings us to the third point. The bourgeoisie finds that if it continues the politically competitive process, then the rich peasant who manages to control the peasantry refuses to part with any surpluses, instead he wants surplus from the city. And so one finds banking capital being shifted from the city to the village: investment in irrigation, in roads, in employment, everything goes from the city to the countryside. Obviously, there can be no development. There is only the perpetua-

tion of process of very low capital investment, and of underdevelopment. The rich peasant, on the other hand, finds that as the process of political competition is there, he is not the only one to take advantage of the situation. There is now an emergent organization of the rural poor, who also come into this stage of history quite often with the help of the urban-based intelligentsia, whether they are sometimes manipulated by the ruling party or sometimes by the opposition left wing groups. The rich peasant also dislikes this complicated political process because all the surplus that now stays in the village is being held by this handful, and then takes the opposite form: the price of agricultural products keep rising for twelve years, while the prices of industrial products go on being lowered. But it is not the peasant, the poor peasant, that is the beneficiary, it is rich peasant. The poorer peasant consequently tries to mobilize and under certain circumstances, even the urban bourgeoisies are capable of mobilizing the poor peasant because it finds itself at a certain point of alliance. So the question is clear: What do we mean by peasant intellectual? Here it is the rich peasant intellectual who is mobilizing, and the political force of the open competition system or otherwise to gain other advantages from whatever political development is taking place. There can be no question, and it is not enough to say as you have said that at least some section of the class of peasantry left. There is a very different process going on and it is not a question of the peasant intellectual, it is a competition between distinct political forces, urban bourgeoisie, urban proletariat, the rural bourgeoisie and the rural proletarian elements.

When the point where the rural poor are more effectively involved in the political organization process is reached national competition is stopped. National competition stops in two places. The bourgeoisie would like to stop it against the rich peasant. The rich peasant would like to stop it against the poor peasant.

EL COLEGIO DE MEXICO

915 9/1n611/1976pe/CE



*3 905 0335683 *

BIBLIOTECA

INVENTARIO 1915

DANIEL COSIO VILLEGAS

