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DEVELOPMENT AND ITS IDEOLOGICAL DIMENSION

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DEVELOPMENT AND ITS IDEOLOGICAL DIMENSION

THE IDEOLOGICAL FUNCTION: CHARACTERISTICS

DEVELOPMENT AND ITS NORMATIVE INTELLIGIBILITY

Candido Mendes

In order to investigate the process from this angle,

it is initial DEVELOPMENT AS A UTOPIA AND THE REVERSAL

THEMATIC OF THE SOCIAL EXPECTATIONS OF THE FIFTIES

in our days has acquired international perspectives and scope.

This is At the end of the so-called decade of development, one of the inevitable frames of reference for criticizing and summing up results is situated in the domain of social reflection; of the universe of representations of reality; and of its peculiar dynamics as mobilizer of a given situation of collective change. It is on this plane that the building of that policy would be appreciated as one of the great utopias of the century, in the technical sense of the word: this analysis implies an inquiry into the broad range of counterpoint between the formulation of development as a sociohistoric project and its impact on the vast modification in degree of social aspirations it originated and, prevailingly, failed to support. From this point of view, the problem set to the ideologist of today by that policy is patterned by this reversal of expectations; by the loss of the conditions of mobilization that it might afford to the collectivities of the Third World; by the substitution, on a widening scale today, of contents of reality representation fraught more cogently with prospects of social compensation or of a traumatic — and isolated — affirmation of some of the values and demands heard as a whole by development.

IDENTIFICATION OF THE ACTORS AND ROLES OF
THE IDEOLOGICAL FUNCTION : CHARACTERISTICS
OF ITS FORMATIVE INTELLIGENTSIA

The starting point of this approach is not the general
 In order to investigate the process from this angle,
 it is initially important to identify its eminent actor: that
 thematics was the product of the first "intelligentsia", which
 in our days has acquired international perspective and scale.
 This fundamental characteristic of the reflex protagonist of
 development must be underscored, despite the fact that the
 direct action of that process continued to evolve in an essen-
 tially national framework. It is necessary at the same time,
 in view of this new type of articulation between the two or-
 ders of setting in which that process of change is configured
 as a whole, to follow the trajectory pursued by the idea of
 development and see how far it succeeded in gaining social
 validity, fulfilling, or not, all the functions of the universe
 of representations of reality that would accompany any project
 of social change. In particular, one with such emphasis and
 urgency as that of a structural transformation of the so-called
 Third World. ~~residual collective identity— prior to, or in-~~
 What, then, is summarily revealed by the phenomenol-
 ogy of this fugitive dimension of development, generally hid-
 den ~~beneath all the classic verbiage implied~~ by that policy,
 especially when considered in terms of the opportunities for,
 and "obstacles" to, its success ?

determination that would
 eventually be translated to acceptance of development as a
 social challenge totalizing and shaping the energies of social
 transformation of the collectivity. Not only the nationalism
 peeked its way out of the shell of development, but its affir-
 mation, predominant, expresses dissociation from the sociohis-
 toric feasibility thereof. None other is the lesson of the

FATIGUE OF THE IDEOLOGICAL FUNCTION :
ITS INCAPACITY OF MOBILIZATION

The starting-point of this approach is not the general perspective of exceptionality in which the hopes of the fifties might come to be substantiated at the present time. But, in a generalized way, the inability of development, in that reflex universe of change, to have attained the functions of mobilization, this being the prevailing target of the collectivites involved in that process of intense social transformation of the status quo. This connotation of fatigue of the ideological function is expressed by the impossibility it revealed of transforming the exaction of self-determination imposed by nationalism, and the corresponding overall visualization of the social change to which it aspired, from a perspective of challenge to one of achievement. Thus attention is drawn to the present contents of mobilization of the Third World, and of references to the totality and the payoff of collective integration that might furnish the effort of change. This effect has been occurring much more in the field of affirmations of residual collective identity — prior to, or independent of, development — than in the results of an effort of social change, or national construction, which might result from that policy.

The demands of identity and national affirmation were not transformed into a prospective determination that would eventually be transposed to acceptance of development as a social challenge totalizing and shaping the energies of social transformation of the collectivity. Not only has nationalism pecked its way out of the shell of development, but its affirmation, predominant, expresses dissociation from the sociohistoric feasibility thereof. None other is the lesson of the

the effort of "themabilization" of development, and to which the Velasco Government in Peru, or the forms assumed by the African Latin American contribution is so closely bound. This temporary emergency of the present, in the higher value attached to the resurrection of "rationality", expressed in the only logical cultural component of change in conditioning the break with the colonial syndrome.

FROM THE DISCONNECTION OF SETTINGS
TO THE BLOCKING OF FUNCTIONS :
THE PARADOXES OF RATIONALITY

On the other hand, the characteristics of internationalization assumed by the actors responsible for formulating the thematics of development would also tend to curtail the full validity of their output, owing to the effect of discontinuity of the settings in which the direct and reflex plans for that policy of change began to be assembled: the result would seem to be the blocking of the function of consensualization, which would demand, forcibly, a complete systematization of the ideological universe before passing, by mobilization, to reconcentration on the objective reality.

Owing to the degree of rationality attained by those contents, the distance to be covered by the tasks of compatibilization proved to be too great for them to form the indispensable connecting link to enable the repertory formulated by that international intelligentsia to be played by the vast cast of nations. Ideology, here understood to be a configuration symmetrically opposed to ^{rationality} ~~reality~~ — lending "representation" to the immediatist perspective of those actors' localized and direct interests — would take an outsize place in that interaction, and in the limitations that would impose on the product of the agencies in which it had been institutionalized,

the effort of "thematization" of development, and to which the Latin-American contribution is so closely bound. This temporary resurrection of "irrationality", expressed in the only logical function in which it could be disguised, was particularly manifest in the composition of the basic roles, of donors and receivers, of a policy of international cooperation for development.

THE ARMAGEDDONS OF CONSENSUS :

GENEVA AND NEW DELHI

The Conferences of Geneva and New Delhi stood out, in view of all these dysfunctions, as true "Armageddons" of rationality, clearly showing the ultimate behavior of the national actors in terms of the policy likely to bring the great utopia of the century into existence. The outcome of those conclaves sealed the unfeasibility of the sociohistoric performance of an intelligentsia which, deprived of the placenta to guarantee its full insertion into the ideological universe, launched out into a consensualization of its mental output with the direct use of exhaustive argumentation backed by the strict force of intrinsic logic. The observer could not fail to be struck by the extremes to which the stalemate was carried by the irreconcilability of the roles played by affluent and underdeveloped actors, in the performance they put on at those Conferences. Suffice it to recall a few purple patches of the debate on the Prebisch effect to realize how the reversal of the functions of social consensus went so far as to undermine the basis of discussion, in the unshifting, previous field of reality. The fact that deterioration in the terms of trade could at times

be held, in the heat of argument, to be an "optical illusion" of the poor countries, is evidence of the extreme means it was felt necessary to resort to, in order to avoid facing facts in a discussion that would be idle in view of the impossibility of reaching a consensus. What would appear to have been reached in the way of ideological corrosion was the factual core of the dispute: the spiriting away of its object.

IDEOLOGICAL UNIVERSES, SUCCESSFUL AND FRUSTRATED

Notwithstanding these drawbacks, the work of men like Prebisch, Ahumada, Myrdal and Hirschmann, eventually resulted in the degree of cohesion and generalization which enabled the theory of development to be built up; still more was achieved: its transformation into an organized program; above all and despite those dysfunctions, the granting of a constellation, eventually successful, for the reflex universe of that process of social change. To record the success of that venture is to realize the extent of the transit obtained by rationality and systemization of research, and finally the relatively low degree of importance that should be assigned to the symptomatics of the various dysfunctions, in which the characteristic behavior of the reflex universe can readily be traced: beliefs that become fatalized; thematics changed into stereotypes; diagnostics emasculated into formulae; perspectives softened or summarized down to easy disjunctives; smoke-screens thrown over the "ad quem" terms of dialogues with absolute formalization of whoever may be the addressees or receivers of the communication.

A CASE OF SUCCESSFUL CONSTELLATION :
 THE UNIVERSE OF THE ECONOMIC REPRESENTATION
 OF DEVELOPMENT

It is a fact that these phenomena will always occur when a complex constellation is manifest in the organization of an ideological universe — that is, of an "equivocity" of roles and settings. And none other is the condition of issue, postulated for the validity of the idea of development, conforming to the international characteristic of the intelligentsia that formulated that thematics.

In the case, however, of its first constellation, there is no doubt about the success achieved or of the low level at which that symptomatics began to appear. To define its configuration today is, however, at the same time to point out the high degree of rationalization attained by its products and, as their counterpart, the fringe of fatal beliefs, stereotypes and other dysfunctions that, nonetheless, still mediate and condition the full validity and social efficacy of those original contents. Among them are to be found, respectively:

THE LIMITS OF TOLERANCE FOR RATIONALITY:

FATALIZATION OF BELIEFS

(a) The urge to change is always mediated by the risks of interfering with the balance of power of the rich nations and the policy of the dominant blocs: the aid to development failed to become an independent variable, in the alteration of that balance of power.

(b) The limiting demands of productivity implied by development and the endogenous formulation of the equations of maximum yield of the factors of social change are seen to be

mediated by the retrospective appreciation of the historical series of their behavior, as verified in the donor nations: the valuation of statism, for example, as an instrument of development tends not to be based on the criteria of its intrinsic efficiency, but on the backlog of experience those nations have of them in analogous circumstances.

(c) This mediation of the full yield of the factors of change by the models, in the perspective of the donor nations, is directly proportional to the degree of externalization which they adopt as a line of conduct: it is much more in the international transactions of the donor countries that the demand of configuration to the congruency of the economic model is manifest. And not in behaviors that may occur in their own ambience, these being subordinated in a high degree to pragmatism and operationality. In the case of transactions between underdeveloped nations and the United States, for instance, it is in the sector of foreign trade that the rules of the conventional model hold good, in contrast with the innovations and systematic deviations that may arise in the nuclear and strategic areas of the affluent economy.

(d) Donor nations never fail to view development in relation to their own social time. That is, subject only to a modification of intensity, in a classic scheme of "progress" and of sociohistoric articulation, on the permanent basis of the action of elites as their exclusive actors: by definition, the employment, for instance, of the mechanisms of mobilization based on instruments such as the "cultural revolution" or that of ~~folk~~ ^{popular} culture is marginalized. Outlay on such whimsies must be sacrificed in favor of the slice reserved in aid programs for the significant action of collectivities immersed in a radical process of change such as development.

STEREOTYPES

The non-dialectization of the leading ~~founders~~ ^{principles} of the thematics of development — expressed in the fatalization of "beliefs" described above — is accompanied by the inevitable phenomena of the subsumption of specific categories, directly called for by that same thematics, in function of the nearest concept thereof held by the donor nations. None other is the role of the stereotype in the ideological universe. And consequently of the deflation or detrupation of that specific determination, as the concept gains validity in the conceptual universe of international relations, capable of being operated in a policy of cooperation for development. Therein is reflected the effect of gravitation, or domestication, of the ways of thinking of underdevelopment, by the relative weight of the totality of the rival systems for that same policy of cooperation. It is thus that we can verify the comprehension of development as "progress", or nationalism as xenophobia: a doctrine of "promotion" is transformed into a content of mere resentment or collective egoism.

It is inevitable that the validity of the thematics of development should have been esdorted, as a sum total of those beliefs and stereotypes, by a somnambulant and anonymous repertory of messages, such as: "supremacy of free enterprise in development"; "congenital inefficiency of state control"; "revolution by reform"; "graduality of social change"....

DIACHRONIES

The true measure, however, of the gaps and differences in level that appear in the constellation of the ideological universe of economic development resides in the series of

diachronies with which the generalization and acceptance of those ideas is marked in the area where they should gain full validity. The most important thing to be stressed is not the delay that such lags imply in the execution of the programs, enchainned to the more or less fatal cycle according to which truths rejected at the moment of their efficiency in the strategy of the change become rhetorical clichés when it is already useless to employ them at all. The critical aspect of the diachronies is the doubling back on reality of this misdated content, animated nonetheless by an excess of "acquired propension" to social validity. It is as though in its anachronistic dimension the demands for orthodox application of its postulates were redoubled.

None other was the trajectory of the idea of planning in the Latin American frame of development, and of its proposal to the donor nations by the poor countries: in the traditional vicious circle of the diachronies, the growing inclination of the United States to accept that proposal lessens the feasibility of international cooperation, at the level of exaction of formalization, which reflected its eventual— and costly— internationalization in the donor's perspective. This would only aggravate the gaps and discontinuities that harass results and the real constellation of the ideological universes to which the intelligentsias formulating development would seem to aspire.

In the course of the idea and the validity of the economic platform of this process of social change, the creative role of man like Prebisch and Myrdal must not be underestimated: their contribution of innovation and "master-minding" shines forth in the complete delineation of a project of radical change, and its formulation well in advance of the time when

it will come to full sociohistoric fruition. A large direct input of ideology in action must be credited to that intelligentsia as an autonomous factor of social change. Its impact had wide repercussion until its production was welded to the "some time — never" cast of national actors of development, with their inevitable overtones of inertia and torpor, represented by all those dysfunctions mentioned above, whether beliefs, stereotypes or social diachronies.

A CASE OF FRUSTRATED CONSTELLATION :

THE UNIVERSE OF POLITICAL REPRESENTATION OF DEVELOPMENT

Different, however, and more risky is the possibility of the intelligentsia that formulates economic development entering into creative conjunction for the configuration of an ideological universe, when the requirements of defining the theory of political development are postulated. The observer of today cannot fail to be struck by the imbalance between the exhaustive, achieved formulation of economic development — and the indefiniteness in which comparable projects are encased in the field of political and social development.

The important point to stress from this angle is the situation of radical ambiguity in which the definition of the criteria of political development is placed. It is not just a question of gaging it, by the excessive transcendence that analogous constructions of economic models of development would still have over the political ones, or of the delay in carrying out the reductions of the multiple extrapolations of contents of other historical series to the precise context of the Third World. The essential is to draw attention to the practically

irreparable lag with which this theory could finally be brought to light, in a sociohistoric frame where the spontaneous concept of change in the fifties had been lost. Even more so, in a state of affairs where the continuation, now rationalized and limited, of an economic policy of development, after the fashion of the products of that same intelligentsia, would be liable to create a series of contradictions with accepted values and criteria, by way of implication, in the ideological structure of that stage, and then leave them, as a quiescent potential remainder, to tag along with the constellation of economic development, as an addition to the string of fatal equivalences emerging from among expansion of income per capita, increase in social mobility, and democracy. This is, as it were, a growing process in the organization of the structures of power, of decentralization, pluralism, and self-government. Reference to the present Title IX, Sec. 281, of the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act, will suffice to show how these correspondences ~~are~~ ^{now} ~~dignified by~~ full "legitimation".

FROM IMPLICATION TO "A-PRIORISM" IN
THE PROPOSITION OF POLITICAL MODELS

It is worth ascertaining how the fifties eliminated all pretense of constructing a theory of social and political development by strict ^{implication} ~~termination~~ of economic development. None other was the accumulated effect of the multiple concrete vicissitudes of the process of change; of the shocks delivered by the "utopia of progressivism" between its desired level of aspiration and its actual outcome; the immediate, peremptory manifestation of the national design, kept in the womb of development; the course, often headlong, taken by the manifesta-

tions of "irrationality", in the same sentiment of collective idiomaticism aroused by the demands of confrontation — hence of reference to the stresses of dependence or of exogenous pressure on its course — more than of performance, and therefore of increasing insertion within the judgments of collective personalization, on the successes and conquests of its own process of social transformation. Such factors, perhaps, stand in the way of the definitive erection of that political theory on the same type of model, or register, on which men like Prebisch turned economic development into an experiment that could be formulated to an effective degree of integration and generalization. What it is a question of ascertaining nowadays is whether the atrophy and perplexity of the analysis of political development do not arise from the idiomatic confinement which would seem to mark the few successful experiments in social change, from the fifties up till now, in the Third World. The political dimension of promotion apparently extorts a "basic prius" that is the essential datum collected empirically during the last two decades through which the Third World has now passed: that of the preeminence of national determination in this process of change, and of the inalterability of its role as a configurating project "for its own sake", of the underdeveloped countries — of Latin America or of the Afro-Asian world — independently of the conditions of success of economic development and even of its own feasibility. And it would be, then, in function of its own concrete vicissitudes in which, as incidents of that policy, it would have actuated the prior demand of national affirmation, that, in their given hierarchies and necessary prevalences, the variables of the model of power: stability, differentiation, institutionalization or mobilization, would be constellated.

modification in the comprehension and evaluation of the change.

Thus it is no mere hazard that the continuation of the work of

THE "NON SEQUITUR" TO THE CONSTRUCTION OF
 THE DEVELOPMENT POLICY OR THE NECESSARY
 AMATEURISM OF ECONOMISTS

It remains to be ascertained whether the translation that occurred in the objective reality of development was accompanied by modifications of the conceptual universe to reformulate it. To the same extent that its onsurge today is to be inscribed on political-institutional thematics, it is not just the content of that formulation that has to be challenged; the posture of the actor is also involved, and the conditions under which it became an intelligentsia of the ECLA model of the fifties. In the representations of the reality of the change, ideological dysfunctions arise today that are not the result of the perspectives of the direct protagonists — donors or receivers of an international aid program — but of the operating intelligentsia itself. They would bring their remoteness, in this case excessive, from the significant setting, challenging the intrinsic validity of their task.

The observation is made above all to mark the return to an essentially national plane, at this stage, of the pursuance of a general effort to formulate the thematics of change.

In the present conjuncture at the end of the sixties, and in a prospect that bars the construction of a generalizing theory of political development, the aspiration for its components to be systematized could go no further than a purely denotative taxonomy of the idiomatic experiences of successful social change. The loss of spontaneism of social exchange, implicating exhaustion of the imports substitution model over most of Latin America was not accompanied by an "entelechiic" modification in the comprehension and evaluation of the change. Thus it is no mere hazard that the continuation of the work of

that international intelligentsia is necessarily transforming economists into amateur political scientists. Or that the explanation of the collapse or the accidents in the process of change, in the keen light of "progressivism", can only articulate *its* economic and political dimensions in terms of a point between "development" and its "obstacles". Or that the congealing of the economic polemic of that process may be compensated by increasing concentration on its political aspects, towards which all the chances of this analysis being innovated are tending; furthermore, to this plane would likely be attributed the levers for reconstituting the "canon" of change.

The loss of the conditions of simultaneism, within the process of social change, did not engender new global intellectual configurations, to represent and study the problem of this emergency.

THE NEW "CHILIASM":

THE APOCALYPTIC DISJUNCTIVE AND THE THEME OF THE "HISTORIC TERMS"

In reality, an enquiry into the dominant considerations on the prospects of successful development of the Third World shows that they are likely to remain dependent on an essentially "harmonic" comprehension of the change, only thinkable in terms of global and cumulative feasibility.

The collapse of spontaneism was not understood fully enough to formulate a project of change likely to persist in terms of remains, and of localized and sectorial results. A tendency was noted on the part of the contemporary intelligentsia of the fifties, to resume the problematization of the subsequent stage, denying sequency, as a thesis, to the limited pursuit of development. Or to think of it in a conflicting

context between the conducts and values referred to as concords in the "utopic" vision of this social change, as enshrined, for instance, in the great documents of that decade.

In this picture, the collapse of the integrality of development is likewise that of change as a whole: the rapidity of unsuccessful promotion is offset by the imminence of revolution. It is in this connection that, normally, the recent output of that intelligentsia abounds in the treatment — in an obviously melancholiastic posture — of the "apocalypse" lurking around the slackening in the rate of change and in the progressive conflictual perspective that its pursuit brings to the conventional vision of the other counterpoints of economic development. This posture is also complemented, within that same "chiliasm", in the precipitation of significant and irreversible time for social transformation. The change would be operated in fatal, waning terms. In this perspective, the rule of rationality was insufficiently imbued with "praxis" for the future to cease to be the prey of facile and rigorously contradictory disjunctives: development (referred, moreover, to the plethoric category of preterite spontaneism), or social disruption.

NEITHER DEVELOPMENT NOR REVOLUTION

The symptomatics of withdrawal of the formulator in those perspectives is present therein, not only in the peremptory character with which this dilemma is enunciated, but above all in the sense of dramatic urgency that is lent to the cohort of initiatives and programs that might finally tip the balance one way or the other.

While the apocalyptic panels accumulate in the vision of the future of Latin America, on the contrary, there remains to be investigated the open prospect, much more probable and recognizable by "praxis", of a situation that is neither one of development nor of revolution. But it cannot be formulated without thinking, ex-novo, the set of partial, localized transactions of each sub-system of the process of change. Or of its inter-systematic combinations. Or, better, when we pay no attention to the category of aborted development and of the manifest situation of social configurability that it presents, even though limited to a condition of regime and not social system: it may represent a condition of contained and localized dynamisms, or the unfolding of an entropic perspective supervenient to one, effective, of social change.

On these terms, there will be seen to appear a block to the acceptance of the present conditions of status quo successors of developmentism, as determinants of the most probable course for its future. And this is due to complacency with the schatological attitude on the part of ^{the} intelligentsia, concentrating on the determinism of such processes. None other is the reaction to the semi-development or aborted development of the middle sixties, looking at it as the precursor of a situation of social disruption. Its defenders had only half-abandoned the "social time" time of progressivism: it would continue to be present in their "verse", represented by the revolution. The challenge the present context affords to the intelligentsia is of another order; it lies in the search for an historic-critical determination of change and, consequently, of a severe posture of induction of the concrete real, to which it is obliged by a study of this problematics. In this context

— and at the opposite pole to his emulator, the economist of ten years back — the political scientist now finds himself at an almost random conjuncture, to translate and configure the multiple variables of his system.

IN SEARCH OF A "NON-^{EW}TELECHIC" FORMULATION
OF THE POLITICAL MODEL

On these terms, any perspective that leaves behind the spontaneism of change, would be oriented by a strategy for relaunching development. And it would necessarily incorporate, as the result of its present scarcity of instruments, the economic determinants and institutions, as component of one and the same policy of change: it would suppose, judging by the reentrances of the system, a given inflection of the structures of power, instead of the loose perspective, and the play on automatic superpositions of planes that characterized the "development" of a decade ago.

This conjuncture can be summed up by establishing the symmetry between the loss of the simultaneism of development and the emergence of the technocracies. The political paradigm achieved by such a regime would gravitate to the opposite pole to that of the formal democracies, such as was admitted as a "pendant" to change in the fifties.

Hence it is inevitable that any conflict of criteria and a-prioris in the construction of these models — stability versus dynamism; participation versus efficiency, for example — may come to be mediated by the concrete determinations assumed for the new start, by the new juxtaposition in which political behavior has been transformed into a variable of its own economic environment.

The final magnitudes in which the representation, centralization or legitimation eventually cinstellate are not derived from ideal correlations among themselves. But in the scarcity and limitations of a new concrete configuration of the project of change, ^{derive now} they form the demands of ~~the~~ planning, mobilization or reformism, congenital to that policy, implying the constant rupture of any implicit pact of expectations and political coalitions which go to feed the conventional stability of a regime.

DEFINITION OF THE NEW STRATEGIC VARIABLE

It is not enough, however, to characterize the technocratic regimes as the resultants of an extreme reduction of the alternatives to pursuing that policy. In this confinement frame of a model, configurated by the "reentrances" of its sub-systems, in a regime of subsumption and compensation of functions, a minimal proposition might be established to define its regularities. That is, it might be postulated that the loss of spontaneism be situated in terms of compensation for the complex of the various sub-systems of a social whole, by the increasing rationalization of the conducts necessary to the achievement of a common result. The summum of this imperative will be the calling to the foreground, as a strategic variable of change, of the problem of ^{consciousness awakening} "~~taking steel~~" and, hence, of the component of the greatest "indetermination" in the political sub-system and potentially of the greatest relevance in the program for "relaunching" development. It may be affirmed that there is an inversely proportional relationship between the waning conditions of spontaneous economic development of

the hemisphere and the creative prospects of an ample strategy of national mobilization. The latter is to be understood as fostering the mechanisms of induction of the collectivities to relevant conducts, in terms of the increase on productivity of the country. And at the same time, of the search for an iconography in which this increasing "self adhesion" of the people to development would be represented, transformed into the conscious subject and object of the social change in which it finds itself involved. Curiously enough, the techniques of relaunching have not convinced technocracy to make use of this vast potential. The paradox should perhaps be attributed to a complete non-dialectization of the political models demanded by development, and to the permanency of its valuations, within the stage left behind in the fifties. And this, from the fatalization of the correspondences between social, political and economic change, as "canonized" by spontaneism, to the essentially elitest permanence of vision in the articulation of the actors of a process of change.

There is, perhaps, no more urgent task today to demand from the constructions of political theory, than this search and research, which requires the keenest efforts of that intelligentsia, which has set itself up as the eminent actor of the great innovating thematics of mid-century.

But what are the obstacles that stand today in the way of its significant action towards the new constellation in which comprehension is manifest of the political problem of change and of the dimension assumed therein by its national actors ?

THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE DEVELOPED NATIONS :

THE DISPERSED TRIANGLE OF THE GOLDEN AGE

From the point of view of the rich nations, called upon, in one of the most stratified role-plays of the present day, to cooperate internationally in development, where in

THE INTELLIGENTSIAS WITH REGARD TO THE NEW
 CONSTELLATION OF THE PROCESS OF CHANGE :
 PROSPECTS OF THE UNDERDEVELOPED NATIONS

From the angle of the underdeveloped nations, the contradiction becomes more acute as the seizure of the systems of power by the technocrats tends to turn the "relaunching policy" into a process of remote control, in a mechanical application of rules of a given economic model chosen for alterations: the degree of ~~advanced~~^{strong} controls, on the one hand, in the political and social domain, led them to labor almost in a vacuum, within this dimension; to sensitize such problems, in the best hypothesis, only as the superaction of a diachrony, establishing vague, far-off targets for "redemocratization" or a recovery of the mechanisms "derailed" in the last decade.

Actually, this new protagonist of development suffers from an encystment, in his outlook on relaunching, that generally causes him to fall far short of his conditions of intervention in reality, and above all of the control mechanism that, empirically, came into his hands by suspension of the conventional rules of the game under the democratic regime. In this direction, and increasingly deprived of the dialectical stresses on which a social process must live if it is to be respected in its entirety by the dominating actors in its decision, he may lapse from the various functions of social reflection: attaining, for example, ingenuously, the ideology of "rationality".

THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE DEVELOPED NATIONS :
 THE IMPOSSIBLE DIALOGUE OF THE GOLDEN AGES

From the point of view of the rich nations, called upon, in one of the most stratified role-playings of the present time, to cooperate internationally in development, there is

no avoiding the contemplation of the various obstacles to that revitalization of roles, and to the full investiture of the creative functions of an intelligentsia able to carry forward the present polemic of the social change of the Third World.

On the one hand, the fact that the United States has assumed the hegemonic role in this repertory of conducts militates against the chance of it being reproblematised. There, the effect of an accumulation is experienced with the acceleration, in that country, of the integrating role of its cultural identity on the internal plane and at the same time, crushingly, in the international domain. Practically, the internal "contemporaneity" of that nation — reemerged from the seism of the thirties — is simultaneous to that of its call to world super-protegenism. It remains insistent on "no questioning" of the axiological premises on which its configuration as a political-social system is erected; its expansion is coupled internally to its "golden age". And not only is it necessary to allude to the inexistence of any concern as to the sociology of knowledge in relation to the university training of its elites: no problem is made of the latent axiology in its sociohistoric behavior, to the same extent that there is no dialogue on the "golden ages".

Seldom has the impermeability to a datum external to its circumstance been manifested so intensely as with regard to the American sociohistoric perspective of today: saturated with information, inexpugnable in the methodology of approach and concentration on the real in its image and semblance, or the storage of gadgets with which to demysticate the external fact, in a formal and exhaustive repertory. That is to say that it shows no break of hegemony in the perspective with which, even

cases and ruptures with conventional society and its standards: as a new link in the chain of contestation that, involved, respec-

when turning to what it defines as distinct and external to its context, it can only be considered as a reply and a retort to its categories and schemes of referring to reality.

Confined to this situation, the formally recognized and legitimate agents of that intelligentsia keep today to the circle of campuses and scholars. They can extend to satiety the multiple divisions and subdivisions of the provinces of knowledge without adding anything to the specific of problematics. That is, of the real historic and cultural questioning of its premises, or of the replacement, as a whole, of the problems of man and his destiny, implied by development.

INTELLIGENTSIA, ELITE AND ANTI-ELITE

One of the most recent phenomena, however, in the possible emergence of this function in the American sociocultural complex — without, for all that, querying entirely its configuration as a symptom of the innocence of the golden ages — is the dimension assumed by the functions of contestation in this frame of reference. And in it the appearance of an anti-elite. One of the most significant facts, in this context, is that, rich and authentic, the thematics of development has only been espoused and assumed by this new type of emergent actor. There is no concealing the dialectical importance of its appearance in the cast of protest thematics, with the sequence of critical references and rupture with conventional society and its standards: as a new link in the chain of contestation that involved, respec-

tively, the struggle for racial integration, in a first stage, and then the campaign against the war in Vietnam. It is in the course and saga of the endeavor of this "anti-elite" that is inscribed the first ^{wide} sensibilization of underdevelopment in the internal context of American society, and outside of that mediation of its own vision of the world, reified and distilled in the approach of the traditional scholar.

The words of some of the more radical leaders of Black Power reveal — as a natural and incoercible discovery — the necessary conjugation between the thematics of ^{anti} segregation, anti-militarism and underdevelopment as international mobilization for the struggle against poverty, and, hence, an obstacle to the essentially productive mobilization of the resources of affluence.

There is no reason for predicting its dissemination at this moment. And this, in the same proportion that — as Horowitz showed so clearly — the articulation of this cultural actor can flee, in the very heart of the West, from its elitist articulation: in the loose profile in which it appears sheltered in the pole of contestation, ideal conditions arise for it to be configurated as "problematic" and thus to enable it to be raised to the position of one of the effective components of open dialogue, in which the parties at issue are no mere emanations, or fetiches, or replicas, of the eminent actor. The road

to be taken by this anti-elite on the fringes that today are creative of the hegemonic society of the contemporary world is as yet uncertain. We do not know whether it will confine itself to the mere retortion of its inner ~~medium~~^{core}, to utopic imitations of the Great Society; whether it will forge ahead to effective contestation and, therein, by the qualitative change of the perspectives of historic-cultural structuration of the actors and conditions of protagonism of this sociopolitical universe. And, as a conclusion, I would come to an observation that hands over, practically, this meeting to the very strategy of the new articulations demanded by an international intelligentsia, concentrating on development and, hence, on the constellation of its reflex universe. At the moment, moreover, when indecision blurs the route to be followed by the "loss of innocence" of the American "golden age", the CSDI seems to be tending toward the performance of one of the eminent functions essential to the exercise of that creative role. This function is, on the fringes of the campus itself and the cultural "establishment", that of affording ideal conditions for the genuine polemic to be engaged: and, wheresoever they may come from, may we quicken thereby the forces of vivification of a culture.

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