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ANGLICAN OPPORTUNITIES IN SOUTH AMERICA
Ivan Vallier
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BUREAU OF APPLIED SOCIAL RESEARCH

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Preface

This report comprises the major findings of an exploratory field study initiated by the Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia University, in December, 1961 at the request of the Advisory Council on Missionary Strategy of the Anglican Communion and the National Council of the Protestant Episcopal Church, U. S. A. The purpose of the study was to obtain information useful in determining whether or not opportunities for Anglican missionary work in South America are evident. In the course of bringing this complex problem into manageable focus, three research objectives were made explicit: (1) to identify significant social and religious trends in selected South American societies; (2) to locate priority social and religious needs within the context of these trends; and (3) to formulate proposals congruent with the Anglican Communion that can contribute to the solution of these needs.

The research was guided and assisted by a project advisory committee which included the following persons: Dr. David Sills, Chairman, presently editor of the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, the Right Reverend Stephen F. Bayne, Jr., S. T. D., Executive Officer, the Advisory Council on Missionary Strategy to the Lambeth Conference, Mr. Warren H. Turner, Jr., Vice President of the National Council of the Protestant Episcopal Church, U. S. A., Reverend Albert T. Mollegen, S. T. D., Professor of New Testament, Language, and Literature, Virginia Theological Seminary, and Reverend John D. McCarty, Executive Director, General Division of Research and Field Study, National Council of the Protestant Episcopal Church, U. S. A.

Four countries were selected as research sites: Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, and Peru. The field work was initiated in Santiago, Chile, during May, 1962. Research activities aimed to reach important materials at three levels of social life: the total society, institutions and organizations, and individual attitudes and behaviors. By September, 1962, the three members of the research team had collected 900 "citizen" interviews, 600 student questionnaires, 70 interviews with key leaders of Protestant and Roman Catholic institutions, 36 interviews with Protestant converts, and numerous informal interviews with Roman Catholic clergy, secular professionals, social scientists, and community leaders. Special trips were undertaken in each country for the purpose of viewing at first hand government projects, religious installations, and social problem areas.

The report may be viewed in three sections. Chapters One and Two are intended as context materials which specify the distinctive features of the social, economic, and political situation. Chapters Three, Four, and Five deal with the religious trends, religious dispositions, and religious missions. Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight deal with the implications of the major findings for future Anglican work.

A division of labor eventually develops in a joint research enterprise. It is most appropriate that this problem receive attention in the present instance.

Dr. David Sills initially developed the research design and wrote the research proposal. His call to the editorship of the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences on the eve of the projects's beginning required that his position as project director be assigned to another

person, Dr. Ivan Vallier. Fortunately, Dr. Sills continually gave of his personal time to participate as a consultant, a critic, and a leader. At every stage the project has benefited from his ideas and research knowledge, his intellectual judgment, and his gentle encouragement.

Dr. William E. Carter served as full-time assistant project director from February through September, 1962. Once he assumed new duties with the Department of Anthropology, University of Florida, he continued part-time to complete his research responsibilities on Protestantism in the four societies. Chapter Five stands as his written contribution to the report. In addition, however, he provided many ideas and submitted numerous interim papers. His intimate knowledge of both religious and social aspects of South America lent valuable assistance to the project.

Mr. Harley Upchurch served as a full-time research associate during the past thirteen months. Mr. Upchurch's efforts were focused on the survey, including field testing the schedule, hiring the national interviewers, and assisting in the processing and analysis of the survey. The results of his work have been submitted earlier as an interim paper and as Chapter Four and in the Demographic Appendix of this report.

Mr. Philip Sidel's competence as data analyst has over the past four months provided that extra hand which in retrospect is so important.

Special thanks are due to the Right Reverend Stephen F. Bayne, Jr., S. T. D., Executive Officer, The Advisory Council on Missionary Strategy to the Lambeth Conference, who graciously invited social science into his

company, and to Mr. Warren H. Turner, Jr., Vice President, National Council of the Protestant Episcopal Church, U.S.A., who ably found the wherewithal to support the research activities and generously served as a liaison between the project and the Anglican Communion. Many thanks are also due Dr. Allen Barton, Director, Miss Clara Shapiro, Director of Administration, and members of the Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia University. In addition, the following persons deserve special mention: Mr. Orlando Sepulveda, Coordinator of Research, the Institute of Sociology, National University of Chile, Santiago; Dr. Gino Germani and members of the Department of Sociology, National University of Buenos Aires; Guillirno Briones, Department of Sociology, University of San Marcos, Lima Peru; Reverend Roger Vekemans, S. J., and Reverend Renate Poblete, S. J., of the Centro Bellarmino, Santiago, Chile; Dr. Jose Miguens and Reverend Justin O'Farrell, S. J., of the Department of Sociology, Catholic University, Buenos Aires; Hernan Godoy, Center of Social Research, Catholic University, Sanitago, Chile; Monsignor Ivan Illich, S. J., Director of the Center of Intercultural Formation, Cuernavaca, Mexico; Reverend Joseph Fitzpatrick, S. J., Chairman, Department of Sociology, Fordham University; Bishop Charles A. Brown, M. M., Santa Cruz, Bolivia; Reverend Robert Gnegy, Methodist Center, Santa Cruz, Bolivia; Dr. Jose Miguez Bonino, Director of Union Theological Seminary, Buenos Aires; Reverend William Senn, Church World Service, Santiago, Chile; Mr. Mario Salazar, Director of American Institute, La Paz, Bolivia; Mr. Gary Fritz, American Institute, La Paz, Bolivia; and Miss Jayne Hahn, Director of Colegio Maria Alvarado, Lima, Peru.

March 28, 1963

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Chapter One

Social Change in Latin America*

The man who desires to travel an unfamiliar river needs to know at least two things. First, that moving water may be either damaging or helpful, depending on one's destination and equipment. Second, he should know the river's special characteristics: its channels, the swiftness of its currents, the conditions of its banks, and its tendencies to flow evenly or turbulently.

Latin America, as a geographical, cultural, and social entity, may be viewed as one great stream of human movement. At the present time the full nature of this stream's direction or the speed of its current are yet to be known and understood. Some observers bring back stories of rapids and waterfalls. Others speak of cross-currents, silted banks, and stagnant pools. A third group reports seeing boat loads of passengers who know neither their destination nor their reason for travel. Other reports indicate there are too many captains and too few oarsmen. Quite clearly, no single authoritative statement has emerged.

This report is an attempt to chart some of the distinctive features of "the Latin American stream" as they bear on the problem of religious missions. Whether for good or bad, a missionary religion inevitably becomes involved in the events and social trends of the host societies. Under certain conditions missions serve as agents of positive social change. They may also provoke unanticipated disequilibrium. This inescapable relation between missions and social change implies that a missionary religion may

* Ivan Vallier.

gain specific advantages from knowing how social change occurs in designated mission societies and the nature of the problems raised by change events.

The keynote in this first chapter is the nature of social change in Latin America. Chapter Two examines comparatively four societies that stand at different points on a continuum of change. Chapter Three deals with Roman Catholicism and its involvement in change. In Chapters Four and Five the group and individual aspects of Roman Catholicism and Protestantism in four societies are reported. Chapters Six and Seven set forth certain implications of the findings for Anglican missionary activity. The Eighth and final chapter contains recommendations derived from the study's findings.

Distinctive Features of Social Change in Latin America

Field observation and interviews pointed to seven distinct aspects of social change in Latin America.¹ In various degrees these features of social change run through all of the Latin American republics; hence, little attention is given in this chapter to specific regions or individual societies.

Social change in Latin America is discontinuous

Social development and goal achievement in Latin America do not

¹ Several written sources have also been helpful: Richard N. Adams, et. al., Social Change in Latin America Today (New York: Vintage Books, 1961); George M. Foster, Traditional Cultures and the Impact of Technological Change (New York: Harper and Bros., 1962); Kalman H. Silvert, The Conflict Society: Reaction and Revolution in Latin America (New Orleans, Louisiana: Hauser Press, 1961); Frank Tannenbaum, Ten Keys to Latin America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962); and Philip M. Hauser, ed., Urbanization in Latin America (New York: International Documents Service, 1961).

proceed in a straight line over long time periods. Starts and stops, detours and regressions, and alternating cycles of grave instability and authoritarian peace mark the process of social change. In certain instances this unevenness stems from public uncertainty about long-range objectives. Other cases result from a leader's incapacity to muster adequate resources or his failure to capture sufficient popular loyalty for reaching the few goals that are agreed upon. Leaders who race into positions of responsibility on the strength of dramatic coalitions frequently find that programs of concrete action dissolve their guarantee of legitimacy and revive factional disputes along lines even sharper than before. Public programs that hold high priorities on paper are undertaken with vigor and optimism only to be cut short by an over-depleted treasury or the appearance of more immediate problems. Sound administrators who achieve important positions under one political leader find themselves looking for a job when the next man steps into office. Both political direction and bureaucratic process are interrupted and weakened.

Discontinuous social change inevitably produces serious strains in major areas of life. These strains develop from incongruencies that exist between one institutional realm and another. In a stable society institutional forms such as property rights, marriage relationships, political decision-making, the distribution of welfare, and the educational process "fit together" with at least a reasonable degree of mutuality.

Societies caught in the throes of discontinuity on the other hand, show various and often severe incompatibilities. In Latin America one

finds that the educational curricula are "out of step" with the demands organizations make for skills and leadership. Norms and obligations governing family and kinship relationships are obstructive to occupational mobility and personal freedom. Economic policies are too advanced for the financial institutions, including the tax structure.

The product of these various kinds of incompatibilities or discrepancies are many: loss of human talent that the society desperately needs; the development of bottlenecks and patterns of miscoordination; and personal frustrations and interpersonal conflict.

Social change in Latin America prompts "all at once" solutions

Latin American societies lack the head start on problems accompanying social change that many other countries have either learned from historical experience or gained from shrewd planning and responsible action. The disequilibrating processes that occur in societies moving from an earlier level of institutional integration to a more complex social order bring into the open a number of serious problems that press for immediate solution. The catalog in Latin America is a familiar one: inflation, illiteracy, corruption and graft, political fragmentation, low productivity, rapid population growth, and substandard living conditions. In every direction, need is apparent. Small wonder that both the leaders and the populace lend credence and support to any idea or plan that guarantees to immediately set things straight. Successive leaderships have time and time again initiated large-scale and prominent public programs to demonstrate that something is being done: e.g., constructing stadiums, airports, and roadways; opening new universities; or proposing additional welfare plans.

The simplistic "all at once" orientation receives additional prominence from the Latin American's tendency to depend on the government and the powerful politician for solving problems. In shifting responsibility to the leaders, citizens relieve themselves of duty, and, indirectly, place their welfare in the hands of a symbolic father.

Social Change in Latin America aggravates and compounds the political power struggle

It takes "power" to lever a society from one stage of development to a second one. This "power" may arise from locally-organized associations that band together for purposes of bringing pressure on national leaders. Power may also have its source in the character structure of individuals who in realizing their own ambitions carry the society forward to a new stage. Power may also stem from the authoritarian control of centralized governments. The case of Soviet Russia in the first two decades following the revolution of 1917 stands as a ready example.

Latin American societies lack, in many respects, the capacities to rely on either the local-association of power or the power stemming from the expression of character structure. This throws an enormous burden on the formal, centralized political machinery and the use of this power for either making changes or controlling changes that already are in motion. This "top to bottom" pattern foments political strife and ideological cleavage. Great amounts of human energy are accordingly expended on tactics for capturing the power

positions that provide the requisite authority for bringing things into line. When power positions are so few and so important and when the tendency to favor "all at once" solutions is so ingrained, the relationship of power to social change is thrown into relief.

Social change in Latin America is blocked by an absence of independent leverage points

Social scientists who study the development of Western Europe point out that the rising commercially-oriented cities of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries played a critical role in social change² because they challenged the feudal structures. Members of the powerful political and religious coalitions that anchored the status quo witnessed the emergence of cities made up of a merchant and trading class whose ambitions were economic independence and political freedom. Standing outside the reach of the prevailing powers these cities exerted tremendous pressures that broke the feudal block and initiated a new age. The presence and growth of various types of independent formations is one of the most significant occurrences in societies straining for change.

For the most part, Latin American societies lack these independent foci. The cities of Chile, Peru, Bolivia and Columbia, Ecuador, and even Brazil are citadels of the oligarchy: the Church, the aristocracy, and the military. In contrast to Europe, Latin American cities during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries became the residences of the feudal powers rather than the market

² Bert F. Hoselitz, "The Role of Cities in the Economic Growth of Underdeveloped Countries," The Journal of Political Economy, 61 (June, 1953), pp. 195-208.

place for a commercially-oriented middle class. The people of the land continued in peonage. Agriculture and extractive occupations dominated the economy, and from many perspectives, still do. Even in these cases where the peasants were mobilized to bring about revolution, as in Mexico and Bolivia, the strength of their position has been difficult to maintain.

In the second place, Latin American societies are Roman Catholic and in relative perspective this Catholicism is heavily traditional and ritualistic. Orientations stemming from this religious culture are not directed towards re-making the world in the service of God. One of the hallmarks of early Protestantism, particularly Calvinism, was its emphasis on worldly action as a religious duty. This action was specifically aligned with a set of religious beliefs that defined man as an instrument to bring about the kingdom of God on earth. Again, an outside point of reference for evaluating society and ordering change was provided. The conception of historical process as intimately bound up with moral action precluded an emotional involvement with the present social order. The energetic, committed Calvinist gained, in one sense, an "Archimedean place to stand;" a point of constant leverage that was continually brought to bear on everyday routine.

When Latin American societies are viewed from this perspective the fast-changing political regimes and the fitful starts and stops in social development are easier to comprehend. Coalitions that are engineered on the basis of short-term loyalties cannot be expected to play the role of a consistent and continuing leveraging force. Furthermore, when new movements that offer a challenge begin to take shape, their leadership frequently falls into the hands of intellectuals who, unbeknown to themselves, are unconsciously

3 tied to many of the patterns that are under criticism. Latin American change does not have the benefit of leverage that has proved so important in other modernizing societies.

Social change in Latin America involves more than one level of social life

So far as Latin America is concerned, a distinction needs to be drawn between geographical mobility (population movement), institutional change, and value change. The first, focusing on changes in physical location may, indeed, open the way for the assimilation of different attitudes, new behaviors, and new aspirations. But there is no basis for assuming that movement in space automatically leads to drastic changes at the second level, key institutions: property rights, spouse relationships, business practices, and the political party system. Movement from country to city or from one town to another may in fact stimulate regressive tendencies, predisposing the people involved to hold on to old forms and to defend them at all costs. The present in-migration of rural peasants to the metropolitan centers of Lima, Santiago, and Buenos Aires appears, actually, to reduce considerably the society's possibilities for moving ahead at the level of institutions. Problems that arise in connection with the migrants' routine needs drain off scarce revenues, leadership energy, and administration regulation.⁴ Whereas institutional change may be benefited by increasing the strength of local and provincial governments, the clustering of populations

³ Thomas R. Ford, Man and Land in Peru (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1955), p. 142.

⁴ J. Medina Eschavarria and Philip M. Hauser, "Rapporteurs' Report," in Philip M. Hauser, ed., op. cit., 1961, pp. 55-58.

to the big cities interrupts this needed change. Ad hoc solutions to immediate and local problems, rather than planned changed sequences for the total society, take first priorities, resulting in detours, confusion, and a loss of direction.

Third, geographical mobility differs even more importantly from "value change." Values are a people's conceptions and standards that define and make meaningful their relations to other men, to the world, to time, and to authority. Values are "built into" the personalities of people. They are modified only very gradually. Accomplishing changes in values requires in most instances, a time span of generations rather than five or ten years. In the broad sense values in Latin America show no indication of radical change. Astute observers, in fact, point out that even the rising middle classes, the more "western" stratum, tend as they move upward to fit their lives into a mold of traditional values. Paternalism, family loyalties, and time-deepened stereotypes prevail. Conceptions of work that de-emphasize physical effort and program efficiency as well as personalistic orientations to administrative procedure are not only present but predominate.

Social change in Latin American is not simply "rapid"

Today Latin America and "rapid social change" are used synonymously. Many observers appear satisfied with this appraisal. Unfortunately, few have seen fit to move beyond an easy generalization and mark off the things that distinguish the nature of this rapid change. It seems worthwhile to note briefly several historical patterns which belie this notion of "rapidity."

1. Political independence has been a distinctive fact in all of these countries, except Cuba and Panama, for at least one-hundred and thirty seven years. Reforms adopted as an outcome of the independence struggles (1810-1830) included, significantly, the abolition of the Inquisition; elimination of the Indian head tax; the abolition of severe weakening of slavery; limiting of the judiciary to the management of justice; encouragement of immigration; the adoption of naturalization laws; and the severing of the caste system from its legal support.⁵

2. Land reform measures have been underway in a few countries for an equally long period. Bolivar's decrees of 1824 and 1825 legalized a program for making the Indian a landowner.⁶ Alvarez's Ley Lerdo, 1856, directed toward a reduction of the Church's power in real estate, aimed to provide the Mexican peasants with land.⁷ Alessandri, in 1935, effected a law calling for the expropriation of the non-producing land in Chile for division among the landless.⁸

3. Mass education and literacy programs are not new. Mexico's Obregon (1920-1924) launched plans to educate the whole nation.⁹ Particular attention was given to training teachers, eliminating illiteracy, supplying libraries, and bringing the aboriginal groups

⁵ Mary W. Williams, The People and Politics of Latin America (Boston: Glinn & Co., 1930).

⁶ Thomas R. Ford, Man and Land in Peru (Gainseville: University of Florida Press, 1955), pp. 43-44.

⁷ A Curtis Wilgus, The Development of Hispanic America (New York: Farrar & Rhinehart, Inc., 1941), pp. 401-402.

⁸ Alfred Barnaby Thomas, Latin America, A History (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1956), pp. 415-416.

⁹ Ibid., p. 678.

into acquaintance with Spanish. Between 1853 and 1857, Urquiza in Argentina recognized the need for public education and in that interest provided national subsidies to the province.¹⁰

4. Social welfare has a long tradition, more so in letter than in fact, yet a significant pattern. Chile's Balcameda, (1886-1891) in addition to the founding of primary schools, liceos, normal schools, and the Institute Pedagogice, initiated training programs for instruction in mining, agriculture, and commerce. Modern prisons were built, the penitentiary system was modified, many cities were provided with pure water, more than twenty public hospitals were built, and a superior board of health was created and put in charge of the provincial councils.¹¹ Laws, under Alfaro in Ecuador (1897-1905), legalized civil marriage, permitted divorce, and granted religious freedom.¹² The right to form unions was established by Mexico's constitution of 1917. By 1927 the Confederacion Regional Obrera Mexican (C.R.O.M.) had two and a quarter million members.¹³ Between 1924 and 1927 Mexico

¹⁰ Williams, op. cit., 1930, pp. 662-663.

¹¹ Ibid., pp. 604-605.

¹² Ibid., pp. 545-546.

¹³ Ibid., pp. 488-489.

established free dispensaries and clinics, a new sanitary code was effected, vaccination programs developed and public baths opened.¹⁴

Reform measures have not been uniformly applied. Nor when effected did these laws lead to swift and general social change. One of the distinctive and often unfortunate characteristics of Latin American leaders is their willingness to assume that laws in themselves produce change. This pattern stands out in bold relief from the period of the first constitutions to the present day. This tendency is one of the basic sources of the Latin American's distrust of "the system" and his rank indifference to formal rules. Too often ideas and the accompanying written statutes have been so far removed from realities that no one could possibly follow them. At the same time, one cannot simply disregard this cultural tradition when appraising social change. Many significant, far reaching, reforms have stemmed from this "idea above reality" formula. Neither during the past nor in the present, however, have these changes occurred swiftly.

The need for social change in Latin America has predisposed outsiders to initiate would-be-helpful solutions

The glaring problems of Latin America have not developed unnoticed by interested outsiders. Latin America's plight has evoked both pity and criticism. Occasionally these emotions have led to actions planned to bring about reform or the erasure of pressing local needs.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 490.

Taking a broad perspective, outside efforts fall into three categories: religiously sponsored activities, foreign government projects, and internationally-regulated non-political programs. The religiously-sponsored attempts, carried out almost exclusively by Protestant religious bodies from England and the United States, began early in the 1820's. Pioneer missionaries spearheaded modest school programs that over the century developed into sizable numbers of denominational primary and secondary schools.¹⁵ The importance of literacy for Protestant religiosity led the missionaries to emphasize education within a broader evangelical outlook. In the years following the turn of the century this educational emphasis was broadened. The social gospel trend in the United States prompted the establishment of clinics, hospitals, vocational schools, farms and orphanages. For the most part, this diversified pattern has remained.¹⁶ There are some indications, however, that the "institutional" concept of missions is weakening. This will be taken up in Chapter Five.

It is no surprise to find that religious-sponsored experiments aim to change the social order as well as the religious inclinations of the individual. The prevailing values of the host society are viewed as impediments, therefore in need of change. Educational services geared into religious instruction have provided these groups with a basic strategy.

¹⁵ Webster E. Browning, The River Plate Republics (London: World Dominion Press, 1928), and Webster E. Browning, John Ritchie, and Kenneth G. Grubb, The West Coast Republics of South America (London: World Dominion Press, 1930).

¹⁶ James G. Maddox, Technical Assistance by Religious Agencies in Latin America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956).

Foreign-government projects are a more recent form of experimental change in Latin America. The United States stands as the key sponsor in these activities. Although the United States government has formed inter-societal information expeditions and survey missions since 1838, the key starting point for taking technical assistance to Latin America is the third quarter of the nineteenth century.¹⁷ At the request of the governments of Costa Rica, Guatamala, Peru and Brazil, engineers, astronomers, and geologists were sent to provide assistance in research and reconnaissance work. Agricultural missions, under the Department of Agriculture, followed in Brazil and later in Mexico. After Cuba's "independence," General Leonard Wood took upon himself the task of converting the republic into a small United States. Financial reforms, health and sanitary programs, and a renovated judicial system focused the attack. Public works, railroad construction, and education figured in prominently. Gains of no small significance were made. The Dominican Republic and Haiti played host to similar United States' assistance programs, with varying positive results. But over the years, extending from 1899 to the 1930's, Americans learned that total societies are not changed by technical know-how alone.

The most significant efforts to promote social change in Latin America through U.S. government programs of technical assistance began on the eve of the second World War.¹⁸ The work of the Interdepartmental Committee on Scientific and Cultural Cooperation (ICSCC) is one significant

¹⁷ Merle Curti and Kendall Birr, Prelude to Point Four: American Technical Missions Overseas, 1838-1938 (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1954), especially Chapters Two, Five, and Seven.

¹⁸ Philip M. Glick, The Administration of Technical Assistance, Growth in the Americas (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1957), pp. 6-13.

theme. In 1939 Congress passed a statute which authorized the President to send U.S. employees to provide assistance and advice to Latin American societies upon request.

These requests had been growing since the nineteenth century and were continually being voiced through the Pan American Union which was established in 1890. The ICSCC became the organization for administering these requests. The bulk of the projects stemming from this innovation focused on geological surveys, agricultural methods, statistical services, child welfare, and civil aviation.

The Institute of Inter-American Affairs (IIAA) was established in 1940 as an agency through which joint programs between the U.S. and Latin American countries could be developed and executed. Health, sanitation, food, and education dominated the priority list.¹⁹ Out of this joint effort the well-known servicio²⁰ came into being. A servicio (service) is a special structural arrangement geared into a Latin American governmental ministry with semi-autonomous status, staffed by both nationals and Americans, financed by joint funds, and directed towards the planning and execution of approved projects.

This device, with minor variations, carried the key work of technical missions to Latin America. The Point Four program, begun in 1949, picked up this arrangement as a model for technical assistance throughout the world. Since that time, other types of administrative structures and field policies have emerged. Technical cooperation, at present, proceeds along several organized lines:²¹ (1) technical missions divided

¹⁹ Ibid., pp. 14-18.

²⁰ Ibid., pp. 18, ff.

²¹ Ibid., Chapter 2, "The Choice of Instruments for Effective Cooperation," pp. 51-104.

into "advisory missions," the "operating technical mission," and "training centers;" (2) the economic survey; (3) the servicio; (4) the university contract; (5) training grants for study abroad; (6) private contracts, handled by business firms, contractors, and interested individuals.

The United Nations is the key figure in the execution of the third type of program, internationally-regulated non-political assistance. The United Nation's work is small-scale. Working within a modest budget that has to cover projects in more than twenty-five countries throughout the world, the contribution to Latin American societies is limited. The United Nations efforts in assistance began in 1950. During 1955 the amount for Latin America was set at \$4,613,966. Seven agencies (FAO, UNTAA, WMO, WHO, ILO, UNESCO, ICAO) divided this total, the FAO and the UNTAA receiving the largest amounts, \$1,263,624 and \$1,107,930 respectively.²²

Two key devices are utilized in United Nations work: providing technicians and awarding training fellowships. Among the Latin American countries, Mexico, Brazil, Ecuador, Bolivia, Colombia, and Chile have received the most attention. Argentina has persistently avoided asking for experts, although in 1954 she received seven training grants. Some of the most important efforts of the UNTAA have been directed to the improvement of public administration procedures, the outstanding case being Bolivia from 1951.²³

²² Ibid., p. 227.

²³ Ibid., pp. 240-243.

Two other recent contributors to Latin America's social needs deserve to be mentioned in this context: CARE²⁴ and the Peace Corps. CARE acts as a distributing agency for relief assistance. Surplus food, technical equipment, and clothing articles are allocated through national organizations to relieve acute misery and promote minor development projects.²⁵

The Peace Corps operating throughout selected areas of the world since 1960, had 1111 members working in a dozen Latin American societies during November of 1962. The number is to be increased to 2250 by June of 1963.²⁶ Adopting a local, grass-roots strategy, the Peace Corps directs its efforts through individual technicians who help plan, initiate, and bring to completion small-scale but priority projects. In contrast to the servicio and other government administered forms of technical assistance, the Peace Corps "works at the elbows" of the people, allowing them to define "need," and then proceeding to facilitate a solution.

In appraising these various leverage strategies, three patterns become clear: (1) the reform orientation, (2) the charity or distributive-focused approach, and (3) the facilitating perspective. Religious groups, being value transmitting systems, stress reform. Leverage is exerted on people's ideas, habits, and cultural traditions. Education is not limited to increasing social skills, but rather emphasizes moral conformity to new value standards.

²⁴ Cooperative For American Relief Everywhere, Incorporated.

²⁵ Executive Director's Annual Report to the Board of Directors of CARE, Inc., CARE, U.S.A. (Washington, D.C: 1960).

²⁶ Center of Intercultural Formation Reports, Vol. 1, 8 (January, 1963), p. 390.

Agencies like CARE and governments that provide grants-in-aid typify the charity or "distributive" approach. The objective of these benefit programs is to provide stop-gap assistance at serious points of need. Although latent reforming hopes may be present in these actions, leverage is not directly attempted. Change occurs only in the sense that an existing problem is reduced or solved by the allocation of some priority resource or commodity.

The "facilitating" strategy is the most advanced of the three and, in many respects, the most disciplined. The sponsors are on guard to hold in abeyance their own values and cultural goals. Technical assistance missions provide the most developed form of the "facilitating" approach. The Peace Corps is even more to the line. The host society or the host community is given major responsibility for signalling "need." Within this culturally-defined situation the expert applies his knowledge and skills cooperatively to bring about the desired result.

Summary of Findings

The key findings on the nature of social change in Latin America fall into two major groups: the direction of change and the pace of change.

1. The direction of change: In various degrees, these societies are moving from one level of social integration that was initiated, developed, and fed by the pattern of colonialism to a second level of integration which is being structured along the lines of occupational groups, voluntary associations, small families, and diverse governmental agencies and bureaucracies. All of these societies are "in transition."

Even the most developed ones -- Mexico, Argentina, and Chile -- do not by any means fit into the category of modern industrial societies which would include England, Germany, and the United States. This "transition," breeds discontinuities, ideological struggles, political malfunctioning, and deep anxieties. In the short-run the trends and patterns are unpredictable. But from the long-range point of view the direction is unmistakable. Pluralism, the emergence of diverse bases for achievement and social status, will mean increased competition at all levels of the society, a process for which many Latin Americans are not prepared. While it is patently true that fierce struggles occur around political issues, this is a different type of competition than that required by the growth of impersonal occupational standards and bureaucratic rules. In order to meet the demands of a modern society these countries will have to pass through a long and deep process of education or "socialization." This change will not be gained only through formal education. Other types of leveraging agencies will need to be evolved. The growing strength of nationalism will do much to bring diverse groups into a single frame of reference. Identities that were formerly centered on kinship, community, and regional units will gradually be superseded by byalties to occupational associations, interest groups, and the total society.

2. The pace of change: Latin American development is extremely uneven; gains are frequently eclipsed by egregious set-backs. Movement is much slower than the visiting "expert" assumes. The few successes, such as the anthropological experiment with the Indians at

Vicos, Peru, are certainly to be recognized but not exaggerated. Furthermore, it is wise to keep clear the distinctions made above between geographical mobility, value change, and institutional change. Similarly the dutiful efforts of the missionaries and the technical specialists have not resulted in spectacular accomplishments so far as leveraging societal change. Countries which have or are achieving a firm, institutionalized political process supported by clear-cut parties who carry enough weight to both hold voter loyalties and dominate the government when in power stand to make the greatest development. Power is a crucial resource, but it is a positive force only so far as it is regulated, continuous, and directed. In this respect political resources are perhaps more imperative than finances. A strong government can accomplish a great deal for the economy by its capacity to discipline short-run interests and guide investments strategically. Voluntary groups which aim to facilitate social development in this period of Latin America's development cannot function as a substitute for this political need. Their role, if any, is more along the lines of facilitating new trends that are needed to support and accompany the operations of power.

Chapter Two

Four Societies in Transition*

Argentina, Bolivia, Chile and Peru were chosen as special research sites. This selection aimed to bring into the investigation a limited number of societies representing a wide range of variation along the dimensions of geographical location, population size, ethnic-cultural heterogeneity, urbanization, economic development, and minority religions. The purpose of this chapter is to highlight both the differences and similarities in these four systems, paying particular attention to specific features and problems that signal long-range trends and directions.

The sources of the materials used to portray the four societies are mainly three: 1) interviews with social scientists, journalists, clergymen, technical advisors in government programs, doctors, psychiatrists, social workers, educators, politicians, and social planners; 2) published materials written mainly by social scientists, including historians; and 3) observations and conversations carried out during the course of the field research. Taken together these diverse sources make it possible to point up a series of patterns and issues that, in part as least, cut through the events and complexities of a fascinating group of societies.

The presentation of the comparative materials forced a decision between taking each society in isolation or drawing the analysis of the four societies together under special headings. While the first alternative can be claimed the easier one, the second approach offered several distinct advantages. First, implicit and explicit comparisons can be made as the materials are presented; second, repetition is reduced; and third, opportunities to make general interpretations come more readily.

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Four general dimensions are differentiated out to carry the comparison: (1) the adequacy and accessibility of human and non-human resources, e.g., natural wealth, capital, organizational capacity, and motivation; (2) power and its regulation, with special emphasis on the relation of power to the processes of social control and goal achievement in the total society; (3) social integration and inter-group strain, e.g., factors which facilitate unity and obstruct it, as well as inter-group cleavages and conflict; and (4) sources of frustration and modes of release.

Adequacy and Accessibility of Resources for Economic and Social Development¹

Development or positive social change is heavily contingent on a society's access to and use of various kinds of resources: capital, human skills, organizational know-how, natural deposits, training centers, and

¹The following sources provided background information on these problems: Dudley Sears, "Inflation and Growth: A Summary of Experience in Latin America," Economic Bulletin for Latin America, VIII, 1 (February 1962), pp. 23-51; J. Medina Echavarría and Philip M. Hauser, "Rapporteurs' Report," especially section on "Urbanization and Economic Development," in Philip M. Hauser, Ed., Urbanization in Latin America (New York: International Documents Service, 1961), pp. 34-42; K. H. Silvert, "A Note on Chile and Argentina," American Universities Field Staff Reports Service, West Coast South American Series, VIII, 8 (October, 1961), pp. 18-23; William F. Whyte and Allen R. Homberg, Human Problems of U. S. Enterprise in Latin America (Ithaca, N.Y.: New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University, 1956); Richard W. Patch, "Bolivia Today," American Universities Field Staff Reports Service, West Coast South America Series, VIII (March, 1961); William E. Carter, "Preliminary Report: Argentina," unpublished ms., Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia University, 1962; Talcott Parsons, "Some Reflections on the Institutional Framework of Economic Development," in Structure and Process in Modern Societies (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1960), pp. 98-131; William M. Stein, Hualcan: Life in the Highlands of Peru, Cornell Studies in Anthropology (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1961); Tomas Roberto Fillol, Social Factors in Economic Development: The Argentine Case (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1961); Everett E. Hagen, On the Theory of Social Change (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, Inc., 1962).

communication networks. Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, and Peru are favored along these lines in differing amounts. Each society has abundant natural wealth. In that sense all are "rich." Similarly all four are characterized by population growth, viz., potential manpower needed for increasing productivity. Furthermore land is extensive with many fertile areas scarcely touched, as in Bolivia and Peru. Quite clearly certain kinds of resources are adequate and many are accessible. Yet all four societies are "undeveloped" or semi-developed and in economic difficulties.

Inflation, unemployment, depressed incomes, and low productivity mark all four societies. Bolivia's and Chile's inflationary trends are phenomenal. Income distribution is so badly skewed in Chile, Peru and Bolivia as to make them countries of poverty. Low productivity marks the agricultural sectors of particularly Argentina and Bolivia. Unemployment is a constant feature of all four economies. In order to place these problems in perspective, several distinctive patterns need to be noted.

First, the key mineral deposits that make these societies naturally rich came early into the ownership of foreign companies that possessed capital necessary for their extraction and processing. Second, the revenues gained by the host countries from taxes on these extractive exports provided the national governments with operating finances, thereby relieving the political leaders of a necessity to develop sound fiscal policies and foster industrial diversification.

Chile,² for example, benefited handsomely from taxes on nitrate exports and copper shipments. The ruling elites, themselves the holders of

² David Felix, "Structural Imbalances, Social Conflict, and Inflation: An Appraisal of Chile's Recent Anti-Inflationary Effort," Economic Development and Cultural Change, VIII, 2 (January, 1960), pp. 113-147.

extensive grazing and agricultural lands, freed themselves from tax burdens, thereby pushing the government to a dependency on revenues from the export of one or two products. Subject to the contingencies of an international market, these commodities fluctuated rapidly in price. Public works and long-range economic policies were subject to the same variabilities. Continuity and stability in all sectors of the society appeared as periodic blessings, not things taken for granted.

The "land complex" stands as a third important factor in the poverty of these economies. Through either faulty distribution measures as in Argentina, or political manipulation and force, most of the choice land in these societies came early into the hands of a few owners.³ Unfortunately for the present period, these owners were members of the politically powerful in-group. Furthermore, they lacked agrarian values. Hence land served as a prestige base rather than as a platform for business activity and rural improvement. "Feudal" practices were maintained to provide an agricultural labor force, thereby tying the illiterate peasants to a static social order. Argentinian land owners were somewhat an exception, though with qualifications. The cattle boom in Argentina during the late nineteenth century stimulated meat production for its own sake, opening the way for rationalizing practices and modern methods. These needed developments, however, reached only part way and then stopped, partly because of a drop in the value of produce.⁴ Today Argentina relies on agricultural

³For example: seventy-five per cent of Chile's land is held by five per cent of the landed proprietors. John J. Johnson, Political Change in Latin America (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958), p. 91.

⁴William E. Carter, op. cit., 1962, p. 5.

products for 90 per cent of its exports yet, curiously, production in this sphere is in decline.

Taken together these three patterns, the reliance on a limited number of exports for key revenues, the "feudal" structure of the agricultural system, and the channeling of profits into a traditional, non-business oriented, aristocratic, and non-entrepreneurial elite, early tipped the balance of these economies toward premature specialization and subordinated them to political, short-run interests. Economic development consequently became dependent on the outcome of successive power struggles. Scarce revenues were applied to political goals or used without calculation for solving immediate, visible problems, thereby precluding capital's strategic control for industrial and agricultural growth.

Turning now to a second aspect of the resource problem, that of human skills and human motivation, several other complicating issues need to be examined. The point of view adopted here is that a society's direction and speed of development depends on more than capital, raw minerals, and land. Equally, if not more, important are these: (1) the attitudes of the people toward work; (2) the level of technical skills in the labor force; and (3) the capacity of leadership groups to develop and handle rational organizational forms.

1. The work ethic: Conspicuous in Latin American societies is the relative absence of a strong grass roots orientation to engage in work as a valued activity in and of itself.⁵ Manual work or physical labor is particularly

⁵On this problem, see the following: Tomas Roberto Fillol, op. cit. 1961, p. 16; William F. Whyte and Allen R. Holmberg, Human Problems of U.S. Enterprise in Latin America (Ithaca, N.Y.: New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University, 1956), p. 9; Simon Rottenberg, How

suspect, even more so when it relates to agriculture. Furthermore, work is not strongly calculated or rationalized to reach an effective outcome. Efforts are defined primarily in terms of meeting the requirements of a personal "contract." The fulfillment of one's obligations is expected to bring a certain return, despite the quality of the performance in relation to those returns.

Disciplined work motivation is, correspondingly, problematic. In addition, welfare state measures provide the worker with social security benefits and compensations on bases other than individual performance.⁶ In one sense, the worker is gratified before he proves himself a producer. This pattern is particularly conspicuous in Argentina where the workers, under Peron's administration, were courted with favors all out of proportion to the long-range requirements of economic development.

One present and increasingly important force operating to change worker motivations is the rise of Protestant sects, especially in Chile. Conversion is accompanied by a dedication to work and frugality. Not surprisingly, the Pentecostal convert is in demand by employers of manual labor.

2. Professional and technical skills: Each of the four societies shows a rather impressive university system. Furthermore education at all levels

United States Firms Promote Technological Progress (Washington, D.C.: National Planning Association, 1957), pp. 29-30; Wilbert E. Moore, Industrialization and Labor: Social Aspects of Economic Development (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1951).

⁶"Developments and Trends in Social Security, 1958-1960: Report IV," Bulletin of the International Social Security Association, XV, 6-8 (June, July, and August, 1962); esp. Argentina, pp. 120-122; Bolivia, pp. 122-125; Chile, pp. 133-135; Peru, pp. 154-156.

is stressed to the degree that the facilities are open to all, at no cost. Faculties and certain types of professional schools abound. Yet, Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, and Peru lack adequate reserves of certain human skills that are demanded by urbanizing and industrializing societies.⁷ Physicists, engineers, agronomists, chemists, and biologists, and trained executives, are only too few. On lower levels scarcities exist in farming skills, machine operators, technical repairmen, and the building trades. These societies are top-heavy with middle class professionals whose capacities and tendencies are more fitted to a post-industrial phase of social development than to an emerging phase of economic growth.

However several trends mentioned by informants preclude outright pessimism. First, vocational schools at the secondary level, scientific faculties in some universities, and research-oriented institutes are emerging at a rapid pace, particularly in Chile, Argentina, and Peru. Second, the prevailing traditional curricula at all levels of education are undergoing some modifications, but against heavy resistance. Third, technical advisory programs organized on international lines are being fitted into bureaus of national development and local training centers.⁸ Fourth, university-trained nationals are increasing their professional competences abroad.

The educational systems of these societies operate under several handicaps, not the least of which is the appointment system to university positions. Vacancies are filled according to political or personal criteria,

⁷ Philip M. Hauser, ed., op. cit., 1961, esp. pp. 77-81; and Simon Rottenberg, op. cit., 1957.

⁸ Charles A. Myers, "Management in Chile," in Frederick Harbison and Charles A. Myers, eds., Management in the Industrial World, An International Analysis (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1959), pp. 169-184.

rather than by professional excellence. Furthermore, the faculty are underpaid, forcing upon them other occupations. One's university responsibilities are wedged in with other occupational pursuits, frequently relegating these duties to third or fourth rank attention.

The university system is unprofitable on two additional counts:

(1) the skills of the graduates are increasingly incongruent with the societies' needs, and (2) since the universities are free, gaining revenue from those who could help pay for needed improvements is precluded. According to one respondent, these advanced and full-blown pedagogical systems, are broadly speaking, both an economic dead weight and products of the cultural past.

3. Organization capacity: These societies' capacities to capitalize on useable resources and bring motivation and skills into effective production are hampered, in another important respect, by inappropriate and malfunctioning organizational forms. Over-centralized administratively, tied to personalistic concepts of office, and subject to the whims of strong, paternally-oriented bosses, the machinery of organization flounders. Work programs are constantly interrupted by information delays, contradictory orders, and "paper work." Time scheduling is a luxury, seldom enjoyed.

These patterns are of enormous significance and, undoubtedly, some of the most critical impediments to social development. Organizational know-how and the organizational capacity to initiate, coordinate, and administer combinations of labor skills, authority relations, and technical resources are two of the scarcest commodities in all four societies. Small but significant trends relative to the solution of this problem are, however, discernible. In Argentina and Chile, professional management training

centers aimed toward the development of business executive ability and the rationalization of administrative procedures are developing.⁹ These slow starts, even as they achieve full speed, are not solutions in themselves. Organization is bound up with the values and the motives of a people; hence this is a problem that, at best, will disappear only gradually.

Viewed comparatively along these lines, Chile is undoubtedly the best supplied with mobilizable resources. Despite severe inflation and economic depression, fiscal policies are being strengthened, credit institutions are being diversified, and exports are on the rise. In addition, Chile's commercial farms are productive and modern. Industrial labor is generally well organized. With an open coast line and a clustering of the population in the central regions, transportation problems are less than in Argentina and Bolivia. The school system is paying more attention to training for vocational skills and, at the higher levels, to basic research and experimental programs. Chile's isolated historical location has done much to unify her people as a nation. This core of nationalism stands in her favor for the economic integration that is eventually necessary in an industrial society. Chile's main problem, in terms of activating her resources, is to find ways to demand a larger and more diversified role in world trade. This achievement, if gained, would provide capital for importing equipment needed to raise her productivity, reduce unemployment, increase wage earnings, and stabilize the currency.

Argentina, in some ways, is ahead of Chile. But on the whole, she appears to stand one notch behind in resource adequacy. One main obstacle

⁹ Charles A. Myers, *ibid.*, and Tomas R. Fillol, *op. cit.*, 1961, Ch. 4, "Industrial Management in Argentina," pp. 57-75.

is Argentina's heavy dependence on agricultural production and the fact that methods have not been instituted to strengthen her competitive position in farm exports. Even though oil exports increasingly figure in as a balancing mechanism, the gains have not met expectations. Another factor worth noting is the absence in Argentina of any powerful motivating force to shift labor's conception of work discipline. The members of Argentina's key work stratum have already been gratified by the beneficent policies of Peron. At the present time these workers are holding to these same expectations, thereby blocking the formation of new attitudes and flexibility. Argentina's educational system is advancing, probably faster than Chile's, and is no doubt more accessible to lower status groups than in Chile, partly because of the greater number of universities. Research and professional training stands to gain importantly in strength over the next twenty-five years. As in Chile much of Argentina's resource exploitation depends on the society's capacity to secure a strong trade position on the international market. Hopes for this have been dimmed recently by the growing reality of the European Common Market since several of these countries are key buyers of agricultural products. Britain's exclusion may, in fact, be a positive circumstance for Argentina.

Peru is a good way behind Argentina and Chile. New roads and the modernization of farming methods are positive trends. Peru has a small steel industry at Chimbote but it appears that this venture has more symbolic value for the nation than for long-range industrial development.¹⁰

¹⁰C. Langdon White and Gary Chenkin, "Peru Moves Onto the Iron and Steel Map of the Western Hemisphere," Journal of Inter-American Studies, I, 3 (July, 1959), pp. 377-386.

Peru is presently developing a first-rate agricultural college near Lima. This in fact is becoming a center for producing engineers, agronomists, chemists, and country planners. On the whole, however, worker attitudes and employer's policies in Peru are heavily traditional. Land reform and industrial development are still mainly plans. Impetus is presently being given to the opening of the country that lies over the Andes. If this colonization program succeeds, enormous gains in grain and cattle production are expected. Formal schooling at the higher levels remains a privilege of the upper class groups. Humanities and the traditional professions remain priority vocations. No evidence is forthcoming to indicate that Peru's existing resources will be quickly modified and expanded in directions that lead to a modern, industrial society.

Bolivia lacks most of the resource levels prerequisite to rapid social development. Despite her successful revolution and agrarian reforms, her economy remains essentially at the subsistence level. The tin mines are severely depleted, roads are lacking, distances are great, and no openings to the sea are available. Colonization programs are slowly opening the eastern farm lands, a few commercial farms are in operation, and oil reserves are being discovered. "Feudal," almost caste-like, relations dominate the society. Even if Alliance for Progress funds are gained in the present period, Bolivia's development will need a long time period and major changes in values and motivations.

The Mobilization of Power and its Application

Power has earlier been identified as a critical resource. As such it deserves special consideration. This section analyzes selected aspects

of political power in the four societies.¹¹ Proceeding as above, the aim is to provide a series of reference points against which specific problems and trends can be identified and understood.

Patterns in the mobilization of power

Power in these societies is centralized in two respects: the office of the presidency provides a single leader with very strong control and immense authority; second, governmental power is heavily centered in the national capitols. Consequently local governments do not figure adequately into the political process. Apart from these features of the formal structure, there is a third consideration: the political party system, the mechanism for mobilizing power, is exceptionally fragmented. These three patterns reinforce each other, with grave consequences. The lack of adequate checks and balances at the national level stimulates party systems to overemphasize the importance of capturing the presidential office. At the same time, party fragmentation requires that coalitions be formed in order to bring about the support necessary for gaining this office. Once

¹¹The following books and articles proved helpful: K. H. Silvert, The Conflict Society: Reaction and Revolution in Latin America (New Orleans: The Hauser Press, 1961); Philip M. Hauser, ed., op. cit., 1961, esp. "Problems of Public Administration," pp. 70-71; Seymour M. Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," American Political Science Review, LII (March, 1959), pp. 69-105; Frank Tannenbaum, Ten Keys to Latin America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962), esp. Chapter 7, "Leadership" and Chapter 8, "Politics," pp. 112-172; William W. Pierson and Frederico G. Gil, Governments of Latin America (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1957); Charles O. Porter and Robert J. Alexander, The Struggle for Democracy in Latin America (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1961); and John J. Johnson, Political Change in Latin America (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958).

formal power is achieved, however, the coalition weakens. The "powerful" president, if not stymied by the chambers of representatives, is unable to proceed effectively. Priorities originally agreed upon by members of the coalition either have to be postponed or watered-down to meet the interests of the groups involved.

This picture is further complicated by the prominence of the military in the political arena. A president holds office only as long as he commands the loyalties of the key officers in the armed forces. Holding a monopoly on force, the question "who has ultimate power?" is, in fact, rhetorical. The most stable governments are, accordingly, those which fuse presidential power and military might in one person. The president who is also a general exemplifies this pattern. Not surprisingly, twelve of the twenty Latin American presidents in 1957 were generals.¹²

Turning to the four societies, several differences that bear on the mobilization of power and its role in societal development can be noted. Argentina and Peru, presently under rule of their respective armed forces, are temporarily neutralized with the scales tipped toward authoritarian conservatism. So long as the military holds its dominance, reform measures will be token. Both countries are being promised legal elections, but this will not solve the basic problem: the incapacities of the liberal parties to join forces. In Argentina the "available mass" strong enough to provide this needed strength is fixated on the right still espousing the justicialismo of Peron. Until the Peronists are drawn into the liberal ranks, the periodicity of modest reform and authoritarian peace in Argentina is likely to continue.

¹²William W. Pierson and Frederico G. Gil, op. cit., p. 222.

Peru's strongest single party, known as APRA, is clearly left and, for this reason, has been a real threat to the oligarchy since the early 1930's. To date, however, the Apristas have not been able to capture the government single-handedly. Their most spectacular achievement, at the level of formal power, came in the late 1940's when they served in coalition with Bustamente's party.¹³ More recently, the Apristas drew a third of the votes in the elections of June 1962, but the trend in the party's national strength appears to be weakening.

Bolivia's National Revolutionary Movement came into power in 1952 as a result of the revolution. Sufficient force was produced by this upset to initiate land reform, nationalize the mines, and speed economic development measures. The powerful and tightly organized mine workers constitute a significant and continuing dissident force within the Movement. In order to mobilize their support for the revolutionary action, grand promises were made by Paz Estenssoro, the Movement's head. Unfortunately the mines which were nationalized failed to provide the revenues and work that the miners expected. Stop-gap measures to reduce the miners' forthcoming hostilities have been engineered, but no real solution has been discovered. From this perspective the sustained mobilization of power in Bolivia is very problematic. Certainly this internal strife has reduced the President's power to move ahead on other economic, educational, and welfare problems. The Bolivian Corporation for Development (FOMENTO), organized as a governmental agency to direct priority development measures, appears to have enough autonomy from the political

¹³ Thomas R. Ford, Man and Land in Peru (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1955), pp. 123-125.

strife and administrative interruptions to make a sizeable impact on carrying the principles of the revolution into concrete programs. Bolivia's most pressing power problem however is the gaining of enough momentum to carry out, over a long period, the gains the revolution formally secured.

Chile appears to be the most advanced politically of the four societies. Local government tends to be strong, political participation is high, and a record of peaceful elections gives the country confidence in itself. The conservative groups are on the run. A powerful coalition, carried mainly by the Socialist and Communist groups, stands a fair chance of winning the elections in 1964. Depending on the capacity of the coalition to remain united in its victory, if gained, major reforms are certain, to take place. Land distribution and the nationalization of the copper and nitrate industries are priority items. The Church, even though completely separated from the State, stands to receive harsh treatment if the Leftists win, unless it falls into line with their progressive principles. The Christian Democrats, the Catholic Liberals, hold in the present period, about one-fifth of the voter's loyalties, hence do not stand a chance to win on their own, nor are they willing to form a coalition with either right or left.

Broadly viewed the platforms for the mobilization of power in these four societies are differentiated out along three familiar lines: The conservative right, a radical left, and a liberal middle. The rightist groups are the strongest, it appears, in Argentina but are split between the ruling elites and the Peronistas, therefore unstable. Peru's right is next strongest, then Chile's, then Bolivia's. With regard to the left, Bolivia is strongest and that group is in power. Chile comes next with

a strong left, then Peru, and finally Argentina. So far as the middle "liberals" are concerned, Chile and Peru are strongest, Argentina next, followed by Bolivia.

These combinations carry the potential for different degrees of social development. If, for example, the leftists captured power in Peru they would need the middle groups to dominate the powerful right. In Chile, on the other hand, this may not be necessary. In Argentina two developments need to occur: a welding of the middle groups and a swing on the part of the Peronistas away from the right. These possibilities do not appear to be in sight. Bolivia, the most backward of the four countries, has the head start in terms of mobilized power relevant for economic development. Unfortunately Bolivia's success in terms of power is too far ahead of her other resource levels and social integration. This means that gratification at the level of the total society will take place very slowly. In fact, the political discipline required for this long haul may not be easy to either generate or maintain.

The application and use of power

The mobilization of power is only one pertinent issue in Latin American societies. Equally important is the application of this power once gained. The question on this point is not whether power is authoritarian or democratic but rather on which parts of the system is power applied and do these applications discipline the society's forces towards social development?

At least two observations can be made on this matter. First, "power

in hand" is often depleted by having to use it to "keep the peace" within the leadership bloc. The system's capacity to bring pressure on social problems is lessened accordingly. Second, power once gained is expended in managing the national economy, not in the sense of using this power to carry out long-range programs but in securing sufficient capital to meet current expenditures. In short, the government cannot rely on the autonomous workings of the credit institutions and the business sector to produce the necessary money. Power, therefore, has to be allocated to manipulate these institutions, again reducing the government's capacity to pull the total society in the charted direction. One might summarize this situation as follows: although the centralized formal institutions of government and the public's acceptance of this strong centralized authority system provide the normative basis for gaining and using power to change society directly, the problems of (1) integrating the diverse interests of party groups and (2) manipulating the financial institutions for purposes of budget revenues drain off the striking force that is required for adequate leverage. Short-term contingencies result in a kind of "loose spending" of a critical resource, i.e., power. Motivations at all levels are frustrated. Direction is lost. Although these problems in the application of power differ importantly among the four societies in certain respects, the broad pattern is present in each case.

Social Integration and Inter-group strain

Two major axes cross-cut and divide the people of Argentina, Bolivia, Chile and Peru: class differences and racial-ethnic cleavages. Except for

Argentina's River Plate region and the major cities in the other three countries, the class structure is essentially a division between a small elite group and the poor. In Bolivia and Peru the lower elements are of mixed racial parentage, but overwhelmingly Indian. This fact reinforces the polar cleavage in the class systems. Rural-urban differences impinge further on this major division.

Historically, these easily recognized breaks in the societies did not generate major strains. Integration existed, but along feudal lines. Changes are occurring, however. Subordination and social exclusion no longer hold as normative principles. Fortunately the assimilation process that brings racial and ethnic groups into the main stream of society is primarily cultural. Biological features are not the key defining criterion, hence a group that adopts the speech, dress, manners, and attitudes of the dominant stratum tend ipso facto to become its members. This optimistic occurrence has, of course, exceptions.

Industrial growth is undoubtedly one of the most important conditions for facilitating the breakdown of class and racial lines. An economy focused on high productivity demands occupational competence, thereby selecting workers according to their performance capacities, not on the basis of race and class origins. Those societies most industrialized and having the highest rates of economic growth stand to gain most along the lines of total social integration.

Argentina and Chile show the highest degree of integration, Chile in particular. Chile is, first of all, dominantly mestizo. Second, her people are self-conscious of their national identity. Both geographical isolation and low rates of foreign immigration have contributed to this.

Third, Chile is potential for high rates of economic growth, even though in the present period stagnation prevails. Chile's most significant division is class, income being distributed at two extreme points of the continuum.

Argentina, at least in the Eastern urban area, has a large middle class. Ethnic amalgamation is high, fusing the second and third generations of the large immigrant waves that hit the country between 1890 and 1920. Immigration is still significant, however, running between fifty and sixty thousand per year. The Jews, numbering several million in Argentina, stand separate socially, though they appear to be highly integrated into the economy.¹⁴ Argentina's rural areas remain sharply divided along semi-feudal lines.

Peru and Bolivia are unusually and deeply split by both class and racial differences. Both countries have an Indian population of approximately fifty per cent. More important is the fact that the racial division coincides with the class divisions and the rural-urban divisions. The polarization of social groups along these three lines predisposes one to speak of two societies within each country. Both countries, of course, show middle class beginnings: government employees, professionals, small merchants, and certain sectors of the military. This incipient middle class is far from powerful, however, socially or politically. The "feudal," caste-like polarity is still the keynote of both societies, contrary to what visitors to Lima and Cochabamba may say. The agrarian reform in Bolivia has broken, at least legally, the property monopoly of the ruling elites.

¹⁴Irving Louis Horowitz, "The Jewish Community of Buenos Aires," Jewish Social Studies XXIV, 4 (October, 1962), pp. 195-222.

But changes in property rights are only one step, hardly sufficient to usher in an era of brotherhood, intermarriage, and easy cooperation. Peru, accordingly, stands as the least "open" society of the four. No major structural breakthroughs have occurred during the past one-hundred and fifty years.

An indirect way to assess the level of social integration in these societies is to isolate major points of inter-group tension and, further, to identify the status groups who appear to experience the greatest amounts of deprivations in the system. So far as inter-group tensions are concerned, the following deserve consideration.

Middle-class versus upper class

This point of tension appears to be strongest in Argentina and Chile. At least two factors support this statement. First, the more advanced elements of the middle class are achievement-oriented. Mobility and success dominate their social perspectives. They are not only aware that others have a more secure and privileged life, but are also conscious that the bulk of their superiors are there by reason of birth or favoritism rather than by effort. Second, the privileged elite are presently threatened by the circumstances of social change. The anxiety that comes from these warnings predispose the upper class to close their ranks even more tightly, to preserve their position, and to defend their privileges. These actions may be almost unconscious, yet very much the fact. The striving members of the middle class are more dangerous to the elites than the proletariat because they not only want "in" but they also represent the ranks from which the lower-class leadership is recruited. The middle class, on

the other hand, feels blocked. Recognition, privilege, and financial compensation are not forthcoming. Their strivings are subverted, detoured, and frustrated. At the same time, they are ambivalent because they would really like to share the rewards of the upper class, yet realize that these are the very things they are fighting against. Furthermore, the middle classes in both Argentina and Chile are politically fragmented. Some are Socialists, some are Christian Democrats, some are Radicals. In this respect they are forced to fall back on their own initiative and to "force" the system as individuals. Taken one by one, the elites can keep these aspirants in place by failing to recognize their capacities in the occupational sphere, by closing the doors of the clubs, and refusing to allow inter-marriage. The one sphere that remains open to the middle class is university education. And this only compounds the strain because their achievements in the professions do not open the right doors. Furthermore, they consider themselves more intelligent and better trained than the elites. Also they realize that their skills are those most needed for the country's development. Many of the members of the middle class are pursuing technical professions, business management careers, and research degrees. In one sense, they are in demand; in another sense they are rejected. Little surprise that they court radical political ideologies and, on more than one occasion, leave their societies forever.

Comparing the four societies along these lines Chile appears to possess the greatest amounts of strain, then Argentina. Peru and Bolivia follow in that order. Chile is most extreme because the ruling elite is more entrenched, smaller, and perhaps more concentrated. At the same time the ethnic-racial lines are more diffused. Furthermore, Chile is pushing

ahead faster in technical and professional education. Argentina, in comparison to Chile, is undoubtedly more open. Influenced by the early immigration, European liberal ideas, and a less conservative land-owning group, the lines in Argentina are less sharply drawn and less carefully guarded.

Urban proletariat versus rural migrants

This is a second major area of social strain. The urban workers are politically self-conscious, well-organized, and demanding. By contrast, the rural migrants who settle in the big cities are extremely poor, bound into family and former community loyalties, and shot-through with paternalistic attitudes gained from their rural background. In addition, the rural migrants in all four societies, but particularly in Peru, are Indian. Points of difficulty arise along several lines: (1) the middle and upper classes tend to lump both groups into the same category, hence identifying the urban worker with the lowest element in society; (2) the urban workers' occupational opportunities are often reduced by the availability of cheaper labor furnished by the desperate migrants; (3) worker ambitions to better their economic position or their place in the state's welfare programs are often frustrated by the very visible and urgent social problems that have emerged in the migrant slum sectors of the large cities. The recent surge of human concern for the displaced rural peasants de-emphasizes the problems and yearnings of the urban proletariat. This cleavage will no doubt be modified as the rural poor become integrated into the economy. From all appearances, this process cannot be realized within the immediate future.

Foreign corporations versus national business interests

This is a problem of long-standing proportions. From certain perspectives, foreign interests actually dominate the important sectors of these economies. The nationalization of Bolivia's tin mines makes this society an exception. In the other three, Argentina, Chile, and Peru, the pattern is firmly established, hence a constant point of irritation for the nationals. Chile's nitrate and copper industries are owned by United States corporations. Shell, Pan American, and Ford, to name only a few, stand out in Argentina. Peru has perhaps an even stronger pattern along these lines. Argentina has long been the center for many British firms, though much less so since the Peron period. The actual names and even, perhaps, the accurate amounts of these foreign interests are not as important for present purposes as the attitudes and tensions that cluster around this issue. To an observer, the predominant reaction of the nationals is ambivalence. On the one hand, it is impossible for them to deny that foreign capital has provided immense advantages for their societies' development and maturity. At the same time, these interests are defined as exploiting, imperialistic, and irresponsible. Peron, of course, got caught in this xenophobic posture and gradually discovered that his barriers to foreign investment were actually defeating his leadership. Chile would be hard put to survive without the tax revenues gained from American companies. Income taxes in Chile make up the largest source of money for the government. Presently more than half of this revenue is gained from outside corporations. In addition, the American companies unhesitatingly lead the way in pay scales, worker privileges, and

security benefits. These policies serve both as a stimulant to change and as models for emulation. Again this calls out criticisms and hostility. The Americans are characterized as guilty of "business immorality" and "unethical irresponsibility." Part of this appraisal stems from certain practices; more of it, perhaps, from the clannishness and voluntary separation of the American "colonies" from the upper and middle class groups of the particular society. Informal conversations with nationals inevitably include stories about the Americans' disdain for the local products, the American wife's anxiety over the absence of Kleenex, and the predispositions of the Americans to value plumbing. The line between the nationals and representatives of foreign business is definite and, in most instances, unbroken. Even though the actual number of these foreign Americans is not great, they are highly visible. The symbolic role of these groups is the relevant consideration, not their numbers.

Church versus liberal

The fourth line of strain in these societies is between the Church, as an institution, and the liberal element. Because of Argentina's inclination toward Europe and Chile's equally important liberal inclinations, the cleavage is more serious than in either Bolivia or Peru. The liberals emphasize lay education, civil marriage, divorce, and separation of Church and State, all the way. The good society of the liberal is open, religiously plural, and economically progressive. For the Church, on the whole, the good society is institutionalized and centered around revealed truths, allegiance to spiritual values, and sacramental participation. But on one point both parties appear in agreement: the good society is one that

possesses a strong, centralized government. And this is one important source of the difficulties involved. Social justice, on both sides, is viewed as flowing from an organized society in which people are cared for, tutored, and are obedient.

This distinction between the Church as an institution and the liberal tendencies should not, however, be confused with Catholic sentiment. It is one thing to speak of the Church as a formal system; it is quite a different thing to draw hard and fast lines within the broader phenomenon of loyalty to a religious tradition. Even the staunchest liberal probably has a note of positive sentiment for the Catholic religion. When Peron found himself an outcast from the Church's embrace, he began to burn places of Catholic worship. This was an insult, even to the atheist. "Burning churches," in one man's words, "is a different matter."

The division between the Church and the liberals takes on complicating political overtones. If the middle class were really liberal, the balance against the establishment could be easily tipped. But this is not the case. Along with other conflicting interests, the middle class is fragmented by their various orientations to the church and its stand. Argentina possesses a strong group with anti-Church undertones, the Peronistas. Curiously, however, this group is strong toward the right, not the left. Hence a viable coalition is precluded. In Chile the Christian Democrats are relatively strong and according to judged opinion this strength appears to be increasing. The Christian Democrats, of course, are pro-church. This is the Church's answer to the secular society. Furthermore they are compulsively independent, therefore closed

to entering bargains in order to help either the staunch conservatives or the coalition of the left.

To place one's emphasis in the matter of Church and State on the fact of whether the two are constitutionally separate is to overlook the operation of the political realities. In Peru, Argentina, and Chile the Church is legally bound up with the State, derives income from the State, and the Catholic religion is recognized as a prerequisite for the presidency. The state, on the other hand, maintains the occasional thorny prerogative of deciding on the clergy who are eligible for vacant sees.

Generational conflict: parents versus children

A fifth and, for present purposes, a final important cleavage that is growing in strength throughout the four societies is the parent-child problem, better phrased as inter-generational strain. The family is without qualification the strongest single solidary unit in all four societies. Family considerations, in general, hold priority over friendships, organizational memberships, and professional associations. The key authority figure, formally and lastly, is the father. The mother, however, is the greatest source of influence. She manages the family and around her the deepest loyalties emerge. The immediate family is the strongest unit in the kinship system, but certainly not the only important one. Extended ties are well developed and serve to support, integrate, and protect each smaller family unit. Obligations and privileges are differentiated out accordingly. People place great importance on family names, family traditions, and family solidarity. These emphases are strengthened by

the Church's teachings and the remnants of a colonial outlook. The honor and reputation of one's family are points for defense vis-a-vis the outsider. It is no surprise to find that careful surveillance is maintained over courtship events and marriage matters. While these are particularly important considerations for the upper status groups, the family is relevant to behaviors and attitudes at all levels. Research, for example, on the rural, lower-class migrants to the large cities, indicates that moving is often, almost always, premised on the availability of housing and help from family members who are already there.¹⁵

To understand the growing strain between the generations, this strong authoritarian and solidary type of extended family pattern cannot be overlooked. The adolescent and the mature child who stretch for more personal freedom and private decisions are caught in this structure. Dating, in most instances, centers around eating at home with the girl's parents. Few privileges are granted outside this repetitive occurrence. The single male who becomes friendly with an unmarried girl must be on his toes to avoid being dragged into marriage plans. In Argentina, for example, the seriousness of a courtship begins after three or four consecutive dates. Hence sustained heterosexual companionship as a period of freedom and exploration is almost non-existent. If sexual relations occur during courtship, the stage for marriage, at least in the middle and upper groups, is set. These rather exacting and very significant norms are intertwined with a whole host of other family considerations that are

¹⁵ Gina Germani, "Inquiry into the Social Effects of Urbanization in a Working-class Sector of Greater Buenos Aires," in Philip H. Hauser, ed., op. cit., 1961, pp. 206-233.

equally important and often, from the youth's point of view, damagingly frustrating. The tendency for youth in these countries to embrace radical political ideologies and engage in disrupting riots is not unrelated to this family situation. In one sense, to understand Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, or Peru, it is necessary to grasp the structural and emotional nature of the family and kinship systems. The trend of these societies is, of course, towards more class mobility, greater stress on individual achievement, and increased personal freedom. The traditional family unit stands to lose heavily in this process. The requirements of industrial organization encourage geographical movement, differential advancement based on competence, and the strengthening of non-family memberships. Those individuals who compete in industrial society realize that chances for success very often depend in part on the severing of ties with their parental families, keeping to a minimum the expenses implied in kinship obligations, and holding their immediate family unit separate from the power hold and emotional entanglements that thrive in inter-family relationships.

Since Argentina and Chile show the highest rates of industrial development and modernity, inter-generational strains are judged to be strongest in these two societies. Although manifestly present in Bolivia and Peru, the conditions for this kind of strain in these two countries are not as well formed. Although the family's strength may be every bit as powerful in Bolivia and Peru, perhaps even more so, the pressures to push against the family are not as important. Alternatives open for making one's own way are less visible.

Personal Frustration and Emotional Release

Latin American societies are known as "explosive." The people tend to be "emotional," even "hot blooded." These characteristics are said to be caused by the "Latin temperament." Perhaps these descriptions are accurate. There is reason to believe, for instance, that the character structure of these populations, despite wide variations along class and racial lines, differs markedly from the Anglo-Saxon personality. It is tempting to type a society or a region by its character traits, even more so in the case of Latin America because so little research on this problem exists. For the present, however, this opportunity is forfeited. Instead emphasis is placed on the identification of sources of frustration in the four societies and the ways people release these tensions. The aim of this section is to briefly examine those patterns that came most often into focus during the field research.

Key sources of personal frustration in society

One of the pervasive sore points in these four societies is the lack of facilities to accomplish one's goals. Scarcities in this sense are universal, yet the problem has a sharper edge in Latin America. It is not just a problem of low wages or no money, but as well the inadequacy of public transportation facilities, the miserable condition of the postal and telephone services, the lack of adequate heat and electricity, the inability to acquire credit for improving one's business, and the delays in court procedure. Taken together, these, and numerous uncited problems, have the capacity to grind down the most optimistic person. Bad enough in

their own right, these limiting conditions acquire an additional sting for members of the working and middle classes who measure their situation against both the elite of their own countries and the lives of the middle classes in the United States and Europe. Furthermore these sources of frustration have to be faced every day. Escape is impossible.

A second frustrating factor is the capacity of the social structure to limit personal decisiveness and individual autonomy. This restricting pattern is built into these societies at several points, particularly at the level of the family and the occupational sphere.

Besides the presence of inter-generational conflict identified in the previous section, the family produces another kind of problem. In this case the woman is the victim. Long treated as a subordinate, closely guarded by proprieties, and frequently tied into marriages on bases other than love, the woman stands to be intensely frustrated as she begins to assert the privileges of modernity. This problem is particularly present among women of the working and middle classes, though not entirely absent even among the elites. The woman's right to vote, as one example of increased involvement outside the family, has a recent history in these societies. Argentina achieved woman suffrage only in 1947, Chile only in 1949, Bolivia only in 1952, Peru only in 1955.¹⁶ However, the woman wants more than the legal right to exercise the franchise. She seeks university education, a respectable job, and the freedom to move about on her own in public life. Protection, so comforting in earlier times, is being defined by her as arbitrary dominance. Both the husband and the kinship matriarchs are

¹⁶William W. Pierson and Frederico G. Gil, op. cit., 1957, p. 345.

viewed as persecutors. The urban centers, of course, are the foci of this frustration. Life in the small towns provides less alternatives and, correspondingly, takes place in a stronger web of traditional controls.

The occupational system provokes a different kind of problem. Work processes characteristically involve a division of labor but not a parallel division of authority to initiate new activities and make decisions. These remain the prerogative of the boss. Subordinates, thereby, become dependent on the leader's actions. This frees the underlings from responsibility. At the same time, initiative is blocked. Suggestions and recommendations from below are overruled or indifferently placed aside.

These barriers inhibit the innovating person and block the ambitious. In mobility conscious societies, e.g., Chile and Argentina, a great deal of frustration is so provoked. Those who recognize new ways and have the competence to guide their development are occupationally castrated. One of the most important sources of this blocking is the leader's conception of his work role. The boss is not only accustomed to exercising this pivotal leadership role, but further, fears that a delegation of authority and the encouragement of worker initiative will prove him less capable than some of his subordinates. He conceives of his position, even if it happens to be in a bureaucracy, as "his own." Losing his position, furthermore, places him at the mercy of private connections which may or may not be strong enough to provide another suitable job. This complex of subordination-superordination runs through all of these societies, though apparently strongest in urban centers where commercial and governmental bureaucracies are most developed.

The third source of frustration, partly related to the last one, but a problem in its own right, is the lack of recognition that certain groups are experiencing. The technically-trained professionals and the scientists stand out in this respect. Psychicists, chemists, engineers, economists, to name only a few representative types, apparently feel this frustration most acutely. Political power is not their chief concern, nor is money always the key. Their priority problem is insufficient prestige. The intensity of this frustration varies positively with one's level of professional competence. The more competent, the more frustrated. A second proposition may be formulated: the higher a society's level of industrial development, the higher the frustration for these professional types. This is premised on two considerations. First, as the level of a society's economic development rises, greater emphasis is placed on these professional skills, yet without a corresponding measure of reward. Second, the higher these professionals are developed in a society, the closer they are required to work with political appointees and traditional elites who, of course, represent in thinking the polar extreme of the pragmatically-oriented, positivistic scientist. Argentina and Chile, particularly in the cities of Buenos Aires, Rosario, La Plata, Santiago, and Concepcion, appear to be the most involved in this problem.

A fourth course of frustration is perhaps more general than those mentioned previously. For want of a better term this problem shall be identified as the "national inferiority complex." To an outsider this pattern springs quickly into view. On the one hand, people appear to lack self-confidence in themselves and in the capacity of their respective

societies. From the other side, they are more than ready to catalog their accomplishments and successes, yet outright competition according "to the rules" tends to be shunned. On the national level this has economic consequences in the sense that the people believe that the market for any products they may produce is limited. In the spheres of scientific and artistic creativity, self-evaluation again leads to pain. In defense, national poets and philosophers are hauled out for parade and embellishment. Or the conversation takes another direction: "ideas" and not facts or action make up the core of the best society. Whatever the particular expressions of this problem, its general presence in these societies stimulates constant insecurity and private forms of depression. Informants in Argentina and Chile pointed to this issue most frequently, Bolivians emphasized it to some degree. In Peru the pattern was hardly mentioned.

To summarize, the major sources of frustration make up four types:

- (1) inadequate facilities to meet the minimum conditions of routine life;
- (2) blockage of personal freedom and development;
- (3) insufficient rewards for competence in priority occupations;
- (4) absence of significant national contributions to the international artistic and scientific communities.

Therefore to argue that the raising of income levels and the building of houses will solve the problems and remove people's frustrations misses the point. Changes will have to take place in the structure of the family, the occupational system, the pattern of reward distribution, and in attitudes toward scientific knowledge. These are sticky problems to solve; all of them stem from a cultural base which is deeply institutionalized. Frustrations in these areas stand to mount rather than decline as these societies move further into the category of industrial nations.

Agencies and specially-trained groups who have the capacity to leverage change, as well as the competence to help adjust and integrate individuals who fall victim to strain and frustration, stand to play an important role in these societies' development.

Modes of emotional release

How do people as individuals or as members of group cope with these and other frustrations? This question was of central importance in both informant-type interviews and field observations. Five patterns emerged from these sources.

1. Leisure time activities -- competitive sports, eating, movie attendance: Competitive sports are prominent in Latin American life. Soccer is a favorite. Neighborhood "football" fields abound and are constantly in use. Clubs formed around these sports interests are said to be the most important voluntary memberships of the men, particularly for the lower and middle classes. On the national level, soccer competes with politics. The latter may be more serious but not more important.

"Eating, drinking, and talking in public" is reported as a second important expressive activity. One informant, a national psychiatrist, finds this directly related to the Latin American's strong oral needs. This may be so. Whatever the causes, three things stand out: (1) the abundance of restaurants at all price levels; (2) the stress placed on companionship" when eating out; (3) the prominence of argument and vigorous conversation during meals. The "restaurant" emphasis helps reduce three key needs: hunger, dependency, and aggression. This public activity appears to be particularly important because, paradoxically,

family activities and traditional "at home" privacy in these societies is held to be so central.

Movie attendance, along with competitive sports and the eating-drinking-talking pattern, is a third conspicuous leisure-time activity that helps reduce tension and promote well being. The ideal world of the Hollywood and Parisian films provides a wide realm for imaginative play and wishful thinking. By and large, the theatres are filled every night of the week. In local areas, Catholic mass is often said early on Sunday evenings to allow time for the last film. Movie theatres tend to be grand, even luxurious, according to American standards. Tickets are purchased by seat and go on sale a week in advance. Each showing during the day is marked off by an intermission. The effect approximates that of a live theatre performance.

2. Verbalization and ideological battle: In societies that by value tradition and authoritarian organization de-emphasize action and personal autonomy, verbalization becomes one approved way of expressing oneself. "Talk is cheap" and so long as it lacks a direct connection to organized action, permissible. Conversation, debate, vivid argument, and shouting exchanges constitute four important levels of person to person verbalization in Latin America. Public speeches and newspapers are the more formalized ways of verbalization. The newspaper is more than a mechanism for reporting the news; it is a weapon of words.

One of the most prominent outgrowths of this verbal expressive tendency is the battle of ideas or ideologies. Since power considerations focus Latin American societies, political ideologies take priority in these battles. Political identification is one of the most important

things to know about another person. And the strength of one's loyalties to a particular political line is often measured by his capacity to carry his position ideologically. Curiously enough, ideology does not need to be tied to a program of action or if it is, this program rather than its realization provides great satisfaction. In one sense, ideological competition is a safety valve for the release of tensions and frustrations. Verbalized ideas, unconnected to their pragmatic possibilities, give vent to hostilities and anger. Release is provided at a level which "lets off steam" without breaking up the machine.

3. Rebellious acts -- riots and revolutions: When ideas are geared to action, the results are dramatic. The system ruptures at some point and the fight is on. Riots are the local outcome; revolutions the societal one. These "frontal attacks" on the prevailing system are not surprising. Since institutionalized levers for changing the system are absent, or in the hands of a monopoly elite, or in disrepair, the only alternative is some type of forced play. The rich, heady ideological ferment that plays through these societies gives direction to these attacks and sets them in a wider framework of value meaning. Riots are "in the name of" freedom, servitude, 'democracy,' injustice, and so on.

Student groups, glorying in their first love affairs with radical ideas, understandably have a big part in riots and revolutionary activities. Anxious to assert themselves against all authority, perhaps unconsciously most against that of the family, enthusiasm for action is easily mobilized. These riots channel a great deal of frustration into "legitimate," viz, political, directions, thereby permitting the family and other sources of frustration to remain secure.

4. "Beating the system": A more general means for releasing negative emotion in these societies is to achieve one's ends at the expense of the formal rules and regulations. "Beating the system" is a favorite game in all societies but with a vengeance in the countries presently under consideration. In the short run, this pattern appears, for those who follow it, to solve all problems. To an outsider, who is more ready to view it in the long-range terms, the prevalence of this pattern is self-defeating for the society. Although it does provide a way "to get even" with the bosses, the bureaucrats, and the oligarchy, it sets up a hazardous social life because it leads to a distrust of all rules, all regulations, and all organization.

In many cases the malfunctioning of the system forces the individual to take things into his own hands, to use his personal contacts, and to work "outside" the system. But this often gives excuse for following these same patterns irrespective of whether or not the situation actually requires it. Quite in contrast to life in the United States where, on the whole, conformity to the rules results in rewards, the people of these societies like to travel the by-ways of non-conformity. In the United States it is quite appropriate to say that "if you follow the rules, the system will protect you." This formula is as strange to people in these societies as the Communists' revolutionary program is to an American.

5. Leaving the system: One extreme solution to an individual's frustrations, if not solved through fantasy, verbalization, rebellious acts, or system non-conformity, is to "get out." This solution is

limited of course, to those few who have money, marketable skills, or no family responsibilities. Since those who have money are being rewarded by the system, they may travel but principally to acquire "culture" and souvenirs. The groups most predisposed to choose the emigrative solution are those who have already been abroad, possess technical training, and know another language. In short, the individuals most inclined to reject their own society are those presently most strategic for the development of their own societies. This is no small problem. From all indications its proportions will increase.

Various mechanisms are found then to be operating in these societies to drain off tension and frustration. There are others which can be mentioned: reckless driving, fascistic outbreaks against minorities, lottery, and magical practices. Vacations are also important in this respect. Religious activities, of course, are particularly suited to handle human frustrations and order them meaningfully into life. Certainly the communal fiestas serve this end. It is less easy, however, to link the routine ritual life of the Church with the solution of these problems. First of all, participation is minimal. Second, participation is said to be mainly performed out of a sense of obligation. Third, the confessional opportunity is barely used. Fourth, the Church is subjectively identified as a key cause of many problems that spring up in family life and the wider society. The Church may be operating effectively to maintain the traditional values of the culture but not so in the realm of providing tension release. Minority religions, especially Pentecostalism, increasingly answer to some of these needs for lower status groups. In this perspective, important gains are expected in their membership numbers and

in their influence for the total society. The anxieties and frustrations that impinge on the deprived as they begin to enter the mainstream of society are effectively reduced by these religions. More importantly, the religious impact of conversion fosters attitudes and habits particularly appropriate to the work norms of an industrial society. To encourage this religious phenomenon may be one of the most effective ways to help place these societies into the modern world.

Distinctions Between Traditional Catholicism

An understanding of the religious situation in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile and Peru hinges on one's capacity to grasp the broad and distinctive qualities of Latin American Roman Catholicism. In its own way, Latin America is very Catholic and will remain so for a long time to come.

Notes

The following written sources have provided useful background materials: Monastic Journal, issued every month, Santiago de Chile; Crucero (Roman Catholic bi-monthly, Buenos Aires) 1951-1952; Crucero magazine of the Maryknoll Fathers, Maryland, N.Y.; Old World (monthly publication of the Center of Intercultural Foundation, Guatemala, Mexico); Quelvo Puro and Isaac Nubi, A Iglesia en Colombia (Bogota, Colombia, Oficina de Investigaciones Sociales de VECSA, 1951); Magis (Bolivia, "Escuela Religiosa," Sucre, B.S., 1952); J. Lloyd Welch, Church and State in Latin America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1938); Robert F. Browning, Human Christianity in Latin America (New York: Macmillan Company, 1924); Teologia de Américo, "Catholicism in Brazil: A Personal Evaluation," Thought, XVIII, 100 (Summer, 1953), pp. 253-274; Frank MacFarlane, Chapter 3, "Religion," Ten Years to Latin America (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1952), pp. 63-69; John J. Patrick, Catholicism, Capitalism and Democracy in Argentina (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1938); and Robert Cecil Mours, Mary and Poverty in Chile (Chapel Hill, North Carolina Press, 1945).

Chapter Three

Roman Catholicism in Transition*

Roman Catholicism's prominence in Latin America's social and cultural life accords it a special place in the report. This chapter aims to catch up the broad, significant features of traditional Catholicism and, second, to identify selectively its present tendencies and problems. Throughout these pages primary attention is given to Catholicism as a total religious system operating in conjunction with the social order. Conversational interviews with Catholic priests and laymen plus field observation in four societies are the primary sources for this analysis.¹

Distinctive Features of Traditional Catholicism

An understanding of the religious situation in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile and Peru hinges on one's capacity to grasp the broad and distinctive qualities of Latin American Roman Catholicism. In its own way, Latin America is very Catholic and will remain so for a long time to come.

* Ivan Vallier

¹The following written sources have provided useful background materials: Mensaje (Jesuit journal, issued every month, Santiago de Chile); Criterio (Roman Catholic bi-monthly, Buenos Aires); Maryknoll (mission magazine of the Maryknoll Fathers, Maryknoll, N.Y.); CIF Reports (monthly publication of the Center of Intercultural Formation, Cuernavaca, Mexico); Gustavo Perez and Isaac Wust, A Iglesia en Colombia (Bogota, Colombia, Oficina de Investigaciones Sociales de FERES, 1961); Renato Poblete, "Situacion Religiosa," unpub. m.s., 1962; J. Lloyd Mecham, Church and State in Latin America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1934); Webster E. Browning, Roman Christianity in Latin America (New York: Macmillan Company, 1923); Thales de Azevedo, "Catholicism in Brazil: A Personal Evaluation," Thought, XXVIII, 109 (Summer, 1953), pp. 253-274; Frank Tannenbaum, Chapter 3, "Religion," Ten Keys to Latin America (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1962), pp. 53-65; John J. Kennedy, Catholicism, Nationalism and Democracy in Argentina (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1958); and Robert Cecil Moore, Piety and Poverty in Chile (Nashville: Broadman Press, 1946).

While new religions may thrive and even grow among certain fringe groups and along the peripheries of the culture, these minorities are not expected to take the place of the Roman Catholic religion. At the same time the Church of yesterday and the Church of today are different from what will be the Church of the future. Important adjustments are under way, many of them a response to the developments in secular society; others related to the dynamics of Catholicism as a world religion.

Roman Catholicism as a religious culture

The Catholic religion in Latin American societies was and is more than a Church organization, more than a belief system, and more than a set of rites. Roman Catholicism is the dominant element in the whole culture. The Catholic religion is fused with the entire range of expressive symbols, basic values, and cognitive orientations that relate man to his world. An individual may be baptized into the Catholic Church but he is "born" to the Catholic religious culture. In this sense, Catholicism is co-terminous with the local community and, for the most part, co-terminous with the total society. A person is "Catholic," even though he is not "religious."

This distinct and pervasive fusion of the Catholic religion with the culture of the secular community has at least two implications for the present report: (1) An individual's participation in the sacraments or his degree of conformity to religious rules are not valid measures of his Catholicism; (2) the strength and durability of Roman Catholicism are not adequately indexed by counting clergymen, noting the number of Catholic universities, and pointing to the Church's constitutional relations to the

State. All of these "measures" are relevant, but taken by themselves miss the mark. The problem of assessing the strength of Latin American Catholicism is akin in its complexities to the task of ascertaining how American are Americans. The parallels are worthy of consideration, even though in both cases, conclusive answers are impossible.

Churches as ritual centers but not primary religious units

In its ritual and worship aspects, the Church is centered in the cathedrals and chapels. As a religion, however, Catholicism is grounded in non-religious social units: the family, the community, and along informal lines that bind the members of a particular status group to one another. The primary anchorage points of Catholicism are to be discovered in these communal units, not in the Church as a formal association. The loyalties that spring from family, friendship, and class relationships include, foster, and perpetuate religious sentiments. The most relevant religious unit for analyzing and understanding traditional Latin American Catholicism is, consequently, the strongly knit solidary groups, especially the family, and not the Church. Not only does each family and often each individual have their own saints, but on occasion their own chapel. The priest and his sacraments tend to be peripheral.

Accordingly, the evolution of Catholicism will take place only as these solidary groups undergo change and modification. When it is recognized that these primary social bonds are among those most resistant to new influences, the implications are clear. Just as a man's family remains sacred, so too his Catholicism. More is involved in leaving his religion

then severing a formal membership. To reject Catholicism is therefore to reject family, friends and acquaintances -- a decision of significant proportions. The demands of modern urban life tend, of course, to undercut and weaken these traditional types of involvement and integration. Yet even urban conditions do not stand to destroy the deeper religious loyalties that emerge in and through concrete social relationships. Encounters with new ideas may serve to modify a person's cognitive orientations but not so much his feelings and values. Loyalty is stronger than belief.

The Church's influence: lofty and hierarchical governance

A third feature of the traditional Church is its aloofness from the people. A distinct and distant separation prevailed and prevails between the hierarchy and the believers. This removed authority has provided a vertical reference point for satisfying the individual's need for supernatural dominance, but it seems not to have served as a source of direction and support, nor as a spiritual relationship. The believer's main loyalties focused on the saints, who were both available and accessible. The priest, with certain exceptions of course, stood separated from the people both in his performance of the sacraments and in community life. His was the role of a ritual leader, rather than pastor, counselor, or judge.

This pervasive separateness emerged as a corollary of the Church's historical involvement with the political order. On the one hand, this political-religious fusion provided the Church with a leverage point which could be used to further its own interests as an organization. On the other

hand, this same connection led the people to identify the Church as a formal, secular power rather than as a religious, personal, supportive institution. The Church became defined as a creator and perpetuator of problems rather than a force working to solve human injustices and relieve misery. In one sense the Church's political success destroyed its chances for spiritual success. Consequently, religion and Church became differentiated, each developing along its own lines.

Myth and form over practice and action

Traditional Catholicism in Latin America is marked, further, by orientations to ideas and rituals as ends in themselves. Cosmological myths, supernatural forces, and mystery engender the religious response. The Latin American's hospitality to both imagination and intuition nurtured and encouraged an almost secret religious experience. Gratification stemmed from involvement in a "world beyond," not from applying beliefs to the problems of everyday life. Pageantry and varying amounts of superstition stimulated idiosyncratic theological interpretations and random forms of worship. Ritual passivity became the keynote. Action in this world was consequently defined as both unimportant and irrelevant for salvation. While it may be true that these patterns gained greatest strength among the rural peasants, their importance for other groups and classes should not be underemphasized.

In addition then to separations existing between Church and religion and between houses of worship and the focus of religious solidarity in the family, a third distinction appears between religious devotion and

action in secular society. Religious practices, centering on private ritual and public celebrations, i.e., the fiesta, were relegated to the expressive sphere of life, something to be pursued apart from one's routine involvements with work. In this latter sphere, religious rules as prescriptions to guide endeavor and make it meaningful were absent. On those occasions when religion did enter the work sphere, it became a vehicle for petitioning the supernatural to bring magical success rather than as a source of meaningful principles geared to making work more effective.

Present Tendencies in Roman Catholicism

Against this background of the traditional religious system, new developments are underway. Under pressures to keep abreast of social development and to hold the latent loyalties of the not-fully committed Catholics, the Church is extending itself along at least two lines: (1) the modification of ritual activities and (2) re-directing traditional-expressive religious orientations toward religious action in secular society. Both emphases are still in the beginning stages. But there seems little doubt that these measures represent the cutting edge of the Church's future.

The social dimensions of ritual are recognized

The changes in ritual activities run along two axes, both of them relevant to social relationships. First, the physical and social gap existing between priest and parishioner is being closed. In times past (and even today) the parishioner needed binoculars to see the priest

performing the sacrament of the mass. And hearing him was a privilege only for the man with good ears and a knowledge of Latin. This physical distance paralleled, and perhaps reinforced, the social distance. Today in the new Church buildings the priest and his parishioners are architecturally, at least, pushed together. Furthermore it is not an uncommon practice to have a layman assist the priest in such activities as the handling of the communion. On such occasions the layman symbolizes a human linkage between the priest and the people.

Both the hierarchical difference and the social distance between the clergy and parishioner are reduced. Religious considerations are being broadened to include social realities. This is also exemplified in the practice of congregational singing and congregational response, both of which stimulate the trend of conducting the mass in Spanish.

A second emphasis in the social sphere is the encouragement of closer horizontal relationships between parishioner and parishioner. Heretofore the parish has been chiefly defined as a geographical area with the church as ritual center. These parishes often include thousands of people representing many classes and interests. Hence, congregational solidarity is precluded. The current emphasis on revitalizing Catholic life takes this problem into account. Church buildings are being added to allow smaller assemblages. The aim is to bring people together that have important things in common other than their identification with Catholicism. Class background is a key consideration. On this new basis fellowship and social solidarity are being strengthened. Perhaps the most important implication of these attempts is the shifting of

religious anchorage from family and kinship solidarities to the church itself. If this transfer is achieved, the Church stands to gain a series of strong local congregations, a most important consideration for any religion that hopes to develop and maintain its place in a pluralistic society.

From ritual passivity to social action

The Catholic clergy see their primary duty to be the salvation of souls, a conception that has often meant an indifference to man's social needs and his secular life. So long as the church as an institution has formal access to the political arena, religious doctrines can have an influence on ordering the society along preferred lines. With this kind of leverage, the salvation of souls can be allowed to hold the clergy's priorities. But Catholicism in Latin America no longer holds its earlier formal power. At the same time, society moves on. Not only does secularism possess the keys to the future: this secularistic trend also gives rise to human and social problems that impinge so heavily on individuals that efforts at salvation cannot help taking them into account. This is, of course, the key dilemma of all salvation religions. For Latin American Catholicism this dilemma is particularly sharp and immediate.

The response of the Catholic system to this strain is not uniform. Nevertheless several broad patterns can be noted: (1) social improvement and welfare assistance is replacing a philosophy of charity; (2) Catholics as individuals are being organized into laymen's associations which are focused on applying Christian principles to all spheres of daily life; and (3) organized programs of a regional and functional nature are being

developed. Each of these deserves brief consideration.

1. Charity is no longer an adequate relief measure: The misery of the masses was previously attended to by upper class groups of women. Assistance, accordingly, was both random and temporary. No one thought of removing the causes of misery by rehabilitating the victims or changing the social structure. The "care through charity" orientation is breaking down, though one should not overestimate the speed of this change. The mounting trend is to provide permanent social services in local areas and, in other ways, to help the people help themselves. Medical clinics, literacy programs, credit cooperatives, producer cooperatives, nutrition classes and sewing circles dot the horizon in the poorer sections. Efforts are increasingly geared to assisting the people in their social lives, not by gifts but through example and training.

This orientation is mainly found in two types of situations: (1) the large cities where the "progressive ideology is strongest and where the slum problems are vividly displayed and (2) in scattered, distant rural communities where "foreign" priests, particularly American, are being placed. The work of the Maryknoll Fathers in Peru, Chile, and Bolivia exemplifies the latter direction.

2. The individual Catholic is being groomed to take responsibility as a moral agent in society: The loss of Catholicism's traditional sources of formal power and the increased visibility of social problems in all areas of life are pressing the Church to develop new types of unity for furthering its work. In this connection a key emphasis is being placed on the individual believer in society as a Catholic agent. The Church

organization and the priesthood are recognizing their incapacity to carry out programs deemed necessary for Catholic development. The layman is needed. Consequently, the Church is working to make the layman socially responsible. This is no simple task. The prevailing conception of the good Catholic is the person who participates in the ritual activities. According to the new standards he must be both involved in the sacraments and also vigorously engaged in the application of Christian principles to issues and problems that impinge on his everyday life, as union member, father, club member, and voter.

The broad term used to encompass this manifold orientation is Catholic Action for the Lay Apostolate. The key social mechanism adopted for generating this needed motivation is the layman's association, each one differentiated out to handle a particular area of life. In the initial stage one association may center a number of interests. The beginning is usually a small nucleus of concerned laymen, similar to a "cell." In this nucleus potential leaders are courted and prepared. The priest attends the meetings as often as possible, at the same time avoiding being placed in the role of actual leadership. From these cells, more specialized associations may develop. Specific types of social issues or interests focus sessions of study and tactics.

The Christian Democratic party is the formal political response of Catholic Action, although in one sense it occupies a place of special distinction. At this level of formal politics the clergy participate, if at all, as other Catholics, not by the authority of their ecclesiastical office. The Catholic Action Movement, covering youth association, worker

groups, women's organizations, and family-centered units, is aimed toward developing a lay apostolate which can, through moral and religious action in society, affect and solve economic, social and political problems.

It is most difficult to estimate the relative strengths of Catholic Action in the four societies. Argentina is apparently weaker than Chile. Bolivia and Peru are yet farther behind. Argentina, for the most part, is still in the stage of mission action whereby laymen (medical personnel and catechists) and a priest travel to distant rural areas to relieve pain, to teach doctrine, and to touch the people with the sacraments.

Although both the work of the priests who provide social service and lower class help and the Catholic Action movement deal with social issues, the two forms of outreach are not the same thing. The first is tied to the hierarchy and is aimed to reduce social problems on a local level. The second is intended to be a ground swell from within the ranks of the laity who then move out into the society as a whole.

3. Organized programs are emerging to provide specific solutions to regional and functional problems: A third type of thrust developing in the church consists of training institutes, mass communication activities, professional schools, and research-planning centers. The objectives of these specially focused activities are to bring new skills into the body of the laity, ward off secular propaganda, and provide the Church with new types of information and strategy proposals.

The Institute of Rural Education in Chile is a strong example of a specializing training program. Founded in 1955, the Institute aims to develop leadership in the rural communities.² By 1961 the Institute had

²"Informe Sobre El Instituto de Educacion Rural," mimeographed, n.d., and "The Instituto de Educacion Rural," typed, n.d.; and CIF Reports, Vol. 1, 3 (June, 1962), p. 128.

established 11 Qualification Centers and 18 Functional Centers, the latter being geared to such specialties as mechanics, carpentry, and agricultural methods. In that same year 1,650 students, boys and girls in late adolescence, graduated from these centers. Publications on home industry, animal husbandry and nutrition make up one part of the Institute's program. A radio school featuring agricultural, moral, and family programs broadcasts daily through 44 stations throughout the countryside. Special emphasis is placed on developing rural leaders, building up the skills of the Chilean campesino, and organizing him into unions and cooperatives. Indirectly these measures are attempting to keep the rural worker in the country through raising his productivity and his level of living. Although the Institute is a private agency, it is closely connected in practice with the Church. Bishop Larrain of Talca figured prominently in the program's initiation and subsequent development.

In addition to the specialized radio broadcasts geared to rural workers and other stations, the Church is branching out into national radio, television, and films. Buenos Aires radio carries daily and weekly programs in drama, religious instruction, and "answer your question" sessions. Chile's Catholic University in Santiago has added a Film Institute. Instead of creating traditional pictures stressing catechetical instruction, the Institute attempts productions that catch up the truth of the sacraments and the Church. Last year in Santiago a film dealing with the actions of the Mass held the spotlight at a downtown theater. It was appropriately titled "The Body and the Blood."

Professional schools focused on business administration, teacher training, social science, and opinion research make up a third line of

activity. The Catholic Universities are the key bases for these developments. Sociology, political science, economics, business methods, and management training are some of the presently stressed courses in both Buenos Aires' and Santiago's Catholic Universities. Teacher training is presently a big enterprise in Bolivia. Social work is receiving added emphasis in Peru. Again, it is somewhat arbitrary to say that one country is more developed along these lines than others. Present judgment is that Chile leads, then Argentina, then Peru, fourthly Bolivia.

A final development to be noted is the rapid growth of research centers and planning groups. In 1955 the Latin American Bishops' Conference (CELAM) approved with priority consideration plans for establishing Latin American research centers to be staffed by trained social scientists. Today these operate in at least Colombia, Brazil, Chile, and Argentina. These centers appear to house the most progressive thinkers in the Latin American Church. Stress is placed on research, both for publication and internal use. At the present time works have been published on the Church in Colombia, spiritism in Brazil and the Church in Chile. For early release are books on the Church in Mexico, The Church in Central America, liturgy and catechism in Latin America, Protestantism in Latin America, the Church in Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay and the history of the Church in Latin America.

In the course of carrying out the present study members of the research staff were received at the Centers in Argentina and Chile with generous hospitality. Libraries, research data, time, and ideas were

provided without reservation. One quickly realizes that these live intellectual centers stand well for the Church's future development and progress in Latin America.

Strains and Dilemmas in Present-day Catholicism

The excitement of the Church's new stand hides several problems that figure to hold back and obstruct the Church's forward movement. The Church's traditional posture, first, is heavily ingrained in both the layman and the hierarchy. It is not simply one or the other. Second, the Church's long-range objectives require a qualitative shift in the total Church, not just the adding of more clergy and the defining of new sub-organizations. Third, the Church will have to dissolve and erase a self-image centered around a goal of providing ritual services and replace it with another that defines the Church as an active agent fully competent to relate theology and activity to a changing social order. Furthermore, the Church will need to accept the hard fact that it no longer holds a monopoly on moral authority. Social justice and human development flow from other agencies and movements, some of which hold significant potential power. In short, a gigantic mobilization task is being presented to the Church. The problem of developing an adequate religious labor force deserves special examination in this context.

No one who speaks to the topic of Latin American Catholicism fails to give priority mention to the shortage of clergy. In fact, this issue is said to be the only thing that holds the Church back.³ The formula

³For a statement of this thesis see William J. Coleman, M.M., Latin American Catholicism (Maryknoll, N.Y.: World Horizon Reports, (1958); and John J. Considine, M.M., Call for Forty Thousand (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1946), p. 91.

is simple: adequate clergy equals strong, vital Church. Unfortunately the problem is more complicated. Too little attention is given to the labor force requirements at all levels and to the motivational issues involved in bringing potential labor services into the organization's program of objectives. Quite clearly the Church's task depends for its achievement on generating motivation among the laymen and channelling this resource into specific activities. This involves shifting the laymen's religious motivations from passivity and token ritual participation into an action position that is strong enough to allow the delegation of responsibility. Men, in particular, are needed. Unfortunately for the Church, the Latin American male stands aloof from formal religious involvements. To gain his steady commitment to the sacramental life would, in itself, be a singular accomplishment. To secure, in addition, his energies for active leadership roles within and on behalf of the Church would signify the occurrence of a small miracle.

The building of the responsible and committed religious labor force needed for initiating, directing, and managing the lay associations required for the Church's long-range objectives is a number one problem. One strategy that is reported to be gaining moderate success in this area is "Christian Courses." Selected laymen, usually 30 to 50 men, are invited to attend a three or four day session that focuses on lessons in Church doctrine, Christian social thought, and religious devotion. The men, chosen from several status levels, live, eat, and study together. Prior to departure each person is encouraged to make a statement, expressing his beliefs and his newly-formed commitments. Those persons who show most

progress are given places of leadership responsibility in their home parishes. Emphasis during these sessions is placed on "the communal dimension of the Church and the layman's role in this, rather than on the spiritual commitment of the person as an individual believer." Clergy who are working with these groups judge them to be more successful than the Christian Family Movement, Catholic Action for Youth, and Worker Action. One curious problem frequently emerges from these "courses." The people who experience the "new life" are sometimes hard to handle. Enthusiasm develops faster than it can be channelled and controlled. Laymen get ideas and if these are somewhat disregarded by the priesthood, they resent it. White collar workers and professionals tend to be most problematic. The worker is more accustomed to submitting to the authority of the Church.

A second, broader strategy, aimed to build up a strong lay apostolate, may be termed "the revitalization of the parish." The first stage is descriptive research aimed to find out the number of the clergy and the degree of active membership. Second, male adults are recruited to organize small "cells" or nuclei of laymen. The third stage consists in breaking up the older parish boundaries into sectors that correspond to the established nuclei. Through these nuclei and smaller congregational assemblages an educational program focused on greater participation in the Mass develops. The sermon becomes a key device in this process and accordingly is being strengthened. In dividing the parish into smaller units class and ethnic lines are carefully considered.

On a higher level of organization, and concentrated on the priesthood,

a third strategy is reported. The keynote is the diocese or archdiocese plan formulated to integrate and consolidate the religious orders and the secular clergy into the developing program of the Church. This is fraught with difficulties, for many of the orders are centers of traditional orientation. Furthermore the orders are accustomed to a certain autonomy. Regional conferences and special study programs are helping to remove some of the resistance. Research reports, demonstrating with hard fact the weak sacramental life of the Church, further this integration. Issues are being raised which, even ten years ago, were politely tabled or pushed into the unconscious. Chile's Church appears to be particularly advanced in this broader organizational approach.

The Church's labor needs in Latin America are not unnoticed by other Catholics throughout the world. Both clergy and laymen are being recruited and assigned to posts in these countries. The Pope's answer is a program of Papal Volunteers for Latin America (PAVLA). In the United States an association called AID recruits and trains lay specialists as part of the PAVLA project. During 1961⁴ more than 110 U.S. volunteers from 40 dioceses were placed at the hands of Bishops in eight countries (44 school teachers, 20 registered nurses, 12 credit union specialists, seven social workers, and 21 others)--the goal is one volunteer in Latin America for every parish.

Cardinal Cushing of Boston has organized the Society of St. James the Apostle. Local priests are assigned on the basis of requests made by Latin American bishops. The Maryknoll Fathers of New York constitute a

⁴CIF Reports, Vol. 1, 5 (October, 1962).

third and very important labor force group. Maryknoll work is being carried on in Bolivia, Chile, and Peru. Many of these Fathers are involved in rural programs. One of their most successful ventures in the back regions of Peru and Bolivia is the establishment of credit cooperatives. From small beginnings in 1955, these local enterprises⁵ together now have 3,000 members and a million dollars in savings. In Chile the forty Maryknollers have 16 parishes, 37 outlying stations, and many chapels. They operate four medical clinics, 23 primary schools, and an agricultural school with approximately 200 students. This agricultural school is situated at Molina, the center of the farming region. Maryknoll work in Bolivia is centered in three places: the upper corner bordering Peru's jungle forests, the Lake Titicaca area, and in the Oriente, mainly around Santa Cruz. Considerable attention is being given in Bolivia to the new colonies, both the planned and the spontaneous.

One of the unfortunate outcomes of these outside helpers is a growing tension between the volunteers and the national Catholics. Differing concepts of priority and approach are tending to provoke criticisms against the "eager beaver" Americans. No easy solution seems at hand.

In the broad picture, the labor force solution is still very much in the beginning stage. The possibilities for steady successes along these lines are contingent on the Church's capacity to involve two strategic groups, the working class and the students. Little gain is being realized in either direction. Those individuals who are most available to the Church as lay leaders, e.g., the upper middle class, are

⁵"Maryknoll in Bolivia," "Maryknoll in Peru," and "Maryknoll in Chile"; pamphlets (Maryknoll, N.Y.: The Maryknoll Fathers, n.d.).

themselves out of touch with the workers and the students. Hence even if a strong lay apostolate emerges, it may not have the capacity to reach these other people.

A second serious problem that will increasingly emerge from the Church's success in recruiting lay leaders is the threat posed by lay leaders to the authority of the priesthood. Laymen who accept responsibility are likely to seek power as well. Already mention is being made of this issue. While the priest may be certain that he holds a position of authority with the sacraments, this sphere is only one of the many that involves jurisdiction. Quite clearly the Church's success in forming a lay apostolate will lead to serious strains in this very area.

Concluding Statement

The winds of social change raise serious dilemmas for all religions. Adjustment is often painful and costly. The case of Latin American Catholicism is special in many ways. During four centuries it remained almost unchallenged. While the age of independence in the early nineteenth century forced the Church into a new role vis-a-vis the state, the question of its legitimacy as the primary religious agent was never raised. Today this monopoly status is being threatened. The Church has in its favor both a strong, latent Catholic loyalty and a highly developed organization. Its greatest lack is the people's active commitment either as participants in the sacraments or as sources of money and labor.

The key problem that the Church faces is to bring about reform without having the benefit of a religious revival. Spiritual enthusiasm is

the absent commodity. If this were present, money and labor resources would flow. The trend is against such a revival taking place. People in these societies are faced toward the immediate political and social issues, not towards otherworldly salvation. The rewards desired are those of the here and now: employment, chances for advancement, material goods, and social status. Religion is not viewed as a pertinent means for these ends. Instead, education, the removal of social barriers, and equal participation in political and economic life are being emphasized. It is not that religion is unrelated to the causes of these societies' social problems, but rather that religion is perceived as unrelated to their solution.

The purpose of this study is to classify or "type" the respondents according to the way in which they answer several sets of questions related to the Christian religion. In general, the respondents are categorized as follows. First, the proportion of respondents, irrespective of religious affiliation, which corresponds to each religious type is given. Third, the distribution of the respondents according to religious type is described, this time by relating data across professed religious affiliation. Fourth, we endeavor to locate the types in the social structure by means of such variables as sex, education, occupation, status, and enrollment at a state or Catholic university. For the sake of convenience, respondents are hereafter referred to as "citizens."

Finally, we show the relationship of the types to some variables which are directly related to religion such as:

1. religious intolerance,
2. acceptance of certain tenets of Catholicism.

Chapter Four

The Religious Behavior, Religious Beliefs, and Religious Attitudes of Citizen and Student Respondents from Buenos Aires, Lima, and Santiago*

Information for this chapter was gathered through a survey of 1,586 persons in the cities of Buenos Aires, Lima and Santiago. The respondents were selected by means of a quota sample of citizens from high, medium, and low socio-economic localities and students of both a state and Catholic university in each city.

The Purposes of this Chapter

The first purpose is to classify or "type" the respondents according to the way in which they answer several sets of questions related to the Christian religion in general and Catholicism in particular. Next, the proportion of respondents, irrespective of religious affiliation, which corresponds to each religious type is given. Third, the distribution of the respondents according to religious type is redescribed, this time by taking into account professed religious affiliation. Fourth, we endeavor to locate the types in the social structure by means of such co-ordinates as sex, student or nonstudent status, and enrollment at a state or Catholic university. For the sake of convenience nonstudents are hereafter referred to as "citizens."

Finally, we show the relationship of the types to some variables which are directly related to religion such as:

1. Religious intolerance.
2. Acceptance of certain tenets of Catholic ethics.

* Harley Upchurch.

3. The attraction of other religions.
4. Participation in mass and communion.
5. Preference for priests as counselors on family problems.

The Indexes and Principal Types

We have constructed six indexes for measuring social attributes related to religion. Four of these indexes have been combined to form a number of religious types (R-types).

Function and meaning. It cannot be too strongly emphasized that the indexes and types are not conceived of as indicators of religiosity, Christianity, or Catholicism in any spiritual sense. They do not measure the affectual aspect of religious experience nor can they gauge the sort of commitment which is said to guide the smallest daily acts of the profoundly religious.

The function of the indexes and types is simply to group individuals according to their willingness to admit conformity or nonconformity to selected norms as well as their professed possession of various attitudes, values, and beliefs connected with religion.

Hence, when such terms as "commitment," "disaffection," "acceptance," or "indifference," are used in the context of this chapter they merely refer to the verbalized condition of the respondents.

The Indexes. Each index is given below along with the questions which it comprises and a statement of the attribute it is intended to measure. Every respondent was asked if he agreed, had no opinion, or disagreed with the statements. His responses were used to give him a rank of high or low on the attribute measured by the index.

A. Basic Christianity.

1. God does not exist. (Disagree)
2. God is threefold: Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. (Agree)
3. God makes miracles. (Agree)
4. God answers our prayers. (Agree)
5. Jesus Christ was born of a Virgin without a human father. (Agree)
6. There is a life after death. (Agree)
7. In the next world some people will be punished and others rewarded. (Agree)

This set of items is used as one indicator of the degree to which the respondent is committed to Christianity in a conventional sense. We have classified respondents as "high" who answer five or more items as indicated above.

B. Basic Catholicism.

1. The Virgin, through intercession, is able to cure people miraculously. (Agree)
2. The Saints intercede and pray for us. (Agree)
3. The Pope is the religious authority who is closest to God on earth. (Agree)

The items in this index not only serve as one measure of the respondents' intellectual commitment to Catholicism but also as a means of distinguishing between Catholic and non-Catholic Christians. We have classified respondents as "high" who answered all three items as indicated above.

C. Image (favorable or unfavorable) of the Catholic clergy.

1. The majority of priests practice what they preach. (Agree)
2. Priests are the best counselors. (Agree)
3. Priests impede the progress of our country. (Disagree)
4. Priests are egotistical individuals. (Disagree)
5. Bishops tend to be egotistical individuals in their religious activities. (Disagree)
6. The lack of nuns is a problem for a country. (Agree)
7. The clergy lives in luxury. (Disagree)

This group of items is intended to serve as one indicator of the individual's own stereotype of representatives of the Catholic clergy. It should not be assumed that the index measures his opinion of the Catholic clergy per se. It is quite likely that many respondents rank low on this index precisely because they do have a high opinion of the Catholic clergy in the abstract. They may well be idealists who have been disappointed in some of the clergy's members. We have classified respondents as "high" on this index who answered five or more items as indicated above.

D. Style of Catholicism (traditional vs. modern).

1. Priests should wear more modern clothing. (Disagree)
2. Priests would do better work if they were allowed to marry. (Disagree)
3. Priests should be allowed to go to the movies. (Disagree)
4. Mass should not be said in Latin. (Disagree)

These items are illustrative of some issues debated among Catholics in the cities where the survey was conducted. Taken together they serve as one measure of what might be called a traditional vs. modern approach to

Catholicism. Although most of the questions deal with the clergy, it is not felt that they necessarily reflect a good or bad opinion of the Catholic clergy or its representatives. That a respondent is able to rank high on "Image of the Catholic Clergy" and low (or modern) on "Style of Catholicism" has been empirically demonstrated through our analysis.

We have classified respondents as "high" who answer two or more items as indicated above.

E. Catholic morals.

1. Divorce should not be permitted. (Agree)
2. Catholics should not use contraceptives. (Agree)

These points, upon which the Catholic Church takes a definite stand, are used as one measure of the degree to which the individual layman accepts basic tenets of Catholic morality.

We have classified respondents as "high" who answer both items as indicated above.

F. Religious intolerance.

1. Marriage between Protestants and Catholics should not be permitted. (Agree)
2. Catholics should not have Protestant friends. (Agree)
3. There are good things in all religions. (Disagree)
4. A person should be permitted to make speeches against religion. (Disagree)
5. All religions should have the same rights before the law. (Disagree)
6. Protestants are winning too much ground in our country. (Agree)

It is not suggested that the Catholic Church has taken a stand on these issues in the direction of intolerance. Quite the reverse may be true. This set of items is meant as a measure of the respondent's ability to tolerate other religious viewpoints and persons of another religious persuasion. We have classified respondents as "intolerant" who answer two or more items as indicated above.

In terms of statistical testing or replication the indexes are, as yet, fairly unproven relative to some more venerable measures of social attributes. Nevertheless, their usefulness for the task at hand has been established to our satisfaction. Each item has been passed on by a panel of Protestant clergymen as well as a group of Catholic social scientists, some of whom were priests. Through item analyses each statement was inspected for its ability to differentiate respondents. Lastly, consistent patterns in the relationship of the index scores to other variables has served to further justify their use.

The religious types (R-types). The R-types were constructed as a unit of analysis for organizing our respondents into meaningful configurations. They are nuclei around which we build a pattern of relationships in order to discover a sort of "religious syndrome."

The indexes of Basic Christianity, Basic Catholicism, Image of the Catholic Clergy, and style of Catholicism have been used to develop the R-types. Each respondent was categorized according to the way he ranked (high or low) on each of the four indexes. Over 80 per cent of the respondents fall into five principal types. (Table 1.)

Table 1. The Religious Types and their Component Indexes

<u>INDEXES</u>	<u>ALL RESPONDENTS</u>				
	<u>LLLL</u>	<u>HLLL</u>	<u>HHLL</u>	<u>HHHL</u>	<u>HHHH</u>
Basic Christianity	Low	High	High	High	High
Basic Catholicism	Low	Low	High	High	High
Image of the Catholic Clergy	Low	Low	Low	High	High
Style of Catholicism	Low	Low	Low	Low	High

The remainder of the respondents were grouped into what we call "deviant" types. Several of these types are explicable in substantive terms, but others contain what appear to be logical inconsistencies--as, for example, when a person scores low on Basic Christianity but high on Basic Catholicism. In the long run a thorough investigation of these types might prove fruitful, but for the present we will concentrate on the majority types.

It is difficult to find a name for each of the principal types which adequately expresses its content yet remains normatively neutral. Therefore we have opted for merely designating them by means of combinations of the letters H (for high) and L (for low). It should be helpful for the reader to think of them as representing points on a continuum ranging from nonconformity (left) to conformity (right) with the norms, values, beliefs, and attitudes included in the indexes.

At the "right" end of the continuum stand those persons who appear to be most firmly committed to Catholicism as it has traditionally figured in their culture. At the other ("left") extreme stand those respondents who seem most disaffected with Catholicism and Christianity in general. In

between are people who express dissatisfaction with some of the traditional appurtenances of Catholicism, with the clergy, or with both.

The ability of the R-types to differentiate among the respondents has been substantiated in much the same way as in the case of the indexes (see p. 6 above).

Religious Affiliation

Students of Latin America generally concede that entrance into and acceptance of the Catholic Church is an almost automatic part of the socialization process in these cultures. There is evidence that our respondents agree. They were asked:

In your opinion, why are the majority of the people in this country Catholics?

The replies of a subsample of our respondents, 120 in all, were analyzed and it was found that 90 (75 per cent) contained some reference to tradition, custom, or historical causes.¹ Some answers of this nature were:

Because we inherited it Catholicism from the Spaniards.

It is the traditional religion.

On account of our environment.

The recognition that cultural factors rather than conviction often push his countrymen into membership in the Catholic religion may or may not

¹Four persons (3 per cent) gave the following answers: "Because it is the true religion;" "Because it is the best (religion);" "I believe it is the most universally true." Two (2 per cent) answers were: "Through ignorance;" "...because the people have not stopped to think." Twenty-four persons (20 per cent) gave no answer or said they didn't know.

be a corollary of the respondent's evaluation of the Church. Note the following replies to the same question:

Because of cultural influences and the spontaneous abnegation of the priests and sisters which is evident to all the people.

Due to the fact that an ancient tradition has been preserved, not because of conviction....

One could say because of atavism, tradition.

In this light it is not surprising that 1,307 (82 per cent) of our respondents replied "Catholic" when they were asked "What is your religion?" (See Table 2.) By the same token we shall see that not all of those who claimed the Catholic religion are even superficially committed to its outward forms.

Furthermore, it should not be supposed that the 169 (11 per cent) who declared that they had no religion had never been formally admitted to Catholicism. When the latter respondents were asked if they had ever had a religion, 135 (80 per cent) said "yes."

Table 2. Distribution of the Respondents by Professed Religious Affiliation

<u>Religion</u>	ALL RESPONDENTS	
	<u>Number</u>	<u>Per Cent</u>
Catholic	1,307	82
Other religions ^{a/}	86	5
No religion	169	11
No answer	<u>24</u>	<u>2</u>
	1,586	100

^{a/} Includes 28 Protestants, 29 Jews, 11 Moslems and Spiritualists, and 9 "Orthodoxos" (Greek Orthodox?).

When young people enter a university they become exposed to influences which impel them to think for themselves and perhaps to question much of what they had formerly taken on faith. The result is often a period of rebellion in which the individual outspokenly denies former convictions including religious ones. It is not surprising that 72 per cent of our "no religion" respondents were university students. Here is how three students, an Argentine, Chilean, and Peruvian answered when they were asked why they had given up their former religion:

I began to think for myself.

Separation from that environment and entrance into a completely anti-religious one.

I have not left it completely. I've simply become indifferent because of its errors and inadmissable dogmas.

This is not meant to imply that university students are, ipso facto, weaker in their religious convictions than are adult nonstudents. The reverse may be true as we shall see later in this report.

It is a commonplace that university life in Latin American countries corresponds, for some students, with a period of disaffection with Catholicism but that many of the rebels return to the faith in later years. Our data provide some indirect evidence that this is so. Twenty per cent of all student respondents declared that they had no religion; but of the citizens who had attended a university, only ten per cent claimed no religious affiliation.

If the generally voiced opinion and our tentative evidence are to be trusted, then a portion of those students who are now reluctant to admit to having a religion will be more willing to do so in the future and it seems likely that the religion will be Catholicism.

Distribution of the Religious Types.

Having arranged the respondents according to religious affiliation we further subdivide them according to degree of formal acceptance of the norms, attitudes, values, and beliefs comprised by the R-types. Table 3. presents our results.

Table 3. Distribution of the Principal Religious Types by Religious Affiliation

<u>RELIGION</u>	<u>Religious Type</u>					<u>Per cent</u>	<u>Total Number^{b/}</u>		
	<u>LLLL</u>	<u>HLLL</u>	<u>HHLL</u>	<u>HHHL</u>	<u>HHHH</u>		<u>Scale Types</u>	<u>Non-Scale Types</u>	<u>No Answer</u>
Total	26	12	22	26	15	100	(1305)	(217)	(64)
Catholic	13	11	26	31	18	100	(1059)	(198)	(50)
Other Religions ^{a/}	55	38	1	5	0	100	(74)	(10)	(2)
No religion	100	0	0	0	0	100	(153)	(7)	(9)
No answer	32	16	16	16	21	100	(19)	(2)	(3)

^{a/} Includes: 28 Protestants; 29 Jews, 11 Moslems and Spiritualists; 9 "Ortodoxos" (Greek Orthodox?)

^{b/} Percentages based on scale types only.

The first thing to notice about Table 3 is that all of the persons who said they had no religion fall into the leftmost category. Of those who professed a religion other than Catholicism, more than one-third scored high on Basic Christianity but low on all the other elements of the typology. About half of them scored low throughout.

The distribution of the respondents along the row marked "Catholics" seems reasonable. According to our criteria 86 per cent of the 1,059

respondents claiming Catholic affiliation are basically Christian and 75 per cent are also basically Catholic; 13 per cent are extreme "leftists" while the "rightists" make up 18 per cent of the Catholics. The largest single type among the Catholics is composed of those who are high on Basic Christianity, Basic Catholicism, and Image of the Catholic clergy, but modern with regard to the Style of Catholicism.

Basic Independent Variables

Our research was designed to take into account the variables of nationality, socio-economic status, sex, and enrollment at a state or Catholic University. They were hypothesized to be keys to an understanding of the respondents' other social characteristics.

Although each of these variables has proven useful for one purpose or another, as yet we have been able to establish a strong relationship between only three of them and the R-types. These three are: Student vs. citizen status, sex, and enrollment at a state or Catholic university. These characteristics seem to be associated with the R-types in ways which cut across country and socio-economic lines.

Inspection of Table 4 will give the reader a better understanding of what has just been said. It can be seen that the R-types to the right of the continuum are less frequent among men than women in most of the breakdowns, while males preponderate toward the left. This indicates that sex and R-type are related. That is to say that the men tend to be less religiously committed than the women.

Table 4. Principal Religious Types by Citizen vs. Student Status, by Sex, and by Enrollment at a State or Catholic University

	ALL RESPONDENTS ^{a/}					Per Cent	Total Number
	LLLL	HLLL	HHLL	HHHL	HHHH		
<u>Total Citizens</u>	20	11	23	31	16	100	(838)
Males	29	13	23	25	10	100	(388)
Females	12	9	22	36	21	100	(450)
<u>Total Students</u>	38	13	20	16	13	100	(448)
Males	38	14	21	17	11	100	(185)
Females	37	13	19	16	15	100	(263)
<u>State University</u>	56	13	16	9	7	100	(248)
Males	67	8	12	8	5	100	(84)
Females	50	15	18	10	8	100	(164)
<u>Catholic University</u>	15	14	26	25	21	100	(200)
Males	14	18	29	24	16	100	(101)
Females	16	9	23	25	26	100	(99)
<u>Total Respondents</u>	26	12	22	26	15	100	(1286)

^{a/} Excludes persons who did not answer the question on religious affiliation.

Next it can be seen that when the students of the state and Catholic University are taken together (Total Students) and compared with the citizens as a whole (Total Citizens) the students tend to have larger proportions of their members in the columns toward the left. Although this pattern would seem to bear out the commonly held view that university students are, as a whole, less religious than adult nonstudents the point needs further specification. Hence we have presented the findings by enrollment at a state or Catholic university.

When comparisons are made between the figures for these breakdowns it is evident that, in our sample, the state university students bulk the largest in the leftmost columns but are outweighed by Catholic university students toward the right. The students at secular universities tend to be much less religiously committed than those at Catholic institutions.

Looking at the figures in another way it can be seen that 32 per cent of the state university students are high on both Basic Christianity and Basic Catholicism, while 69 per cent of the citizens and 72 per cent of the Catholic university students show the same pattern.

Professed religious affiliation is a fourth variable which must frequently be taken into consideration when examining the R-types. Consider Table 5.

Table 5. State and Catholic University Students: Religious Types of Catholics and All Students Compared

RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION AND UNIVERSITY	Religious Type					Per Cent	Total Number
	LLLL	HLLL	HHLL	HHHL	HHHH		
<u>State University</u>							
Catholics	18	19	31	18	14	100	(126)
Other religions or no religion	94	6	0	0	0	100	(122)
<u>Catholic University</u>							
Catholics	9	14	28	26	23	100	(183)
Other religions or no religion	82	12	0	6	0	100	(17)

A glance at the column headed total number will show the reader that, over 90 per cent of our respondents at Catholic universities claim Catholic

religious affiliation but only about 50 per cent of those at state universities do likewise. Table 5 also throws into sharp relief the fact that those students at both state and Catholic universities who do not claim Catholic affiliation are primarily of the LLLL type.

Finally, it is instructive to compare the students of professed Catholic affiliation at both the state and Catholic universities according to the way they range along the continuum. By summing the percentages for those who are both basically Christian and basically Catholic it is seen that, in our sample, they account for 78 per cent of the declared Catholics at the Catholic universities and 63 per cent of their fellows at the state universities. In the same vein, there is a larger percentage of extreme "rightists" than "leftists" at the Catholic universities while the reverse is true at the state universities. In conclusion it should be noted that the distribution of Catholic students at both universities peaks in the type which is high on Basic Christianity and Basic Catholicism but low on Image of the clergy and modern in Style of Catholicism.

These findings lend support to the popular opinion that students enrolled in state universities tend to be less religious or less Catholic in their Catholicism than those who attend Catholic institutions. They do not, however, shed any light upon the question of whether young people choose one or the other university on the basis of religious tendency or whether the differences noted are the product of contrasting university environments.

The Association of the Religious Types with Other Religion Related Variables

The next step in this report is to depict the way in which the R-types are associated with a number of variables which are directly related to religion.

Intolerance. When speaking with non-Latin American Protestants in Buenos Aires, Lima, or Santiago one sometimes gets the impression that they see Protestants in those cities as minority groups which are at worst persecuted and at best discriminated against. For example, one Protestant clergyman interviewed in the field expressed the following sentiment:

One cannot be too cautious when dealing with the Romans. After all they were stoning us here only twenty years ago.

Our survey provides several kinds of information which can be brought to bear on the subject of intolerance.

The respondents were asked a number of questions designed to get at the degree to which they are able to tolerate varying religious viewpoints, especially Protestantism. The questions and an index derived from them are given on page 5.

In terms of this index each respondent was ranked as either high or low on intolerance and the results were related to the R-types. Table 6 shows how the two variables are related among Catholic citizens and students.

Table 6. Percentage of Respondents Classified as "Intolerant,"
by Religious Type

<u>STATUS</u>	<u>ALL CATHOLICS</u>				
	<u>LLLL</u>	<u>HLLL</u>	<u>HNLL</u>	<u>HHHL</u>	<u>HHHH</u>
Citizens	29%	38%	43%	56%	65%
Number	(100)	(72)	(189)	(255)	(133)
Students	21%	12%	23%	24%	54%
Number	(39)	(49)	(91)	(71)	(59)

By scanning the rows headed "citizens" and "students" one can quickly see that moving from left to right, there is a fairly steady upward trend in the percentages for citizens; for students, only the most traditional are notably high on intolerance. When the citizens are compared with the students it is apparent that, irrespective of R-type, the students have a smaller percentage of "intolerants" among their company than do their citizen counterparts. This seems to be especially true for the more "modern" Catholic students in the HHLL and HHHL types.

Before going any further the reader should be warned that the term "intolerance" and the magnitude of the percentages given in Table 6 can be misleading. He should be cautioned against a hasty inference that there are relatively large proportions of very intolerant persons among our respondents. Precisely the reverse may be true.

Although the index used as a measure of intolerance contained six questions only about one half of the respondents answered two or more in a direction which indicated intolerance. Hence this was the cut off point used to divide the scores into high and low ranks. Even among the extreme "rightists" who (in accord with expectations) are the most "intolerant" of the types only 12 per cent answered four or more of the questions in a fashion which indicate a lack of tolerance. The magnitude of the percentages shown in Table 6 should be evaluated in the light of these facts and thought of strictly as indicators of the relative intolerance of each R-type in comparison with all others.

The respondents were also asked:

In your opinion what sort of people are (1) Protestants,
(2) Catholics?

The answers of a 316 person subsample were analyzed and classified according to varying degrees of approval expressed regarding both Protestants or Catholics. The results are presented in Table 7.

Table 7. Varying opinions about Protestants and Catholics in Buenos Aires, Lima, and Santiago.

SAMPLE OF ALL RESPONDENTS

<u>City</u>	<u>Negative</u>	<u>Neutral</u>	<u>Mixed</u>	<u>Positive</u>	<u>All Others</u> ^{a/}	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Number</u>
<u>Buenos Aires</u>							
Attitude toward Catholics	8	15	27	38	13	100	(101)
Attitude toward Protestants	4	15	8	42	32	100	
<u>Lima</u>							
Attitude toward Catholics	10	3	34	43	10	100	(103)
Attitude toward Protestants	6	13	18	42	21	100	
<u>Santiago</u>							
Attitude toward Catholics ^{b/}	-	-	-	-	-	-	(112)
Attitude toward Protestants	12	22	4	40	23	100	

^{a/} Includes: "Don't know," "no answer," and unclassifiable answers.

^{b/} Question not asked concerning Catholics in Santiago.

It can be seen that there are considerably larger percentages of "positive" answers than "negative" ones regardless of the nationality of the

respondents or the religion in question. If one attends solely to the column headed "positive" he will see that in Buenos Aires and Lima there is little difference between the percentages of favorable answers pertaining to both Catholic and Protestants. For Santiago the proportion of replies favorable to Protestants is roughly of the same order of magnitude as in the other cities. This indicates that among our respondents there is no pronounced anti-Protestant bias.

Responses were classified as "Mixed" if they contained one or more statements which could be considered to reflect a positive opinion plus one or more statements of a negative nature. By referring to the appropriate column it can be seen that among our Argentine and Peruvian respondents mixed opinions about Catholics considerably outnumber those about Protestants. Also, the proportion of Chilean who appear to have mixed feelings about Protestants is small (4 per cent).

Finally it is instructive to note that in Argentina and Peru negative opinions on Catholics outnumber those on Protestants.

The points brought out in the two preceding paragraphs suggest that our respondents found it more difficult to express a categorical opinion of Catholics than of Protestants and were more prone to express unfavorable opinions of Catholics than Protestants.

In our judgment, these tendencies are understandable of one remembers that Protestants are very much in the minority in these cities. It is likely that few of the respondents to our survey have had a chance to become intimately acquainted with large numbers of Protestants while the reverse is certainly true of Catholics. Out of 1,440 respondents who answered the

question about to what religion the majority of their friends belonged 88 per cent said Catholicism while 1.5 per cent said Protestantism. Furthermore, in answer to another question less than half (41 per cent) said that they had any Protestant friends at all.

Under these conditions a plausible hypothesis is that due to a limited number of contacts with Protestants the respondents have had less chance to receive a range of good and bad impressions of them and find it easier to make a categorical judgment than is the case with Catholics.

Answers such as the following lend credence to this hypothesis.

Very strict Protestants but I only have one Protestant friend and I am unable to judge very widely.

I've never dealt with any, therefore I don't know them.
I believe they are very good people.

I suppose they are good people but I don't know them.

I know very few but I find them full of good qualities.
This is because I have known good ones, but surely there are all kinds.

Furthermore, answers such as these suggest that although the respondents are not very familiar with Protestants they are more ready to think well than poorly of them. In other words many of our respondents seem to be prejudiced in favor of Protestants.

Attraction of another religion. The respondents were asked:

Is there something in a religion other than your own which attracts you?

Table 8 shows the distribution, by sex and R-type, of professed Catholics among our respondents who asserted that there was something in another religion which appealed to them. Several patterns emerge from these figures.

Table 3. Religious Type by Attraction to Another Religion

	ALL CATHOLICS				
	<u>Religious Type</u>				
	<u>LLLL</u>	<u>HLLL</u>	<u>HHLL</u>	<u>HHHL</u>	<u>HHHH</u>
<u>Both sexes</u>	29%	42%	26%	16%	11%
Number	(117)	(100)	(238)	(268)	(166)
<u>Males</u>	25%	38%	23%	17%	13%
Number	(76)	(56)	(107)	(106)	(45)
<u>Females</u>	37%	48%	28%	15%	11%
Number	(41)	(44)	(131)	(162)	(121)

It is the extreme "rightists" in our sample who are least prone to admit the attraction of another religion. Conversely, the distributions consistently peak at the column containing persons who remain high on Basic Christianity but rank low on the other elements of our typology. Among the extreme "leftists" the proportion of respondents who declared an affinity for something in another religion is lower than for those of the HLLL type but higher than for any of the types further to the right.

It would appear that, among our respondents, the appeal of something about another religion grows stronger at points along the continuum which accumulate first a dissatisfaction with the traditional style of Catholicism, then disillusionment with members of the Catholic clergy, and finally a disaffection with Catholicism itself. Persons who share all these traits, but do not go so far as to negate certain basically Christian beliefs are apparently most often disposed to declare an attraction to another church. Among those respondents who claim Catholic affiliation

but answer to questions about Christian dogma in non-Christian ways a smaller proportion admit an affinity for some facet of another faith than do their "Basically Christian" fellows. Yet even these (of the LLLL type) seem to be more pulled to another religion than those respondents who pertain to any of the types which are "Basically Catholic."

Although the patterns just described hold for both males and females they become refined in plausible ways when this variable is introduced. It should be noted that the percentage of those who are attracted by something in another religion is higher for females among the three leftmost types; among the two rightmost types the difference is reversed. It might be inferred that, in our sample, it is the females rather than the males who are most strongly drawn to religion as religion. Hence, weakening of religious convictions of one kind are more frequently accompanied by an increased attraction to religious convictions of another kind among females as opposed to males.

In conclusion it should be pointed out that the religion most frequently named as holding some attraction for the respondents was Protestantism. Those who stated that there was something in another religion which attracted them were also asked what they most liked and disliked about that religion. It was found that 226 of the answers were phrased in a way which permitted the unequivocal identification of the religion in question. Of these replies 84 per cent contained a reference to Protestantism.²

²Of the remaining answers 11 per cent referred to Buddhism or Mohammedanism; 3 per cent to Catholicism, and 2 per cent to Judaism.

Ritual participation. This section describes how the respondents of each R-type who professed Catholic affiliation reported the degree to which they participate in the sacraments of mass and confession (see Table 9).

Table 9. Participation in Mass and Confession 12 Times A Year or More by Religious Type

<u>Sacrament</u>	<u>ALL CATHOLICS</u> <u>Religious Type</u>				
	<u>LLLL</u>	<u>HLLL</u>	<u>HLLH</u>	<u>HHHL</u>	<u>HHHH</u>
<u>Mass</u>					
Citizens	21%	45%	64%	80%	91%
Number	(94)	(71)	(182)	(247)	(129)
Students	61%	69%	87%	100%	96%
Number	(31)	(39)	(84)	(65)	(54)
<u>Confession</u>					
Citizens	1%	6%	10%	24%	32%
Number	(91)	(63)	(175)	(238)	(129)
Students	17%	22%	40%	80%	68%
Number	(29)	(32)	(78)	(60)	(53)

The data show three basic patterns. First, the percentage of persons in each R-type who say they go to mass or confession at least 12 times a year becomes larger moving from left to right. This is true for both citizens and students. Second, the percentage of persons who report such a rate of participation is consistently larger in the case of mass than in the case of confession.

Last and most interesting is the tendency of a larger proportion of students than citizens in each R-type to report themselves as attending mass and confession at least 12 times a year. Note, for example, type LLLL. In the case of confession almost three times as many of the "leftist" students than of the "leftist" citizens claim that they go to mass 12 times yearly while the difference is 17 times as great in the case of confession.

These figures indicate that a weakening of adherence to traditional religious norms, values, beliefs and attitudes is more apt to be accompanied by a decrease in ritual participation among our "Catholic" citizen as opposed to student respondents.

Turning to the rightmost column it can be seen that, once again, larger proportions of students than citizens are represented as attending mass and confession at least twelve times yearly. This indicates that even among the most committed and traditional of our Catholic respondents it is the students who most frequently participate in mass and confession.

It was hypothesized that the students enrolled at a state university would differ from those enrolled at a Catholic university with regard to ritual participation. The figures given in Table 10 indicate that this is indeed the case.

It can be seen that in nearly every R-type the percentage of students enrolled at a Catholic university who attend mass and confession at least twelve times yearly is higher than among the state university students.

Table 10. Participation in Mass and Confession 12 Times a Year or More, by Religious Type and Enrollment at a State or Catholic University

<u>Sacrament</u>	CATHOLIC STUDENTS				
	<u>Religious Type</u>				
	<u>LLLL</u>	<u>HLLL</u>	<u>HHLL</u>	<u>HHHL</u>	<u>HHHH</u>
<u>Mass</u>					
State University	44%	63%	88%	100%	100%
Number	(18)	(16)	(34)	(20)	(15)
Catholic University	85%	74%	86%	100%	95%
Number	(13)	(23)	(50)	(45)	(39)
<u>Confession</u>					
State University	0%	27%	31%	78%	50%
Number	(17)	(15)	(35)	(18)	(16)
Catholic University	42%	18%	46%	81%	76%
Number	(12)	(17)	(43)	(42)	(37)

Priests as counselors on marital problems. Our respondents were asked the hypothetical question:

If you were having trouble with your (husband/wife), to whom would you turn for counsel?³

The answers to this question were analyzed to determine the proportion of citizens and students in each R-type who spontaneously mentioned a priest as the first person from whom they would seek advice on marital problems. (Table 11.)

³ Unmarried respondents were asked to answer as if they were married.

Table 11. Choice of Priest as Advisor on Marital Problems, by Religious Type and Citizen vs. Student Status

		ALL CATHOLICS				
		<u>Religious Type</u>				
		<u>LLLL</u>	<u>HLLL</u>	<u>HHLL</u>	<u>HHHL</u>	<u>HHHH</u>
<u>Citizens</u>		3%	6%	11%	22%	30%
Number		(93)	(64)	(180)	(226)	(117)
<u>Students</u>		7%	23%	33%	59%	54%
Number		(28)	(35)	(67)	(58)	(48)

It can be seen that the proportions of both students and citizens who express a tendency to seek the counsel of priests on such matters grow larger moving from left to right on the R-type continuum.

Furthermore, by referring to Table 12 it becomes evident that larger proportions of students enrolled at a Catholic university than a state university spontaneously express a preference for the advice of priests on such matters.

Table 12. Choice of Priest as Advisor on Marital Problems, by Religious Type and Enrollment at a State or Catholic University

		CATHOLIC STUDENTS				
		<u>Religious Type</u>				
		<u>LLLL</u>	<u>HLLL</u>	<u>HHLL</u>	<u>HHHL</u>	<u>HHHH</u>
<u>University</u>						
State		0%	16%	28%	44%	33%
Number		(16)	(19)	(29)	(18)	(15)
Catholic		17%	31%	37%	65%	64%
Number		(12)	(16)	(38)	(40)	(33)

It was hypothesized that one of the factors which prevents some Catholics from turning to priests for advice on marital problems is a feeling that the priest, being celibate, could not truly understand the practical side of married life.

Table 13 presents some tentative evidence that this is so. Out of 310 of the professed Catholics in our sample who felt that priests should remain celibate, 37 per cent mentioned "a priest" as the first person to whom they would appeal for advice if they were having trouble with their spouse. Less than half as many of the Catholics who felt priests should marry said they would go to a priest for similar advice.

Table 13. Opinions About Clerical Celibacy, by Choice of Advisor on Marital Problems.

<u>Would Choose:</u>	ALL CATHOLICS		
	<u>Should not Marry</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>	<u>Should Marry</u>
Priest	37%	24%	14%
Other ^{a/}	<u>63</u>	<u>76</u>	<u>86</u>
	100%	100%	100%
Total number	(310)	(205)	(566)

^{a/} Includes: "No one;" relatives, friends; other clergy, or professionals.

The marital status of the respondents was thought to be another factor which could influence the naming of a priest as the person to whom they would turn for advice on marital problems. It was hypothesized that, in contrast with single persons, married ones might:

(1) be more alive to the complexities of matrimonial problems and therefore more dubious about the ability of anyone to help them with such troubles;

(2) have, at some time, turned to a priest who was unskilled as a marriage counselor, become disillusioned and reluctant to return to a priest for help on like problems.

The figures given in Table 14 support these hypotheses.

Table 14. Percentage of Persons Saying they Would Solve Their Own Marital Problems or Who Would Choose a Priest for Advice by Religious Type and Marital Status^{a/}

ALL CATHOLICS					
<u>Religious Type</u>					
<u>MARITAL STATUS</u>	<u>LLLL</u>	<u>HLLL</u>	<u>HHLL</u>	<u>HHHL</u>	<u>HHHH</u>
<u>Married</u>					
Would solve own marital problems	55%	38%	46%	34%	26%
Would go to a priest	3%	7%	12%	23%	29%
Number	(93)	(61)	(178)	(214)	(114)
<u>Never married</u>					
Would solve own marital problems	28%	32%	22%	12%	7%
Would go to a priest	4%	19%	31%	50%	52%
Number	(25)	(37)	(64)	(66)	(46)

^{a/} The remaining respondents named relatives, friends, other clergy, or nonclerical professionals as their choice of advisor on marital problems or did not answer the question.

It can be seen that in each R-type the percentage who said that they would go to no one for help on marital problems is greater in the case of married persons than in the case of unmarried respondents. Second, regardless of R-type, smaller proportions of married persons than single ones named a priest as the person to whom they would turn for such advice.

It should be stressed that it would be unjustified to conclude from these findings that priests are unqualified as marriage counselors. The figures merely reflect the attitude of some of our respondents.

Catholic Morals. Respondents were rated as being high on Catholic morals if they agreed that divorce should not be permitted and Catholics should not use contraceptives. Table 15 demonstrates how a "high" score on this index relates to membership in the various R-types among Catholic citizens and students.

Table 15. Percentage of Respondents Classified as "High" on Catholic Morals, by Religious Type and Citizen vs. Student Status.

<u>STATUS</u>	<u>ALL CATHOLICS</u>				
	<u>LLLL</u>	<u>HLLL</u>	<u>HHLL</u>	<u>HHHL</u>	<u>HHHH</u>
Citizen	4%	14%	20%	33%	53%
Number	(101)	(72)	(188)	(255)	(133)
Students	8%	22%	37%	68%	64%
Number	(39)	(49)	(91)	(71)	(59)

As the R-types move from left to right the percentage of their members who score high on Catholic ethics grows larger both in the case of citizens and students. However, when one compares the proportions of students with that of citizens in each R-type who are high on Catholic morals it can be seen that the figure for the students is consistently larger.

One of our hypotheses was that persons of Catholic affiliation who had actually been faced with the strains sometimes attendant on married life or the problems of rearing children would be less likely to accept the propositions that divorce should not be permitted nor contraceptives used by Catholics than would those persons who had never been married at all. The figures given in Table 16 tend to support this hypothesis.

Table 16. Rank on Index of Catholic Morals by Marital Status^{a/}

<u>Rank</u> ^{b/}	ALL CATHOLICS	
	<u>Marital Status</u>	
	<u>Married</u>	<u>Never Married</u>
Low	39%	24%
Medium	35	34
High	<u>27</u>	<u>42</u>
	100%	100%
Number	(836)	(401)

^{a/} Items: divorce should not be permitted; Catholics should not use contraceptives.

^{b/} Low = 0 agree responses; Medium = 1 agree response; High = 2 agree responses.

Thus we see that married Catholics are not only less likely than those who have never married to turn to priests for marital counsel, but they are also less likely to agree with their church's teaching concerning contraception and divorce.

Summary

In the earlier sections the R-types were related to one other "religion connected" variable at a time. The first part of this section is devoted to drawing the findings together in summary form in order to show how they compare when centered around each of the R-types. In the second part of this summary we make some broad distinctions for citizens vs. students, males vs. females, and students enrolled at a state or Catholic university.

Since nearly all of the foregoing analysis has dealt with persons who profess affiliation with the Catholic Church the summarization is restricted to those respondents only.

Type HHHH. This type comprises those of our respondents who are high on Basic Christianity, Basic Catholicism, Image of the Catholic clergy, and traditional on Style of Catholicism according to the criteria given earlier.⁴

Respondents of this type were found (1) to have the largest proportion of "intolerants" among their ranks; (2) to be most likely to report a rate of attendance at mass and confession of 12 times a year or more; (3)

⁴See pp. 3-5.

to be most likely to name a priest as their first choice as an advisor on marital problems; (4) to be most likely to agree that divorce should not be permitted and that Catholics should not use contraceptives.

On the other hand respondents of type HHHH were least likely to say that there is something in another religion which attracted them.

Type HHHL. This type is made up of persons who are "high" on Basic Christianity, Basic Catholicism, Image of the Catholic clergy and low (or modern) on Style of Catholicism.

Respondents in this category were found to be second in (1) the proportion of intolerants among their ranks; (2) the reporting of a rate of attendance at mass and confession of at least 12 times yearly; (3) the likelihood of naming a priest as first choice for counseling on marital problems; (4) a tendency to agree that divorce should be forbidden and Catholics should not use contraceptives.

Among those interviewed, persons of type HHHL were the second least likely to admit to the attraction of something in another religion.

Type HLLL. Persons who are high on Basic Christianity, Basic Catholicism, but low on Image of the Catholic clergy and modern on Style of Catholicism fall into this type.

Such respondents were found to be intermediate (third) according to (1) proportion of intolerants; (2) high rate (at least 12 times yearly) of attendance at mass and confession; (3) the choice of a priest for marriage counseling; (4) agreement with the proposition that divorce should not be permitted and Catholics should not use contraceptives.

This type also ranked third according to the proportion of its members who said that they found something attractive about another religion.

Type HLLL. Individuals of this type are characterized by being high on Basic Christianity but low on Basic Catholicism, Image of the Catholic clergy, and modern on Style of Catholicism.

This type ranked next to last (fourth) on (1) proportion of intolerants; (2) a high reported rate of ritual participation; (3) tendency to seek out priests for advice on marital problems and (4) acceptance of prohibitions on divorce and the use of contraceptives.

Persons of this type were the most likely to say that there is something in another religion which attracts them.

Type LLLL. In this type are found the extreme "leftists," i.e., persons who rank low on Basic Christianity, Basic Catholicism, Image of the Catholic clergy and modern on Style of Catholicism.

Persons of this type were found to be lowest on (1) the proportion of "intolerants" in their company; (2) likelihood of reporting a high rate of attendance at mass and confession; (3) tendency to name priests as preferred advisors on marital problems; (4) agreement that divorce should not be permitted and that Catholics should not use contraceptives.

Respondents of Type LLLL are, however, the second most likely to admit the attraction of another religion.

Persons who are not from Latin America frequently believe that in Spanish language societies it is the female rather than the male who is most "religious" by nature, who tends to participate most highly in the ritual

activities of the church, and who is more conservative in religious outlook. The findings presented in this chapter seem to support such generalizations insofar as the respondents in our sample are concerned.

Another opinion commonly held by non-Latin Americans is that university students in those societies tend to be less religiously oriented and less conservative in their religion than adult nonstudents. Our findings suggest that such a sweeping generalization is not warranted. One must at least take into account such things as enrollment at a state or Catholic university and professed religious affiliation.

The foregoing analysis does indicate that the students surveyed at a state university were more likely to deny religious affiliation than were the citizens. On the other hand, those state university students who said they were Catholics seem to be somewhat more committed and conservative than the citizens who professed the Catholic religion.

A smaller proportion of students questioned at Catholic universities denied having a religion than did their fellows at state universities or among the citizens. Furthermore, it was the Catholic students at Catholic universities who appeared to be most committed to the Catholic religion, at least according to the criteria employed here.

Chapter V

Protestantism in Four Societies*

This chapter deals with Protestantism in Argentina, Chile, Bolivia and Peru. The chapter's objectives are six: (1) to designate the historical development of Protestantism; (2) to trace its patterns of distribution and growth; (3) to relate these patterns to social and organizational factors; (4) to evaluate Protestantism's earlier and present place in society; (5) to assess the functions of Protestantism for its members, particularly for recent converts; and (6) to point out some general principles relevant for non-Roman Catholic religious groups engaging in mission activities in these countries.

The substantive materials for this chapter come from three major sources. The first source is sixty-one interviews with leaders of non-Roman institutions and six interviews with leaders of Roman Catholic institutions. These interviews represent information from a variety of enterprises and denominations. Thirty-two interviews concern local churches, ten concern schools, seven social centers, six hospitals or clinics, four rural development projects, four student centers or homes, one a publishing house, and four the overall program of a particular denomination. These respondents represented sixteen different religious bodies: Baptists, Methodists, Oregon Friends, Presbyterians, Free Church of Scotland, Nazarenes, Peruvian Evangelical Church, Christian Missionary Alliance, Adventists, Roman Catholics, Assemblies of God, Pentecostals, Anglicans, United Lutheran, Plymouth Brethren and French Reformed.

*William E. Carter.

The second major source of information is thirty six life histories of Protestant converts. These converts do not represent a controlled sample. Nevertheless, in selecting the persons to be interviewed, considerable effort was made to avoid gathering all the information from a single denomination, age category, occupational group, educational level, or socio-economic sector. Of necessity, most converts were contacted through their clergymen.

The third major source of information is questionnaires mailed to Protestant clergymen in the four countries. These questionnaires contained items on size and location of the clergyman's church, his family background and training, his most serious personal problems, the most serious problems of his church and denomination, and his judgments on the future of Protestantism in his country. Ninety-one clergymen returned completed questionnaires: Thirty from Peru, twenty-nine from Bolivia, twenty-six from Chile, and six from Argentina.¹

The significance of Protestant activity

It is felt that the information obtained on the Protestant movement in Argentina, Chile, Bolivia and Peru is pertinent for any non-Roman Catholic religious group engaging in or contemplating activity in these countries. In the past an individual could not decide whether he would be Roman Catholic or not; he was so by virtue of having been born. South American society was monistic--that is, there was one great religious

¹The low rate of response from the Argentine clergy is undoubtedly related to the fact that just when the questionnaires were mailed, correspondence in the country was brought to a standstill by a nationwide postal strike.

tradition to which everyone was expected to conform at least outwardly. Sometimes the price of nonconformity was legally decreed to be death; always it meant social ostracism.

Although legal prohibitions of religious nonconformity began to break down after the struggle for independence, these prohibitions persisted in backwaters like Bolivia as late as 1906. Even today, when the legal sanctions have been withdrawn, allegiance to a non-Roman religious group in all four countries places one in a definitely identifiable, sometimes deeply resented, minority.

This minority is always stressful particularly so for those who, finding themselves partially in sympathy with the Roman Catholic church, nevertheless prefer for a variety of reasons to carry on their formal worship outside of it. These people often share much more with Roman Catholics than, for example, with Pentecostals. But they find that the public at large usually identifies them much more with the latter than with the former.²

Historical Phases

Most Protestant activity in southern South America began with small

²The Anglicans present a prime example of this dilemma. For example, when a Chilean priest, Father I. Vergara, recently wrote a book about Protestantism in Chile, he began with Anglicanism and gradually led up to Pentecostalism. This seemed to him perfectly logical. For, as he pointed out, the Anglicans were the first people to request freedom of worship in Chile, and to bring in the work of the British Bible Society, a definitely Protestant organization. It is not surprising, then, that when North American Maryknoll priests began to work in Chile a few years ago, one of the spots they chose as a prime target was the little town where S.A.M.S. has been carrying on work for over half a century. Yet S.A.M.S. had gone there merely because it had felt that here was a territory neglected by all churches. Certainly it had never intended to come into open conflict and competition with the Romans.

groups of European immigrants who brought Protestantism with them. These immigrants, of course, never composed more than a very small proportion of the total population. These small minorities generally encountered minimal opposition to their appeals for freedom of worship. For, beginning with the independence movement, the intellectual climate in countries such as Argentina and Chile favored any activity which would help break the despised domination of the Spanish, and one way to do so was to break the monolithic hold of the Roman church on public life. Protestants, then, were looked upon as a small pawn that could be used in the struggle against the traditional powers. These religious minorities were used by the anti-clerics to symbolize their defiances of the clergy and the hierarchy. Yet few of the anticlericals who encouraged the Protestants had any intention of becoming Protestants themselves. They would remain nominally Catholic the rest of their lives.

The men who first granted freedom of worship to these small Protestant minorities had no desire to see Protestantism spread beyond its original ethnic boundaries. But from the beginning the immigrants had different ideas. One of their activities was distributing portions of Scripture. In other instances they provided a badly needed secular service which opened opportunities for discussing their religion and distributing religious literature. James Thompson used this approach. He went first to Argentina, where he successfully set up a series of "Lancaster" schools. Then, invited by Bernardo O'Higgins, he went to Chile in 1821 to carry out the same task. Finally, he received a similar invitation to work in Peru. In all of these travels he served as a representative for the British and

Foreign Bible Society, distributing some of the first Protestant literature in southern South America.

Through efforts like Thompson's, then, the small group of Protestant immigrants formed the basis for proselyting activities. Not long after some of the immigrant leaders sought backing from foreign mission boards--particularly those in the United States.

Activity by foreign mission boards represents the second phase of Protestant growth. It was accompanied in many cases by social service projects. For often sponsoring of such projects was the only formal non-Roman religious activity permitted among the public at large. A number of what have come to be outstanding schools were begun in this way, a most noteworthy example being the American Institute in La Paz.

The third major stage of Protestant activity in these countries began only after the beginning of the twentieth century. Characterized by other-worldliness, spontaneous ritual participation, and decentralized administration, this stage is a reaction against the imported religious patterns of the nineteenth century ethnic and mission groups. Today the Pentecostal movements of Chile represent this development most truly. It is a holiness type of religious approach, initially divorced from service institutions, aimed primarily at spiritual salvation, and filled with opportunities for individual expression. This particular combination of theology and ritual has gained its greatest successes in places where foreign sponsorship is absent. A few mission-backed groups, such as the Assemblies of God, with a similar approach have, however, experienced far greater growth than that of traditional groups.

The location of churches

Protestant church locations today reflect the heterogeneity of this historical background. The ethnic Protestant groups often possess rather imposing old structures in the heart of the major cities. However, this seems to be due not to purposefully their seeking out of prominent sites, but to their early arrival. The cities have grown around them. Significantly, hardly any of the Protestant churches face plazas; yet in nineteenth century Latin America all important public buildings were erected on plazas. If ethnic churches are prominently situated on large boulevards and avenues today, then, it is because of changes in the structure of the cities themselves since the last century.

From the prominence of the ethnic churches, a slow, downward gradation in location roughly reflects the historic emergence of Protestantism in these countries. Thus, those missionary denominations which first entered the field, such as the Methodists and the Presbyterians, also have imposing buildings on main thoroughfares, even though they today have fewer members than some later arrivals.

Most marginally located, geographically, are the sect groups which have grown up in the twentieth century. Not only do their church buildings tend to be poor in quality, but they are usually located where the streets are unpaved, and in areas where the cities and towns have only recently expanded. Significantly, these are the same areas where the deprived, lower socio-economic classes live.

Geographical Distribution of Protestants

Interestingly enough, Protestant gains do not seem to be significantly greater in the capital cities than in the hinterland, in spite of the fact that the cities are more open and pluralistic than the countryside. Buenos Aires, Santiago, and Lima each have approximately the same proportion of Protestants as has each of the respective countries as a whole. La Paz is an exception, probably for two major reasons: first, there has been no Protestant immigration to Bolivia; and second, communication with the Bolivian hinterland is considerably more difficult than with the hinterland of the other three countries.

Where the capital city does not have an especially high percentage of Protestants (in Argentina, Chile, and Peru), the Protestants seem to be concentrated most heavily in regions which have received many European Protestant immigrants, and in frontier areas opened up since national independence. Thus, in Argentina, Entre Rios, an area into which large groups of Germans and Valdensians came at the turn of the century, leads the rest of the country in Protestant membership; and Temuco, a rich farming region settled only during the last one hundred years, in Chile. In Peru, Loreto, a wild tropical forest region just now being colonized from settled parts of the country, far surpasses them in Protestant membership.

When the four countries are compared as wholes Chile is far ahead in Protestant membership, both by percentage and by absolute numbers. Roman Catholic authorities today estimate that one out of every ten

Chileans has become Protestant. The proportion in the other countries is far less, however. Bolivia averages 324 persons per Protestant; Argentina 326, and Peru 647.

In spite of relatively few members, Protestant denominations proliferate. Between 1910 and 1920 a major effort was made to divide the southern continent among the principal mission groups working there. However, a number of them refused to cooperate, mainly because of separatist doctrines imported from the United States and Europe. Some, such as the Seventh Day Adventists, had been among the pioneers in extending non-Roman religion into the hinterlands. Others were related to the growing number of holiness sects.

Competition between denominations is very keen in the present period, despite attempts to curb it. Not uncommonly a small city of thirty thousand play host to as many as twelve different groups--none of which is able to gather together a following larger than one hundred persons.³ In such a situation, some groups openly work to convert numbers from one Protestant church to another. Frequently an individual makes the complete round and return to his original denomination after a period of eight to ten years.

This uneconomical situation may be changing. There are indications that the indigenous church leaders are dissatisfied. A number of them accuse the foreigners of having brought extraneous divisions to an already fragmented society. Converts, in many cases, come to the new church seeking

³Concordia, Argentina, is a case in point.

a solid peer group to substitute for undesirable or abandoned kin, and they find the divisiveness discouraging.

The interest of South American Protestants in ecumenicity is therefore growing. It made possible an interdenominational, international conference in Lima two years ago. Observers at the conference noted that the delegates desired fixed identification applicable to all Protestants in southern South America. Consequently, major efforts were put forth to work out some basic credal statement acceptable to all. This, in the end, proved so difficult that the host delegation itself walked out.

The most consistent signs of ecumenical rapprochement are found in Chile and Argentina. In the former country, Church World Service has played a catalyzing role in bringing extremely divergent groups together into what has been basically a hand-out program.⁴ As a result, open-handed cooperation is taking place between holiness sects and traditional denominations. Reciprocal visits are made; care is taken not to berate the contribution of sects with approaches highly divergent from one's own, local councils of churches are forming, and attempts are being made to look at Protestant denominations as complementary, not as competing. However, the formal structure in Chile is too weak to take real advantage of this unique opportunity. The National Council of Churches represents only one faction of the whole, and is administered only in the spare time of an aging Santiago pastor.

⁴It should be noted that Church World Service in Chile is now attempting to go beyond this by sponsoring a number of community development projects.

In contrast, Argentina has a long history of formal ecumenical structures. Its Council of Churches boasts of a permanent office, a full time administrator, and a qualified secretary. It has had no central program, such as Church World Service, with which to draw the different denominations together. Therefore, only a small number of the many denominations working in the country cooperate with the Council. The growing holiness sects, in particular, have remained aloof.

Next in extent of cooperation is Bolivia, where relations between the various heavily foreign-dominated missions are warmer than they were ten years ago. Ecumenical cooperation is weakest in Peru. Indeed, here the past decade seems to have brought even more suspicion and lack of cooperation than before. For example, the Peruvian Evangelical church, originally representing a number of Protestant groups in the countries, has now split into two of its sponsoring denominations: The Evangelical Union of South America, and the Christian Missionary Alliance church.

Geographical Patterns of Growth

Although the growth of Protestantism in southern South America is certainly not phenomenal, it does keep ahead of population growth. For all countries combined population expansion has averaged 1.7 per cent per year during the period of 1920-1950.⁵ In contrast, Protestant membership has, since 1939, increased by an average of 6.4 per cent annually.⁶

⁵T. Lynn Smith, 1960, p. 74

⁶Based on an analysis of 1939 figures from the World Christian Handbook; and on 1960 figures from a recent statistical survey entitled Protestant Missions in Latin America, published by the Evangelical Foreign Missions Association.

Because of the Pentecostals, Chile leads the other countries in Protestant expansion. Since 1939, the Protestant churches there have increased 505 per cent in membership (though the non-Pentecostal churches have grown by only 106 per cent. At the other extreme is Argentina which, during the same period, has seen its Protestants increase by only 37 per cent. Bolivia and Peru, both of which possessed very tiny Protestant minorities in 1939, show growth curves intermediate between the Argentine and Chilean extremes. In the former country, membership has increased by 164 per cent; in the latter by 130 per cent.

This wide disparity in growth patterns in the different countries seems directly related to general societal development. In Chile the period since the 1930's has been one of rapid industrial expansion, where chances for both physical and social mobility have been far greater than those of earlier periods. In Argentina, on the other hand, the great push forward came in the latter part of the nineteenth and the first third of the twentieth centuries. Since 1930, the country has remained on a plateau characterized by great political unrest and economic stagnation. Moreover, in the post-1930 period the foreign ethnic groups have had time to assimilate themselves within the general Argentinian culture. As this occurred, the separatistic functions of their minority religion became increasingly unnecessary. Therefore, with the exception of the already Latinized Valdensians, the numerous ethnic churches of the country have recently suffered drastic declines in membership. The Danish and Anglican groups are examples of this phenomenon.

Protestant growth in Bolivia and Peru seems directly related, as

suggested earlier in this chapter, to the opening of new frontiers and the emigration of rural peasants from the original closed communities to the growing edges of the urban centers. But this is by no means the only factor involved. The Bolivian revolution, giving the Indian real importance on the national scene for the first time, adds a qualitative dimension to the Bolivian scene that has not yet appeared in Peru. The revolution is important for understanding why Protestantism has grown faster in Bolivia than in Peru, in spite of the large waves of migration from the Peruvian highlands to the Peruvian coast.

Denominational Patterns of Growth

Differential denominational growth appears to be inversely correlated with the length of time the denomination has functioned in the society. That is, the more recently established groups have expanded fastest, while the oldest groups have in many cases actually lost members. This places the ethnic churches at the lowest point on the growth scale, the traditional mission groups in the middle, and the indigenous holiness sects at the top.

Historical depth is not the only factor related to differential growth, however. In fact, rather than a factor in itself, it seems to be an indicator of the truly relevant issues. One issue is, of course, the language in which denominational activity is carried on, and its closeness to a given minority ethnic group. The oldest churches tend to lose membership today because they have seldom transferred their allegiance from their original northern European tongue to Spanish. They tried as much as possible to preserve their entire culture in the foreign setting. But they were too

few. Once their members could obtain respected status within the larger society, on its terms, they left.

A second relevant factor seems to be the sponsorship of service institutions. The traditional mission groups most enthusiastically support this type of activity, and these groups show much slower growth curves than the newer holiness sects. Does this mean that the sponsorship of institutions invariably inhibits church growth?

The question is very complex. Where large institutions have grown up more or less divorced from a specific local church, they have inhibited church growth. Over the years, these institutions have drained the major manpower and financial resources from their sponsoring agencies. Those, such as the American Clinic in La Paz, Santiago College in Santiago, the Baptist High School in Temuco, and Ward College in Buenos Aires are today among the larger and better-directed service units in their countries. In a number of cases the institutions have served as pilot projects later emulated by local governments, and the indigenous churches have felt dutifully proud of their denominations' achievements. But at the same time, the institutions have been divorced from the local churches for two reasons. First of all, they usually ended by serving people outside the church -- often people from social classes entirely different from that of the church constituency. Particularly is this true with a number of prestige schools, such as Santiago College. It has not been intentional; financial necessity has driven the leaders of these institutions to direct their efforts mainly to the white collar and professional groups, even though the members of their local churches come more often from the lower classes. Second, where large

institutions developed independent of the local church, they have never depended upon the local church for leadership or financing, except very marginally. In most cases, then, were the institution to be turned over to the local body, the human and financial resources to continue its operation would simply not be forthcoming.

There are exceptions, of course. The Adventists have developed a large school and hospital in the middle of the open country of Entre Rios province in Argentina. These two institutions were initially divorced from any local church, though one is now growing out of them. They were, moreover, the direct result of missionary enterprise. Nevertheless, today they are self-supporting, draw most of their clientele from Protestant families, and supply both converts and leadership for the local churches. However, this Adventist center has two unique advantages. First, it was established in the middle of a predominantly Protestant region which had a great practical need for its services. Second, from the beginning the school and the hospital were looked upon primarily as means of reaching potential converts. Many of the Adventists in Argentina today, then, come from old European Protestant backgrounds. Their decisions were made in the Adventist service institutions, where the pressure to be converted was quite real.

The largest local churches (for instance, the First Pentecostal Church of Santiago and the First Methodist Church of Buenos Aires) throughout the four countries have never been directly involved in institutional work. Nevertheless, a number of small, relatively new, local churches today enthusiastically desire to support parochial schools, confident that

this activity will be effective in bringing many new people into the church. However, verification of this supposition is not visible, even when the institution grows out of the interest of an already established local congregation and receives no outside support. The Baptist church in Avellaneda, Argentina, for example, is nine years old. In 1958 it started a small school in its Sunday school rooms. Today the school is flourishing and has 185 students, yet the church can barely bring 25 people together for its worship services. In Temuco, Chile, the Methodist church started a similar parochial school. Students flood in, but the church board feels that the congregation is stagnant. The minister looks on the school as more liability than asset.

Undoubtedly the major Protestant service institutions in South America have helped in large measure to remove some of the stigma traditionally attached to Protestantism. They have undoubtedly contributed sorely needed basic services which local governments have not been able to provide adequately. They continue to do so. But, except for isolated exceptions such as the Adventist school and hospital at Puigari, it is difficult to find a direct positive relationship between church growth and institutional involvement. If the institution has been established before the local church, at most it can establish a local congregation within its fold. Examples of this tactic are the American Institute of La Paz and Ward College in Buenos Aires. In both cases, the emerging congregation is middle class. But in neither case is it one of the stronger Protestant congregations in the country.

Protestantism and Society

This section will treat Protestants both as a group in society and as individuals, for the two are continually interlaced.

Protestant leaders frequently compare their church's position in society to a ghetto. A Methodist clergyman in Argentina recently said that the Protestant church in South America was obsessed with its own being, and turned in upon itself.

Observation verifies this judgment. Sermons are directed at drawing people out of society, at removing them from the world, at preparing them for the next life. Many churches engage in feverish activity, but it is usually aimed at either fortifying the allegiance of those long in the church or expanding the membership through new conversions. So that the Argentinian Student Christian Movement leader could state that while the percentage of Protestants in Argentina approaches that in France, their influence is practically non-existent in Argentina, while in France they are a force to be reckoned with.

Informants from every church noted that it was not very difficult to interest outsiders in what they had to offer, particularly if the outsider was facing some sort of problem when they approached him. But they complained that once the person's problem was solved, he withdrew again. Most informants indicated that at least two-thirds of all new converts drop out within their first year or two as Protestants. Pentecostal pastors estimated that sometimes only ten per cent of their converts remain.

The principal reason for this rate of withdrawal appears to be fear of losing status, or "face." Just as the church buildings themselves

are marginally located, so the people who are converted to Protestantism tend to come from the margins of society. It is rare for persons of the middle or upper classes to be lastingly converted.

If Protestantism is such a marginal element in society, why do any retain their affiliation with it? The basic answer seems to be that the Protestant churches offer companionship and acceptance. They provide solid common interest groups, usually quite divorced from the traditional kin ties that bind Latin society together. Significant in this respect, then, is the fact that, of thirty-six life histories of converts, nineteen mentioned social isolation or a break from their families as one of the principal motives in their conversion. This isolation far outweighed any other reason given. The next most frequently indicated motive--sexual guilt--was mentioned by five. Four pointed to disappointment with the moral conduct of the Roman Catholic clergy; an equal number attributed their conversion to divine healing; and three referred to their resentment of abusive confessionals. Three more said that they had come into the church because of their Protestant schooling. Only one had become a Protestant because he felt it would help him financially.

It is understandable, then, why one of the problems most frequently mentioned by Protestant leaders is difficulty in working with whole family units. By and large, the man who enters the Protestant church comes as an individual. Yet, in all fairness, it should be pointed out that most conversions take place in the crucial period between adolescence and marriage, when many young people find themselves physically removed from their families for the first time. Religious endogamy predominates. Therefore, when

these young people establish their families of procreation, they often set up notably stable family units that become the real backbone of the growing church.

Some light on the influence of conversion to Protestantism on family relationships was given by the responses of converts to the question of what they were trying most to teach their children. Love of God was the item most frequently mentioned, reflecting the convert's concern to place identification with his small Protestant sub-society above all other considerations. The church represents the one major social unit with which he has been able to identify more or less successfully. He has been accepted by it, and without it he falls back into marginal abandonment. The next most frequently mentioned item was love of neighbor. Of course, this precept is one of the most constantly repeated in the churches. However, the fact that the convert seizes on this and not another tenet of his religion seems to reflect a need he feels acutely, as a marginal member of society, to establish positive human relationships. The third most frequently mentioned lesson was obedience. Here it must be remembered that broken family relationships were pointed to more often than any other one factor in pushing converts into their new churches. Moreover, it should be pointed out that, in most cases, the convert's very affiliation with Protestantism only widens the gap between him and his family. An emphasis on obedience, therefore, would reflect the guilt feelings so common to persons who have disregarded the precepts of their parents, the principal authority figures in their lives.

Respect for women, intellectual development, responsibility, and truthfulness were the next mentioned values, in that order. Here the imprint of the Protestant ethic is most clear. When these values are lived out, they prepare a person for a society in which individual achievement is recognized on its own merit, one in which workers may be trusted to carry on with a minimum of supervision. In effect, such qualities are highly desired in the rationalistic economy emerging in certain sections. Protestants may often be looked upon as queer or fanatical, and the upper levels of society may withdraw from possible identification with them. But as "good" people, it is generally believed that they cannot be surpassed. Not surprisingly, then, Protestants as a group tend to be upwardly mobile.

This recognition of the functional importance of the Protestant ethic in an industrializing society points out the error of the frequent accusations that the extreme puritanism of the Latin American Protestant is traceable solely to the forceful wills of narrow, fundamentalist missionaries. Actually, admiration of puritanical morality is in a sense indigenous to the traditional Latin culture. Long-practiced custom, for example, dictates that, if one wishes a divine favor or forgiveness, he should make vows of some kind, promising abstinence or sacrifice. Protestants, in a sense, are looked upon as having taken such vows in perpetuity. An ordinary person would not dream of doing such a foolish thing. But those who do should be praised for their fortitude and persistence.

That converts consciously set social mobility as a real life-goal

is indicated by their answers to the question of what they would like their children to have that they themselves had not had. Most picked economic well-being (i.e. adequate food, clothing, toys). Next to that they selected education. And finally they mentioned understanding and guidance--two qualities probably chosen because of their own tense family backgrounds.

Struggling to leave the past behind, converts appear almost desperate in their need to cling to something concrete and lasting. For example, when asked to verbalize what attracts them most in their new church, they spoke first of all about the happy social contacts. And following that, they frequently mentioned the clarity of Biblical explanation characteristic of Protestantism. The significance of the first reference is obvious. With regard to the second, it should be mentioned once again that converts usually have rejected parental advice and social tradition. This is a serious step in a culture which emphasizes authority as much as southern South America does. For example, schooling in the region tends to discourage critical thinking. Lessons are often dictated, word for word, and the pupil is expected to parrot them back at the time of final examination. Clarity of Biblical explanation for the convert, therefore, seems to mean instruction about how to conduct his life on the basis of an infallible book. So it is understandable that the most authoritarian of the Protestant groups experience the most rapid growth.

Also related to the convert's need for security is the insistence of most South American Protestants on resisting the forms of ritual found in Catholicism. Even crosses are forbidden in many of the churches. Candles are very rarely used, with considerable caution and misgivings.

Images are absolutely forbidden. At first glance this seems to be a strange development for a culture which has traditionally placed great emphasis on symbolism. It is easy to attribute it to the influence of iconoclastic missionaries, but it seems more directly related to the fact that the people within Protestantism, excluded from much of normal societal activity, need certain clearly visible forms with which they can unequivocally identify. Therefore, if representatives of the larger society burn candles, the Protestants will not burn candles. If Catholics place crucifixes in their homes, even crosses will be forbidden. If others pray in a whisper or in silence, Protestant prayers will be shouted at the top of the voice. And the more marginal one is in the society, the more insistently he must rebel.

Thus, among the most economically depressed Protestant groups, deviance from customary Catholic ritual is the most pronounced. But as Protestants gradually climb the ladder of the larger society, their enthusiasm for such separateness diminishes. Consequently, traditional denominations working in the area today frequently experience a "ritual reform." The younger members of their churches are now second- or third-generation Protestants. They feel no need to rebel against their past, for they are prepared both academically and psychologically to participate in the emerging pluralistic society. They do need fuller acceptance by the larger social unit. Therefore, they are insisting on bringing back candles, vested choirs, stained glass windows, and formal liturgy. Some even ask why their church should remain separate at all. These younger Protestants have become the cutting edge of the ecumenical movement.

With exceptions, the general Protestant orientation in the four countries continues to emphasize the separateness so well suited to the

needs of people rejecting their low status in the larger society in favor of preferred status in a common-interest group. One reflection of this separateness is the extreme fragmentation in the training of Protestant clergy. Most preparation is done in a wealth of tiny schools, some of which have only two or three students. Chile has over one hundred separate training centers, and even strongly Catholic Bolivia has over thirty. The only approach to a really united effort is the Union Seminary in Buenos Aires. Significantly, there, rapid acceptance of immigrant groups has laid the foundations for a Protestantism which no longer feels such a deep need to establish unique identity. The Seminary has become the vanguard of theological thinking for those churches which have already moved up the social ladder.

Given the nature of Protestantism in these countries, the status of the clergy can hardly be high. The low academic standards of most of the training centers do little to alleviate the situation. Recruitment is mostly from the lower socio-economic groups within the churches themselves. In fact, a disproportionate number of volunteers for training are recent converts. This pattern has not been abandoned even in the old established churches of the River Plate, where the congregations have over the years become solidly middle class. Seldom, for example, can they interest a third- or fourth-generation Protestant from a professional family in studying for the ministry. If he did, it would mean a considerable loss of status, even if he returned home to serve his own congregation. Among other things, his material recompense would be far inferior to that in another profession. South American Protestants, accustomed to a society in

which the church has traditionally been supported by government and property holdings, tend to find the constant search for voluntary support bothersome.

Since the congregations tend to climb rather rapidly on the social ladder, the major result of this situation is that the clergy often finds itself ill-adapted to understand the needs of the maturing generations. In a number of older congregations the majority of the young people are today obtaining university educations. Indeed, even Pentecostals are making sacrifices to send outstanding young people off for professional training. Yet the minister, in most cases, comes from far down on the socio-economic ladder and has a rather limited education. Even in Union Seminary few of the students ever carried out a general university course of study.

It is possible that Protestantism will continue to rise socially in the future, and as it does, the quality of its clergy will be forced to improve. However, there are numerous indications that as the religion improves its status, its appeal to potential converts, most of whom now are marginal in society, will diminish.

Missions and Culture

One idea basic to understanding cultural change is that for a new item to be accepted, it must meet a felt need. The rapid growth of the Pentecostal groups, especially in Chile, indicates that they have done just that. How they have accomplished it demands consideration, particularly when their spectacular success is compared with the failure of many well-financed foreign groups.

Undoubtedly one of the needs most successfully coped with by the Chilean Pentecostals has been that which the poor have for releasing aggression generated by the extreme contrast between rich and poor. Seizures which take place during the Pentecostal service, therefore, may partly represent a process whereby frustration-produced aggression is turned inward against oneself in a manner sanctioned by his social group, thereby helping him deny the reality of the deep anger it feels about difficult economic or social circumstances.

This is not the only secret of Pentecostal success. For not only has Pentecostalism known how to meet a felt need; it has known how to fit its ritual into the culture, while yet maintaining its unquestionably unique identity. For example, its church buildings may be on deserted, side streets. But it follows the traditional pattern of religion in the plaza, by constantly holding open air meetings there. It rejects the traditional saint's day processions, but it preserves the basic idea that one should process in religion. One sees immense groups processing from the evening plaza rally to their Pentecostal temple, singing songs that are accompanied by guitars and that come straight out of the popular music of the masses. It instructs its members to refrain from their frequent evening visits with friends in the neighborhood bar. But it offers, in its place, nightly, informal services with one's friends at the local temple. It retains extended, private prayer, but it dictates that this should be done in a clearly audible voice. It rejects miraculous healing through the saints, but it claims that divine healing may be easily had by direct prayer to God.

If the Pentecostals have had notable success, then, it seems to be due principally to the fact that their early leaders came from the culture itself and were first of all concerned with a problem. In contrast, most missionaries and mission sponsored churches begin with a program. For example, the first step they often take is to organize an 11:00 A.M. Sunday worship service and import a harmonium.

In other words, missionaries go to their respective fields burdened with a whole series of presuppositions, most of them never consciously recognized. Yet in many cases they close the door to effective work. For example, it is often presumed that the population with which one is working is basically literate and consequently attempts are made to have people read complex liturgical responses. With much of the South American population, such a practice merely hastens alienation. For though a man might be literate, he is often barely so, and reading in public embarrasses him. Here again, the ability of the Pentecostals to give people the chance for active participation in the religious rite, even though their literacy level might be very low, seems to be significant.

Another common presupposition missionaries hold is that church government should be democratic. Time and again the transferral of church organization from one country to another becomes the prime goal of a missionary. Yet in many cases, the most efficient and acceptable form will be a much simpler one--and often will even be authoritarian. Let it be pointed out that those religious groups which have grown the swiftest have been those in which organization has been developed gradually by a growing body of indigenous church members. In southern South America, these organizations have usually turned out to be decentralized and simple.

Yet another presupposition is that, if it desires, the population can support more full time religious specialists. There have even been cases where missionaries have gone into subsistence-oriented Indian communities--places that never had had any kind of full time specialist--and have expected native pastors to spend all their time in religious duties and to receive full local support.

It should be constantly borne in mind, then, that the cultures in which religious leaders grow up predispose them to certain views and values. They then go to another culture with preconceptions about what is good and what is rational. But these preconceptions do not universally hold true. Setting them aside is one of the most difficult tasks facing the mission' movement.

Summary Of Findings

1. Protestantism is growing in South America, particularly in those places where society is mobile and open.
2. Denominational growth is greatest in the newer groups, and least in the oldest. But in another way, denominational growth is greatest in those groups which offer a highly authoritarian doctrine, an easily distinguishable ritual, and administrative decentralization.
3. Protestant congregations tend to be composed of people from the lower socio-economic groups. This accounts, in part, for the difficulty in winning permanently a member of the middle or upper classes.

4. Social mobility among Protestants is rapid. Many congregations that were lower class a generation ago tend to be middle class today.

5. As Protestant congregations rise socially, their desire for distinctiveness from the general society diminishes.

6. There is a lag between the socio-economic rise of many Protestant members and the status of the clergy, as well as the general posture of their church.

7. One major factor in the slowness of Protestant expansion has been the importation of whole, pre-digested programs by foreign missionaries.

Implications of Findings for Future Mission Activity

1. Major efforts should be directed to marginal groups in places where there is evidence of the emergence of a new, open society.

2. The doctrinal message should be presented in an unequivocal, authoritarian way.

3. Ritual should be abundant, and should preferably use elements from traditional Roman Catholicism, but in such a way that no doubts can arise as to the new ritual's uniqueness.

4. Administration, including the handling of money, and initiative should be placed in local hands as much as possible.

5. Institutional work should be avoided, particularly in the early stages of mission development, unless the sponsoring agency is willing to forego overall church growth for needed social service.

6. Aside from local church work, cooperative ventures with already existing denominations show greatest possibilities in those areas where lag exists between upwardly mobile, often university educated Protestants and their societally marginal religion.

7. In every case, problems should be attacked with an open mind. Programs should never be imported.

Four sections comprise this chapter: (1) the problem of Anglican identification in South America; (2) Anglicans and missions in Latin America; (3) Anglicans via a-via the Roman Catholics; and (4) Anglicans via a-via the Protestants.

Anglican Identification in South America

South Americans in general do not have a clear picture of the Anglican Doctrine. Their ignorance allows room for misunderstanding to encourage positive opinions.

However, the Roman Catholic hierarchy is better informed. Informative reports on the topic of pre-evangelical missionary work indicate its definite stand. One priest said, "If they come, they will convert the people; particularly if they are high church. It will make our work harder, because of the explanations." Another stated, "I will tell the people that the Anglicans are not Catholic." A third Roman

Chapter Six

Religious Needs and Anglican Opportunities*

The preceding pages have (1) examined the nature of social change in Latin America; (2) charted trends and problems in four societies; and (3) analyzed selected findings pertaining to these societies' religious situation. The purpose of this chapter is to draw additional implications from these materials for a limited number of issues that bear on Anglican missionary work.

Four sections comprise this chapter: (1) the problem of Anglican identification in South America; (2) Anglicans and vacuums of religious meaning in South America; (3) Anglicans vis-a-vis the Roman Catholics; and (4) Anglicans vis-a-vis the Protestants.

Anglican Identification in South America

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priest pointed out another dimension of the problem: "These Protestant groups, including the Anglicans, represent a contradiction. How can you give Christ to a people who already have him?" Thus, in one bishop's words: "The Anglicans will have to be identified as Protestant."

At the same time there were small hints that, for both religious and political reasons, the hierarchy would welcome Anglican work. Anglicanism is viewed as an added force for reason, stability, and a Christian society. Progressive members of the Roman Catholic hierarchy even speak of opportunities for "dialogue," exchange, and cooperation. Apparently the question of Anglican missions creates ambivalence in Roman Catholics; Anglicanism seems both blessing and curse.

Basically, however, the judgment of Roman Catholics is negative. There is no doubt that the Anglicans will promptly and consistently be identified as Protestant, even if the mission's formal name includes the word "Catholic." At best, Anglicanism will be associated with England, the Protestants, and good manners; at worst, with foreigners, minority religions, and "sheep grabbing."

That the Anglican churches hold to the historic episcopacy, celebrate the sacraments, and possess a formal liturgy does not mean that Anglicanism and the Roman Catholicism of South America can be considered interchangeable. The religion of a nation is first and always part of its culture, fused with a cosmology, linked to standards and values, co-existent with language and idiom, built into child-rearing practices, and carrying dimensions of prestige and social class. Both South American Roman Catholicism and the Anglican Communion are in the first place

cultural systems, and only secondarily religions. Both religious traditions have grown beside distinctly different political and economic structures for several hundred years. The Church of England is, of course, the source and center for all churches of the Anglican Communion, and the entire Communion is thereby infused with cultural perspectives and references that are wider, perhaps even deeper, than the respective religious belief systems and the ritual activities.

The question of Anglicanism's fit in the South American culture may be posed as follows: are the English capacities to participate in subtle democracy, to compromise, to embrace empiricism, to provoke a humorous self-image, to handle things on one's own and to hold the old and new in balance congruent with the typical South American tendencies to tolerate heavy-handed leaders, to view ideas as solutions in themselves, to stand one's ground and defend it with honor--right or wrong, to glory in myth and non-empirical principles, to let things take care of themselves, and to tolerate no middle ground, either rejecting completely the old or standing completely aloof from the new?

If by happenstance Anglicanism were identified as Catholic by the people, its missionary work would fall heir to all the stereotypes, good and bad, of Roman Catholicism, including the idea that going to church is only for fanatics. Since the Roman Catholic church draws largely women and children and only ten per cent of the adult population, could the Anglicans, if identified popularly as Catholic, even hope for as much? The lesson is plain: If Anglicanism were marked as Roman Catholic, it would have to work within Roman Catholicism's reputation. However, Anglicanism will undoubtedly be marked as Protestant.

Anglicanism vis-a-vis Major Status and Class Groups

The primary objective of a missionary religion is to attract new members and to sustain their commitments to new religious beliefs and rituals. Success in this endeavor depends on many factors, not the least being the capacity of the mission to capture and direct the latent religious needs of the host population. On occasion, a missionary religion possesses sufficient "spirit" to actually create religious needs. But manufactured revivals do not result in strong, indigenous religious communities. History abounds in bare-faced failures of missionary groups which attempted to tap these religious currents. Sometimes the fault lay in the missionaries' preconceived notions of need; in other cases the religion lacked the institutional forms for capitalizing on religious sentiments; still other failures may be blamed on poor strategies.

This section examines the potential appeal of Anglicanism to major class and status groups in South America. Simply put, are there key vacuums in the life of these groups that open possibilities for Anglicanism? Answering this question requires a review of several key findings of the present study: All of these societies presently have secular, national goals which focus people's attention on worldly achievements, social rewards, and political power; these diverse secular social movements and political ideologies already operate to direct strivings toward a just social life and glorious futures; nationalism with quasi-religious overtones is on the rise and figures prominently as

a focus of social identity, cultural pride, and personal meaning; Roman Catholic loyalties and sentiments are strong, undoubtedly highest in the upper status groups and the socially-integrated middle class; both sects and radical political groups are increasingly capturing the deprived classes, particularly those groups clustered in the urban centers; and Missionary religions in South America (and elsewhere) grow along class lines. Consequently the Anglicans will have to work mainly within one class, although local exceptions may occur.

Indeed, throughout South America "salvation" is in the air. Quasi-eschatological beliefs abound, promises proliferate, and expectations are high. These findings pose this question: Are Anglican missions the critical addition that can focus these important surgings? An examination of key social groups and their connections with various ideology-meaning systems and potential membership groups in the chart on Page VI-6 provides a schematic overview of the situation.

This chart shows how problematic it is to identify religious vacuums in the life of these major social groups. The socially-integrated middle class may be taken as an illustration. Broadly speaking, the members of this important stratum adhere to traditional values, maintain loyalties to the Roman Catholic Church, are involved in many social and friendship ties, and hold important positions in the formal life of their respective communities. Consequently, a member of this class already possesses a system of meanings and ideological principles, and he has a religious identity. Moverover, he has numerous opportunities to participate in ritual activities that are significantly like those of the Anglican churches. When membership

STATUS AND CLASS SECTORS	DOMINANT IDEOLOGY-MEANING SYSTEMS	RELEVANT AND POTENTIAL MEMBERSHIP GROUPS
1. Upper class	"high culture" and conservative politics	extended family, social ties, clubs, the Roman Catholic Church
2. Scientific professionals	science as a belief system, personal creativity, "success"	nuclear family, professional associations, social ties
3. Middle-class socially integrated	bourgeois values, traditional education in private schools, conservative politics	extended family, social ties, Roman Catholic Church, community organizations
4. Middle-class, socially integrated, liberal	reform values, traditional education, democratic politics	extended family, social action groups, Christian Democratic Party, occupational associations
5. Lower middle-class, rising, socially non-integrated	personal success, social mobility, higher education	partial family ties, temporary formal memberships, reform political parties, Protestant Church
6. Urban working class	education <u>per se</u> , radical politics, worker consciousness and worker prestige	nuclear family, trade unions, sports clubs, extreme parties of the left (Argentina: "right")
7. Deprived urban groups	other-worldly compensation, salvation from sin, in-group superiority	partial family ties, holiness-type Protestant churches, radical political movements
8. Rural peasants	local traditions, non-empirical beliefs--animism and fate	extended kin group, local neighborhood, ceremonial ties with both indigenous religion and the Roman Catholic Church

in this class is compared to potential rewards of Anglican membership, there are two considerations: (1) few distinct advantages would be gained at the level of religious meaning; and (2) social losses would undoubtedly follow the acceptance of Anglican identity. In short, a member of this class would not add significantly to his overall religious perspective, yet he would experience non-religious losses. Under these conditions not many conversions would occur.

Another example: the rising middle class tends to be less involved in status networks and less attached to the Roman Catholic Church. Thus, religious change would bring fewer negative social consequences. But those who are inclined towards another religion are not necessarily interested in Anglicanism. In fact, the established Protestant denominations in South America open more possibilities for the upwardly-mobile isolates who desire a different religious identity. The Protestant chapels are not overcrowded, and ample opportunities already exist for those who seek the salvation they offer.

Again, the urban working class tends to be either coldly indifferent or openly hostile to many aspects of formal religion. Strong political ideologies and trade-unions provide forms for identity and sources of meaning. To the deprived urban groups, the religious sects and radical politics appear competent to handle their needs. Members of the liberal middle class, particularly those with Roman Catholic loyalties, have an opportunity structure that allows them to "have their cake and eat it too"--the Christian Democratic Party. The small but growing body of scientific

professionals possess in science a universal belief system and a system of ethics. Loyalties to Roman Catholicism certainly figure into their feelings, if not their actions. Undoubtedly the scientific professionals are partial to the Roman church, even while recognizing its shortcomings. Thus, religious opportunities for Anglicanism among major class and status groups in South American society are not evident.

Anglicans vis-a-vis the Romans: Catalyst or Competitor?

The religious work of Anglicans could possibly serve Christian development indirectly by spurring the Roman Catholic religion toward new goals and increased effectiveness. Possibly the Anglican missions may act as a catalyst to the Roman religion.

However, this prospect appears unlikely. Cooperation, theological dialogue, and symbolic support might indeed help to establish relationships with sectors of the Catholic hierarchy. But these mild forms of stimulation and assistance are not sufficient to move Roman Catholicism into new directions. More likely, the Anglicans would provoke conventional postures of competition, local animosities, and duplication of religious activities. The Catholics would probably take a wait and see approach, standing back to allow new churches and corollary institutions to emerge, and then promptly duplicate them. An area is easily saturated this way. Although local people may temporarily feel complimented by so much attention, this kind of relationship would hardly further Christian development.

In short, "conversations" with progressive members of the hierarchy may be one kind of relation. Another may be symbolic acts of cooperation, visits, formal ceremonies, and the like. But the overall picture would quickly become locally stalemate easily turning the intended role of catalyst into one of competitor. While it is not altogether far-fetched that the Anglicans could spur the Roman elite, assisting them in key problems such as reaching the lower and working classes and contributing to a theology relating the church to man in a period of change, there is little basis for viewing these relationships as really workable and successful. If the Roman Catholic religion is to be stimulated to new vigor, a strategy that stresses activities in which the Anglicans, working within the "Catholic" religious framework, can excel, is probably required, to demonstrate that they are one step ahead as Christians and as Catholics.

Anglicans vis-a-vis the Protestants: Duplication or Quality Control?

Almost certainly the Anglicans will be identified as Protestant. Competition will dominate the Anglican relationship with the Roman Catholics. Further, no major class or status group appears ripe for religious change. However, this gloomy picture does not take into account possibilities in two other major directions: (1) intra-Protestant work and (2) contributions to secular social development. In this final section the potentialities in South American Protestant life are examined. Chapter Seven calls attention to opportunities in the sphere of priority social needs.

Speaking broadly, Protestantism in South America has three patterns:

(1) the European Protestant immigrants who brought their religion with them and who have held it as part of their ethnic-cultural identification; (2) the denominational churches that have grown from, and are still connected to, foreign mission boards; and (3) the indigenous sect-type Protestant churches known as Pentecostal.

An overall Protestant complex, including psychological, structural and historical factors, cuts across these three patterns. The psychological component is a minority self-image, resulting in feelings of religious and social inferiority. Considerations of prestige are central to this self-image. Recognition comes not from churches on the plaza, ministers who speak fluent Spanish, and expensive propaganda shows, but from intellectual, business, and political contributions in the larger society. Prestige and recognition are contingent on the Protestants' capacities to achieve distinction in secular pursuits. The success of the Protestants in the next stage of their development depends importantly on how they handle this problem of prestige and recognition.

The structural factor in the Protestant complex centers on voluntary isolation from the social and political issues of the society. The prestige problem mentioned above is the absence of societal recognition because "he is a Protestant." Just as important, from the other side, is the Protestant's hesitation and unwillingness to participate actively in the life of the society and to compete for its rewards and social gains. Part of this hesitation stems from theological orientations, part of it from timidity.

The third factor, the historical one, is the absence of working, organized cooperation (both among the denominational groups and between the denominations and the Pentecostals) that can provide Protestantism with direction and impact. Primarily an intra-Protestant problem, it has however larger consequences: the non-Protestant is presented with a spectacle of religious splintering, family quarrels, missionary competition, and organizational confusion. South America presents some particularly formidable obstacles to Protestant work, and gains may depend primarily on the full mobilization of Protestant efforts around a central purpose. In England and the United States Protestantism flowered on a local, denominational basis with each denomination out for itself. The more developed non-Protestant cultures of South America and the strong allegiance to secular political ideologies of justice and social reform present, in combination, conditions that may make demands on Protestant organization that never emerged in other areas. The implications of division and decentralization are clear.

Protestantism in South America is at a critical point in its history. On the one hand, the missionary attempts of the historical groups are, in all fairness, at a dead end. The establishment of local churches and the construction of conventional institutions (schools, clinics, farms) operate either as isolating mechanisms or as service units centered on transient "customers." Neither strategy, the local church or the institutional programs, adds to Protestantism in society or to its long-range religious force. Yet, on the other hand, the most significant religious phenomenon in South America is Protestant--the growth of the Pentecostal

sects. This vigorous indigenous trend in religious expression easily eclipses both the Roman Catholics' attempts at reform and the struggling missionary work of the historical denominations. The Pentecostals cannot be ignored. Even though their numbers are relatively small (highest in Chile with approximately five per cent of the population), they are important in two respects: (1) this religion is anchored in the national cultures and hence represents the first genuinely indigenous expression of Protestantism in South America; and (2) the spiritual experiences of the Pentecostal produce a set of attitudes and behaviors that are congruent with the economic and occupational trends of these societies; hence these people will be increasingly recognized and rewarded. The Pentecostal movement may deserve to be nurtured and strengthened because of this importance to the future.

For the Anglicans to enter the mission field simply as another denomination does not hold much promise either for Protestantism or for Anglicanism in South America. At the same time, Anglicans are neither eager nor equipped to initiate and develop a sect-type strategy to tap the revivalistic surge. Neither, as concluded above, are prospects for close work with Roman Catholics encouraging. But the Anglicans, aided by their concepts of church order and organization, their prestige among Protestants, their positive attitude toward society, their style of leadership, their strong sense of history, and their hospitality to reason and compromise may be equipped for the unique role of solving these important Protestant dilemmas. Anglican work might well be premised on a new concept of mission. The present period presents opportunities of a different kind than proselyting and local church development.

The existing Protestants may be "converted" to both new concepts of religious activity and a new self-image. Or it may mean pioneering work in areas of social need that are presently only peripherally recognized and totally unattended. Or it may be developing a bridge to link the denominational groups and the Pentecostals and furthering their integration into the life and limelight of the respective societies. In this case, the function of the Anglicans in bridging Protestant-Roman Catholic differences would be geared to unifying divergent Protestant emphases and leveraging them into society. This role would allow for the establishment of inter-Protestant institutions with potentials both for ecumenicity and for raising the overall prestige of Protestants.

Proposal: A Protestant university

The Protestant situation calls for the creation of institutional programs that (1) increase the membership's prestige in the community; (2) develop members' capacities for contributing to key areas of social life, e.g., through the professions; (3) strengthen inter-denominational cooperation; and (4) provide ways for integrating the Pentecostals (who outgrow their religious origins) into Protestant life. A high-quality, strategically-located university appears well-suited to handle these manifold problems. An excellent university that sponsored the physical and social sciences and provided professional schools in applied fields (business administration, social work, teaching, journalism, library service, etc.) would offer a mobility channel for the Protestants, raise the standing of the Protestant community, serve as a bridge between the Protestant minority and the secular world, and promote social development.

Advantages

1. A Roman Catholic catalyst: A university offering opportunities for achieving excellence in needed disciplines will challenge the Roman Catholic church, not as a religious competitor but as a learning enterprise inviting open-book learning within a religious tradition. The Protestant faith permits and encourages an intellectual independence that cannot be matched by the Roman Catholics. Many significant social and religious implications flow from this central difference. If the Anglicans desire to spur the Roman Catholics, a first-rate university may indeed be critical.
2. A training center for missionary specialists: A university would provide a training base and resource center for initiating and developing skills for special religious programs: management training, industrial relations, family counselling, youth work, and psychiatry. These programs require professional training not ordinarily received in the seminary. The university's facilities would open opportunities for developing mission specialties within the culture being worked.
3. An agent for managing bi-lateral resources: Universities are strategic bases for various aspects of bi-lateral technical assistance programs. Peace Corps members, for example, are frequently assigned through national institutions. The Rural Institute of Education in Santiago serves as the headquarters of the Chilean Peace Corps. Although nominally a private organization, the Rural Institute is actually Roman Catholic. Acting as a private corporation, a university may be able to bid for advantages that international projects and aid programs provide.

4. A meaningful focus for attracting religious resources: A high quality university would attract resources from all parts of the world. Scientists and scholars desiring to make a contribution to the Church while developing their own careers may find university residency a stimulating and welcome prospect. Similarly, contributors to overseas missions may discover giving money for scholarships and books as meaningful as financing clinics, buying farm tools, and sending playground equipment.

Problems posed by a university

A university raises difficult problems of financing and of selecting a geographical location. In addition, the development of a university poses a dilemma created by differences between religious values and the rational standards of the scientific community. Student eligibility (Protestants only? Roman Catholics? free-thinkers?) is a further consideration. However, the many advantages a university would provide for both the Protestants and the society clearly outweigh these various difficulties.

Concluding Statement

The present problem of South American Protestantism appears to be one of "quality" rather than "quantity." The implication is simply that Protestant life invites endeavors that can place its adherents on a firm platform for both participating in and effecting the larger society.

The next phase of South American Protestantism, depending on what the Anglicans choose to do, may be either a qualitative upgrading of this religious phenomenon or a further dwindling of the denominational trend.

Chapter Five indicated that institutional programs raise many problems for the sponsoring religion, e.g., the institution is identified with its initial leader, especially if he is a charismatic figure, and converts are through institutional programs do not remain with the church.

There is however no reason to assume that future work will consider these difficulties automatically. They will depend on the sponsoring religion's objectives and the types of influence it hopes to have in the society. A long-range plan, specifying stages of missionary activity in relationship to critical social needs, would provide a meaningful and reasonable alternative to both conventional proselytizing and traditional institutional activities. The first stage should provide a program that opens maximum opportunities to reach various sectors of the society and for learning about the culture, the people's concerns, and group relationships both formal and informal. A second stage of the plan, building on the learning phase, could specialize in one or two strategic needs. Emphasis might be placed on providing new types of information, contributing a needed kind of education, or applying services not available elsewhere. This vision would be to the society as a whole, not necessarily to the specific religious needs of the individual. Local churches would undoubtedly emerge, but the focus would not be exclusively

Chapter Seven

Priority Social Needs and Anglican Opportunities*

This chapter identifies priority social needs and formulates proposals, congruent with Anglican resources, that can contribute to their solution. Chapter Five indicated that institutional programs raise many problems for the sponsoring religion, e.g., the institution is identified with its initial leader, expensive facilities restrict mission flexibility, and converts won through institutional programs do not remain with the church.

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*Ivan Vallier

on building religious communities. While it may be true that a missionary religion can succeed only so far as it establishes strong, local churches, this theory holds only if the objective of the mission is specifically religious. If a religion includes as part of its mission the social and human development of the society then, by initiating and sponsoring critical pioneering programs, local churches become only one part of the long-range program of religious development, not the initial or the final objective. In this sense, the missionary religion would subordinate some of its religious goals to the salvation of society.

The special features of mission organizations, including their altruistic values and their independence from the culture, provide positive bases for initiating and developing special kinds of assistance. Frequently new ideas and activities can be sponsored that national organizations would not be able to handle. Innovations are expected of outsiders and some range of permissibility is thereby guaranteed.

Types of need, program solutions, and the problem of responsibility

Latin America is presently stimulating an unusual amount of professional interest. Public health officers, government administrators, business men, social scientists, politicians, and religious leaders from many countries are seeking to discover opportunities for working in these societies. Research and study have become the means for identifying priority needs and choosing bases for operation. Recommendations, suggestions, and plans flow from this attention.

Careful examination of representative reports and professional writing on these topics indicates a number of problem areas: (1) raising economic productivity, (2) improving the effectiveness of governmental

and administrative operations, (3) controlling population movement, (4) improving social, educational, and health facilities and services, and (5) modifying values, attitudes, and behaviors. This last area is increasingly recognized as crucial to the achievement of the other four.

Priority problems are easily spotted in these countries. Solutions are much harder to formulate and judge. Raising productivity, for example, prompts recommendations that range all the way from land reform to a Latin American Common Market. Government problems call forth pleas for overhauling the court system, decentralizing the bureaucracy, reducing the formal power of the presidencies, and developing better planning facilities. In the areas of health, education, and social service, schools, hospitals, community centers are proposed, along with recommendations for full-time university faculty and raising the quality of primary and secondary teachers. Rural demonstration centers, public lectures and audio-visual aids, leadership training, and cooperatives are recommended to make country life more attractive, and stem migration to the cities.

It is true that need exists on every hand. But a mere catalog of needs served by random proposals accomplishes little. Certain needs are amenable only to large-scale public programs. Others require special resources or political access, hence are limited to contracting parties with unique qualifications.

Religious groups, particularly if they represent "outside interests", do not have either the legitimation or the resources to make effective contribution in many key areas. The problems of public housing, transportation facilities, agrarian reform, and educational curricula not only require the authority of national governments or their subordinate

agencies but, as well, represent issues that nationals want to take responsibility for solving. Even bi-lateral government programs of technical assistance working in non-political areas create strains and difficulties. "Outside infringement" becomes the slogan, national pride suffers, and well-intentioned help incites embarrassing public criticism.

Religious groups have avoided some of these problems by choosing to establish services that the national institutions are either unable to provide or unwilling, in the face of other priorities, to sponsor. Frequently, religious groups serve experimental purposes by initiating a new kind of service which, if successful, can be later generalized by national agencies to major sectors of the society. Health, education, agriculture and recreation are the principal spheres for religious mission work. Special, small-scale projects along these lines have often made effective contributions to local areas and, occasionally, to a whole sector of the host society. Effectiveness varies, of course. Problems arise partly from unanticipated reactions, partly from an assumption of what is needed rather than actually knowing, and partly from unsatisfactory personnel.

Types of opportunities in areas feasible for religious work

Within the range of priority needs most feasible for religious groups working in South America, three distinctions are necessary: (1) those needs increasingly attended to by either national or international non-religious agencies; (2) those already being served by other religious groups; (3) those that offer opportunities for pioneering and innovative programs. A brief discussion of each of these need areas follows.

1. Needs which are receiving increasing attention from national or international non-religious agencies: The problems of physical health, education (illiteracy, school buildings, teacher training, professional disciplines), agricultural development, and social services stand to benefit significantly from the programs of national governments and technical missions. The problems may or may not be solved. This is not the point. Great need exists and many opportunities are open to privately-sponsored groups. Nevertheless the trend is towards meeting these needs through large-scale, secular, public organizations that have both the legitimation and the financial backing for ordering significant changes. If religious groups work here, they may find that their programs are merely auxiliary, perhaps even redundant.

2. Needs already receiving attention and assistance from religious groups: Credit cooperatives, literacy classes, community extension work, employment agencies, neighborhood centers, vocational training, rural leadership development, and mass media programs are presently priority projects for religious groups. Here again, vast opportunities are evident. But, the innovations have been made. Further effort on these lines would complement and stimulate these endeavors, without producing the gratification to be gained from developing new ideas and pioneer programs.

3. Need areas in which pioneering and innovative work is feasible: In order to avoid having a program's work eclipsed by large-scale secular agencies or becoming an additional religious group working conventionally, priority needs that invite new ideas and fresh approaches should be given consideration. Frontiers, of course, inevitably increase the chances of failure. Likewise, they often increase the possibilities of success. The outcome is never predictable.

Within the societies presently under study, four areas of need warrant special consideration by missionary religious groups:

1. Facilitating the development and effective allocation of management-leadership resources as means for increasing the societies' capacities to meet the critical organizational problems that arise with industrialization.
2. Preparing youth for adult roles in a changing society and assisting them in reaching decisions that bear on future career and family life opportunities.
3. Relieving inter-personal conflicts and personal anxieties that obstruct human development, disrupt family solidarity, and provoke withdrawal from social and occupational responsibilities.
4. Helping residential groups achieve community identity and gain the resources necessary for attaining their own goals.

These areas of need share a number of properties. First, they are problems that occur in periods of social change. Second, they center on motivational problems, status considerations, and adult behavior. Third, the needs have a multiple reference, i.e., to the individual, group relationships, and general social development. Fourth, all of the areas are potential avenues to the deepest level of human concerns. Hence work in these areas can provide first-hand knowledge about the real problems, strivings, and dilemmas of the people. Fifth, the needs are appropriate for a religion that values man's total life, possesses an effective organization, emphasizes a high quality of professional training, and is open and tolerant towards new ideas and competing ideologies.

Five proposals are developed to link religious resources to these priority needs: (1) management-training and human relations work answer to need number One; (2) university work and youth work answer to need number Two; (3) religio-psychiatric programs answer to need number Three; and (4) community development work answers to need number Four.

University Work

Any long-range plan aimed to facilitate social development in South America deserves to pay close attention to the educational sphere. The needs are vast at every level: illiteracy is prevalent, curricula need improving, buildings and facilities are inadequate, trained teachers are scarce, technical and vocational skills are needed, and opportunities for adults to gain additional training for occupational and social advancement are almost non-existent.

The present choice of university work as a priority need involved these considerations: (1) university training is a focal concern of the Latin American people -- a university degree is increasingly coveted as a source of prestige and a means of occupational advancement; (2) university graduates are the leaders of tomorrow -- their ideas will influence other people; (3) university professionals, particularly those skilled in the physical and social sciences, constitute one of the most important resources for social development; (4) university work is almost virgin territory for religious groups, hence an opportunity for innovative leadership is provided; and (5) the religious orientations and professional training of the Anglican clergy mark them well for the task of initiating and developing work with university people.

Assuming that the university is an almost unexplored mission field and that the students are potential influentials in their societies, does the university hold promise for religiously-sponsored programs? An answer depends on at least two considerations: (1) Whether the program aims to reform and change the students' religious beliefs and behavior, or (2) whether the program aims to provide presently unavailable facilities and services that can assist students in reaching their own goals more effectively. Both purposes may, under special conditions, be achieved. Realistically, however, the two sets of aims are quite distinct. Given the fact that university students in these societies come mainly from upper status families, hence are heavily involved and loyal to the dominant values and the religious culture, a program attempting to achieve religious reform stands to meet distinct obstacles. On the other hand, if the religiously-sponsored program assumes a role of facilitating student goals without making this help contingent on changing religious identity, greater possibilities are provided.

Broadly speaking, university work can be developed along two lines:¹ (1) providing facilities and sponsoring activities for students in established universities who are already non-Roman Catholic; and (2) developing programs that assist all students in particular areas of need.

The student home: providing programs for students who are Protestants

Protestant students in the national universities are few in number and self-conscious about their religious identity. Consequently, they work

¹Parts of the material for the university proposals are taken from William E. Carter, "Interim Report on University Work", unpublished m.s., Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia University, 1963.

under a burden of minority status. This situation prompts both a social de-emphasis of one's religion and an internal weakening of the faith. The student residence is often proposed as a solution to this problem. The minority student group is provided housing, an insulated social center, and premises for maintaining their own worship services. This combination can easily lead to the segregation of Protestants from university life, a consequence of no small importance if the university is defined as a mission field. Furthermore, the comprehensiveness of the residence program -- dormitory, meals, recreation, worship -- opens up various possibilities for student complaint. A minor issue may easily be generalized to the residence's total activities. A reputation for bad food may simply mean that the whole program is avoided. A student residence serves primarily as a protector of those who have a minority religious status rather than as a platform for university involvement. It is a "holding operation" rather than a beachhead for religious entrepreneurship. Present judgment is against the use of a student residence as a primary approach to university life.

The student center: providing facilities and services for the total student population

More in line with mission emphasis and student needs is the university center. A center can become a focus of intellectual life, a gathering place for leisure activities, and a location for services geared to student needs.

A student center may take any number of directions. Small beginnings could easily lead to a multiple-focused program. The key considerations are (1) to provide strategic services, otherwise unavailable, and (2) to add to the intellectual ferment of the university. Without falling

into a position of being either "pro" or "con" on key social issues, a university center can serve as an arena for debate, intellectual exchange, and the development of new knowledge. The capacity of a center to create and maintain this intellectual function is dependent on the leaders' knowledge of intellectual cross-currents and their skill in recruiting able speakers, locating first-rate reading materials, and programming stimulating social affairs. Unless the center captures and maintains a frontier role in raising issues and furthering their understanding, it stands to lose one of its key links with university life.

In addition to its intellectual role, a center holds the potential for developing strategic student services that answer to "felt needs." Uppermost in the students' minds are problems of meeting academic requirements, financing their studies, and securing good jobs at the end of their training. These problems undoubtedly produce numerous personal worries and general anxiety, because throughout these societies increasing emphasis is being placed on professional competence, career success, and job specialization. Occupational placement and occupational performance are being recognized as the critical avenues to social prestige and financial security. Great pressures are placed on the student to succeed in his studies.

The following "occupational and career" program is provided as an example proposal for linking student needs in a key area with strategic services:

1. Student needs connected with "occupation and career": At least six key needs are identifiable in the area: (1) the student's problems involved in making judgments about his capacities and interests when deciding on a career program: "What am I best suited for and will I be able

to make it?"; (2) securing part-time or full-time employment as a means of financing his university work; (3) coping with the stresses and strains of university competition, a part-time job, and family conflicts that emerge during the student's period of study and preparation; (4) gaining information about professional openings and job opportunities at the end of his university work; (5) acquiring information about graduate training abroad, including ways to apply for scholarships, grants, and fellowships; and (6) finding opportunities for social relaxation, mixed company, and the exchange of ideas.

2. Types of services that can contribute to a solution: These important needs of the student may be answered by providing the following types of services: (1) psychological testing to determine student aptitudes and interests; (2) vocational counselling on career opportunities and professional preparation; (3) lectures, films, and printed materials on professional ethics, careers for women, business morality, and the emerging professions (social science, executive administration, psychiatry, social work, recreational directing, advertising, commercial art, etc.); (4) guidance and assistance in securing information about university training abroad; and (5) development of an information service geared to helping students find local part-time or full-time jobs for either the school term or the summer months.

In these respects the university center would function as a facilitating agent for both improving the student's progress while in the university and helping him link his capacities effectively to the occupational sphere, once his training is complete. Part of a student's problems arise from his indecisiveness about what he really wants to do. Another source of his problems is his lack of knowledge about what kind of training

is most needed and what kinds of opportunities exist for his skills. Both sources of difficulty can be possibly reduced through appropriate guidance and reliable information.

Advantages

- (1) provides a limited number of strategic services in a critical area of the students' concern;
- (2) can be generalized to any society;
- (3) religious beliefs and Christian principles could be related to problems of work and success in the society.

Disadvantages and obstacles

- (1) job openings and occupational opportunities are deeply tied to personal contacts and informal channels, hence the leaders of the student center may not have access to the critical kinds of information needed to carry on their work;
- (2) students may be hesitant and apprehensive about using the testing, counseling, and information services, not only because these aids to career choice and employment are not institutionalized in the society, but also because the student may feel it places him under an obligation to do something in return.

Expected problems in university work

To demonstrate need and ^{to} link this need to a program represents only one part of the problem. Any new venture inevitably encounters obstacles. To attempt student work in South American universities is, from some perspectives, to court trouble. Hence it may be worthwhile to point up some things that may prove disadvantageous to such an effort.

1. University faculties are geographically dispersed: The absence of a central university campus precludes the locating of a university center that will be conveniently accessible to students of all faculties. The Faculty of Philosophy and Letters may be several miles from the Faculty of Law or the Faculty of Physical Sciences. The matter of deciding on a suitable place for the university center poses problems. Present judgment is that priority consideration should be given to those faculties that represent the trend of the professions in the society, e.g., Economics, Social Sciences, Public Administration, Education, and Applied Science (Engineering, Agronomy, etc.). This suggestion is based on two considerations: (1) these faculties stand to be most involved in modern ideas; (2) students in these areas appear to come increasingly from the middle and lower status groups, hence a possible greater receptiveness to modern and innovating activities.

2. The majority of students are part-time at the university: Large numbers of students are enrolled part-time. Many work at full-time jobs. The University is not a focus of their entire day but an activity wedged into a time schedule that includes other obligations and activities. People come for a particular class, then leave. The premises of the university do not serve as leisure-time gathering points. Study is done at home or in the lodgings of friends. The image of the university is a place of learning and work, not a place to lounge and relax. Informal activities are reserved for the home, the restaurant, or the coffee house.

A university center that places high priority on attracting students by offering them a place to spend leisure time may find these invitations unaccepted. The whole idea of a "place to go" during university hours is alien to the South American student. He comes, and goes, but he does not

linger.

3. University students are generally religiously indifferent, often religiously antagonistic: The atmosphere of the South American university is not hospitable to religious ideas. As a group, students are in rebellion against all forms of authority and convention. Religion figures as a target on both counts. Religion is identified with superstition, thought control, political conservatism, and a bourgeois life. The focus of student life is politics and the bearing of this activity on the social struggle in the total society. Political party identifications are the key dividing lines in university life. Not only do students have a direct part in the control of the university but, as well, often figure importantly in political events of the whole country. When religious identification serves, as in the case of the Christian Democrats, to differentiate out a political group the emphasis is still political, not religious per se.

University work is both a priority need and a sphere of potential difficulty. Ideas are the critical medium on this level. If the religious program has the capacity to lead and stimulate in this area, both through advancing new ideas and showing their relevance to issues of importance in the society, attention may be captured. Second, if innovative and strategic services pertinent to the concerns and problems of students are offered, a singular contribution to the educational process may be achieved. Much depends on the kind of image the students develop to define the university work and give it meaning. If this image turns out to be negative, little success can be expected. A reputed character, whether based on fact or not, becomes the key variable and the basis for judgment.

Youth Work: Social Identity and Preparation for Adulthood

Social change in Latin American societies, identified earlier in this report as a movement from a traditional social order to a differentiated, secular, pluralistic society, places many strains on the family. Its customary authority is challenged, its links to the community are broken, and its capacity to confer status on its members is eclipsed by the occupational world. The children, particularly the adolescents, are major victims of these strains. Although deeply dependent on the family for emotional and financial support, the adolescent rebels against its control, its traditions, and its feudal atmosphere.

As the family retreats from its earlier position in society, the distance between its boundaries and secular, public life increases, leaving a no-man's land across which the adolescent must find his way. During his transit from the embrace of the family to his own marriage and occupation, the adolescent has to find new social identities, form new relationships with age mates, and make decisions of the utmost importance to his adult life. Two decisions are particularly crucial: the choice of an occupation or career and the choice of a spouse. On these two decisions his future depends. Whereas earlier the parental family and its wider kinship group remained a source of identification, guidance, and support throughout maturity, today this support is weakening.

The adolescent phase of life in South America lacks the institutional controls and social forms that can prepare youth for the demands that a modern type of society makes on the adult. While the "obvious" solution is a radical change of the family system, this solution is utopian. Families are the most impenetrable of all social units. Modifications in their

structure take place slowly. Over time, changes can be made through the children's involvements with new emphases in education. Primary and secondary schooling can play a key role here. However, the immediate problem is the development of new forms for the children who are already past primary school age: the adolescent. Programs aimed at capturing the adolescent's attention and orienting him to the exigencies of his adult social life will play a significant part in his development as a human being.

Suggested approaches to work with adolescents

Adolescent problems emerge principally in the urban centers. There, non-family contacts are greater in number and more different ways of life are visible. Further, the urban occupations of fathers allow the adolescent more leisure, particularly if his father is a skilled industrial worker, a white-collar employee, or a professional. Little opportunity exists for integrating the adolescent member of the family into the father's work. Lower class boys assume jobs on their own, as do some girls either as domestics, clerks, or waitresses. Education occupies the middle class adolescent. Part-time jobs are sometimes gained during the school year, more so in the summer vacation. On the whole, however, the middle class urban adolescent is a member of a leisure class. This may increase his confusion about adult life and his dissatisfaction with family routine.

Taking this broad situation as a starting point, several lines of program development are worth considering:

1. Youth camps during vacation: vacations are part of these societies' institutions. People expect them. Often a vacation involves travel, either to a beach, to relatives, who live at a distance, or to the mountains. Vacations are family centered; parents and children go as a

unit. Hence, special youth vacation camps would be somewhat experimental. Protestants and Catholics have already developed programs along these lines, but for their own members. Perhaps more stress could be placed on camp programs open to all and centered around activities that would not push religion. The focus would be more on educative and expressive themes linked to the adolescent's adult future in his society. Camp activities may become an arena for promoting leadership skills, participation in group decisions, and directing attention to occupational and family issues that emerge in modern societies.

2. Work projects to assist social development: more feasible perhaps than youth camps are youth work projects organized to assist the solution of a pressing social need. Volunteers, under qualified leaders, would make up a work team assigned to help an isolated community build a school, clear a slum land area for a sports field, or teach literacy classes in the rural villages. These projects could be planned by the volunteers in consultation with local government officials and the people representing the local community. The preparation for the project and its execution would familiarize the adolescent volunteers with problems of decision-making, local politics, and public opinion. Work assignments in a group context may stimulate new ideas about occupational performance and organized cooperation. Indirectly these projects deal with attitudes toward manual labor, the process of group decision, and social effort as a way of helping to change society. Sufficient ideological meaning could be given to these activities as a way of linking small local projects to broader issues of social reform that play against each other at the national political level.

Advantages

1. Both proposals capitalize on the adolescent's leisure time as a starting point for age-group activities that have relevance to both attitudinal change and social development. The manifest activities in both cases are vehicles for accelerating social skills, preparation for adult life, and value change.
2. Both proposals stress the importance of peer group activities in a social context that isolates the participants (for a length of time) from routine family involvements and local neighborhood life, hence new ideas and attitudes stand a better chance of congealing before being tested against outside influence.

Disadvantages

1. Family control over adolescents is firm. Supervision is relatively constant and protective. Hence, even if these projects stimulated youth interest, the possibilities for gaining their parents' approval may be slim.
2. The religious sponsorship of the youth activities would certainly raise problems for both the parents and the youth. People would likely see these projects as a religious plan for proselytizing. This issue may be partially resolved through home visiting, detailed printed matter on the camps' activities, and through using non-religious specialists on the staff.
3. Youth groups have their own ideas about what they need and what they want. Youth culture is nearly always strong and the norms are binding on group members. To capture the attention and the participation of adolescents may require serious studies of youth values, group norms, and adolescent status aspirations.

Management Training and Human Relations Work

For a number of historical and cultural reasons South American societies are "poorly managed." Observers note a lack of organizational know-how and an excess of administrative confusion. Bureaucracy abounds, but few of its advantages are realized. These difficulties stem from many things: the one-man rule pattern (the reluctance to delegate responsibility to subordinates), authoritarian managerial attitudes, employer-employee paternalism, job placement by family connection rather than on bases of competence, and an unwillingness to trust the rules of the game. All of these factors, and many others, interrupt the rationalization of work relations, organizational procedures, and communication. Although the economy is usually singled out to illustrate these weaknesses, there is good reason to assume that the same phenomena cross-cut all organized sectors of the society: public administration, government offices, health organizations, and schools. As noted in Chapter Two, one of the pressing needs in these societies is increased "organizational capacity."

Various programs have been established and are being developed to contribute solutions. Bilateral technical assistance projects are focusing on an upgrading of public administration techniques and the reorganization of business firms' operations. Chile is attacking these problems in several ways. Through the Servicio Industrial and the Chilean Institute for the Rational Administration of Enterprises (ICARE) a new professional management movement is developing. Most of the members are young Chileans who, for reasons of background or ideology, do not fit into the traditional business elite. These special programs are supplemented by management courses in the

Catholic University of Santiago, the Catholic University in Valparaiso, and the University of Concepcion. At the University of Chile a research institute and an institute of business administration are now in operation. Graduates of these programs are in demand. Since 1956 high-level management seminars and conferences have been held in Chile each summer, focused around human relations in industry, general administration, personnel policies, and firm reorganization programs. Professors and business leaders from the United States, in cooperation with ICARE, lead this work.

In Argentina, both private and public institutions are operating to facilitate management training: the Enterprise High Studies Association, the National Institute of Industrial Technology, and the Administrative Division of the School of Enterprise Management in the Catholic University of Buenos Aires. United Nations work in Bolivia, centered around public administration development, has been underway since 1951.

Proposals for contributing to the solution of organization problems

The development of organizational capacity, administrative efficiency, and executive leadership depends importantly on attitude changes and new conceptions of human relationships. These will not take place quickly. Diverse types of educational services are needed to bring these critical changes about. Voluntary groups may be able to contribute enormously in this area. Several specific programs suggest themselves:

1. Management-leadership workshops: the sponsoring group would act as a bridge between management experts and small groups of young executives, administrative trainees from the universities, and middle-level administrators in the area. Specialists from abroad would focus the initial part of the program. The periods between lecture series could be given to

(1) a discussion of cases, developed around small forums composed of leaders from firms, unions, hospitals, government agencies, and public bureaus, and (2) sponsoring trips to "example organizations" as a means of illustrating the effects of new policies and programs.

2. Information center and consulting service on human relations and group dynamics: the sponsoring group would provide the community (city or region) with literature and counsel on problems of labor-management relations, industrial morale, personnel policy, occupational retirement, job satisfaction, and low productivity. This information and consulting service may, over time, allow for a development of special training courses and a research library. While it is increasingly true that formal courses are being given to train the student in management, little is being done to complement this formal training with applied skills.

Some disadvantages

- (1) A voluntary organization working in this area would be competing, in some degree, with commercial management firms, university programs, and special national projects. In order to be recognized the program would need to be of high quality, located in an urban center, and made highly visible to the potential users.
- (2) The services offered in these programs are highly specialized. This means, first of all, that only small numbers of people would be reached. Second, the services do not, on the surface, link the clientele with a religious ideology, though certainly the moral problems involved in the organizational activities of a modernizing society would provide issues for bridging this gap.

Advantages of the programs

- (1) The services provided, in the several ways mentioned above, answer to a fast-growing and very important need in these societies.
- (2) Through these programs the sponsoring group would have contact with members of the rapidly growing management class in the urban centers.
- (3) The kinds of problems encountered in providing these services could serve as vehicles for developing mass media programs on issues in modern civilization.

The resources of the Church in relation to this proposal

The professional interest shown by the Anglican Church for leadership training, human relations principles, and group dynamics lends itself to working these problems. Many of the concepts and ideas pertinent to the "group dynamics" work in the United States would require modification. However, a general resource base now exists from which new applications may develop.

It deserves to be recognized that many of the growing problems in these countries center around the re-ordering of human relations. The public, organized sector of life is only one of several important spheres in which modifications will need to be made. By concentrating on management leadership, industrial relations, and work morale a wedge is made into a whole range of human issues that underlie the activities and concerns of a modern society.

Religio-Psychiatric Program

No society escapes human problems: personality disorders, family conflict, occupational frustration, anxiety about the future, misery from loss, social prejudice, and aggressive deviance. Populations undergoing abrupt and rapid change from a traditional way of life to modern, individual-centered, achievement-oriented living, are particularly subject to various kinds of stress, human anguish, and inter-group conflict. New types of performance are required, and numerous adjustments in relation to authority, the expression of emotion, and responsibility need to take place. People tend, in these circumstances, to experience insecurity, apprehension, and distrust. Old forms of solving problems and customary habits are either tenaciously held to or abruptly rejected for the new. Some people try to deny that change is required; others recognize its inevitability but try to escape; others accept change but meet it with idiosyncratic short-term solutions that often prove unsatisfactory. The results of these strains and frustrations are several: psychological disturbances, reactionary fascist-type movements, utopian thinking about the future, and free-floating hostility that can be readily channeled by demagogues into slashing riots and wildcat uprisings.

Each of the societies presently under examination are deep in "transition." Major sectors of the population are caught in the disorganizing side effects of this process. While it is extremely important to seek ways to solve the population's needs for food and housing, it may be even more important to develop ways to help people cope with the human and psychological problems that emerge and accompany change. At many key points in these societies the values and habits of the people will require modification,

re-alignment, and adjustment. Much of the responsibility for providing this balance will fall on privately-sponsored agencies that are able, through professional staffing, to pick up these "victims of change" and help them back into society. For a long time to come, major attention in these societies will be on problems of economic development and political stability. Furthermore, social security and welfare programs, already begun, will continue to be focused heavily on material benefits for the retired, the unemployed, and the handicapped. In addition, the whole range of attitudes and assumptions that are prerequisite to a "psychiatric outlook" are alien to much in the Roman Catholic-based cultures of these countries. Men are, first of all, concerned with masculinity; families are accustomed to take care of their own conflicts and to keep them private; fate is held to be the ruling cause for many misfortunes, hence little can be done to right that which is undesirable.

There is little basis, therefore, for assuming that public attention will be quickly turned to problems of work morale, family integration, the psychology of crime, the rehabilitation of occupational failures, and the counselling of the distressed. Providing institutions to handle these "depth motivational problems" is quite an open field. There is no doubt that this kind of work will meet many obstacles. However, such work is needed, and will be increasingly needed, through the next hundred years.

Indications of need and opportunity

Several patterns having to do with trends, problems and emphases can be identified that point to need and opportunity:

(1) Social service work is chiefly focused on solving material problems and finding places of care for the neglected, the sick and the handicapped.

- (2) The rationale for welfare and help in these societies is a carry-over from the concept of charity: supplying relief food, clothing, and medicine for those who are in desperate physical need.
- (3) Technical assistance programs carried by national and international organizations are overwhelmingly directed towards improving sanitation, reducing physical disease, and raising economic productivity with priorities on providing new skills and new equipment.
- (4) Religious groups, speaking of the historical Protestant denominations, are caught up in conventional education programs, technical training projects, and a physical concept of illness. The Catholics, with very minor exceptions, are only beginning practical social action in any form, and this again, is mainly centered on material help and the revitalizing of the sacramental life.
- (5) Alert doctors, university professors, priests, and an occasional Protestant minister are pointing to the area of "psychiatric work" as a problem of high priority.
- (6) The emerging, striving, aspiring "middle class" focuses many of the most significant problems of a psychiatric type: the status of the woman in this stratum is undergoing major change; mobility and occupational demands are straining family loyalties; sexual repression is reported to be "near the breaking point," traditional courtship patterns are pushing adolescents to rebellion; worry about economic security (particularly in the middle class) leads to double employment and overwork with consequent fatigue and disillusionment.
- (7) Small beginnings in the area of psychiatry, group therapy, psycho-drama, and group dynamics are taking place in the large cities, particularly in Buenos Aires. Some psychiatric work is carried out in large hospital clinics

by psychiatric interns. Most of these services, however, are available only through private practice; hence, only a small segment of the upper-middle class and the upper class can be treated. In the universities, e.g., the University of Buenos Aires and the University of Chile, the work is very much "in the beginning stage" and mostly academic and experimental. One indication of developing concern is found in the International Journal of Social Psychiatry. Latin American representatives hold several places on its editorial board.

(8) Judging from the reports on the a-religiousness of most people in these countries, and viewing further, the trend of change toward increased rationality, secularism, and professionalization, a rather strong basis is found for suggesting that the "psychiatric perspective" will become increasingly important in many spheres of life, thereby providing an unique opportunity for innovating groups.

Suggested approaches to the development of religio-psychiatric work

At least two directions are potential for developing this type of activity:

1. As an integrated part of parish work in the middle class groups: Pastoral ministry in most western countries places major emphasis on counselling and some forms of therapy. These skills, with some modification for the particular culture, may very easily be transferred to new cultures. It is highly possible that training for this type of parish work could be integrated into the curriculum of the seminaries that already exist, e.g., Union Seminary in Buenos Aires.

2. Developing a religio-psychiatric center in each of the large metropolitan areas (Buenos Aires, Santiago, Lima): this center could be flexibly planned to eventually provide therapy services, training programs

for ministers, social workers, and teachers, publications, and new data gained from research. Professional groups, practicing specialists, and students of the human sciences may, indeed, find this center one answer for getting in touch with new ideas, keeping up with the work of others in the field, and making international contacts. Attention could be given to special fields of application: group therapy, marriage counselling, and psychiatric work with children. From the very beginning the center would concentrate on leading the field. Liaisons with the hospitals and universities would certainly open as the program developed.

Several positive benefits would flow from a successful enterprise of this type: (1) a strategic service would be provided; (2) the program would not be limited to any one status group in the society; (3) the program carries a potential for working cooperatively with other agencies and associations, secular or religious; (4) the center could be a source of critical information for planning the work of the parishes; (5) the activities of the center could provide a focus for building a mass media program; (6) books on religion and psychiatry, on group therapy, on theology and psychology may be an avenue for entering into translation and publication work.

Obstacles and disadvantages

- (1) Although psychiatric work in a religious context has many possibilities in these societies, most of the culture is alien to the ideas and concepts that make up its core. Furthermore, the people who are turning to psychiatrists are often those who are most indifferent to religion. As one leading social scientist in Argentina put it: "People here are a-religious."

They may turn to secular psychoanalysis or to spiritism, but not to the church."

- (2) Although the "healing" theme is considered to be very strong in these cultures, the major concern has been with physical illness. Whether or not this same theme will prove to be a positive factor in the acceptance of therapy remains an open question.
- (3) People's image of the clergy is reported to be particularly negative when the relationship bears on the individual's personal problems. Many people who tolerate the priest as part of the mass, would not tolerate him in a relationship of personal counselling. The reluctance to take advantage of the confession is perhaps one indication of this.
- (4) Special training would be a basic requirement for those who would undertake this kind of work. The clergy would be under responsibility to handle the skills of a psychologist, his own skills as a priest, and the intricacies of the particular culture's language, thought patterns, and character structure.

The role of the church in the development of psychiatric services

The church is one of the few institutions that is particularly suited for the task of pioneering work in the broad area of social psychiatry and dynamic counselling. Several factors stand out in this respect:

- (1) The clergy are professionals in ascertaining human need at the level of personality. Their concern for the whole person requires them to see people in relation to their spouses, their occupations, and their histories.
- (2) People look to the church and its leaders for basic kinds of emotional support. Dependency is encouraged, relief of various kinds is expected,

guidance is wanted. In short, the clergy have access to people at those times and at those levels that provide an optimum meeting place for the practice of professional skills that are attuned to psychic needs.

(3) The church is qualified to combine in its ideology both beliefs about the future life and beliefs about a full emotional life in the present world. The church stands on the boundary between the "here" and the "there", consequently is able to meet and solve problems that other institutions can only diagnose.

(4) Religious groups in these countries are being superseded in key areas of endeavor -- such as education, public health, and vocational training -- by government programs, social legislation, and international assistance projects. The more difficult task of coping with psychological problems in various sectors of the population remains an almost uncharted area. The church can act as a laboratory for later developments.

Community Development Work

Community development refers to many things. In order to clarify the meaning of this phrase, three major approaches are noted.

Types of community development

1. Extension work: This approach provides new services to established social groups: e.g., rural villages and/or urban neighborhoods. In most instances extension work is performed by a team of experts who work, individually or in teams, from a center base. Instead of requiring the people to come to a mission center, and instead of building permanent quarters in any one village, the experts go out to the people, guide them in establishing priority needs, and assist their solution.

The work of the Methodists in eastern Bolivia exemplifies this approach. Using the recently completed Rural Training Institute in Montero as home base, a doctor, nurse, agronomist, educator, and a community development expert make regular visits to six or seven colonies to provide services, training, and advice in a wide range of practical needs: well digging, crop planning, health, and credit cooperatives. Emphasis is placed on an evolving program whereby "first things first": e.g., help provide adequate food, then on to health, then education, then cooperatives, and finally general community improvement.

2. Increasing community capacity through leadership training: In this approach the emphasis is on improving the "political" capacity of either newly-formed or established communities by an upgrading of the local leaders. This type of community work requires skilled attention to problems of human relations, the pattern of kinship ties, and a knowledge of the local values and traditions.

The International Labour Organization sponsors a program of this type, known as the "development of social promoters." I.L.O. representatives working in the Andean Programme concentrate on spotting local leaders in the Indian communities. These natural leaders are trained in special courses at I.L.O. action bases in elementary principles of organization, in administrative techniques, and in procedures for working with the provincial governments for the benefit of their communities. The major objective of this leadership program is to increase the community's power to help itself.

3. Building a community basis in socially-fragmented residential areas: This approach aims to develop and strengthen group ties, mutual trust, and extra-family identities that are essential for the emergence of neighborhood relations and local cooperation. This is "ground floor work". Various

types of associations and informal networks do develop spontaneously in many suburban slums. However, important vacuums continue to exist, leaving individual family units and partial families outside the boundaries of group life. These isolated units have no leaders, no bases for cooperation, and no channels for making the change from "transient" to "resident." In these gaps the radical political groups practice their skills of entrepreneurship. Very little positive work is being done in this sphere, other than the experimental attempts of a few Catholic priests. Father Josse Van Der Rest, S.J., with a handful of priests, has begun work in Santiago. The Maryknoll fathers in Lima are working to develop community life in one of the slums along the Rimac river. These efforts are so small that it is not unfair to say "nothing is being done." Community development of this type is, without doubt, the most difficult. Those who direct this kind of enterprise need to know the people and their habits well. Skills in the building of rapport and a knowledge of felt needs are only two of many important requirements for entering this kind of work.

Problems and trend in South America that point to a need for community work

Four major patterns point to a need for community-type projects.

First, population movement and migrations are taking place on a vast scale, particularly in Chile, Peru, and Bolivia. These processes are accompanied by family disorganization, the dissolution of extra-family ties, and the individual's loss of community or corporate identity.

Second, illiteracy, poor health, unemployment, and malaise are a prominent part of life in the settled provincial villages, the rural areas, and major sections of the large towns and cities. Technical assistance and social services of every type are abundantly needed. Present efforts by

religious groups, international organizations, and national agencies are inadequate.

Third, directors of technical assistance programs, social planners, and alert politicians are increasingly recognizing that the problem of "grass roots" community development is a critical prerequisite for national stability and long-range economic growth.

Fourth, the overall development of Chile, Bolivia, and Peru depend very heavily on both the rapid integration of the transient migrants into the national economy and the stabilization of rural life. Rural-area development can help reduce migration to the cities by increasing the attractiveness of country living.

Problems that emerge in community development attempts²

Despite an abundant need for work in this area, certain problems and dilemmas arise for any group that begins community projects. The following findings from interviews with Protestants and Roman Catholics familiar with community development activities indicate the nature of these problems and their causes.

1. Protestant growth in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, and Peru shows an inverse relationship between church member increase and the sponsorship of community service projects. Projects take personnel and other resources that could otherwise be transferred to church expansion. Therefore, denominations which have traditionally sponsored service projects are turning away from them. On the other hand, religious groups which have not used this

²This section, with minor changes, is taken from an interim report by William E. Carter, "Community Development", unpublished m.s., Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia University, 1963.

approach (e.g., the Pentecostals) are showing an interest in developing community projects.

2. Since the concept "community development" covers diverse ventures, projects tend to degenerate into amorphous masses of do-good enterprises which have no clearly specified goal and no concept of ultimate leverage.

3. Community projects are especially attractive to foreign missionaries and tend to develop around a single leader. Often a project gives rise to permanent institutions which are, in a sense, shadows of that person's concern. As a result, when the leader is withdrawn, the project frequently collapses, leaving a cluster of empty buildings.

4. The very size of the foreign-sponsored community project frequently precludes effective responsibility by a national church.

5. Community development projects are usually started to meet a specific need only to find that within a few years the activities are duplicated by government-sponsored work. On the other hand, some government activities (e.g. health centers, schools) are developed only because a private agency has provided an example.

6. Many leaders in community development projects look to cooperative endeavors (e.g. producer and credit cooperatives) as ends in themselves, rather than as means to ends. In addition, the whole tenor of the people is so individualistic that cooperative work is both impracticable and unwanted.

7. If a "felt need" for a social service project is present within the society, local support may be successfully solicited. However, most community development projects have been based on the "felt need" of the innovators, rather than the felt need of the community (e.g. a program consisting of games, handwork and choir training in a very poor suburb of Lima).

8. The relation of the local church to the community project produces ambivalence and uncertainty. The leaders are not sure, from one year to the next, whether or not they should use this means to win people for the church. Furthermore, confidence is lost through fear of unwanted involvement. Churches that win adherents through community projects, encounter difficulties in keeping them (e.g. the Boca mission in Buenos Aires).

9. Many so called development projects base their attraction on free distribution of consumer goods (e.g. food, clothing). These are the least effective and, in the long run, perhaps harmful.

10. Governments are sometimes willing and anxious to cooperate with private agencies in community development or social service programs. For example, in Chile land for new housing projects has been offered to both Protestants and Catholics on the condition that an educational or social activity be included. In Argentina, a willingness has been shown by national agencies to turn over entire on-going institutions (e.g. orphanages) to private groups. However, political change makes this cooperation precarious.

11. Within the same country, or city, needs may be quite different for different groups and social classes. In Buenos Aires, for example, work with women and children among the lower classes would receive the most response; in the middle class, work with the adolescent.

Community work clearly invites many problems and difficulties for the sponsoring group. However, this pessimistic conclusion need not preclude the initiation of new projects that are carefully planned, securely tied to definite goals, and oriented to the needs of the host group. Family counseling, recreation programs, vocational education, tutorial and remedial work, health services, and the assistance of local economic development (credit

unions, employment services, and crop programs) are definitely needed.

Innovative activities are as possible in these familiar problem areas as in the pioneer spheres of youth work, psychiatry, and leadership training. Yet so much depends on how the program is initiated and developed. Both the specification of definite long-range goals and attention to program flexibility appear to be primary requisites for achieving the aims of the sponsor and assisting the solution of the hosts' needs.

Priority areas for community development activities

Although need is apparent throughout these countries, two areas appear to have priority. The one has to do with rural colonies; the second with the new housing developments in the great cities: Lima, Santiago, and Buenos Aires.

1. Colonies in eastern and central Bolivia: The Bolivian government, acting through the Bolivian Development Corporation (Fomento), is presently engaged in transferring groups of people from the plateau regions to the fertile lands in the east. The families are provided with a parcel of undeveloped land and a colony is established. The number of family units varies from 100 to 200. Faced with the tasks of clearing the land, building homes, setting up schools, and digging wells, need is apparent on every hand. While the government is able to sponsor the transfer of these peoples, little concrete help can be supplied. In the present period the officials of this program are asking for help.

Minor efforts are being initiated in this area by the leaders of the Methodist Rural Institute in Montero and the Maryknoll Fathers. But the region is tremendous in size. As one respondent noted: "We have a region 500 to 1000 miles to develop. With all the help we can get it will take us

fifty years." And another: "Our problem is skilled leadership. With the right kind of help we could open up 5 to 10 areas a year. And we need help now." And on the question of other religious groups participating, this answer came: "We're not out to strike against the Roman Catholics or any one else. We would welcome the Roman Catholics and the Anglicans."

The fact that these colonies are made up of people who are in the process of recovering from migration and change, indicates some of the open possibilities for basic community development work and education.

2. Housing developments in the large cities: Chile is undoubtedly ahead of Argentina and Peru in solving the problem of housing for sectors of the working class and the urban slum dwellers. Using dollar aid from the United States, loans from the World Bank, and national capital, a series of new housing projects are being built. By various criteria of need, priorities are established for placing slum dwellers and members of the working class into these homes. It is expected that many of the social connections and forms of association developed in previous living areas are carried over into these new projects by the participating families. From one perspective, then, these people come partly organized, therefore have some communal basis. Observers of this process point out however that life in these new housing projects tends to create a whole host of new problems: child care, adequate credit, recreation needs, job placement, and a need for corporate trust. Services in these areas can help the people make the transition from poverty-stricken transients to the status of a productive lower-middle class.

In both instances, the rural colonies of Bolivia and the housing developments in Chile and Peru, large numbers of family units and separate individuals are making important transition moves. In the one case, the

move is from a traditional community life of feudal proportions to that of independent farmers. In the second case, the move is from slum squalor and social inferiority to respectable housing and the promise of a suitable community life. These critical changes create glaring gaps in cooperative social relationships and customary habits. Under these conditions people are often open to new ideas and new institutional forms. A meaningful social life may be one of the most important factors in helping them to make a success of their ventures.

Concluding Statement

These proposals chart a wide range for religiously-sponsored programs. Diverse concrete alternatives are open in each need area. Furthermore, several proposals require special professional skills. Three proposals, however, present themselves as parts of a wider area of need: management training, psychiatric work, and university services. This suggests that a single center might be developed that brings these specialties into one organization. Initial work in one area would provide ideas and open opportunities for additional specialization. Professional skills would be interchangeable to a degree.

Choosing a name for this center is a critical decision. It would be wise to select a general title to allow room for adding new programs or terminating others. A Center for Modern Living is one possibility. The name is important on one other count. The Church is a conservative institution and for this reason its critics always feel that it sets out to solve problems of the last decade. Many a church-related institution has been saddled with an old-fashioned name and purpose. Hence, keen attention deserves to be given to program identification.

Chapter Eight

Recommendations*

The report has called attention to a variety of issues and social-religious trends. Many implications can be drawn from the materials. Some of these implications would certainly be true to the writer's intentions, while others would not. It seems particularly appropriate, therefore, to set forth a limited number of explicit recommendations. These statements represent the project director's basic posture on the question of Anglican work in South America.

1. The report contains many indications that serious difficulties would face any new missionary activity in South America. Of particular importance in this respect are the people's focus on secular and immediate goals, the latent strength of the Roman Catholic religious culture, the problems of present Protestant missions, and the reluctance of South American nationals to welcome additional "outside interests." In light of these findings, the Church would be well advised to consider any new commitments in South America against its mission responsibilities in areas where its work has been established for many decades.

2. If in the face of the report's findings the Church decides to accept the mission task, a conventional denominational-type program is not recommended. Instead, attention deserves to be given to a concept of mission

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that includes taking responsibility for (a) the needs of the people in their cultural-historical setting and (b) the needs of those religious movements which are indigenous to the society, especially Pestecostalism.

3. If missionary work is initiated, the Church should not only keep abreast of the economic, political, and social situation but, in addition, be sensitive to the implicit direction of major trends as a means of capturing a one-step-ahead position on critical problems. Unless the Church gains prominence as a modern, positive, and active agent in society at large, work is not recommended. Faced with the large-scale efforts of government agencies, bi-lateral missions, and other private groups, this task is a difficult assignment.

4. If this pace-setting role is accepted as a long-range possibility, it is recommended that the Church allow for a learning phase in the cultures, not as a carrier of new values but as a student of the respective group relationships and personality factors. This learning phase would be geared to working out a plan that, over a generation or two, allowed for the establishment of various programs differentiated by activity, geographical location, and need area.

5. If the Church decides to initiate missionary work in South America careful consideration should be given to activities that, early in their development, can provide "feed back" information on people's reactions, how the program is being identified, and the points that raise criticisms. Room would be made for modifications, shifts, and overall flexibility. Basic research would stand as an auxiliary activity.

6. Should missionary activity develop in urban, coastal areas the potential role of the Anglican chaplaincies deserves to be carefully considered. A new concept of Church mission fresh in the minds of the missionary team could easily become subordinated to local ideas of priority. Hence, it is recommended that new work stand completely on its own, at least for a sufficient time to allow the activities to gain their own momentum.

7. Assuming that missionary work is initiated, the Church should foster a religious approach that takes into account the basic social units that link an individual to society: family, friendships, colleagueships. In short, the individual and his primary group associations are the critical consideration. This may help the Church avoid the problems that often develop from tearing a person out of context in an attempt to bring him salvation.

Appendix

Selected Demographic Data on the Populations
of Argentina, Bolivia, Chile and Peru and
their Capital Cities,

Table A1. Population, Area, and Density for Argentina,
Chile, Bolivia, and Peru: Latest Census.

<u>Country</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Population</u>	<u>Area in Sq. Kilometers</u>	
			<u>Kilometers</u>	<u>Density</u>
Argentina	1960	20,003,945	9,363,387	21
Bolivia	1950	2,704,165	1,098,581	3
Chile	1952	5,932,995	741,767	10
Peru	1961	10,364,620	1,285,215	12

Sources: Data for Argentina and Peru are taken from the provisional results of the latest censuses; those for Bolivia and Chile from the United Nations, Demographic Yearbook, 1960.

Table A2. Populations of Buenos Aires, La Paz, Lima and Santiago, by Sex and Percent of the National Population at Recent Census Dates.

<u>City</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Population</u>			<u>Percent of National Population</u>		
		<u>Both Sexes</u>	<u>Males</u>	<u>Females</u>	<u>Both Sexes</u>	<u>Males</u>	<u>Females</u>
Buenos Aires	1960	6,734,548	3,426,599	3,307,949	33.7	34.1	33.2
La Paz	1950	321,073	-	-	11.9	-	-
Lima	1961	1,802,251	890,105	912,146	17.4	17.3	17.5
Santiago ¹	1959	1,894,000	868,000	1,026,000	24.8	-	-

^{1/} Estimate

Sources: Data for Argentina and Peru are taken from the provisional results of the latest censuses; those for Chile from Instituto de Economía, La Poblacion del Gran Santiago (Santiago: Universidad de Chile, 1959); those for Bolivia from Demographic Yearbook, 1960 (New York: United Nations, 1960).

Table A3. Enumerated Populations of Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, and Average Annual Increase.

<u>Country</u>	<u>Latest Census</u>	<u>Population</u>	<u>Previous Census</u>	<u>Population</u>	<u>Average Annual Increase (in thousands)</u>
Argentina	1960	20,003,945	1947	15,293,827	316.2
Bolivia	1950	2,704,165	-	-	-
Chile	1952	5,932,995	1940	5,094,353	69.9
Peru	1961	10,364,620	1940	6,207,967	197.9

Sources: Computed from materials in the Demographic Yearbook, 1960 (New York: United Nations, 1960) and (in the case of Argentina and Peru) from the provisional results of the latest censuses.

Table A4. Populations of Buenos Aires, La Paz, Lima, and Santiago, and Average Annual Increase.

<u>City</u>	<u>Latest Census</u>	<u>Population</u>	<u>Previous Census</u>	<u>Population</u>	<u>Average Annual Increase (in thousands)</u>
Buenos Aires	1960	6,734,548	1947	2,981,043	288.7
La Paz	1950	321,073	1942	301,450	2.5
Lima	1961	1,802,251	1940	520,585	61.0
Santiago ¹	1959	1,894,000	1952	664,575	175.6

¹ Estimate of Instituto de Economía, La Poblacion del Gran Santiago (Santiago: Universidad de Chile: 1959).

Sources: Computed from materials in the Demographic Yearbook, 1960 (New York: United Nations, 1960) and (in the case of Argentina and Peru) from the provisional results of the latest census.

Table A5. Crude Birth Rates for Argentina, Bolivia, Chile and Peru in 1958.

<u>Country</u>	<u>Birth Rate</u>
Argentina	22.7
Bolivia	23.0
Chile	35.5
Peru	37.6

Source: Demographic Yearbook, 1959 (New York: The United Nations, 1959), pp. 209-211.

Table A6. Crude Death Rates in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, and Peru: 1950-1959

(Number of deaths per 1,000 population)

<u>Country</u>	<u>1950</u>	<u>1951</u>	<u>1952</u>	<u>1953</u>	<u>1954</u>	<u>1955</u>	<u>1956</u>	<u>1957</u>	<u>1958</u>	<u>1959</u>
Argentina	9.0	8.9	8.5	8.8	8.3	8.8	8.2	8.7	8.1	8.0
Bolivia	15.0	17.3	16.1	14.4	11.7	9.6	10.0	8.6	7.7	5.0
Chile	15.0	15.0	13.0	12.4	12.8	13.0	12.1	12.9	12.1	12.5
Peru	12.9	13.6	12.2	12.2	11.7	11.8	12.1	13.7	12.1	10.8

Source: Demographic Yearbook, 1960 (New York: United Nations, 1960), pp. 502-504.

Table A7. Infant Mortality Rates in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, and Peru: 1950-1959

(Number of children less than one year of age dying per 1,000 live births.)

<u>Country</u>	<u>1950</u>	<u>1951</u>	<u>1952</u>	<u>1953</u>	<u>1954</u>	<u>1955</u>	<u>1956</u>	<u>1957</u>	<u>1958</u>	<u>1959</u>
Argentina	68.2	67.4	64.9	63.4	60.4	61.8	57.3	67.0	61.0	-
Bolivia	170.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Chile	139.4	135.5	129.2	112.4	125.1	126.1	116.2	120.4	126.8	119.6
Peru	103.7	104.6	100.0	98.2	94.5	94.8	95.4	108.1	97.2	85.0

Source: Demographic Yearbook, 1960 (New York: United Nations, 1960), pp. 514-516.

Table A8. Age Composition of the Populations of Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, and Peru at Recent Dates.

<u>Country</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Population</u>	<u>0-4</u>	<u>5-14</u>	<u>15-19</u>	<u>20-44</u>	<u>45-64</u>	<u>65+</u>	<u>Total Per Cent</u>
Argentina	1947	15,893,827	11.2	19.5	9.9	39.0	16.1	4.3	100
Bolivia	1950	3,019,031	15.7	23.8	10.0	34.0	12.2	4.3	100
Chile ¹	1952	5,932,995	13.1	24.1	9.6	35.3	13.4	4.0	100
Peru	1956	9,196,000	17.5	25.6	10.7	31.1	11.1	3.0	100

¹ Estimate.

Source: Center of Latin American Studies, Statistical Abstract of Latin America (Los Angeles: University of California, 1961), p. 9

Table A9. Populations 15 Years of Age and Older of Argentina, Bolivia, Chile and Peru by Sex and Percent of Literacy at Recent Censuses.

<u>Country</u>	<u>Census</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Percent Literate</u>	<u>Males</u>	<u>Percent Literate</u>	<u>Females</u>	<u>Percent Literate</u>
Argentina	1947	11,318,896	86.4	5,828,722	37.9	5,490,174	84.8
Bolivia	1950	1,633,313	32.1	775,626	42.4	857,687	22.8
Chile	1952	3,724,407	80.4	1,801,500	82.2	1,922,907	81.7
Peru	1940	2,071,637	42.4	1,731,237	55.0	1,864,563	30.7

Source: Demographic Yearbook, 1960 (New York: The United Nations, 1960), pp. 460.463.

Table A10. Primary School Enrollment Trends in Argentina, Chile, Bolivia, and Peru: 1930-1953.

Country	(Enrollment (in thousands))		(Enrollment Ratio)	
	Average 1930-1934	1953 or Latest Year	Average 1930-1934	1953 or Latest Year
Argentina	154.7	-	54	-
Bolivia	94.3 ¹	234.0 ¹	14 ¹	29 ²
Chile	527.6	805.6	51 ³	54
Peru	372.6	1,022.5	23 ⁴	43

¹1935.

²1952.

³Does not include municipal primary schools.

⁴Does not include private schools.

Source: Latin America: Seminar on Population (New York: United Nations, 1955), p. 100.

Table A11. Total population and per cent economically active in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, and Peru.

Country	Age ¹	Census	Total	Per cent	
				Active	Inactive
Argentina	14	1947	15,893,827	40.6	59.4
Bolivia	10	1950	2,704,165	50.3	49.7
Chile	12	1952	5,932,995	36.9	63.1
Peru	6	1940	6,207,967	40.6	59.4

¹Lower age limit (in years) of economically active population tabulations.
Source: Demographic Yearbook, 1960 (New York: The United Nations, 1960), pp. 460-463.