FERTILITY CONTROL AND DEVELOPMENT PLANNING:
AN EXAMINATION OF SOME IMPLICIT ASSUMPTIONS

SIDNEY M. GREENFIELD

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN--MILWAUKEE

Let me begin by stating that I am not a demographer--neither by training nor inclination. In fact, I have no professional expertese in the field of population. The closest I have come to conducting research on population has been to study the family in Brazil and the West Indies. I am also not a specialist in planning and development. You may legitimately ask, therefore, why I have come to participate in this program. The answer is simple. As a social anthropologist working in parts of the world where development has become a major preoccupation of government, and where population control is being advocated as a necessary dimension of public policy directed towards development, I am confused as to the logic of the argument. It is not that I am opposed to fertility control as such. However, the argument that leads to the conclusion that population control programs should be implemented by governments in the name of the general welfare as part of planning and development and the improvement of the material well being of the members of society contains a series of assumptions about social organization that I find to be questionable. These assumptions, unfortunately, are never made explicit. Instead they are left unstated and tend to be treated by most planners, development workers and population experts as self-evident truths--or scientific laws. In line with Professor Stricken's distinction between science and engineering, I would maintain that the social engineers are arriving at conclusions that lead to policy based upon what in the ideal should be tested and verified scientific theories. In the fields of development and population, however, this is not the case. Instead of tested laws, social science has only hypotheses to offer. As I see it, however, a specific set of generalizations have been taken over and employed as implicit assumptions in formulating an argument for specific

programs and policies. As a social scientist, therefore, I wish to make explicit these assumptions and subject them to critical examination. In this way, I hope both to be able to reassess the place of fertility control as a possible public policy and open the door to discussion of alternative strategies of social planning and engineering that are now precluded because we hold a number of untested and questionable assumptions about the relationship between development and social organization as assumed truths.

I

The past three decades have been characterized by growing awareness and concern as to the numbers of people inhabiting the various nations and continents of the earth. Specialized disciplines have grown up and numerous programs have been established to combat the "population explosion"-- a once esoteric term that has come to be a familiar household expression. Today, when we speak of a population problem the consensus is that it is the quantity and not quality that is at issue. Demographers, sociologists, planners and politicians not only in Latin America but in Africa, Asia and other parts of the world speak about the"population problem" and now feel constrained to say and do something about it.

The term population problem implies the existence of too many people in a geographical area that cumulatively implies the existence of too many people on the earth. But what does it actually mean to speak of too many people for a given territory? On the one hand, we may be speaking of subjective definitions shared by the carriers of a given cultural tradition that says that more than so many people per square mile, or more than a specified number of houses, settlements, towns, or cities in a given area is too much. Such subjective definitions that say that a certain amount of open land, vacant areas, or some similar criteria must be maintained for the sake of beauty, or other aesthetic reasons are interesting, but certainly not sufficient to justify massive attempts to constrain and coerce the members of society so that

change their behaviors and beliefs so as to limit the number of offspring they produce.

The logic that generally leads to the conclusion that there are too many people is grounded in assumptions not related to the aesthetics quality of life. On the contrary, the argument relates directly to the material, and to the ability of society to provide food, clothing shelter and other basic goods and services for an increasing number of persons. The argument is strengthened when we realize that many nations of the world have devoted themselves in recent years to the task of increasing the volume of goods and services available for their citizens. Their leaders recognize that great inadequacies exist and they see their task--or have the task defined for them--as improving the low material level at which the masses of their people live. Policies are planned and implemented toward the end of eliminating the inadequacies and improving the material well-being of those who inhabit the national territory. Starting low in terms of volume of goods and services available for their citizens they must play catch up, so to speak. An increase in population above the figure at the time of planning spreads the effort out over a broader base and prevents the objectives of the policies from being realized. One way of viewing this is to say that there are too many people for the existing--and even increasing--volume of material goods and services. If population could be reduced, or at least prevented from increasing, the share of those left would be increased in proportion with the increase in total production until the desired goal is achieved.

The demographer's or planner's use of too many people--apopulation problem exists--generally refers to this situation. The number of people living in a national society is related to the volume of goods and services available, and some judgment of sufficiency is made which leads to conclusions about too many people and a population problem.

In the vernacular, we are speaking, for the most part, about

In the vernacular, we are speaking, for the most part, about underdeveloped, or developing nations like those in Latin America who are striving to improve the material level of living of their people. The primary means by which this upgrading is to be accomplished is generally agreed upon as being through the improvement of the technology employed in the national system of production. Those nations whose citizens enjoy high levels of material prosperity are taken as the goal, or model towards which the developing nations aspire. The productive system of these model nations is characterized by the use of machines and generally is referred to as industrial. Hence the goal of developing nations is industrialization by means of which they hope to increase the volume of goods and services produced, and consequently the material level of living of their citizens. Industrialization then is a general objective of nations that wish to increase their total productivity.

We are talking about the total amount of goods and services the productive sector of a national society is capable of creating and a population that is to share in the consumption of those commodities. Simplistically, we can say that if productivity increases and population remains constant, the hypothetical share of each individual decreases. Given the value of improving the material well-being of a national population, industrialization and development--which result in the production of more goods and services--may be viewed as positive factors in the attainment of the goal. Increase in the numbers who share in the total volume of production inhibits the general improvement and may be viewed as a negative factor. Hence, too many people and a population problem may be taken to exist whenever there is a desire to improve material standards of living by means of more efficient industrial technology and an increase in gross numbers that prevents the desired end of material improvement for the masses from being achieved. An obvious solution to the problem is to

prevent the population from increasing. This is the role of fertility, or population control programs. Given the decrease in mortality that has resulted from the diffusion of medical technology from the industrialized nations, the only way to reduce population growth is by reducing future births. It is toward this end that population programs are directed.

In grossly oversimplified form the above is the logic that leads to the conclusion that fertility control is necessary and is in the best interests of the masses in the developing and developed nations whether or not they, as individuals or groups, see it in that way. Population programs, directed at reducing fertility, can be implemented as public policy in the name of the general welfare and defended against criticism.

Our oversimplified presentation of the argument for fertility control highlights the fact that for most demographers, planners, politicians and others involved with population programs there are two primary variables to be analyzed: 1) productivity, as measured in volume of goods and services (Gross National Product or some similar measure); and 2) population, taken to be the numbers consuming the commodities produced. Whether or not more goods and services can be produced is viewed as a matter of improving technology. Since the most productive nations are the industrialized ones, the task of development is defined as obtaining the industrial-machine technology and training the population in its use. From there it is assumed that once the minor problems of adjustment are overcome--often with the aid of social scientists playing social engineer--gross productivity will increase. Population then represents the numbers who must share in the total produce. The simple division of national product (as measured in monetary terms with an assumed market for all commodities) by total population to obtain a per capita portion in currency terms, and the use of this in evaluating sufficiency, and the formulation of additional policy based upon judgments of insufficiency skips over a very significant variable that all too often is taken as given. We refer here to the institutionalized means of

distributing the goods and services created by the productive sector. The system of distribution is a variable intermediate between the productivity of the technology and the ability of the population to consume what is produced.

With respect to the goal of increasing the material well-being of a national population we have the three variables that economists generally talk about. The first is the system of production which includes the technology and the forms of social organization that relate man and tools in the production of goods and services. The second is they system of distribution which moves the goods and services produced to the numerous persons and groups that constitute the society. Here we are dealing with the way men in different societies organize themselves *vis a vis* the goods and services produced so that the commodities are moved from those who produce them to those who consume them. The final variable, consumption, is very much a function of the first two in that whether or not a population of any size obtains commodities to consume is as much the result of the organized system of distribution making them available as it is of the productive sector's ability to create them.

The social organization of production and distribution then, to say the least, are relevant for any discussion of development and population. We have seen, however, that institutionalized systems of distribution are scarcely, if ever, touched on in discussions relating population (consumption) to development (increased productivity). We would maintain that not only are they important, but, given the evidence accumulated in recent years supporting functionalist assumptions as to the interrelatedness of institutions, they are crucial for any analysis that is a result in meaningful policy with respect to increasing productivity (development), or controlling numbers--based upon the value of increasing the material level of living of a population.

The social organization of distribution as a variable in the production-consumption equation has been neglected in the literature and in discussions

of population and development. It is our belief that perhaps the primary reason for this is that certain assumptions are made by demographers, planners and development workers that enable them to take as given a specific system of distribution and, therefore, make discussion unnecessary.

We have already said that there is a growing world-wide consensus that governments have a responsibility for the quantity and quality of the material life of their citizens. Policies of governments, therefore, aim increasingly at enlarging both the total volume of goods and services produced as well as the per capita share of the citizenry. Volume of production is directly related to the technology employed. The obviously greater efficiency of industrial technology when compared with the forms traditionally employed by the occupants of most of the nations of the world has resulted in the conscious attempt of most nations to adopt industrial technology in place of what is presently employed by their citizens. Several problems must be faced in this process of industrial development. One is purely technological: to obtain the knowledge required to make the machines and other tools work--how they are mounted and installed? how they are operated and used? how they are serviced, cared for and maintained? A related problem is how men are to be organized and recruited in the use of the new technology. From our reading of the literature, little if any attention is devoted to these questions as compared with the volumes written on the strictly technological questions.

Directly related to the matter of implementing industrial technology in a developing nation is the matter of allocating resources to the various groups and persons in the society. This is the institutionalized system of distribution referred to above. For the most part, it is assumed that traditional forms of distribution, functionally interrelated with non-industrial modes of production, will not be adequate for an industrial technology and, therefore, must be replaced. Again, however, there is little attention devoted to alternative systems of distribution. As with the social organization of production, somehow

it appears to be assumed that there is a system that is there to be adopted. Governmental decisions and policy, therefore, tends to focus on the technological side of implementing industrialization with it almost implicitly assumed that there is a system of social organization of machine technology that almost will implement itself as a matter of necessity--sometimesphrased formally in the terminology of scientific law. Also placed on the level of "necessary consequence" of industrialization is a system of distribution that likewise is expected almost to appear whether or not is desired, objected to, studied, debated, or planned for. With respect to the subject of this conference, the discussion of governmental policy with respect to population control appears to contain the implicit assumption that there are systems of organizing production and distribution that will be implemented--we might almost say will implement themselves--to relate new productive technology to the number of consumers almost independent of human effort in support of or against them. It may be true that given the acceptance of these forms of organizing production and distribution implicit in the thinking of most planners and development workers, population control is a logical, positive and necessary step in attaining the desired state of society. However, it is our belief that once the unstated assumptions as to forms of organizing production and distribution are made explicit, and treated as variables, many alternatives are available to nations wishing to improve the material condition of their citizenry that do not necessarily lead to the conclusion that population control is a necessary requirement. This is not to say that population control is to be ruled out as a possible policy that may aid some developing nations in attaining their goals. Instead it is to say that the present argument for population control contained in the working papers for this conference is based upon the acceptance of what, in fact, are variables as givens. Accepting the need for population control based upon this argument precluded the examination of alternative forms of production and distribution that if found and implemented might make fertility control and the resources and energy expended on it at the present time either unnecessary, or

manner.

With respect to gross productivity and level of material living enjoyed by its people, the nations of the world have been divided into two broad categories; the rich and poor, or the developed and the developing (or underdeveloped). The rich nations are those that for a series of historical reasons have developed industrial technology and harnessed it in the production of goods and services. Though there are rich and poor individuals in all of these nations, the overall level of living in the rich nations vastly surpasses that found in the poor ones.

Though the rich and poor nations differ in terms of numerous aspects of their cultures and social organization, perhaps the most significant difference between the two groups is that the rich nations have all employed mechanized, industrial forms of production (their technology is industrial) whereas the poor nations, though they differ amongst themselves, have technologies that are not industrialized.

Industry and the machine are what set off the rich nations from the poor. This being the case, poor nations wishing to improve the material level of life of their people have sought to industrialize.

Industrialization refers to a distinctive technology, a set of artifacts and tools to be employed by man in the production of goods and services. However, to make machines produce, men must be recruited and organized in a manner that will result in high level output. What the range of possible organization is that is compatible with machine technology, we do not know. What the record indicates is that a relatively small number of societies who shared a common cultural-historical experience developed industrial productive systems.

Given the desire of developing nations to become industrialized, (and the converse desire of industrialized nations to expand their potential markets), a a mass diffusion of culture and social organization took place. Machine technology was adopted by poor nations, along with the forms of organizing and recruiting men in the use of the machines, and the institutionalized systems of distribution of

the products of the machines.

The new forms of production and distribution, for the most part, clashed with traditional forms and resulted in considerable social dislocation. Many governments have become concerned over the potentially disruptive impact of adopting the new forms of production and distribution. However, the long run advantages are believed to outweigh by far the short term difficulties--once the new technology is implemented.

The industrialized nations were few in number and did share, for the most part, a common historical experience. With the great desire for development in the post World War II period, the question was raised by social theorists: How can we account for the fact that a handful of societies spontaneously industrialized and developed, whereas all the others did not and hence remained poor? The quest for answers moved in the direction of isolating what have been referred to as the institutional preconditions of development. Attention came to focus on some aspect, or aspects of the institutional traditions of these genetically related societies. Thinking about the process of industrialization and development came to focus on certain specific institutions within the Western world.

When governments in the underdeveloped world began to plan for development, directed policy came to a considerable degree to replace the random process of diffusion that saw both industrial technology and the culture of the industrialized societies spread throughout the world. To plan for rapid development that could be implemented successfuly, answers were needed to questions about social process that social science had only recently begun to investigate.

The industrialized nations of the Western world were taken to be the model aspred to because of their technology and productive capacity by the developing nations. What was desired specifically was the level of material productivity and consumption enjoyed by these nations. Other aspects of their culture were, for the most part, looked upon neutrally, not necessarily desired, or in cases actually not wanted. The question was, how the developed state (which implied a high level of material productivity based primarily upon machine technology)

was to be attained.

The answers to the question why specific societies developed and not others tended to focus upon diverse aspects of the institutions of Western civilization--the cultural tradition shared by the developed nations. It appeared to many students that the best way to attain industrial technology was to accept also--and implement--the institutionalized behavior that appeared to be directly related and perhaps functionally intertwined with technology. Minimally this was the system of recruiting and organizing men in the use of the machines, and the systems of allocating the products of industry to the ultimate consumers. Arguing from functionalist assumptions, thinking in the field of development took on the distinct posture of unilineal evolution. In brief, it was maintained that the functional correlates of industry and machine technology were necessary prerequisites to the attainment of the developed, industrialized state. To industrialize and develop, therefore, nations who so chose had to accept "modern" or "industrial" institutions. The conclusion was that the fruits of industrial production could be obtained most efficiently--if not only--by adopting the institutionalized behaviors that had grown up with machine technology. A nation had to become "modern" in its institutions if it wanted to develop.

This might represent an overstatement of the argument; however, so much of the literature on modernization and development though rarely if ever stating directly, leads to the conclusion that if industrial forms of production are desired, a developing nation must minimally adopt and implement the forms of social organization that go with the use of machines in the developed countries, and the forms of distribution that also have been associated with it empirically. It is only by accepting this argument that the case for population control as a policy necessary for development can be made.

Now this is not the place to challenge the assumptions made by the vast majority of experts in the field of modernization and development. The best that we can do is make the point that from the perspective of science on this level of generalization, any position taken represents a hypothesis that is as yet un-

tested. As sound as it might appear to the intuitive sense of both the reader and the expert, it cannot be accepted at the present time as not subject to question.

The position presented, on yet another level of analysis, comes very close to being a form of unilineal evolution. For assorted reasons proponents argue that to (evolve to) the industrialized state all societies must adopt a single system of recruiting and organizing men in the use of technology, and one system of distributing goods and services. From an evolutionary perspective, an alternative hypothesis can be presented in line with the theory of multilineal evolution. We would propose that since social organization is a variable independent of technology, there may be more than one way to recruit and organize men in the use of tools, mechanical or other, that will result in the efficient production of goods and services. We also would suggest that more than one system of distribution can serve to allocate the commodities produced to the members of society.

If we think in terms of multilineal evolution and alternative institutional forms to go with machine technology, we can no longer accept any argument that takes the social organization of production and a system of distribution as given. From this perspective, development planning requires an examination of alternatives, some of which may be similar to, or derived from traditional forms. The discovery of alternative social arrangements, however, might lead us to think differently about population and the need for its control.

What we are trying to say is that there are too many questions that must be resolved before we can accept the naive argument that leads to the conclusion that programs of population control are necessary as part of a program of development. This is not to say that we would be opposed to making available to all people to employ as individuals when and as they choose in accord with their own beliefs and values the technology of contraception. It is to say that according to our judgment, government programs that will coerce citizens to behave in ways they might choose not to, based upon the arguments presented above, are not defensible at the present time. Furthermore, and perhaps the most pertinent criticism to

be made of fertility control programs, the acceptance of these programs as government policy for the reasons given leads scholars, researchers, planners, development workers, social engineers, concerned citizens and government officials away from experimenting with alternative forms of organizing society in the production and distribution of goods and services. The consequence is that creativity and innovation are directed away from these areas. The acceptance of the population program implies the acceptance of the assumptions that take the social organization of production and consumption as given. Experimentation in these areas, however, might result in changes that could improve the level of material well-being of a population more than the reduction of members might.

In brief, conclusions as to the public programs of population control can be justified only after the search for viable alternatives that might enhance existing productive capacity is concluded. Based upon the acceptance of a questionable set of assumptions the search has not even been begun. All the developing nations have as directives for guidance comes from the empirical experience of a handful of genetically related societies. Given their institutionalized forms of production and distribution, population must be controlled in the interest of general welfare. However, once these forms of organization are subject to modification, alternatives might make the drastic control of population no longer necessary

II

In the final section of the paper we propose to outline schematically, and in abstract terms, the social organizational dimension of the system of production and distribution that generally is assumed to be part and parcel of the process of industrializa ion. It should be obvious to the reader that the model upon which it is based is our own society. For the most part it is assumed that nations that aspire to a high level of material productivity similar to our own will adopt this organizational form.

To reverse the usual process, we shall take the technological dimension as given. Let us assume that our hypothetical developing society has obtained machinery and the technical information necessary for its construction, assemblage, use and maintenance. We have the technical capacity for everything from textile mills to hydroelectric plants to automobile factories. The question we wish to pose is: How are men to be recruited and organized in the operation of the machines?

The implicit assumptions that we have been referring to hold that the construction, use and maintenance of the machines will be organized according to the model of the complex organization, or firm. In sociological terms these represent distinctive social groups composed of specifiable and clearly ordered and interrelated social roles. The roles are referred to as occupational positions, or jobs, and each has associated with it a series of behavioral expectations that when performed in concert with others results in the operation of the machines and in the production of commodities. If persons are recruited and trained--either prior to their recruitment, or on the job--in the defined role behavior, and actually perform, goods and services are created in quantity.

The industrial organization, factory, or firm consists of a series of positions and roles of varying complexity and importance that, given a system of recruitment, brings groups of men together in the performance of previously defined, complementary activities that cumulatively result in the production of goods and services.

and services.

The next question to be asked is: How are men to be recruited to occupy the positions and perform the roles? According to the implicit model, monetary rewards are to be offered as motivation. It is further assumed that price making markets exist--or will be established--and all goods and services pass through and can be obtained in the market. The monetary units in which price in the market is expressed is assumed to be used by the firms as the motivation for individuals to seek job positions, thereby joining a firm. Since it is assumed also that the members of the society want the commodities available in the market and have no other way to obtain them, it is further assumed that they will do what has to be done to obtain the money necessary for their purchase. If the only way money is to be obtained is as payment for occupying a job position--in a productive organization--it is further assumed that all men will strive to obtain jobs, creating a competition for occupational positions that in turn are competing for able and qualified persons.

The efficient operation of the technology for the production of consumable commodities requires the performance of all of the roles created in the numerous operationally independent firms. Given the assumed competition for jobs, differential rewards, or varying salaries can be offered to the aspirants to the numerous occupational positions. Greater performance skills can then be demanded of persons seeking some of the positions--those offering the highest rewards--thereby intensifying the competition and further motivating aspirants to higher rewards to acquire skills through specialized training.

In the ideal, persons will be recruited to occupy all of the positions, and they can be expected to perform the necessary behaviors or else be replaced by others who will do what is called for. In sum, the factories and firms will operate with efficiency and produce the commodities they have been established to create.

The products of each of the firms then will be placed on the market to

be sold at a price determined by the competition amongst buyers for the range of alternative commodities available. From the sale of their product, each firm will earn the money to pay its employees--the rewards they seek in the competition for jobs and in the performance of the activity called work--and return a portion as profit to the occupants of the positions whose role is to provide the capital necessary to create and mobilize the firm.

In the normal course of events it is assumed that a large number of firms will be created thereby producing a quantity of diverse goods and services and in the process creating a large assortment of occupational positions. Persons will be recruited for these positions and their salaries and wages will provide them with the money to purchase the diverse commodities that have been made available on the market.

In the abstract, all of the positions created in the occupational sector can be scaled according to the amount of monetary rewards offered to attract role incumbents. The result would be the skeleton of a system of social stratification.

So much for the assumed system of recruiting and organizing men in the use of industrial technology. Now let us turn to the social organization assumed for the distribution of the increased volume of commoditiesproduce and placed on the market.

When we spoke about recruiting persons for occupational positions by offering monetary rewards as motivations, we assumed that in some unspecified way the members of the society were organized for the performance of other activities necessary for group survival. Implicitly we assumed that they were to be recruited for the occupational positions out of whatever groups they were in, independent of their position and degree of involvement. They were expected to compete equally, that is, independent of their position in other organized groupings, when

entering the market place for jobs.

Just what other groups exist in society is an empirical matter. In the implicit assumptions of most students of development and/or population, however, society (often spelled with a capital S) is organized in nuclear families--a group consisting of an adult male and an adult female, related through a combination of legal, religious and social ties called marriage, and their offspring. It is further assumed that within this nuclear family unit, which is also assumed to function as the domestic group, or household, there is a division of labor between the adult male and the adult female whereby the male is responsible for providing material goods and services for the group. It is still further assumed that prestige accrues to males who are able to provide their nuclear family with large amounts of goods and services, with evaluative judgments being made by peers and associates based upon comparison of the ability to provide of all adult males in the community. The combined desire to attain prestige and esteem from others, and the delegation of responsibility in the division of labor is assumed to motivate adult males to enter the occupational sphere and aspire to positions that pay monetary rewards sufficient to purchase more and more goods and services.

In the division of labor within the nuclear family it is assumed that the adult male member will hold an occupational position. For his role performance--work--he will earn income which earmarked for use in the market to acquire the goods and services to be consumed by the members of his nuclear family. In the assumed division of labor the adult female--occupant of the position wife-mother--is expected to take the earnings of her mate and go into the market to purchase judiciously and wisely commodities to be consumed by the entire group. Less some amount for savings, if possible, amount and variety of goods and services that she can purchase becomes the visable sign of just how successful her mate has been in his occupational pursuits since it is the volume of commodities purchased for consuption that actually serves as the basis for judging the comparative prestige of adult males.

Children in this system function only as consumers since positions in the productive sphere are restricted to adult males, and to a growing degree of adult females.

With respect to the production and distribution of goods and services, the system works best when the society actually is ordered in nuclear families, and all adult males have been socialized in a set of beliefs and values that motivate them to seek their fulfillment in occupational attainment. Another systemic requirement is that there be created enough occupational positions to provide income at a minimum level for all heads of nuclear household units.

Implicit in these arrangements are attitudes about children, and implications as to potential maximums of persons in the system. Children, as we have seen, are defined as consumers. Loveable though they may be, from the perspective of the nuclear family material welfare, they represent a constant drain on resources that becomes exaggerated with maturity as expensive specialized training--i.e., college, graduate school, etc.--becomes requisite for competition within the job market. Since each nuclear family is expected to provide for and educate its own,children are a costly burden who make no material contribution to either the general welfare or the immediate material well-being of their nuclear family. As nuclear groups strive to acquire more and more of the goods and services being produced--assuming that they are starting from low levels of consumption--large numbers of children represent a handicap that frustrates the effort to "get ahead." Controlling and limiting family size makes sense within this structural context.

With the entire society ordered in nuclear family households, a balance is required between the number of jobs available in the occupational sector and the number of adult male heads of nuclear groups whose dependents can obtain material commodities only if they are employed and earning income. If there are fewer jobs than family heads, those without jobs do not have access to any material goods and services no matter how much is produced within the society. They and their families must go without completely until either jobs are created--for which they are qualified--or other arrangements are made.

From the perspective of the system, increase in population means that in the next generation the absolute number of nuclear families will increase, and, therefore, the number of jobs necessary to make the distribution system work must be increased. A long as more jobs can be created, the system can accomodate more people. When for any number of reasons it becomes difficult to create large numbers of jobs, the prospect of additional people poses a threat to the institutional arrangements. This is not to say that goods and services cannot necessarily be produced in sufficient quantities to provide more than adequately for the increased population. Rather it is to say that the institutionalized arrangements for distributing produce cannot accomodate them.

We have already said that our abstract model is derived from our own society. The united states of America is perhaps the greatest producer of goods and services the world has ever known. It is commonly acknowledged that we have the technical capacity at present to provide more than adequately for atleast two to three times our present population. In spite of this we are concerned over the population explosion. More significantly, with our present population we have a sizeable minority who are unable to obtain even minimum material standards. The reason is that there are not enough jobs for them. For a combination of reasons the number of jobs, and the amount of labor required to operate our machines in the production of our high level of material commodities is being reduced. Forecasts indicate that more goods and servides will be produced in the future along with a decrease in the number of jobs. The combination of increasing population, which means more nuclear families and the need for more jobs, and prospects of fewer jobs represents a potential crisis of which social thinkers are very much aware. One part solution to this problem is to control numbers and keep the population, to as great a degree as possible,in line with the job creating potential of the economy.

The massage of those advocating population control as public policy both rings true and is worth listening to in this socioeconomic context. But this conference is on Latin America. For the planners, development workers and popu-

lation experts who automatically assume that the institutionalized arrangements for the production and distribution of goods and services developed in our society will (or must) be those adopted by developing nations, the argument about population can be extended from our own society to Latin America. Then it follows that population control, especially when the birth rate is much higher than our own, is necessary as a policy to reduce the severity of the problem later on.

However, the question this paper was written to raise is: Why must we assume that the institutionalized arrangements for the organization and recruitment of persons in the use of industrial technology, and the social organization of distribution to be implemented in developing nations be those of contemporary Western world? Why must we implicitly assume and expect Latin Americans seeking to improve their own material well-being to accept and adopt a set of social arrangements that are no longer adequated to the needs of the societies that created them. We may hold to these arrangements for other than rational reasons; but why should others developing their own future destinies be stuck with them? Most of the nations of Latin America are not organized in nuclear families. Perhaps their extended family traditions might serve as a basis for alternative distribution arrangements. Also, some of their traditional aesthetic values might be just what is needed to give meaning to a new set of arrangements that will make something other than work and occupational success the basis of self-esteem and personal dignity.

What I am saying is that the apparently obvious argument for population control as public policy in conjunction with development implicitly assumes institutional arrangements that are no longer viable in the societies where they were invented. If the assumed arrangements upon which the argument rests is questionable, however, so might be the policies derived from the argument. If the present is a period of reworking outdated institutions for most of nations of Latin America, why must the social scientists and social engineers

offering to help be so limited in what they have to offer? Why can't we employ our energies to be truly imaginative and creative? Why must we find ourselves in the position of repeatedly offering as solutions to others the part answers that really can't work for us?

By way of conclusion I might add that the only place an argument similar to the one presented in this paper is generally offered is in the Marxist literature. There the intent is to criticize one system--ours--to have it replaced by their own alternative. Personally, I find their institutionalized arrangements about as unattractive for Latin America as our own. My questioning of our arrangements is not to be construed as a plug for theirs. Instead, I am saying that the reorganization of Latin American societies in the process of increasing their productive ability calls for imagination, creativity and daring that is not to be constrained by implicit assumptions based upon models that are no longer adequately to their own needs. The acceptance of population control programs based upon implicit assumptions as to what those societies must be like prematurely closes the door precisely where it must be opened. With all due respect to my committed colleagues, I suggest that prior to--or perhaps along with--the massive social change necessary for population programs to work, resources, energy and creativity be directed towards designing new and hopefully better ways of organizing men in the production and distribution of material goods and services.