Latin American Bureaucracy or the Ugly Looking-Glass of Organization Theory

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I. Introduction

The gradual americanization of sociological theory that has taken place since the early twenties has resulted in an increasing difficulty in generalizing its terms to other societies, especially the developing nations, with the result that evidence contrary to established models originated outside of the United States has been either ignored, or isolated in *ad hoc* models which purport to account for divergences from central theories without questioning these.

In this paper, we shall single out organizational theory as an example of this kind of theoretical double-talk and try to show that given certain premises, organizational behavior can be explained in similar terms in developed as well as developing societies. We shall therefore argue that there are basically no differences between industrialized and partially industrialized societies in terms of the social mechanisms that explain the behavior of people in organizations, [1] although there may be some in the overall outcomes of such mechanisms, due to the distinct historically evolved structural conditions that prevail in their environments. What we are therefore seeking to establish is a common theoretical core explaining human behavior in organizations which will make differences between developed and underdeveloped societies appear as theoretically predictable, instead of marginal qualifications of little

theoretical import.

As things presently stand, the interested reader can choose between two kinds of approaches when seeking to understand the way in which bureaucracies function in the developing countries. Either he can turn to theories in the weberian tradition that emphasize the rational character of bureaucracies, or he can turn to the now abundant literature on development administration which owes its origin to the vogue of developmental ideas in the sixties.

In the first alternative, bureaucracies in the developing countries (BDC's for short) appear as bad carbon copies of their more fortunate sisters, based on the fact that trait-by-trait static comparisons with Western bureaucracies yield appreciable differences. Such comparisons naturally lead to the idea that BDC's are "catching up" with the more technologically advanced Western world, i.e., reflect the "transitional" status of the societies in which they are immersed.

The second alternative consists in assuming that there are qualitative differences between Western and non-Western bureaucracies. Unfortunately, this alternative approach has not converged on any central theoretical idea. Rather, as is too often the case in the social sciences, it has offered a heterogeneous collection of partial theories, that all purport to account for what is thought to be a misfit between

organizational behavior as it supposedly happens in Europe or the United States, and the discrepant behavior or BDC's.

In the pages that follow, we shall alternatively criticize these approaches, addressing ourselves to larger theoretical and methodological issues which we believe are responsible for our lack of understanding of organizations in general. This will allow us to set the terms in which we believe there can be an alternative view capable of accounting for organizational behavior under all latitudes. In that way, we hope to show that the division in American sociology between developmental and "developed" sociology is a misleading one in the particular case of organization theory, and that emphasis upon problems of developing countries may shed considerable light upon unresolved issues in the so-called developed nations.

The theoretical framework proposed has been suggested mainly by the Mexican experience, but is generalizable to other societies. México is one of the largest and most industrialized countries of the Third World. It has a long tradition of political independence from colonial rule and underwent a social revolution only sixty years ago. As such, it provides a useful midpoint between industrialized nations of the West and younger countries of the Third World.

II. Theoretical critique of models of organizational behavior

Sociology has always dealt with some uneasiness with problems of reification on the one hand, and reductionism on the other. In the case of organizational theory, however, it has frankly opted for reification, to the extent that human behavior has been reduced to a simple extrapolation from organizational mechanisms, relegating individual manifestations to the status of marginal constraints. As a consequence, what is assumed to be human behavior varies with changes in theoretical models of organizational structure. We shall present four basic competing paradigms most commonly embodied in contemporary organizational literature and analyze them in terms of what we know about behavior outside of the organizational context.

1. Theories of global rationality: man as the oversocialized robot

This paradigm takes the organization as the smallest unit of analysis and defines it as a set of interdependent structural components orchestrated by mechanisms of coordination, communication and control. When it comes to broadening this model to take into account external forces impinging upon the organization, actors are just as absent from the model, except for the provision of boundary-spanning roles in which it is conceded that particular positions in the organization bestow

special opportunities upon given actors in order to determine the way in which the external world is interpreted and acted upon. Usually, however, the environment is either seen as affecting the organization as a monolithic whole, or specialized external agents are seen as affecting the corresponding specialized organizational structural parts.

In this paradigm, whatever actions are undertaken by organizational participants are assumed to embody its collective purpose. Organizations are therefore supposed to present coherent sets of goals and subgoals to which participants are supposed to adher voluntarily. Deviance is either insignificant or randomly distributed, so that it only affects the relative efficiency of the system. Yet, it is not quite clear why participants should make theirs the intersts of an organization. In the overwhelming majority of cases, the only answer to this question is that they do what they are told because they get paid for it, which should prompt the further question of what would be the opportunity cost of performing one's role according to established rules as against the potential additional economic benefits of bending them. 2/ But in this paradigm, this kind or problem is not usually brought up, as it is defined out of existence by the assumption of coherence between individual and organizational goals and values. Besides, it is always possible to invoke "work values" in American society which will prevent this sort of individual calculus from taking place, as well as the

availability of at least some intrinsic rewards for performing one's role according to an approved script.

The functionalist "natural system" variant of this paradigm gives a different sort of explanation for rational behavior but the end result is almost the same. Internal mechanisms are "natural" and "unconscious", but everything happens as though there were an unconscious rationality acting for the whole organization and geared on preserving its existence (as opposed to creating efficiency and profits as in the rational management outlook).

Of course, there are problems that prevent such mechanisms from functioning smoothly: instrument for reaching goals are "resistant", goals get "displaced" and information is never perfect. In addition there are cognitive limitations to the knowledge necessary to make rational decisions, and besides, people have emotional needs that have to be fulfilled via informal groups that can undermine rationality up to a point. Nevertheless, these kind of objections never become meaningfully incorporated into the theoretical framework; they are only seen as limiting factors, not as determinant ones.

2. Theories of group and quasi-group rationality: gregarious man

With the discovery that organizational goals are not all compatible and cannot all be maximized simultaneously, either because they are mutually contradictory, or because resources are limited, internal organizational processes take on a different appearance. With limited resources comes the idea of competition for power and influence in order to secure them, and the relative dominance of given groups that stand to gain qua groups by championing one set of goals rather than another. Nevertheless, much of the work in this vein still assumes relatively strong normative integration on the part of members of competing groups. Instead of assimilating some vague general organizational identity as in the preceding paradigm, they are seen as internalizing the limited proximate goals that are directly related to their role and competing with the group with which they interact directly (i.e., sales vs. production, teachers vs. administration, etc...) Man is therefore not out for himself and the approval of the larger system, but out for his department and the approval of his immediate colleagues, which indirectly will give him a bigger share of the material and non-material rewards which the organization distributes unequally. Likewise, whatever external resource may be available in order to improve the position of one's group in the organization will be used as such, rather than for personal gains.

This paradigm is therefore essentially similar to the preceding one, except for the fact that it adopts a smaller unit of analysis and does not assume a super-rationality at the organizational level akin to the invisible hand of the free market.

3. Theories of individual calculus: hobbsian man

The following analytical step down consists in viewing organizations as made up of sets of shifting coalitions overlapping internal divisions and external boundary lines that compete for organizational pay-offs. This is the only view that does not make any assumption about the nature of the linkages between individuals and organizations, or the nature of the interests that underlie coalitions. Needless to say, it does not occupy a very respectable status in sociology, as it tends to give an atomized view of man uncontrolled by shared belief systems and mechanisms of compliance. It is usually found in somewhat sarcastic and facetious works on bureaucracy that do not occupy an accepted scientific position, and as such, are not regarded as serious objections to arguments pertaining to the two preceding paradigms. Thus, instead of dealing with the problems of the relationship between structure and individual role, which the two preceding paradigms define as identical, this alternative paradigm symply defines structure as non-existent. Not only does this not resolve the issue, but it also creates

a new set of problems that are probably more untenable than those identified in the more respectable paradigms. As we shall be arguing later, the solution is not to either reify or ignore structure, but to assess how much constraint it does impose on participants, and therefore how much individual "improvisation" the latter can get away with.

4. Theories of non-rationality

We are grouping two types under this heading: the human relations package and the refuse --alias garbage can-- model. In the first perspective, humans are seen as bundles of emotional needs that should be fulfilled if they are to have any degree of allegiance with the organization: they need to feel that they are participating, that their efforts are recognized. In brief, they need to receive personal satisfactions. Without going into the various sequels of this general model that are sufficiently well known, we may just point out that it raises some of the same problems identified in the preceding hobbsian paradigm, only somewhat less obviously. What the school of human relations has done is reduce the social system of the organization to a set of autonomous primary groups for which informal interaction takes precedence over task fulfillment. Once more, the impact of the formal structure has been relegated instead of explained.

In the garbage can model, one of the latest arrival in the firmament of organization theory, formal structure is relegated to an equally unimportant status: issues are ambiguous, selfinterest undetermined, and decisions are less the outcome of competition than pretexts for other processes, such as the allocation of status among participants or the reassertion of loyalties. The image of man implicit here is that of limited committment to either organizational, group or personal goals. Situations around him are not clear, his attention span is limited, and so, he just muddles through. Occasionally, he comes across decisions that have important consequences, "en passant", so to speak.

Discussion: Of the four paradigms just presented, the first two are clearly the dominant ones in the short history of organization theory, in that they have weighed heaviest (and still do) in published studies to date. These dominant paradigms project an image or organizational man that is both overly segmented and overly regimented, one leading to the other. In effect, by working on the premise that organizational and non-organizational roles are clearly separated, these models ensure that the outside world does not intrude upon organizational mechanisms, except via broad mechanisms (market, technical knowledge, political constituencies, etc...) that impinge upon the whole organization into which individual and supposedly absorbed. Thus, the only

officially recognized stage for fulfilling man's various socially induced needs and aspirations is the organization which, by implication, must command his loyalty. As a result, organizations tend to be reified as the structural requirements necessary to make the system work, (hence the bad carbon copy theory regarding BDC's) .

The dehumanization of behavior that ensues is barely tenable in the context of developed countries (and indeed, it is being questioned seriously), but looses all credibility when it comes to developing societies, so great are the discrepancies between predicted (as per rules) and actual behavior.

Up until now, none of the other paradigms have provided viable alternatives by themselves, so that they have been used merely as patching up devices for the dominant ones. The garbage can model, for example, does attempt to offer a radical alternative, but simply does not explain how we could ever send a man to the moon. The hobbsian paradigm, on the other hand, has the advantage of aiming at a theory of human behavior which has consequences for organizations (instead of the other way around), but smacks of reductionism. As for human relations, it can do no more than explain why dominant paradigms cannot work perfectly.

The problem, however, is not to decide which image of man is the correct one, but precisely, to get away from oversimplifying assumptions. We must stop assuming the nature of the linkage between individual actors and organizational mechanisms and start considering it as a problematic issue in and of itself. In doing so, it may turn out that any one paradigm may be correct in some limiting cases, because it may turn out that much of what has been described as the modal way in which people behave in organizations is in fact a response to a specific constellation of social conditions that are highly unstable both in time and across national boundaries. Therefore, we cannot understand current discrepancies among types of organizations, or apparent changes in American society as well as in other societies unless we start exploring that link.

In the process, we may blow up the myth that there is such a thing as organizational behavior that works from the kinkiest conglomeration of millenists, all the way to NASA, Dupont, or the Soviet Army Choir. We may also have to give up on unilateral views of man as goal maximizing, as a repressed bundle of emotions, or as a lackadaisical garbage collector, and focus instead on what kinds of behaviors have the greatest probability of outweighing the others and in what context.

In the alternative view that we wish to present, people are considered the major driving forces that determines internal organizational mechanisms and constitute the pivot for the interaction between environment and organization. In other words, the social system is brought into the organization by individual actors themselves: they judge situations not according to narrow organizational rules of the game, but with a broader outlook that makes them interpret their relation to the organization in terms of the expected (not necessarily normatively) patterned behavior dominating in the surrounding society. This implies that far from making a neat separation between organizational and non-organizational roles, they use whole batteries of roles with different probabilities of success and rewards, according to the larger institutional context in which the organization finds itself.

III. Methodological critique of organizational literature

Apart from the issue of the lack of cross-national research that is still generalized in the social sciences, the field of organizations suffers from an overly narrow conception of theory building which it shares with most other areas of sociology. We shall call it abstracted empiricism in order to cosntrast it with an alternative form, namely analytical abstraction.

Very succintly, the general theory-building strategy adopted in abstracted empiricism is to create an abstract concept by generalizing some concrete empirical situation to all similar concrete situations, usually by adding an "ism" or an "ation" to the word designating the single case. Thus, the sum of authoritarian persons becomes authoritarianism, (or the sum of authoritarian traits in one person) or the sum of formalized operations becomes formalization. The next step consists in relating such constructed terms to similarly created abstractions by postulating a causal relation, either without specifying the dynamic precesses responsible for such a linkage, or formulating them in vague terms (the so-called theoretical rationale) that are never submitted to any test. For example, the number of people working in a firm may be given the pseudo-theoretical name of "size", and the number of supervisory levels that of "vertical differentiation", in addition to some intuitive explanation as to why the first should determine the second.

Examples of this kind of approach can be found most typically in the work of Zetterberg and his followers who assume that all that sociologists ever need to look for is of the form "the more A, the more C; the more B, the more C; hence the more A, the more B," which consists in borrowing indiscriminately from formal logic a form of reasoning whose intrinsic rules they cannot possibly hope to satisfy.

An example of the lack of theoretical validation of linkages, on the other hand, can be found in the time-honored relationship between size and structural differentiation which is supposedly "explained" by processes of structural strains generated by growth in the form of a worsening of communications and coordination. Yet, all that is ever produced as evidence of that linkage is a correlation between the number of people working and the number of internal divisions.. Nevertheless, it is easy to imagine a number of alternative "explanations" of the same kind that are equally plausible: for example causation goes in the opposite direction, so that differentiated structures create more need for administrative overhead, hence pressures toward growth, or as Stinchcome (1964) or Meyer (1977) suggest, internal arrangements in organizations have more to do with the adoption of institutionalized patterns in the environment (and, maybe, large firms can afford them more easily) than structural imperatives.

The way that the environment of organizations has been dealt with also provides a good example of this kind of approach. Mostly, it is described as affecting the organization on an ad hoc basis: the researcher has a bag full of fuzzy environmental factors ready at hand (such as population growth, percentage of white collar workers, urbanization, etc...) and takes out any number of them as he sees fit. There is no global view from which to infer connections, so that environ-

mental factors are handy things to fill the gaps left by endogenous factors and increase the amount of variance explained. Conceptually speaking, then, the environment is an amourphous mess that encompasses everything and nothing, and for that very reason has been a favourite ground for explanatory fishing expeditions of aspiring sociologists - since the midsixties. The environment has not been integrated into organization theory, it has merely been juxtaposed, using the very same tools of abstracted empiricism used to account for internal mechanisms. Perhaps this juxtaposition stems from the fear that not all may be fair with organization theory? Also, expanding along the same line gives us the comforting illusion that we are creating cumulative theory.

In the particular case of BDC's, environment has been invoked as the all powerful factor to explain their "imperfect" (as compared to their US counterparts) functioning, whereas environment is merely seen as a modifier in industrialized countries. Is there some difference in the degree of permeability of organizations between countries? and why? Studying both kinds of organizations separately and with different frameworks does not help to answer that question, or even figure out if it is an interesting question.

In addition, abstracted empiricism, whether applied to internal or external factors, is a black box approach that has important consequences

when it comes to comparing BDC's to American organizations, for example. If an equation that works for N organizations in the USA does not provide a good fit for M organizations in Argentina or Peru, it must be concluded that organizations in Peru or Argentina do not function in the same way. This kind of reasoning is equivalent to the following scientific nonsense: assuming that we won't make any attempt to isolate under direct observation processes of genetic transmission, if mothers in region A are found to give birth to children with physiological characteristics (such as eye or skin color) that are different from those procreated by mothers in region B, therefore we conclude that genetic processes for A and B mothers are different. If in addition, we think A children have more desirable characteristics, we can even suggest that B children are imperfect replicas of A children.

Beyond the issue of falsifying comparisons between bureaucracies in developing and so-called developed societies, the practice of abstracted empiricism can be both misleading and unfruitful, because it is based upon the epistemological fallacy that theory can only be built inductively. Otherwise known as operationism, this approach conforms to "the demand that the corcepts or terms used in the description of experience be framed in terms of operations which can be unequivocally performed" (Hempel 1952; p. 41). The underlying reasoning is that the most promising way towards establishing explanatory arguments in the social

sciences "is to create a large supply of operationally defined terms of high determinacy and uniformity of use" (Hempel, 1951, p.47). Obviously, this sort of conception delegates the actual construction of a larger theoretical paradigm to a later stage where inductively collected concepts would be given some meaning by combining them in a logical manner. Therefore this method of constructing theory is based on the idea that social reality is ready to be captured by some vague process of defining it empirically. Such a premise is epistemologically suspicious, because it assumes that theory building is a simple taxonomical exercise that goes from the more concrete to the more abstract by some smooth process of ever wider encompassing categories of empirical entities.

An alternative view of theory is one that posits a reconstruction of reality as a basic task for theory construction. In that framework, theory constitutes the product of an ongoing dialogue between objects of the empirical world and the cognitive subject (the investigator). Their interaction allows to build the theoretical foundations that not only help to designate relevant concepts and acceptable criteria, but also determines the necessary steps to operationalize them. In this sense theory not only encompasses datum and concept by specifying their linkages, but also creates their very existence. In contrast to abstracted empiricism, this conception of theory does not attempt to capture whole portions of social reality, but to abstract some analytical elements from

the latter. Therefore, the basic task of building theory consists in detaching specific analytical aspects common to a large number of widely differing empirical situations. In that sense, education or marital status for Durkheim are not empirical indicators of social integration (in the sense of designating similar empirical situations), but two clearly distinct empirical situations analogous only with respect to one analytical aspect of them —the strength of social ties relating the individual to society (be they family or tradition).

It is precisely this conception of theory building that inhibits the unrelated, voluminous and, above all, undirected accumulation of empirical phenomena without giving it some meaning. Instead of just designating the sum of formalized operations in organizations as "formalization", or the proportion of non-productive employees as "administrative intensity", one must first establish the general theoretical context in which these notions will be used, which includes, on the one hand, defining them nominally, and on the other, linking them to a more generally formulated theory. Short of that, it should come to no one's surprise that pseudo-theoretical concepts do not travel too well, wether from one society to another, or even within the same area of concern. Inferred from empirical indicators, they demonstrate in fact narrow qualities of definition, although they were meant to express general characteristics. Hence, what abstracted empiricism actually does is

present grand names for empirical phenomena that can neither be translated into distinct analytical levels of inquiry, nor used to explain them.

IV. Critique of development administration literature

Development administration literature seems to suffer from precisely the opposite limitations to those found in organizational literature. It tells us a great deal about the historical, political and cultural surroundings of BDC's, but little about how these get translated into structural arrangements and behavior in organizations. We will argue in the dicussion that follows that mere differences in culture or values are insufficient to explain behavior. What needs to be unravelled are the major social mechanisms whereby structural factors impinge upon the ways in which people act in different frameworks of social action (in this case organizations). Values from our point of view, must therefore be treated as consequences rather than determinants of such major mechanisms. Although development literature encompasses similar interests, it has not in our opinion provided for a clear junction between organization and environment in BDC's.

The number of approaches that may be distinguished in development literature are identified less by their distinct conceptual frameworks

than by their particular interests in concrete phenomena. Accordingly, we find studies of administrative ecology, materials that utilize political regime variables for distinguishing among national administrative systems, historical accounts of bureaucratic responses to processes of modernization, studies that apply cultural explanations to bureaucratic behavior and, finally, research that deals with problems of altering bureaucratic performance in the context of rapid political, social and cultural change. What all those approaches have in common is a general concern over the political, economic social and cultural impact of the environment upon the functioning of bureaucratic organizations. While such conceptions represent a major step towards undermining the time- and spaceless sociology of organizations their lack of a coherent conceptual framework reduces them to mere ideographic representations.

In its practical applications, the study of administrative ecology follows the structural-functional perspective, with all its implications. Thus, it is essentially a conservative approach in which - "disruptive" efforts towards modernization by the developing countries are frequently viewed as negative or pathological. Although this approach can help to elucidate the complexity of interdependence between structures and functions acting upon administrative systems within a national context, it cannot provide any precise causalities, simply because of the sheer vastness of inquiry. On the other hand, by its very

nature, this approach yields a useful ordering of complex social realities, though it cannot go beyond some descriptive classificatory schemes.

Studies that utilize political regime variables to distinguish among national bureaucratic systems may be considered special cases of the preceding approach. They postulate that political systems are primary determinants of bureaucratic norms, structures and behavior. Accordingly, the political instability of developing countries is seen as leading to bureaucratic performances that are equally unsteady. In this sense, this approach conveys essentially the same results as the foregoing. Nevertheless, its concentration upon a few variables considered as crucial makes for clearer causal relationships. Furthermore, it is useful for comparative purposes, in the sense that it singles out factors accounting for regime differentials and their consequent bureaucratic behavior patterns.

Historical accounts of bureaucratic experiences of "modernization" constitute essentially a body of works that attempt to develop inductively relevant criteria and concepts through reconstructing the emergence of national bureaucracies. Making eclectic and somewhat indiscriminate use of concepts from other disciplines, -these works describe developments and institutional changes, and interpret environmental influences by borrowing concepts from political science. sociology, economics, etc. They constitute a rich source of information for later attempts towards more

theoretical conceptualizations. [3]

The studies that utilize culture concepts for identifying national administrative systems rely upon psychological factors, such as values and attitudes held by individual administrators, in order to explain bureaucratic behavior and its structural equivalents. From its basic conception, this perspective does not aim at a comprehensive evaluation of bureaucracies, but rather attempts to assess cultural phenomena in terms of such tangibles as the authority concept of administrators and its possible relationship to the political value system or problems of decision-making and their implications for structural bureaucratic arrangements. Basically, it is a behavioral approach stressing methodological issues and quantitative data collection techniques.

A last approach that may be mentioned really constitutes a continuation of the preceding one in that it deals with problems of altering bureaucratic performance in developing nations. This type of concern addresses the more practical problem of inducing administrative change in order to increase efficiency and compliance according to norms of western bureaucracies. Essentially, it focuses on problems encountered by the practicioner-expert confronted with the task of implementing administrative reform measures or supervising development projects. Although it does raise questions about the relationship between political systems and corresponding administrative patterns of behavior, it nevertheless

confines itself to practical applications such as planning, programing or staffing.

To sum up this brief review, this whole area may be characterized as lacking a coherent framework or anything resembling what might be called a common theoretical foundation. It is an area defined by the interest in certain subject matters and based upon the artificial distinction between developing and developed countries. The mother discipline of these approaches is undoubtedly political science, with other areas playing minor parts. Furthermore, this literature is almost exclusively descriptive, interspersed with occasional fumbling attempts to get at explanations of general import. Nevertheless, this area of inquiry cannot be ignored; it has produced very rich empirical materials and constitutes, besides, the only attempt to overcome the ethnocentric limitations of organizational literature by including wider social parameters.

V. Common core theory for organizational behavior

Our objections to currently established models of organizational behavior can be summarized by the simple statement that they ignore people. The obvious solution, therefore, is to "bring men back in", to follow an old recommendation, for "an organization is, after all, a collection of people, and what the organization does is done by people" (Simon, 1957). Nevertheless, we are not proposing to come back full circle to a reductionist view of organizations since, as we pointed out, it raises more problems than it solves.

The major advantage of "bringing men back in" as we see it, is to clarify the relationship between environment and organization, thereby making the latter an authentic product of society, instead of a more or less standardized formula for the production of goods and services.

There have been several indications in past works that individual behavior is not solely determined by organizational roles. In particular, works by Selznick, Gouldner and Crozier have pointed out the importance of broader socializing forces from the environment. What is still needed is the specification of social mechanisms that link such forces to individual behavior, and in turn to organizational outcomes. This

theoretical gap has forced those who did want to take external socializing forces into account to resort to the usual cop-out of "cultural" explanations, in which men become passive receptacles of legitimate societal values which they somehow transmit to organizational mechanisms by unspecified processes of permeation. The potential of such "explanations" for BDC's is obvious, and has been fully exploited: it has led to the argument that social values in developing countries are somehow dysfunctional for bureaucracies, which explains why they "don't work" so well as their US counterparts.

A. <u>The tools of career -advancement: performances vs.roles</u>

We would like to propose, as a first approximation to a better understanding of these problems, a conceptualization of individual activities in organizations as sets of resource getting behavior. The role paradigm would seem appropiate to describe such sets, if it were'nt for the fact that roles have traditionally been used in social theory to relate action to prescribed tasks with little or no mediation from the individual. In the present context, we need a concept that is not restricted to normatively prescribed behavior, or to the functional notion of behavior required for obtaining some socially or systemically appropiate output. Thus, in some institutional context, a physician is likely to make his patients wait several hours before seing them, or a policeman to seek bribes, even though neither behavior is prescribed or functionally

required for these occupations (or deviant, for that matter, since that kind of behavior is generalized).

In addition, people in organizations, as elsewhere, perform on different levels, so that one may be a simple pretext for the other. In other words, performing a given action, such as preparing a report, or requesting information, may in fact be a covert attempt at changing or solidifying a given distribution of power and influence, rather than a simple task-fullfillment in conformity with the charter of an organization. Goffman's notion of performances (Goffman, 1959) would therefore fit this conceptual framework better than that of role, as it includes behavior "given-off", as well as overt behavior, and does not have a normative straight jacket. While seeking a bribe, for example, a petty official may assume the outward appearance of performing his legitimate "role" by making a long speech on the importance of law-abiding, yet giving off the behavior that will correctly be interpreted as requesting a bribe. Likewise, a politician on a campaign tour will extoll the virtues of democracy while in fact seeking votes. In each case, the audience knows how to distinguish assumed from given off behavior and respond appropriately. Overt behavior, in extreme cases, will have little more than symbolic value designed to make the actor's claims more legitimate.

Contrary to the notion of role in its most classical sense, that of performance does not reduce individuals to mere carriers of internalized rules. They alone can travel from one kind of performance to another and apply strategically any number of them to a given situation, in order to control --not just the definition of the situation, as Goffman assumed -but ultimately, valued resources in the form of wealth, prestige and power. Furthermore, far from being restricted to short-lived face-to-face interaction within the confines of any one organization, performances fill up an actor's whole life-space, i.e. the totality of his group affiliations. For any given actor, therefore the special importance any organization may have as a stage for performances (rather than the family den or a football field) simply lies in the latter's potential as a source of wealth, prestige or power, or simply, self-sustenance and minimum recognition.

The notion of whole life-spaces as the universe of an individual's career, as opposed to restricted organizational tasks, implies that if any resources external to the organization that employs him may be used to improve his internal bargaining position , it will be. Such resources may come in the form of scarce or privileged information, knowledge about skills or external conditions vital to the organization (family or other personal ties) with centers of power or information potentially detrimental to the organization (or some of its members) if divulged.

All of these may win the individual entry as well as promotion and power within the organization, quite independently of how he willperform his tasks.

Those who disagree with this opportunistic view of behavior in organizations may argue that the vast majority of organizational participants in industrialized societies in fact do not use outside influences in order to gain access to organizations, or be promoted in them. This, however, is hardly a convincing argument. Rather that attribute such virtuous behavior to so-called universalistic values or the protestant ethic, it makes more sense to conclude that many people don't use outside influence simply because they have access to none that can make any difference in their careers. When it comes to the upper ranks in organizations, however, the notion of using external sources of power to boost one's own position no longer sounds so preposterous, do that C W.Mills's Power Elite may have been more an organizational than a political theory.

A thorough analysis of the variety of and interaction between different kinds of organizational performances is not called for in the present paper. To postulate their existence, however, amounts to merging several of the paradigms that we have discussed previously by assuming a basically opportunistic posture on the part of organizational participants ready to seize upon different lines of behavior in order to present

themselves in the best light, depending on available opportunities. In the discussion that follows, we shall use a simple dichotomy to distinguish between different kinds of performances, namely task-related and power-related performances. The first category corresponds roughly to what might be called "doing one's job", in the sense of accomplishing tasks as they have been laid out in an organization's charter. Power-related performances, on the other hand, pertain to the manipulation of people and resources in order to influence certain outcomes which may, or may not, correspond to "legitimate" organizational activity. Clearly, this is a very rough distinction, and no concrete action can ever be unequivocally one or the other kind of performance. Nevertheless since several performances may correspond to the same action, the problem is more one of salience than identity.

What needs stressing is that no given performance can be considered rewarding a priori, regardless of the official values of an organization or its surrounding society. For example, technical competence may be, in some contexts, highly valued and rewarded, but in others, it may actually be punished. This may be the case for a number of reason. It may be that a particular job is simply impossible to do (such as "curing" mental patients, governing New York City, or doing away with poverty), so that there will never be any concrete evidence to show for it. It may also be that the indicators of achievement are not clear or salient enough, not

valued enough in society or that results lag too far behind initiating behavior, and therefore cannot be used as a basis for reward.[4] Lastly, "doing one's job" may come in conflict with entrenched interests in and outside an organization.

Task-related performances can be considered as as potential resources if one's expertise is scarce and in high demand, and if it is congruent with established interests. In such circumstances, it may serve as a career-furthering device; if not, an organizational participant will have to resort to alternative sources of self-advancement (or merely survival). The correct attitude, therefore, is not to assume that people will do their jobs just because it is "prescribed", but, as Stinchcombe did, to ask in what kind of setting will anyone actually be under any pressure to do anything in the direction of what he is officially paid for. (Stinchcombe, 1974). In the example that he described, the head of Tráfico (Motor Vehicles and traffic police in one) in a small town of Venezuela, spends little or no time delivering driver's licences, simply because no rewards can possibly be reaped that way. On the other hand, paying his respects to his hierarchical superiors in Caracas is indispensable for protecting his career, and so, he spends more time in Caracas than delivering licences, In other words, the man has his priorities in the correct order. [5]

In effect, delivering drivers' licences in New York City, or not delivering them in Venezuela is exactly the same behavior for a head of Motor Vehicles, if organizational rationality is understood as a function of environmental parameters rather than blind compliance with rules.

Another example of this process that comes to mind is the brain-drain characteristic of developing and also European countries. It can be explained by the low bargaining position that technical skills give in certain organizational settings, even though, from a conventional rational viewpoint, such services may be desperately needed, especially in the developing countries. Likewise, universities do not usually distribute high rewards to faculty who devote most of their time to teaching, or to administrative employees who work hard at bureaucratic chores, as neither are considered scarce or particularly valuable. The ability to bring money and prestige to the institution by coaching a successful football team or bringing in grants or support funds are far more rewarded.

If "doing a job" is not sufficient to get money and recognition, and if in fact it may be counterproductive to do so, then gaining and giving political support, often as exchange for other resources, may become a major activity for career advancement. Access to priviledged knowledge, contacts with external sources of support (due to previous circulation in other organizations or primary groups networks), the

ability to distribute jobs or share loot are some examples of bases of power that may command other kinds of resources and thus advance a career.

The point we want to make is not that influence-peddling is anything new in organization theory. It has been recognized as a major resource, but usually it has been attached too closely to organizational or subunit goal achievement, or to the protection of the organization from outside alien forces (i.e. legitimating its activities). This is what has made it possible to assume that organizations always strive to survive, as no extra-organizational forces or subgroups within them, were supposed to use them for their own devices. If, on the other hand, we take career-furthering rather than group goal furthering as the basic dynamic factor, then the very efficient way in which private interests plunder bureaucracies in some particular organizational settings should no longer come as a surprise, for given that premise, political activities need not be associated with loyalty toward the organization, but loyalty toward any source of political support of one's career, be it internal or external to the organization. This view has the advantage of separating career-related rationality from rationality linked to organizational survival and success, instead of assuming them to be identical. It still leaves us to specify the conditions under which the two kinds of rationalities will be at least compatible, and those under which they will be opposed. Hopefully, this will

lead us away from stereotyping the first condition as typical of industrial societies and the second as the necessary lot of developing countries.

Furthermore, if we take power-related performances as alternative ways of obtaining pay-offs, it becomes possible to include bureaucratic corruption as a normal ongoing activity, instead of a marginal phenomenon of interest only to amateurs of social disorganization. In an organizational setting, for example, where the rules of the game make recruitment and promotion based on merit virtually impossible and dismissal extremely difficult [6/], the corruption of petty officials by service recipients give the latter at least minimal control over incentives, otherwise absent, that will encourage these officials to provide services. On the other hand, the tolerance of such petty corruption on the part of higher officials gives these a leverage over their subordinates that the formal hierarchy cannot provide. The not so distant past (and in some cases the present) of municipal governments in the US is a case in point.

Corruption may also be a way in which one organization (or a group therein) gains influence over another. The higher official who is willing to be bribed by outside interests will make some organizational resources available to them, and in exchange expand his universe of opportunities

beyond the boundaries of his membership organization. Recent scandals involving heads of state (from developed as well as developing countries) with transnational corporations are good ilustrations of this phenomenon.

Nevertheless, it is not enough to assert that organizational participants sometimes behave like busy bees, other times like manipulators of people and situations, and still other times like apathetic and indifferent bystanders (to acknowledge the garbage can contribution). We must specify, to some degree, the probability of chosing one kind of performance against another, if we want to go beyond an eclectic theory of social motivation, and discover why people behave differently in some organizations than others, particularly in the developing countries.

3. The structure of opportunities

The dangers of a voluntaristic argument can only be averted by pitting performance against actual opportunities. The nature of these opportunities is contingent upon a number of structural factors that act alternatively as constraints and inducements upon actors. It is in these factors, that we believe, the reason why people do any work at all in organizations should be sought. It is also in these factors that the key to fundamental differences between bureaucratic behavior within and between countries may be found.

We shall distinguish three basic variable factors --from the furthest removed from individual behavior to the most proximate-- that will be hypothesized to influence actors' choices of performances, and ultimately create and differentiate organizational climates: 1) historically shaped institutional forces prevalent in the larger surrounding society; 2) the immediate environment of an organization; and 3) social linkages available to individual actors in order to further their career.

We may consider historical-institutional factors as the generalized environment within which organizations act in a given national space, that is, the environment shared by organizations of all kinds. This is the element that has sometimes been reduced to the 'cultural' characteristics of organizational participants. In the present context, we shall seek to establish the historical reasons for the institutionalization of dominant behavior patterns on the part of organizational participants, by relating them to historically evolved structural arrangements in the larger society.

The immediate environment of organizations, on the other hand, will vary from one organization to the other within the same society. It is close to Evan's concept of the organizational set, in that it includes those elements in the environment that have a direct interational impact on a given organization. (Evan, 1972). It is in the differentiation between organizational environments that we will seek to explain some of the major

differences between industrial and public service bureaucracies that may be found in the developing countries.

Finally, the lowest analytical level is that of individual social linkages. By that, we mean not just the set of measurable characteristics that allow a ranking of the individual, but his participation and circulation in various social groups and networks that are relevant both to his career and to the organization of which he is a full-time member. Social status, in the usual static sense of the term, would therefore only be considered as a facilitator of such linkages rather than a direct determinant of career success.

Clearly, these three sets of factors are not independent, and represent a hierarchy of theoretical antecedents, akin to a series of concentric circles, but not in a classical "causal" sense of the term which would be represented by an $X \longrightarrow Y \longrightarrow Z$ chain. Rather, each antecedent is seen as contributing to an understanding of the impact of the next element down the line on bureaucratic behavior. Thus, the social position of an actor should not be understood as a single isolated measure of socio-economic status, but as an element of a certain class structure with its own patterns of political dominance and processes of social change, and individual or group mobility. Likewise, the market of an organization must be understood within the broader context

of the world division between dependent developing and dominant developed nations and the consequent role of government in defining the future of a society. Therefore, we are not making the naive assumption that historical forces "cause" bureaucratic behavior as a moving billiard ball colliding into another "causes" the latter to move. Rather, we believe that contemporary social structures are embedded in history and cannot be understood separately, least of all by the irresponsible use of theoretically free-floating empirical indicators. 7/

1. Historical factors

We shall limit this analysis to exploring the historical roots of two institutional factors that seem to have had the heaviest impact on differentiating Western from non-Western bureaucracies, namely, 1) personalism and 2) politization. In doing so, we shall lay more emphasis on characterizing non-Western societies, but only because they are less known to students of organization. Therefore, this unequel emphasis should not be construed as another disguised attempt at explaining BDC's as "exotic" organizations, but simply as a short-cut.

Historical roots of personalism

The importance given in Latin American societies to personal relations 8/ strikes even the most casual observer. As a concomitant

feature, educational, occupational and organizational ties lack strength and prestige as facilitators of social interaction. Put more simply, who you know is more important in these societies than what you do or, where you work, or what degrees you hold. By contrast, family and personal ties in Western industrialized societies are reputed to be of little more than personal value, instrumental activities being activated and legitimized by impersonal ties based on educational and professional standards.[9]

It is easy to understand how such contrast could lead many writers to assert that bureaucracy, as defined in weberian terms, was a peculiar Western institution that did not travel well. Nevertheless, we still maintain, following our original thesis, that differences between Western and non-Western bureaucracies are of degree rather than kind and that the mechanisms that govern behavior are essentially the same. We shall argue, in particular, that personalism as defined here 1)is more a class-related than a general cultural form of interaction, and 2) that when it pervades an organizational system, it affects individual strategies of survival rather than individual degree of rationality or "modernity"[10] We shall consider the sum total effect of such strateiges for the organization as a whole as a separate by-product of processes of individual strategies which may turn out to be system-preserving or system destroying, not a priori, but according to the structure of opportunities as we

shall analyze it.

One of the few consequences of the industrial revolution in Western nations on which almost everyone seems to agree is the emergence of the middle class as a new social category. This phenomenon has been diversely analyzed, but the general paradigm most writers follow is the transformation of an agrarian-based communal type of society (Gemeinschaft) in urbanized depersonalized industrial based society (Gesellschaft). From that point on, two additional postulates have sometimes been made which have since been questioned; first, that a linear process of development from gemeinschaft to gesellschaft could be generalized at all levels of Western society, and second, that developing societies were going to follow the same pattern at some later time.

Questioning of the first postulate came when it was found that impersonal and "universalistic" values were not found in Western societies either below or above the vast middle class with the same intensity of dedication. The personal orientation of social relations in the working class of these societies had long been recognized and considered slighly pathological. It took longer to recognize a similar pattern in the upper class, but with rather different consequences. Families in the upper class are not "nuclear", people get top jobs through connections based on friendship and kinship, lend each other money on a personal basis, and exchange important information in informal settings such as **putting greens and locker rooms.**

Without going so far as to subscribe to an overly integrated image of the upper class, it should be conceded that it is a great deal easier for its members to know each other and communicate than for the vast amorphous more geographically dispersed middle class. 11/ Upper classes Relationships therefore acquire a far more direct personal character, not because of some peculiar subcultural propensity, but simply because social circumstances make it possible for a relatively small group to interact on a face to face basis.

Doubtless, this description of differences between the quality of social relations in different classes leaves many open questions which cannot be resolved at this point. Our limited objective is to indicate a general institutional factor which may have contributed to the general character of social relations in organizations and has received little attention in sociological studies, owing to the low profile which the upper class occupies in them. Therefore, we only ask the reader to agree on minimum level, that is, to accept that people in the upper class have more opportunities to evaluate each other on a personal basis than the middle class. 12/ (Whether there are more explanations for this factor than sheer size is not relevant to our present argument.)

What can only happen at the very tip of the social structure in societies like the United States, and therefore go almost unnoticed, can equally be argued to happen among the elite of non-Western societies, except that in their case, there is no incentive for the incipient middle class to counteract that pattern, and plenty to emulate it. In the context of mass rural and urban poverty, elites are more culturally as well as politically dominant than in Western societies. The middle class, on the other hand, represents such a small proportion of the social spectrum that it soon becomes absorbed into the elite. This process of absorption is facilitated by the fact that in Latin America, belonging to the elite is more a function of sudden(and often shortlived) political fortune than education or "breeding", so that the usual opposition between the old and the new upper class is not operating in most cases. 13/

As a result of the lopsided class structure peculiar to most developing countries, some of the characteristics that we find limited to a given social milieu in industrialized countries take on a more dominant form and are more diffused throughout the social structure. Therefore, the more oligarchic a given country will be, the more we are likely to encounter personalized forms of interaction, even in the most seemingly impersonal settings, such as bureaucracies.

Anyone who has lived in one of the several immense tentacular cities of Latin America will have been struck by the quasi "village" quality of social life among the educated elite. The members of that class constantly "bump" into each other in restaurants, clubs, parties and art galleries. They share the same schools, live in the same secluded residential areas, study in the same US or European universities, go to the same clubs and gravitate in the same bureaucracies. This gemeinschaft-like social organization, in addition to the highly politicized character of social life in these countries cannot fail to have important consecuenques for processes of recruitment into and promotion within and between organizations. It also results in the marginalization and political impotence of the poor, regardless of the demagogic front any government may assume.

Politization

The impact of government in the developing countries is far broader than in industrialized nations. On the one hand, government is the prime mover of economic policies, and as such, controls vast resources. It therefore acts as a magnet for most individual careers, as it holds the best promises of social achievement and mobility. On the other hand, the history of political instability in most of these countries has prevented the institutionalization of government as a separate specialized function, so that the separation between political and non-political arenas is very weak. We shall argue that these two factors contribute to the salience of government as a source of social promotion

and the politization of social relations in organizations.

In the economic sphere, partitially developed countries are distinguished by considerable government involvement through the need for extensive planning. Government in many instances constitutes the prime mover of economic progress. There are a number of reasons for that. First, a narrow basis of savings and private investment makes it mandatory for government to step in for purposes of infra structural improvements, such as transportation and communication. Usually, these sectors require heavy and long-term investments that private initiative can not afford or is not willing to engage in. As we shall see in the next section, this has important consequences on the environment of industrial bureaucracies, not only as it affects their performance, but also by linking them directly to the political process.

Colateral to these considerations are the concrete phenomena of external dependency such as chronic balance of payment deficits, huge foreign debts, high inflationary pressures and other consequences of international relationships such as the much-evoked problem of having to sell natural resources [illegible] prices and to buy capital goods from abroad at steeply high p[illegible]

Nevertheless, it is not enough to underscore the crucial role of

government in the efforts toward economic growth in order to show the importance of the political realm in developing countries. It is equally important to bear in mind the forms of political dominance that operate in such countries. Economic and other policies are not dictated by an impersonal bureaucracy recruited on the basis of talent and training, but by a ruling elite that means to stay in power, and among whom, therefore, loyalty to the established system is often more important than competence. As a result, patterns of personalism are further reinforced. This situation creates, in addition, an atmosphere of arbitrariness where rules and regulations are used to fit the personal interests of people in power, rather than as a commonly negotiated and fairly enforced set of standards.

The fact that a ruling elite holds power over a widely parochial mass has many implications, as students of government have pointed out. There is, however, only one particular consequence that is relevant to this discussion, namely, the dominance of the political realm over most other spheres of social life. Because of weak political institutionalization, an effective separation between the political system and other areas of activity, such as the economic and organizational sectors, be it private enterprise or public bureaucracy, is lacking. On the other hand, society must function somehow. It is therefore mandatory for the individual businessman or administrative office-holder to engage in extensive political bargaining whit government in order to insure the survival of his organization in a way

which established channels cannot provide. In doing so, the setting of his action may be constituted by what the Gesellschaft in progress stipulates, but the strategy to implement his goals will be governed by the principles of Gemeinschaft. In concrete terms, this means that structures of Gesellschaft such as commerce, industry and science which supposedly break with traditional molds and lead to high degrees of individualism, impersonality, consensus upon rational decision-making and other mechanisms to regulate group interests, are held in check by patterns of behavior which rely upon elements of Gemeinschaft such as kinship, localism and friendship.

The foregoing discussion shows the high degree of interdependence between patterns of personalism and that of politization in non-Western society. In that kind of environment, members of organizations are not, by and large, led by a service ideal toward the organization that employs them. Rather, they see their loyalties as intimately connected with the fortunes of their superiors with whom they interact on an informal basis. Nepotism and patronage are only natural consequences of that basic pattern of behavior, and in any concrete situation, it defines the political dimension of social action as paramount.

In addition, the pressure to create jobs at all costs further depresses the relative importance for self-advancement of task-related performances. In the name of social and political stability, public

organizations frequently fulfill the crucial role of employment centers. Young university graduates, emerging from crowded state universities with more training in political activism than competence in their field, need an opportunity to "work", that is, to integrate themselves within the ranks of the privileged. Since there are too many to be absorbed by a free-wheeling play of supply and demand, government has to furnish those opportunities. Because the primary goal is to alleviate potential dissatisfaction rather than solve technical problems, job contents often have little to do with job performance. Moreover, the heavy load of people who do not have any special skills and do not fulfill any essential tasks will lead to considerable overload in administrative overheads, hence excessive redtape, which in turn will provide further employment opportunities.

In order to make our point, we have so far exaggerated certain contrasts between developing and so-called developed societies, although from the very beginning we had stated that we would assume no fundamental differences between the two. How can we reconcile this apparent contradiction?. The answer is that every society may be considered as a mixture of gemeinschaft and gesellschaft-like features, distributed in different institutional realms, where the relative dominance of one or the other affects organizational behavior and outputs in that realm. Furthermore, it is important to keep in mind that this conception does not imply any

value judgements as to which "ingredient" may be more desirable. Nor does it assume any processes of development whereby society travels smoothly from dominant patterns of Gemeinschaft towards those of Gesellschaft. What it does stress is the idea that the same mechanisms are working in both kinds of society, so that the same kinds of behavior will emerge given similar structural arrangements.

2. Organizational environments

Broad historical explanations are useful to establish a dominant pattern in a given society, but they are powerless to account for internal variations within the same historical context. The glaring differences in the developing countries between organizational behavior in private industrial and public service organizations defeats at once any general explanation. Despite many limitations, industrial bureaucracies, on the one hand, seem to approach the respectable model of organizational behavior in which people get their job done, follow orders and produce something they can sell (with a little help from tariff barriers). Public service organizations, on the other hand, offer an image of bewildering confusion compounded by inefficiency and widespread corruption. (We are, of course, talking from the conventional viewpoint of the user of organizational services; as for participants in these organizations, the system is remarkably efficient as measured by the ratio of actual

work over pay-offs). The contrast may be somewhat exaggerated, as we know that industrial organizations in these countries produce expensive and low-quality products, but in the final analysis, they do produce something, even if it's only Coca Cola. 14/

Since there are no clear and systematic sociologically relevant differences in the recruitment of either type of organizations, the most promising ground for the explanation of such visible differences seems to be the environments. We shall therefore distinguish between the environments of two broad categories of organizations, public service organization that may include anything from a public hospital to the ministry of public works on the one hand, and private industrial bureaucracies on the other, to tipify the kinds of environments that they will find in a developing country. That is not to say that we don't recognize the existence of public industrial bureaucracies or private service organizations. We merely wish to establish a contrast.

a. The environment of public service bureaucracies

In addition to being dominant for reasons explained earlier, government in the developing countries is also relatively independent from control by other institutional spheres, and relatively monolithic (no matter how structurally complex), owing to the high degree of centralization

in policymaking.

By independent, we mean that mechanisms of checks and balances are usually absent and political participation weak. That is the case, not so much because popular masses are uneducated and apathetic, but because effective channels of political expression such as parties and elections are usually lacking de jure or de facto.[15] In cases where some sectors may have reached a level of organization or outspokenness that may be threatening to the state, (such as for example labor organizations), the solution adopted may be, as in the case of Mexico, cooptation. Otherwise, repression and extermination appear to be the usual policy.

Governmental institutions therefore usually enjoy a very sheltered environment from a national political standpoint, insofar as they almost never have to legitimize their activities (otherwise than in vague slogans) or ask for orientation from the electorate. The generalized absence of a free press perfects the picture of a ruling bureaucracy that controls vast resources (relatively speaking) and manages them as it pleases.

Nevertheless, it cannot be claimed that government is free of pressures, even if it is virtually immune from internal political control.

Unemployment, mass migrations to cities of impovershed peasants, galloping demographic growth and mounting foreign debt impose severe pressures, no matter how insensitive any particular regime may be. In addition, participation in international organizations that control important resources, and the dependence on foreign markets, also constitute strong pressures for governments to engage in vast developing programs, some of which have an important impact on the welfare of sizable portions of the population, even if it is mainly a trickle-down effect. We must therefore consider such factors as structural constraints that will contribute to inducing public bureaucracies to produce at least a minimun of services in order to alleviate the most pressing problems. For, after all, hungry masses cannot be held in check forever with nothing more than demagogic promises or ideological scapegoats. And so, there has to be some relieving of pressures to keep up hopes.

Nevertheless, in spite of such restraining factors, much of the usual apparently pathological "bureaucratic" behavior that can be witnessed in most public service bureaucracies in the developing countries is not due to some strange cancer that besets them, or individual incompetence, but to the excessive independence from external institutional controls in their immediate environment. This general tendency is aggravated in the case of Latin America by the fact that the only social sector that

could exert some countervailing pressure —the upper class— either enjoys privileged ways of obtaining services (through friends, family, or just plain bribes) or do without them altogether. Thus, the upper class not only send their children to private schools, go to private hospitals or drive private cars, as in any other country, but they also use private mail organizations, install electric generators in their houses and offices (due to numerous cuts), build vast water tanks under their houses and hire private body guards to protect themselves and their property. Therefore, the only social sectors that absolutely depend on public services are the large masses that are as politically powerless as they are economically deprived.

b. The environment of private industrial bureaucracies

The two major elements which private industrial bureaucracies have to face in their immediate environment are market forces and government.[16/] The relationship between the governmental sector and private industrial concerns can be described as a sort of love-hate relationship, insofar as government protects the latter by eliminating from their environment the most serious threat to their survival, but on the other, attempts to control them through economic policy and places them in a position where they constantly have to bargain imdividually for the advantages which law supposedly grants them.

One of the major tasks of government is to provide enough incentives for private investments in areas it considers strategic for development. In cases of certain bottlenecks, government will move in as entrepreneur if other solutions fail. This activity has important consequences for the performance of industrial bureaucracies. The very attempt to build and diversify industrial activity does not allow for the forces of a free market to operate on a major scale. The strees is on building, not necessarily on building well. Thus, if competition would be allowed to operate to any degree, many industrial enterprises would be eliminated, a possibility which is both politically and economically unacceptable.

A particularly pressing imperative is the ever increasing need for employment, due to rising demographic pressure. Considerations of efficiency or maximization of profits is of secondary importance for goverment which therefore encourages almost any types of investments. The need for blue collar jobs is particularly acute since the majority of the population has little formal schooling, an indispensable prerequisite for the establishment of modern industries. The application of lower technologies is therefore a necessity.

In terms of its relationships with other nations, a partially developed country needs to protect itself against fierce competition on the world market, particularly in the case of infant industries, through high

tariffs, special import licensing or other fiscal manipulations. Naturally, this condition has a direct impact upon performance criteria. Organizations do not -quasi by nature- respond to internal requirements for up-dating production or improving quality of products, but do so in response to institutional and external pressures. The simple question to be asked, then is why any industrial firm that enjoys complete governmental protection should do anything to raise standards of efficiency.

The fact of small internal markets and lack of competition gives rise to a monopolistic position of industry. The scarcity of producers and products does not maintain incentives towards better quality controls. On the contrary, the absence of constant innovative stress slows down the rise of industrial development. This is readily understandable by the fact that the emphasis is laid upon building industry in the first place, instead of thinking about what kinds of industries would be most beneficial to the country, or how they can be made more efficient or more competitive.

c. <u>A comparison between these two types of environments</u>

Compared to organizational environments in most Western industrialized societies (as they have been described in the literature), we may qualify the two types of environments just described as singularly secure. Industrial bureaucracies, on the one hand, enjoy captive markets and very

few price restrictions, so that internal inefficiencies can be passed on to the consumer. Public service bureaucracies, on the other hand, receive a constant --if sometimes meager— support from the governmental sector with no questions asked, so that internal inefficiencies are also borne by recipients.

Nevertheless, there remains in both kinds of environments sources of uncertainty that cannot be eliminated by administrative fiats, namely menacing processes of social change in the surrounding society. That is to say, both organizational environment, private industrial and public service must be visualized as being immersed within the structural make-up of society. The basic constellation of class relationships, income differentials, educational opportunity, social mobility, and a host of related components of social dynamics and organization are responsible for structuring the concrete parameters of action (environment) for governmental as well as private bureaucracies.

Whereas public bureaucracies have to face directly the hard facts of increasing unemployment and pauperization, as mentioned earlier, industrial bureaucracies have to face indirect consequences of such processes, namely, the fact that their future growth is limited by the potential growth of their markets, In countries where the policy of import substitution is only at its initial stage, such concerns are not likely to

to come to the foreground too soon. But in those where the process of industrialization is more mature (mostly the larger countries), recent growth has been achieved on the basis of product differentiation, rather than market expansion of established lines. The reason is that industrial production, in many sectors, has reached, or nearly reached, the level where internal demand is satisfied, and it is in no position to open export markets.

Based on what we know about innovative pressures, we should consider such factors as a potential source of inner change in industrial bureaucracies. 17/ But there is yet another aspect in which the environment of industrial bureaucracies can be considered less secure than that of public bureaucracies. In spite of all the artificial props which they enjoy, they can never hope to achieve the kind of monopolistic hold over the consumer which public service bureaucracies enjoy over the public. By and large, industrial goods are more substitutable and dispensable than public services such as health and education. Moreover, in spite of generally high industrial concentration, there is some degree of internal competition among firms, especially in the industrially more advanced countries (Mexico, Brazil, Argentina).

A third element that distinguishes industrial bureaucracies from public ones has to do with the perception, rather than the intrinsic

nature of their respective environments. As pointed out earlier, the social problems that surround public service bureaucracies are serious enough, but the political personnel in charge or perceiving them and elaborating programs to solve them suffers from chronic turnover and hence chronic amnesia: a regular six-year clock in the case of Mexico, and frequent spasmodic change in that of most other countries in Latin America. This situation seriously affects the time perspective which any public official may be reasonably expected to hold. Industrial bureaucracies, on the other hand (that is, private ones), enjoy longer planning horizons, even if they don't always take advantage of them, and do not suffer constant turnover in their personnel.

We may therefore conclude that owing to the nature of their respective environments, industrial bureaucracies are more dependent on appropriate task performance for their survival than public service organizations. Given the stronger hold of clients on these organizations, technical competence has a better chance of receiving some recognition, whereas it becomes more an obstacle than a resource in organizations that exploit their environment while producing only a minimum in exchange. 18/

This tentative conclusion may be further reinforced if we consider the deviant cases of public industrial bureaucracies, on the one hand, and semi-socialized private service organizations on the other. The experience

in the first kind of organization in Latin America has been of widespread inefficiency and inability to show any profits, even within the framework of protective tariff and fiscal policies. 19/

As for private organizations that enjoy a near-captive pool of recipients, such as for example, insurance firms or health organizations contracted out by large business or banking firms for their employees, they seem to show some of the same lack of responsiveness, toward their clientele that characterizes their public counterparts. This would seem to reinforce the postulate that it is the environment, rather than the nature of the tasks that determines the relative emphasis on task-related performances in organizations.

3. Individual social linkages and career mobility

We are concerned in this section with outlining the effects which institutionalized forms of interaction described in the two preceding sections have on individual strategies of survival and self-advancement in Latin American organizations. Furthermore, we are concerned with showing that bureaucratic behavior in such settings is predictable on the very same general principles as in industrialized societies, although it will clearly differ empirically.

In the literature on occupational sociology, the determinants of career advancement in industrialized societies have usually been conceptualized in terms of static structural concepts designating social placement, such as profession of father, education of mother, formal education, etc. It is undeniable that social placement has consequences for career achievement in any social setting. Yet, such indicators leave wide gaps that can only be filled out by more dynamic kinds of analyses of individual pertainance to and circulation in the kinds of social groups that may affect a person's vertical and/or horizontal mobility. 20/ This kind of research, however, is inhibited by the strongly entrenched methodological bias that mobility can be explained by structural properties that are readily measurable by survey techniques, and by the practical difficulties of trying out alternative approaches.

By contrast, the importance of personal relations for individual career mobility in the developing countries is both acknowledged and profusely commented upon as an exotic feature of such societies, as well as used for explaining many of their problems in following the true path of modernization. Going back to our claim that a closer look at developing societies may give new insights into unresolved issues in industrialized societies, we shall attempt to characterize these relations and regard them as the finer web that underlies any class, institutional or

organizational reality, recognizing only a difference of emphasis on their impact in industrialized and semi-industrialized nations.

The peculiar nature and importance of interpersonal relationships in the developing countries has been noted early by anthropologists and political scientists who have typified them under the patron-client model (Boissevain, 1966, 1974: Cotler, 1970, Foster, 1967). It has been described mostly in rural settings as a quasifeudal relationship in which the isolated and defenceless peasant exchanges with the local strong man (cacique) loyalty, obedience, service and social deference for assistance, protection and social connections with the external world, thereby prolonging the social ethics of the now extinct hacienda system.

The patron-client relationship has been described by Foster (1967) as the dyadic contract model. The latter postulates an informal structure that underlies all institutional ties interacting people might have. People associate by contract, i.e. the relationship exists as long as the interacting individuals recognize it as convenient to further ends. Its content and its endurance are determined by the number and quality of obligations each of the actor has incurred from the other. Thus, we deal essentially with a reciprocal relationship of obligations and expectations.

Secondly, the contractual relationship is fundamentally dyadic.

It puts pairs of actors into interaction rather than groups. It connotes a very simple configuration of give and take.

> "Each person is the center of his private and unique network of contractual ties, a network whose overlap with other networks has little or no functional significance. That is, A's tie to B in no way binds him to B's partner C."
>
> (Foster: 1967 p. 215)

The continuity of the relationship simply is a function of the rewards each of the contracting individual receives from maintaining it. Thus, the bonds of exchange are completely subject to individual consideration and override any formal link based upon institutional roles. When the contract is dissolved by either one or both of the interacting individuals, institutional ties held simultaneously will loose their significance. Regardless of the fact that two actors may live in the same organizational context and, therefore be subject to formalized patterns of interaction, the discontinuity or disappearance of contractual ties render the formalized relationship inoperative.

A legitimate question to ask, at this point, is how such relationships can exist in a bureaucratic context where formal rules are supposed to provide a modicum of protection against arbitrariness (Crozier, 1968). The simple answer is that in many institutional contexts, they

simply don't. As we have pointed out earlier, the even-handed application of rules is untypical of authoritarian oligarchic institutional frameworks where power weighs more heavily than legitimacy. Bureaucracies are no exceptions from other institutional realms, no matter how "rationalized" they may appear on paper. In such contexts, the individual participant attempts to compensate for the basis uncertainty of his position by "buying insurance" in the form of multiple allegiances to actors that have better access than himself to sources of security and reward in the bureaucratic system.

It may be interesting, to draw at this point, a parallel between the arbitrariness and uncertainty that surrounds contemporary Latin American bureaucrats and the prejudice and aggression that have been the common lot of immigrants and racial minorities in the United States. For such people, somehow, the celebrated American "institutionalized value system" did not function, and so they were, and still are, denied equal treatment and opportunities.

The development of highly oligarchic and personalized forms of political organization i.e., patrimonial, in weberian terms, among such minorities can be seen as a reaction to the basically insecure position in which official institutions leave their members. In such conditions, their rank-and-file have to depend on their own leadership, which is

often hard and exploitative in character, but does provide them some marginal benefits that outside institutions will deny them. If that pattern has been particularly pronounced among Italian immigrants, it is only because it had strong historical precedents in their country of origin. It has by no means been exclusive of them.

Likewise, the development of the labor movement in most societies has taken place mainly against official institutions and approved rules of the game. It may be worthwhile speculating whether the so-called iron law of oligarchy in unions and some political parties does not have something to do with the kinds of personalized forms of power that emerge in the context of institutional insecurity, rather than solely to internal organizational dynamics, as Michels claimed.

Probably other examples of such behavior patterns would suggest themselves in the context of industrialized countries, provided it be

admitted that personalized pyramidal power arrangements are not the fruit or any cultural peculiarities, but specific responses to given institutional and environmental premises. What is important to point out is that such arrangements impose strategies of conduct that reinforce them, by compelling the individual participant who means to stay in business to seek career security in personal ties and exchange, in addition to, or instead of, the quality of his task performances.

VI. Exploration of the Mexican Case.

At the onset of this article, we laid the claim that differences in organizational behavior between developed and partially developed societies were of degree rather than of kind. We proposed that such differences could be explained within a single theoretical framework instead of being treated as exotic deviant cases of otherwise resolved issues. In order to accomplish this, we proposed that any organization should be treated as an integral part of society whereby man, as a member of the organization as well as of society, constitutes the linking nexus. When we now turn to developing the Mexican case as an illustrating example, we must admit that the empirical evidence to back up our conceptual stipulations will be somewhat scant simply, because there is

not enough concrete testimony available. For industrial organizations, in particular, there are practically no relevant empirical studies. Therefore, we will have to restrict our discussion mainly to governmental bureaucracies which have been examined somewhat closer in the current literature. In any case, we do not find it necessary to present a full picture in order to keep our promises. If we can present glimpses of Mexican reality as they pertain to crucial insights of our framework, we will be satisfied.

1. Historical Background and Institutional Factors.

From a historical perspective, Mexico belongs to the group of old nation states. After a long and arduous war, it gained independence from Spanish colonial rule as early as 1821. Parkes qualifies this transitional period by stating that "what should have been a war for national independence became for ten years something more bitter and of profounder significance: a war of classes" (Parkes, 1969; p. 144). When the bloodshed accompanied by economic destruction and social upheaval finally subsided, the next half-century witnessed a long and chaotic struggle for national integration as well as against foreign aggression. Civil war, foreign interventions and a devastating armed conflict with the United States, in which Mexico lost about half her territory, did little to further the emergence of this new nation. It

was not until 1876 that Mexico entered a prolonged era of political stability and economic development, although that period was also marked by social regression. For 36 years, the country was ruled by a classical dictatorship that finally succumbed to the first major revolution of the twentieth-century (years before the Bolsheviks'). Again, Mexicans fought against Mexicans, as they had done so many times in the past. Fourteen years of bloody battles, intrigues and assassinations divided the country, before a revolutionary coalition could consolidate its control over the nation and begin the task of rebuilding. Since then, Mexico has become one of the most stable polities, not only in Latin America, but also in the rest of the world.

On the basis of this brief sketch which spans more than 150 years of Mexican history, we shall concentrate upon a few but important historical developments in order to show their impact on institutional and environmental factors as constraining influences over organizational behavior and structure in that society. We will also look at what we have called the structure of opportunities by examining some of the institutions which govern the patterns of organizational interaction.

Mexico's colonial past was determined by the authoritarian and centralist principles of absolutist Castile. Power in economic as well as political terms was vested in the person of the king, and subsequently in the executive arm of his New Spain, the viceroy who ruled in

conjunction with the Council of the Indies. Though Mexico entered her independence with the creation of a monarchy, this empire was short-lived. The example of the United States proved to be too successful for Mexico not to give the republican experiment a try. Throughout the nineteenth century, politics revolved around the ideological split between conservative and liberal factions among the ruling elite. Mexican governments disappeared almost as soon as they had emerged.[20] In short, independent Mexico was characterized by extreme political instability.

This search for solving the problem of order has to be understood within the social context of independent Mexico which had inherited a social system of enormous complexity. Inequality and discrimination were the fundamental ingredients of a highly stratified society on top of which a small minority held all key economic and political positions. Independence did little to change the lot of the lower classes, while the elite status of the higher clergy, large landowners and commercial entrepreneurs remained virtually untouched. The isolation of the elite from the masses made politics the concern of small circles, or, as we have conceptually stipulated, a matter of Gemeinschaft. This situation conferred supreme importance upon the actions of individuals; Mexicans followed men, not ideas. On this basis, a very peculiar political

organization arose.

The institutionalized patterns of politics in pre-revolutionary Mexico have become known as caudillismo (bossism) -a peculiarly Mexican form of oligarchic rule. Its roots go back to colonial times, although it became more important at a later date. With the attainment of independence, the barrier to the emergence of local political power was effectively removed. Local political bosses, the caciques, usually joined forces with a regional caudillo, frequently a wealthy hacendado (large landowner) or a powerful military commander. As a national contender for power, this caudillo related to individual caciques, on the basis of personal contracts characterized by a dominance-subordination interplay of the traditional patron-client type. The emergence of such political factions was wholly geared to the individual through personal ties with his temporary subjects, the hombres de confianza. Since leadership resided in the person rather than in the office, the death or loss of power of a caudillo usually meant the dissolution of his associational group. In such conditions Mexican political leadership could be considered as a succession of caudillos personalizing the basic disposition of oligarchic rule. Examples are plentiful; they range from the unsinkable Santa Ana (who rose and fell ten times) to the patriotic hero Benito Juárez, and the national villain Porfirio Díaz. They all represented this peculiar Gemeinschaft organization of the political realm. While this mechanism

provided for relatively frequent changes in the exercise of power, it had little impact upon the social structure of Mexican society. When a caudillo was on top for too long, as was the case for Porfirio Díaz, the latent problem of personal power would surge head on.

The Díaz dictatorship which lasted from 1876 to 1911 evolved, by the turn of the century, into an immobile and encrusted system. By then the Mexican class structure was essentially reduced to a simple dichotomy of "haves" and "have-nots". While the former encompassed a ruling oligarchy of landed and commercial elites allied with a substantial number of foreigners, the latter constituted the vast mass of peasantry and labor subsisting under most indignant conditions of poverty. As Cosío Villegas notes, the final eruption of "the Mexican Revolution was in fact the revolt of the impoverished many against the wealthy few" (Cosío Villegas 1964; p.13). This static distribution effectively prevented circulation of any sort between the top and bottom layers of society. It was a system brought to a stand still which increasingly relied upon repression to preserve the <u>status quo</u>.

With the advent of the Mexican Revolution that swept away the Porfirian colossus on its clay feet, the basic constellation of class and power was altered, but not their mechanism. This needs some further explanation. Curiously enough, one of the foremost goals of the

Mexican Revolution of 1910 was expressed by the demand for no-reelection. All warring factions wholeheartedly supported this aspiration. When the revolutionary violence had substantially subsided in 1917, the "search for effective government" was greatly influenced by prior examples of history. The basis problem was how to keep the situation from reverting to the abuses of the past by instituting a number of depersonalized structural arrangements.

When the Coalition of the North finally emerged as the victorious faction, it was confronted with the necessity to reestablish law and order. The top caudillos -the revolutionary generals Plutarco Elías Calles and Alvaro Obregón,- went about this task by creating an informal network composed of those leaders important enough to constitute a threat to the still fragile new republic. In exchange for loyalty and obedience, Calles and Obregón, as heads of state, promised to legitimize their claims of personal rewards -a very simple quid pro quo deal. However, the intrinsic nature of that relationship remained very personalistic and, in fact, constituted a newly polished edition of the old caudillo configuration. Hence, the fundamental problem for the ensuing years was to find a formula which would help institutionalize such patterns of political dominion without provoking a repetition of the trauma that had followed the revolution. In more abstract terms, the basic issue was to reconcile Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft patterns by periodically breaking the oligarchic rule through

the renewal of its ranks, thereby making the dynamics of the patron-client relationship transparent and predictable. This was achieved by instoring two new devices: an official party and a fixed six-year presidential term, i.e. the sexenio.

When in 1929 the National Revolutionary Party (Partido Nacional Revolucionario - PNR) was founded, it very quickly proved effective as an electoral instrument, organizer of multiple interest groups and legitimizer of the new power hierarchies. It complied effectively with the demand for no-reelection, on the one hand, while monopolizing the continuity of power on the other. No elected official, from the President of the Republic to the local deputy, would be allowed more than one turn comprising up to six years. Any plan conceived, any project undertaken, any disposition made thus became subject to six-year periods congruent with presidential terms in post-revolutionary Mexico.

To conclude this brief overview, it is evident that the "Gemeinschaft" pattern of informal group formation centered around prominent individuals has deep and complex historical roots in Mexican society. The literature on Mexican post-revolutionary history is very explicit on this point, exhibiting a surprising agreement of opinion among the authors. Brandenburg proposes to talk about the "Revolutionary Family" in order to indicate the basic oligarchic nature of political rule in

Mexico. This wording underlines his concern for describing the dominant ruling faction in terms of intimate reciprocal relationships (Brandenburg 1970). Padgett, on the other hand, prefers the label "Revolutionary Coalition", indicating somewhat less intimate ties among its members, but emphasizing reasons for political opportunism (Padgett 1966).

In this historical context, the demand for no-reelection and its institutional embodiment, the sexenio, have transformed up to a point the nature of patron-client relationships by making their termination more predictable. Because of the constitutional requirement that a Mexican President should not succeed himself, the latter is unable to keep supporting forever the men who helped him ascend to power. After his term is over, he can no longer provide his supporters with the necessary rewards. In other words, the institution of the sexenio, far from eliminating the reality of Gemeinschaft, has given it a new meaning within a modern context. We must therefore consider it as a restraining institutional factor within which dominant patterns of bureaucratic behavior will operate. As we shall see below, this applies to the public as well as the private sphere.

The environment of organizations in Mexico.

In our attempt to make organizations and their behavior a true

offspring of society, we have isolated some historical notions that have given rise to the development of given institutional factors. As we have made clear in our model, however, organizational behavior is also shaped by the peculiar environments which organizations have to relate to. In this section of the article, we will try to furnish some additional evidence to make the conceptual link society -organization more plausible.

Our first task will be to describe some of the more obvious facets of organizational environments in Mexico. The task is complicated by the fact that government not only constitutes a delimiting parameter within which private organizations must act, but also engages actively in business. Hence we are confronted with a dual role of government: that of an active entrepreneur as well as that of regulator of organizational behavior. Furthermore, it is not easy to come across reliable data regarding the make-up of the class structure and other areas that may describe with some accuracy the contures of a society. Hence, most of the data we present will only serve to illustrate the kind of analysis we have in mind.

Mexican public bureaucracy embodies the developmental aspirations of government as the prime mover of economic and social change. The task-related complexity of it all can

simply be appreciated through its enormous apparatus. Numerous agencies, institutes, departments, semi-autonomous committees, state corporations and ministries form an administrative conglomerate entrusted with the most diverse tasks, ranging from the protection of nascent industries to the actual operation of transportation facilities, from the control of financial transactions to the management of specific commercial entreprises, and from the operation of complete health services to the funding of important educational projects. A recent compilation from 1973 arrives at a total of 912 public organizations (Revista de las Revistas, Dec. 1973).

Based upon the general conditions of development, this heterogeneous organizational set-up provides the framework within which economic activity may evolve with government laying out the rules. Since the years of economic take-off during World War II, the relative independence of the state has been demonstrated over and over again by its economic policy (Reynolds 1970). With a vast array of instruments at their disposal, public organizations have intervened in almost all sectors of the economy and have thus been able to shape the conditions required by the needs of the polity. More specifically, those actions went from nationalizing key industries, such as petrochemicals and electricity, to going into business as in the case of the steel industry, or following specific fiscal policies, such as imposing price ceilings

in given sectors of the economy.

In more general terms, the Mexican government "employed the market mechanism as the major process for resource allocation, but exerted strong influence on it by the new economic rules of the game, such as the protection of growing industries, tax exemptions, and active promotion of export industries, as well as discriminant import licensing" (DeFlores 1968; p.391). In short, government institutions dominated the economic sphere of society by setting out guidelines and keeping the results under control.

In order for this rather general perspective to acquire a relevant meaning in our discussion, it is necessary to make certain important distinctions. Overall government policies in post-revolutionary Mexico were not uniform over time, but made indiscriminate use of the economic instrumentarium available by setting different emphasis upon the goals of economic and social progress. The observation that each new administration came to power with its own priorities as to what should be the better route towards development gave rise to the so-called pendulum theory characterizing the different administrations by a left-right orientation. According to Needler, Mexico's modern history starts off with the rightist regime of Ortiz Rubio (1930-1932) which was replaced by the more moderate administration of Rodríguez (1932-1934). The

following government of Cárdenas (1934-1940) proved to be extremely leftist. The later regimes can also be classified along this continuum with one regime shifting left or right also in terms of different policy orientations (Needler 1971; pp. 46-49).

As an example of this pendulum movement, the fundamental dilemma for any Mexican administration of either increasing production or fomenting social justice will probably be approached differently in two successive sexenios. If production increase is emphasized in the first, then a step towards a more equal distribution of wealth is more likely to be taken in the next. Whereas in one case, government may provide heaven for business, it may change completely its policies in favor of labor in an other. As an illustration of this phenomenon, the table on the foregoing page tells us something about changes in fundamental governmental policy orientation, but also gives us an idea about certain constants. One of the most radical changes ocurred during the successive administrations of Avila Camacho and Alemán. Looking at actual government expenditures, economic investment jumped by more than 10% percentage points, while those in social areas dropped. Administrative expenditures were kept about equal. On the other hand, a further look at the row of actual social expenditures illustrates nicely what is meant by the pendulum theory. Starting with Cárdenas' administration that marked a new high in social expenditures, the latter's share decreased in

TABLE 1

AVERAGE PERCENT OF FEDERAL BUDGETARY EXPENDITURE
BY TYPE OF EMPHASIS AND PRESIDENTIAL TERM

Years	President	Total	Economic		Social		Administr.	
			Proj.	Act.	Proj.	Act.	Proj.	Act.
1921-1924	Obregón	100.0	18.7	17.9-	12.0	9.7-	69.3	72.4+
1925-1928	Calles	100.0	21.4	24.8+	10.4	10.1-	68.2	65.1-
1929-1930	Portes Gil	100.0	25.7	23.2-	13.2	12.9-	61.1	63.9+
1931-1932	Ortiz Rubio	100.0	28.7	28.1-	15.2	15.8+	56.1	56.1=
1932-1934	Rodríguez	100.0	22.0	21.7-	17.0	15.4-	61.0	62.9+
1935-1940	Cárdenas	100.0	30.3	37.6+	23.0	18.3-	46.5	44.1-
1941-1946	Avila Camacho	100.0	30.7	39.2+	23.5	16.5-	45.8	44.3-
1947-1952	Alemán	100.0	39.2	51.9+	18.6	13.3-	42.2	34.8-
1953-1958	Ruiz Cortines	100.0	43.8	52.7+	20.4	14.4-	35.8	32.9-
1959-1964	López Mateos	100.0	38.8[a]	39.0+[b]	30.8	19.2-	30.4	41.8+
Average 1935-1964:			36.6	44.1	23.3	16.3	40.1	39.6

Source: James Wilkie. The Mexican Revolution: Federal Expenditure and Social Change Since 1910. (Berkeley, The University of California Press, 1967), p.32.

a) Data for 1964 not included
b) Data for 1964 not available

The plus and minus signs indicate whether the actual expenditures remained under or surpassed the projected expenditures.

the following regimes of Avila Camacho and Alemán, with the latter representing an absolute low. Then the pendulum swung back with the administration of Ruiz Cortines and reached a new high of 19.2% during the López Mateos government. Corresponding changes can be observed in economic and administrative expenditures.

Some constants, may also be identified. During the take-off period of 1935-1964, actual economic expenditures by government surpassed projected spendings consistently by an average of 6.5%, while social investment remained under projected goals by an average of 7%. Meanwhile, actual and projected expenditures for administrative purposes remained relatively unchanged. These figures indicate very clearly preferences towards industrialization, with social development a clear second (in fact a clear third when we include administrative expenditures). Furthermore, when comparing the absolute size of social to other expenditures, it turns out that they only amount to approximately half of those taken individually. In general, it can be said that the data of the table reflect the wide gap between official rhetoric about social equality and actual choices in favor of economic development.

These patterns of government expenditure policies find themselves reflected in society at large. Since 1940, government development policies have been changed to favor new and previously non-PRI affiliated

industrial-agricultural elites. At the very moment when the agrarian and labor sectors of Mexican society experienced their greatest advances under the leftist Cárdenas regime, the development strategy changed drastically. Figures of production began to win over advances in social justice. Tightly controlled labor union activity slowed the pace of agrarian reform and reduced the relative income share of the bottom 60% of the Mexican population. A small middle-income group was able to obtain relatively high material gains, while the majority remained at rather static levels of subsistence. Hansen's conclusion regarding this aspect is that "a government in which the demands of organized labor and Mexico's campesinos were EFFECTIVELY (our emphasis) represented could neither have designed nor implemented the development strategy that has characterized Mexico's recent economic growth (since 1940)". He adds further that "by comparison, most other Latin American countries have generally done more in all areas, save the redistribution of land" (Hansen 1971; p.107). Hence, for more than thirty years, a small elite of agrarian, industrial and to a lesser degree military interests, as well as a small group of professionals, have maintained (by means that need not be discussed here) the internal stability required for economic development by controlling the population at large.

An answer to the question as to how such a static social structure could evolve lies in the intricate relationship between public service

organizations and pattems of political organization of the population. There is enough evidence to assert the virtual political powerlessness of popular masses over the apparatus of public bureaucracy. The official government party, the PRI (Partido Revolucionario Institucional), effectively controls, integrates and, when needed, mobilizes society at large, particularly workers and peasants. Given the latters' potential for demanding a greater share of developmental benefits, the PRI acts as an efficient control instrument for regulating votes and chanelling public unrest.

For all practical purposes it is therefore a governmental apparatus that closely watches over the various strata of society by coopting those that might have an impact upon the polity. Periodically, the government party conducts new membership drives. In july 1967, the PRI hoped to achieve a total of seven to eight million registered members. This would mean that about 50% of all eligible voters would be party members (Furtak 1969; p. 340). Even if this figure is too high to reflect actual party membership, it still does indicate that a large part of the population, in one way or another, must be counted as formally organized members. How much control is actually exercized on an individual level is of course another question. In any case, the point we want to make is that a majority of the Mexican population is effectively excluded from making any claims upon public service organizations, or

said differently, do not constitute an active constituency.

In our specific context, this means that the behavior of large public service organizations can be effectively kept from being checked by its clientele. Its responsiveness is restricted to a small minority (that also manages its structure) rather than directed towards the constituency it formally professes to serve. On the basis of physical size alone, i.e. the small circle to which public service organizations respond, it is therefore plausible that we will find patterns of organizational interaction and individual behavior governed by the principles of Gemeinschaft, naturally prompted and reinforced by external institutional factors, as we have tried to demonstrate, in earlier sections.

In addition to processes of political control of the masses, sheer economic facts of income distribution demonstrate that the majority of the Mexican population is effectively excluded from benefiting from the policies of industrial development in the name of which they are actually being sacrificed. A look at patterns of income distribution (Table II) reveals little changes over time, except for the highest strata whose share has dropped consistently from 1950 to 1963. In 1968, for instance, 80% of the population controlled only about 43% of the national income. Hansen states it more inequivocally: "early in the 1960's it was estimated that between two-thirds and three-quarters of the Mexican population was outside the market for many modernday products"

TABLE II

Personal Income Distribution 1950, 1957, 1963, and 1968

(in percent)

Percentages of families in decreasing order		Percentages of income			
		1950	1957	1963	1968
	50	19.1	15.5	15.5	17.1
	30	21.1	23.0	25.5	26.3
	20	59.8	61.4	59.0	56.6
highest	5	40.0	36.5	29.0	-
highest	1	23.0	16.0	12.0	-

Sources: 1950 and 1957, Ifigenia M. de Navarrete, La Distribución del Ingreso y el Desarrollo Económico de México, México, Instituto de Investigaciones Economicas, Escuela Nacional de Economía, 1960.

1963, Banco de México, Encuesta sobre Ingresos y Gastos Familiares en México -- 1963, México, Banco de México, 1967.

1968, Banco de México, La Distribución del Ingreso en México, México, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1974.

(Hansen 1971; p. 216-217). Although there is a discussion about whether the market has demonstrated to be flexible enough or not, the fact remains that a sizable portion of the population is effectively barred from it [21].

Within the general parameters of development policies, government and the socio-political conditions of society provide the framework

Within which the private sector must operate, cashing in upon the ample opportunities supplied by the state that fills in for necessary investments and provides for complementary economic activities. The important point to be kept in mind is the primacy of government over private interests, with the former laying out the rules.

In terms of organizational environments this symbiotic relationship has resulted in the creation of secure environments for both public and private sectors. Whereas government enjoys almost unlimited autonomy of action in preparing the ground for industrial development, private organizations can count upon its protection. Vernon relates some of the more concrete aspects of that situation. Though somewhat outdated, the picture he conveys may still be considered valid today. During the presidential campaign of Alemán in 1946, business interests approached government by requesting protective measures that went from guaranteeing minimum purchases by state agencies to restricting certain competition, or even outrightly prohibiting the establishment of new production facilities (Vernon 1965; p. 162). In short, the Mexican entrepeneur could always count upon a protected domestic market with little or no interference from international competition and with the whole backing of government.

This intimate relationship between business and government is further reinforced and institutionalized by the particular form of

organization of industrial firms. By law, any firm but the smallest must belong to either one of two federal chambers, the Confederation of Industry of Mexico (CONCAMIN) or the Confederation of National Chambers of Commerce, (CONCANACO). Although they do not officially belong to the government, they are constantly being consulted over economic policy decisions. As Hansen puts it:

> "..interaction between the various business chambers and the government is by now institutionalized and continous. The chambers frequently phrase their demands in the form of proposed legislation; on other occasions they submit amendments to pending legislation at the invitation of the government. Their representatives now sit on numerous public-sector regulatory and advisory commissions and a host of other government bodies".
>
> (our emphasis) (Hansen 1971; p.108)

In the case of a third organization, the National Chamber of Manufacturing Industries (CNIT), the relation between government and private sector is even more straightforward. Its members are primarily recruited from the ranks of recently established business firms (the ones most in need of protection). Within this chamber, they have found a common platform advocating continous and close contact with official state organisms. Hansen aptly summarizes the policy exchange in the following way:

> This new group of industrialists, "more than the older established firms, needed tariff protection, tax incentives and government-financed assistance. In return for such support they endorsed government policies of land reform and social

welfare, and the unionization of Mexican labor".

(our emphasis)

(Hansen 1971; p.109)

On the basis of this evidence, we can suggest how patterns of close cooperation between public and private sector reinforce each other. On the one hand, the compatibility between those two sectors is furthered by the general conditions of development, as government fixes the general framework within which the private sector may develop its activities. On the other hand, the state is dependent upon the latter if it wants to implement successfully its industrialization program.

Under such symbiotic conditions, organizational structure and behavior in both governmentand industrial sectors should develop peculiar forms. For instance, with government managing about 90% of all import licences, the adequacy of a product becomes less important for the private businessman than his relations with the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, since the latter may help him to jump certain legal barriers. This is a very important point, because it shows the tendency of private industrial organizations to respond to official policies rather than to imperatives of their own such as marketing, product diversification, or research and development.

In the particular case of R. & D, additional factors peculiar to developing countries are responsible for business seeking close government cooperation. In a country where new products almost always find captive markets or, said differently, where businessmen enjoy a near monopolistic position, there is little reason to impulse R & D activities, vigorously engage in intensive marketing or, in general, improve the quality of products. If a business firm introduces a new product, government will always protect it, even in cases where the latter may be outdated from the start. Hence, success for a businessman depends more upon entertaining good relations with those governmental agencies that control the general guidelines of economic activity than upon objective market conditions. In a situation of general scarcity, the problem of efficiency simply does not come up seriously enough to be considered. Even in a country like Mexico which already possesses a widespread and diversified market structure, competition is preponderantly oriented toward obtaining competitive advantages over rivals from government institutions, rather than from winning customers by simply being "better". In other words, how good a firm is at selling is a lot less significant than how good it is at fostering friendly relations with government [22/]. The consequences of overprotection on the one hand, and the sexenio, that is, the periodic upheavals in government due to the six-year personnel reshuffle on the other, combine

to foster conservative behavior among industrial firms. Organizational policy will tend towards self-containment which permits greater autonomy of decision, while minimizing possible adverse effects from the immediate environment such as a change of administration. As for the direct relationship between government and private business, emergent patterns will be stamped by the expediency of Gemeinschaft, simply because institutionalized ways are slower and more uncertain, given constant shifts over general policies.

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Social linkages and career mobility: The question of organizational behavior.

We have postulated that the explanation of behavior in organizations within or across national boundaries comes from two sources: institutional-historical factors and immediate environment. Based upon what has been said so far, we will now repeat our initial question: why is it that organizations in countries like Mexico do not function "properly", despite the fact that their range of outputs and functions have been spelled out in great detail, and their organizational structure designed to correspond to those tasks in the most rational (in the Weberian sense) way possible. One answer we already suggested is that they are indeed very efficient, but not in the conventional sense of the term. The reason, as we pointed out, lies in the Gemeinschaft strain that influences the mix of task and power-related performances. The

concrete end result of this process is that large public service organizations in countries like Mexico are often closer to being mutual benefit associations (of their members) than commonweal organizations in terms of the Blau & Scott typology.

Another explanation lies in the consequences of group linkages peculiar to Mexico, as they are both shaped and disrupted by post-revolutionary institutional mechanisms. Every six years, the Primer Jefe (the President), at once the head of state and of his own ample super- camarilla, has to leave office, following which governmental bureaucracy initiates a complete reshuffling of its personnel. This bureaucratic change follows certain patterns. The patron-client relationship, embodied in the camarillas, emanates from top to bottom and not vice-versa. The Primer Jefe surrounds himself with political and economic strongmen who themselves head camarillas of their own. Within each of those groupings, other people of lower rank will constitute, at some point, leaders of even smaller supporting groups. What we encounter, therefore, is a chain of dependency relationships from top to bottom. It is now obvious that when the top man leaves office, all his immediate followers will have to go too. Considering that each one of these had been the head of a camarilla of his own, it follows that most lower ranks will also have to leave. The following concrete example will illustrate this problem:

> "Reordering of the Cabinet: A new Secretary brings in his own faction of faithful followers, because the secretary as much as the President depends upon absolute loyalty. I have seen that when the Secretary of Agriculture goes to Foreign Affairs, all employees -in one case down to the doorkeeper- go with him".
>
> (Tannenbaum 1963; p. 253).

On the other hand, it is important to keep in mind that the loss of position of a leader immediately implies the probable (although not certain) dissolution of the contractual relationship with his supporters. What are the implications for bureaucratic functioning?. Following the logic we have been expounding, it means chaos: the kind that has led most observers of Latin American bureaucracies to associate bureaucracy with pathology. But precisely because the quality of services rendered to recipients is only of secondary importance, at least in the cases of public service bureaucracies, organizational behavior such as red tape, tortuguismo (slowdown), buck-passing, rigidity, inflexibility, oversecretiveness and unwillingness to delegate decisions must be interpreted as a function of personalization and group coherence rather than from a conventional perspective of organizational rationality. From a wider sociological angle, such organizational behavior, again, must be considered as a reflection of dominant institutional factors, in this case, the Gemeinschaft strain.

If we abandon the perspective of "global rationality" to focus on individual rationality, the behavioral consequences of this six-year

cut become understandable. For one, it implies rapid bureaucratic turnover, even within the same sexenio, that makes long range projects a virtual impossibility. Resources available to any organization must be spent immediately, given the certainty that other people with different priorities will soon take over. This system of constant change has the latent property of reminding everybody that his bureaucratic status is fragile and subject to revocation at any moment. Naturally, this fosters behavioral patterns that may conflict with requisites to fulfill complex technical tasks. Furthermore, it stresses non-committent and conservative attitudes.

As a result, there is little propensity for taking risks in decisionmaking, because an error almost certainly means the loss of bureaucratic office. At the lower levels of government, for instance, this situation has given rise to what has been called "plazismo": "especially at the local level, rapid rotation in office, scarcity of resources, unwillingness to take risks, and personal ambitions untempered by the necessity of standing for election combine to produce an inordinate number of public projects with low developmental importance" (Fagen & Tuohy 1972; p. 29). Hence, public spending is done in a visible and politically expedient fashion, usually including projects of public interest that do not hurt anybody, such as a big Zócalo, a new park or a grandiose "glorieta" (a city square). As Fagen and Tuohy state.further, such projects "can be completed in a relatively short time and thus accrue

wholly to the reputational capital of the incumbent ... they are for all people and thus require no hard choices as to what sector or project should receive scarce resources" (Fagen and Tuohy, 1972 p.29).

Up to this point, such patterns do not differ drastically from any found in the United States. A candidate for elective office will promise everything, but choose the course of least political conflict once an incumbent. However, this identity of behavioral patterns is only superficial. In Mexico, civil servants are not loyal to their clientele de jure, but to those who have power over their success or failure in office. Bureaucratic decision and behavior follow patterns that are designed to enhance careers in a pyramidal fashion, so that the lower ranks indirectly profit from the chief's ascent in a tricle-down manner. As long as they comply with the rules, they indirectly further their own careers. In such conditions, any technical problem, in the purest sense, actually constitutes a political question to be solved on the basis of personal considerations. Technical competence may help, but under no circumstances is it the primary requisite [23].

Translated into specific behavior patterns, those basic conditions define a good bureaucrat, or better, an efficient bureaucrat, as one who acts in accordance with the wishes and needs of his patron(s) without ever bothering him (them), particularly when a certain problem awaiting

solution is handed down to him. It is expected of him that he "do away" with it, without disturbing his superiors. The latter have to dedicate their time to more important things (albeit their political survival), than being concerned about what their bureaucratic posts technically demand. This means that only middle and sometimes even lower ranks will indulge in making important decisions that not only affect their particular environment (department or office) but often the general direction of the whole organization. Only with a few exceptions will the higher ranks make decisions beyond those of a general and non-controversial policy such as voting for economic autonomy, welfare programs, etc...

Those behavior patterns are repeated over and over again in different bureaucratic contexts. In the case of intermediate ranks, they must be careful not to expose themselves too much for two reasons. First, their patron can fall from favor, and those who associated with him too closely will be identified with him and almost certainly share the same fate. Second, any important decision, by definition, will be more controversial and hence more conflictive. Considering the quiet understanding that the middle rank bureaucrat should let nothing embarrassing come to public light and hence reflect upon his patron, it is therefore clear that he will postpone important decisions until the last possible moment, or will try to avoid them entirelly. As Fagen and Tuohy put it: "The good administrator is thus above all a manager of hierarchically

delegated responsabilities and a manipulator of the public environment, not a responsible or responsive public servant" (Fagen and Tuohy, 1972; p.27)

This fundamental situation of loosely defined responsibilities has some further consequences. As we said, while on the one hand a bureaucrat's career depends upon his attachment to a sponsor, he is also very much aware that he stands to lose his gains the very moment his leader falls from grace. Hence the smoothing out of problems by the lower level bureaucrat ultimately means enhancing his own trajectory. However, the success of his actions is wholly dependent upon arbitrary criteria, because their effect is, in turn, dependent upon the interests pursued by his superior. What this in fact means is that the behavior of superiors and lower ranks follow parallel courses instead of being contingent upon each other. The chief, and at the same time head of a camarilla, pursues his goals of politicking with all their proper requirements, while his followers in the bureaucratic ranks comply with the functions and requisites their superior is supposed to fulfill.

The political primacy of bureaucratic behavior has further complications that have often been described in terms of a "musical chair" conduct. The rather limited time-span of holding office in conjunction with the personal interests of the office-holder make bureaucratic -

rotation a built-in component of organizational change. To what extremes this can lead in the Mexican case is conveyed by the following quote:

> "A few years ago, I asked a friend of mine in Mexico, now a well-known personality: Where will you be next time when I come back to Mexico? Every time I visit this country, you are in a different position. Once you were heading the land office in the Census Bureau, then you went to the National Railroad Administration, after that, one could find you in the tax office of the Treasury, and later you became oficial mayor in the Ministry of Public Education. Where will be you next time I come back?" We had been walking. He suddenly stopped and said earnestly: "I will be either in the Cabinet or in prison and one or the other thing will be completely accidental".
>
> (Tannenbaum 1963; p.252)

The practical consequence of this kind of situation is that it cannot be in a bureaucrat's interest to be too closely identified with a particular leader; but neither can he allow to be qualified as a "neutral" follower. This paradoxical situation requires extensive shifting and maneouvering on the part of the bureaucrat in order to gain enough security for himself. Often this consists in making a lot of contingency plans in case of abrupt changes. In fact, the administrator has to resort to what Riggs calls "strategic spending", like giving expensive parties, wearing fashionable clothes and indulging in a number of other activities that insure the constant attention of his superiors. But it also puts considerable strains on individual capacity for "being politically flexible", as the following quote illustrates.

> While Mr. X was Director of Credit, he played squash every week with Mr. Y. After he had left his post as Director of Credit, the squash game ceased. Then one day the ex-Director of Credit ran into his former squash partner and asked what had happened to their squash game. The man replied, "Oh, I still play golf every week with the Director of Credit".
>
> (Purcell & Purcell, 1977)

Naturally, such conditions more often than not mean the non-solving of problems, that is, deferring them indefinitely on the "Waiting list". Almost by definition, then such supposedly good administrative characteristics as innovativeness, initiative and responsability are not only not rewarded, but are actively discouraged because they can potentially disrup the smooth top to -bottom organization of bureaucracy and its informal functioning. People with such qualities are regarded as politically naive, and rightly so, considering the social setting. Seen from this perspective therefore, bureaucracy, its tasks, functions and goals, look more like a personalized matter whose structures have been adapted to the idiosyncracies of its human members than like a standard response to given problems.

In terms of organizational outputs, this situation can have additional implications. When we consider governmental bureaucracies as technical organizations geared at solving problems competently and efficiently, there is a paramount need for experienced personnel. After all, government, even in countries like Mexico, is doing something. Nevertheless,

even if a large pool of educated, experienced and competent bureaucrats existed (which is not the case in Mexico, where they are scarce), it would have little impact upon bureaucracy considered as a system of solving purely technical problems. The first obstacle, as mentioned earlier, is the limited time-span of office-holding. Thus, any bureaucratic position above clerical-type jobs is essentially political, given the general institutional framework we have presented. Individual competence and professional training therefore constitute a clear second to private politicking (grilla).

In these conditions, if bureaucracy is to function at least minimally, it becomes necessary to establish even more personalized ties among bureaucratic heads. That is to say, because of the absence of bureaucratic expertise and low degrees of effective formalization, the demand for absolute dependability represents the foremost requisite for a bureaucracy to be functioning at all.. We encounter the structural embodiment of this requisite in the hombres de confianza. This peculiar stratum of bureaucrats is solely devoted to their superior (chief of a clique) who amply rewards their loyalty with material and political kickbacks, which characterizes the relationship as a reciprocal and contractual arrangement (Grindle, 1977). At the same time, this solution (if one may call it that way)assures strict compliance with hierarchy. In this limited sense, bureaucracy can reach high levels of efficiency.

One important piece of evidence that the relative "technical" importance of the tasks performed by a public bureaucracy does not basically affect these patterns is furnished by Greenberg's study of the Mexican Ministry of Hydraulic Resources (Greenberg, 1970). This governmental bureaucracy represents one of the most technically oriented public institutions, yet its political leverage within the Mexican public administration system is minimal.[24/]

Given its rather narrowly defined range of technical competence, such as building hydroelectric dams and creating irrigation systems, this organization supposedly should resemble industrial organizations. Nevertheless, in his analysis, Greenberg characterizes this Mexican bureaucracy as both politicized and partisan. Basically he follows the Riggsian model of prismatic society, whereby the orientation of bureaucracy is one where the acquisition of power overrules questions of implementing governmental decisions. Since the problem of power is tied to individuals because of the personalistic nature of interaction, the consideration of loyalties toward peers and friends instead of the organization is paramount. In the Ministry of Hydraulic Resource, therefore, the question of "making it" follows the very patterns we have spelled out all along.

Where recruitment is concerned, technical specifications for running this Ministry make it imperative to consider applicants

broad general requirement for technically trained personnel, the selection process quickly becomes very personalistic, obeying the informal patterns of social intercourse and political expendiency. As Greenberg concludes:

> "The Ministry demands technical expertise in the vast majority of its confidence positions, and that factor becomes paramount in the recruitment of personnel. At the same time, technical personnel are selected from that group of engineers which is in political favor at any given time... At the level of specific positions, moreover, the selection process becomes highly personal. It is at this point that 'whom you know' becomes more important than 'what you know'.

Greenberg goes on to tell us more about the specifics of recruitment such as the use of recommendation letters from high-ranking politicians. Such practices are possible because any test of technical competence concerning applicants is at the discretion of recruiting officers.

In short, organization man in Mexican society is first and foremost a social man, as defined by his particular group affiliations. As we have tried to argue, organizational requirements constitute dependent variables of this basic disposition. Thus, problems are not attacked and solved on their own merit, but based upon whether a hierarchical superior defines them as such. The input-side of organizational behavior, moreover, is basically structured by influences which no organization, no matter how well designed, can hope to control. In fact, an or-

The examples we presented in the last part of this article were chosen not only to illustrate some concrete dimensions of our conceptual framework, but also because of their apparently "pathological" characteristics which might be construed as deviant or exotic from the conventional viewpoint of organizational analysis. It has been precisely our goal to demonstrate that those features, whether they refer to bureaucratic recruitment, to certain output functions or to internal group dynamics, find their roots in the surrounding context of history and society. This link may have been acknowledged in sociological literature, including the sociology of organizations, but its theoretical consequences have not been spelled out. In the context of social policy, if those "deviant" factors are judged to be undesirable and detrimental to the efficient functioning of bureaucracy (supposing one knows how to define efficiency), then it becomes impossible to argue that what is needed in the developing countries is technical aid programs that implant good bureaucratic practices among the ignorant natives. As long as nothing changes in the surrounding social and economic system, such endeavors can be no more than sad, illusory, and above all costly masquarades that provide fat consulting fees to Western firms and a convenient progressive front behind which political games can profitably be played for the recipient organization.

Conclusion

The first reason that has prompted us to write this paper was the inability of various strands of organization theory accumulated to-date to offer satisfactory explanations for organizational behavior in the developing countries. As we have argued, whenever a genuine attempt at explaining bureaucratic behavior in those countries has been made, it has lied outside of the theoretical frameworks reserved for respectable Western bureaucracies, and has usually consisted in catch-all factors such as "culture" or "underdevelopment". No matter how obscurely technical the language of such works may have been, they have gone no further than telling us, in the final analysis, that bureaucracies in the developing countries don't work in the same way as in Western societies, because, somehow, they are "different".

Yet, this very inability of established paradigms to account for the apparently deviant behavior of non-Western bureaucracies prompted a further question, far more portentous, namely, whether those established paradigms had even gone as far as accounting for bureaucratic behavior in those industrialized nations for which they have been supposedly tailored. We found, indeed that these paradigms had produced some models of behavior, but that these

strangely clashed with reality as it confronts us every-day. The reason was, we argued, that these were not models derived from direct observation of behavior, but behavior inferred from theoretical constructions in which individuals played no theoretically central part, but only affected predictions insofar as their emotional needs interfered with the accuracy of such models.

We now have to make good our further claim that current models have been little more than comfortable myths, and that a closer look at non-Western bureaucracies can enlighten us considerably as to how people actually behave in the bureaucracies of Western and non-Western nations alike. In order to find a common key to both kinds of societies, we have argued that there was a need to change the basic analytical premises on which most organizational analysis rests, namely that the starting point should be the individual, with all the historical, cultural and personal paraphernalia that he culls from his social experience in and out of the organization, and uses in order to survive and prosper in it on the basis of whatever payoffs may be available. As a result, organizations can be analyzed as far more permeable social constructions and individual actors in them become key reflectors and activators of major social mechanisms.

What, then, should be the special advantage that we claim for

developing countries over Western industrialized societies in order to bring out this "society-in-organization" analytical scheme? In our opinion, mainly their simplicity. In such countries, the all-powerfulness of the state and the clear-cut division between elites and non-elites simplify greatly the task of inferring the impact of the socio-historical environment on individual strategies and the role of individual social linkages on processes of mobility. There are no clearly different and analytically separable social arenas in such countries, because they are institutionally and organizationally sparse. In such conditions, expectations match reality far more easily than in highly differentiated and highly complex systems, such as those found in the United States, where everyone naively expects all organizations to work like the Bell System. When confronted with contrary evidence from other arenas, such as health or education delivery systems that are based on entirely different interest and power structures, rather than abandon cherished myths, disappointed observers are likely to attribute failure to technical inability easily remedied by more funding and more training. Thus, in societies like the United States, the "deviant" organization (Police departments, prisons, hospitals) is as likely to be swept under the carpet as "untypical" as bureaucracies in the developing countries, and dismissed with the simplistic diagnosis

that it does not work properly because it needs more and better-quality inputs. Theoretical double-talk therefore functions just as well within the same society as between different societies.

What we have proposed in this paper is precisely to single out such "sick" organizations as more fruitful for investigation, which makes BCD's more promising than most. Nevertheless, the use of the term "sick" should not be construed as related in any way to the notion of rationality, as we have repeatedly argued that apparently pathological bureaucracies can be very rational indeed. By describing them as "sick", we are really making a statement of moral disapproval, placing ourselves on the political side of powerless and cheated service recipients, while recognizing that the system has its own gruesome rationality.

From a theoretical standpoint, "healthy" organizations, that is, those that display consensus between goals, participants, beneficiaries and supporters are just as interesting as "sick" ones. For the social scientist to single out the latter, therefore, is to make a non-intellectual choice and opt for denouncing forces in society which he (or she) deems undesirable or destructive. As morally commited scholars, therefore, we chose to denounce what we believe to be wrong with certain kinds of organizations, so as

to prevent (as much as our lowly political status will permit) the slick politicians of our societies from reinforcing the status quo by claiming that more funding and more training will solve the problems of bureaucratic inefficiency.

Therefore, the arguments which we have presented in this paper should not be construed as a disguised attempt to justify covertly the malfunctions of bureaucracy. As a generalized phenomenon in the developing countries, it provides the sad spectacle of self-defeating societies in which individual shortsighted selfishness condemns the whole system to stagnation and regressive change.

But to stop at such a judgement would reveal an overly narrow perspective, namely that organizations are, somehow, supposed to be instruments of progress, when in fact, they can be no better or no worse that the society that surrounds them. Nevertheless, we reserve our right to judge entire societies as unjust and crippling, while considering bureaucracies as mere reflections of such general conditions. To blame bureaucracies exclusively for generalized social ills would go no further than singling out an ill-chosen sociological scapegoat.

Quite apart from moral considerations, we fell that the view

presented here, in addition to challenging traditional methodologies, gives old questions a new ring. For example, we can no longer be satisfied with pointing out that given behavior is, or is not conducive to organizational survival, because the further question of survival for whom and at whose cost must immediately prompt itself. With such questions, the political dimension of organizational sociology can no longer be ignored, and we may at last attend to the serious criticism on the part of marxists that any sociological perspective that fails to bridge the gap between concrete empirical facts and larger historical forces is at best an idle excercise and at worst tacit acceptance of the status quo.

This means that the internal mechanisms of organizations as well as their exchanges with their environments must be set squarely within the socio-historical context of given class structures. Seen from such a perspective, organizational sociology is no longer an isolated speciality that may be arbitrarily chosen from a heterogeneous shopping list such as those generally displayed in introductory textbooks. Instead, it becomes the stage for vital social processes and the indispensable link to understanding them.

However, we do not want to leave the stage just by diagnosing

that there is something "wrong" with organization theory or that there has been a basic misconception about approaching the subject of inquiry. We would also like to propose some general ideas as to where we should go from here.

In a large part we think that the development proper of the various disciplines concerned with organization in all its multiple facets has been responsible for the relative inability to explain so-called "deviant" cases. The relentless pursuit of the empirical without a concomitant advance in theory-building has prompted the rise of various subdisciplines within one area of interest which has made it increasingly difficult to reconcile disparate results under one topic. Expressed in a more popular fashion it has become difficult to visualize the forest because too many trees (empirical research) stand in the way. Hence, some regrouping of organization theory is called for, particularly in regard to merging it with general social theory.

In what way does the vision we propose remedy this conceptual dispersion? Although our role has been more of muck raking than building in this paper, we have first made an attempt to merge historical, structural and situational(individual strategies) factors usually kept separate in most organizational analyses and

second, we have attempted to reconcile structure with an action-oriented view of reality. No doubt, we have left many conceptual gaps and ambiguities in the process, which should be mercilessly pointed out (we hope) by future critics. Whatever on fate in their hands may be we, hope, at the very least, to have convinced the most sceptical that there is something basically wrong with established sociological ways of analyzing organizations, so that they won't be so harsh on pointing out obvious inadequacies in the alternatives proposed.

What has encouraged us in our iconoclastic impulse is that we feel we are no longer alone in denouncing traditional ways of analyzing organizations. Although we cannot claim to be standing on the shoulders of giants, at least, some establishment sociologists have already thrown the first stones, (as they should, since they are more likely to be listened to than more peripheral scholars). Thus, we have already been told that most features of organizational structure are not technically necessary, but mythical instruments designed to bolster legitimacy (Meyer, 1977), that organizations are used by established interest groups (Alford, 1975, Perrow, 1977) and that these can form various patterns of organization borrowed from society rather than manuals of organization (Zald and Berger, 1978).

Generally speaking, such views seem to be "bringing men back in", as we had hoped for, and restore the link between organization, society and history which the old European masters had handed us as an inseparable symbiotic unit, and which we had so carelessly partitioned.

FOOTNOTES

1. In disregard of all definitional subtleties, the terms bureaucracy and organization will be used interchangeably in this essay to refer to collective endeavors of permanent character.

2. It does not help to counter-argue that mechanisms of supervision and control will prevent that from happening, because that would be assuming that only lower participants are tempted into deviance, when in fact, higher participants have much more to gain by it and many more resources at their disposal to remain undetected.

3. One other point may be worth mentioning: special emphasis has been given to the Japanese experience - the only case of a non-Western developing country which has "made" it into the priviledged club of the industrialized, westernized and thus modernized countries.

4. e.g., the social benefits of bringing India's birth rate from 1.6 to 1.2 may be enormous, but not visible enough or socially valued, and there is too much time-lag between activating the policy and its results.

5. Besides, delivering licences would depress the bribe opportunities that his subordinates may take advantage of by catching drivers on the road without licences, and consequently, earn him their enemity rather than their respect. Creating economic opportunities for them by not delivering licences therefore constitutes an additional political resource at the chief's disposal which he uses to win allegiance from his subordinates more effectively than by enforcing rules and regulations. The public loses, but that is of no consequence. seen in this perspective, the process is therefore not "idiotic",as Stinchcombe wrongly presumed (Stinchcombe, 1974, p.10,SIC), but highly rational.

6. Such conditions exist in many developing countries where unions have acquired considerable power in exchange for their cooperation with government. It also seems to be the case in many Western societies, at least in tre case of civil servants.

7. By implication, this view of history also repudiates the use of so-called historical explanations that link in a mechanical way century-old patterns of behavior to contemporary processes by virtue of "traditions" dragged out century after century as social residues of bygone ages miraculously left intact by processes of social change.

One example of this kind of explanation is corruption in Latin America in terms of the practices of the Spanish Crown in its colonies, another is marital instability among black families in the U.S. in terms of slavery. Both arguments inmediately make water when confronted with comparative empirical data of societies with radically different historical backgrounds. Corruption flourishes in societies that did not have strong historical precedents, and female-headedness of families is characteristic of the urban poor since the very beginning of the industrial revolution, regardless of slavery.

8. We cannot use here the classical primary-secondary dichotomy of social relations, since this concept is supposed to differentiate intrinsically from extrinsically valued relations. As we shall argue, this neat separation is not possible in developing societies, and not generalized in Western societies.

9. It is interesting to note that minority groups such as Blacks and Women U.S. society have rarely suscribed to this view...

10. We shall consider the sum total effect of such strategies for the organization as a whole as a separate by-product of processes of individual strategies which may turn out to be system-preserving or system destroying, not a priori, but according to the structure of opportunities as we shall analyze it.

11. It can be argued that the upper class are just as mobile or more, but in their case, distances do not have the same significance. It does not present the same barrier to frequent face to face interaction, as distance represents more money than time. Besides, they are not as dispersed over the territory as the middle class, as they tend to concentrate in large metropolies.

12. In addition to informal channels of interaction, the high positions that upper-class members usually occupy in organizations allow them to interact with a higher range of people in similar positions in other organizations than would be possible for middle-range participants.

13. In the case of Mexico, for example, the old land-owning upper class has been virtually destroyed by the revolution, while the new upper class is constituted by those who have been closely associated with the "revolutionary family" or the new emerging industrial elite.

What a social revolution has finalized in Mexico has been achieved by more gradual economic processes in the rest of the underdeveloped world, whereby economies have changed from an export to an import substitution base. This, in turn, has given rise to a new social elite and relegated the old land-owning families to a secondary position.

14. In addition, it should be pointed out that there is no a priori reason why an organization that does not deliver services efficiently to its recipients de jure should be considered as any less rational or efficient than one that does. The first may have oriented its rationality toward serving other kinds of clients, such as its members or those of other selected organizations. Official goals are therefore quite irrelevant to judging the rationality or efficiency of an organization.

15. Some have argued that the situation in Western democracies is not drastically different, insofar as democratic mechanisms are also very weak and do not constitute effective measures of control upon the behavior of government.

16. It is important to note that we have not included technological change as an important element, as there is practically none that is internally generated. Technology is therefore part of the market and one of the primary sources of dependence from industrial nations.

17. It may also contribute to an aggravation of industrial concentration, as the larger firms are likelier to see sooner the writings on the walls and proceed to necessary internal reforms, while smaller more traditional firms will be swept in these changes.

18. That minimum, however, can be increased by bribes, which goes to show that in given contexts, corruption is a solution rather than a problem.

19. We are not thinking of public concerns that 'normally' lose money, such as public transportation or electricity, but of a wide gamut of public manufacturing concerns that may be found in all sectors.

20/ An indicator of the practical consequences of such loose political arrangements may be the fact that the average tenure of governments was nine months between 1823 and 1855 (cumberland 1968; pp.141-142).

21/ The consequences for industrial organizations in the private sector are clear: restrictions in market size mean equal restrictions upon organizational size and diseconomies of scale. Although such a situation should enhance competitive and innovative behavior, its emergence is effectively inhibited by tariff protection.

22/ What has been described here as the general situation for México, can also be found in certain sectors of the US economy. For large government contractors in military hardware for instance, it is often at least equally important to know well the "right" senators on the Committee for military spending than to offer the "best" pieces available.

23/ The distinction between task-related and power-related performances (which we have drawn) may appear to correspond to that between "técnicos" and "políticos". Nevertheless, although it makes sense to suppose a latent conflict between the expertise of the técnico clashing with the primacy claims of the político, this distinction has little conceptual value in the Mexican case, precisely because the line between administration and plain politics is blurred. The authority derived from technical competence and particular skills has been viewed by many scholars as being in conflict with the demand for control rooted in political position and loyalty. This conception was used in order to "explain" the inefficiency and waste encountered in partially developed countries. The remedy proposed was simply educating more technicians in order to undermine the power of politicians. As we are trying to show, such a perspective ignores the real nature of society, not to mention the objetive forces that are at work forcing técnicos to be políticos in order to survive in any organization.

24/ So much so that following the 1977 "administrative reform" it has been relegated to a level subordinate to a both powerfull and highly politicized Ministry, that of agriculture and Animal Husbandry.

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