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THE REVOLUTION OF OUR TIME

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THE REVOLUTION OF OUR TIME

Revolution is the name given to those traumatic episodes in human history when the structure of society are radically changed to permit a different distribution of the effective exercise of power, and the dominant mentality of a society is radically altered to include new aspirations and a new vision of human society. Revolution in itself is nothing new, though it often comes in different forms, seeking different goals. Revolution has generally meant a break-through against opposition in the continuing search of men and society for wider and more meaningful participation of more people in the goods and decision-making process of a society.

In our time, characterized as it apparently is by an apparent "speeding up" of the historical process, several emphases seem to be compressed in the current "time of troubles" that is by some of us hopefully called "The First World Revolution." All of these apparently separate movements are also known, increasingly, as "The Movement." By this is meant the anti-imperialist, anti-colonial, anti-neo-colonial, the civil rights movement, the student power, the university reform, the church renewal, the anti-paternalism, the anti-racist, the Black Power movements, and the movements of solidarity of the so-called "underdeveloped" or poor nations and peoples of the world. There perhaps is a great common denominator in the anger of Fanon, the sorrow of Mannoni, the nationalism of Tito, the prophetic and suffering love of Martin Luther King, Jr., the plaintiveness of the flower children, the new freedom of the Hippies, the determination and earnestness of the intellectuals of the "New Left," the Quixotic romanticism of Ché Guevara, the desire to be themselves of Fidel and Stokely, the courage of desperation of the anti-war and anti-draft demonstrators, the frustration of many American university students with their academic life, the small but growing revolt against computers and careerism of many white, middle-class American graduate students, professors and professionals, the bitterness of the Black Power movement, the earnestness of the young Roman Catholic priests and nuns and laymen who love their church though it sometime persecutes them, and the pastoral rage tempered by compassion of Father Helder Camara of Recife. All of these, and many more, are seeking, against one form or another of imposition, freedom, dignity, equality and their own identity.

Perhaps the beginning of this great World Revolution can be dated from the "Civil Libertarian" phase as manifested in the English, French and American Revolutions. These were revolutions made (particularity of each case noted) by the "Magistrates" against the absolute and personal power of the monarchs, and they produced those dreams that are now common to almost all of mankind (though no where fully realized, and in the majority of places still largely dreams) of freedom of speech, regular democratic processes of popular participation in the setting of the major goals and priorities of a society, freedom of religion, freedom of the press, a secular and limited state, etc. But as the revolutions established themselves and time wore on it became apparent that not only could the revolutionaries become corrupt but that it was itself nurtured on only a partial vision of the task of human emancipation. There were other forms of power and imposition, other forms of injustice and humiliation that were not touched by liberal, democratic political institutions and mores. The Civil Libertarian Revolutions became the victims of the victors: The Magistrates themselves became the new establishment, the new nobility, and created a society dominated by middle-class, commercial, industrial and capitalist interests and values. The new, industrial middle class began early to accommodate the rhetoric of the French, American and English revolutions to their own interests, and finally lost their drive to "share the blessings of liberty" with those less fortunate, and began to think of themselves not as magistrates-with-responsibility and servants of mankind, nor even as the more fortunate, but as the virtuous who had been regarded and who deserved what they had, even as those who were not free and prosperous obviously did not deserve these things until they had "earned" them.

The subsequent phases of the Great World Revolution can be seen as successive, widening circles of participation in society as subjects rather than objects of history. As the first phase emphasized the political, the second great phase turned to economic injustices and inequalities. The Socialist Revolution against entrenched economic power, as typified in the Mexican Revolution, the Russian Revolution, the two Chinese Revolutions, and the Cuban Revolution, is striving to overcome the inequalities of dignity and opportunities in life caused by the distribution of wealth on property on other bases than of need, the equal dignity of all men, and the welfare of the whole society. Like the libertarian revolution, it is nowhere complete, but has everywhere become part of the common expectations and dreams of the vast majority of men. Thus, the first phase of the great world revolution sought and still seeks "liberty," the second sought and still seeks "equality," and the third phase - not widely perceived as yet although already a tremendous force, seeks

liberal vision, middle-class democracy is no longer a vital, dynamic force, and anyway it is not enough. It is not enough because there is not enough real participation, not enough real tolerance or acceptance of diversity, creativity, spontaneity and ambiguity. Not enough stimulation of real individuality, not enough real community and love. Not enough individuality, not enough freedom, not enough compassion, not even enough real conflict to be creative. Middle-class democracy let its soul perish as it satiated itself at the table of plenty, and as it began to identify affluence with authenticity. Middle-class democracy, and the world-style of the affluent nations, means too much competition (as differentiated from conflict), too much "putting-down to stay-up," too much up-tightness, too satiated and thing-oriented, too un-loving and closed.

Strange to say, the great world movement of our time for revolution was precipitated by the same middle-class that now seeks to stifle it, because the dreams that were forged in the struggle against the absolute monarchs were couched in universal terms, and they have seeped out of the narrow bounds of the white, European and middle-class societies, and become the dream of great numbers of brown, black and yellow peoples, who are poor and non-European or North American. Perhaps the most radical statement in all history - at least for our time - is that "all men are created equal." This proposition, when held up against the great and obvious inequalities of wealth, opportunities, prestige, acceptance, power and education of the world of today - inequalities that are increasing rather than diminishing - is enough to make a sensitive humanist long for radical change, and to frustrate him and drive him to despair when he considers the lack of evident progress. Gone or going is the once-full confidence in "electoral politics," in appeals to the reason and humanity of the powerful, in appeals to morality and compassion, in mass-education of the poor as a means of their liberation when that education is in the hands of the powerful.

In our time the old, liberal structures of the west, including the Marxist structures (of thought, institutions and power), have tended to harden, and to justify themselves with pretentious myths that conceal the satisfied magistrates who profit from these social orders. The inherent paternalism of the middle-class and of the west, with its basic fear of real, popular, spontaneous democracy that can well up from the soul of a people, has deformed the true mission of the magistrate, which is to liberate and not to perpetuate domination. The paternalistic magistrates of the west distrusts individual and group spontaneity, distrusts the poor, distrusts the colored, distrusts the non-westerner, and seeks to make them all

"fraternity," or acceptance and love-in-human-community. As the first phase was largely political, the second mainly preoccupied with economic injustices, so the third phase is taking an anti-racist and/or racist form. As the tyranny of the absolute monarchs precipitated the first phase, the cruelties of capitalism the second, so the racism of the imperialist powers has precipitated the third phase.

Of course, liberty means equality, and equality means fraternity, and fraternity means liberty, and this all together means a human community of love and mutual respect, of "non-coercive concern, for all, by all." For such a society, with its full participation, full responsibility, and full realization for all, man gropes not knowing exactly what forms such a society-of-communities will take, but still knowing he was meant to be free, equal, and accepted.

The world today must needs make all three struggles at once - now that history has caught up (or better, men have seen a bit more of the pattern of history), and the interrelatedness of the three phases is clearly seen. The struggle for human community and liberation has, however, become significantly more difficult given the emergence of the "systems managers" of the great middle-class capitalist bureaucracies, and the great middle-class socialist bureaucracies, who prize predictability and stability above any mere dreams or human aspirations. And this dominant middle-class mentality - the mentality of the "organization man" - is not just the pattern of the United States domestically: It is the pattern of the world-society in which we live today. That is; the rich or "developed" nations are those who consider themselves the "magistrates" of the world system, advocating their own virtues before the world majority of proletariats. It is the rich nations who are convinced of their own right and competence to continue the tutelage of the "underdeveloped" or poor nations of the world.

As the first world revolution was made against the absolute monarchs by the emerging middle-class, so the present phase of this continuing world-revolution is the stirring of the world proletariat against the modern magistrates - the good, grey decent middle class of the world. Against the managers, the social engineers, the technocrats, the moralists and the bureaucrats. Against a style of life that stifles community and smothers creativity and spontaneity. Against ascriptive authority, against the imposition of mass-produced identities of people-made-passive to let the rulers continue to rule. Against the continued massification and homogenization of mankind by the mass-culture machine. Against the designation of men as only producers and consumers. And as uncomfortable as it may be for those who are still prisoners of the old,

over in the image of the satisfied white middle-class technocrat. In short, the west no longer believes in democracy because it no longer believes in people, and because its power has made it arrogant and insensitive and isolated it from the needs of the people over whom it has so much - too much - power and influence. Even as once the monarchs become insensitive, isolated and indifferent to the societies over which they ruled, and used ancient myths to defend privilege, so today the middle-class and affluent and powerful nations and classes of the world have done the same thing.

The insistence that "stability" is the prerequisite for "progress" (understood as imitating the west), that "order" is the beginning of "civilization," shows how easily the west has forgotten the conflicts and dreams that characterized its own period of dynamic creativity, and belie its professions of belief in the ability of common and poor people to participate meaningfully in the formation of their own destinies. Even the acid of cultural relativism (a comfortable ideology for middle-class social scientists) has failed to corrode the spiritual arrogance that characterized so much of both the Communist and non-Communist west. Small wonder that there builds slowly a gigantic reservoir of resentment in the proletariat of the world, who see in the insensitive middle-class nations their oppressors and condescending would-be tutors.

But even as at home in the vast university students (soon to be joined by high school students) and minority groups join the "Third World" in their rage against a system interested only in its self-aggrandizement and perpetuation, the techniques and power of skilful repression, "cooption," and social engineering increase at perhaps a more rapid rate. Thus seen, the World Revolution is not just a phase, but the continuing nature of the human condition. Its exact forms and issues are given to us by the historical moment, but the very nature of society and history is perhaps to demand a continuous struggle. "Life is struggle."

WHY LATIN AMERICA NEEDS A RADICAL, SOCIAL REVOLUTION

Radical social revolutions become the only possible avenue of the expansion of humanism when existing structures in a society are constructed to perpetuate the domination of a minority and there is little hope of erosion of this position. Even though the dominant classes of Latin Americans have professed for over a century the old, liberal ideals of the civil libertarian first phase of the Great World Revolution, progress towards the creation of an egalitarian

community of mutual confidence and common mission has been, to say the least, negligible. It is in part the failure of the elites to lead and to share. There is little "egalitarian thrust" that has been the chief drive in the moderately successful North American progressive and evolutionary process in the Latin American culture. But the egalitarian dreams are beginning to penetrate the hitherto docile and submissive masses, even though the techniques of manipulation and repression are also improving.

But the stagnation of Latin America is also in large part due to the nature of the economic, cultural, military and political tutelage imposed by the rich Western powers (in our time, the United States) on Latin America. Even if we could imagine a paternalism that could remain enlightened and devoted to the eventual liberation of the dependent, the United States has not been interested in even an evolutionary process that would liberate Latin America. The United States has also contributed massively to the inability of the Latin American republics to move towards a more just and egalitarian society. At any rate, the results are obvious: Between the elites and North American imperialism, the evolutionary approach in Latin America is barren of significant results.

Three hundred years of domination by elites who profess liberal doctrines, but who in practice do not even believe in "dribble-down" theories of economic and cultural development, and who are only capable of twin policies of repression and condescending paternalism, has left a massive sea of potential popular wrath. And though there are several dramatic centers of development in Latin America today, these centers are still surrounded by great and still silent masses who are not participating in the modernization process. It is no where more true in the world than in Latin America today that the rich are getting richer, and the poor are not only getting poorer, but becoming more numerous. It is difficult to affirm whether Latin America today is in the grips of a stagnant process propped up by the United States, or whether there is real social, economic, cultural and political regression in the area. The dominant classes of most of the Latin American republics are most closely allied with and identify with the developed nations than they do with their own fellow citizens who are poor.

It has been argued that in such a situation North American technocracy and capital - assuming that enough of both are forthcoming and Latin American nationalist pressures do not become too "obstructionist" - can effectively "develop" Latin America. But such a style of development - assuming its possibility - would not only be from the top down, but from the outside, and therefore not only doomed to perpetuate paternalism but to inflict alienation

on Latin American society. The best that could be hoped for would be for United States capital and skills to be made available to non-governmental and popular forces in Latin America to give them the capacities to make their own revolution, from the bottom up, and from inside. Development or modernization, "U.S. style," is only introducing a new class of managers, as has begun to emerge in the United States, which imposes on Latin America the technocratic managerial paternalism that is one of the enemies of an indigenous and liberating process of development. Assuming the best of intentions, there are still great limits on what one nation can do for another to help it develop - aside from get out of its way. The true meaning of development perhaps is the conquest of self-determination and the affirmation of one's own true identity - and these are things that people, and nations, must do for themselves.

Latin Americans share in common with mankind the great aspirations and dreams, and also the growing, gnawing realization that the technical skills and the resources are available to realize many of these dreams for all men - if society were but organized more rationally and justly. It is the rage of knowing that men can now "invent their own future" that couples with the rage of centuries of mass misery that produces the double rage of some contemporary Latin Americans. The long list of failures - from the Liberators to the 19th Century liberals, through the Good Neighbor period, the collapse of populism, the failure of the Alliance for Progress - further causes despair over patience as an answer and remedy.

Perhaps the Mexican Revolution better than any of the other revolutions of the twentieth century combined in its aspirations the longing for liberty, equality and fraternity. It was a struggle against tyranny, for social justice, and for a new sense of national community and purpose. Like all revolutions it shows today a tendency to worship its past victories more than to realize the great ennobling dreams of its heroes. But here at least we saw the power of a people with a dream. And in the Mexican revolution there were efforts - long since abandoned - to find meaningful participation in the political societies and structures of the nation for all the people. Like the United States, Mexican society is not pretty well "safely" in the hands of the managers. But the dreams remain.

But it is not just the power of the idea of a just society, but also the inadequacy and refusal to adapt itself of the traditional structures that makes revolution in Latin America a necessity. The gap between man's dreams and his potential to realize those dreams on the one hand, and the performance of the Latin American power elites on the other, demonstrates the isolation from reality of the traditional elites in Latin America. Indeed, the ineptness and

unwillingness to even give an inch has already led to their replacement by modernizing military elites, largely trained by the United States army, who are interested in managing their societies but not in justice, freedom and equality. The old system is breaking down, and being replaced by one of military technocrats.

In addition to the intransigence of the traditional power elites, the imposition of an exploitive system by the United States, the denial of popular aspirations by the new modernizing military technocrats, one must also add the inevitable "population explosion" and "rising expectations." Both of these are results of the first penetrations of the technology and dreams of the modern western nations, but both work against the continued dominance by the west.

A revolution in Latin America is not inevitable - as necessary as it may be. As an ancient Chinese proverb has it, "Nothing is so bad that it couldn't be worse." Latin American traditional elites, could be replaced by more competent, North American trained and dependent technocratic elites, who could manage misery so expertly that there was no release. Indeed, the trends are in this direction - aided and abetted by "U. S. Aid."

WHO ARE THE ENEMIES OF THE REVOLUTION IN LATIN AMERICA?

If a Revolution in Latin America is so necessary, and yet seemingly so far away and difficult, it must be because of the tremendous obstacles to its realization. Therefore it would be perhaps useful to describe in a little more detail the enemies of the revolution.

The people of Latin American are not held back from taking control of their own destinies by pure inertia, docility and lack of the necessary skills and education. Strong forces are allied in defense of the status quo, and as it is always well to know the strength of those opposed to the revolution, it is well to know who, and why.

First, there is the traditional oligarchy. Often melancholy over the increasing inroads of modernization, literacy, urbanization, and industrialization, they are nonetheless committed to defending as long as possible their vested interests, and utilize their strong hold on the ancient cultural symbols to continue the vassalage and immobility of millions of their fellow Latin Americans. They are prepared, like the useless kings of Balkan republics, to go into permanent but affluent exile when they can no longer hold the dike against inevitable change. They believe that they have been born

not only to rule, but they have been born superior to the great majority of the human race - especially of their own nation. At best, they believe that it takes some five or six generations to "civilize" a peasant - and by civilization they mean being like they are. Their favorite verb is to "orient", that is, to mould someone in a predetermined fashion to fit into the wisdom of the ages (middle ages, that is). They commonly believe that the peasants are "little better than savages," and that they are the essence and flower of western civilization. They look with secret (convenience dictates secrecy) horror upon popular democracy, with its exaltation of the wisdom and power of the common man, and consider democracy a form of government that cheapens culture. They believe idleness is the mother to true culture, but that the majority of men cannot use leisure correctly, and thus should have to work to insure idleness and culture for the few.

Second, there is the new oligarchy, new creations of the modernizing and industrializing dynamics. They are interested in change, but have shown a marked inability to involve their wealth and energy into any significant programs for social improvement and justice. They have such a limited confidence in the future of their own nations, and so little interest in promoting the concept of the common welfare, that they usually are not even interested in the development of a mass, internal market. They want stability in order to get richer, and believe they are the rightful heirs of the mantle of power of the traditional oligarchs which must soon drop. They are "nationalist" because they would like to hamstring competition by North American private enterprise, and not because they really believe in true national development. They crave and demand protection and support from their governments, but argue against any suggestion that they have public responsibilities in return. They are open advocates of an unchecked capitalism that has not existed for some decades in the United States - and they are unblessed by the guilty Puritan conscience that has provided some of the great monuments of "benevolence" in the way of libraries, universities, and foundations in the United States. They take their tax deductions in deposits in Swiss banks and the purchase of U.S. stocks, and the purchase of gold squirreled away somewhere against the rainy day of the revolution. They are not interested in humanist values for the whole society - their energies are devoted to their own pursuits.

Third, the emerging "modernizing military elites," the Ibero-American Nasserites. These military technocrats and bureaucrats are interested in social change, and in modernization and industrialization, and probably understand much better than the new oligarchy built by industrialism itself the dynamics and requirements of a modernizing national system. But they see development only as "systemic development," and are unaware or unconcerned with its

human significance, and very little interested in human development except as it affects the national system. The "military managers" offer little hope of meeting the needs of the revolution because their view of national development affords no room for innovation-from-below, for democratic feed-back, and for significant citizen participation in planning the national destiny. The military mentality is not likely to encourage significant dissent, or to really believe in a pluralist society, and is likely to prize national power as the ultimate goal rather than the liberation of men to be themselves, and likely to emphasize competition rather than work for the world community that is the necessary precondition of a truly just society.

Fourth, the Modernizers of the United States, in their assorted varieties. There are U.S. Aid officials, military technocrats ("advisors"), businessmen, bankers, missionaries, social scientists, educators, etc. Interestingly enough, they all share some of the same defects: They all usually fail to see the development process as a whole, they all usually fail to understand their own built-in cultural values and biases, and they all are likely to feel (consciously or unconsciously - it doesn't make any difference) at least a little bit superior, if for no other reason than that they are "helping." Furthermore, as a result of the spontaneous way in which American political processes grew, they all fail to understand how to stimulate meaningful participation in the political, social and economic life of the society. Strange that North Americans in Latin America demonstrate so clearly the deterioration of the democratic idea of confidence in the common man as a political actor, even while this same idea is so much still a part of the North American political mythology. But this, too, is a result of the rise of the social managers and technocrats. Coupled with the traditional and deep messianism of the American people, this set of techniques of social, political and economic manipulation have created a new kind of manager. But there he is, the North American in Latin America working to achieve "stability" because he is afraid of the dynamics engendered by dispossessed and repressed groups trying to organize themselves, and join the nation. Therefore, though often genuinely interested in modernization, and sometimes even motivated by a desire to help-from-above, still the dominant strains of cultural imperialism and messianic national mission to civilize and modernize remain constant. And then, too, the later evolution of American society has tended to make irrelevant the traditional articulations of the humanist dream of freedom and justice for all, and Americans have not continued to develop their humanist sensitivity and aspirations as fast as they have developed their technology and manipulative skills.

Fifthly, the "vanguard elites" of those "revolutionary" political groups who believe that in the name of the people they should seize power from the traditional and/or dominant groups in order to guide the people in the "correct" path of national liberation and development. These elements, many believing themselves to be truly revolutionary or, indeed, the "only" revolutionaries, must be judged counter-revolutionaries even though they are against the system. Counter-revolutionary because they only want to substitute the rule of a new elite or class for the rule of the old elite and the old class. Counter-revolutionary because they, too, are paternalistic, arrogant, and do not really believe that the people are capable of taking control of their own destiny. "Democratic centralism" and "guided democracy" are counter-productive ways of bringing about the liberation of the individual from social and political pressures, because they build in new ones, implemented by the latest techniques of pressure and manipulation. Rather than liberation, they promise liberation, and deliver a new messianic slavery. Vanguard elitism works against true communities by building small communities of "true believers" who cannot embrace the dissenter, and who are threatened by pluralism in their own numbers, and in society around them. Vanguard elitism is revolutionary, ideological triumphalism, as bad as the old religious and political triumphalism it seeks to replace. It has to be admitted that our imagination has lagged behind our needs, and the demands of rapidly changing and industrializing societies are especially difficult. It is true that we do not have too many clear ideas as to what type of democratic institutions would be adequate to insure significant citizen participation in the making of the political, social, economic and cultural decisions that directly affect him. But there is little hope of even the experimentation necessary to develop such new modes of political association and participation as long as the magistrates continue their domination, buttressed in their own minds by a newer but not much subtler version of the "white man's burden," which is the paternalism of the bureaucrat-technocrat. And, unfortunately, recent history has shown how difficult it is for a vanguard elite not to become like the traditional elite that it replaces. How much more difficult - and rewarding for freedom - it is to have a servant elite than a vanguard elite.

Sixth, the guerilla warriors and their apologists must also be seen as impediments to the process of national liberation, because they vainly imagine that they can conquer violence by violence, and then rule without violence. They imagine that the answer to arrogant paternalism is organized mass hatred. They vainly imagine that they will purge themselves of their lust for power and violence by purging those who lust for power and violence, and have them.

They vainly imagine that an elite can for long stay disinterested and in touch with the majority of the people, and at the same time enjoy a majority of power over the people. Power not only corrupts, it isolates, and de-sensitizes. They vainly imagine that guerilla warfare is a catharsis, and see it as the portal to purity of motive, vainly forgetting the lessons of all of history. They are inverse copies of the military modernizing, technocrat, or the U. S. aid technocrat, differing only in that they do not have power. If warfare could liberate men from slavery to other men, from hate and fear, from insecurity and tribalisms, it would be worth the effort. History to date shows that violence only produces the seeds of more violence, hate of more hate, and that the great promises necessary to move men to great violence are like heroin, not only capable of creating sustained illusions, but are habit-forming. The death of Ché Guevara is an extended parable that serves only to make the bitter, more bitter, and to drive some few desperate ones into more desperation. But it is also a typical incident whose meaning is not only mythological. It shows us that the United States has succeeded in dominating the Latin American military establishments, and in turning them into domestic peace forces - against "subversion." The anti-subversion techniques that began to be developed soon after the Nixon riots have become increasingly more widely-disseminated and understood (through U. S. training programs), but increasingly more sophisticated and effective. Perhaps the folk wisdom of the peasant is here more trustworthy than the despair-fed romanticism of the intellectual revolutionary, who forgets to note and count where the guns are. Suppressed peasants have learned in the hard school of centuries of hopelessness that adventurism is hard on the defeated, and that hope and dreams alone do not a revolution make. Since there is today no real chance for the supplying or training of any significant guerilla band in Latin America, calls for such are counsels of despair of those who imagine that radical thought can substitute hard thinking and imagination when confronted with apparently insurmountable problems. Because the call to violence can only serve to perpetuate a society (whatever new form the victors - whoever they may be - impose, based on hate and violence, and because the objective conditions in Latin America do not exist today, calls for guerilla warfare are today counter-revolutionary, and anti-human.

All of these enemies of the revolution have one thing in common - and this is what makes them enemies of the revolution: They all want to rule society from the top, either in their own interest, or in the interest of their ideals, or of "the people." All have an exaggerated estimate of their own virtue and disinterestedness, all presume too quickly to know what other people want and what is good for other people. All are incurably paternalistic and arrogant. All secretly

disdain the capacity of the peasants and workers to be responsible for anything. All have difficulty in understanding and listening to the peasant, the poor urban worker, the slum dweller. They are all enemies of the true revolution because they all rely on violence to dominate, all rely on purely structural changes and manipulation of others, and because they all are potential "new classes", either occupying the positions of power or impatiently waiting in the wings to seize these positions. All of them are corrupted by the almost inherent paternalism, arrogance and triumphalism of the West. All of them are more interested in the form of society than they are in the building of community. To hold power by violence, to rule by violence, or to take power by violence, is to be by violence corrupted - made insensitive, to be isolated, and finally indifferent.

They are the true radicals in Latin America - and in any society - who desire to destroy the old chains of bondage, but who do not aspire to forge new ones for the people. They are the new breed of revolutionaries who envision and seek to realize in their own lives and relations with other people a style of life that is radically egalitarian, and that seeks to replace coercion with bonds of love and mutual respect. They are the true radicals who deem community more important than politics and government, and who are determined that the state should serve men and not men the state. Who are determined that freedom from anxiety and the possibilities to be a part of an "affinity-community" without taking from others, or putting others down, is the function of politics. They are the true radicals who have discovered behind the ancient symbols a new and an old and a timeless truth - that men were meant to be free, and that men can live by faith, and love and hope. They are the New Breed of Revolutionaries who have already become free men in the midst of all the social, cultural, economic and political structures of our time, men who are free in the midst of the national systems of bondage, imperialism and colonialism. Men who are free, yet who long for that day when all men will be free at last.